ISSN 2664-4428
Volume -I, No.1 Religious
Extremism
Review
Apr-Jun 2019
Peace Research and Advocacy Institute I S L A M A B A D
Volume – I, Number 1 Apr-Jun 2019
Religious Extremism Review
A Quarterly Journal
Peace Research and Advocacy Institute Understanding Conflicts for Peace
Copyrights © Peace Research & Advocacy Institute All Rights Reserved
Views expressed are authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those held by the Institute.
Peace Research & Advocacy Institute is an independent, non-government research institute based in Islamabad. It studies the phenomena of terrorism, violent extremism, and issues of religious minorities that impact security and interfaith relations in Pakistan and the region.
ISSN (PRINT): 2664-4533 ISSN (ONLINE): 2664-4428
Editor: Ahmed Ali Research Associates: Wajahat Khalid M. Suleman Khan
Peace Research & Advocacy Institute 4D, Mehmood Plaza, Fazle Haq Road, Blue Area, Islamabad Ph: 051-2344074, Email: [email protected] CONTENTS
Abbreviations Contributors
1. Life in the Shadows: the Plight of Pakistan’s Christians Ahmed Ali 01 2. Forced Conversions: A Crisis for the State; a Nightmare for the Hindus Muhammad Suleman Khan 17 3. Proscribed Extremist Outfits Wajahat Khalid 26 4. Pak-Iran Relations and the Problem of Cross-border Militancy Liaqat Ali 47 5. A Dangerous Education Rehmatullah 64 6. Worries about Pak-Afghan Peace Talks Muhammad Suleman Khan 81 7. Daesh Khorasan Wajahat Khalid 92 8. The Genesis of Religious Radicalism in Pakistan Ahmed Ali 104 9. Religious Extremism on Social Media M. Suleman Khan & Wajahat Khalid 113 10. The Troubled Pak-Afghan Relations Wajahat Khalid & M. Suleman Khan 122
ABBREVIATIONS
AJK: Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ANP: Awami National Party
AQIS: Al-Qaeda in the IndianSubcontinent
ASWJ: Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat
ATC: Anti-Terrorism Courts
ATF: Anti-Terrorism Force
BC: Balochistan Constabulary
BLA: Balochistan Liberation Army
BLF: Balochistan Liberation Front
BNP: Balochistan National Party
BNP-M: Balochistan National PartyMengalGroup
BRA: Baloch Republican Army
BSF: Border Security Force
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CID: Criminal InvestigationDepartment
CPEC: China-Pakistan EconomicCorridor
CTD: Counter Terrorism Department
FATA: Federally Administered TribalAreas
FATF: Financial Action Task Force
FC: Frontier Corps
FIA: Federal Investigative Agency
HRCP: Human Rights Commission ofPakistan
HuA: Hizbul Ahrar
IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
ISI: I nter-Services Intelligence
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
IS-K: Islamic State Khorasan
ISPR: Inter-Services Public Relations
JI: Jamaat-e-Islami
JM: Jaish-e-Muhammad
JuA: Jamaat ul Ahrar
JuD: Jamaatud Dawa
KP: Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
LeJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeJ-A: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami
LI: Lashkar-e-Islam
LoC: Line of Control
NACTA: National Counter-TerrorismAuthority
NADRA: National Database andRegistration Authority
NAP: National Action Plan
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA: National Security Advisor
SM: Sipah-e-Muhammad
SP: Superintendent of Police
SSP: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
TLP: Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan
TNSM: Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia-Muhammad
TTP: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UBA: United Baloch Army
UNSC: United Nation Security Council
CONTRIBUTORS
Ahmed Ali – Editor
A former civil servant, Ahmed Ali has been studying the problems of terrorism and violent extremism since 2009. His works have been published both locally and internationally. He studied political science at the University of Karachi.
Muhammad Suleman Khan – Research Associate
Muhammad Suleman Khan is a professional researcher with interest in terrorism as a global phenomenon. He pursued M.Phil in peace and conflict studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad.
Wajahat Khalid – Research Associate
Wajahat Khalid studied International Relations at Preston University, Islamabad. He has a keen interest in studying Pakistan’s relations with Russia, and Russian policy towards the Middle East.
Rehmatullah
Rehmatullah worked as a journalist in Balochistan for over eight years. Later, he remained associated with policy development and counter- terrorism research at the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Islamabad.
Liaqat Ali
Liaqat Ali graduated from the Queen Mary University of London, UK and later pursued M.Phil in economics at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad. His academic interests include political economy, and security.
Religious Extremism Review
Life in the Shadows: the Plight of Pakistan’s Christians
Ahmed Ali
“It is necessary to identify the fact that most of the slums are under the occupation of the Christian community whose members shift to Islamabad from Narowal, Sheikhupura, Shakargarh, Sialkot, Kasur, Sahiwal and Faisalabad, and occupy the government lands so boldly as if they have been allotted to them, and it seems that this pace of occupation of land may affect the Muslim majority in the capital”
– The Capital Development Authority, Islamabad, 2015
The Christians make up 1.6% of the over 200-million population in Pakistan.[1] Most of them are the descendants of Dalit Hindus who converted during the British era. Although a few Christians are comparatively prominent and successful, the Christians tend to be amongst the poorest and most vulnerable communities in Pakistan.[2] Economic deprivation, discrimination, and social exclusion await them at every step. Most Christians live in Punjab, with sizeable populations in Sindh, Islamabad, and KP. In 2018, a Christian support group ‘Open Doors’ ranked Pakistan fifth (out of fifty) most difficult country to be a Christian. Societal prejudice against the Christians is rampant at almost all levels. Many Pakistanis refer to their fellow Christians as ‘Chuhra’, meaning low-caste but also with connotations of janitorial work.
Discrimination against the Christians is so common that often public advertisements for janitorial jobs specifically ask for Christian applicants. In 2013, Pervez Khattak, then the chief minister of KP province and currently Pakistan’s defense minister, publicly declared that only non-Muslims would be recruited as sweepers.[3] Sanitary jobs are normally considered below the dignity of Muslim citizens which is
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Religious Extremism Review why it is generally thought fit to reserve them for “others” like Christians.
The status of Christians as citizens of Pakistan has declined over decades especially since the 1980s. Till the early 1970s, the Christian churches in Pakistan ran religious schools that served as key centers for the learning of Christian faith and values as well as community gathering. The Bhutto regime nationalized all religious schools in 1972. However later, religious schools of other religions were de-nationalized and returned to the communities, but the Christian schools were not denationalized.[4]
The Conversion and the Disappointment
In the 19th century, the Chuhra (Dalits) were the biggest caste of untouchables in Punjab. Condemned to the bottom of social hierarchy, they mainly did janitorial works for survival. In 1870, the Chuhra caste initiated a mass movement for conversion to Christianity in a bid to escape the plight of lowly life in the society. The movement peaked in 1930s during which the entire Chuhra community converted to Protestant Christians.[5] At the time of Pakistan’s creation, they emerged as the nascent Protestant Church in Pakistan.
But the question is did the conversion improve the social, economic, or religious status of the Chuhra community? The answer is unfortunately ‘no’. In 1971, Streefland, a sociologist, studied the ‘Chuhra Christians’ of Karachi in order to ascertain if the Christian faith had made any difference in their lives. He found the community was still stuck in the same social and economic misery. They were employed to clean public latrines, sweep the streets, and open the city’s clogged sewerage.[6]
In short, the Chuhra’s mass conversion drive to Christianity that lasted for over half a century (1870-1930s) failed to achieve its objectives. Today, they are as disappointed about their fate as they have ever been. Their desperation and hopelessness are best reflected in the words of Afzal Masih, a Pakistani Christian, who told the Express Tribune that “I am a sweeper; my sons will be sweepers and, in the future, so will my
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The Christians and the Making of Pakistan
Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s struggle for Pakistan would have been less effective had his political ideals not been propagated so intensely by the Muslim League’s newspaper daily Dawn. Founded by Jinnah, the daily Dawn became a crucial mouthpiece and the top propaganda tool of Muslim League. Its first editor Pothan Joseph, an Indian Christian, aggressively advocated the cause of Muslim League in the early 1940s and disseminated the Muslim viewpoint to the Indian audience. Joseph started or developed over two dozen newspapers including the Hindustan Times, the Indian Express, and the Deccan Herald.[8]
At a time when Jinnah and other Muslims League leaders desperately needed mass support for their political goals, they also turned to the Christians, Parsis, and other minorities and promised them equality of citizenship in the proposed state of Pakistan. When Jinnah presented his celebrated 14 points, the ‘All India Christians Conference’ instantly endorsed them, while rejecting the Nehru Report.[9] The idea of Pakistan looked promising to many Indian Christians and other non-Muslims who joined hands with the Muslim League to push for the division of India, and creation of Pakistan. Like Indian Muslims, the Indian Christians opposed Hindu-majority rule.[10] The Christian community made remarkable contributions to the development and progress of Pakistan as a nation, especially in the critical formative decades.
In 1940, the All India Muslim League passed its historic Lahore Resolution that later served as the roadmap for the creation of Pakistan. While drafting the resolution, Jinnah was assisted by an Indian Christian, Alvin Robert Cornelius who was a distinguished jurist and a former administrative officer of the Indian civil service. Cornelius was an
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Religious Extremism Review outspoken speaker of the Pakistan movement. In 1946, he was elevated to the bench of the Lahore High Court as an associate judge. Cornelius opted for Pakistan in 1947 and became one of the pioneers of the judicial system in the newly-born state of Pakistan.
At the time of partition, most of the government machinery and infrastructure were located in India which meant Pakistan had to build many institutions from scratch. The services of highly qualified professionals such as Alvin Robert Cornelius were critical in the initial years. Pakistani Christians like Cornelius contributed immensely to the building of the new state. Cornelius served as law secretary both to Pakistan’s first law minister, Jogendra Nath Mandal, and prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, and advised them on the establishment of the court system in Pakistan. He also advised successive governments on legal matters.
In 1960, Cornelius was appointed the 4th Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP), a position he held for eight years. Following his retirement, he served as Pakistan’s law minister in the cabinet of Yahya Khan. Cornelius was a diehard defender of the rights of religious minorities and the freedom of religion in Pakistan.[11] His legal opinions are considered some of the greatest defenses for the freedom of religious practices in the country.[12]
Today, Pakistan is a nuclear power with one of the strongest militaries in the region. And behind this strength is the blood and sweat of Pakistan’s diverse communities. Like all other communities, the Christian community of Pakistan has had an indispensable contribution to the country’s defense. During the wars of 1965 and 1971, Christian officers of the armed forces fought on the forefront. For instance, flight lieutenant Cecil Chaudhry was one of the four fighter pilots that attacked a key radar station in Amritsar India in an extremely difficult mission during the 1965 war. Later, he fought as valiantly in the 1971 war against India. He was awarded Sitar-e-Jurat for his remarkable services to Pakistan.
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Similarly, another Christian officer in the Pakistan Air Force was Mervyn Middlecoat who died during an aerial fight on 12 Dec 1971. Middlecoat was a strike and fighter pilot and participated in aerial battles during the wars of 1965 and 1971 before sacrificing his life for his country.[13] He was amongst the first air force officers to be sent to the United States for training.
Discrimination
At birth, Pakistan was more tolerant of diversity, and a better place to be a non-Muslim. Diverse communities of Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Parsis etc coexisted relatively peacefully. However, progressive radicalization of the political system and society in the subsequent years has overshadowed religious diversity. Like other non-Muslims, the Christians face severe societal discrimination and exclusion in today’s Pakistan. Although no laws target the Christian community specifically, yet several key articles in the constitution favor Islam over other religions. Many Muslims treat their Christian neighbors with contempt, and refer to them with offensive terms.[14] Pakistan has not been an ideal place for religious minorities, yet the Christian community has specifically been reduced to lowly jobs of cleaning toilets and opening filthy drains and sewerage. The federal capital, Islamabad, employs 1500 sanitary workers who are mostly Christians. Likewise, 80% of the 19000 janitors in Pakistan’s economic hub, Karachi, are also Christians.[15]
Besides, the Christians along with Hindus are the primary victims of the bonded labor at Pakistan’s agricultural and brick-making industries.[16] Many brick-kilns give birth to stories of brutal modern-day slavery wherein poor laborers, mostly Christians and Hindus, are often kept in chains, beaten, and abused. In 2017, Christian sanitary workers in Peshawar complained that their Muslim colleagues (also sanitary workers) did not perform their duties, but got their salaries while shifting their responsibilities to Christians.[17]
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Discrimination against non-Muslim citizens has become a constant feature of everyday life in the society. Discrimination permeates even the education sector. Christian students face faith-based harassment from their Muslim fellows. The textbooks exclude the contributions of the Christian community in the creation and progress of Pakistan. The educational contents are overdosed with Muslim history and culture that the Christians are also forced to study. Little wonder that many Christian parents prefer to send their children to Christian schools.[18] However, the Christian schools are also forced to buy the same textbooks as Muslims, and every textbook begins with an overview of Muslim faith, even the texts on chemistry and biology.[19]
The state of education among the members of the Pakistan’s Christian community is alarming. A study by the Pehchan Foundation in 2013 found that:
6 % of Christians get primary education
4 % of Christians get high school education
1 % of Christians get college education
5 % of Christians get a professional education[20]
Born, Raised, and Dying in Slums
Perhaps nothing epitomizes the Christians’ exclusion better than the overcast and filthy slums, dotting the otherwise clean and green capital of Islamabad. Generations upon generations of Christian citizens live and die in shantytowns they call home. In Dec 2015, Islamabad’s capital development authority (CDA) launched a drive to eradicate what it called the “ugly” slums. In a report submitted to the Supreme Court, the CDA termed the Christians as refugees who come to the capital to grab government land, but contribute nothing to the national growth. The term “ugly” is frequently used in the report to refer to the shabby homes of the
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Christian community. In the beautiful town of Islamabad, the slums look like “ugly villages”, the letter said.[21] It went further on to say that:
“It is necessary to identify the fact that most of the katchi abadis (slums) are under the occupation of the Christian community who are shifted from Narowal, Sheikhupura, Shakargarh, Sialkot, Kasur, Sahiwal and Faisalabad and occupied the Government land so boldly as if it has been allotted to them, and it seems this pace of occupation of land may affect the Muslim majority of the capital”[22]
The CDA feared that the growing number of Christians in the slums could threaten the numerical strength of Muslim citizens in Pakistan’s capital. This might sound like a dark comedy, but it gives a critical insight into the thinking and attitude of the society and state towards the Christian citizens. Life in the Christian slums is a nightmare. The settlements are mostly deprived of basic amenities, and an average of seven people including children live in one room. The slum residents complain about the absence of clean drinking water in their areas, but such complaints are barely noticed by the authorities.[23]
Attacks against Christians
For years, Pakistan’s Christian community has faced terrorist attacks, intimidation, harassment, and vigilantism by Muslim mobs. On 22 Sep 2013, two suicide bombers stormed the All Saints Church during a Sunday Mass in Peshawar[24], killing over 85 Christian worshippers including women and children and injuring more than 140.[25] Jundullah, a terrorist group linked to the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack.[26] Many of the injured persons were left disabled or paralyzed for life.
Likewise, on 15 Mar 2015, two suicide bombers attacked the Roman Catholic Church and the Christ Church during a Sunday service in the Youhanabad locality of Lahore, killing at least 14 and injuring around 70. Jamaatul Ahrar, an offshoot of TTP, took responsibility for the deadly attack.[27] The next terror assault against Christians came in Dec
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2017 when two suicide bombers stormed the Bethel Memorial Church during a Sunday service in Quetta and killed at least nine people and wounded 30.[28] In April 2018, at least six Christians were gunned down in the same city on two separate occasions.
On 13 Jul 2018, a gang of violent Muslims attacked and damaged a church in Faisalabad, Punjab. Eyewitnesses said the attackers attempted to set the church on fire, but failed due to reaction by the police. Later, in August, another Muslim mob attacked a church in Kasur. The Christian men, women, and children were severely beaten as they attempted to defend the premises.[29] Besides, at least four Christians including a boy were killed randomly around the country in Aug 2018.[30]
Blasphemy Allegations
Blasphemy is an extremely sensitive issue in Pakistan. Mere allegations of blasphemy often lead to brutal lynching. In Nov 2014, a mob of 1200 Muslims burned a Christian couple alive after accusing them of insulting the Holy Quran in Kot Radha Kishan, Punjab. The victims were brick- kiln laborers. The bone-chilling details of the murders shocked people around the world. Reporting the gruesome crime, the Daily Mail said:
“A pregnant Pakistani woman killed alongside her husband for alleged blasphemy was wrapped in cotton so she would set alight faster, relatives who witnessed the horrific attack revealed. Shama Bibi, 24, and her husband Sajjad Maseeh, 27, also had their legs broken so they could not flee the mob that locked them inside a brick-making factory before their murder.
They picked them up by their arms and legs and held them over the brick furnace until their clothes caught fire,’ family spokesman Javed Maseeh told NBC News. ‘And then they threw them inside the furnace.’ He said Bibi, a mother of four who was four months pregnant, was wearing clothing that did not initially catch fire, so the mob removed her from over the kiln and wrapped her up in cotton to make sure the material would burn faster.
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The killings were sparked by the mob’s belief the couple had desecrated a copy of the Koran. By the time the attack was over, only charred bones and the couple’s discarded shoes remained.” [31]
The authorities charged 103 people with the murder of the Christian couple, but only 5 of them were convicted of murder by a Lahore court in Nov 2016.[32] Some of the accused were given jail terms, while the rest were set free by the courts.[33] Back in 2009, Asia Bibi, an illiterate Christian woman, was accused of insulting the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). She was convicted of blasphemy in 2010 and sentenced to death. After remaining incarcerated for about a decade, she was declared innocent and released by the Supreme Court. Similarly, a court in Mirpurkhas in Sindh handed down death sentence to a mentally disabled Christian, Yaqoob Bashir, for blasphemy.[34]
On 13 Dec 2018, another court in Jhelum sentenced two Christian brothers Qaisar Ayub and Amoon Ayub to death for allegedly committing blasphemy. They had been in prison since 2015 on blasphemy charges.[35] These are but only a few incidents of violence against the Christian community. Back in Aug 2009, an entire Christian neighborhood in Gojra, Punjab was attacked by Muslim mobs after some Christians were accused of desecrating pages of the Holy Quran. Eight Christians were killed which included four women and a child, and around 40 homes were burned to ashes.[36] Similarly, another Christian neighborhood was attacked in Lahore in 2013.
The table below shows the Christians accused of blasphemy in Pakistan from 1990 to 2009: [37]
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Month Year Incidents reported Location Dec 07 1990 Tahir Iqbal, a Christian man, was accused of Lahore abusing Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) at the time of Azaan, and imparting anti-Islamic education to children during tuitions. Oct 08 1991 Chand Barkat, 28, was charged with blasphemy Karachi by a bangle vendor because of professional jealousy. Dec 10 1991 Gul Masih of Faisalabad was charged for using Sargodha sacrilegious language about the Prophet (PBUH) and his wives Jan 06 1992 Christian teacher Naimat Ahmar, 43, was Faisalaba butchered by a young member of a militant d religious group on charges of blasphemy. 1992 Bantu Masih, 80, and Mukhtar Masih, 50, were Lahore arrested on the allegation of committing blasphemy. Nov 1992 Same Gul Masih, a Christian, charged in 1990 Lahore was sentenced to death.
Feb 1993 Anwar Masih, a Christian, was sent to jail for Samunda allegedly insulting the Prophet Mohammed ri (PBUH). May 1993 Twelve-year-old Salamat Masih, Manzoor Gujranwa Masih, 37, and Rehmat Masih, 42, were charged la with writing derogatory remarks against Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) on the wall of a Mosque. April 1994 Manzoor Masih is killed outside the District and Gujranwa Sessions Court after exiting a hearing in la blasphemy case. July 1995 Catherine Shahen, a teacher, was denied her Lahore salary on grounds of blasphemy. Oct 14 1996 Ayub Masih, a Pakistani Christian bricklayer, Lahore
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was arrested for violation of Section 295-C. Oct 19 1997 Judge Arif Iqbal Hussain Bhatti was assassinated Lahore in his office after acquitting two people who were accused of blasphemy. May 6 1998 Bishop John Joseph of Pakistan shot himself in Sahiwal the Sahiwal courthouse to highlight the 1996 case of Ayub Masih. Octobe 2000 Younus Shaikh, a teacher, charged with Islamaba r blasphemy on account of remarks that students d claimed he made during a lecture. Jul 18 2002 Judge imposed death penalty and a fine of Rs. Lahore 500000 on Anwar Kenneth in a blasphemy case registered with the Gawalmandi police. Jul 09 2003 A Christian journalist was sentenced to life KP imprisonment for blasphemy. Nov 2003 Anwar Masih, a Christian laborer was charged Lahore 20 for insulting the Prophet (PBUH) in front of his neighbor. Aug 2005 Judge Arshad Noor Khan found Younus Shaikh 11 guilty of defiling a copy of the Quran, and propagating religious hatred among society. Nov 2005 After receiving frequent death threats, Parvez Lahore 12 Aslam Chaudhry, a lawyer who defended many accused for blasphemy, was also physically assaulted outside Lahore High Court. May 2006 A Christian, Qamar David, was arrested from for Karachi 24 allegedly sending blasphemous messages to some Muslims Jun 03 2006 Dan Browns’s novel 'The Da Vinci Code' Islamaba declared as blasphemous. Authorities banned the d promotion of the movie. Sep 21 2006 Shahid Masih, 17, was jailed on suspicion of Punjab ripping book pages containing Quranic verses in
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Punjab. Jan 22 2007 Martha Bibi, a Christian woman, was accused of Kasur making derogatory remarks about Prophet Muhammad and defaming his sacred name. Apr 01 2007 Masih, 45, and four other Christians were Toba Tek accused for the desecration of Islamic posters Singh and stickers containing the name of Allah, Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and other Islamic verses. Apr 13 2007 Sattar Masih, a 29-year-old worker at a water Kotri pumping station, was allegedly attacked by Muslim extremists for uttering blasphemous remarks. May 2007 The nursing school at PIMS in Islamabad was Islamaba 17 shut down and seven Christian staff members d suspended after female students of Jamia Hafsa protested over allegations that blasphemy had been committed at the school. Oct 28 2007 The police arrested Muhammad Imran for Faisalaba allegedly setting the Holy Quran on fire. d Mar 06 2008 Altaf Hussain elderly man, was arrested for Khanewa desecrating the Holy Quran l May 2008 The Punjab police jailed Robin Sardar, a Lahore Christian physician, upon an accusation of blasphemy. Jul 31 2009 Seventy-five houses and two churches were Gojra burnt by the residents of a neighboring village over the alleged desecration of the Holy Quran Aug 2009 Eight Christians were burnt alive and 18 others Gojra 01 injured in Gojra on charges of blasphemy Nove 2010 Asia Bibi Christian woman was charged of Lahore mber blasphemy by local women, she was given death penalty and later she was acquitted by court.
