DOCSLIB.ORG

Constructing Takfir: from `Abdullah `Azzam to Djamel Zitouni

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Constructing Takfir: from `Abdullah `Azzam to Djamel Zitouni JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 Constructing Takfir: accept takfir as necessary and the broader he eschewed a radical interpretation he is able to construct his definition of of Islam and jihad.11 While in the From `Abdullah `Azzam takfir. training camps of Afghanistan, `Azzam to Djamel Zitouni interacted with jihadist leaders from Dr. `Abdullah `Azzam around the globe as he continued By Shane Drennan `Abdullah `Azzam is considered to be espousing his messages of defense and the godfather of the Afghan jihad. His resistance. It was in this context that he on april 2, 2008, jihadist websites posted writings calling for the unification of produced his two most famous works an “open interview” with Dr. Ayman the umma through defensive jihad, and on jihad: Defence of Muslim Lands and Join the al-Zawahiri wherein the al-Qa`ida his Maktab al-Khidmat (Services Bureau), Caravan. leader fielded a number of often hostile created the organizational archetype for questions. The first, and arguably the the current manifestation of the global Definition of Takfir most important, concerned al-Qa`ida’s Salafi-jihad and al-Qa`ida specifically. `Azzam did not excommunicate invocation of takfir (excommunicating or Although `Azzam’s Salafi-jihadi ideology Muslims. For him, defending Muslim declaring a Muslim an apostate, which was considered radical by most lands from invasion by kuffar (infidels is punishable by death): academics, his eschatological grounding or nonbelievers) and uniting the umma made him relatively moderate compared was paramount, and takfir only served Excuse me, Mr. Zawahiri, but to many of the jihadists4 who answered to create fitna (division). His opinion of who is it who is killing with his invitation to Afghanistan,5 especially takfiri jihadists suggests that a deficiency Your Excellency’s blessing the regarding takfir. in formal training in Shari`a may innocents in Baghdad, Morocco result in expansive violence through and Algeria? Do you consider the Religious Training incorrect or incomplete understandings killing of women and children to `Azzam enveloped himself in Islam and of Islam: “They, because of their lack of be Jihad?...Why have you—to this Shari`a throughout his entire life. Even knowledge, are simply youth with much day—not carried out any strike as a child he was considered “serious” zeal, and the hearts of these youth were in Israel? Or is it easier to kill and “pious.”6 His higher education made to follow their desires.”12 `Azzam’s Muslims in the markets?1 focus was Shari`a, earning a bachelor’s7 Islamic training even trumped political and a master’s degree8 in Shari`a pressures of infighting among the This article explores the correlation from Shari`a College at Damascus mujahidin in Afghanistan,13 essentially between religious training and the University, and a Ph.D. in fiqh (Islamic deriving an order of combat precedence construction of the definition of takfir jurisprudence) from the renowned al- from the scriptures placing jihad for leaders of Salafi-jihadi movements.2 Azhar University in Cairo.9 His level against occupiers over reforming those This is established using four cases of of scholarly authority is rare among led astray from Islam.14 contemporary Salafi-jihadi leaders: Salafi-jihadis, especially those directly `Abdullah `Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, engaged in physical warfare.10 Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi and Djamel Ayman al-Zawahiri, commonly referred Zitouni. For each case, the individual’s `Azzam continued to self-reinforce to as al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, level and type of religious training his radical Salafist views as a lecturer. is one of the most influential leaders and his most recent definition of takfir He taught at the University of Jordan of the current Salafi-jihadi movement. are outlined and analyzed.3 Overall, in Amman and lectured at Abdul Aziz He has issued numerous communiqués the evidence suggests that the less University in Saudi Arabia where concerning every front of the global religiosity a jihadist leader has gained Salafi-jihad and has campaigned to unify via formal training, personal piety, 4 See, for example, `Abdullah `Azzam, Fi Dhilal Surat Salafi-jihadi movements worldwide 15 and/or the duration of his adherence to at-Tawbah (place, publisher and date unknown). Also see under the banner of al-Qa`ida. Salafist Islam, the more likely he is to Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (London: Penguin Recently, al-Zawahiri’s authority has Books, 2006), p. 130. come under attack for al-Qa`ida’s 1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Open Meeting with Shaykh 5 For further commentary on how misunderstandings Ayman al-Zawahiri,” al-Sahab, April 2, 2008. of Islam lead to extremist views, see Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 2 This article does not analyze the practical application Islamic Awakening: Between Rejection and Extremism 11 Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc. (New York: Free Press, of takfir by these individuals or their lieutenants. In prac- (Washington, D.C.: The International Institute of Islamic 2001), p. 50, p. 55. tice, takfir often varies from the definition created by the Thought, 1991). 