CASE STUDIES of POST- INDEPENDENCE GHANA By

CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BE EFFECTIVE? CASE STUDIES OF POST- INDEPENDENCE GHANA By Copyright 2011 Kenneth Shelton Aikins Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chairperson John Kennedy ________________________________ Ronald A. Francisco ________________________________ Mark R. Joslyn ________________________________ Mariya Omelicheva ________________________________ Garth A. Myers Date Defended: April 5, 2011 The Dissertation Committee for Kenneth Shelton Aikins certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BE EFFECTIVE? CASE STUDIES OF POST- INDEPENDENCE GHANA ________________________________ Chairperson John Kennedy Date approved: April 8, 2011 ii Abstract Many African nations use both statutory and customary laws in governing their countries. This suggests an apparent mix of formal and informal rules. For example, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana did not abrogate customary law, but protects chieftaincy, a corollary of customary law. The situation becomes even more complicated within a democratizing country attempting to decentralize and allow for greater local autonomy. It also creates a struggle for space between state and chieftaincy, which naturally ensues in areas that may intentionally not be codified, such as succession rules and traditional land management. This fray has sometimes sparked violent disagreements and conflicts, with a likely spillover into national politics. These conflicts can compromise effective local government if they are not successfully resolved. Without formal laws that provide mechanisms to combine formal and informal rules, the customary laws will always be parallel with the formal rules rather than a mix. I placed Ghana within the larger context of sub-Saharan Africa to investigate this notion of parallel operation of formal and informal rules. From interviewing 55 key elites, and through opinions of 60 focus group discussants that I sampled over three districts (counties) in Ghana, I show that it is only when there is a high level of government interference and a low level of acceptance of institutional bargaining that violent conflicts emerge requiring successful conflict resolution strategies. This necessitates a refinement of the existing theory that contends that conflict occurs when there is an interpenetration of formal and informal rules. Parallel operation of formal rules comes about in chief selection process when state actors and institutions (formal) marginalize the traditional process (informal). This is a result of lack of a history of institutional bargaining and no mediation processes. It appears formal rules are differentially accepted by local political and traditional elites, more so in traditional land management than succession rules. The parallelism iii seen in formal and informal rules is potently expressed in dual systems of governance, where the chieftaincy institution is strong, and “Little Man politics” – mimicry of “Big Man” politics at the local level is prevalent in local government. iv Acknowledgments I am indebted to various persons and institutions that have contributed to the success of this dissertation. First and foremost, I thank God for opening this avenue for me to study in the United States of America through a Fulbright scholarship in 2005. This two-year program was for a master's degree in Political Science. On completion, the Political Science department offered me the opportunity to pursue a doctoral degree, which has now come to fruition. My gratitude goes to the entire faculty and staffs of the Political Science department who have contributed in diverse ways to enable me complete this PhD. Space will not permit me to mention everybody, but I am very appreciative of members of my dissertation committee - Professors John Kennedy (advisor and chair), Ron Francisco, Mark Joslyn, Mariya Omelicheva and Garth Myers of the Geography and African American Studies departments. As I worked with John, he also became a friend, mentor and encourager. Garth also encouraged me to pursue a program in the study of Africa, which additionally earned me the Graduate Certificate program in African Studies (December 2010). In furtherance of the fieldwork research component of my dissertation, I received various funding and awards. Prominent among them are 1) The Harry S. Truman Good Neighbor Award (Eddie Jacobson Scholarship) - 2008, 2) E. Jackson Baur Student Award - 2008, 3) Walter Thompson Graduate Scholarship - 2008 and 2010, 4) University of Kansas Graduate Summer Research Award - 2010 and 5) 2010 Howard Baumgartel Peace and Justice Award. To all these kind donors and institutions/foundations, accept my deepest gratitude. Finally, I want to thank my wife Joana and my children