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Suggestions
Improving the Blasphemy Laws: Every government in Pakistan squarely avoids touching upon the blasphemy laws. No amount of domestic or international criticism, condemnation, or pressure has been able to move the government on reforming these laws. The governments’ reluctance is, to some extent, understandable given the deeply entrenched Islamist violent extremism in Pakistani society. The government is too fearful of the Islamists to attempt a reform. However, the government has to take the bull by the horn at one point or another because it cannot just leave its non-Muslim citizens at the mercy of religious extremists who often invoke blasphemy to justify violence. The government must rise to its constitutional responsibilities and protect the lives and honor of all citizens. The blasphemy laws must be improved, at least, to prevent their misuse against religious minorities. The country can no longer afford inaction on this count.
Equal Employment Opportunities: The government must provide equal employment opportunities to all citizens without discrimination. Restricting religious minorities such as Christians to lowly sanitary jobs is, indeed, a matter of national shame. A Christian citizen is as intelligent and mentally capable as any other citizen in this country provided that they are given equal educational and job opportunities. Economic welfare of the citizens is a fundamental responsibility of the state. The government cannot eradicate slums by running bulldozers over them. The best way to get rid of those slums is to improve the economic condition of their inhabitants through equal access to opportunities.
Representation in the State: Regardless of faith, sex, color, race, ethnicity, or language, the state must give all citizens opportunities for national leadership roles. The positions of the president and prime minister must be accessible to all. The constitution must be amended to remove the clauses that prevent the access of non-Muslim Pakistanis to high offices of the state. Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder had categorically
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Protection against Mob Vigilantism: The Christians are often subjected to mob violence on one pretext or the other. The state must come down hard on the religious vigilantism and mob rule. The right to life is an inalienable right of all citizens irrespective of their religious beliefs. Religious vigilantism must be effectively deterred through exemplary prosecution and legislation. The state must send a clear message to all that it does not tolerate mob violence on religious grounds. Most importantly, the state should reform the educational system especially the textbooks that often promote religious bigotry and hatred against non-Muslims.
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References:
1. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-religion 2. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/country-information-report- pakistan.pdf 3. https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/07/pakistani-christians-angered-by- sweeper-comment/ 4. https://www.christiansinpakistan.com/christianity-in-pakistan/ 5. John C. B. Webster, The Dalit Christians: A History (Delhi: ISPCK Press, 1992), 39; Frederick and Margaret Stock, People Movements in the Punjab, with Special Reference to the United Presbyterian Church (South Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1975), 65. 6. Pieter Streefland, The Sweepers of Slaughterhouse: Conflict and Survival in a Karachi Neighbourhood (Van Gorcum, 1979), 30. 7. https://tribune.com.pk/story/528535/nothing-changes-for-us-we-will-live-and-die- sweeping/ 8. http://josephclan.com/pothanjoseph.htm 9. https://nation.com.pk/12-Jul-2015/role-of-christians-in-pakistan-movement 10. Ibid 11. Gabriel, Theodore P. C. (2007). Christian citizens in the Islamic state: Pakistan experience 12. https://www.dawn.com/news/623377/a-soft-opening-into-judicial-past 13. Hali, S.M. (2000). “F-104 Starfighters in Pakistan Air Force”. Defence Journal 14. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/ 15. https://www.ucanews.com/news/christians-selected-for-degrading-jobs-in- pakistan/78708 16. https://www.refworld.org/docid/510f8dbd2.html 17. https://www.ucanews.com/news/christians-selected-for-degrading-jobs-in- pakistan/78708 18. http://www.thevoicesociety.org/over-view/ 19. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1426168/90_1520500210_easo-pakistan- meeting-report-october-2017.pdf 20. https://icmica-miic.org/themes/education/1394-education-of-pakistani-christian- students-in-danger.html 21. https://www.dawn.com/news/1225694 22. Ibid 23. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/No-rights-or-drinking-water-for-residents-in-one- of-Islamabad%E2%80%99s-Christian-ghettoes-22614.html 24. https://www.dawn.com/news/1044668 25. https://www.ucanews.com/news/christians-remember-peshawar-church- bombing/77210 26. Ibid 27. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31894708 28. https://www.dawn.com/news/1401797
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29. https://www.persecution.org/2018/07/18/gunmen-storm-church-pakistan-settle- property-dispute/ 30. https://www.persecution.org/2018/09/13/pakistani-christians-endure-fourteen- violent-attacks-august/kckc 31. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2828845/Relatives-Christian-couple- beaten-Pakistani-mob-burned-death-say-d-legs-broken-stop-fleeing-wife-wrapped- cotton-d-burn-faster.html 32. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1240887/5-sentenced-death-burning-christian-couple- kot-radha-kishan/ 33. https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-20-acquitted-case-christians-burned-alive- blasphemy/29121531.html 34. https://www.persecution.org/2018/10/24/mentally-disabled-pakistani-christian- sentenced-life-in-prison/ 35. https://www.persecution.org/2018/12/18/christian-brothers-sentenced-death- pakistans-blasphemy-laws/ 36. https://nation.com.pk/02-Aug-2009/9-killed-in-gojra-riots 37. https://www.dawn.com/news/589587/high-profile-blasphemy-cases-in-the-last-63- years
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Forced Conversions: A Crisis for the State; a Nightmare for the Hindus
Muhammad Suleman Khan
Pakistan’s constitution guarantees fundamental rights to all of its citizens. The Article 20 of the constitution ensures freedom of religion and religious practices. Pakistan’s founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah clearly chalked out the nature of the relationship between the state and the citizens in his address to the country’s first constituent assembly on August 11, 1947. He said,
“You are free; you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in the State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State … We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not so in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state”.
While Jinnah’s speech clearly reflects his desire for a pluralistic society where faith was to be a personal matter of the citizens rather than a business of the state, his immediate successors and later generation of political leaders took the country to a direction that ran opposite to what Jinnah had envisioned. Today’s Pakistan is bruised by the very problems Jinnah sought to avoid, as is evident in his above speech. Of all the issues, the most burning is the growing religious extremism in the society. Extremism is spreading its tentacles, and the space for the non- Muslim minorities is shrinking. At the time of Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the non-Muslims constituted 23% of the population which has
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Religious Extremism Review been reduced to roughly 4% today. Pakistan’s Hindus have been hit hard lately as their female members are subjected to abductions and forced conversions to Islam.
The country’s legal system has many laws that are supposed to protect the religious minorities against persecution and crimes such as forced marriages. They include the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act 2013, prevention of forced marriage under Section 498-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, prevention of rape under Sections 375 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wrongful confinement and restraint under XVI-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, abducting or inducing a woman to compel for marriage under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, kidnapping or abducting from lawful guardianship under Section 361 of the Pakistan Penal Code, kidnapping or abducting a person under the age of fourteen under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code etc. However, despite these legal safeguards, the Hindus continue to suffer forced conversions at an alarming rate.
According to the Pakistan Hindu Council chief Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani, “about 1000 Hindu and Christian girls are abducted in Pakistan every year. They are converted through the use of forced marriages.” Most of the cases of alleged forced conversions are reported from the provinces of Sindh and Punjab. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) says dozens of cases of forced marriages are registered every month which is really worrying. Majority of the victims (girls and women) come from impoverished families. Muslim persons belonging to influential and feudal families have been reported to be involved in converting Hindu girls to Islam.
In 2010, a 17-year old Hindu girl Kasturi from the Kohli community was kidnapped by a Muslim man. Few days later, the abductor’s family confessed to having the girl kidnapped. The police refused to file a ‘first information report’ (FIR) due to pressure from the abductors. Likewise, the public hospital also refused to write the medical report of the victim girl. Finally, it took the Sindh High Court to order the registration of an
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FIR and submission of the girl’s medical report. At the end, the criminal went escort-free as the victim’s family agreed to a financial settlement with the abductors.
In another case, a married Hindu woman Chandavati Bagri was taken along with here three-year old daughter from their home. The family went to the authorities only to face police that was as usual reluctant to register their complaint. Two months later, the police informed the husband that his wife had converted to Islam and married a Muslim man. Six months later, she reappeared and took shelter at her uncle’s home. Finally, the family had to take the matter to the court.
However, the most highlighted case of the alleged forced conversion was that of Rinkle Kumari. Aged 19, Kumari went missing from her home in Ghotki in 2012. Her family accused MianMitho, an influential cleric and lawmaker of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), of effecting the conversion of their daughter to Islam. Mitho denied the allegation, claiming the girl had gone to him willingly for conversion. The case proceeded to the civil court where Kumari revealed that she had been forced to adopt the new religion. She was given to the police custody during the hearing of the case, and later the court ordered her to be allowed to live with her husband as, according to the court, she had converted at her own will. Unwavering, the girl’s family went to the higher courts in pursuit of justice. Ultimately, the girl sought to live with her husband, which disappointed her family and shocked the human rights groups.
The issue of forced conversions refuses to die down. The Hindus continue to live under the shadow of forced conversions. The latest case surfaced just last month when two sisters Reena Meghwar and RaveenaMeghwar were kidnapped from their home in the notorious Ghotki district of Sindh on March 20, 2019. The issue captured the attention of the media and government only after an amateur video of the girls’ father emerged on the social media. The video shows the father weeping and beating his head outside a police station in protest against
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Religious Extremism Review the abduction of his daughters. Another similar video shows the girls’ post-conversion marriage with Muslim men. In this case, as in almost every other case of alleged forced conversion, the police had been unresponsive to the victim family. As usual, after the media jolted the authorities into action, the girls were produced before the Islamabad High Court where the girls stated that they had converted to Islam of their own free will. It is noteworthy that the complaint registered with the local police by the girls’ family clearly mentioned that the girls were underage. The Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act clearly prohibits child marriage which means the police should have acted promptly to prevent the marriage. But, they didn’t. In fact, the police relied only on the girls’ statements.
The perception is that the police delayed any action deliberately in order to allow the abductors to transport the girls out of their home province of Sindh to Rahim Yar Khan in Punjab. Only after the girls were converted and married off, the police woke up to make some arrests. The HRCP has condemned the alleged abduction and forced conversion of the girls, and demanded of the PPP-led Sindh government to pass the bill for the prevention of forced conversion which is pending since 2016 due to opposition from religious parties.
Pakistan’s ruling party ‘Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf’ (PTI) had vowed to protect the rights of the minorities and prevent the forced marriages as part of its election promises in 2018. Prime Minister Imran Khan had pledged to prevent the forced marriages and safeguard the rights of the Hindu girls. However, despite being in power for 10 months, there is no reform in sight regarding the prevention of forced conversions and marriages of Hindu girls. And the predators, mostly backed by influential feudal lords or extremist clerics, continue to prey on vulnerable and helpless Hindu girls. Experts believe the crisis is deeper and more serious than the obvious as many cases of forced conversions go unreported across the country. Threats and intimidation by the abductors
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Religious Extremism Review and sometimes feeling of shame prevent many families from seeking justice.
Sindh with the largest Hindu population in the country has become the ground zero of the forced conversions and marriages. In 2016, the Sindh provincial assembly passed a bill ‘the Criminal Law (Protection of Minorities) 2015’ in an attempt to curb the extremist onslaught against the Hindu community and protect the Hindu girls from forced conversions and marriages. Chapter III of the bill prohibits children/minors from converting to a different religion. Likewise, the Section 4(1) states that no person shall be deemed to have changed their religion until they attain the age of majority which is 18 years. The punishment it prescribes for forced conversion is minimum 5 years in prison, and maximum a life term, plus a fine to be paid to the victim. Persons who perform, conduct, direct, or bring about or facilitate a marriage, knowing that either or both parties are victims of forced conversion, or who are abettors to a forced conversion, are also liable to imprisonment and a fine” along with other clauses.
As the bill was passed by the assembly and sent to the governor for ratification, the religious parties began protesting against the bill. They termed the proposed law as un-Islamic and demanded its withdrawal. Under pressure, the governor returned the bill to the house for a review. And the bill continues to be on hold even today. It is unclear if the ruling PPP would ever take up the bill again at the cost of taking the Islamists head on in the province. The Islamist parties are known for their formidable, and often violent, street power. The PPP is likely unnerved by the idea of Islamists taking to the streets.
As the media react to individual cases of alleged forced conversions and political leaders keep issuing statements of sympathy and solidarity with the victim families, the Hindus continue to live through the nightmare of losing their daughters, sisters, wives to forced conversions. Simply having young daughters at home might be keeping many Hindu parents awake at nights because nobody really knows where the predators would
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Religious Extremism Review strike next. For religious minorities like Hindus, this is clearly not the Pakistan Jinnah had promised them back in 1947.
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References
1. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/forced-conversions-torment- pakistan-hindus-201481795524630505.html 2. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/msp/pages/162/attachments/original/13967 24215/MSP_Report_- _Forced_Marriages_and_Conversions_of_Christian_Women_in_Pakistan.pdf?139 6724215 3. https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/another-forced-conversion-in-pakistans- sindh-1.61620767 4. http://www.statistics.gov.pk/assets/publications/Pakistan%20Paopulation%20and% 20Housing%20Census-2017%20National%20Report.pdf 5. https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/18452/19498/12%20-%20Forum%20- %20Schaflechner%20- %20Forced%20Conversion%20and%20(Hindu)%20Women%20s%20Agency%20 in%20Sindh.pdf?sequence=1 6. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/469cbfc30.pdf 7. https://www.indexmundi.com/pakistan/demographics_profile.html 8. http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/HistoryPStudies/PDF- FILES/1%20Abdul%20Majid_v27No1june2014.pdf 9. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/04/08/1000-christian-hindu-girls-forced- to-convert-to-islam-report/ 10. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/741222/Pakistan_-_Christians_-_CPIN_- _v3.0__September_2018_.pdf 11. https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg-searching- for-security-pakistan-report.pdf 12. http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf 13. http://theconversation.com/forced-conversions-of-hindu-women-to-islam-in- pakistan-another-perspective-102726 14. https://www.hudson.org/research/9781-cleansing-pakistan-of-minorities
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15. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/asia/pakistani-hindus-say-womans- conversion-to-islam-was-coerced.html 16. http://paktribune.com/articles/Article-2-A-of-the-Constitution-and-Minorities- Rights-242889.html 17. https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Anti- Conversion-Laws_eBook-1.pdf 18. https://sharepoint.uclouvain.be/sites/cismodoc/Articles/J.%20Schaflechner,%20%E 2%80%98Forced%20conversions%E2%80%99%20of%20Hindu%20women%20t o%20Islam%20- %20another%20perspective%20,%20The%20Conversation,%2018%20sept.%2018 .pdf?Mobile=1&Source=%2Fsites%2Fcismodoc%2F_layouts%2F15%2Fmobile% 2Fviewa%2Easpx%3FList%3D92955ebf-add3-4d94-ac4a- 1d18a4155567%26View%3D4789c3c5-cd90-4f85-85f7- ca0ad767945c%26RootFolder%3D%252Fsites%252Fcismodoc%252FArticles%2 6TreeField%3DTags%26TreeValue%3D304308d7-43d3-463e-8ed1- 216513ff1ce4%26wdFCCState%3D1 19. http://sappk.org/wp- content/uploads/publications/eng_publications/Forced_Conversion_of_Religious_ Minorities.pdf 20. http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/05/minorities-pakistan-fear-forced-conversion-islam/ 21. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1243091/sindh-assembly-passes-bill-forced-religious- conversions/ 22. https://www.meforum.org/3056/islam-forced-conversions 23. file:///C:/Users/dell/Downloads/JS9_UPR28_PAK_E_Main.pdf 24. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324245465_SADF_Focus_The_plight_of _Religious_Minorities_in_Pakistan 25. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/blasphemy-and-the-constitution- 1.3674430 26. https://end-blasphemy-laws.org/countries/asia-central-southern-and-south- eastern/pakistan/
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27. https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s- blasphemy-law 28. https://www.samaa.tv/culture/2018/09/forced-conversions-of-hindus-to-islam-in- pakistan-isnt-as-portrayed-expert/ 29. https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/families-await-answers-after-alleged-forced- conversions-in-pakistan-1.841016 30. https://www.dawn.com/news/1345304 31. https://www.dawn.com/news/1472977/forced-conversions 32. https://nation.com.pk/26-Mar-2018/rights-of-minorities 33. https://www.dawn.com/news/1473003 34. http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/opinion-details/2995 35. http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/pakistan-sindh-provincial-assembly- passes-new-law-prohibiting-forced-religious-conversion/ 36. https://nation.com.pk/03-Dec-2016/call-for-repeal-of-forced-conversions-law 37. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/170265-Religious-parties-threaten-to-lay-siege- to-Sindh-Assembly 38. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/03/25/reena-and-raveena-sound-a- familiar-knell/ 39. https://cutacut.com/2019/03/25/everything-that-has-happened-so-far-in-the-case- of-reena-and-raveena/ 40. https://dailytimes.com.pk/6377/forced-conversions-in-sindh/ 41. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/pakistan-places-2-hindu-girls-in-protection-after- conversion/ 42. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/extremism 43. https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/ 44. https://qz.com/india/1395029/why-pakistans-hindu-women-covert-to-islam/ 45. http://www.pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto-pti.pdf 46. https://www.dawn.com/news/1419430
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Proscribed Extremist Outfits
Wajahat Khalid
Pakistan’s ministry of interior has proscribed 71 organizations and splinter groups under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.[1] These outfits were found to be directly or indirectly involved in acts of violence or hate crimes on the basis of religion. Some of the groups banned also include those which participated in separatist insurgency and other similar crimes designated as anti-state. Majority of the groups are, however, proscribed for violent extremism. Below is a brief profile of key religious extremist groups proscribed in Pakistan.
Daesh (Islamic State)
A Salafist terror group with transnational ambitions, Daesh aims to create an exclusive Islamist caliphate by conquering territories.[2] Such a caliphate is based on an extreme understanding of Islamic Shariah.[3] Daesh was originally founded as ‘JamaatulTawheed Wal Jihad’ by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, in 2000.[4] The members of this group were key players in the Iraqi insurgency during the US occupation of the country. Later, the group joined hands with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. When the Syrian civil war started, the members of this group shifted to the new war front.[5] In 2013, the group adopted the name ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS). The ISIS seized territories in Syria and Iraq during 2013-14 that shocked the entire world. Its atrocities against people in the captured areas paled Al-Qaeda’s terrorism.
Leadership
1. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (2002 to Jun 7, 2006)[6] 2. Abu Ayub al-Masri (Oct 2006 to Apr 18, 2010)[7] 3. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (Oct 2006 to Apr 18, 2010)[8] 4. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2010 to Present)[9]
Proscription:
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Pakistan proscribed Daesh in 2015. Earlier, it was proscribed by the U.S. Department of State as well as the United Nations.[10]
Sources of Funding
Daesh has been the richest terrorist organization in the world. Its terror operations were financed by various extraction schemes within its controlled territories and foreign donations. Al-Qaeda also funded it in the past.[11]
Areas of Operation
Daesh mainly operated in Syria and Iraq where it captured territories and temporarily established what it called caliphate. It has also declared provinces in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the North Caucasus. Moreover, in Turkey, Lebanon, Belgium, Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Sri Lanka it has claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks.[12]
Linkages/Associations
Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), Boko Haram, The Nusra Front, Taliban[13]
Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
On 14 Dec 2007, members of at least 27 terrorist and extremist groups came together under Baitullah Mehsud to establish what came to be known as the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[14] The terror movement’s prime focus is the state of Pakistan, but it also supports the Taliban insurgency in neighboring Afghanistan.[15] Its first commander, Baitullah Mehsud, belonged to the Shabikhel sub-tribe of the Mehsuds.[16] In Aug 2009, Mehsud was killed in a US drone strike.[17]
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Baitullah Mehsud was succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud who was the Taliban commander in the Khyber, Kurram, and Orakzai regions. A graduate of a local religious seminary, Hakimullah had fought for Taliban in Afghanistan against the Western forces. He met his predecessor’s fate as an American drone targeted him in North Waziristan on Nov 1, 2013.[18]
After Hakimullah’s death, TTP’s rein was taken over by Mullah Fazlullah – one of the most brutal Taliban commanders to date. A former chairlift operator in Swat, Fazlullah got the sobriquet of ‘Mullah Radio’ after giving extremist sermons on his illegal FM radio in the tribal regions.[19] The US State Department added him to the ‘Reward for Justice’ wanted list on 7 Mar 2018. An American drone strike finally killed him in Afghanistan’s Kunar province on 14 Jun 2018.[20]
Ideology
TTP follows an extremist version of Salafist ideology and justifies use of violence and violence in implementing Shariah. It demands of Pakistan to disassociate itself from the US-led war on terror. It publicly endorses violent implementation of Shariah laws in Pakistan, and propagates armed struggle against Pakistani security forces and coalition forces in Afghanistan. [21]
Organizational Structure
The outfit has an estimated 5000 fighters and a total of about 50,000 members.[22] It is based in South Waziristan and control a network of regional chapters headed by local commanders. It is believed to have links with other terrorist groups in Pakistan.[23]
Funding Sources
1. Drug trade 2. Kidnapping for ransom 3. Extortion
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Other criminal activities for raising funds
Besides, TTP also maintains effective relationship with Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban which provide it with resources[24]
Proscription
The TTP has been proscribed by the governments in Pakistan, Canada, the US and UK. The United Nations Security Council has also listed it in its international anti-terrorism sanctions list.[25]
TTP’s Manpower
The outfit mostly recruits fighters from tribal ranks and religious seminaries, and draws strength from foreign fighters coming the Middle East and Central Asia. Its affiliations with other terrorist organizations also provide it support in man and material.[26]
Areas of Operation
The TTP has carried out terrorist attacks mostly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and its adjacent tribal areas, but it has managed to stage attacks in other areas of Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan too.[27]
Nexus with other Terror Groups
1. Al-Qaeda, [28] 2. Afghan Taliban 3. Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) 4. Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM) 5. Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM) 6. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)[29]
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Sipah-e-Mohammad
A Shiite extremist outfit, Sipah-e Muhammad was founded by Maulana Abbas Yazdani in 1993 with an aim to counter the Sipah-e-Sahaba’s anti-Shiite militancy in Pakistan. Yazdani broke away from the Tehreek- e-Jafaria after believing the outfit was unable to counter Sipah-e- Sahaba’s activism.[30] After his murder in 1996, Yazdani was succeeded by Ghulam Raza Naqvi. Naqvi and another leader of Sipah-e-Mohmmad Munawar Abbas Alvi have been in prison on murder charges.[31] The group follows the Shiite ideology. It is believed to receive financial support from Iran and other local Shiite organizations.[32] The outfit was banned in Pakistan on 14 Aug 2001.
Recruitment and Operations
The organization’s recruitment sources are largely unknown but some young people from the Imamia Students have joined the group.[33] It mainly operates in Punjab, Pakistan. The outfit has participated in several targeted killings and robbery.[34]
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)
The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was founded by Malik Ishaq, Akram Lahori, and Riaz Basra in 1996 as a breakaway faction from the Sipah-e- Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). These hardliners considered their parent outfit SSP too soft against the Shiites. LeJ has been one of the most brutal anti- Shiite terrorist groups in Pakistan.[35] Its founding commander Akram Lahori had joined the SSP in 1990. He is suspected of involvement in Shiite massacres in Pakistan.[36]
Another founding member of LeJ was Riaz Basra who had been associated with the SSP since 1985. Basra contested elections from Lahore for the provincial assembly seat in 1988, but lost. Later, he moved to Afghanistan to receive terrorist training in camps run by Harkatul Mujahideen. Basra was first arrested for the murder of a Shiite leader Syed Sikandar Shah and Sadiq Ganji – a director at an Iranian
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Religious Extremism Review cultural center in Lahore.[37] He escaped from police custody during the hearing of the case.
