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Regional Insights WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES Regional Insights 2018 EDITION, NO. 2 (MARCH) The Evolving Role of the Security Forces to Counter Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas by Celina B. Realuyo Summary: As transnational organized crime increasingly presents a national security threat throughout Latin America, governments must re-examine the roles and responsibilities of their security forces, both military and police, to ensure the welfare, security, prosperity and sovereignty of their countries. To reduce drug-related violence per- petrated by the Mexican cartels, President Felipe Calderon deployed the military to complement police efforts across Mexico in 2006; after 10 years of the armed forces countering the cartels, there is a heated debate over how the military and police should be engaged in internal security as homicides are on the rise. In 2011, the U.S. issued a national strategy to combat transnational organized crime recognizing the seriousness of the threats from transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to the Americas. As Colombia transitions from fighting the decades-long FARC armed insurgency to implementing the peace accord in the “post-conflict” era, counter- Regional Insights is a publication of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. The views represented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Perry Center, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This manuscript was originally published in Transformacion Militar from the Centro De Análisis Estratégico Ejército Del Futuro (CAEEF) in Colombia in 2017. Copies of Perry Center publications can be obtained on the Perry Center website at: www.williamjperrycenter.org Regional Insights ing transnational organized crime has become a top money and data. While crime is not a new phenome- priority and will entail an evolving role of the police non, the magnitude, velocity, wealth and violence of and military to fight TCOs. Governments will need a illicit activities are empowering transnational crimi- strong legal framework, clearly defined missions for nal organizations that undermine sovereignty, econ- the military and police, specialized training, and tal- omy and citizen security in Latin America. Criminal ent recruitment and retention to realize security sec- networks like the Mexican cartels, Central American tor reform to counter transnational organized crime gangs and the Russian mafia do not respect the rule effectively across the Americas. of law and challenge state authority. The Evolving Threat from Transnational Organized Crime: Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) threat- en the security and prosperity of countries through- out the Western Hemisphere at an estimated cost of 3.5% of GDP to the region, according to the Inter- American Development Bank. Since the end of the Cold War, illicit networks, comprised of terrorists, criminals and proliferators, have increasingly capi- talized on globalization to expand their criminal Photo caption: U.S. Coast Guard personnel from Cutter Stead- fast detain members from a Low Profile Vessel in the Eastern agendas. Leading U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Pacific Ocean. The vessel was transporting over 3,200 pounds of cocaine when it was intercepted in November 2017. Photo Kurt Tidd explained before Congress in April 2017, credit: U.S. Coast Guard. “transregional and transnational threat networks are In recent years, TCOs have transformed from now the principal threat to regional security and sta- local, specialized criminal mafias into powerful bility [in Latin America]. These networks operate transregional-transnational criminal organizations unconstrained by legal and geographic boundaries, that have diversified their activities across the world. unimpeded by morality, and fueled by enormous In many cases, international drug cartels, mafias, and profits. They prey on weak institutions and exploit gangs are better armed, funded, and trained than the the interconnected nature of our modern financial, government security forces charged with confronting transportation and communication systems and the them. In the face of these powerful and violent TCOs, seams in our organizational boundaries.”1 governments are struggling to fulfill their basic While terrorist groups are driven by political mission to provide security, promote prosperity, or religious ideology, transnational criminal organi- guarantee the rule of law, and respect and represent zations are motivated by maximizing profits. They the political will of their people. They must reassess exploit global supply chains across the land, air, sea and reorganize the efforts of their security forces to and cyber domains to move goods, people, services, better confront TCOs and promote citizen security. 1 Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern Command before the 115th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 6 April 2017, http://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/ Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_2017_posture_statement_FINAL. pdf?ver=2017-04-06-105819-923 2 Regional Insights The United States TOC penetration and abuse. After a comprehensive assessment in 2010, the U.S. 4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that government concluded that transnational organized pose the greatest threat to national security crime should be considered a national security threat by targeting their infrastructures, depriving requiring a distinct national security strategy. It de- them of their enabling means, and prevent- termined that TCOs are increasingly able to pene- ing the criminal facilitation of terrorist ac- trate and/or co-opt state structures in some countries. tivities. Transnational organized crime threatens global eco- 5. Build international consensus, multilat- nomic interests and international markets by distort- eral cooperation, and public-private part- ing prices, demand and supply. Moreover, terror and nerships to defeat transnational organized insurgent groups, like Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, are crime.3 increasingly relying on TCOs for funding and logisti- cal support, with particularly dangerous implications for the potential movement of operatives and weap- ons of mass destruction.2 In July 2011, the White House issued the U.S. Strategy to Combat Trans- national Organized Crime (CTOC) to focus U.S. efforts to detect, degrade, dismantle and prosecute transnational criminal networks through interagency and international cooperation. The strategy consid- ers the Western Hemisphere as an area where illicit trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons [by TCOs] fuel increased instability and threaten the prosperity Photo caption: Belizean security forces onboard a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter during a drug eradication opera- of some Central American states.” The strategy has tion in Belize in 2015. Photo credit: Westin Warburton, Joint Task Force Bravo. five main objectives: 1. Protect Americans and our partners from More recently, on February 9, 2017, the White the harm, violence, and exploitation of House issued Presidential Executive Order (E.O.) transnational criminal networks. 13773 on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Prevent- 2. Help partner countries strengthen gover- ing International Trafficking, demonstrating the new nance and transparency, break the corrup- Administration’s commitment to combat transna- tive power of transnational criminal net- tional organized crime to promote domestic and in- works, and sever state-crime alliances. ternational security. The E.O. recognizes that TCOs 3. Break the economic power of transnation- and subsidiary organizations, including transnation- al criminal networks and protect strategic al drug cartels, have spread throughout the nation, markets and the U.S. financial system from 2 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” July 25, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/fact-sheet- 3 U.S. CTOC Strategy, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ strategy-combat-transnational-organized-crime files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf 3 Regional Insights threatening the safety of the U.S. and its citizens.4 It volvement is “in support” of those law enforcement strengthens the enforcement of federal law to thwart agencies. Typically, U.S. military personnel are in- TCOs that threaten public safety and national secu- volved in supporting an interdiction during maritime rity and that are related to: (i) the illegal smuggling operations in international waters, where U.S. Navy and trafficking of humans, drugs or other substances, ships and aircraft patrol and intercept suspected traf- wildlife, and weapons; (ii) corruption, cybercrime, fickers. The actual interdictions – boarding, search, fraud, financial crimes, and intellectual-property seizures and arrests – are led and conducted by em- theft; or (iii) the illegal concealment or transfer of barked U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detach- proceeds derived from such illicit activities.5 ments or partner nation drug law enforcement agen- cies.6 The collaborative partnership between law In the United States, there are clear roles and enforcement and the military is the cornerstone of an responsibilities for law enforcement and the military effective U.S. CTOC strategy. to counter TCOs. U.S. law enforcement, like the FBI and DEA, leads the CTOC campaign, with the
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