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SCEPTICISM and DEPRAVITY By THE WAGES OF THEISM: SCEPTICISM AND DEPRAVITY by Matthew Morgan Harrop Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Philosophy Acadia University April, 2010 © Copyright by Matthew Morgan Harrop, 2010 This thesis by Matthew Morgan Harrop is accepted in its present form by the Department of Philosophy as satisfying the thesis requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours Approved by the Thesis Supervisor __________________________ ___________________ Dr. Stephen Maitzen Date Approved by the Head of the Department __________________________ ___________________ Dr. Paul Abela Date Approved by the Honours Committee __________________________ ___________________ Dr. Matthew Durant Date ii I, Matthew Morgan Harrop, grant permission to the University Librarian at Acadia University to reproduce, loan or distribute copies of my thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats on a non-profit basis. I however, retain the copyright in my thesis. ___________________________________ Signature of Author ___________________________________ Date iii Acknowledgements My supervisor, Dr. Stephen Maitzen, has been a tremendous help throughout the entire thesis writing process. He has improved my work by asking me stimulating questions, providing me with helpful information, and giving me immensely valuable suggestions. He stuck with me the whole time, pushing me whenever I needed motivation and giving me a break whenever I needed time. But Dr. Maitzen has been so much more than a dedicated supervisor, academic advisor, and professor. He has been my friend and mentor since my first week on campus. I am truly grateful for the fact that he has helped me improve not only my thesis, but also my intellect and character. During the latter stages of the writing process, Dr. Ian Wilks has been invaluable. His insightful comments and extremely close proofreading have been greatly beneficial— they‘ve helped me to improve the clarity of my arguments and eliminate many unsightly typographical errors. I couldn‘t have asked for a more astute and careful second reader. In general, the quality of my thesis was dramatically improved by the influence that all of the wonderful philosophy professors at Acadia University have had on my academic career. Dr. Paul Abela, Dr. Marc Ramsay, and Dr. Anna Wilks—and, of course, Dr. Ian Wilks and Dr. Stephen Maitzen—have pushed me to strive ever-harder to reach goals that didn‘t exist for me before I arrived in Wolfville. Their knowledge, personalities, and passion for teaching provided the impetus for many of the ideas that I‘ve tried to synthesize in my thesis. Additionally, their commitment to living the examined life has regularly provided me with inspiration. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their ever-present support and love. They have given me everything I have ever truly needed. iv Contents Acknowledgements iv Abstract vi Introduction 1 Chapter One: Heaven, Killing, and Troubles for Ordinary Morality 7 I. Introduction 7 II. Killing According to Ordinary Morality 8 III. Accounts of the Wrongness of Killing 12 IV. Objections and Replies 19 V. Conclusion 27 Chapter Two: From Theism to Psychological Egoism and the Impossibility of Altruism 29 I. Introduction 29 II. Psychological Egoism 30 III. Constraints on Psychological Egoism 31 IV. Eschatological Moral Compensation‘s Implications for Theism 32 V. Heaven and Infinity 37 VI. Conclusion 40 Chapter Three: Theism, Libertarianism, and Another Conflict with Ordinary Morality 42 I. Introduction 42 II. Theism and Free Will 43 III. Theism and Soft Determinism 44 IV. Theism and Libertarianism 48 V. Divine Timelessness: A Possible Solution 50 VI. Another Conflict between Theism and Ordinary Morality 54 VII. Conclusion 56 Chapter Four: From Contextualism and Theism to Scepticism 57 I. Introduction 57 II. The Sceptical Possibility of a Deceptive God 58 III. Divine Deception and Epistemic Contexts 63 IV. Non-Theists‘ Immunity to this Sceptical Threat 65 V. Avoiding Semantic Descent 67 VI. Conclusion 68 Conclusion 70 Bibliography 75 v Abstract Historically, philosophers and theologians have argued for what remains a popular position—the view that atheism threatens morality and even knowledge. Contrary to historical custom and popular sentiment, I argue that morality and knowledge are actually threatened by theism. Throughout my thesis, I use ―theism‖ to refer to the proposition that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God exists. Theists believe in the existence of God, while also commonly believing in the existence of heaven and the notion that we will ultimately be rewarded or punished depending on how laudable or blameworthy our earthly deeds are. I arrive at my