The third founding leader of LeJ was Malik Ishaq. Ishaq served in detention for over a decade for many counts of homicide and killings. However, he was subsequently released in 2011 due to lack of evidence. After a massive bombing targeting the Hazara Shiites in Quetta in Jan 2013, Ishaq was arrested and released again. On 29 Jul 2015, Ishaq along with his two sons and eleven other militants were killed by the police during an encounter in Muzaffargarh, Punjab.[38]
Sectarian Ideology
LeJ believes in an extremist version of Sunni faith and considers the Shiites as ‘infidel’ and justifies their killings. It has been involved in assassinating Shiite leaders and professionals in Pakistan. Many of its former and present members had participated in the anti-Soviet jihad.
Organizational Structure:
LeJ is known as a group of secrecy. It mainly consists of sub-unit of 5-8 men with one of them as the leader. A sub-unit operates in a specific area. Lack of communication among different sub-units makes it hard for the authorities to track their actions and movements. It is believed a sub- unit is divided and reconstituted in another secret place after carrying out assaults.
Funding Resources
Reports suggest the LeJ receives funding from private sources in the Arab countries. A number of Karachi-based businesspeople are also suspected of being LeJ supporters. Besides, the group also raises funds to finance its terrorist activities by resorting to crimes.[39] The outfit was proscribed by the Musharraf regime on 14 Aug 2001.
Recruitment:
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The LeJ leadership is primarily based in Punjab, and secondly in Balochistan. The group recruits footsoldiers from Deobandi seminaries across Pakistan. It has carried out deadly terrorist attacks against Shiite leaders and practitioners through the country.[40]
Areas of Operation:
During the 1990s, the LeJ fought alongside the Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Following the fall of the Taliban regime, the LeJ returned to focus on targeting Shiites in Pakistan. In recent years, the LeJ has specifically targeted the Shiite Hazara community in Quetta. Their operations stretch from the tribal regions to metropolitans like Karachi, Quetta, etc.[41] According to latest reports, the LeJ has developed links with Daesh.[42]
Jaish-e-Muhammad
Maulana Masood Azhar founded the Jaish-e-Mohammad in 2000, soon after his release on 31 Dec 1999 as a result of hostage-swap operation following the hijacking of the Indian Airline Flight IC-814.[43] The hijacked airline was forced to land in Kandahar, Afghanistan. A former general secretary of Harkatul Mujahideen, Azhar was born in 1968 in Bahawalpur, Punjab. He joined the corps of anti-Soviet “freedom fighters” during the 1980s, and later joined a religious seminary as a teacher. He preached jihad in Sindh province. In 1994, while he was on an insurgency mission in the Jammu and Kashmir, he was captured by the Indian authorities. India released him as during a hostage swap on 31 Dec 1999, following the hijacking of the Indian Airline Flight IC-814. Most of the outfit’s leaders are former members of Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM).
Structure of the Organization
Jaish-e-Mohammed maintains offices in different cities of Pakistan as well as in Jammu and Kashmir. These offices also serve as schools of
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Funding Sources
Prior to 2002, the group reportedly received donations from Al-Qaeda. However, over the years the outfit has diversified its sources of financing. It also receives funds through charities. The JeM’s charity wing Al-Rehmat Trust seeks donations for carrying out social work and building of mosques.[45] JeM was proscribed by Pakistan in 2002
Recruitment
JeM mainly hires members from semi-urban areas and seminaries. The outfit has organized many recruitment rallies in Pakistan since 2002, calling on the youth to take the path of jihad. Besides, it also recruits members internationally from Kashmiris and Pakistani immigrants in the UK. A considerable number of Afghan national are also part of the group.
Ideology
JeM is a Deobandi extremist outfit that seeks freedom of Jammu and Kashmir from India and their accession with Pakistan. It also views India and the United States as significant threats to the Muslim world. In recent years, the group has also included sectarian minority groups to the list of its enemies.[46]
Areas of Operation
JeM is a Kashmir-centric jihad outfit. However, it has also been blamed for the attack on Indian parliament in 2001 and an assassination attempt on Pakistan’s former President Pervez Musharraf in 2003. Some reports suggest the group was also involved in the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Daniel Pearl in 2002.[47] It is believed to have links with Al- Qaeda, SSP, and LeJ.
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Lashkar-e-Taiba
Lashkar-e-Taiba operates mainly in the India-occupied Kashmir. It was formed in 1990 as a wing of ‘Markaz Al-Dawa wal Irshad’ (MDI) – an Islamist organization founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in 1987.[48] Saeed is the chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). He studied at Punjab University before graduating in Arabic language from the King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. He remained associated with several Saudi scholars and became a favorite of a noted Saudi scholar Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz.[49]Other important leaders of JuD include Zakiur-Rehman and Maulana Amir Hamza.[50]
Structure of the Organization
The LeT reportedly acts as the militant wing of JuD, and perpetuates insurgency against the Indian forces in Kashmir. JuD also engages in social and philanthropic activities in Pakistan which help it develop strong bonds with its target populations. In Pakistan, where the civilian government is perceived as corrupt, organizations like JuD virtually act as an alternative to the state and provide humanitarian services to people.[51]
Funding Sources:
JuD solicits financial support for its activities from its target population and like-minded philanthropists. Donation boxes with emblem of JuD decorate countless retail shops in Pakistan. Besides, the group also collects animal hides on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha. Saudi Arabia is also considered to be a donor of the outfit. JuD was first banned in Pakistan in Jan 2002.
Recruitment:
Headquartered in Muridke, the JuD runs a network of religious seminaries and other educational institutions that also serve as outlets for recruitment of new members. It owns one of the biggest seminaries in
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Pakistan. The organization has been notable in providing relief works to victims during natural disasters such as earthquake and flood. It believes in jihad primarily against India, but also against the US and Israel. JuD shares ideological similarities with Al-Qaeda. One of Al-Qaeda operatives, Abu Zubaida, was captured in 2002 from an LeT safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan is an extremist Deobandi group. It was established by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in Jhang, Punjab on 6 Sep 1985 with an aim to counter the Shiite influence and activism in Pakistan.[52] Many SSP leaders have served as elected members in the parliament. The outfit is currently headed by Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi.[53]
Ideology
The SSP follows a radical anti-Shiite ideology that declares the Shiites as non-Muslims. The outfit has also shown hostility against other Sunni sects such as Barelvi.[54] The ultimate purpose of the SSP is to declare Pakistan an exclusive Sunni state. The outfit also opposes Pakistan’s participation in the war on terror.
Organizational Structure
According to an estimate by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the outfit had around 5000-6000 members in 20014. During its initial years, it had a central executive board. It established offices in major cities in Pakistan. Currently, it maintains small urban chapters under local leaders.[55]
Funding Sources:
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The outfit has been receiving considerable funding from private sources in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It also collects donations and zakat from rich people in Pakistan.[56]
Proscription by the Government:
The government of Pakistan proscribed SSP on 14 Jan 2002, only to see it re-emerge with a changed name ‘Millat-e Islamia Pakistan’. It was again designated as a terrorist outfit in Sep 2003. Currently, it operates under the name of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ). ASWJ leaders contested polls both in 2013 and 2018 general elections in Pakistan.[57] The outfit mainly operates in Punjab and Balochistan.
Links
SSP has known relations with Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Jaish-e Muhammad, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The organization also has deep-rooted links with its offshoot Lashkar-e Jhangvi.
Tehreek Nifaz Shariat Mohmmadi (TNSM)
TNSM was established in Swat valley in 1994 by a religious leader Sufi Mohammad. TNSM abhors the democratic system and seeks to create a Shariah state in Pakistan with Islamic justice system.[58]
Leadership
Sufi Muhammad, the TNSM founder, was an active member of Jamaat- e-Islami (JI) in the 1980s which he quit in 1992. He was instrumental in mobilizing thousands of tribesmen for jihad in Afghanistan. With his outfit banned in 2009, he was put into detention. He was succeeded by his son-in-law Mullah Fazlullah, also known as ‘Mullah Radio’. Fazlullah later became the chief of TTP. Other prominent leaders of TNSM were MolviFaqir Mohammad and Maulana Liaqat.[59] The outfit operated in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
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Structure of the Organization
The outfit had an estimated 10,000 members in 2001, according to Pakistan Journal of History and Culture. The New York Times reported that they had a power of approximately 4,000 in 2004.[60]
Hizb-ul-Tahrir Pakistan (HuT)
Hizb-ul-Tahrir was founded by a Palestinian cleric and judge Taqiuddin Nabhani in Jerusalem in 1953 with the objective to unite Muslim states around the idea of an Islamic caliphate governed by Shariah. HuT has spread to over 40 countries including the US, the UK, and Pakistan since its inception.[61] In Pakistan, HuT Pakistan was set up by Imtiaz Malik in 2000.[62]
Leadership
Imtiaz Malik, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, was the founder of HuT. In the 1990s, Malik along with nine others travelled to Pakistan to establish HuT chapter in the country. His current status and location is unknown. The HuT’s spokesperson in Pakistan was Naveed Butt who was reportedly inspired by the outfit during his study in the United States. In May 2012, Butt was abducted by unidentified persons and has been missing since.[63] Similarly, another HuT leader Imran Yousafzai also went missing in 2012.[64] Very little is known about him. The HuT Pakistan’s deputy spokesman, Shehzad Sheikh, is believed to hail from Karachi where he reportedly act as a recruiter for the outfit. No more information is available about him.
Ideology:
HuT seeks to create Islamic caliphate run by Shariah laws in countries like Pakistan, and abolish democracy.[65]
Structure of the Organization
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HuT reportedly operates in over 50 countries including the U.S, the UK, Russia, Germany, Turkey, Bangladesh, Australia, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. It has a massive global network, and boasts over a million members worldwide.
Funding Sources:
HuT’s financial operations are largely unknown. However, they are believed to be financed by donations and contributions from their Middle Eastern and UK branches. HuT’s London office is reportedly most active in raising funds. HuT is proscribed in many countries. Pakistan proscribed it in 2004.[66]
Jaish-e-Islam
JeI was formed in 2004 by Mufti Munir Shakir who ran an illegal radio station in Bara. The objective of JeI was to establish Shariah in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.[67] Shakir was succeeded by Mangal Bagh who was previously a driver by profession. JeI believes in suppression of women and harbors hatred against Shiites and Ahmadis.[68]
Funding Sources:
The outfit mainly got funding through smuggling of goods at the Pak- Afghan border. After a security crackdown in 2009 cut their smuggling routes, the group’s revenues nosedived. It is also believed to extract funds through kidnappings for ransom.[69] The outfit has been banned in Pakistan. In Mar 2009, JeI claimed responsibility for blowing up the shrine of famous Pashto poet Rehman Baba near Peshawar.[70] In Jun 2010, it had an armed confrontation with TTP terrorists which left 25 people dead.[71]
Shia Tulba Action Committee (STAC)
The Shia Tulba Action Committee was founded in Pakistan’s northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan. The outfit claims to protect the persecuted
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Shiite community in Pakistan. The exact date of its formation is unknown. The group subscribes to Shiite Muslim faith. It was proscribed on 10 Oct 2011. Its prominent leaders and activists include:
1. Allama Mirza Yusuf Hussain 2. Syed Sagheer Abid Razavi 3. Syed Ali Aosat 4. Sohail Mirza and 5. Hasan SagheerAbidi 6. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)[72]
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was created as a reaction to the banning of Adolat Islamic Party by Uzbek Prime Minister Islam Karimov in early 1990s. The IMU’s founding members were Taher Yaldashev and Namagani. The movement developed during and following the civil war in Tajikistan.[73]
Leadership
The IMU command was controlled by Yuldashev, Namangani and then by Usmon Adil. Yuldashev was a renowned young mullah in the underground Islamic movement and he was 24 years old at the time he founded the IMU.[74] Yuldashev settled in South Waziristan after the US invasion of Afghanistan. Soon, he became famous among the local people for his fiery speeches at local mosques. Yuldashev was killed in a drone strike. After his death, Usmon Adil, another Uzbek Islamist took the charge of IMU. He was also killed in drone strike in 2012.[75] Pakistan proscribed IMU in Mar 2013.
Recruitment:
In its early days, its recruits were purely Uzbeks who operated mainly in Central Asia and northern Afghanistan. The US invasion of Afghanistan forced them to move into Pakistan’s tribal areas. Besides, Uzbeks the outfit also has members from Tajik and Turkmen people.[76]
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Funding Sources:
During the movement’s initial years, Yuldashev travelled to various countries like Turkey to seek political and financial support for his outfit. At that time, some countries did provide aid to the IMU. Al-Qaeda also extended financial and material support to it.[77]
Areas of Operation
Pakistan, Russia, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.[78]
Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF)
The FIF was established as a charity wing of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) in 1990.[79] It has been banned in Pakistan.
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)
The JuA came into being in 2014 as a faction of TTP. The split was spearheaded by former TTP commander Omar Khalid Khorasani after he developed differences with Mullah Fazlullah.[80] Other prominent leader of JuA is Ehsanullah Ehsan who served as the TTP spokesman.[81]
Funding Sources:
JuA has reportedly been receiving support from the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). It carries out attacks against the interests of Pakistani state.[82] The outfit recruits members from tribal regions including Mohmand, Khyber, Charsada, and Peshawar, and Bajaur etc.[83]
Major Attacks:[84]
The group carried out twin bombings, killing at least six people in the Mohmand Agency in Nov 2014. Later, it attacked a Roman Catholic
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Church in Lahore that left 15 people dead and around 70 wounded in Mar 2015. The outfit seeks to impose Shariah in Pakistan.
Al-Rashid Trust (ART)
Al Rashid Trust was established as an Islamic humanitarian organization in 1996. It opened 21 offices in Pakistan and also expanded its presence to Chechnya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan as a counterweight to Western- funded NGOs whom it considers as ‘enemies of Islam’. The ART provided funds to the Taliban and other similar organizations as relief packages.[85] Headquartered in Karachi, the organization also publishes a newspaper called ‘Zarb-e-Momin’.[86]
Funding Sources:
The Pakistani diasporas in the Middle East and the UK are major sources of funding for the ART. It also raises significant amounts of revenue locally in Pakistan.[87] The organization has been proscribed by Pakistan, the US, and the UN.
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References:
[1] https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Proscribed-OrganizationEng.pdf
[2]https://www.rand.org/topics/the-islamic-state-terrorist-organization.html
[3] https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant
[4]https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi
[5]https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant
[6]https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi
[7]https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abu-hamza-al-muhajir-zarqawis-mysterious- successor-aka-abu-ayub-al-masri
[8]https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/tag/abu-umar-al-baghdadi/
[9]https://www.samaa.tv/tag/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/
[10]Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. “The List established and maintained by the Al- Qaida Sanctions Committee with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida.” The United Nations. 2 Jun. 2014. Web. 25 Jun. 2014; Department of Public Information. “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends Entry of One Entity on its Sanctions List.” The United Nations, 30, May. 2013. Web. 25 Jun. 2014.
[11]https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/whos-funding-isis-wealthy-gulf- angel-investors-officials-say-n208006
[12]https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/isis
[13]https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/isis#rhetoric
[14] https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan
[15]https://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Baitullah-profile-Manzar-LWJ- 09302008.pdf
[16]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/07/baitullah-mehsud-profile
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[17]https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/12/08/fazlullahs-appointment-causes-rifts- among-ttp-ranks/
[18] https://www.dawn.com/news/1053410/pakistani-taliban-chief-hakimullah-mehsud- killed-in-drone-attack
[19] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8219223.stm
[20] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-taliban-leader-mullah-fazlullah-killed- us-drone-strike-afghanistan/
[21]http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/105#note28
[22]http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/105#note28
[23]https://ctc.usma.edu/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan/
[24]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban- pakistan#note28
[25]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ttp.htm
[26]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban- pakistan#note28
[27]https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-ttp
[28]https://ctc.usma.edu/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan/
[29]https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-ttp
[30]http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SMP.htm
[32]Mujtaba Rathore, MasrorHausen, Amir Rana, Safdar Sial and Abdul Mateen. Profiling the Violence in Karachi. Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2, Number 3. July-Sept 2009. Page number 17
[33]https://dopel.org/organizations.htm
[34]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SMP.htm
[35]https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database/lashkar-e-jhangvi-2000
[36] https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm
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[37]https://www.dawn.com/news/1063116/dawn-features-may-15-2002#3
[38]https://www.samaa.tv/news/2015/07/malik-ishaq-among-14-killed-in-police- encounter/
[39]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm
[40]https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/legacy_files/files/publication/120709_Mufti_ReligionMilitancy_Web.pdf
[41]https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20982987
[42]https://nation.com.pk/26-Oct-2016/lej-collaborated-with-isis-for-quetta-attack
[43]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e _mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm
[44]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jaish-e- mohammed#highlight_text_9343
[45]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jaish-e- mohammed#highlight_text_9343
[46]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm
[47]https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ec248692.html
[48]https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Lashkar-e- Tayyiba.aspx
[49]https://ctc.usma.edu/lashkar-i-tayyiba-remains-committed-to-jihad/
[50]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/lashkar-e- taiba#highlight_text_12554
[51]https://ctc.usma.edu/the-fighters-of-lashkar-e-taiba-recruitment-training- deployment-and-death/
[52]https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/147
[53]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm
[54]https://islamqa.info/en/answers/22473/deobandis
[55]https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/147
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[57]https://tribune.com.pk/story/456294/list-of-banned-organisations-in-pakistan/
[58]https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/411.
[59]http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical%20No-5.pdf
[60]http://www.dopel.org/TNSM.htm
[61]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm
[62]https://tribune.com.pk/story/417593/hizbut-tahrir-and-the-army/
[64] https://tribune.com.pk/story/230273/missing-persons-case-court-miffed-by-isis- lack-of-serious-efforts/
[65]https://www.newstatesman.com/node/195464
[66]https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/07/22/ban-on-hizb-ut-tahrir/
[67]http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/445#note1
[68]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm
[69]https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/445
[70]https://www.dawn.com/news/937533
[71]https://jamestown.org/program/the-fm-mullahs-and-the-talibans-propaganda-war- in-pakistan/
[72]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement- uzbekistan
[73]https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/search?q=islamic+movement+of+uzbekistan
[74]https://www.academia.edu/1214053/The_Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan_IMU _
[75]https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27801257
[76]https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-movement-uzbekistan-roundtable/25405614.html
[77]https://www.academia.edu/1214053/The_Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan_IMU _
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[78]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement- uzbekistan
[79]http://tns.thenews.com.pk/jamaat-ud-dawa-finding-relief-in-jihad-through-falah-e- insaniat-foundation/#.XOZ9yU43mUm
[80]https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jamaat-ul-ahrar-ja
[81] https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2016/01/jamaat-ul-ahrar-jua/
[82]http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=955.
[83]http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/taliban_splinter_gro.php
[84]https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2016/01/jamaat-ul-ahrar-jua/
[85]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al- Rashid_Trust.htm
[86]http://www.alkalam.pk/ebooks_htm/ebooks_02.htm
[87]https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al- Rashid_Trust.htm
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Pak-Iran Relations & the Problem of Cross-border Militancy
Liaqat Ali
Pakistan and Iran share common history, faith, and culture. Their bilateral relations have seen ups and downs over decades. Their 900-km long common border often serves as a point of attraction for criminal and militant activities. The border area has been ripe for human trafficking and smuggling of petroleum products. Illegal immigrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan mostly take the Iranian route to reach Europe via Turkey. On the other hand, Iranian petro products regularly make their way into Pakistan through smuggling. Pakistan’s Balochistan province is a huge market for smuggled Iranian oil. However, what creates tension between the two countries is the cross border movement of militants. Both sides have accused each other of supporting or sheltering militants against each other. Iran complains that Pakistan is not doing enough to contain anti-Iran militants that allegedly operate from Pakistani soil. Pakistan, on its part, blames Iran for the same.
Just earlier this year, Pakistan lodged a strongly-worded protest with Iran over the killing of 14 Pakistani security personnel in the Ormara area of Balochistan. Pakistan’s Foreign Office conveyed a letter of protest to the Iranian Embassy in Islamabad, and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi called his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif to protest. On 20 Apr 2019, Qureshi said Pakistan had credible information that the training and logistics camps of the Baloch terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the attack were based on the Iranian side of the border. Pakistan’s allegations came just days before Prime Minister Imran Khan was due to visit Iran.
The Pak-Iran relations had a warm start as Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan’s sovereign status after the latter’s independence. During the 1970s when Pakistan was facing a Baloch sub-nationalist insurgency, Iran came forward to help Pakistan put down the insurgency for their mutual benefit. Iran’s Sistan-e-Balochistan province is home to
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Sunni Baloch who resent Tehran’s discrimination against its Sunni citizens particularly the ethnic Baloch minority. Iran also supported Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971.
However, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 drastically changed the political and security dynamics in the region. In Iran, the pro-West Shah was deposed and replaced by Khomeini, a religious hardliner who adopted an aggressive foreign policy towards the United States. To make matters worse, a group of Iranian revolutionaries stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and took 52 American diplomats and other citizens hostage on 4 Nov 1979. It became the longest hostage crisis in recorded history as it lasted for 444 days. The crisis formally laid the foundation of hostility between the US and Iran.
On the other hand, Pakistan came closer to the United States during the same time. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the US formed a trio to push the Red Army back from Afghanistan. The Zia regime whipped up the fears of communist expansion, driving the Saudis and Americans to commit funds for the Afghan jihad. However, Pakistan’s policy of welcoming the US presence in the region during the 1980s did not sit well with Tehran. Another factor that upset the Pak-Iran relations was the exclusion of Shia militias from the Afghan jihad. Saudi Arabia which was a major stakeholder in the Afghan war favored the exclusion of Shia militias from training and funding. They were left to be taken care of by Iran.
During the 1990s, Pakistan and Iran again found themselves on opposing sides in Afghanistan. Pakistan backed the Taliban who in turn aroused Iran’s suspicion and discomfort by clamping down on Shiite populations in Afghanistan. Iran extended support to the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance. In 1998, the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif triggered a war-like situation as Iran mobilized its army on the Afghan border. A public rally in Iran accused Pakistan of being responsible for the murder of their diplomats. Pakistan denied the allegation. It was
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Religious Extremism Review reported that the diplomats were killed by some unruly Taliban elements following the takeover of Mazar.
In recent years, Iran has been inching closer to India. Their bilateral agreements in trade, energy, and infrastructure etc have led to a growing Indian presence on the Iranian soil. The strengthening of ties between Iran and India has caused considerable security concerns in Islamabad. Official quarters in Pakistan see the Indian expansion in its west as an attempt at Pakistan’s strategic encirclement by India. India’s deep engagement in the post-Taliban Afghanistan has frequently been blamed for the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan. Pakistan has been accusing India of fomenting unrest in Balochistan through its consulates in Afghanistan.
