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https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ Theses Digitisation: https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Praxi-centric Phenomenology: from Nâgârjuna through Dôgen to Martin Heidegger Diana Gail Keuss Submitted fof the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Glasgow Faculty of Arts and Divinity School of Theology December 2006 Diana Gail Keuss 2006 ProQuest Number: 10390617 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10390617 Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). C o pyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO. ProQuest LLO. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.Q. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346 (GLASGOW UNÏVERSSTY LIBItARY: : Abstract t Buddhist practitioners in the Zen tradition have repeatedly located the tension between : 4 'd theory (theoria) and practice ipraxi^ when describing profound reality or the way things '? are/are becoming {yathabutani). The subjective stance is constantly challenged as not just I a limiting but entirely mistaken perspective with which to approach reality/meaning. Although the Buddhist practitioners and teachers considered here propose teachings distinctive to each other, there is consistency in emphasising the necessity of practical experience expressed via sûnjatà and tlie ultimate realisation of egolessnessness or no-self {anàtman!nairâtmjâ). Nâgârjuna's logical critique works to free the mind from conceptual foundationalism so that practice is effective and unfettered by delusion. Practitioners ■ 'A' within the Yogacârâ school such as Asanga recognise the powerful effectiveness of meditation that highlights the tension between no-self and a perfected self necessary to the Bodhisattva-marga. Dôgen explores the relationship between the cosmic reality of Buddha-nature and personal participation in seated meditation such tliat letting go of ego-self is tlie very manifestation of the Buddha-self. I consider these Buddhist approaches to reality/meaning in relation to Western phenomenology, as especially borne out in Martin Heidegger's work to allow for an authentic attitude in and toward truth event (Ereigms). Ultimately, I argue that the Buddhist approach to reality embodies what I term a “praxi-centric phenomenology" that encourages Western phenomenological reflection to remain practical but egoless. Table of Contents Praxi-centric Phenomenology: from Nâgârjuna tlirough Dôgen to Martin Heidegger 1. Introduction 2. Nâgârjuna and the Working of Emptiness 3. Yogacârâ: No Mind tliat Knows 4. Dôgen's Datsuraku-datsuraku 5. Martin Heidegger tlie Reluctant Priest 6 . Conclusion 7. Bibliography I dedicate tiiis work to my husband, Jeffrey F. Keuss, and to my daughters, Clara Ruth, Eilidh Elizabeth and Miriam Grace. Additionally, I express my gratitude to my thesis advisor. Dr. Kiyoshi Tsuchiya and tlie members of die Faculty of Divinity for their support of my research. Introduction This thesis will explore a particular phenomenological approach in Buddhist thought as found in the development of the Zen tradition from the teachings of Nâgârjuna, through Yogacârâ and Dôgen that I will refer to as “praxi-centric phenomenology"/ I will consider how Buddhist thought and teaching reflect this particular phenomenological approach which is similar, although not identical, to tlie course of tliinking developed and labeled such in tlie West by Edmund Husserl and further reflected upon by Martin Heidegger. Recognizing certain phenomenological aspects of Buddhist thought is certainly not unique for a number of scholars, Kasulis, Laycock, King, Stambaugh, Kopf, among otliers, have demonstrated phenomenological overtones witliin Buddhist thinking. Buddhist thinking from a phenomenological perspective continually asks where meaning and essence can be encountered. Although tlie Buddhist sources I present express and/or describe the route to the heart of tilings in their own way, there is continuity and agreement tliat the individual actively engage in the trutli event for tliere to be any encounter witli ultimate meaning. Thus, praxis, the practical engagement in the truth event, is central to any phenomenological reflection. Furthermore, the passivity of “reflection” in context of phenomenological reflection, takes on the active nature of practical engagement instead of mere projected analysis. The term “phenomenology" originates in Western philosophy and has been used to describe whole schools of thought; it generally describes an approach to philosophical investigation which is in direct contrast to positivist methods of investigation (Comte) and the enlightenment model (Kant). The phenomenological approach seeks to clear away tlie prejudices tlie subjective perspective brings to seeing/understanding experience so that reality, meaning, or things as they exist ‘in tlieniselves' are able to show themselves in an autlientic manner. Auguste Comte, as the fatlier of Positivism, set forth to organise and analyse the phenomenal world by scientific and measurable means. Because certainty lies only in tlie phenomenal realm of experience and in what is measurable, mystery and the undefinable are not recognised as valid and verifable 1 1 introduce the phrase, “praxi-centric phenomenology,” in order to better locate and clarify what I mean by ‘a particular Buddhist phenomenological approach’, being fully aware of tlie pitfalls and limitations of classification and categorization. There is often tension between praxis and theoria, and, particularly in the West, although I locate the same in Eastern thought, theory dominates and at some points obliterates practice in philosophy, religion and other disciplines, including phenomenological movements. To say “praxi-centric” is not to dismiss theory, but to locate theory as supportive rather than the dominating partner when considering the profundity o f reality. components of phenomenal reality. The subject, as the organiser of the information provided in the phenomenal realm, is in turn measured by how sophisticated he/she has become at interpreting such reality. Further, all meaning is located in the immanent f realm. Society, as well as the human subject, is treated as a progressive science with ever increasing aptitude. One problem with this approach is the zeal with which the phenomenal world is considered witliout allowance for a deeper understanding of reality. Additionally, tlie subjective stance becomes evaluator and mediator of meaning (that is, information) which in turn ultimately demands perfection from the subject. Limiting meaning to tlie measurability of the phenomenal realm as well as relying solely on the perception of the subjective stance results in its trivialisation in the positivistic approach. The phenomenological approach recognises tlie limited perspective of tlie subject and works to clarify how the subject is able to evaluate information. Furthermore, phenomenology is no mere descriptive science, concerned widi cataloguing the various appearances of reality. Ratlier phenomenology, as Jan Patocka states, is about the meaning of existents and about being as tlie presupposition for the description carried out.^ Patocka continues to explain tliat phenomenology considers as its highest goal not an explanation subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason ... but ratlier a comprehension of the tiling, tliat is, of all that has to do witli meaning, in the structured richness of its nature and substance.^ With this turn in philosophical investigation, reason tliat eschews from the subject is not allowed to subjugate the objective field of perspective. Instead, the subject-object split is set aside in order to consider where and how meaning itself speaks and abides. This approach destabilizes tlie foundational (ontological) assumptions at the root of most Western philosophical pursuits and allows for tlie possibility of movement so tliat trutli or meaning may emerge. In contrast to Comte’s readiness to find tlie phenomenal realm a fully “real” situation in which to carry out scientific evaluation, Immanuel Kant proposed that there was a ^ Patocka, Jan, A n Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd, Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 16 2 Patocka, Jan, A n Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd, Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 16 , ft difference between the “phenomenal” and the “noumenal.” He considered the