THE HYLOMORPHIC STRUCTURE of THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY from the PERSPECTIVE of a SYSTEMS BIOLOGY a Dissertation Submitted To

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THE HYLOMORPHIC STRUCTURE of THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY from the PERSPECTIVE of a SYSTEMS BIOLOGY a Dissertation Submitted To THE HYLOMORPHIC STRUCTURE OF THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SYSTEMS BIOLOGY A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Theology at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) for the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology by REV. NICANOR PIER GIORGIO AUSTRIACO, O.P., PH.D., S.T.L. Directed by Rev. Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., Ph.D. 2015 This thesis was approved by the Faculty of Theology at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, on May 19, 2015, upon the recommendation of the following scholars: Prof. Michael S. Sherwin, O.P. (1st Reader) Prof. Marty Hewlett (2nd Reader) Prof. Hans Ulrich Steymans, O.P. (Dean) © Copyright Rev. Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, O.P. 2015 All rights reserved. To my students, my parents, and the Mother of God. In gratitude for the gift of joy. TABLE OF CONTENTS Approval of Dissertation ii Dedication iii Table of Contents iv Abbreviations vii Acknowledgements viii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER ONE 8 The Classical Hylomorphism of St. Thomas Aquinas The Thomistic Theory of Hylomorphism in the De Principiis Naturae The Thomistic Theory of Prime Matter The Thomistic Theory of Substantial Form A Classical Hylomorphic Account of the Human Agent The Analogous Use of Hylomorphic Theory in Thomistic Moral Theology CHAPTER TWO 52 Is a Placentectomy to Resolve a Crisis Pregnancy a Virtuous Act? A Hylomorphic Investigation of Human Acts The Hylomorphic Structure of the Human Act The Moral Specification of a Human Act: Specification The Moral Specification of a Human Act: Moral Specification The Moral Specification of a Human Act: Simple and Complex Acts The Moral Specification of a Human Act and the Virtue of Prudence Applying this Thomistic Theory of Action: The Act of Self-Defense Objections to this Thomistic Theory of Action: Fr. Martin Rhonheimer Objections to this Thomistic Theory of Action: Stephen A. Long The Moral Specification of a Placentectomy to Resolve a Crisis Pregnancy iv CHAPTER THREE 122 Is There a Non-Dualist Definition for Pavlovian “Learned” Fear? A Hylomorphic Investigation of the Passions The Hylomorphic Structure of Thomistic Passion The Hylomorphic Structure of Fear According to St. Thomas Aquinas The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Human Knowing and Feeling The Emotion of Fear According to Joseph LeDoux Responding to LeDoux: A Hylomorphic Definition of Pavlovian Fear Postscript: Reconceptualizing the Cogitative Sense CHAPTER FOUR 155 How is the Human Intellect Transformed in the Life of Grace? A Hylomorphic Investigation of the Acquired and the Infused Virtues The Hylomorphic Structure of Thomistic Virtue An Aristotelian Characterization of Thomistic Virtue Categorizing the Thomistic Virtues According to their Material Cause Categorizing the Thomistic Virtues According to their Efficient Cause Categorizing the Thomistic Virtues According to their Final Cause The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Individual Virtues The Hylomorphic Relationship Between Categories of Virtues Theories of Cooperation Between the Acquired and the Infused Virtues Evaluating a Hylomorphic/Non-cooperative Theory of Cooperation Evaluating a Hylomorphic/Accidentally-cooperative Theory of Cooperation Evaluating a Hylomorphic/Essentially-cooperative Theory of Cooperation A Summary Evaluation of Hylomorphic Theories of Cooperation The Genealogy of the Infused Virtues and their Acquired Counterparts Faith as the Infused Counterpart for the Acquired Speculative Virtues CHAPTER FIVE 219 Is Every Deliberately Willed Spoken Falsehood, a Lie? A Hylomorphic Investigation of Sinful Speech Acts An Aristotelian Characterization of a Lie A Thomistic Taxonomy of Lies The Moral Structure of a Lie The Single Function Nature of Human Speech According to St. Thomas Evidence for the Multiple Functions of Human Speech v Formulating a Thomistic Theory of Speech Acts Defining a Lie Within a Thomistic Theory of Speech Acts Disputed Question: Lying to an Enemy as Spycraft in a Just War Disputed Question: Lying to a Nazi to Save Jews Disputed Question: Lying to Planned Parenthood to Unmask Evil Objection: Speaking Falsehoods Necessarily Corrupts Moral Character CHAPTER SIX 263 Rehabilitating Classical Hylomorphism with a Systems Biology Marginalizing Substantial Forms with a Mechanical Biology Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: René Descartes Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: Robert Boyle Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms: John Locke Rehabilitating Substantial Forms with a Systems Biology An Overview of Systems Biology Rehabilitating Classical Hylomorphism with a Systems Biology Rehabilitating the Natural Ends of the Human Organism with a Systems Biology Responding to the Early Modern Scientific Objections to Substantial Forms CONCLUSION 303 Bibliography 306 Declaration sur l’honneur 327 Curriculum vitae 328 vi