Document Symbol:

A/2437

Best copy available j "i \ I

UNiTED NA1'IONS

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Covering the period from 16 July 1952 to 15 July 1953

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS: EIGHTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/2437)

NEW YORK, 1953 UNITED NATIONS

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE GENERAL ASSEl\fBLY

Covering the period from 16 July 1952 to 15 July 1953

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS: EIGHTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/2437)

New York, 1953 NOTE All United Nations documents are designated by symbols, i.e., capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United :0T ations document. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION V

PART I Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security C!z(l.pter 1. THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION 1

PART n Other matters considered by the Security Council

2. ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS 12

3. ApPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL .. 24

PART III The Military Staff Committee

4. \VORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE...... 26

PART IV Matters brought to the attention of the Security Council but not discussed in the COUlwiI

5. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION...... 27

6. CO:\IMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION . .. 28

7. COMPLAINT OF FAILURE BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH PROVISIONAL MEASURES INDICATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY CASE 28

8. REPORT ON THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS...... 28

9. A REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH-UNITED STATES ZONE OF THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE 29

10. QUESTION OF AN APPEAL TO STATES TO ACCEDE TO AND RATIFY THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF BACTERIAL WEAPONS 29

11. REPORT OF THE DISARMA:\JENT COMMISSION 29

12. REPORT OF THE COLLECTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE . 29

13. ApPOINTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMISSION. . 29

14. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GUATEMALA TO THE UNITED NATIONS...... 29

Appendices 1. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council 30 n. Presidents of the Security Council 30 Ill. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1952 to 15 July 1953 31

IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee 31

iii INTRODUCTION

The present! report is submitted to the General As­ Council also replaced the retiring members on the Dis­ sembly by the Security Council in accordance with Ar­ armament Commission, which was established under the t.r Security Council by the General Assembly in accordance r" ticle 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter. with its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, to Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for l" lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which Conventional Armaments. constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative ac­ The period covered in the present report is from count of its deliberations. 16 July 1952 to 15 July 1953. The Council held twenty­ With respect to the membership of the Security Coun­ six meetings during that period. cil during the period covered, it will be recalled that Part I of the report contains a summary account of the General Assembly, at its 389th plenary meeting on the proceedings of the Security Council in connexkm 25 October 1952, elected Colombia, Denmark and Leba­ with its responsibility for the maintenance of interna­ non as non-permanent members of the Council for a tional peace and security. term of two years, beginning 1 January 1953, to re­ Part II covers other matters considered by the Secu­ ( place Brazil, the Netherlands and Turkey, the retiring rity Council. ~i members. The newly-elected members of the Security Part In deals with the work of the Military Staff Committee. 1 This is the eighth annual report of the Security Council to Part IV provides an account of matters brought to the the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted th~ under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873 attention of Security Council but not discussed in and A/2167. the Council.