Currently, Pakistan is worried that India is doing the same from Iran. This fear magnified after Pakistani authorities nabbed an Indian national, Kulbushan Jhadav, from Balochistan province in Mar 2016. Jhadav was later identified as a serving officer of Indian navy who worked for the Indian intelligence agency RAW. In a confessional statement to Pakistani authorities, Jhadav said he planned and carried out subversive activities in Balochistan. Following his arrest, Balochistan’s Home Minister Sarfaraz Bugti claimed Jhadav provided finances to the terrorists in Balochistan and Karachi. According to Jhadav’s confession, he operated from the Iranian port city of Chahbahar, and maintained relations with the Iranian intelligence. India’s investment in the construction of Chahbahar port has stressed the Pak-Iran relations.
However, no country has factored in the Pak-Iran relations as much as Saudi Arabia. In Dec 2015, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of what it called the Islamic military alliance against terrorism. Officially known as ‘Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition’, the Saudi-led security alliance comprised 41 member states. The alliance is believed to be the brainchild of the ambitious Saudi prince, Mohammad bin Salman. Iran was excluded from the group. The alliance claims it seeks global peace and elimination of terrorism. Iran, however, believes the coalition has been put together with Iran in mind. Later in Jan 2017, Saudi Arabia
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Religious Extremism Review appointed Raheel Sharif, a former Pakistan military chief, to head the coalition. Though the coalition has largely been insignificant since its inception, nevertheless it has served to widen the trust deficit between Pakistan and Iran.
A problematic border region
The most prominent factor which triggers tension between Pakistan and Iran is the cross-border movement of militants. Iran alleges that terrorist groups such as Jandullah and Jaish-ul-Adle carry out terrorist attacks in its border regions from their safe havens on Pakistani side. Jandullah and Jaish-ul-Adle (both believed to be Al-Qaeda affiliates) target personnel of the Iranian border security, often triggering a standoff between Pakistani and Iranian forces. Jandullah and Jaish-ul-Adle are Sunni extremist groups that oppose Tehran’s repression of its Sunni citizens in regions like Sistan-Balochistan. Iran’s stance on the border issue, at times, been marked by frustration and warning towards Pakistan. In 2014, anti-Iran militants kidnapped five Iranian border guards and allegedly transported them to Pakistan. Following the incident, Iran’s Interior Minister AbdolrezaRahmani accused Pakistan of inaction against the militias. Pakistan refuted the allegation.
Similarly, General Soleimani, a commander of Iran’s revolutionary guards, has criticized Pakistan for not taking sufficient actions against the anti-Iran militants that allegedly operate from the Pakistani side. Soleimani, who is famed in Iran for his efforts against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, once threatened that Iran would take direct action against the terrorists if Pakistan was unable to do so. The General went as far as to accuse Pakistan of playing Saudi’s proxy against Iran. Such war of words between Pakistan and Iran, mostly triggered by militancy on the borders, increasingly push the two countries apart.
Pakistan, on its part, accuses Iran of allowing India to use the Iranian soil instigating separatist insurgency in the troubled Balochistan province. Several Baloch separatist groups have been fighting the law enforcement
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Religious Extremism Review agencies in the province since the early 2000s. Pakistan’s Baloch problem worsened after a noted Baloch tribal head and politician, Akbar Khan Bugti, was killed in a military operation in Aug 2006. Security operations have largely suppressed the insurgency, but it has not died down completely. And Pakistan blames the Indian presence in Afghanistan and Iran for the problem.
In Aug 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a reference to Balochistan during his Independence Day speech in New Delhi. Later, a suspected Indian intelligence operative was caught in Balochistan who confessed to having been involved in promoting insurgency in Pakistan. These factors cemented Pakistan’s apprehensions about Indian presence in Iran. Pakistan’s army chief, General Raheel Sharif, took up the matter of KalbushanJhadav with the Iranian president during the latter’s official visit to Pakistan in Mar 2016. The arrest of the Jhadav was an embarrassment for Iran as Pakistan had always maintained that Baloch militants linked to BLA and BRA were sheltered in Iran. Pakistan maintains that Iranian authorities are aware of the movement and whereabouts of these militant groups.
In April, Pakistan experienced one of the deadliest attacks from Baloch separatists in Balochistan. On 18 Apr 2019, suspected Baloch militants intercepted several passenger buses on a highway near the coastal area of Ormara. The militants checked the passengers’ IDs and offloaded 14 passengers. Those taken out were lined up and executed in cold blood. The victims were personnel of Pakistan’s armed forces. An alliance of Baloch militant groups called BRAS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack. The incident drew a strong reaction from Islamabad which blamed Iran-based militants for the massacre. Pakistan claimed the terrorists had fled to Iran after carrying out the deadly attack. Pakistan’s Foreign Office sent a protest letter to the Iranian Embassy in Islamabad, and the foreign minister called his Iranian counterpart to lodge a protest. Few days after the Ormara attack, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Iran with the cross-border terrorism on the
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Religious Extremism Review top of his agenda. In Tehran, PM Khan and Iranian President Rouhani agreed to form a joint “Quick Reaction Force” to tackle the shared problem of cross-border militancy and terrorism. Commenting on the proposed force, the Iranian president, however, said:
“Both sides would benefit from it. I don’t expect it to be a separate force per se but rather a mechanism for sharing intelligence on what is happening in the area… Iranian border forces won’t tolerate a Pakistani command and Pakistani forces won’t tolerate an Iranian command. It will be a consultative body, I believe”.
Jandullah:
Jundallah is a Sunni militant group that fights against the Iranian regime for suppressing Iran’s Sunni Baloch in the Sistan-Balochistan region. It was founded by an Iranian Baloch Abdul Malik Regi in 2003. It has roughly about 1000 men with explosives and small weapons in the Sistan-Balochistan that border Pakistani Balochistan. Its power is derived primarily from the local Iranian Baloch people. Its declared objective is autonomy for the Baloch in Iran. Jandullah militants mostly target Iranian revolutionary guards through guerilla warfare. It has carried out suicide attacks, assassinations, bombings, and targeted killings in Iran. In 2014, Jandullah declared allegiance with TTP and Daesh. Iran claims the group is funded by the US and UK to instigate instability in Iran.
Jandullah began actively attacking Iranian targets in 2005. In one of their initial attacks, the Jandullah militants ambushed the motorcade of Iranian President Ahmedinejad in 2005. The president remained safe. On 16 Mar 2006, the group blocked a road near Tasooki in Sistan-Balochistan and killed 22 civilians. Likewise, on August 19 2007, Jandullah militants abducted 21 Iranian truck drivers near Chahbahar and took them to Pakistan. The Pakistani forces responded by arresting the kidnappers and freeing the drivers after a fierce gunbattle. On June 13 2008, the militants struck again. They abducted 16 Iranian police officers from Sarawan
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Religious Extremism Review district of Sistan-Baluchistan and transported them to Pakistan where some of them were killed.
Iran executed Jandullah’s founder Abdul Malik Regi in June 2010. A month later, the group carried out two suicide attacks, targeting members of revolutionary guards at a mosque in Zahedan. The group claimed the attacks were a revenge for Regi’s death. Regi’s execution dealt a blow to the militant group. It split into two factions namely Jaish-ul-Adle and Harkatul Ansar Iran. Both splinter outfits drew their manpower from Jandullah.
Jaish-al-Adl
Jaishul Adl is the most active Sunni terrorist group operating in Sistan- Balochistan. It killed 14 Iranian border guards near the Pak-Iran border in Oct 2013. Five months later, its militants abducted five Iranian soldiers and took them to Pakistan. Later, four of the soldiers were released while the fifth one was killed. On 26 Apr 2017, Jaishul Adl ambushed a group of Iranian border patrol near Pakistani border, killing nine and injuring several others. In Oct 2018, the group took 12 Iranian security personnel from Zahedan and shifted them to the Pakistani side. Pakistan helped recover some of the kidnapped Iranians. One of their deadliest attacks came in Feb 2019 when a Jaish suicide bomber hit a bus carrying the members of Iran’s revolutionary guards. At least 27 people were killed and 13 wounded.
India in Iran
The problem of cross-border terrorism has afflicted bilateral ties between Pakistan and Iran for years. India’s growing presence in Iran has further compounded Pakistan’s security worries. India has invested heavily in the construction of the Chahbahar port that many view as counterweight to the Gwadar port. In 2003, Iran and India signed a defense pact that allow Iran significant reach to the Indian defense technologies, joint military exercises, up-gradation of defense systems, and establishment of
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Traditionally, Pakistan has mostly been concerned about the security of its eastern borders with India. But, now with India effectively present in its west in Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistan fears India is attempting to strategically encircle Pakistan. Pakistani defense circles believe if Pakistan deploys its troops on both eastern and western borders it would become weaker militarily which would ultimately benefit India. Therefore, peaceful western borders with Iran and Afghanistan are indispensable for Pakistan’s security.
On the other hand, Iran is also skeptical about Pakistan’s close relations with Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom’s financial and ideological influence is a cause of concern for Iran. The country has indispensable financial stakes in the Kingdom because the bulk of Pakistan’s foreign remittances come from Saudi Arabia. Lately, the issue of gas pipeline has also stressed the ties between Pakistan and Iran. Iran believes Pakistan halted its part of the project under Saudi pressure rather than international sanctions against Iran. Pakistan has arranged an alternative to the Iranian gas by importing gas from Qatar.
Squeezed between two regional rivals
Pakistan frequently finds itself caught in a difficult situation in the Saudi-Iran tussle. It has to balance its relations with the two regional rivals. Pakistan is a Sunni-majority state with a considerable Shiite population. Over decades especially since the Iranian revolution, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have made attempts to export their respective religious ideologies7 to Pakistan. Both have stakes and influence in the country. Therefore, Pakistan has exercised caution in its relations towards the two rivals. Notwithstanding the balancing efforts, Pakistan often ends up upsetting one or the other on some count.
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In 2015, Saudi Arabia requested Pakistan to provide troops for its war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Pakistani government put the matter before the parliament which debated the question for about four days and finally passed a resolution in favor of Pakistan’s neutrality on Yemen war. According to analysts, the Kingdom was considerably annoyed with Pakistan’s neutral stance. Pakistan feared becoming a party in the war between Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels backed by Iran could invite sectarian tensions in the country because there are an estimated 35 million Shiites in Pakistan.
However, three years later Pakistan sent over 1000 troops to Saudi Arabia. In Feb 2018, Pakistan army announced the sending of the troops. The army said the troops were on a training and advisory mission. It also clarified that no Pakistani troop would be deployed outside the kingdom. Many politicians in Pakistan were shocked by the decision because it clearly contradicted the parliament’s resolution of maintaining neutrality on Saudi-Yemen conflict. Some security analysts speculate that the real behind the sending of the troops was to help protect the royal family which was probably feeling vulnerable after Prince Mohammad bin Salman launched a crackdown against some very powerful members of the royal family on charges of corruption.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been competing for hegemony in the region. Both want self-serving governments in their neighbors and indulge in intense proxy wars. And Pakistan gets caught in the middle. Deadly proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere have caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, not to mention the radicalization on sectarian grounds in regional countries including Pakistan.
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Counter-militancy efforts
It is virtually impossible for Pakistan and Iran to completely man their 900-kilometer long porous border which is the reason the militants operating in the border regions always manage to cross over to either side. The cross-border movement of the militants has often brought the security forces of the two countries eye ball to eye ball. Though the two sides have often demonstrated their seriousness in tackling the militancy issue and addressing the other’s grievances, yet the mutual trust deficit continues. In 2008, Pakistan handed over Hamid Regi, brother of Malik Regi and a key commander of Jandullah, to Iran. The move was seen as a remarkable instance of bilateral cooperation against cross-border terrorism. In 2018, both countries signed an MoU to contain the illegal movement of people and goods on the borders.
Earlier this month, Pakistan announced the formation of a new security command structure in the Turbat city of Balochistan with the purpose of boosting the effectiveness of troop deployment at the Pak-Iran border. The two sides have already agreed on setting up border centers under which the patrolling on both sides would be synchronized. A proposal for aerial surveillance of the borders is also on the cards in order to prevent cross border movement of militants and criminals.
Need for joint efforts
The border issue has often stressed the ties between the two neighbors. There is a chronic trust deficit between Pakistan and Iran on the question of cross-border militancy. The two countries should start by building mutual trust. They should adopt a holistic strategy for bilateral cooperation regarding their border issues. The Iranian forces have more than once crossed over into Pakistani territory allegedly in pursuit of militants. Such a reckless approach is bound to invite resentment from Islamabad. Therefore, the sovereignty and territorial limits of both countries must be honored by both sides.
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Most importantly, however, both Pakistan and Iran must not allow militant groups, criminals, and other non-state actors to use their territory against the other. Denying space to militants of all shades is in the interest of both Pakistan and Iran in the long run. Using or supporting extremist militant groups for short-term strategic purposes is always fraught with great security risks. Therefore, both countries should resist the temptation of supporting or sheltering proxies against each other. Pakistan is in a tougher position viz-a-viz Iran because it has to do a delicate balancing in its relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The latter is one of the largest markets for Pakistani labor, and a top source of foreign remittance. Besides, the kingdom has often bailed Pakistan out of financial crises through cash payments and deferred payments on oil supplies to Pakistan. Ideologically too, Pakistan is more tilted towards Saudi Arabia.
Currently, Pakistan is facing an economic crisis. The country is negotiating a bailout package with the IMF. With its economy tottering, Pakistan tends to look more towards Saudi Arabia for financial help. However, despite these challenges, Pakistan must tread with caution and avoid over engagement with the kingdom as far as possible. The parliament’s 2015 decision of neutrality on Saudi-Yemen war was a hard but prudent one. Neutrality should be maintained for greater security interests. Pakistan is already facing violent extremism. It cannot afford to become a fuel in the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has already suffered too much from the Iran-Saudi tug of war.
Likewise, Iran must also address Pakistan’s grievances regarding cross- border terrorism. No doubt, as a sovereign nation Iran has every right to maintain relations with other countries including India. But the fact that an Indian intelligence operative confesses to having used the Iranian soil against Pakistan raises many questions about India’s presence in Iran. It is surely unlikely that Iran is oblivious of India’s intentions or activities on its soil. Pakistan has long maintained that the insurgency in its Balochistan province is fuelled by India. Therefore, Iran must address
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Pakistan’s genuine security concerns regarding India. The two countries need more diplomatic engagement to discuss bilateral issues and common interests. Lastly, Pakistan and Iran are unlikely to establish good relations as long as the Afghan issue lingers on. These two countries should support peace efforts for an inclusive Afghanistan where no segment of Afghan society is left out of the mainstream.
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References:
1. https://www.dawn.com/news/884966 2. http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Report_PT_March_12_2018.pdf 3. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/pakistans-approach-to- navigating_the-saudi-iranian-split.pdf 4. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 5. https://www.mepc.org/journal/understanding-pakistans-relationship-iran 6. https://www.dawn.com/news/1139502 7. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190420-pakistan-asks-iran-to-act-on- militants-behind-baluchistan-killings/ 8. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/460723-hubs-of-terrorists-who-killed-pak- security-men-based-in-iran-qureshi 9. https://www.mepc.org/journal/understanding-pakistans-relationship-iran 10. https://jamestown.org/program/briefs-299/ 11. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1072455/terror-purge-forces-nab-indian-spy-in- balochistan/ 12. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/08/08/pakistan-iran-relations-india-factor/ 13. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/08/08/pakistan-iran-relations-india-factor/ 14. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/regional-rivalries-threaten- iran-pakistan-relations 15. http://embassies.mofa.gov.sa/sites/usa/EN/PublicAffairs/Statements/Pages/Joi nt-Statement-on-the-Formation-of-the-Islamic-Military-Alliance.aspx 16. https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/islamic-military-coalition-holds-first- meeting-in-riyadh-1.1698994 17. https://www.geo.tv/latest/126414-defence-minister-Asif-confirms-Raheel- Sharifs-appointment-to-Islamic-military-alliance-saudi-arabia-led 18. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/international/pakistan/paks-raheel-sharif- appointed-chief-of-saudi-led-military-coalition 19. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/pakistans-approach-to- navigating_the-saudi-iranian-split.pdf 20. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1453301/iranian-border-forces-fire-3-mortar- shells-pakistani-territory-near-panjgur/ 21. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/pakistans-approach-to- navigating_the-saudi-iranian-split.pdf 22. https://dailytimes.com.pk/368704/challenges-of-terrorism-along-pakistan-iran- borders/ 23. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/433253/General-Soleimani-to-Pakistanis- Saudi-Arabia-is-ruining-your
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24. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2019/02/23/Iran-s-Soleimani-Saudi- Arabia-wants-to-destroy-Pakistan-.html 25. http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13971202000751 26. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2019/02/23/Iran-s-Soleimani-Saudi- Arabia-wants-to-destroy-Pakistan-.html 27. https://www.mepc.org/journal/understanding-pakistans-relationship-iran 28. https://jamestown.org/program/briefs-299/ 29. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/pakistans-approach-to- navigating_the-saudi-iranian-split.pdf 30. https://dailytimes.com.pk/368704/challenges-of-terrorism-along-pakistan-iran- borders/ 31. https://www.dawn.com/news/1477075 32. https://nation.com.pk/19-Apr-2019/14-bus-passengers-martyred-in-ormara- terror-attack 33. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/460588-pakistan-lodges-protest-over- irans-inaction-against-terrorists-behind-ormara-incident 34. https://crssblog.com/baloch-militant-group-bras-targets-bus-passengers-kills- 14-on-makran-coastal-highway/ 35. https://fp.brecorder.com/2019/04/20190421466231/ 36. https://www.refworld.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=522ec5aa4&skip=0&query=Jundall ah&querysi=Jundallah%20profile&searchin=fulltext&sort=relevance 37. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-balochi-insurgents-and-iraq-tango 38. https://arynews.tv/en/ctd-arrests-hardened-terrorist-of-outlawed-jundullah- group/ 39. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062074140996374.ht ml 40. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 41. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jundullah-pakistan 42. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-is/pakistan-taliban- splinter-group-vows-allegiance-to-islamic-state-idUSKCN0J20YQ20141118 43. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 44. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/jundallah_kills_seni.php 45. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2010/07/16/jundallah-suicide-attack-targets- irans-revolutonary-guards-corps/ 46. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180927/31c68a20991b5a98b0dece4fd929c9c8.pd f
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47. https://www.academia.edu/7827995/The_Baluch_insurgency_linking_Iran_to _Pakistan 48. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2007/02/14/AR2007021400039.html 49. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2010/07/16/jundallah-suicide-attack-targets- irans-revolutonary-guards-corps/ 50. http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/02/16/iran.bombing/ 51. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2010/07/16/jundallah-suicide-attack-targets- irans-revolutonary-guards-corps/ 52. https://www.dawn.com/news/262289/iranian-hostages-freed-after-clash-with- militants 53. https://www.rferl.org/a/Iran_Rebels_Killed_16_Policemen/1356706.html 54. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2010/07/16/jundallah-suicide-attack-targets- irans-revolutonary-guards-corps/ 55. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180927/31c68a20991b5a98b0dece4fd929c9c8.pd f 56. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/nov/07/part-1-history-terrorism-against- iran 57. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8072795.stm 58. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8074978.stm 59. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm 60. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8312964.stm 61. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10655900 62. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-ethnic-baluch-insurgency-in-iran/ 63. https://nation.com.pk/14-Feb-2018/govt-bans-iran-based-jundallah-militant- group 64. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10729946/Iran- calls-for-return-of-abducted-border-guards-held-in-Pakistan.html 65. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10729946/Iran- calls-for-return-of-abducted-border-guards-held-in-Pakistan.html 66. https://www.refworld.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=522ec5aa4&skip=0&query=Jundall ah&querysi=Jundallah%20profile&searchin=fulltext&sort=relevance 67. http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/iran-sunni-baloch-insurgents-union-hezb-ul- forqan-strengthens-front-safavids/ 68. http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/iran-sunni-baloch-insurgents-union-hezb-ul- forqan-strengthens-front-safavids/ 69. https://www.france24.com/en/20190214-jaish-al-adl-shadowy-sunni- extremists-iran-pakistan-border
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70. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/06/rare-suicide-car-bombing- kills-people-iran-chabahar 71. https://www.dopel.org/jaishaladl.htm 72. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180927/31c68a20991b5a98b0dece4fd929c9c8.pd f 73. https://www.france24.com/en/20190214-jaish-al-adl-shadowy-sunni- extremists-iran-pakistan-border 74. http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82507932 75. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/iran-warns-pakistan-crack-jaish-al- adl-190216071021469.html 76. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/report-at-least-20-guard- personnel-killed-in-iran-bombing/2019/02/13/947b8336-2fa8-11e9-8781- 763619f12cb4_story.html 77. https://nation.com.pk/17-Apr-2018/the-indo-iran-syndrome-pakistan 78. https://www.mepc.org/journal/understanding-pakistans-relationship-iran 79. https://jamestown.org/program/briefs-299/ 80. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 81. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/regional-rivalries-threaten- iran-pakistan-relations 82. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 83. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 84. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/saudi-arabia-iran-battle-power- middle-east-n819041 85. https://qz.com/585647/how-the-shia-sunni-split-in-632ad-led-to-iran-and- saudi-arabias-power-games-today/ 86. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321385505_Will_the_Mideast’s_Ne w_Power_Matrix_Spark_Iran-Saudi_War 87. https://qz.com/585647/how-the-shia-sunni-split-in-632ad-led-to-iran-and- saudi-arabias-power-games-today/ 88. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 89. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/iran-backed-iraqi-militia-declares- support-for-houthis-1.748204 90. https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/iran-is-the-force-behind-the- houthis-the-world-should-hold-it-to-account-1.742825 91. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/saudi-arabia-iran-battle-power- middle-east-n819041
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92. https://eurasiantimes.com/pakistan-iran-to-create-joint-task-force-to-combat- terrorism 93. https://www.rt.com/news/457203-irans-president-rouhani-announces-joint/ 94. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2019/04/22/Iran-s-Rouhani- announces-joint-border-reaction-force-with-Pakistan.html 95. https://www.rt.com/news/457203-irans-president-rouhani-announces-joint/ 96. https://lubpak.net/archives/6290 97. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 98. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1866475/1-pakistan-iran-ink-mou-boosting- border-security/ 99. https://www.dawn.com/news/1442759 100. https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/04/20/593925/Pakistan-details-steps- Iran-border-security 101. https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/04/20/593925/Pakistan-details-steps- Iran-border-security 102. https://www.brecorder.com/2019/04/20/491157/pakistan-has-decided-to- fence-border-with-iran-announces-shah-mahmood-qureshi/ 103. https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Pakistan-boosts-border-protection-after- Iranian-based-attack-on-passengers-587727 104. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 105. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf 106. http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/23%20Iram%20Khalid_v31_no1_ja n-jun2016.pdf 107. https://dailytimes.com.pk/363684/managing-iran-pakistan-relations/ 108. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship. 109. https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers- 2010/05-Towards-Harmonization-of-Pak-Iran-Relationship.pdf
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A Dangerous Education
Rehmatullah
American educational philosopher Robert M. Hutchins once warned that “Education can be dangerous. It is very difficult to make it not dangerous. In fact, it is almost impossible. The only way you can prevent education from being dangerous is to try and develop an educational system in which the pupil is exposed to no ideas whatsoever”.[1] Education is one of the key factors that determines the making or breaking of a society. Education helps shape the collective thinking and worldview of a population. The educational content is, therefore, of critical importance for a country’s educational system. An education riddled with omissions and distortions of facts serves no purpose, apart from acting as an intellectual plague for a country. Such an education tends to create paranoia where everyone and everything is a suspect.
