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The Impact and Promise of the Cognitive Revolution

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The Impact and Promise of the Cognitive Revolution The Impact and Promise of the Cognitive Revolution Roger W. Sperry • Opening a new era in science, psychology's cognitive rev- tive physicalism or microdeterminism, the traditional ex- olution contradicts traditional doctrine that science has planatory model of science (including behaviorism), has no use for consciousness to explain brain function. Sub- serious shortcomings and is no longer tenable. jective mental states as emergent interactive properties of Other disciplines, even physics, are beginning to brain activity become irreducible and indispensable for agree and join in, discovering and adopting the new anti- explaining conscious behavior and its evolution and get reductive and emergent insights, including, for example, primacy in determining what a person is and does. Dual- computer science, neuroscience, biology, anthropology, istic unembodied consciousness is excluded. A modified evolutionary and hierarchy theory, general systems theory, two-way model ofinterlevel causal determinism introduces and of course, quantum theory, among others (e.g., new principles of downward holistic and subjective cau- Blakemore & Greenfield, 1987; Campbell, 1974; Check- sation. Growing adoption in other disciplines suggests the land, 1981; Gell-Mann, 1988; Gleick, 1987; Goodwin, two-way model may be replacing reductive physicalism 1978; Greenberg & Tobach, 1988; Grene, 1987; D. Grif- as the basic explanatory paradigm of science. The practice, fin, 1988; D.R. Griffin, 1981;Laszlo, 1972;Piaget, 1970; methods, and many proven potentials of science are little Popper & Eccles, 1977; Stapp, 1982; Wasow, 1989). Each changed. However, the scientific worldview becomes rad- discipline, however, appears to have a different version of ically revised in a new unifying vision of ourselves and how these innovations came about, each finding the or- the world with wide-ranging humanistic and ideologic as igins in its own particular field. well as scientific implications. I strongly believe that, in the long run, history will show that among the sciences, psychology was actually the first discipline to overthrow its traditional mainstream eflecting on a century past, with an eye to the fu- doctrine in favor of the new paradigm. By the early 1970s, ture, what I have to say is colored in no small part mainstream psychology already had adopted the new R by a concern long shared with the late B.F. Skin- outlook (Dember, 1974; Matson, 1971; Palermo, 1971; ner, namely, "Can APA, or any other organization, count Pylyshyn, 1973; Segal & Lachman, 1972), whereas the on another hundred years?" Skinner's answer became in- other fields came to it later, especially during the 1980s. creasingly less optimistic, especially in his last decade. He In effect, most have just been following and developing concluded, "The more we learn about human behavior, varied forms and applications of what, in essence, is the the less and less promising appear the prospects." Re- same basic new core concept. At least that is the conclu- flecting a similar vein of increasing concern, I see a pos- sion I have come to and will try to support. sible ray of hope in psychology's cognitive revolution and what it could mean in bringing new perspectives, beliefs, Advance Overview and values—in short, new mind-sets and a new way of thinking—much needed if humanity is to survive the next First, it will help to have a quick review of some of the century. salient features of the cognitive revolution as I see it: the During APA's first hundred years, psychology is said essence of this revolt, what it means, and some of its to have gone through three major revolutions. In addition to the recent shift to cognitivism, there were the two earlier Lewis P. Lipsitt served as action editor for this article. revolts, which were associated with J. B. Watson and Sig- This article is an edited version of a Distinguished Centennial Ad- mund Freud. I believe that, of the three, the current so- dress presented at the 99th Annual Convention of the American Psy- chological Association, San Francisco, August 1991. The address was called cognitive, mentalist, or consciousness revolution is read for Dr. Sperry by his former associate, Theodore J. Voneida, pro- the most radical turnaround—the most revisionary and fessor and chair, Department of Neurobiology, College of Medicine, transformative. Northeastern Ohio Universities, Rootstown, OH 44272. A main theme I want to stress concludes that in the The work was supported by funds donated to the California Institute cognitive revolution psychology is leading the way among of Technology for research on the mind-brain problem. I thank Dr. Voneida for his excellent reading and Mark Rosenzweig