r,

I v L PART 1

Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security il:~':·

Chapter 1 THE INDIA.PAKISTAN QUESTION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: On 30 April 1951 the Security on 7 September 1951 (A/2167, para. 75) suggesting in Council appointed Mr. Frank P. Graham as United paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and (b) (ii) a minimum force of Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. After 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, and of consultation with the Governments of India and Pald­ 18,000 on the Indian side. He had made it clear that stan, the United Nations Representative was to effect those figures did not include the Gilgit and Northern the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Scouts on the Pakistan side nor the State militia on the on the basis of the resolutions adopted on 13 August Indian side. In addition to suggesting definite mini­ 1948 and 5 January 1949 by the United Nations Com­ mum figures, the redraft of his proposals had attempted mission for India and Pakistan.2 Failing the achieve­ to accomodate the concern expressed during the con­ ment of that objective or agreement on demilitarization, versations by including a provisional clause to the ef­ the United Nations Representative was to report to the fect that the agreement should not come into effect until Security Council those points of difference .between the programme (schedule) of the demilitarization had the parties in regard to the Commission's resolutions been approved by the two Governments. The draft I( which he considered must be resolved to enable de­ of that programme was to be drawn up in meetings . militarization to be carried out. A summary of his first between the representatives of India and Pakistan, as­ three reports and an account of their consideration by sisted by their military advisers, under the auspices of the Security Council were given in the last annual report the United Nations, the first meeting to be held two (A/2167) of the Security Counci1.s weeks after signature of the agreement. A. Fourth report of the United Nations Repre. 3. On 3 September it had appeared that no agree­ sentative for India and Pakistan ment could be secured on the basis either of the figures proposed or of those of 3,000 to 6,000 on the Pakistan 1. Following the submission of his third report (SI side and 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side which had 2611 and Corr.1)4 on 22 April 1952, the United Nations been proposed to the parties on 16 July 1952. As it had Representative for India and Pakistan informed the not been possible under the circumstances to secure Security Council on 29 May 1952 that negotiations with agreement on the minimum forces to be left on each side the parties had been renewed. By a letter of 31 July of the cease-fire line, the United Nations Representative (S/2727) he further informed the Council that the Gov­ had thought that it might be possible for the two Gov­ ernments of India and Pakistan had agreed to a meet­ ernments to agree on some principles based on the ing of representatives of the two Governments at minis- requirements of each side, which principles could then s; terial level under the auspices of the United Nations serve as the criteria for fixing the quantum of forces. Representative at the European office of the United Na­ He had accordingly submitted a further draft on 4 Sep­ tions in Geneva, beginning 25 August 1952. tember 1952, according to which, at the end of the de­ 2. On 16 September, the United Nations Representa­ militarization period, there would be on each side of tive submitted his fourth report to the Security Coun­ the cease-fire line the minimum number of forces re­ cil (S/2783 and Corr.l).5 The report covered the ne­ quired for the maintenance of law and order and of gotiations carried out in agreement with the two Gov- the cease-fire agreement, with due regard (in the case ~ ernments from 29 May to 16 July 1952 in New York, of the Indian side) to the security of the State and (in and the conference held at ministerial level from 26 Au­ the case of both sides) to the freedom of the plebiscite. gust to 10 September 1952 in Geneva. The United Na­ 4. Concerning that draft, he reported, the position tions Representative stated that, as a result of meetings of the Government of India was that the principles and conversations with the parties, he had submitted, enumerated were conceived in the right spirit, having on 2 September 1952, a revision of the draft agreement regard to the two UNCIP resolutions. As a basis for consisting of twelve proposals which he had submitted the evolution of a suitable definition of the functions of t 2 See Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, forces on both sides of the cease-fire line, they con­ ~1!pple1l!ent for November 1948, document 5/1100, para 75, and tained the germs of a settlement. The Government of IbId., Fourth Year, Supplement for Jamwry 1949, document India could not, however, accept any equation of its S/1196, para. 15. responsibilities with those of the locar authorities on .3 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Ses­ the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree that non, SlIpplement No. 2. the maintenance of public order in that area by those 4 S~e Official Records of the Security Council, Seventh Year, Speclal StlpPlement No. 2. authorities should have anything more than a local character. The defence of the entire State was the con­ .5 See oftidaI Records of the Secllr£ty Council, Seven-th J ear, SpeCial Supplement No. 2. cern of the Government of India, which alone was en-