12 `Azzam, Fi Dhilal Surat at-Tawbah. leader of an organization. 6 `Abdullah `Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands (place, 13 Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 131-137. 3 The most recent definition was chosen because such publisher and date unknown). 14 See `Azzam’s response to the question “Do we fight concepts are epistemologically constructed, resulting 7 Andrew McGregor, “Jihad and the Rifle Alone: ‘Abdul- alongside Muslims that are below acceptable levels of Is- in definitional variations throughout one’s lifetime. For lah ‘Azzam and the Islamist Revolution,” Journal of Con- lamic education?” in `Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands. example, Kant discusses the construction of concepts flict Studies 23:2 (2003): pp. 92-113. 15 For example, in 2004 al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership through experience and the reconstruction of those con- 8 `Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands. was successful in incorporating the part of the militant cepts once they are applied outside of the previous limits 9 McGregor, “Jihad and the Rifle Alone: ‘Abdullah ‘Az- Saudi Salafist movement and al-Zarqawi’s Jama`at al- of experience. For a full explanation of the construction zam and the Islamist Revolution,” pp. 92-113. Tawhid wal-Jihad under the al-Qa`ida name. Recently, of language and definitions, see Jerome Bruner, Acts of 10 While a number of Salafist scholars with credentials the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, similar to `Azzam advocate jihad, none have physically has also changed their name in a formal allegiance to al- 1990). taken up arms themselves. Qa`ida. JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 expansive invocation of takfir.16 fiqh through personal studies, although Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi his neo-scripturalist hermeneutic Although Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi was Religious Training approach has likely been prejudiced by killed by U.S. forces in 2006, he remains Having no collegiate level religious his combat surroundings. one of the most popular jihadist figures training, al-Zawahiri’s understanding in contemporary history. During his few of Islam is derived mostly from the Definition of Takfir years in Iraq, he amassed a force capable religiosity of his upbringing (much of Al-Zawahiri embraces takfir, but of controlling cities,27 engineered a which was self-induced) and the ideas maintains a relatively selective definition sectarian clash that threatened a full- propagated within Islamist and jihadist of it. He views the governments ruling scale civil war28 and waged murder and organizations in which he has been over Muslim lands to be illegitimate and intimidation campaigns that continue involved. Al-Zawahiri was raised in apostate, to include civilian government today. He is hated by most Iraqis and is a strict Muslim family in Egypt where employees, security forces22 and any celebrated as a hero by much of the Salafi- he attended all of the daily prayers persons collaborating or engaging with jihadi community.29 Yet, for his fame, al- at the local mosque. His adolescence those entities.23 This is likely derived Zarqawi had one of the most latitudinal was devoted to Islamic self-studies, from his personal historical hatred and controversial definitions of takfir. especially concerning fiqh and Qur’anic for and experiences with the Egyptian interpretation.17 Throughout his regime rather than an objective Religious Training education, he was not openly involved analysis of the situation through the For the first 21 years of his life, al-Zarqawi in Islamist organizations; however, al- guidelines of fiqh. He also declared that was nearly antithetical to his later Zawahiri confessed to being a founder an organization, Islamist or not, which jihadist self. Raised in the anti-Amman and active member of a militant Islamist participates in the political process is milieu of Zarqa,30 he was described as a cell with a violent takfiri bent as a teen18 a transgressor,24 again derived from tattooed delinquent who drank heavily, and maintained a covert affiliation with personal differences with the Muslim experimented with drugs and was similar groups thereafter. Brotherhood rather than an educated involved in criminal activity. Al- hermeneutic ruling. Al-Zawahiri Zarqawi had no religious training until Several Islamists and jihadists informed accepts a great deal of collateral damage he was 22 when he was ordered to a al-Zawahiri’s interpretation of Islam in the form of “innocents,”
Load more

Recommended publications
  • In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as CHILD POLICY a public service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION Jump down to document ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and PUBLIC SAFETY effective solutions that address the challenges facing SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY the public and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Learn more about the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. in their own words Voices of Jihad compilation and commentary David Aaron Approved for public release; distribution unlimited C O R P O R A T I O N This book results from the RAND Corporation's continuing program of self-initiated research.