for the kind the sciences to a new and improved, that is, a more com- introduction. Constructive criticisms on an earlier draft were contributed prehensive, adequate, and valid conceptual foundation by Joseph Bogen, Erika Erdmann, Polly Henninger, Jan Sperry, Dr. for scientific as well as for all causal explanation and un- Voneida, and anonymous referees. I also thank Patricia Anderson, Norma derstanding. Any perceived irony here is indeed quite real. Deupree, and Mary Jeffries for valued help in compiling the references and processing the manuscript. Psychology, after having been put down for decades by Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Roger the so-called hard sciences as not being really a science, W. Sperry, Trustee Professor Emeritus, Division of Biology 156-29, Cal- is now turning the tables—in effect, asserting that reduc- ifornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. 878 August 1993 • American Psychologist Copyright 1993 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. OOO3-O66X/93/S2.OO Vol. 48. No. 8. 878-885 consequences and future implications. Most important, To many psychologists, such claims for the cognitive the cognitive revolution represents a diametric turn revolution will seem a lavish even fanciful overstatement. around in the centuries-old treatment of mind and con- I believe, however, that firm substantial backing can be sciousness in science. The contents of conscious experi- found for each of these assessments, plus many more yet- ence, with their subjective qualities, long banned as being unmentioned extensions. Toward a preliminary under- mere acausal epiphenomena or as just identical to brain standing of why the impacts should be so profound and activity or otherwise in conflict with the laws of the con- far-reaching, consider the fact that the cognitive revolu- servation of energy, have now made a dramatic comeback. tion, as here conceived, involves radical changes in not Reconceived in the new outlook, subjective mental states just one but in two core concepts, consciousness and cau- sality, both of which have extremely wide, almost ubiq- become functionally interactive and essential for a full uitous application to everything we experience and try explanation of conscious behavior. Traditional micro- to understand. In view of this alone, it is obvious that the determinist reasoning that brain function can be fully paradigmatic shift to cognitivism-mentalism, following accounted for in neurocellular-physiochemical terms is centuries of rigorous materialism, is bound to have nu- refuted, as are also former assumptions that traditional merous far-reaching consequences. materialism provides, in principle, a complete coherent explanation of the natural world. The cognitive-con- Among further effects, this turnabout in the causal sciousness revolution thus also represents a revolt against status of consciousness abolishes the traditional science- the long-time worship of the atomistic in science. Re- values dichotomy. That we are in a new era today in ductive microdeterministic views of personhood and the respect to values is well recognized (Edel, 1980). Thus, physical world are replaced in favor of a more wholistic, the cognitive revolution, from an ethical standpoint, might equally well have been called a values revolution. top-down view in which the higher, more evolved entities The old, value-free, strictly objective, mindless, quanti- throughout nature, including the mental, vital, social, and tative, atomistic descriptions of materialist science are other high-order forces, gain their due recognition along being replaced by accounts that recognize the rich, ir- with physics and chemistry. reducible, varied and valued emergent macro and holistic It is important to stress, however, that the cognitive properties and qualities in both human and nonhuman changeover from behaviorism to the new mentalism does nature. Subjective human values, no longer written off not carry all the way from one previous extreme to the as ineffectual epiphenomena nor reduced to microphe- opposite, that is, to a mentalistic dualism. The shift, nomena, become the most critically powerful force shap- rather, is to a quite-new heterodox position that integrates ing today's civilized world (Sperry, 1972, 1991a), the un- and blends aspects of prior opposed solutions into a novel derlying answer to current global ills and the key to world unifying synthesis (Natsoulas, 1987). The new position change. is mentalistic, holding that behavior is mentally and sub- A different approach is opened also and a resolution jectively driven. This, however, does not mean that it is offered for that age-old enigma, the freewill-determinism dualistic. In the new synthesis, mental states, as dynamic paradox. Blending previous opposites in a heterodox emergent properties
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