1 titled to maintain a military armed force for that pur­ about agreement between the Governments of India 11. The joint ( pose. and Pakistan; attention on resol 5. The Government of Pakistan had been prepared "Notes with gratification that thL United Nations the way of agreem to accept the draft proposals of 4 September, subject to Representative has reported that the Governments of and the holding the observation that the references to "due regard to India and Pakistan have accepted all but two of the representative COl the freedom of the plebiscite" and the "security of the paragraphs of his twelve-point proposals; ceptance by the p State" shoulrl. be deleted to avoid recurrence in the "Notes that agreement on a plan of demilitarization tative's proposal military sub-committee of the political controversies of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been conducted in suc that had held up progress in the main conference. reached because the Governments of India and Paki­ cease-fire agreen 6. In conclusion, the United Nations Representative stan have not agreed on the whole of paragraph 7 militarization per stated that in order to reach an agreement on a plan of the twelve-point proposals; ing the stages by of demilitarization, it was in his view necessary either "Urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to of the cease-fire (a) to establish the character and number of forces to enter into immediate negotiations at the Headquarters should provide a be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of of the United Nations in order to reach agreement differences of vie the period of demilitarization; or (b) to declare that the on the specific number of forces to remain on each been guided by t forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period within which the the end of that period should be determined in accord­ of demilitarization, this number to be between 3,000 side should be fi ance with the requirements of each area, and accord­ and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side decide on final fig ingly, principles or criteria should be established which of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 pa rtial plebiscite would serve as a guide for the civil and military rep­ armed forces remaining- on the India side of the sure themselves tl resentatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations armed forces wo in the meeting contemplated in the provisional clause Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952 (S/ or to the security of the revised proposals. 2783, annex 3), such specific numbers to be arrived sponsors of the jo at bearing in mind the principles or criteria contained sidered that the B. Consideration of the third and fourth reports in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representa­ which occupied a by the Secnrily Conncil tive's proposal of 4 September 1952 (5/2783, an­ in the total of the 7. The Security Council considered the third and nex 8); 12. Recalling t fourth reports of the United Nations Representative "Records its gratitude to the United Nations Rep­ Kingdom and th for India and Pakistan in the course of seven meetings resentative for India and Pakistan for the great ef­ (S/2017), that a held between 10 October and 23 December 1952. forts which he has made to achieve a settlement and demilitarization 0 Requests him to continue to make his services avail­ the fear that de 8. At the 605th meeting (10 October), the UNITED of the conflict i NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE made a statement summariz­ able to the Governments of India and Pakistan to the parties felt tl ing the main points of his report, in which he dealt with this end; "Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan the proposal that the obstacles that had been found in the way of de­ device would of c militarization and the twelve proposals which he had to report to the Security Council not later than thirty days from the date of the adoption of this resolu­ tion on the lines made to overcome those obstacles. The narrowing of the resentative and il difference to the number and character of forces to tion; and further Requests the United Nations Rep­ brought about. remain on each side of the cease-fire line emphasized resentative for India and Pakistan to keep the Security the depth of the difference on that point. Recalling Council informed of any progress." 