    [Show full text]
  • Violent Jihad in the Netherlands
    Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat 2 Contents Foreword 5 Introduction 7 The murder of Theo van Gogh: consequences and effects 7 General trends in the development of jihadism 9 Framework of terms and definitions 10 1 From exogenous threat to home-grown terrorism 13 1.1 What is a jihadist network? 13 1.2 Historical development of network formation 15 1.2.1 The traditional phase: migration of jihadists 15 1.2.2 The proliferation phase: recruitment 16 1.2.3 The ‘home-grown’ phase: radicalisation and jihadisation 17 1.3 Three types of jihadist networks 17 2 Decentralisation and local implantation of international jihad19 2.1Al-Qaeda: from ‘network of gynetworks’ 19 to trademark and ideolo 2.2 Ideology of global violent jihad 21 2.3 Decentralisation of international jihad 22 2.4 Local implantation of international jihad 26 3 Radicalisation and the emergence of local networks 29 3.1Radicalisation, recruitment and jihadisation 29 3.2 The religious context of radicalisation 30 3.3 The socio-political context of radicalisation 33 3.4 The cultural and socio-psychological context of radicalisation 35 3.5 Emergence of local autonomous cells and networks 37 3.6 Backgrounds and functioning of local autonomous networks 38 3.7 The significance of the Hofstad network 39 4 Virtualisation of jihad 43 4.1The Internet as a propulsion of the jihad movement 43 4.2 Al-Qaeda as a virtual database (top-down) 44 4.3 The virtual umma (grass
    [Show full text]
  • Should We Be Scared of All Salafists in Europe? a Dutch Case Study by Ineke Roex
    PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 3 Should we be Scared of all Salafists in Europe? A Dutch Case Study by Ineke Roex Abstract European governments consider the Salafi movement to be primarily a security threat. Yet developments in the Dutch Salafi movement reveal that quietist and political Salafists distance themselves from coercion and violence in the European context and also respect democratic authority. The movement manifests itself in very different ways worldwide. A more nuanced and contextual approach is necessary in order to assess and interpret potential threats. The peaceful branch of the movement should be understood as orthodox in nature, with the accompanying social and societal problems, but not by definition as a threat to the democratic rule of law. Keywords: Salafism, The Netherlands, Jihadism Introduction The Salafi movement is an orthodox Sunni Islamic movement. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it has been rooting itself in Europe since the 1980s, due to the arrival of Islamic activists from the Middle East [1]. In the past decade, the movement has gained notoriety for acts of violence that are attributable to jihadist Salafism, a violent offshoot of the movement. Filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered in the Netherlands in 2004, and there were bombings in London (2005) and Madrid (2007) by Islamists. More recently, in 2012 and 2013, jihadists operating as individuals or in groups have carried out acts of violence in Belgium, France and England [2]. As a result, the Salafi movement as a whole is viewed as a security threat [3]. In this article, it will be shown that important sections of the Salafi movement distance themselves from violent extremism.