conclusion—that theism threatens morality and knowledge—via four distinct, but related, arguments. My first argument attempts to show that theism‘s explanation of the wrongness of killing heaven- bound victims clashes with our ordinary moral intuitions. My second argument tries to force theists to admit that their beliefs imply either the impossibility of altruism and laudable self-sacrifice or the dissolution of our ordinary conception of morality. My third argument is based on the premise that theism implies the existence of libertarian free will. It concludes that theism once again comes into conflict with our ordinary moral practice and commitments. My fourth argument moves from morality to epistemology by arguing that, given the popular theory of epistemic contextualism, theists cannot accurately claim knowledge of the external-world for themselves or others. By combining these four arguments, I hope to repel both historical and popular criticism of atheists by showing that theists, not atheists, ought to bear the burden of explaining unacceptable moral and epistemological consequences. vi Introduction For thousands of years—from the birth of Judaism to the present day—classical monotheism has offered itself as a foundation for many valuable aspects of the human condition, including morality and knowledge. Presently and historically, theists popularly, and sometimes philosophically, invoke God as the only possible foundation for objective morality.1 Additionally, some of the giants of Enlightenment philosophy argue that acknowledging God‘s existence is necessary in order to avoid universal scepticism. I intend to dispute both of these positions. In contrast to these popular and philosophical views, I‘ll argue that monotheism (or, as I prefer, just ―theism‖) is, in fact, the enemy of morality and knowledge because of its implications for our moral commitments and practice and because it flirts dangerously with scepticism. As such, my project concludes that the ―wages of theism‖ (with apologies to St. Paul) are depravity and scepticism.2 Atheists, people who disbelieve in classical monotheism‘s God, face frequent attacks on their character from theists.3 In contemporary times, atheists are frequently viewed suspiciously due to the popular assumption among theists that atheism implies moral nihilism. In fact, atheists are the most distrusted minority group in the United States of America, according to survey results published in the American Sociological Review. When asked to explain this distrust, most respondents opined that only believers 1 By ―objective morality,‖ I‘m referring to moral standards that hold regardless of anyone‘s say-so. 2 Compare Romans 6:23a (KJV): ―For the wages of sin is death...‖. 3 It should be noted that, given my definition of ―theism‖—i.e., as classical monotheism—polytheists, animists, and others who hold similar beliefs are, strictly speaking, atheists (or at least non-theists): they deny the existence of monotheism‘s perfect God. 1 in God are morally trustworthy, implying that atheism is anathema to morality.4 Other, more philosophically sophisticated theists also accuse atheism of being unable to support objective morality. They target atheism by arguing that, while evolution can explain our actions, it cannot conclusively demonstrate that our actions are objectively moral or immoral. One of these sophisticated theists, William Lane Craig, concludes that if there is no God, then any basis for regarding the herd morality evolved by Homo sapiens as objectively true seems to have been removed. Some action— say, rape—may not be biologically or socially advantageous and so in the course of human evolution has become taboo; but on the atheistic view there‘s nothing really wrong about raping someone.5 In expressing his view, Craig affirms the popularly held belief that atheism is unable to underwrite the existence of objective morality, despite the fact that evolution and other naturalistic worldviews are able to explain our tendency to believe in objective morality. Indeed, the sentiment that theism is necessary to uphold objective morality, which remains strong today, has been expressed throughout the centuries. John Locke, one of the previously mentioned giants of the Enlightenment, professes: 4 Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and Douglas Hartmann. ―Atheists as ‗Other‘: Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society,‖ American Sociological Review 71 (2006): 212. 5 William Lane Craig, ―The Kurtz/Craig Debate: Is Goodness without God Good Enough?,‖ in Is Goodness without God Good Enough?: A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics, edited by Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 32. 2 [T]hose are not at all to be tolerated
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