13. As for the the alternative approaches which he had suggested with each side of the c( 10. At the 606th meeting (6 November 1952), the ment could quick] a view to reaching an agreement on that remaining dif­ representative of the UNITED KINGDOM, introducing the ference, he stressed the great importance of solving ciple that at no s joint proposal, said that his Government had always re­ threat to the cease the Kashmir problem peacefully, not only for the peoples cognized the great delicacy of the issues involved with of the State and of the sub-continent, but for the whole the forces on eac regard to the future accession of the State of J ammu speaking, of the world. and Kashmir. Encouraged by the firm agreement of the s, 9. On 5 November 1952, the representatives of the two Governments concerned on the principles to be fol­ 14. At the 60 UNITED KINGDOM and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA lowed in order to achieve a settlement, it continued to resentative of the submitted the following joint draft resolution (S/2839 hope, however, that agreement could be reached on how the principles on and Corr.1) : those principles could be put into effect. Paying a tri­ ceed to assist th bute to Mr. Graham, he noted that the action which it obligations were "The Security Council, settlement must "Recalling its resolutions of 30 March 1951, was proposed that the Council should take was based on certain of the detailed suggestions made by the would always wel 30 April 1951 and 10 November 1951 ; basis consistent 1 "Further recalling the provisions of the United United Nations Representative. In sponsoring the joint draft res·olution, his delegation had been guided by its the dispute; (3) Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolu­ the parties to l' tions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which belief that the dispute could not he left simply to settle itself, and that the efforts of the United Nations to reached most fre were accepted by the Governments of India and Paki­ tion, and negoti stan and which provided that the question of the ac­ achieve a settlement could not in any way be relaxed. His Government had in no sense closed its mind to the mise; and (5) t cession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India possibility of a settlement on lines different from those the views and th or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic considered so far in the Council and had always in­ tive and indicate method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted sisted that the solution could come only as a result of the position he h under the auspices of the United Nations; an agreement by the two Governments concerned. Since 15. Reviewing "Having received the third report, dated 22 April the only agreement so far was that contained in the of those principl 1952, and the fourth report, dated 16 September 1952, two resolutions of the UNCIP, his delegation had al­ thought that the t of the Uniced Nations Representative for India and ways supported a settlement on that basis and would the forces to rem i' Pakistan; continue to do so unless there was some indication from should be fixed h l "Endorses the general principles on which the OOth Governments that they preferred a settlement in the basis of care I. United Nations Representative has sought to hring- some other form. basic agreement 11. The joint draft resolution therefore concentrated UNCIP resolutions. He pointed out that it had been attention on resolving the main difficultie~~ standing in on the basis of those ranges of figures that Mr. Graham the way of agreement on the demilitarization of the State had reported the willingness of the parties to negotiate and the holding of a plebiscite. The United Kingdom in Geneva. The representative of the United States cited representative considered of great significance the ac­ the principles or criteria suggested by Mr. Graham on ceptance by the parties of the United Nations Represen­ 4 September 1952 and observed that they must be the tative's proposal that demilitarization should be consideration which had led the Representative to ?!'rive conducted in such a way as to involve no threat to the at the concrete figures put before the parties. The joint cease-fire agreement either during or after the de­ draft resolution accordingly urged the partJes to nego­ militarization period. If taken as a criterion in decid­ tiate "bearing in mind" those principles or criteria. It ing the stages by which the military forces on each side was clear, considering what the functions of the remain­ of the cease-fire line should be reduced, that principle ing Azad Kashmir forces would be at the close of the should provide a way of resolving at least the major demilitarization period, that those forces would be sepa­ differences of view. He believed that Mr. Graham had rated from the administrative and operational control of been guided by that principle in suggesting the limits the Pakistan High Command, as envisaged in Mr. Gra­ within which the final number of armed forces on each ham's proposals of 16 July 1952. The United Nations side should be fixed. If the two Governments could Representative had also indicated that the role of the decide on final figures within those limits, a free and im­ forces on the Indian side of the c.ease-fire line, which p:! rtial plebiscite could be arranged and they could as­ would consist of armed forces of the Indian Army and sure themselves that the reduction in the strength of the of the State, would call for the minimum number re­ armed forces would involve no threat to the integrity quired for the maintenance of law and order and of the or to the security of the territory on