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Chapter One: During-War Reconstruction 14 The impact on conflict of ‘state-led no-military reconstruction during war’: the case of the protection of Land Rights for IDPs during conflict in Colombia (2007-2010) David Camargo Cárdenas PhD University of York Department of Politics September 2011 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo Abstract This thesis examines, via a single case-study – The Colombian Government's "Land and Property Protection Program" (LPPP) – whether non-military state-led programs developed to help civil populations during conflict impacts on the conflict; and whether the impact is positive or negative. The rationality for this is that studies on activities of reconstruction after armed conflicts usually include assessments of the positive and negative impacts of such activities on the conflict itself; and a consensus in academia and field-work practice that peace can be built through proper reconstruction programs. However, a similar level of scholarly interest does not exist regarding reconstruction during warfare. Such reconstruction is conflated with notions which regard it as being part of a war effort and commanded by the military and/or a matter of political necessity. This research proposes that both: Post-war reconstruction and During War Reconstruction (DWR), must be studied under the complexity of 'Reconstruction' in general. This empirical thesis demonstrated the existence of and studied a State-led non-military DWR program which – as defined – is not used for military purposes by the Colombian' state and whose final goal must be to repair the political link between citizens and the state. It was found that the LPPP seeks to restore confidence in the state, either by approaching populations that historically have been abandoned by the state and trying to win back their confidence; or returning property rights to those from whom it was unjustly removed. Three main recommendations flowing from the research: the first claims for more academic studies about DWR; the second for the study and design of protective programs reinforcing the role of the state as primary protector of private property in society; the third for more in-depth studies of the LPPP and the dual behaviour of 'violence corridors' and 'illicit crops' problems in Colombia. 2 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo Table of contents ABSTRACT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 LIST OF TABLES 5 LIST OF FIGURES 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7 DECLARATION 8 INTRODUCTION 9 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 10 THESIS STRUCTURE 10 RESEARCH DESIGN 12 CHAPTER ONE: DURING-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 14 INTRODUCTION 14 WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 15 LAND AND CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 29 STUDIES ABOUT COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT 34 THE “LAND AND PROPERTY PROTECTION PROGRAM” (LPPP) 42 CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICT AND LAND PROTECTION 53 INTRODUCTION 53 THE RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY OF RESTITUTION OF LAND RIGHTS 55 THE RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY OF PROTECTION OF LAND RIGHTS DURING WARFARE 77 CONCLUSIONS 85 CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 92 INTRODUCTION 92 FIELDWORK TOOLS 93 THE FIELDWORKS 96 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 100 RESEARCH BIASES 103 BIAS MITIGATION 104 CHAPTER THREE: FIELDWORK FINDINGS 106 INTRODUCTION 106 THE LAND AND PROPERTY PROTECTION PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA 107 DAILY LIFE IN CASE-STUDY TOWNS SOUTH1 AND NORTH1 116 COMPARATIVE DAILY LIFE IN CONTROL TOWNS SOUTH2 AND NORTH2 134 CHAPTER FOUR: ANALIZING THE IMPACT OF DWR ON CONFLICT 146 INTRODUCTION 146 FROM “DESK POLITICS” TO “STREET POLITICS” 148 SUMMARY OF LPPP MICRO-ANALYSIS 163 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 166 NEW RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 172 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT 173 APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWEES LIST 179 3 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo INTRODUCTION 179 CODED LIST 180 TOTALS 184 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 185 BIBLIOGRAPHY 188 WEBPAGES 220 LEGISLATION 220 4 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo List of tables TABLE 1: RESTITUTION IN PRACTICE 75 TABLE 2: GOALS OF RESTITUTION AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES DURING WAR 85 TABLE 3: NUMBER OF ARMED ACTIONS BY ILLEGAL GROUPS 1998-2011 149 TABLE 4: NUMBER OF ARMED ACTIONS BY COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES 151 TABLE 5: NUMBER OF IDP ACCORDING WITH TOWN OF ORIGIN - RUPD 156 TABLE 6: NUMBER OF IDP ACCORDING WITH TOWN OF ORIGIN – OBSERVATORIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 1997-2010 157 TABLE 7: LIST OF NO-CODED INTERVIEWS 180 TABLE 8: LIST OF NO-PERFORMED INTERVIEWS 180 TABLE 9: LIST OF CODED INTERVIEWS. OWN ELABORATION. 181 List of figures FIGURE 1: HOMICIDE RATES 1998-2011 161 5 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo A Bruno, el dulce ser que decidió venir a nuestra familia. 