Pakistan’s public education is a case of what devastation a bad education can inflict on the intellectual capabilities of a society. Pakistan is one of the few countries that continue to suffer from a disturbing scale of religious extremism and high impact terrorism [2]. And this grim state of affairs has a critical relationship with the textbooks taught at public schools in the country.
Corrupting the Contents
The textbooks taught in public and private schools across Pakistan are riddled with distortions of historical accounts, omissions, and bits of truth mixed up with untruths. Many Pakistanis demonstrate a strong interest in their general history. The region forming Pakistan has an ancient past, stretching thousands of years back. The land was home to some of the earliest human civilizations such as Indus Valley and Gandhara. Some believe that people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture are like a tree without roots.[3] But, what if the history is corrupted with omissions and, sometimes, with falsities?
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People who are deprived of a true reading of their history tend to repeat the history of their predecessors.
In Pakistan, education has always been a rundown sector, where public investment is made more out of compulsion rather than preference. The nobility who control political power and national resources generally tend to educate their children in the West who often return to succeed their elders in power and politics. And the majority of the population is left at the mercy of a largely wrecked education system that indoctrinates pupils with a chronic paranoia about the world around them. Millions of children in Pakistan do not even go to schools, and end up as child laborers. A 2018 estimate puts the number of out-of-school children at 22.84 million [4]. But the issue of access to education pales when compared with the problem of contents taught at the educational institutions, public as well as private [5].
The radicalization of the textbooks and the propagation of Muslim faith as the sole national identity by the regime of President Zia-ul-Haq during the 1980s have had a devastating impact on the collective thinking and behavior of the society in Pakistan.[6] Zia, however, was not the first ruler to distort textbook contents. President Ayub Khan abolished history as a subject and replaced it with social studies for classes 1-8 and Pakistan Studies for classes 1-12. These subjects are a cocktail of history, geography, and economics etc.[7] The content fed into the raw minds of students has a direct bearing on the views and perceptions they develop later in life.[8]
Over years, three types of school systems have emerged in Pakistan; elite private schools, public schools and non-elite private schools, and the religious seminaries which provide different types of environments, teaching styles, exposures, and textbooks to their pupils.[9] President Zia went farthest in restructuring the education and rewriting the textbooks with Islamist overtones.[10] Pakistani historian K. K. Aziz has discussed how history subjects are taught to students in a distorted way.[11] His
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A study of the textbooks by SDPI in 2003 concluded that the “contents of the textbooks do not fulfill the values and objectives for the pursuance of a progressive nation.[12] Likewise, Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani physicist and critique of religious radicalism, sees the Pakistani education as part of problem rather than solution. He believes the textbooks taught to millions of young students across the country are a major driver of religious extremism.[13] Hoodbhoy laments what he sees as serious distortions of facts in the textbooks.[14] He believes there is a critical link between the pervasive extremist mindset in Pakistani society and the school curriculums taught to children.[15]
Image credit: Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy
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The Structure of Education
There are textbook boards at provincial levels that are responsible for curriculum till the 12th grade. Next, the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and universities manage the contents of the textbooks taught to the graduates. This is overseen by the federal education ministry. The basic educational structure is 7-layered:
1. Nursery 2. Primary (grades 1-5) 3. Middle (grades 6-8) 4. High school (grades 9-10) 5. Intermediate (grades 11-12) 6. College (grades 13-14 in most cases, except for 4-year programs) 7. Universities (15-upwards) [16]
Investing in Education
Source: The Global Economy Education Spending 2006-2018:
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Source: Trading Economicsn Education Education Spending 2006-2018:
Reforming the Curricula
Pakistan adopted its first public policy on education in 1959. Called the “National Education Policy”, it transferred the responsibility for primary education to the provinces. During the second 5-year plan (1960-65), primary and secondary curricula were revised, and “much emphasis was laid on Islamic studies and religious education. Later, the 1969 education policy sought to bridge the gap between general education and seminary education.[17] Islamic religious teachings were made integral parts of the new textbooks, and Islam was to be taught as the state religion.
However, most of the radicalization of the textbooks occurred under President Zia (1977-88) who embarked on an ambitious project to Islamize Pakistan as a state and society. He declared ‘Islamiat’ compulsory at all levels of education till college, and made seminary certificates equivalent to university degrees.[18] Many scholars believe Zia formally strengthened the foundation of religious extremism and Muslim exclusiveness in Pakistan. Several governments in Pakistan have attempted to undo Zia’s educational reforms, but in vain largely due to fear of backlash by religious extremists, says Prof. Hoodbhoy.[19)
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Demonizing the Hindus
The post-Zia textbooks are filled with radical contents that promote paranoid views about the Hindus. They are portrayed as untrustworthy despite the fact that Pakistan is home to millions of Hindus. Sometimes, the Hindus are equated with India. No wonder Pakistan’s Hindu community has been suffering persecution for years. Over the past decade, the news of forced conversions of Hindus by Muslims has frequently hit headlines in the country. A large number of Pakistani Hindu families have left the country to escape religious persecution. The textbooks project Islam as the exclusive faith of the Pakistani society at the disadvantage of other non-Muslim faiths. The Hindus and their faith are demonized through distortions in historical accounts. The textbooks blame Hindu conspiracy for the miserable condition of the Muslim community under the British Raj, and claim that British-Hindu conspiracy prevented the Muslims from progressing politically, economically, and socially in the undivided India.[20] A study of Pakistani textbooks titled “The Subtle Subversion” by the SDPI has identified the following major themes in the contents of public sector textbooks:
1. Pakistan is for Muslims alone; 2. Compulsory Islamic teachings including memorization of the Quran are included in all subjects, and taught to all the students, whatever their faith; 3. The Pakistani ideology is to be internalized as faith, 4. Hatred against Hindus and India; 5. Encouragement for jihad and martyrdom; [21]
The ideology of Pakistan has been a subject of debate among scholars since there is no record to show that Pakistan’s founder Mohmmad Ali Jinnah ever used the term. The term was coined much later when political parties began using it for political motives.[22] In contrast, while addressing the first constituent assembly in Aug 1947, Jinnah said:
“We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state … Now I think we should keep that in
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Religious Extremism Review front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the sense as citizens of the state. … You may belong to any caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state”.[23]
Many believe the anti-Hindu biases were largely absent from the textbooks before the Zia period.[24] In the initial few years, the contents of the textbooks were drastically different from what is taught today. For example:
1. The early history books contained chapters on not only on the ancient civilizations such as MoenjoDaro, Harappa, and Gandhara, etc, but also on the Hindu mythologies of Ramayana and Mahabharata and extensively covered, often with admiration, the great Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms of the Mauryas and the Guptas. 2. The textbooks did reflect biases while discussing the politics of Indian independence, but still they had chapters on Mr. M. K. Gandhi, using words of respect for him and admiring his qualities. 3. The creation of Pakistan was attributed to the intransigence of the All India Congress and its leadership rather than on ‘Hindu machinations’. 4. Some textbooks also clearly mentioned that many prominent Muslim religious leaders were bitterly opposed to the creation of Pakistan.[25]
However, criticality and balance in textbook contents were done away with after General Zia came to power in 1977. The Zia regime redesigned the books to inculcate religious biases and intolerance in the minds of the young generations. The primary purpose of the textbooks was to make students understand the differences between the Muslims and Hindus. The post-Zia textbooks attribute Pakistan’s creation to these religious differences.[26] They portray the Hindus in the following manner:
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1. The Hindus have always been an enemy of Islam (Class-5 Urdu book of Punjab textbook board, March 2002, Page 108).[27] 2. The Hindus made the British Raj believe that the Muslims were solely responsible for the war of independence of 1857 (Class-8 book of Punjab text book board, March 2002, Page 90).[28] 3. The British snatched all lands from Muslims and gave them to Hindus. (Class-8 book of Punjab text book board, March 2002, Page 91)[29] 4. In the introduction of political reforms Muslims were not allowed to cast vote. (Class-8 book of Punjab text book board, March 2002, Page 94-95)[30] 5. The Hindus always wanted to eliminate the Muslims as a nation. (An Introduction to Pakistan, The Caravan Book House Lahore, 1995, page 12)[31] 6. All India Congress was against Muslims and the British gave the leverage to Hindus over Muslims.[32] 7. Hindu pundits were jealous of Muslim scholars like Al-Beruni because they could not compete nor had such talent.[33] 8. Child marriages were common among Hindus; they used to live in dark and small houses and their women were held lower positions.[34] 9. Hindu culture was imposed on Muslims. In the war of 1965, India conspired with the Hindus of Bengal and succeeded in spreading hate among the Bengalis about West Pakistan.[35] 10. The Hindus do not respect women, and Hinduism is not capable of teaching good things. (Urdu Class V, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p 108)[36] 11. The Quaid saw through the machinations of the Hindus. (Social Studies Class-VII, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, p 51)[37] 12. The wars with India are also branded as jihad, and sometimes historical facts are distorted. For example, recounting the 1965 war, one textbook reads, “The Armed Forces of Pakistan, filled with the spirit of jihad, forced an enemy many times bigger than them to face a humiliating defeat”.[38]
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13. Another textbook says “After the 1965 war, India, with the help of the Hindus living in East Pakistan, instigated the people living there against the people of West Pakistan, and at last in December 1971 India invaded East Pakistan. The conspiracy resulted in the separation of East Pakistan from us. All of us should receive military training and be prepared to fight the enemy”.(MuashratiUlum [social studies], Class V, NWFP, Textbook Board, Peshawar, p.93)[39] 14. Another book states that “There were a large number of Hindus in East Pakistan. They had never really accepted Pakistan. A large number of them were teachers in schools and colleges. They continued creating a negative impression among the students. No importance was attached to explaining the ideology of Pakistan to the younger generation. The Hindus sent a substantial part of their earnings to Bharat, thus adversely affecting the economy of the province. Some political leaders encouraged provincialism for the selfish purpose of gaining power. They went around depicting the central Government and (the then) West Pakistan as hostile and exploiters. Political aims were thus achieved at the cost of national unity”. (Pakistan Studies for secondary classes, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, May 1993, p. 39) [40] 15. In the same way, textbooks blame India for initiating the Kargil War in 1999.[41]
The History: Twisted and Deformed
The educational institutions teach unauthentic history, with accounts of many major historical events twisted. Some have called it the “hiding of history” because it not only omits many facts but also excludes the rich and diverse South Asian cultures and traditions. The Muslim culture is portrayed as good and the Hindu culture as bad.[42] The Bhutto government brought the non-Muslim religious schools under state’s watch, but left the Muslim seminaries unchecked which later produced jihadists for anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.[43]
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Since the late 1970s, the mission of authorities responsible for national curriculum has been the Islamization of the society. For example, social studies textbooks published under the national curriculum guidelines stress Islamic ideology and contain material that can be characterized as insensitive toward non-Muslims. Such teachings pose a serious threat to interfaith harmony and tolerance in the society. These books project Muslim citizens above all other citizens.[44]
A seventh class textbook advocates for Pan-Islamism, with most of its chapters dedicated to Muslim countries. The first chapter discusses Pakistan and the Muslim world and begins with the statement that ‘Pakistan is a sovereign Islamic nation’. Islam is presented not only as a belief system but also as the sole political ideology of Pakistan. The region’s history, culture, and traditions are largely overlooked.[45] The history of Punjab also suffers from omissions of facts because the wars of the Sikhs against the British are squarely excluded from the accounts. Instead, only the British conquest of Punjab is mentioned. As a result of appalling distortions of history, the students develop biases and hatred against the Hindus.[46]
The textbooks till the early 1970s included balanced contents on the culture and history of the Subcontinent. In her paper ‘Hegemony and Historiography: the Politics of Pedagogy’, American scholar Yvette C. Rosser highlights that till 1972 the textbooks included much more elaborate sections on the history of the subcontinent. The books described the Hindu Period, The Muslim Period and the British Period. History textbooks such as Indo Pak History Part-1 published in 1951 included chapters called Ramayana and Mahabharata Era, Aryans’ Religion and Educational Literature, the Caste System, Jainism and Buddhism, Invasions of Iranians and Greeks, Chandra Gupta Maurya, Maharaja Ashok, Maharaja Kaniska, The Gupta Family, Maharaja Harish, New Era of Hinduism, and The Era of Rajputs.[47] Till 1972, the textbooks used to have general and non-Muslim contents along with chapters on Muslim religion. For example, a textbook published in 1971
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The Islamization of textbooks was initiated by secularist Z. A. Bhutto, and taken further by Islamist Zia-ul-Haq. The textbooks began intensively propagating the Two-Nation Theory and the supremacy of Islamic principles over principles of Hinuism.[49] Mehmood of Ghazna was elevated to the status of a national hero of Pakistan. His invasions of India that resulted in the deaths of thousands of indigenous people and destruction of many temples were painted as holy jihad against the infidels. Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir is glorified as a pious Muslim ruler, but his ruthless killing of his own brothers and the imprisoning of his father Shah Jehan for the throne are not mentioned. [50] On the other hand, Jalaluddin Akbar gets a slight mention. The rein of Akbar the Great is largely overlooked in the history of the Great Mughals. [51]
The books promote exclusiveness of the Muslim community. M. K. Rabbani in his book which is prescribed for English medium schools writes that “As the Muslims of India found it extremely difficult to live according to the Islamic principles of life in the United India they were forced to demand a separate homeland to safeguard their national and religious identity”.[52] The history of Muslims is presented as the exclusive history of the Subcontinent. Such history typically begins with the invasion of Sindh by Mohammad bin Qasim. Though some textbooks in Sindh do mention the history of Moenjo Daro and the Indus Valley Civilizations but that too is very brief. Significant eras of the subcontinent are omitted such as the Aryan civilization, and the 1000 years of Buddhism etc. [53]
Distorting history can prove disastrous for a country and its people. Generations of Pakistanis grow up reading and learning chunks of truths mixed up with untruths. They mostly miss on the richness of their
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References:
[1]http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/02/Pakistan-Education-Challenges-and- Prospects-2006.pdf
[2] http://globalterrorismindex.org/
[3]http://www.elegantbrain.com/edu4/classes/readings/100readings/Garvey_bio.pdf https://globalglimpse.org/a-people-without-knowledge-of-their-past-history-origin-and- culture-is-like-a-tree-without-roots-marcus-garvey/21527
[4] https://www.dawn.com/news/1418208
[5]http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/448221510079762554/120997-WP- revised-PUBLIC-Role-of-Education-in-Prevention-of-Violence-Extremism-Final.pdf
[6]http://nhdr.undp.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Moeed-Yusuf-Youth- Radicalisation.pdf
[7]http://apnaorg.com/books/english/murder-of-history/murder-of-history.pdf
[8]http://nhdr.undp.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Moeed-Yusuf-Youth- Radicalisation.pdf
[9]http://nhdr.undp.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Moeed-Yusuf-Youth- Radicalisation.pdf
[10]https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/DevelopmentPolicy/DAP_Volum e3-Issue1.pdf
[11]http://apnaorg.com/books/english/murder-of-history/murder-of-history.pdf
[12]https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pakistans-education-system-and-links-extremism
[13]http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/02/How-education-fuels-religious- terrorism.pdf
[14]https://www.dawn.com/news/1225815/burn-these-books-please
[15]http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/02/How-education-fuels-religious- terrorism.pdf
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[16]http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/02/Pakistan-Education-Challenges-and- Prospects-2006.pdf
[17]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[18]https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pakistans-education-system-and-links-extremism
[19]https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pakistans-education-system-and-links-extremism
[20]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/pdf/asia-s-ed/v07/10Pakistan.pdf
[21]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[22]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[23]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[24]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[25]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[26]https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/pdf/asia-s-ed/v07/10Pakistan.pdf http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[27]https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=- TdmDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Urdu+Class+V,+Punjab+Textbook+Bo ard,+Lahore,+March+2002,+p+108&source=bl&ots=bpWSdRv3AI&sig=ACfU3U0Ki ytshOXxNbBDO3inwi3Q- pOVQA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBgvuwoaziAhWGyKQKHbPnBPEQ6AEwA noECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Urdu%20Class%20V%2C%20Punjab%20Textbook%20 Board%2C%20Lahore%2C%20March%202002%2C%20p%20108&f=false
[28]https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=- TdmDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Urdu+Class+V,+Punjab+Textbook+Bo ard,+Lahore,+March+2002,+p+108&source=bl&ots=bpWSdRv3AI&sig=ACfU3U0Ki ytshOXxNbBDO3inwi3Q- pOVQA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBgvuwoaziAhWGyKQKHbPnBPEQ6AEwA noECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Urdu%20Class%20V%2C%20Punjab%20Textbook%20 Board%2C%20Lahore%2C%20March%202002%2C%20p%20108&f=false
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[29]https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=- TdmDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Urdu+Class+V,+Punjab+Textbook+Bo ard,+Lahore,+March+2002,+p+108&source=bl&ots=bpWSdRv3AI&sig=ACfU3U0Ki ytshOXxNbBDO3inwi3Q- pOVQA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBgvuwoaziAhWGyKQKHbPnBPEQ6AEwA noECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Urdu%20Class%20V%2C%20Punjab%20Textbook%20 Board%2C%20Lahore%2C%20March%202002%2C%20p%20108&f=false
[30]https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=- TdmDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Urdu+Class+V,+Punjab+Textbook+Bo ard,+Lahore,+March+2002,+p+108&source=bl&ots=bpWSdRv3AI&sig=ACfU3U0Ki ytshOXxNbBDO3inwi3Q- pOVQA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBgvuwoaziAhWGyKQKHbPnBPEQ6AEwA noECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Urdu%20Class%20V%2C%20Punjab%20Textbook%20 Board%2C%20Lahore%2C%20March%202002%2C%20p%20108&f=false
[31]https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=- TdmDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Urdu+Class+V,+Punjab+Textbook+Bo ard,+Lahore,+March+2002,+p+108&source=bl&ots=bpWSdRv3AI&sig=ACfU3U0Ki ytshOXxNbBDO3inwi3Q- pOVQA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBgvuwoaziAhWGyKQKHbPnBPEQ6AEwA noECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Urdu%20Class%20V%2C%20Punjab%20Textbook%20 Board%2C%20Lahore%2C%20March%202002%2C%20p%20108&f=false
[32]https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=- TdmDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=Urdu+Class+V,+Punjab+Textbook+Bo ard,+Lahore,+March+2002,+p+108&source=bl&ots=bpWSdRv3AI&sig=ACfU3U0Ki ytshOXxNbBDO3inwi3Q- pOVQA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBgvuwoaziAhWGyKQKHbPnBPEQ6AEwA noECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Urdu%20Class%20V%2C%20Punjab%20Textbook%20 Board%2C%20Lahore%2C%20March%202002%2C%20p%20108&f=false
[33]https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/pdf/asia-s-ed/v07/10Pakistan.pdf
[34]https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/pdf/asia-s-ed/v07/10Pakistan.pdf
[35]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/pdf/asia-s-ed/v07/10Pakistan.pdf
[36]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[37]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
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[38]https://qz.com/india/1239211/jihad-islam-us-and-india-how-pakistani-school- textbooks-mould-its-students-skewed-worldview/
[39]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[40]http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf
[41]https://tribune.com.pk/story/163868/what-are-we-teaching-our-children/ https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/02/02/musharraf-himself-crossed-loc-during- kargil-mission-book/
[42]https://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/Messing%20Up%20the%20Past.pdf
[43]https://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/Messing%20Up%20the%20Past.pdf
[44]https://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/pdf/25710_7_1_Ahmad.pdf
[45]https://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/pdf/25710_7_1_Ahmad.pdf
[46]https://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/pdf/25710_7_1_Ahmad.pdf
[47]https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_rosse_hegem_frameset.htm
[48]https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_rosse_hegem_frameset.htm
[49]https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_rosse_hegem_frameset.htm
[50]http://www.drmubarakali.org/assets/pakistan-in-search-of-identity.pdf https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_rosse_hegem_frameset.htm
[51]https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_rosse_hegem_frameset.htm
[52] M. Ikram Rabbani, An Introduction to Pakistan Studies, The Caravan Book House, Lahore, 1987, p. 10
[53]https://www.dawn.com/news/1125484
[54]https://www.dawn.com/news/1125484
[55] https://www.dawn.com/news/1125484
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Worries about Pak-Afghan Peace Talks
Muhammad Suleman Khan
Afghanistan is a landlocked country in the north and west of Pakistan. Its estimated population of 29.2-34.1 million consists of various ethnic groups. Demographic data for Afghanistan tend to be unreliable and hard to verify. The figures about the ethnic composition of the country are also disputed by various ethnic groups. According to the 2010 data from the US Department of State, the Pashtun roughly make 42% of Afghanistan’s population, followed by the Tajik who account for 27%.
Majority of the Pashtun are Sunni Muslim, with the exception of the Turi tribe that professes Shiite faith. Other ethnic groups include Hazara, Uzbeks, Baloch etc. Islam is the state religion in Afghanistan. However, the country’s post-Taliban constitution, enforced in Jan 2004, gives fundamental rights and freedoms to religious minorities in the country. The Article 2 of the constitution states: “followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law”. It is not compulsory for a non- Muslim to study Islam in public schools.
Religious Makeup of Afghanistan
Around 99% of Afghans are Muslim. The Sunnis constitute roughly 80% while the Shiites are around 19% of the population. The remaining 1% consists of the followers of Hinduism, Christianity, Sikhism, and Judaism etc.
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Pic Source: US Department of State (20101)
1. Shiite: 19% 2. Sikhs: About 1,000-8,000 Sikhs live in cities like Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kabul, and to a lesser extent Kandahar 3. Hindus: An estimated 1000 individuals live mainly in Kabul and other major cities 4. Zoroastrians (a monotheistic religion): 100-200 members live in Afghanistan. 5. Baha’i Faith: About 400 members are living in Afghanistan. 6. Christianity: Approximately 500-8000 Afghans are Christian. Reports suggest most of the Afghan Christians practice their faith secretly.
Judaism: As of now there is only one Jew living in Afghanistan. The Jews are said to have resided in Afghanistan for over a millennium. The Afghan Jewish community now mainly resides in Israel and the United States
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A Jewish cemetery in Herat, Afghanistan
Religious Intolerance
The Afghan history is riddled with faith-based violence. Afghanistan’s religious minorities have suffered persecution and violence during various periods. Religious intolerance and sectarian bloodshed often drive mass exodus of Afghans to neighboring countries. In recent years, religious extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Al-Qaeda, and Taliban have been targeting members of religious minorities particularly the Shiites with impunity. In 2001, the Taliban forces blew up over 1000-year old Buddhist murals in central Afghanistan that led to a global outcry.