either side. The cease-fire agreement, with due regard for the security sponsors of the joint draft resolution, he explained, con­ of the State. Both those indications were entirely con­ sidered that the Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, sistent with the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 which occupied a special position, need not be included and 5 January 1949. Expressing the hope of the spon­ in the total of the forces to be determined. sors that there would be no tendency on the part of 12. Recalling the proposal, put forward by the United either the Government of India or the Government Kingdom and the United States on 21 February 1951 of Pakistan to reopen questions on which agreement (S/2017), that a neutral force might be used to facilitate had already been reached under the two UNCIP res­ demilitarization of the State, he suggested that, should olutions, he stressed his Government's interest in a solu­ the fear that demilitarization might lead to a renewal tion of the matter by the parties, as well as the dangers of the conflict in Kashmir still exist, whichever of involved in allowing the case to drift. the parties felt that fear might be urged to reconsider 16. ~t the 608th meeting (8 December), the rep­ the proposal that such a force be made available. That resentatIve of INDIA pointed out that five years had device would of course not be necessary if demilitariza­ passed since the Government of India had requested tion on the lines suggested by the United Nations Rep­ the Security Council tQ call upon the Government of resentative and in the joint draft resolution could be Pakistan to put an end immediately to its assistance to brought about. and particip:=ttion i!1, the invasion of the State of Jamm~ 13. As for the character of the forces to remain on and. KashIm.r, WhICh was an act of ag~ression against each side of the cease-fire line, the hope was that agree­ IndIa. DespIte the Government of PakIstan's denial of ment could quickly be reached on the basis of the prin­ the c~arges, the complaint had !ater been proved to be ciple that at no stage should demilitarization involve a true 111 an aggravated form. The Pakistan C'1uthorities threat to the cease-fire agreement. That would mean that the~selves admitted that the regular Pakistan Army the forces on each side of the line should be, broadly had 111vaded the State of J ammu and Kashmir on 8 I1J1:ay speaking, of the same kind. 1948. That invasion had taken place despite the fact that the Council had already been seized of the question and. 14. At the 607th meeting (5 December), the rep­ had been engaged in searching for a peaceful solution. resentative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA said that No solution had yet been found because the root cause the principles on which the Council was trying to pro­ of the ~onflict continu~d, namely, the illegal occupation ceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter by PakIstan of the terrItory of the State and the creation obligations were the following: (1) a lasting political of subversive forces and authorities therein. Until the settlement must be an agreed one; (2) the Council Council was prepared to face that central issue no just would always welcome agreement of the parties on any and lasting solution could be found. ' basis consistent with the Charter which would settle 17. The r~presentative of India said that the validity the dispute; (3) the role of the Council was to assist t~e the parties to reach agreement; (4) agreement was of acceSSIOn of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India had.never been and could not be questioned by reached most frequently step by step through negotia­ ~y tion, and negotiation involved an element of compro­ the CouncIl, bf the UNCIP or any other authority set up or app0111ted by the CounCIl. Pakistan's status in mise; and (5) the Council should consider with care ~ashmir, the views and the recommendations Qf its Representa­ in contrast, was based on an act of aggres­ tive and indicate to him and to the parties its views on SIon. That was why the two resolutions of the UNCIP the position he had taken. had drawn a distinction between the commitm€nts of the two sides in furtherance of an armistice agreement. 15. Reviewing the joint draft resolution in the light U!1der them the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kash­ of those principles, the United States representative mIr Government over the entire State and the Govern­ thought that the limits within which the number of ~ent of India's c~nstitutional responsibility for protect­ the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line mg- the State ag-amst external ag-gression had been ad­ should be fixed had been suggested by Mr. Graham on mitted and duly recognized. Similar recognition had the basis of careful consideration, bearing in mind the been contained,in Mr. Graham's proposals' of 16 July basic agreement of the parties in the £o;m of the two 1952, under whIch the forces to remain on the Pakistan 3 ~,u4kjail!i:'