6 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo Acknowledgements Esta investigación es producto de la beca doctoral otorgada por Colciencias y la Universidad Antonio Nariño. Mediante el financiamiento otorgado por el pueblo colombiano a través de estas dos instituciones fue posible realizar el trabajo de campo y cumplir con las distintas tareas investigativas durante mi permanencia en la Universidad de York. Espero poder retribuir con mi trabajo este esfuerzo de mi nación. Personal thanks to Tom Farnhill. 7 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo Declaration I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work. It is being submitted for the degree of PhD in Politics at the University of York in 2011. It has not been submitted at any other institution or published elsewhere. 8 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo Introduction In this empirical thesis I am presenting a single case study – The “Land and Property Protection Program” (LPPP), led by the Colombian Government – as an exemplar case of a successful reconstruction strategy in the middle of war. The single case study is a useful method in social science where data is collected retrospectively (i.e. asystematic, qualitative and anecdotal information [Nock et al, 2008]) in order to identify complexities or singularities that are ‘unique’ in some characteristics but, at the same time, could be useful as a model or generalisation for certain other cases. This thesis collects data through three separate fieldworks over two years, involving 118 interviews and the interrogation of documents in order to analyse how the LPPP is working in two sets of towns in a specific region of Colombia. Based on this information I make inferences regarding the role and interest of the Colombian state in developing reconstruction programs during war, and its potential impact on the Colombian conflict. There are logistical and epistemological advantages associated with the single case study: The logistical advantages are concerned with resources and accessibility to the fieldwork, geared towards maximising the likelihood of completing the research. The epistemological advantages relate directly to the general conditions of studying conflict and reconstruction through the study of the Colombian conflict. In this introduction I present the research objectives, the structure of the thesis and the rationality for the research design. 9 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo Research objectives The objectives of the research are to understand how During-war reconstruction (DWR) programs operate, and the effect of those programs on conflict. Five objectives are proposed: Objective 1: Prove that those reconstruction strategies developed during warfare are not neutral in terms of the confrontation. Objective 2: Determine what kind of Reconstruction during war can help shorten war and have a subsequent positive impact on peace. Objective 3: Assess the impact of activities of ‘protection of housing, land and property rights’ in preventing escalations of violence and mitigating the effects of war on civil population. Objective 4: Examine the ‘Land & Property Protection Program’ for Internally Displaced Persons in Valle del Cauca, Colombia. Objective 5: To use Micro-analysis techniques to assess the impact of DWR activities. Thesis structure This thesis presents the particularities and experiences of human beings in the studied area, and it uses Micro-analysis techniques to better understand the information gathered in the fieldwork. Chapter one discuss the relevant academic debates for the case study; Chapter two presents the methodological design and the details of the research strategy used to perform this single case study. Then chapters four and five present the case-study and the micro-analysis. Finally, last chapter summarizes the conclusions and proposes new 10 DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo areas for further research (Chapter 6). Following, there is a detailed description for each chapter: Chapter 1, During-war reconstruction, introduces the discussion about what is meant by During War Reconstruction (DWR), and by ‘state-led non-military DWR’. It also presents the actual and relevant academic debate about the Colombian conflict. Chapter 2, Conflict and land protection, establishes the existing lacuna in academic and humanitarian studies about protection of land rights during conflict; and valuates and compares the protection and restitution strategies of reconstruction. Chapter 3, Methodology, firstly, presents the qualitative approach: field research and ethnographic work complemented by documentary research. The second section presents how the fieldwork and associated issues were developed. Then, the third section introduces the use of micro-analysis techniques to analyse the data collected during the fieldwork. Chapter 4, Fieldwork findings, details the ethnographic work of this thesis around the “Land and Property Protection Program” (LPPP) in two sets of towns in Valle del Cauca region. It presents the data collected during the three fieldworks in Colombia: February-March, October-November 2009 and October-December 2010. The findings concerning the operation and guidance of the LPP program from an institutional point of view are contrasted with the findings from the fieldwork interviews with beneficiary and non-beneficiary IDPs; Non- displaced rural population (non-beneficiary); and state officials. Chapter 5, analysing the impact of DWR on conflict, details the logic of the perceptions and explanations present in the micro-data in a structured way.
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