Araba, Nana Amowie, Aba and Ekow Aikins for their love, prayers and patience. Living without them for six years has been very trying, but the reward has been worth the sacrifice. To my university in Ghana, the v University of Cape Coast and especially, my department, the Institute for Development Studies, I thank you also for creating an enabling environment conducive for faculty like me to embark on such professional developments that will inure to the benefit of the university. To all the nameless people out there in Kansas and Cape Coast, rest assured that I will always have fond memories of you all. May you, and all mentioned find favor with God. vi Table of Contents Abstract iii Acknowledgments v Acronyms x List of Tables xi List of Figures xii CHAPTER ONE – RATIONALE OF STUDY 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Relevance of research 8 1.3 Scholarship on Formal and Informal Institutions 12 1.3.1 Colonial rule and its Effects on Chieftaincy; British Indirect Rule 16 1.3.2 Application of Knight’s Institutional Theory to the Dagomba (Dagbon) Kingdom 20 CHAPTER TWO – DEVELOPMENT OF PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS 34 2.1 Church-state Separation as a Paradigm of State-tradition Relations 34 2.2 State-tradition Interface 36 2.3 Local Government, Decentralization and the Locus of Chieftaincy 42 2.3.1 Local Government 44 2.3.2 Decentralization 45 2.3.2.1 Little Man Politics: An Unintended Outcome of Decentralization 48 2.4 Chieftaincy and Decentralization 54 2.5 The Puzzle of Ghana’s Northern Region 69 2.6 Conflict Resolution and Strategies 72 CHAPTER THREE – OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 76 3.1 Variables, Hypotheses and Data 76 3.2 Research Methods 82 3.2.1 Choice of research sites 82 3.2.2 Preliminary research and previous fieldwork 83 3.2.3 Data collection/Sampling techniques/Sources 86 3.3 Operational Definitions and the Use of Standard Questions, Semi-structured Interviews, Focus Groups and Archive and Documentation 94 3.4 Research Schedule 95 3.5 Methods of Data Analysis 96 3.6 Research Prerequisites 97 3.7 Pre-test Issues 98 CHAPTER FOUR – SUCCESSION RULES IN GHANA 106 4.1 Selection of Chiefs 106 4.1.1 Succession in Ashanti kingdom 107 4.1.2 Succession in Cape Coast Traditional Area 114 4.1.3 Succession in Dagomba kingdom 121 vii 4.2 Central Government Interference and Interaction of Formal and Informal Rules 127 CHAPTER FIVE – SUCCESSION CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTION 139 5.1 Conflicts in Chief Succession over the Past Decade 139 5.2 Actors Involved in Succession Conflicts 159 5.2.1 Actors in the Dagbon Conflict 159 5.2.1.1 Perceptions of District Assembly Officials 159 5.2.1.2 Perceptions of Traditional Elites 164 5.2.1.3 Perceptions of District Assembly Members 167 5.2.1.4 Perceptions of Community Leaders 171 5.2.1.5 Perceptions of Non-Resident Respondents in Dagbon 173 5.2.2 Actors in the Cape Coast Conflict 175 5.2.2.1 Perceptions of District Assembly Officials 175 5.2.2.2 Perceptions of Traditional Elites 178 5.2.2.3 Perceptions of District Assembly Members 180 5.2.2.4 Perceptions of Community Leaders 182 5.2.2.5 Perceptions of Non-Resident Respondents in Cape Coast 183 5.3 Conflict Resolution 186 5.3.1 Successful Resolutions 187 5.3.2 Partial Resolutions 188 5.3.3 Unsuccessful Resolutions 194 5.3.3.1 Succession Conflict Resolution Suggestions from Dagbon Residents 196 5.3.3.2 Succession Conflict Resolution Suggestions from Dagbon Nonresidents 207 CHAPTER SIX – TRADITIONAL LAND MANAGEMENT IN GHANA 212 6.1 Traditional Land Management Principles 212 6.1.1 Traditional Land Administration in Kumasi 216 6.1.2 Traditional Land Administration in Cape Coast 224 6.1.3 Traditional Land Administration in Tamale 231 6.2 Central Government Interference and Interaction of Formal and Informal Rules 241 CHAPTER SEVEN – TRADITIONAL LAND CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTION 255 7.1 Conflicts in Traditional Land Management over the Past Decade 255 7.1.1 Traditional Land Management Conflicts in Kumasi 257 7.1.1.1 Actors in the Kumasi Land Conflicts 267 7.1.2 Traditional Land Management Conflicts in Cape Coast 268 7.1.2.1 Actors in the Cape Coast Land Conflicts 277 7.1.3 Traditional Land Management Conflicts in Tamale 280 7.1.3.1 Actors in the Tamale Land Conflicts 298 7.2 Land Conflicts and Extent of Resolutions 301 7.2.1 Land Conflict Resolution Patterns in Kumasi 301 7.2.2 Land Conflict Resolution Patterns in Cape Coast 307 viii 7.2.3 Land Conflict Resolution Patterns in Tamale 312 CHAPTER EIGHT – SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 326 8.1 Summary and Conclusions 326 8.2 Policy Recommendations 344 Bibliography 355 Appendices 364 Appendix 1 364 Appendix 2 368 Appendix 3 370

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