Constitutional guarantees have largely failed to improve the situation of the religious minorities. For instance, the Hindus and Sikhs claim they avoid settling of disputes with Muslims at courts due to fear of retaliation. Instead, they prefer dispute resolution through community elders. And if they do knock at the courts for justice, their cases often get delayed unnecessarily by judicial officers. They also suffer from land grabbing. There have been instances of their properties being illegally occupied by influential Muslims. They also report that Muslim
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Religious Extremism Review communities interfere in their religious rituals like cremating their dead. Their funeral processions are often flanked by police officers due to threats of harassment from Muslims.
Likewise, the followers of Ahmadi sect report social discrimination due to their faith. There are an estimated 600 members of Ahmadi faith, mostly living in Kabul. They mostly hide their faith due to fear of risks to their lives. Ahmadi children enroll in public schools without mentioning their faith. The members of the community have reported harassment by neighbors. Many Afghans consider them Indian, and hence outsiders despite them living in the country for decades. Both Sunni and Shiite clerics have shown hostility towards the community because they view certain Ahmadi beliefs as un-Islamic. Due to chronic faith-based discrimination and restrictions on fundamental rights, many Ahmadis seek to leave the country.
The Afghan Christians have similar complaints of discrimination. They mostly worship and practice their rituals in private, away from the sight of Muslims. The number of Christians has been on the decline for decades. They face risks and challenges while practicing their religion, which is a reason many of them tend to migrate to the West.
The Shiites account for 15-25% of the Afghan population. Most of the Shiites are members of the ethnic Hazara people, though there are also Sunni and Ismaeli Hazaras in the country. Over the last decade, the Hazara people have been targeted by a number of extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Khorasan Province and Taliban. The Hazara localities and social and religious gatherings have repeatedly been bombed in Kabul and other areas, resulting in massive casualties. Despite increased security from the government, the attacks against the Hazara continue.
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Talking to the Taliban
In Sep 2010, the Karzai government constituted a ‘High Peace Council’ with the objective to hold talks with the Taliban insurgents. A month after the council’s formation, President Karzai appointed Burhanuddin Rabbani as the council’s head and government’s chief negotiator with the Taliban. The peace talks could not make any visible progress as the Taliban showed a lack of interest in putting down their arms and accepting the Afghan constitution. The peace efforts came to an end after Rabbani, the chief negotiator, was assassinated by suicide bombers in Sep 2011. In subsequent years, various attempts at talks with the Taliban for a peaceful resolution of the conflict failed to achieve any concrete results.
The Latest Push for Peace
In early Sep 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo appointed Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Afghanistan, as special advisor on Afghanistan. Khalilzad was tasked to lead the Afghan peace process in order to bring an end to America’s longest war. The Taliban expressed interest in negotiations with the US in Dec 2018. The talks began in Doha, Qatar in late Jan 2019. On 25 Feb 2019, Khalilzad claimed that the fresh round of talks was more productive than they had been in the past.
One of the key Taliban negotiators is Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar who was released by Pakistan just months before the initiation of the latest round. Pakistan had arrested Baradar from the port city of Karachi in 2010. According to Khalilzad, a “draft framework” of a peace deal has been agreed, based on the commitment from the US to withdraw the international forces from Afghanistan, and from Taliban not to allow jihadist groups to operate in the country. What is conspicuous in the peace talks is the absence of the Kabul government. The Taliban refuse to talk to the Afghan government, dismissing it as a puppet.
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However, not everyone is happy with the exclusion of Kabul from the talks. American journalist Edward Luce wrote in the Financial Times on 4 Apr 2019 that “Just as he (Trump) is preparing to leave Syria’s Kurds to their fate at Turkey’s hands, he is willing to risk sacrificing Kabul to the Taliban”. Luce likened Trump’s Afghan policy to America’s policy in Vietnam. The Afghan officials are angry at being shut out of the peace process. They claim their exclusion legitimize the Taliban and undermine their authority. Many political analysts believe the chances of achieving peace in Afghanistan would be slim without the inclusion of Kabul in the process.
The sixth round of talks began on May 1, 2019 with focus on four main points:
1. Troops withdrawal 2. Guarantee against terrorism 3. Talks between Taliban and Afghan government 4. Lasting ceasefire
The seriousness on the parts of both the US and Taliban indicates a peaceful settlement of the conflict might finally be close. Although hopes are high, still the Taliban have not observed a ceasefire, and continue to carry out attacks in the country. President Donald Trump is keen to end the war that reportedly costs around 45 billion dollars a year. In Apr 2019, Khalilzad told Afghanistan’s Tolo television that the US’s focus was terrorism in Afghanistan. He assured the US would sign no agreement with the Taliban unless there was a permanent ceasefire and a genuine commitment to end the war. “We want peace to give us the possibility to withdraw”, he added.
Pakistan, Afghanistan’s most important neighbor, supports an “Afghan- led” and “Afghan-owned” peace process in Afghanistan. The US government has been cognizant of Pakistan’s significance in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table. In early Dec 2018, the US President, Donald Trump, wrote a letter to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, seeking
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Pakistan’s help with the Afghan peace process. In order to facilitate the US-Taliban dialogue, Pakistan also released key Taliban figure Mullah Baradar who had been in prison since 2010.
Women and Minorities in Post-American Afghanistan
The US-Taliban peace talks have sparked a hope that the nearly two- decade old war in Afghanistan would come to an end. However, the conspicuous absence of Afghan women from the negotiations has been unsettling for the defenders of women’s rights. The brutal suppression of women by the Taliban during the second half of the 1990s still haunts a large part of the Afghan society. Long-term peace and stability would continue to remain a dream unless all Afghan stakeholders including the religious and ethnic minorities are taken on board in the peace process.
Any peace settlement between the US and Taliban that overlooks human rights including the rights of women, children, and persons belonging to minority religious groups would be extremely fragile. Susan Chira of the New York Times fears that the future of Afghan women is not on the American agenda for its peace talks with the Taliban. She believes the talks primarily revolve around terrorism and US military presence in Afghanistan. In the past, the Taliban had completely curtailed the women’s rights to movement, education, and work.
Apart from women, religious minorities are also apprehensive about the ongoing negotiations that would likely bring the Taliban back to power in Afghanistan. The Hazara, a religious and ethnic minority, fear persecution under Taliban rule. The Hazara people are already under fire from the Islamic State and Taliban forces. They have repeatedly been hit by IS suicide bombers in recent years. Similarly, non-Muslim minorities equally dread a potential return to power of the Taliban hardliners. They see escalated risks and threats to their lives in the post-American Afghanistan.
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The country has seen a sharp decline in the number of non-Muslim minorities since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad. The Afghan Hindus and Sikhs already suffer harassment at the hands of their intolerant Muslim neighbors. They often rely on police protection to cremate their dead. According to Awtar Singh Khalsa, an Afghan Sikh, the Muslims throw stones and abuse at their funeral processions. In such a situation, the religious minorities see even darker times ahead in the context of the US-Taliban talks.
Experts warn that a hasty American withdrawal would jeopardize the future of Afghanistan. They point to the fact that the US-Taliban negotiations have so far overlooked the issues and matters relating to women and religious and ethnic minorities in the post-American Afghanistan. The Taliban’s open aversion for women’s freedom does not augur well for the future of an Afghan society that has seen women coming into businesses, politics, government institutions, colleges, and universities over the past years.
Women are an integral part of the Afghan society and their absence from the talks presents risks for them after the US withdraws from the country. The outcome of the talks is hard to predict at this stage. However, it remains to be seen whether the Taliban agrees to fundamental human rights for all Afghans as per the international laws. Whatever the outcome of the peace settlement, the women and minorities in Afghanistan are currently worried by the sight of the exclusionary talks in Qatar.
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References: 1. https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Dust-Mohammad-1826-39- 1843-63 2. http://afghanistan.countrystat.org/key-indicators/en/ 3. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281260.pdf 4. https://www.who.int/leishmaniasis/resources/AFGHANISTAN.pdf 5. https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Dust-Mohammad-1826-39- 1843-63 6. https://minorityrights.org/country/afghanistan/ 7. https://minorityrights.org/country/afghanistan/ 8. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281260.pdf 9. https://minorityrights.org/country/afghanistan/ 10. https://www.refworld.org/publisher,MRGI,,AFG,4954ce5ec,0.html 11. https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Dust-Mohammad-1826-39- 1843-63 12. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/religious-minorities-persecuted- afghanistan-war-181027173758339.html 13. https://swedishcommittee.org/afghanistan/religion 14. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281260.pdf 15. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/religious_studies/CDC/afghanistan.html 16. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zoroastrianism 17. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aabdcc.html 18. http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/119/article_5843.asp 19. https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/07/31/hindus-sikhs-warn-leaving- afghanistan 20. https://web.archive.org/web/20070111080626/http://www.hinduismtoday.com /archives/1994/4/1994-4-02.shtml 21. https://web.archive.org/web/20090222132753/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/worl d/south_asia/3138282.stm 22. https://web.archive.org/web/20071009174745/http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ir f/2007/90225.htm 23. https://web.archive.org/web/20071009174745/http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ir f/2007/90225.htm 24. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm 25. https://www.academia.edu/16338087/Believers_in_Christ_from_a_Muslim_B ackground_A_Global_Census 26. file:///D:/REPORTS/Future%20of%20religious%20minorities%20in%20post- US%20Afghanistan/Related%20material/19635-Article%20Text-46118-2-10- 20130518.pdf 27. https://en.qantara.de/content/judaism-in-afghanistan-kabuls-one-remaining- jew 28. https://www.refworld.org/publisher,MRGI,,AFG,4954ce5ec,0.html 29. Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia”, page 17-67, 2009 30. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/taliban-attacks- hazara-afghanistan-isis-south-asia-security-news-18891/
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31. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/death-toll-rises-11-afghan-capital- attack-shia-gathering-190308102222870.html https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281260.pdf 32. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281260.pdf 33. https://minorityrights.org/country/afghanistan/ 34. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281260.pdf 35. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/367 36. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan 37. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan 38. https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-unintended- consequences-us-taliban-talks 39. https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-CivilMilitaryAfghanFramework- 2013.pdf 40. https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/ex-afghan-president-to-lead-taliban- peace-talks-1.606924 41. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8776911/Form er-Afghanistan-president-Burhanuddin-Rabbani-killed-in-Kabul-blast.html 42. https://archive.is/20130104072416/http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/09/29/p eace-council-members-named 43. http://www.afghan- bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=686&task=view&total=2411 &start=842&Itemid=2 44. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan 45. https://archive.is/20130104072416/http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/09/29/p eace-council-members-named 46. http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/20/u-s-embassy-staff-in-kabul-ordered-to- take-cover/?hpt=hp_t1 47. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan 48. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan 49. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan 50. https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-CivilMilitaryAfghanFramework- 2013.pdf 51. https://intellectualobserver.com/new-contacts-announced-between-the-taliban- and-americans/ 52. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47351369 53. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47351369 54. http://khalilzadassociates.com/aboutus.aspx 55. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47351369 56. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/world/asia/taliban-peace-talks- qatar.html 57. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47733079 58. https://www.foxnews.com/world/taliban-launches-spring-offensive-despite- delicate-peace-negotiations-with-us 59. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47733079 60. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-talks/afghan-peace-deal- hinges-on-ceasefire-by-taliban-u-s-peace-envoy-idUSKCN1S40HD
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61. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-talks/afghan-peace-deal- hinges-on-ceasefire-by-taliban-u-s-peace-envoy-idUSKCN1S40HD 62. http://www.radio.gov.pk/06-12-2018/pakistan-has-significant-role-in-afghan- peace-process-analysts 63. http://www.radio.gov.pk/06-12-2018/pakistan-has-significant-role-in-afghan- peace-process-analysts 64. https://fp.brecorder.com/2019/01/20190129443063/ 65. http://www.radio.gov.pk/06-12-2018/pakistan-has-significant-role-in-afghan- peace-process-analysts 66. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/919003314674634752?ref_src=tw src%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E91900331467463475 2&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.parhlo.com%2Fdonald-trump-praises- pakistan-tweet%2F 67. https://www.parhlo.com/donald-trump-praises-pakistan-tweet/ 68. https://southasianvoices.org/end-of-the-afghan-conflict-pakistans-hopes-and- fears/ 69. https://southasianvoices.org/end-of-the-afghan-conflict-pakistans-hopes-and- fears/ 70. https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398779 71. https://southasianvoices.org/end-of-the-afghan-conflict-pakistans-hopes-and- fears/ 72. https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-us-taliban-talks/4707000.html 73. https://southasianvoices.org/end-of-the-afghan-conflict-pakistans-hopes-and- fears/ 74. https://www.dawn.com/news/1462714 75. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1948399/1-pakistan-not-part-forthcoming-us- taliban-peace-talks-doha/ 76. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1948399/1-pakistan-not-part-forthcoming-us- taliban-peace-talks-doha/ 77. https://www.dawn.com/news/1441400 78. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47733079 79. https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-unintended- consequences-us-taliban-talks 80. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/asia/afghanistan-hazaras-taliban- peace-talks.html 81. https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/12/how-secure-afghanistans-future
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Daesh Khorasan
Wajahat Khalid
On 15 May 2019, the Islamic State or Daesh announced the creation of its province in Pakistan, just days after it had declared the establishment of Hind province through its propaganda mouthpiece Amaq news agency. Previously, these divisions fell under Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). The ISKP or Wilayat Khorasan was created over four years back on Jan 26, 2015. The ISKP consisted of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and parts of India and Iran. Announcing the creation of ISKP back in 2015, Daesh spokesman Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani had nominated Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander, as the head of Wilayat Khorasan. The Long War Journal reported that the ISKP consisted of a core group of 12 members – nine of them Pakistanis and the rest Afghans.
The TTP had lost territories in Pakistan’s erstwhile FATA region following the operations by Pakistan army. Disarrayed, the TTP infrastructure cracked as many TTP commanders broke free from the outfit. The breakup was announced in a video message by TTP’s ex- spokesman Shahidullah Shahid. Later, these “disenchanted” TTP elements became the pioneers of ISKP. The group was primarily focused on Afghanistan, but eventually it had to turn its guns on Pakistan since the group’s founding commanders were predominately Pakistanis.
The fact that many TTP elements of Pakistani nationality spearheaded the establishment of the ISKP is nothing short of a nightmare for the law enforcement agencies in Pakistan because those who founded the Wilayat Khorasan chapter are well acquainted with the security landscape in Pakistan. They know the country well, and have influence with local people, tribes, and other terror groups operating in the country. These factors enhance their likelihood of establishing a support base in
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Religious Extremism Review the country. According to a research in Sep 2016 by Tariq Pervez, former NACTA chief, some members of ISKP are allegedly linked to the Lal Masjid which is believed to serve as a networking point for various extremist groups and seminaries in the country.
Over a year after the ISKP’s creation, its founding commander Hafiz Saeed Khan was killed in an American drone strike in Afghanistan’s eastern province of Nangarhar. His death was announced by a Pentagon spokesman on July 26, 2016. Khan was succeeded by Maulvi Abdul Haseeb. Pakistan designated Daesh as a terrorist group in 2015. However, it has not joined the ‘Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’. So far, members of the following Pakistan-based terrorist groups have, at various points, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State:
Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Jamaat-ul-Ahraar (JuA)
Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)
Jundullah Pakistan
The ISKP has not been able to demonstrate a strong command and control infrastructure in Pakistan so far. However, it has claimed responsibility for some deadly terrorist attacks in the country in the past few years. The group has carried out attacks in KP and Balochistan, while in Sindh it targeted Sehwan Sharif – a Sufi shrine – in 2017 that left 90 people dead and over 300 wounded. Daesh ideology has inspired people and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry out attacks in Pakistan. With religious extremism running deep in Pakistani society, the increasing presence of Daesh is worrying for Pakistan’s security agencies. Its extremist Salafist ideology is likely to attract existing and prospective militants who believe in violence against the Shiite Muslims,
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Religious Extremism Review the Pakistani state, and Western interests. Many extremist groups find Daesh’s goal of creating a pious Islamic caliphate inspiring.
Image: The Nation
Initial Denials and Vague Stances
The government stance on the presence of Daesh has largely been marked by confusion or vagueness since at least 2015. Statements by government officials and reports by local media on the presence and activities of Daesh have been contradicting each other for years. The government either lacks a coherent stance on the issue or it deliberately downplays the threat for security reasons. In Feb 2016, Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Aftab Sultan warned about the Daesh threat in Pakistan only to be refuted by the interior and foreign ministries. Sultan told the Senate that Daesh was an emerging security threat because many Pakistani-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e- Jhangvi, Sipah Sahaba and others had soft corner for the group. He further added that IB had busted an IS network in Punjab following the Safoora Goth massacre in Karachi in May 2015.
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The next day, the Foreign Office spokesman, Nafees Zakaria, contradicted the IB chief, saying there was no organized presence of what he called “the Middle Eastern group” in Pakistan. Few days later, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar, also downplayed the IB chief’s warning. Nisar claimed that local terrorist groups were building their profiles by using Daesh’s name, and that there was no Daesh presence in Pakistan. Earlier in Nov 2015, the army spokesman, General Asim Bajwa, had declared that Pakistan had zero tolerance for Daesh. A report by the UK-based Royal United Services Institute in Feb 2016 estimated that around 2000-3000 active Daesh members were based in Pakistan.
Despite the confusion, however, the Pakistani media have reported Daesh activities in many cities in Pakistan including Lahore, Sialkot, and Karach, Quetta, Mastung etc. A column titled “Miss Leading” in the Urdu daily Khabrain on 12 Feb 2016 said:
“The recruitment of women in terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Daesh in the name of Islam is creating problems for the Law-enforcement agencies. Recently a group of women was arrested from Karachi, which was motivating innocent girls to become wives of the jihadists of terrorist groups. One of them was the wife of Khalid Bari who was running a religious seminary for women and was brainwashing young girls by showing them videos of ISIS and creating sympathies for ISIS fighters in order to convince these girls to marry members of ISIS”.
Likewise, another piece by Haider Javed Sayyed in the Urdu daily Khabrain of 27 Jan 2017 mentioned Daesh activities in Pakistan. Titled “Sir, the ISIS threat is increasing”, the column had this to say:
“At last the Interior Ministry has admitted that the ISIS does exist in Pakistan, but they have not admitted the full truth. The members of banned jihadi groups are joining ISIS for rupees 30,000-50,000 per month. Other incentives include: a new war front where plenty of beautiful girls from Syria and other countries would become their
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Religious Extremism Review jihadist wives. According to a new fatwa (religious decree) of Muradul Najeeb Basri, a jihadist can just say nikah three times when he likes a woman and that woman will become his wife. More than 800 members of LeJ, JeM, and LeT have joined the ISIS. The ISIS conducted its activities in extreme secrecy in the country.”
Daesh terror in Pakistan
July 2014: The Iraq-based Jamaat Ansar ul-Islam releases a video of their militant training camp in Syria in July 2014. Dozens of men, armed with rocket-propelled grenades and a few anti-aircraft guns, are put through military drills. The terrorist training camps is named after Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, the radical cleric who was killed in 2007 after the security agencies conducted an operation on Lal Masjid.
Oct 2014: The Sindh Home Department reports that Abid Kohat, a resident of Rawalpindi, has been recruited by Daesh to reach out to disgruntled elements of Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as TTP, Sipah Sahaba, JeM etc and set up an office in Rawalpindi.
Oct 2014: The Balochistan Home Department writes a letter to senior officials, warning about Daesh activities in Pakistan. The letter claims that Daesh has gained 10-12 thousand followers in Hangu and Kurram agencies. It also warns about Daesh’s plans to attack the Shiite community.
Dec 2014: A group of female students from a seminary in Islamabad declare their allegiance to Daesh in a video recording, and vow to avenge the security operation against the Lal Masjid. In the same month, police in Karachi detain six women for recruiting jihadist brides for Daesh. Many of them were the wives of the suspects of Safoora Goth massacre.
Jan 2015: Daesh announces the creation of its chapter for Khorasan region that includes Pakistan, Afghanistan, and parts of Iran in Jan 2015. The allegiance to Daesh was announced by ex-TTP spokesman Shahidullah Shahid in a recorded video message.
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Mar 2015: Graffiti supporting Daesh and the terror group’s trademark black banners start appearing in several cities in Pakistan in Mar 2015.
May 2015: Eight heavily armed terrorists ambush a bus carrying Ismaili- Shiites in Safoora Goth in Karachi in May 2015, killing at least 46 and injuring 13. Daesh claimed its militants targeted Shiite infidels in the attack. Another terrorist group Jandullah also claimed responsibility for the carnage.
July 2015: Punjab police kill LeJ chief Malik Ishaq and eleven of his accomplices in a shootout in Muzaffargarh in July 2015. Reports suggest Ishaq was about to announce his allegiance to Daesh kingpin Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi.
Nov 2015: Unidentified gunmen throw grenades into the offices of Dunya TV and Din News in Faisalabad and Lahore respectively in Nov 2015. While no one was killed or injured, Daesh pamphlets were found from both crime scenes.
Dec 2015: The Punjab Counter-terrorism Department (CTD) raids a house in Sialkot and nabs nine suspected militants affiliated with Daesh in Dec 2015. Following the security raid, Daesh Sialkot sent a message to media houses, threatening to overthrow the government. It identified the arrested people as members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). The suspects were actively recruiting militants and arranging funds for Daesh in Pakistan. The CTD officials claimed the men were in contact with Abu Muavia Salafi, a Pakistani Daesh terrorist in Syria, via Skype. The CTD further said they had credible intelligence that six young boys from Sialkot, who had been reported missing earlier, were killed in the fighting in Syria.
Jan 2016: Pakistan authorities launch a crackdown to nab Daesh members and sympathizers in Punjab and Sindh in Jan 2016. Punjab’s law minister reveals that over 100 people had left to fight alongside terrorist groups in the Middle East. Three women and twelve children go missing from Lahore. Later, one of the women sends a voice message to
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May 2016: A military court hands down death sentences to Saad Aziz and four others in May 2016 in 18 cases including the Safoora Goth massacre and assassination of rights activist Sabin Mehmood. According to authorities, Aziz, a graduate of Pakistan’s top business school, was inspired by Daesh and Al-Qaeda. He was also charged with an attempt to murder Debra Lobo, an American educationist and vice principal of Jinnah Medical and Dental College, Karachi.
Jul 2016: Hafiz Saeed Khan, head of the Wilayat Khorasan chapter, is killed in a US drone strike in Afghanistan in July 2016. Khan had defected from TTP to establish the Wilayat Khorasan chapter of Daesh.
Aug 2016: The president of Quetta Bar Association is killed on 8 Aug 2016. When his body is brought to a hospital, a suicide bomber blows himself up, killing 93 people mostly lawyers and media persons. Daesh claims responsibility for the attack.
Sep 2016: The first major admission about Daesh presence comes from Pakistan army in Sep 2016. General Asim Bajwa, a former military spokesperson, admits that Daesh has a presence in Pakistan. He says over 300 people, including foreign nationals, have been arrested in connection with Daesh. He reveals that authorities had thwarted Daesh’s plans to attack foreign embassies and the airport in Islamabad.
Oct 2016: A Pakistani intelligence officer, Akbar Ali, is gunned down by unidentified motorcyclists in Charsadda on 24 Oct 2016. Later, Daesh claims responsibility for the killing.