    [Show full text]
  • I Am a Salafi : a Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis
    The Hashemite Kingdom Jordan The Deposit Number at The National Library (2014/5/2464) 251.541 Mohammad Abu Rumman I Am A Salafi A Study of The Actual And Imagined Identities of Salafis / by Mohammad Abu Rumman Amman:Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014 Deposit No.:2014/5/2464 Descriptors://Islamic Groups//Islamic Movement Published in 2014 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Not for sale © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung or the editor. Translation: Dr. Hassan Barari Editing: Amy Henderson Cover: YADONIA Group Printing: Economic Printing Press ISBN: 978-9957-484-41-5 2nd Edition 2017 2 I AM A SALAFI A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis by Mohammad Abu Rumman 3 4 Dedication To my parents Hoping that this modest endeavor will be a reward for your efforts and dedication 5 Table of Contents DEDICATION ........................................................................................................ 5 FOREWORD .......................................................................................................... 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Trends in Southeast Asia
    ISSN 0219-3213 2016 no. 9 Trends in Southeast Asia THE EXTENSIVE SALAFIZATION OF MALAYSIAN ISLAM AHMAD FAUZI ABDUL HAMID TRS9/16s ISBN 978-981-4762-51-9 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg 9 789814 762519 Trends in Southeast Asia 16-1461 01 Trends_2016-09.indd 1 29/6/16 4:52 PM The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) was established in 1968. It is an autonomous regional research centre for scholars and specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute’s research is structured under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) and Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and through country- based programmes. It also houses the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), Singapore’s APEC Study Centre, as well as the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre (NSC) and its Archaeology Unit. 16-1461 01 Trends_2016-09.indd 2 29/6/16 4:52 PM 2016 no. 9 Trends in Southeast Asia THE EXTENSIVE SALAFIZATION OF MALAYSIAN ISLAM AHMAD FAUZI ABDUL HAMID 16-1461 01 Trends_2016-09.indd 3 29/6/16 4:52 PM Published by: ISEAS Publishing 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore 119614 [email protected] http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg © 2016 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission. The author is wholly responsible for the views expressed in this book which do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • Takfiris in Tehran: the Sectarian Face of Iranian Counterterrorism by Mehdi Khalaji
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2637 Takfiris in Tehran: The Sectarian Face of Iranian Counterterrorism by Mehdi Khalaji Jun 24, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mehdi Khalaji Mehdi Khalaji, a Qom-trained Shiite theologian, is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis While the severity of the Sunni extremist threat inside Iran is debatable, the regime's recent operations against suspected terrorists highlight its pattern of exploiting sectarian sentiment to bolster its regional adventurism. n June 14, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence launched a series of operations leading to the arrest of ten O "Wahhabi takfiri terrorists" in Tehran and three other provinces. Following the initial announcement of the crackdown on June 19, Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi provided further details about the captured suspects two days later. According to him, "their plan was to attack several crowded spots using remote bombs and car bombs"; they had prepared a list of fifty targets in all. Agents also reportedly seized about one kilogram of explosive material and used "sophisticated measures" to prevent the delivery of two tons more to "terrorists." Video clips claiming to show the sting have been posted to the website of Fars News , a media outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The actual scope and severity of this threat remain uncertain for now, but the rhetoric surrounding the regime's response holds clear domestic implications. In addition to treating terrorist infiltration as a political football in recent years, various officials have been using loaded words like "takfir" to rally the public behind Tehran's sectarian regional agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • Do Islamists Have an Intellectual Deficit?
    Rethinking Political Islam: Ovamir Anjum RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM SERIES April 2016 Do Islamists have an intellectual deficit? Ovamir Anjum, Imam Khattab Endowed Chair of Islamic Studies, University of Toledo Editor's Note: As part of Brookings's Rethinking Political Islam project, we’ve asked a select group of outside scholars to react and respond to the overall project, in order to draw attention to potential blind spots, trends of note, and more. Although my primary area of research has been premodern Islamic tradition, my interest in “political Islam” in general and in reformists in particular goes back farther than that, and has been the subject of my more recent thinking. When interviewing the leadership of the Egyptian “revolution”—as it was then being called—during the summer of 2011 in Tahrir Square, I developed a suspicion that has since developed into something stronger, though not quite a coherent thesis just yet. It is that the reformists—by which I mean “moderate Islamists” who are, almost by definition, committed to working within the modern nation-state system—have been devoid of a well-grounded vision of Islamic politics, by which I mean a vision backed by a densely elaborated discursive tradition.1 Notwithstanding the debate concerning the extent to which social movements’ success depends on a coherent ideology (as opposed to just effective framing), a debate whose adjudication is beyond my scope here, I note that in the context of fierce competition from the militant, quietist and pro-establishment Islamic groups, it appears that this deficiency is taxing Islamists’ ability to deliver the goods they promise and prevent radicalization.2 1 By discursive depth, I simply mean that a set of ideas is widely and deeply explored in such a way that the implications of and tensions among the various key commitments of a given system or family of ideas has been explored sufficiently.