side of the cease-fire line would be separated from the of cllaracter or of quantum, between India on the one olutions to administrative and operational control of the Pakistan hand and Pakistan or the local authorities on the other, ways willin High Command, and would be officered by neutral and was unacceptable to the Government of India. The rep­ lead to a pe local officers under the surveillance of the United Na­ resentative of India found it significant, therefore, that did not igno tions, whereas on the Indian side there would be an no mention was made in the joint draft resolution of the correct appr Indian armed force. Mr. Graham's seventh proposal of character of the forces to remain. Indeed, the sponsors by the UNC 4 September 1952, which laid down that, in considering had inadvertently or unjustifiably combined the essen­ 25. Stres the final number of forces on the Indian side, due re­ tially independent and alternative approaches envisaged settlement, t gard would be paid to the security of the State, also by the United Nations Representative. Where Mr. her Govern recognized India's moral and constitutional responsibil­ Graham envisaged two alternative and flexible proce­ account wou ity for the protection and security of the State, which dures, the draft resolution proposed one procedure, ernment of 1 had twice suffered invasion at the hands of Pakistan. restricted in advance, and leading to a predetermined make that d The Government of India was not prepared to abdicate result. Moreover, Mr. Graham's proposal of 16 July courage war that responsibility, or to share it with others, least of all had also stipulated a radically different character for war were be' with the aggressor. the forces on either side of the cease-fire lbe, a dif­ 26. The ference which, incidentally, Pakistan had rejected. The 18. Paying a tribute to the efforts made by Mr. Gra­ self to the c ham, the representative of India emphasized that the Government of India had therefore been forced to refer India. The UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January once again to the essential difference in the status of proposals in 1949 had made it clear that the requirements of main­ the parties and to show that that was totally disregarded to go beyon taining law and order as well as the over-all security of in the draft resolution. vital element the State, which included adequate defence, had to be 20. As for the reference to a so-called "neutral" 27. At th taken into account in assessing the requirements of the force, a proposal originally made by the representative (16 Decemb forces to be maintained on the Indian side of the cease­ of Pakistan, the United Kingdom representative should clared that th fire line. It should be borne in mind that the Govern­ know that the Government of India had long since of aggression ment of Pakistan would be free to locate its forces as it rejected the idea of the imposition of a foreign force ous one. Th liked within its own borders, which for a considerable on Indian territory as being derogatory to the dignity assumption, length were within striking distance of the cease-fire and territorial integrity of an independent nation. Kashmir was line and vital areas of the State. In the light of those 21. The United Kingdon! representative's reference 28. Recal considerations, and after careful study, the Government to the principle that demilitarization should be carried emphasized t of India had come to the conclusion that a minimum out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease­ against the a force of 28,000 was required to carry out its responsi­ fire agreement was misleading, since the relevant para­ the accession bilities. However, on complete disbandment and dis­ graph of Mr. Graham's proposals, paragraph 8, had no the trouble b armament of the Azad Kashmir forces, and as a bearing at all on the principles for determining the Maharajah w further contribution towards a settlement, the Govern­ character and the quantum of the forces. Prime Minis ment of India was prepared to effect a further reduction tober 1947, of 7,000 to a figure of 21,000, which was the absolute 22. The figures suggested in the proposals of 16 July, territory of . and irreducible minim'.Utl. That figure, which included namely 12,000 to 18,000 troops for the Indian side, were had been for the former State armed forces, represented less than entirely arbitrary, and the United Nations Representa­ result of pOf one-sixth of the Indian forces at the time of the cease­ tive had never explained satisfactorily how they had capital, the 11 fire. The force would have no supporting armour or been arrived at. They were unrelated to the normal India. India artillery and, in addition to its other duties, it would considerations determining the minimum need for secu­ him military: be responsible for policing the cease-fire line on the rity. In that connexion, the representative of India written a lett other side of which was the aggressor. pointed out that no outside advice could supersede that Governor-Get of those who were themselves responsible for the secu­ the accession 19. The Government of India had agreed that United rity and protection of the State. Any alternative figures Nations surveillance over the local authorities in the day Indian t1' for the figure considered by India to be the absolute Pakistan rep] area evacuated by the Pakistan army should continue minimum must be justified on realistic considerations !" until the plebiscite had been carried out. Those author­ aggression on of security and not be put forward merely as a matter not rather be ities could not be entmsted with any responsibilities of political bargaining or appeasement. under the cease-fire agreement, since that agreement the people 0 was between the Governments of India and Pakistan, 23. The view that the limits suggested by Mr, Gra­ the Maharaja while the local authorities could have no international ham represented the United Nations Representative's 29. The status. They could at best be entrusted, therefore, only considered judgment was also incorrect in view of pected to ac with a civil armed force. Considering the pre-aggression Mr. Graham's definition of his functions-which had ceptance of t strength of similar forces policing the area, a civil been accepted by both parties-that his position was but be regar armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side, but that of a mediator whose duty was to find an approach encroachment the Government of India would be prepared to make acceptable to both Governments. inconsistent some increase in those forces, which would be operat­ 24. The United Kingdom representative's conclusion existed betwe ing under the surveillance or the United Nations Rep­ that the forces on each side of the cease-fire line should Government resentative, provided the latter could make out a case be of the same kind went beyond the terms of the two Government that the proposed strength was inadequate, The United UNCIP resolutions and could rest only on the totally disruption in Kingdom representative's argument that the presence inadmissible basis of equating the aggressor with the the influence of troops on the Indian side with only a civil armed victim, That representative's reference to the require­ India in utter force on the other -side would be inconsistent with a ments of security on each side of the cease-fire line had tion had been really free plebiscite ignored not only the provisions of no basis in the UNCIP resolutions or in any of Mr. Gra­ tive of Pakis the UNCIP resolutions, but also the proximity of the ham's proposals, which recognized that the security were precisel Pakistan frontier and of Pak:stan forces. Any departure of the State was the sole responsibility of the Govern­ Minister of from the position recognized by the two UNCIP res­ ment of India. The Government of India could not ac­ gram to the olutions aimed at establishing parity of any kind, either cept any decisions which violated the two UNCIP res- accession to