Oct 2016: Three heavily armed terrorists storm a training college of Balochistan police in Quetta on 24 Oct 2016, killing 61 cadets and injuring 165 others. Daesh claims responsibility for the attack. The LeJ also claims to have worked with Daesh to carry out the deadly assault on
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Religious Extremism Review the police. Pakistan authorities said the attackers came from Afghanistan, and were facilitated by local handlers.
Nov 2016: Terrorists attack the crowded shrine of Shah Noorani in the Lasbela district of Balochistan on 12 Nov 2016, killing at least 62 Sufi worshippers and injuring over 100. Daesh claimed responsibility, saying its fighters targeted the Shiite worshippers.
Dec 2016: Daesh claims responsibility for killing a police officer and injuring his son in Peshawar on 10 Dec 2016.
Feb 2017: Daesh pamphlets are distributed in the volatile Kurram Agency in Feb 2017. The pamphlets show beheadings and warn that Daesh would soon start operations in Hangu and DI Khan areas of Pakistan after its success in neighboring Afghanistan.
Feb 2017: The shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sindh is hit by a suicide bombing on 16 Feb 2017. As the followers of Sufi Islam were busy in a dance ritual at the shrine in evening, a bomber blew up his suicide vest, killing over 100 people and injuring more than 300. The ISKP claimed responsibility for the deadly attack.
March 2017: Five terrorists, including a Daesh commander, are killed in an intelligence based operation (IBO) in Orakzai Agency on 21 Mar 2017. Daesh was planning to target the Shia Nauroz (New Year) festivals.
Apr 2017: Pakistani security personnel raid a home in Lahore and arrest Noreen Leghari and seize suicide vests, grenades, and bullets on 4 Apr 2017. A medical student at the Liaqat Medical University, Leghari was to be used by Daesh as a terrorist to bomb a church on Easter in Pakistan. An intelligence tipoff led to her arrest and pre-empted what could have been a deadly attack against the Christians. Reportedly, Leghari was inspired and recruited by Daesh through the internet.
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May 2017: A Chinese couple is kidnapped from the Jinnah Town area of Quetta city on 24 May 2017. Police say the couple was forced into a vehicle and driven away by armed kidnappers. The Chinese couple reportedly ran a Chinese-language training center in the provincial capital. A month after the abduction, Daesh claims it had killed the couple.
June 2017: Pakistan security forces kill 12 terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami (LeJA) near Mastung in Balochistan in a 3- day operation from June 1-3. Briefing the media, the army spokesman says the terrorists were Daesh facilitators. The security operation denied Daesh presence in Pakistan, the spokesman adds.
Aug 2017: Pakistan army launches Operation Khyber 4 in the Rajgal valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Aug 2017. The operation involves 3000 troops to comb the area. According to reports, TTP, JuA, and Lashkar-e-Islami were teaming up with Daesh in the Rajgal valley.
Dec 2017: Two suicide bombers storm a church ahead of the Christmas in Quetta on 16 Dec 2017, killing at least 9 worshippers and injuring dozens of others. Daesh claims responsibility through its Amaq news channel, claiming that two of its militants had stormed the church.
July 2018: Daesh claims responsibility for one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Pakistan’s history. A suicide bomber strikes a political rally of the Balochistan Awami Party ahead of the general elections in Mastung area of Balochistan on 13 July 2018, leaving at least 150 people dead and 186 wounded. Daesh claims responsibility via its Amaq and identifies the bomber as Abu Bakar Al-Pakistani.
July 2018: Pakistani security forces kill Daesh’s Balochistan chief, Mufti Hidayatullah on 19 July 2018, on a tipoff from intelligence agencies. Hidayatullah was believed to have masterminded the Mastung attack a week earlier that left 150 people dead.
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July 2018: A suicide bomber hits a polling station on the day of Pakistan’s general elections on July 25, 2018. The attack kills 31 people and injured 35 others. Daesh claims responsibility via its Amaq website.
Sep 2018: On 26 Sep 2018, law enforcement personnel including commandos raid a compound in Mangochar area of Balochistan where, according to intelligence reports, multiple terrorists (believed to be affiliated with Daesh) were holding some men, women, and children hostage. The raid leaves the three armed terrorists dead. Two security personnel were also killed in the gunbattle.
Nov 2018: A suicide attack kills 33 people and inures 56 others in the Orakzai district of KP on 23 Nov 2018. The attack is later claimed by Daesh through a video message.
Apr 2019: A bomb blast in a fruit market in the suburb of Quetta city kills 20 people and injures 48 on 12 Apr 2019. Eight of the victims belonged to the Hazara Shiite community. Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack.
May 2019: On 17 May 2019, the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of Balochistan raids a Daesh hideout in Qabu Koh-e-Mehran area of Mastung, 47 kilometers from Quetta city on the basis of an intelligence tipoff. The raid kills at least nine Daesh terrorists and leaves four security men wounded. The bodies of the terrorists are shifted to the Civil Hospital Quetta. The police also seize arms, ammunition, and suicide vests from the site.
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References:
1. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In- Pakistan.pdf 2. https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/isis-in-pakistan-a-critical-analysis- of-factors-and-implications-of-isisrecruitments-and-concept-of-jihadbilnikah- 2151-6200-1000276.php?aid=90682#f16 3. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamicstate-idUSKCN10N21L 4. https://www.dawn.com/news/1408081 5. https://www.geo.tv/latest/131484-daesh 6. https://www.samaa.tv/news/2016/11/several-feared-dead-in-blast-near-shah- noorani-shrine/ 7. https://jamestown.org/program/the-balochistan-insurgency-and-the-threat-to- chinese-interests-in-pakistan/ 8. https://www.dawn.com/news/1338454/abducted-chinese-nationals-killed- claims-is 9. https://www.dawn.com/news/1338242/army-releases-details-of-3-day- mastung-operation-that-targeted-is-facilitators 10. https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=12_02_2016_001_006 11. https://www.samaa.tv/news/2016/02/banned-outfits-using-daeshs-name-nisar/ 12. https://dailytimes.com.pk/94479/nisar-says-daesh-has-no-presence-in- pakistan/ 13. https://www.dawn.com/news/1238771 14. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/330781-threat-of-daesh-to-pakistan 15. https://dailytimes.com.pk/256672/countering-daesh-in-pakistan/ 16. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327419130_The_Islamic_State_in_ Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_origins_evolution_and_implications 17. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/06/05/emergence-of-daesh-raises- new-security-challenge-for-pakistan/ 18. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/10/20/pakistan-india-under-new-is- threat-wilayat-e-hind-study/ 19. https://www.geo.tv/latest/212372-terrorist-involved-in-safoora-bus-attack- arrested-in-dadu 20. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32717321 21. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/pakistan-elections-2018-deadly- blast-hits-quetta-city-180725063749657.html 22. https://www.itct.org.uk/archives/itct_news/exclusive-two-pakistani-soldiers- killed-while-rescuing-women-and-children-from-isis-terrorists-in-balochistan 23. http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/isis-pakistan-afghanistan-rhetoric-reality/ 24. https://www.dawn.com/news/1322488 25. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/330781-threat-of-daesh-to-pakistan
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26. https://www.samaa.tv/news/2017/08/around-95-objectives-of-operation- khyber-4-achieved-dg-ispr/ 27. https://www.state.gov/s/seci/c72810.htm 28. https://rusi.org/publication/newsbrief/daesh-moves-house-settling-life- afghanistan 29. https://dailytimes.com.pk/123065/senior-ttp-commander-daud-khan-switches- loyalty-to-daesh/ 30. https://www.dawn.com/news/1143133 31. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/business/un-blacklists-daesh-linked- outfit-jamaat-ul-ahrar/ 32. https://www.dawn.com/news/1145310 33. https://www.longwarjournal.org/assets_c/2015/01/Khorassan%20Shura_Org- 5469.php 34. https://www.hudson.org/research/12453-prospects-of-the-islamic-state-in- pakistan 35. https://news.yahoo.com/claims-deadly-attack-shiites-karachi-133623598.html 36. https://www.samaa.tv/news/2017/05/daesh-militant-with-mba-degree-arrested- from-karachi/ 37. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/quetta-lawyers-attack-irreparable- blow-future-161209085121086.html 38. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1208036/police-sub-inspector-shot-dead- peshawar/ 39. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1208735/militants-attack-police-training-centre- quetta/ 40. https://nation.com.pk/26-Oct-2016/lej-collaborated-with-isis-for-quetta-attack 41. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/731590/explosion-pakistan-shah- noorani-shrine-death-toll-injured 42. https://www.rt.com/news/377577-pakistan-shrine-blast-killed/ 43. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/international/pakistan/terror-group-claims- suicide-attack-in-pakistans-quetta 44. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/17/world/nine-islamic-state- militants-killed-southwest-pakistan-raid/#.XN8CGY4zZPY
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The Genesis of Religious Radicalism in Pakistan
Ahmed Ali
Jinnah – Pakistan’s founding father – declared that the citizens’ caste and religious beliefs had nothing to do with the business of the Pakistani state.[1] He advocated for freedom of the press and speech and criticized the laws that curtailed that freedom.[2] As a constitutionalist, Jinnah stood by legal process rather than executive action.[3] While addressing an audience at the Kingsway Hall in London on 13 Dec 1946, he said “Democracy is in the blood of Muslims who look upon complete equality of man. Muslims believe in fraternity, equality, and liberty”.[4]
As the president of Pakistan’s first constituent assembly, one of the first steps Jinnah took was to form a committee on the fundamental rights of the citizens and minority issues.[5] Historical accounts from Jinnah’s political life amply suggest that his idea of Pakistan was an inclusive democracy where all citizens irrespective of which faith they subscribed to were equal members of society.
In a tragic turn for Pakistan, however, its founder passed away too soon to practically determine the political future of the new state. And his immediate successors most likely did not agree with the Pakistan Jinnah had envisaged. As Jinnah died, the other founding leaders embarked on their own plan of creating an Islamic state where a Muslim was the primary and natural citizen, while non-Muslim Pakistanis were minorities. And unfortunately minority usually equates degraded citizenship with truncated rights in the country. For Jinnah’s successors, Pakistan was to be an exclusive territory where the Muslims were to practice and promote their faith with ultimate freedom, while “other” citizens were merely an afterthought, at best.
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So in Mar 1949, the post-Jinnah constituent assembly took the first major step to Islamize the country by presenting the ‘Objectives Resolution’ – a set of principles that were to guide future constitution writing in the country. The resolution declared the following:
Allah Almighty alone is responsible for sovereignty over the whole universe and that authorities are to be exercised as sacred faith by Pakistani citizens. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah; The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; The rights and interests of the minorities to freely profess and practice their religion will be protected.[6]
Liaqat Ali Khan took power after Jinnah died. While presenting the objectives resolution, Khan said:
“The ideals that promised the demand for Pakistan should form the cornerstone of the state. When we use the word ‘Democracy’ in the Islamic sense it pervades all aspects of life. It relates to the system of
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Liaqat Ali Khan was not a religious man. Like majority of early lawmakers, he belonged to the secular elite class.[7] While Khan pushed for the creation of an Islamic state in Pakistan, he loved to flaunt his love for alcohol in the Western capitals in order to impress his foreign friends. One of his Western admirers was US assistant secretary of state, George McGhee, who was impressed by Liaqat Ali Khan’s ability to consume alcohol without losing his sobriety.[8]
When non-Muslim Pakistani lawmakers pointed out that the Objective Resolution could bar them from becoming head of the state, Liaqat Ali Khan was quick to reject their concerns. Khan promised that in no way was the idea of an Islamic state envisaged by the Objectives Resolution a theocracy discriminating against non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the president’s office was reserved for Muslims when Pakistan’s first constitution was enforced in 1956. However, it was argued that president was the symbolic head of state like the Queen of England and that the real power office, i.e. prime minister, was open to all communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
Bhupendra Kumar Datta, a Hindu member of the opposition in the constituent assembly of Pakistan said:
“My fear is real, as these concepts will everywhere be interpreted by much less enlightened men. Sir, it would be wiser perhaps for the House, as our Leader suggested the other day, to dispense with a Resolution of this nature at this stage”.
Likewise, another opposition leader Mian Iftikharuddin called the resolution a historic blunder. But there was no turning back from the status of Pakistan as an Islamic state after the objectives resolution. The fate of the new born nation had been sealed.[9] The house went on with passing the resolution without addressing the concerns put forth by non- Muslim lawmakers.[10] While the objectives resolution buried Jinnah’s
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A Sindhi politician Shehla Raza claims the objectives resolution was authored by Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat Islami. It is, however, unclear what drove a secularist like Liaqat Ali Khan to push for an Islamic state in Pakistan. The architects of the objectives resolution clearly failed to foresee that such religiously-skewed principles could instigate persecution of non-Muslim citizens and lay these principles open for misinterpretation and exploitation.
Institutionalizing Radicalism and Exclusion
Pakistan’s founding politicians could not write the country’s first constitution for about nine years after independence. And when they did put out the first document in 1956, it was basically a political roadmap for institutional Islamism in the country and exclusion of Pakistan’s non- Muslim communities from mainstream. The constitution prevented a non-Muslim Pakistani from holding the office of the head of state. Besides, all laws were to be aligned with the teachings of Muslim faith. No law considered to be contrary to Islam was to be made in the country.
This provision gave immense power and freedom to the religious establishment to decide what did or did not contradict Islamic teachings. The Objective Resolution, adopted in 1949, was made the preamble of the 1956 constitution and the country was declared an Islamic republic. The second constitution more or less retained the exclusionary Islamic provisions in 1962. Both constitutions, however, did promise to protect the rights of non-Muslim Pakistanis. But, unfortunately these safeguards have hardly saved the minorities from the extremist onslaught.
Under the constitution of 1962, the president became the effective head of government and the office was still reserved for Muslims. In 1973, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in an attempt to appease the religious right, declared that the offices of the president and prime minister were reserved for
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Muslims alone. After having the non-Muslim Pakistanis excluded from the high offices, the clergy demanded of the state to define who was and who was not a Muslim.
An intensive debate ensued in the parliament that culminated in the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims through a constitutional amendment in 1974. Ironically, the National Awami Party leaders such as Wali Khan who branded themselves as secularists also voted in favor of the amendment.[11] When Pakistan’s first foreign minister Sir Zafarullah Khan, an Ahmadi, objected that the parliament had no authority to make a decision on Ahmadis’ faith, Pakistan’s law minister, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, replied that parliament was the supreme body whose decisions could not be contested.[12]
The 1973 constitution declared Islam as state religion and defined a Muslim as someone who believes in the unity of Allah and finality of the prophethood of Mohammad (PBUH). It also stipulates that only Muslims can be elected as president and prime minister of Pakistan.[13] By 1974, Pakistan as a state effectively took over the role of a radical cleric and began deciding who was a Muslim and who was an apostate. The citizens were categorized into Muslims and others. The plant of religious extremism was watered and groomed which over decades became a formidable tree with firm roots. The declaration of Ahmadis as non- Muslim institutionalized their persecution. It initiated the state’s hostility towards this downcast religious community.
Islamist Extremism in Early Days
Mohammad Ali Jinnah appointed Zarfarullah Khan, a member of Ahmadi community, as foreign minister after the Kashmir issue erupted in 1947. His appointment did not sit well with the Majlis-e-Ahrar, a group of radical Muslims which had been campaigning for the expulsion of Ahmadis from public offices since at least 1935. The Ahrar started calling for Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslim in 1948. Abul Ala
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Maududi, the founder of Jamaat Islami, severely criticized the Ahmadi faith.
On 22 Feb 1953, at the convention of Muslim League in Dhaka, anti- Ahmadi Islamists threatened to take direct action if their demand of declaring Ahmadis non-Muslim was not met.[14] In the same year, Jamaat Islami waged an anti-Ahmadi campaign which resulted in a countrywide agitation and violence.[15] The Punjab was most affected. According to an estimate, about 2000 people mostly Ahmadis were killed across the country.
The violence spiraled up to such a point that martial law had to be imposed to contain the violence in Punjab. The governor general dismissed the federal cabinet.[16] Ahrar activists attacked Ahmadi rallies, raided their homes and shops, and burned their places of worship. In hate campaigns, Ahmadis were ridiculed and humiliated. A judicial investigation was carried out into the anti-Ahmadi pogrom. The findings, known as the ‘Munir Report’, unveiled atrocities committed against the community.[17] The martial law authorities sentenced JI founder Maududi to death for instigating anti-Ahmadi violence. [18] His sentence was later turned into life imprisonment. The anti-Ahmadi agitation achieved a milestone in 1974 with the declaration of Ahmadis as non- Muslim.
Religious Extremism as Policy Instrument
After the East Pakistanis started a separatist insurgency in 1971, President Yahya Khan’s dictatorship embarked on a disastrous policy of using religious extremists to counter the Bengali nationalism and insurgency. His regime mustered up pro-federation elements from amongst Bengalis to form religious militias such as Al-Shams and Al- Badar. These militias were tasked to counter pro-independence Mukti Bahini and their supporters and sympathizers. Jahangir Satti in his book ‘The Ruling Enemy: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Taliban’ argues that
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General Rao Farman Ali, who was good at exploiting religious sentiments, was the architect of these militias.[19] [20]
Al-Badar consisted of Bengali students from colleges, universities, and seminaries who were loyal to Jamaat Islami.[21] On the other hand, Al- Shams was made up of students, teachers, and supporters of Islamist parties other than JI.[22] Scholars from Bangladesh accuse these outfits of exterminating leading left-wing professors, journalists, littérateurs, and even doctors in 1971.[23] Many activists of Al-Shams and Al-Badar were also killed in clashes with Mukti Bahini. These numbers grew significantly when Bengali nationalists settled scores after East Pakistan became Bangladesh.[24] Al-Shams and Al-Badar disintegrated after the fall of Dhaka.
A Dictator with a Holy Mission
The Islamization campaign that began with the Objectives Resolution in 1949 touched its zenith under President Ziaul Haq. He took a holistic approach in bringing religion into everyday life. His mission was to turn the country into a citadel of Islam so that it could lead the Muslim world.[25] Scholars, however, maintain that beneath Zia’s Islamization was the sole purpose of legitimizing his dictatorial regime and strengthening his grip on power. Zia made blasphemy punishable by death which would later lead to vigilante lynchings in the country.
His imposition of zakat and ushr laws triggered a massive protest by Shiites who suspected Zia of attempting to create a Sunni state in Pakistan. In early July 1980, the Shiites marched on the federal capital in protest against the imposition of zakat ordinance. Around 100,000 Shiites laid siege to the secretariat of the chief martial law administrator, paralyzing the bureaucracy and finally forcing the regime to give them exemption from paying zakat to the state.[26]
Zia’s gory penchant for creating a cocktail of power politics and religion had serious repercussions for Pakistan as a society. According to
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Religious Extremism Review historian Vali Nasr, the Islamabad protest revealed the Shiite community’s reliance on Tehran to organize and assert its demands. While Pakistan’s Shiite leaders felt empowered after their encounter with Zia, the conservative Sunni groups were appalled by Shiites’ assertiveness.[27] As if the division of citizens on the basis of Muslim and non-Muslim was not enough, Zia took up policies that widened the sectarian crack within the Muslim community. Under Zia’s watch, extremist terrorists groups were created that would wreck havoc with the country later.
Pakistan’s political nobility has always sought to create an exclusive Islamist state where Muslims are primarily the natural and legitimate citizens, and where people professing other religions are relegated to political and social oblivion. Bigoted policies since inception have produced a society that routinely tolerate religious extremism and intolerance, and loathe diversity. The non-Muslim citizens are frequently under fire from extremists, and their populations are dwindling. Religious extremism and terrorism have become formidable threats to Pakistan’s political and economic stability and national security. The country is shuffling, at best, under the weight of religious extremism, and it remains to be seen if the ruling elite would ever contemplate over the relationship between their policies and the overall decline of the country.
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References:
[1]https://www.ucanews.com/news/are-minorities-in-pakistan-really-free/80034 [2]http://m-a-jinnah.blogspot.com/2011/01/quaid-e-azam-mohammad-ali-jinnah- and.html [3]http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/quotes.html [4]http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/quotes.html [5]http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html [6] https://storyofpakistan.com/objectives-resolution-is-passed [7] https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153880 [8] https://www.thefridaytimes.com/historic-blunder/ [9] https://www.thefridaytimes.com/historic-blunder/ [10] http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical%20No-7.pdf [11] https://dailytimes.com.pk/92484/non-muslims-as-heads-of-state/ [12] Dawn, Karachi, 10 October 1974 [13] http://cii.gov.pk/aboutcii/history/constitution.pdf [14] https://www.revolvy.com/page/1953-Lahore-riots [15] https://www.dawn.com/news/771040 [16] https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=DRMTO7mn7hIC&pg=PA217&dq=ahmad iyya+ji&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SW1SVNKFGoz_yQS4goKYAg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage &q=ahmadiyya%20ji&f=false [17]https://proxyus7.toolur.com/browse.php?u=FujZTx81xTLdpWL1tGEIMI%2Fwfnf 6TkpqYeZPcEpp%2FEXOXTCW8XgUrF6wy5yGFtrqV1EF5P2Lou6HfOXj2skI3aAQ rKwa7b6a%2FplRNQmciOLXpY8GFs%2BSYZqPXbdg2oc%3D&b=1&f=norefer [18] https://storyofpakistan.com/maulana-abu-ala-maududi [19] https://lubpak.net/archives/42543 [20] https://www.dawn.com/news/612841 [21] http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Al-Badr [22] http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Al-Shams [23] http://www.sanipanhwar.com/Pakistan%20between%20Mosque%20and%20Milita ry%20by%20Husain%20Haqqani.pdf [24] Jalalzai, Sectarianism and Politico-Religious Terrorism in Pakistan, p. 258 [25] https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-islamization-before-and-after-dictator-zia-ul- haq/a-19480315 [26] https://www.dawn.com/news/1125851 [27] 78 Vali Nasr, ‚The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics, ‛ 155.
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Religious Extremism on Social Media in Pakistan
M. Suleman Khan & Wajahat Khalid
Pakistan has an estimated 37 million active social media users, which amounts to 18% of the population. The number of users has spiked by 5.7% over the last year, as per the Global Digital Report by ‘We Are Social and Hootsuite’ in Feb 2019. Those who use mobile internet in Pakistan account for 21% of the total population. Social media have unlocked incredible opportunities for individuals and entities to network with other peoples and organizations around the globe. Public and private entities use social media to reach out to their customers and audience with ease. The access to social media is indiscriminate which means that even those individuals or entities that seek to use the cyber platforms for illegal and criminal purposes also get space and voice in this ever-expanding online world.
In recent years, worries have grown about the promotion of hate speech and other extremist contents on social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube etc and there has been an increased debate about whether the social media should be regulated by states to check the spread of cyber violence. The governments’ inability to control contents on social media sites has caused considerable frustration in many countries. In 2017, Pakistan warned of imposing a blanket ban on social media sites like Facebook if the latter did not remove sacrilegious materials from its pages.