    [Show full text]
  • Islam and the Rule of Law. Between Sharia and Secularization
    ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW BETWEEN SHARIA AND SECULARIZATION Birgit Krawietz Helmut Reifeld (Hrsg.) ISBN 978-3-938926-86-6 IM IM www.kas.de PLENUM CONTENT 5 | PREFACE Gerhard Wahlers 9 | INTRODUCTION Birgit Krawietz 17 | I. JUSTICE as A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ORGANIZING priNCipLE 19 | JUSTICE AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPLE IN ISLAM Werner Ende 35 | JUSTICE AS A PERVASIVE PRINCIPLE IN ISLAMIC LAW Birgit Krawietz 49 | II. CONSTITUTION BUILDING 51 | WAYS OF CONSTITUTION BUILDING IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES – THE CASE OF INDONESIA Masykuri Abdillah The published statements reflect the opinion of their authors, 65 | WHERE IS THE “ISLAM” IN THE “ISLAMIC STATE”? but not institutional positions of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Farish A. Noor © 2008, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Sankt Augustin/Berlin 71 | THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS CLAUSES ON All rights reserved. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN COUNTRIES WITH AN No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any ISLAMIC CHARACTER means, electronical or mechanical, without permission in writing from the Naseef Naeem publisher. Design: SWITSCH Kommunikationsdesign, Köln. 81 | THE SUDANESE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF 2005 – Cover photo: (c) Das Bild des Orients, www.das-bild-des-orients.de A MODEL TO ESTABLISH COEXISTENCE BETWEEN AN Photographer: Joachim Gierlichs, 2003. ISLAMIC AND A SECULAR LEGAL REGIME Translation of German statements: WB Communication, Germersheim. Printed by Druckerei Franz Paffenholz GmbH, Bornheim. Markus Böckenförde Printed in Germany. Printed with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. ISBN 978-3-939826-86-6 5 PREFACE 91 | III. reLIGIOUS versUS seCULar LAW? 93 | ISLAM, CONSTITUTION, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS For the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, strengthening and devel- AND JUSTICE IN MALAYSIA oping structures that support the rule of law is one of the Norani Othmann most important objectives and elements of its global inter- national cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • Justifying Relations with an Apostate During a Jihād a Salafi-Jihādist Group’S Relations with Turkey in Syria
    JUSTIFYING RELATIONS WITH AN APOSTATE DURING A JIHĀD A SALAFI-JIHĀDIST GROUP’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY IN SYRIA BAILEY ULBRICHT MARCH 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-6 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 DEFINITIONS * 4 THE CREED AND PRINCIPLES OF HTS * 6 THE CASE OF TURKEY * 13 CONCLUSION * 14 U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Several months after formally breaking with al-Qaeda in January 2017, the Salafi-Jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) deviated significantly from its prior methodology when it gave the Turkish Army access to portions of territory it controlled in Syria. Though HTS was careful to avoid direct military collaboration with Turkey, it welcomed the Turkish Army’s presence as an additional force against the Syrian regime and secular opposition groups. This caused a significant rift among the group’s supporters and the al-Qaeda community, who accused HTS of thwarting its own jihād by forming relations with Turkey, considered by Salafi-Jihadists to be an apostate. This analysis aims to explain how HTS has legally justified its relations with Turkey. After outlining key legal terms and the group’s creed, I argue that under the doctrine of loyalty and disavowal and the doctrine of necessity, HTS is in fact able to legally justify relations with an apostate during jihād. However in doing so, the group is unable to reconcile its own methodological deviance, in which forgoing doctrinal purity for military pragmatism appears to be undermining the objective of its own jihād.