ABBREVIATIONS CT Compendium theologiae DA Quaestio disputata de anima DP Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei De virt. in com. Quaestio disputa de virtutibus in communi De ente De ente et essentia De prin. De principiis naturae De spirit. creat. De spiritualibus creaturis De veritate Quaestiones disputatae de veritate In DA Sentencia libri de anima In DT Super Boethium de Trinitate In Phys In libros Physicorum In Sent. Scriptum super libros sententiarum SCG Summa contra gentiles STh Summa theologiae Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations from the Latin and the French originals are mine. vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS “IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE THANKS, FOR THIS IS THE WILL OF GOD FOR YOU IN CHRIST JESUS” (1 THESS. 5:18) I did not write and could not have written this dissertation alone. First, I have to thank my Dominican brother and thesis director, Michael Sherwin, O.P., who supervised this dissertation from afar. May his patience and generosity be rewarded abundantly by the Lord! I also thank the other members of my jury for their critical comments: Thierry Collaud, Marty Hewlett, Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P., and Hans Ulrich Steymans, O.P. Several colleagues and friends read individual chapters as they were being written and provided valuable feedback: Basil Cole, O.P., Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., Steven Jensen, Kevin Keiser, Martin Rhonheimer, Janet Smith, and Ezra Sullivan, O.P. I am grateful for their scholarly assistance. Finally, I thank Aquinas Guilbeau, O.P., who helped me with all my dealings with the University of Fribourg from afar. I wrote this dissertation while teaching full-time as a professor at Providence College where I also supervise a research laboratory in the Department of Biology. Over the years, I have been blessed with talented and devoted undergraduate research students in the Dead Yeast Society who kept our laboratory running and productive while their PI was writing his dissertation in theology. Special kudos goes to my research students who graduated this past year: Ryan Frazier ‘15, Alfredo Gonzalez ‘15, James O’Brien ‘15, and Stephen Rogers ’15 (with honorary lab members, Nicholas Mazzucca ’15, and Chad Roggero ’15). They have been with me through the four years of dissertation work for this STD, and they have kept me sane. Morgan McCarthy ‘16 helped with the bibliography. Thank you, Mo, for checking all the citations in record time! Finally, I have to thank my faculty colleague, Brett Pellock, for his good humor, his ever-present conversation, and his enduring friendship. Doing biology at PC is exceptional because we share Hickey 181. I was challenged to think through some of the ideas discussed in this thesis by the penetrating questions raised by other talented Providence College students in my classroom and in my office. I especially would like to thank Joseph Graziano ‘14, Alanna Smith ‘14, Michael Wahl ‘12, and Meredith White ‘13. They will recognize our conversations in many paragraphs of the text. The staff of the Interlibrary Loan Services at Providence College especially Carol Wiseman and Beatrice Pulliam went beyond the call of duty to help me locate books and journal articles for this dissertation. I could not have completed this work without their dedicated help. Eighteen years ago, I was moved to ask for the habit of the Order of Friars Preachers. It was both the most difficult decision and the best decision that I have ever made. I thank my Dominican brothers especially the friars assigned to St. Thomas viii Aquinas Priory at Providence College, particularly my prior, Timothy Myers, O.P., for their fraternal support during the writing of this thesis. I am thankful to God for the friendships of Basil Cole, O.P., Dennis Klein, O.P., Ambrose Little, O.P., Ezra Sullivan, O.P., and Peter Martyr Yungwirth, O.P., that have sustained me during my doctoral studies in theology. Bro. James Mary Ritch, my former research student and lab manager, has enriched my life for nearly a decade now since we first met when I was first assigned to Providence College. Thank you, buddy. I also thank my many sisters in the Order for their love and their prayers. Special mention has to go to my sisters in the Congregation of St. Rose of Lima, better known as the Hawthorne Dominican sisters, particularly Mother Mary Francis Lepore, O.P., and to my fellow Dominican biologist, Sr. Stephen Patrick Jolly, O.P. Finally, I thank the men at MCI Norfolk who have taught me about the mercy and grace of God as members of the Dominican laity. I am a better theologian because of their witness. Most of this dissertation was written during my 2013-2014 sabbatical year, while I was home with my parents in Manila. This is the second doctoral dissertation they have had to suffer through with me. No words can adequately express my love and gratitude for everything they have given me. They were the ones who first taught me how to pray. Finally, I thank God. And His Mother. They have given me the full life I have always wanted to live. And so much more! Non nisi te, Domine. Et tu quoque, Mater Dei. August 27, 2015 Memorial of St. Monica ix INTRODUCTION As one of Aristotle’s most significant medieval interpreters, St.
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