In March 2017, Pakistan’s former interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, threatened to block all social media sites over the issue of blasphemous contents allegedly propagated by some Facebook pages[1]. Earlier in Sep 2012, Pakistan imposed a ban on YouTube after an anti- Islam film was uploaded to the site. The film had triggered violent protests across the country. The site was allowed to return only after it
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On 15 Mar 2019, a terrorist stormed a mosque and opened indiscriminate firing at the Muslim worshippers in Christchurch, New Zealand. The terrorist, identified as a white supremacist by media, livestreamed on Facebook the massacre of innocent people[3]. The incident was shocking, but hardly surprising since social media have been used by many individuals and groups for propagating violence in the past. The Christchurch tragedy drove the Australian government to introduce a sweeping legislation to punish social media companies for failing to check hate speech and extremism on their platforms[4].
The proposed legislation aims to punish social media giants if they do not “expeditiously” remove abhorrent violent content produced by perpetrators, such as terrorism, kidnapping, and rape. If found guilty, a company could not only face fines of up to 10% of their annual turnovers, but its executives imprisoned for up to three years[5]. Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison argued that social media sites have a responsibility to ensure that they are not serving as vehicle for terrorist agendas. Critics of the proposed law have warned of unforeseen consequences and reduced international investment in Australia[6]. The Australian government is, nevertheless, determined to go on with the legislation.
In Pakistan, online extremism is a growing problem. Hundreds of pages on social media sites like Facebook and Twitter propagate hate speech and sectarian extremism. Many extremist groups broadcast violent content and propaganda through their social media accounts. Pakistan’s PMLN-led government passed a controversial law called ‘Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act’ (PECA) on 11 Aug 2016 with the purpose to curb hate speech on cyber space. The opposition political parties initially resisted the proposed law, but after some cosmetic amendments supported it. The PECA imposes a fine of rupee 10 million, or an
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In Dec 2018, a study by the Rand Corporation found that ISIS mobilized around 40,000 people from 110 countries to join the terror organization through the strategic use of social media [8]. Sectarian extremist groups in Pakistan are likely using similar cyber strategies for mobilizing potential followers around sectarian causes. It is hard to provide authentic statistics on the actual recruits gained by such groups through the internet. However, given the deep-running religious and sectarian extremism in the country, it is safe to assume that social media platforms do serve as effective vehicles for extremist propaganda. Through social media platforms, many extremist groups attempt to create a mob mentality, and urge their followers to fight for a given cause. The followers of such groups are predominately male.
Pakistan is home to an alarming number of militant and extremist groups. The interior ministry has banned over 70 outfits, most of them associated with extremism [9]. There is a well-established pattern in the country that whenever an outfit is officially banned, it simply adopts another name and resurfaces to carry out its business as usual. Many of the banned groups operate social media accounts and propagate their message to their audience unhindered. In the first half of 2018, the government of Pakistan reported over 3000 accounts to Twitter for allegedly violating the country’s laws. During the second half, the number of reported accounts dropped to 2349. The government has often complained that Twitter has been slow in responding to its requests for action against social media accounts. According to Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), Twitter has responded only to 5% of the complaints forwarded by the government.
On 13 Feb 2019, Pakistan’s then Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry announced the government’s plan to launch a crackdown against hate speech on social media. A working group of intelligence agencies reportedly led by the federal investigation agency (FIA) has been set up
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Religious Extremism Review to help regularize expression on social media platforms. Chaudhry claimed that hate speech was not a problem on mainstream media. The challenges lied with the social media, he added. As expected, many people view the government’s planned clampdown on social media with suspicion, fearing that it might lead to a curtailing of freedom of expression in the country. The country already stands at 142nd out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index. The situation of press freedom has worsened by 3 points since last year. Details are also scant about the nature of accounts that have been reported to Twitter by the government. It is unclear if the reported accounts were involved in promoting religious extremism and terrorism.
A study by daily Dawn in Sep 2017 found that 41 banned outfits in Pakistan openly operated accounts on Facebook. Some of the key extremist groups on the social media were Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), Sipah Sahaba, Sipah Mohammad, Lashkar Jhangvi, Tehreek Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek Taliban Swat, Tehreek Nifaz ShariatMohammadi, Jamaatul Ahrar, 313 Brigade, and many Shia outfits[10]. According to the report, around 160,000 people have subscribed to the pages of banned outfits. The leading group with most followers is Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat. Below are some of the hundreds of Facebook accounts that propagate religiously extreme contents on their pages:
Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ):
ASWJ runs about 200 pages and groups and spread anti-Shia hate material. Formerly known as Sipah Sahaba, ASWJ was banned in 2012. However, the outfit routinely operates in the country by holding public rallies and spreading sectarian hatred. ASWJ leaders have also been participating in mainstream politics.
Taajdaar-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat:
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With over 500,000 followers on Facebook, this page proudly glorifies extremists like Mumtaz Qadri, the police officer who assassinated Punjab’s governor Salman Taseer for blasphemy allegation in 2011. It openly instigates violence against the Supreme Court judges who exonerated a Christian woman Asia Bibi of blasphemy charges.
This explicitly anti-Shia Facebook platform claims to offer true history of Shia Muslims which involve hate speech and instigation for violence. It was created in October 2014.
Ahlulbait [A.S] (shias):
This Facebook page, with over 2500 followers, propagates hardcore extremist content against Shia Muslims, and abuse Shia religious leaders. The identity of its administrator is unknown.
Jago Sunni Jago:
It has over 158,000 likes on Facebook. It spreads religious hatred and incites violence against the Shias and Ahmadis in Pakistan. Created in Sep 2014, its admin’s identity is as usual unknown.
Sunni killing:
Apparently linked to ASWJ, this page is liked by 11,657 people. It propagates extreme anti-Shia contents and promotes religious extremism.
X-Shia Exposes Shiaism:
Created in Feb 2013, this Facebook page spreads hatred against Shia faith and Sufi rituals. It projects Shias as proxy of Iran in Pakistan.
Sunni Defense & Media Cell. Kashmir:
It has a more global tone as it claims to raise a voice against the alleged injustice to Muslims around the world. At home, it specifically targets the followers of Ahmadi faith. It is liked by more than 1400 people.
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Sunni Rights:
It has been involved in sharing extremist religious content. The page is liked by nearly 6000 people.
AHL E Sunnat (SunNiBrelvi):
This page is particularly anti-Ahmadi. Created in Sep 2012, it is liked by over 39,000 people. The page shares extremist religious content and incites sectarian violence.
HAQ SUNNI HAQ:
This page is apparently administered by Pakistan Sunni Tehreek. It promotes sectarian hatred against Shias and Ahmadis, with some criticism also directed at Wahabis.
True Sunni Defender:
This Facebook page promotes violent narratives of Tehreek Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) – an extremist group led by Khadim Hussain Rizvi. The account propagates hate speech and instigates violence against the Supreme Court justices who set Asia Bibi free in the blasphemy case. Bibi, a Christian woman from Punjab, was in death row for years on charges of blasphemy.
Sipah-e-Sahaba Kohistan:
A hardcore anti-Shia platform, this page shares extreme hatred against Shias. Its motto is to expose what it calls non-Muslim Shias. Apart from Shias, it also targets Barelvi sect.
Qadianis& Ahmadis are Kaf***:
As the name suggests, this Facebook page with over 900 likes openly calls for the violence against the Ahmadi community which was declared non-Muslim in Pakistan through a constitutional amendment in 1974.
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Anti Ahmadiyya, Difa-e-Risalat:
This page also promotes hatred and incites violence against the Ahmadi community. It is liked by 1200 people.
Shia Help-Refrences:
Followed by over 11,000 people, this Facebook page promotes sectarian content against followers of Sunni Islam.
Shi’at Is The Right Faith:
Created on in 2011, this Shia page has been involved in sharing religiously extreme content. Its admin is unknown, while its followers are over 2000.
Basij-e-Pak Watan BPW (official):
This pro-Iran and anti-Saudi page promotes sectarian content, portraying Iranian clerics and Saudi sheikhs in good and bad light respectively. The page is liked by over 11,000 people. It also shares anti-Israel and anti- Jewish content.
Political Shia – Pakistan:
The sectarian tug of war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the focus of this page. It propagates content in favor of Iran, and against Saudi Arabia. Its followers are over 40,000.
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Religious Extremism Review
I AM MALANG:
This Shia page promotes hate speech against the Sunni sect. It is liked by over 6000 people.
:کُھالخط Open Letter
It’s a Shia page with over 17,000 likes. It specifically shares abusive content about Pakistan’s former President Ziaul Haq. It also shares pictures of Hezbollah militants. Some of its contents are extreme in nature.
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References:
1. [1] https://www.ucanews.com/news/pakistan-warns-of-social-media-ban-for- blasphemous-posts/78634 2. [2] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-youtube/pakistan-lifts-ban-on- youtube-after-launch-of-local-version-idUSKCN0UW1ER 3. [3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/16/why-social-media- terrorism-make-perfect-fit/?utm_term=.b6fbf0c3a906 4. [4] https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/apr/04/australia-passes-social-media- law-penalising-platforms-for-violent-content 5. [5] https://www.engadget.com/2019/03/30/australia-laws-could-imprison-internet- execs/ 6. [6] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/australia-social-media-law-violent-video- streaming-illegal-facebook-new-zealand/ 7. [7] https://www.boell.de/en/2018/02/07/pakistans-cybercrime-law-boon-or-bane 8. [8] https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/12/isiss-use-of-social-media-still-poses-a- threat-to-stability.html 9. [9] https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Proscribed- OrganizationEng.pdf 10. [10] https://www.dawn.com/news/1335561
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The Troubled Pak-Afghan Relations
Wajahat Khalid & M. Suleman Khan
Pakistan and Afghanistan had a cold start in their relations as Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1947 over the issue of Durand Line. The bilateral relations deteriorated later as Kabul began to instigate the so-called Pakhtunistan Movement. The most painful period in their bilateral relations was the reign of Sardar Dawood Khan who served as Afghanistan’s prime minister from 1953 to 1963 and later as president from 1973 to 1978.
Dawood’s rule saw border clashes with Pakistan and sabotage activities in latter’s tribal regions. Dawood’s policy of supporting Afghan militias around the question of Durand Line was opposed both by Pakistan’s Baloch and Pakhtun nationalist leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The latter believed Afghan leaders exploited the issue for political ends. Towards the end of his rule, Dawood had probably realized the futility of pushing Pakistan over the issue as he had stopped talking on the Durand Line. And the Pak-Afghan relations have continued through the ups and downs ever since.
The Durand Line was drawn by the British India and the Afghan state under an agreement signed on November 12, 1893. Pakistan inherited at birth the territories acquired earlier under the agreement. Successive Afghan governments have toyed with the idea of what some call “ethnic reunification” of the Pakhtun population straddling either side of the Durand Line. During the initial decades following Pakistan’s creation, Kabul actively pursued the issue and fomented trouble in Pakistan’s tribal areas with Afghanistan. Pakistan responded forcefully by suppressing the intruding Afghan militias and blocking the trade routes to the landlocked Afghanistan. The hostility damaged the Afghan economy and Kabul increasingly relied on the former USSR for bailouts.
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With the exception of the Taliban leaders who brushed the Durand issue aside during their rule in Afghanistan in the second half of the 1990s, various Afghan politicians have been commenting on the problem.
In 2017, Pakistan approved a comprehensive plan to improve security in its militancy-hit tribal areas. The move elicited a prompt response from the former Afghan President Hamid Karzai who tweeted that “Pakistan government has taken some steps on Durand Line which are angering the Afghans”. Later he again tweeted “the Govt. of Pakistan has no legal authority to dictate terms on the Durand line. While we wish freedom for the people of FATA from FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations) and other repressive measures, we remind the Govt. of Pakistan that Afghanistan hasn’t and will not recognize the Durand line”. Likewise, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, a Pakistani Member of Parliament and chairperson of Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party, created a domestic uproar by saying that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) belonged to Afghans. His controversial remarks came after Islamabad expressed its intention to repatriate Afghan refugees to their country.
However, there have also been Afghan voices that support Pakistan’s stand on the issue of Durand Line. For instance, Abdul Latif Pedram, a prominent Afghan lawmaker and head of National Congress Party, said he recognized the Durand Line as an internationally recognized border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pedram said “I once again announce that the Line is an international border and Afghanistan and Pakistan should respect each other and respect the border of each other and refrain from interfering in internal affairs of each other”.
Similarly, Shahjee Gul Afridi, a Pakistani Pakhtun lawmaker from the tribal areas, quoted Afghan Vice President Abdullah Abdullah in March 2017 as saying “I am a supporter of the Durand Line and consider it a border between the two brotherly Muslim countries as it is no more a dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan”. Afridi claimed Abdullah wanted Afghanistan not to waste time on the border dispute with Pakistan. When asked about the US stance on the Durand Line, a US
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Department of State official said the US had no new policies with respect to the borders of Afghanistan.
The Durand Line issue had been a bone of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan for decades. However, in recent years especially after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 the question of insurgency in Afghanistan has replaced the Durand Line issue as the main irritant in the bilateral relations. Cross border terrorism continues to create troubles for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both Islamabad and Kabul accuse each other of supporting Taliban militants against each other. The Taliban emerged from the chaos of the post-Soviet civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Pakistan supported and later recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan took a drastic turn in its Taliban policy in the wake of terrorist attacks in New York and the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Justifying the policy shift, Pakistan’s then President General Pervez Musharraf said Pakistan had no option but to support America’s anti-Taliban war efforts.
As the US planes began bombing Taliban targets, Pakistan deployed 80,000 troops on the border to prevent the militants from crossing over to Pakistan. However, with over 2000 kilometers of porous and poorly manned border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the spillover of militants into Pakistan was inevitable. Many Taliban groups took shelter in Pakistan’s tribal regions and later other banned extremist groups in Pakistan joined them to form the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007.
The TTP was established as a distinct entity free from the control of the Afghan Taliban. It sought to enforce a strict version of Islamic Shariah in its stronghold of North and South Waziristan and Swat valley which brought it face to face with the Pakistani government. The TTP has staged some of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan, killing thousands of Pakistanis. In 2017, a report by Pakistan government stated that over 60,000 Pakistanis including civilians and security personnel died in the war on terror from 2001 to 2017.
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In June 2014, Pakistan launched a military operation nicknamed “Zarb-e- Azb” to cleanse the North Waziristan agency of the TTP militants. Earlier in the same month, the TTP had claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack on Karachi’s international airport. The airport attack that left 36 dead invited a decisive military action from the Pakistan government. The TTP carried out another deadly attack in December 2014 by targeting the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar. The attack left 148 dead including 136 schoolchildren.
Pakistan continues to battle Islamist militants including the TTP. However, despite its continued anti-terrorism operations against extremist militant groups, Pakistan has been accused of harboring Taliban factions that carry out attacks inside Afghanistan. Pakistan has often been accused of pursuing a policy of differentiating between ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’ – the good ones comprising those attacking Afghanistan, and the bad ones those that challenge the writ of Pakistani state. Pakistan denies the allegation, saying elimination of all forms of terrorism is in its own national interest.
One of the major allegations Pakistan faces is that it harbors the so-called Quetta Shura of Taliban allegedly based in Balochistan. The Quetta Shura is the self-claimed legitimate Taliban government of Afghanistan in exile. After the collapse of the Taliban government in 2002, a number of Taliban leaders who held top positions in the Taliban regime in Afghanistan formed a Council of Leaders (Rahbari Shura) which later came to be known as the Quetta Shura. Pakistan denied the existence of the Quetta Shura initially.
However, in Dec 2009, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar told Dawn News that Pakistani security forces had taken on the Quetta Shura and damaged it to such an extent that it no longer posed a threat. By 2010 it was clear that Pakistan had changed its policy toward the Afghan Taliban. Pakistani security forces had arrested a number of key Taliban figures like Mullah Kabir and Mullah Mohammad Younas. Kabir was an alleged member of the Quetta Shura, while Younas was the
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Taliban shadow governor of Zabul province. Commenting on the Pakistani crackdown on the Quetta Shura, a report in the New York Times said the development indicated a shift in Pakistan’s policy towards the Afghan Taliban.
But, the blame game between Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to this day, with Afghanistan repeating the allegation that Pakistan harbors the Afghan Taliban leaders. For many years, Afghan and US officials claimed that the Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Omar was hiding in Pakistan. In July 2015, Haseeb Sediqi, the spokesman of Afghanistan’s Directorate of National Security (NDS), claimed that Mullah Omar had died in April 2013 in a hospital in Karachi, Pakistan. Another Afghan official said “we can confirm that Mullah Omar died two years ago…in Pakistan due to an illness”.
However, the claim about Mullah Omar’s presence and later death in Pakistan has been refuted recently by a Dutch journalist Bette Dam who spent five years digging out information on Mullah Omar. According to Dam’s research, the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar never lived in Pakistan after the overthrow of his government in Afghanistan. She claims, instead, that Omar lived near a US base in Afghanistan where he finally died of natural death.
Nevertheless, the mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan continues. Afghanistan refuses to acknowledge that Pakistan is serious in cracking down on all Taliban militants despite the losses Pakistan has suffered in the war against terrorism. US and Afghan officials have repeatedly asked Pakistan to do more against the Afghan Taliban allegedly based in Pakistan. Pakistan denies the presence of Afghan Taliban on its soil and accuses Kabul of providing safe havens to TTP militants that carry out attacks against civilian and security targets inside Pakistan.
On Sep 6, 2017, Pakistan’s Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa said “despite all our efforts, our countless sacrifice and over decades of war, we are being told that we have not done enough against terrorism,”,
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Apart from the issue of alleged TTP safe havens in Afghanistan, the presence of India in Afghanistan is also a matter of serious security concern for Islamabad. Pakistan maintains that India is using Afghan soil to instigate insurgency in Balochistan province. In 2009, Pakistan’s then Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed that India is involved in Balochistan unrest through the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).
On Sep 2, 2016, the former interior minister repeated his claim during a press conference that India was fomenting unrest in Balochistan and helping the Baloch separatists. According to Shashank Joshi, a fellow at London’s United Services Institute, “India’s steps on Balochistan are largely a tactical move to deter Pakistan from raising Kashmir”. Joshi adds that India also hints at more extensive support for Baloch rebels should Pakistan not reduce its support for anti-Indian militants.
Pakistan rejects the claim that India is in Afghanistan primarily for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country. Pakistan sees the proliferation of Indian consulates in Afghanistan as an attempt at strategic encirclement of Pakistan. In March 2016, Pakistani authorities arrested a serving Indian naval officer KulbushanJhadav from Balochistan’sSarawan area. Jhadav confessed to his involvement in terrorist activities in Balochistan. Islamabad has also provided to the United Nations dossiers on the Indian involvement in terrorism in Balochistan. However, the blame game, suspicion, and mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan continue unending, with each side flaunting their own sets of facts to accuse the other of wrongdoing.
Pakistan and Afghanistan are unlikely to live as peaceful neighbors as long as the border dispute around the Durand Line remains alive. Some Afghan politicians have propagated an assumption that the Durand Line
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Pakistan inherited the territories at birth. For Pakistan, the Durand Line is a non-negotiable reality. The issue is a matter of national security and territorial integrity and no claim, historical or otherwise, is likely to ever lead to a change in Pakistan’s stated position on its international border with Afghanistan. Even the diehard champions of the Durand Line like Afghan President Sardar Dawood Khan had to ultimately realize that it was a waste of time and resources for Afghanistan to push Pakistan over this question.
Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are suffering from multiple crises of poverty, illiteracy, terrorism, and violent extremism, etc. An early demise of the Durand Line issue would most likely usher in a period of more stability and peace in both countries. The Afghan leaders’ intermittent playing with the Durand Line issue has never helped the Afghan people whose several generations have grown up seeing nothing but war and destruction. A country annihilated by decades of war can concentrate its time, talent, skills, and resources to the social and infrastructural reconstruction instead of digging out a matter that invites only tension and instability.
Peace and stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan are interlinked. Neither is immune to what happens to the other and a development in either country spills over to the other. Both neighbors need to address the gaps in their bilateral relations. The mutual mistrust prevailing on both sides can be overcome by addressing each other’s concerns. Pakistan should ensure that its territory is not used by any shades of militants against Afghanistan. The National Action Plan, developed following the horrifying attack on the APS, needs to be activated with full force of the
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Religious Extremism Review state and implemented indiscriminately across the country. On the other hand, Afghanistan must, likewise, ensure that Afghan soil does not become a launching pad for anti-Pakistan terrorist groups. Kabul needs to address Pakistan’s genuine security concerns around the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Only through a genuine commitment to peace and stability can the two neighbors build mutual trust and policies to root out the scourge of terrorism and insurgency permanently.
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References:
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/president-general-pervez-musharraf- returned-home-after-two-day-visit-afghanistan" https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/president-general-pervez-musharraf- returned-home-after-two-day-visit-afghanistan https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/president-daud-khan-of-afghanistan-and-his- relations-with-pakistan-prince-sardar-muhammed-daud-was.308294 http://www.khyber.org/publications/016-020/daudafghanistan.shtml https://www.academia.edu/19907052/PAKISTAN- AFGHANISTAN_RELATIONS_IN_POST_9_11_ERA_A_Case_Study_of_ Durand_Line_Security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortimer_Durand" \l "Career https://www.ips.org.pk/pak-afghan-relations-the-durand-line-issue https://www.academia.edu/11781461/Durand_Line_Issue_and_Pak- _Afghan_Relation?auto=download https://www.nationalgeographic.org/news/durand-line https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909535?seq=1"\l"page_scan_tab_contents https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/07/16/putting-achakzais-statement- in-context-2/ https://nation.com.pk/05-Mar-2017/ex-afghan-president-says-kabul-won-t- recognise-durand-line https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/195390-Afghan-VP-accepts-Durand-Line- as-border-claims-MNA https://www.globalvillagespace.com/durand-line-pakistan-afghan-relations- stressed-due-pestering-wound-past http://www.afghanistantimes.af/people-on-both-sides-of-durand-line-victim- of-terror-ghani https://www.dawn.com/news/1206218 https://www.dw.com/en/the-godfather-of-the-taliban-hamid-gul-and-his- legacy/a-18652103 https://thelondonpost.net/bhuttos-created-taliban-benazir-apologized-in- london-at-lse https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283507520_Pak - China_Joint_Strategy_against_the_Soviet_Invasion_of_Afghanistan https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13971203000497 https://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-terrorists-openly- collect-funds-in-pak-for-war-on-india/20120711.htm
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https://web.archive.org/web/20070214103922/http:/www.cfr.org/publication/9 135 https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm http://in.rediff.com/news/2007/may/25guest.htm http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/21spec.htm https://web.archive.org/web/20060718135741/http:/www.cfr.org/publication/9 514 https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/world/asia/16intel.htmlhttps:/www.cfr.o rg/backgrounder/india-afghanistan-relations https://jamestown.org/program/the-quetta-shura-understanding-the-afghan- talibans-leadership/ https://web.archive.org/web/20091214024627/http:/www.dawn.com/wps/wcm /connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-quetta-shura-ahmad- mukhtar-qs-04 https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/world/asia/23islamabad.html https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2005/03/25/musharraf-at-india- conclave/ https://www.dawn.com/news/1455348/india-rebuffs-trump-over-afghan- library-swipe https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/india-afghanistan- relations-gaining-strategic-bonding/ https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/india-afghanistan- relations-gaining-strategic-bonding/
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