    [Show full text]
  • The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
    BOOK REVIEWS for the utility of digital expression made are far broader and go The Looming Tower: is thorough and has signifi cant to the heart of the university Al-Qaeda and the road merit. In seizing the power of system—online or off. Despite to 9/11 images as well as words, it is likely the tenuous link to the topic by Lawrence Wright that mechanisms such as ‘kinetic of his book, this chapter was text’ have the potential to convey particularly satisfying, with a Allen Lane meaning more effectively, and structured, convincing argument. London, 2006 restore a sense of ‘stuff’ to the Lanham probably overestimates 480pp, £20 ‘fl uff’ of communication. the potential for online courses to ISBN 9780713999730 Lanham overestimates the solve the problems raised, but his flexibility of such modes of criticisms are valid. expression, however, failing to One of the most compelling acknowledge limitations such critiques is of the assumption in awrence Wright’s background as lack of uniformity, restricted many universities that the faculty Lis a unique mix of journalism, accessibility and larger space should be employed full-time in academia and screenwriting. He requirements. It is telling that the the sequestered environment of a was one of the co-writers of the website Lanham directs readers learning institution and that the movie The Siege and he draws to, in order to see animations of administration exists to protect on this eclectic background certain fi gures that are featured in the faculty from the real world. to produce an engaging, well the book, is in the form that the This attitude is deeply frustrating researched and analytical book.
    [Show full text]
  • Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’S Enduring Insurgency
    Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency Editor: Jacob Zenn KASSIM BOKO HARAM BEYOND THE HEADLINES MAY 2018 CHAPTER 1: Boko Haram’s Internal Civil War: Stealth Takfir and Jihad as Recipes for Schism By Abdulbasit Kassim The jihadi insurgent movement Boko Haram has established itself as one of the relatively few jihadi movements to succeed in the capture, control, and governance of territory in Africa. Over the course of less than two decades, Boko Haram has morphed from a jihadi movement operating within Nigeria to a movement with a regional presence across multiple countries in West Africa and beyond. Since the internal civil war within the group shot into the news following the war of words between Abubakr Shekau and Muhammad Mamman Nur in August 2016, sundry observers have remained puzzled over how to describe the open competition and outright hostility that fractured the group into two factions. What is the current state of Boko Haram’s internal civil war in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region? This is the most frequently asked question by policymakers, scholars, and the general public interested in understanding the trajectory of the decade-old insurgency. The answer to this question has often focused on a stationary analysis of the mutual recrimination between Shekau and Nur in August 2016. Nonetheless, many events are taking place behind the scenes that can only be grasped through a close reading of the constant stream of primary sources produced by the two factions. Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi’s
    [Show full text]
  • From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism
    NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW VOLUME 79 MAY 2004 NUMBER 2 COMMENTARY FROM EXCLUSIVISM TO ACCOMMODATION: DOCTRINAL AND LEGAL EVOLUTION OF WAHHABISM ABDULAZIZ H. AL-FAHAD*t INTRODUCTION On August 2, 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait. For several days there- after, the Saudi Arabian media was not allowed to report the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. When the Saudi government was satisfied with the U.S. commitment to defend the country, it lifted the gag on the Saudi press as American and other soldiers poured into Saudi Arabia. In retrospect, it seems obvious that the Saudis, aware of their vulnerabilities and fearful of provoking the Iraqis, were reluctant to take any public position on the invasion until it was ascertained * Copyright © 2004 by Abdulaziz H. AI-Fahad. B.A., 1979, Michigan State University; M.A., 1980, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; J.D., 1984, Yale Law School. Mr. Al-Fahad is a practicing attorney in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Transnational Connec- tions: The Arab Gulf and Beyond, at St. John's College, Oxford University, September 2002, and at the Yale Middle East Legal Studies Seminar in Granada, Spain, January 10-13, 2003. t Editors' note: Many of the sources cited herein are available only in Arabic, and many of those are unavailable in the English-speaking world; we therefore have not been able to verify them in accordance with our normal cite-checking procedures. Because we believe that this Article represents a unique and valuable contribution to Western legal scholarship, we instead have relied on the author to provide translations or to verify the substance of particular sources where possible and appropriate.
    [Show full text]