4 .- nn le olutions to which the parties had agreed. But it was al­ parallel to that of Kashmir. The Indian case on the r, ways willing to explore every avenue which might accession of the States to either Dominion had been l­ lead to a peaceful solution of the problem and which tnat sovereignty vested in the people and that, although It did not ignore or vioi.ate the basic principles vital to a the instrument for intimating the decision was to be le correct appreciation, principles which had been accepted the ruler, where there was a difference between the 's by the UNCIP and the parties themselves. ruler and his people, the wishes of the latter had to I- 25. Stressing India's attempts to secure a peaceful be ascertained and the verdict of the people had to be d settlement, the representative of India pointed out that communicated by the ruler for the purposes of acces­ r. her Government had repeatedly declared that on no sion. When those tests were applied to Kashmir, it was account would it ::nitiate military operations. The Gov­ clear that the aggression, in the words of the Prime , ernment of Pakistan, on the oher hand, had refused to Minister of India himself, had been committed by India "'d make that declard.tion. Despite its undertakin6" to dis­ and not by Pakistan. y courage warlike propaganda, constant threats of holy 30. As for the second instance of alleged aggression, r war were being hurled at India from across the border. the representative of Pakistan pointed out that, from 26. The Security Council had failed to address it­ the time of submission of the matter to the Council, self to the central and basic issue d aggression against the effort of the Government of India had been to se­ India. The Government of India had to reject the cure the withdrawal of the tribesmen so that Indian proposals in the joint draft resolution, which appeared armed forces could then crush the freedom movement to go beyond the UNCIP resolutions or to ignore the by military action. Sheikh Abdulla had said as much to vital elements of principle contained in them. the then President of the Security Council who was " 27. At the 609th meeting of the Security Council trying to arrange a settlement by conversations be­ e (16 December), the representative of PAKISTAN de­ tween the parties. The Security Council, however, had j clared that the charge that Pakistan had twice been guilty persistently refused to endorse that position. In the e of aggression against India was a very grave and seri­ meantime, despite the Security Council's resolutions, ous one. The allegation was .obviously based on the on-the-spot preparations had been made to launch assumption, altogether inconsistent with the facts, that an offensive so as to bring about a military decision. Kashmir was part of the territory of India. 28. Recalling the background of the question, he 31. It had been in the face of a general offensive emphasized that the people of the State had revolted by the Indian Army in Kashmir, launched with the against the authority of the Maharajah long before both declared intention of occupying the whole State, that the accession and the invasion of tribesmen, the root of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army had rec­ the trouble being their suspiCion or their fear that the ommended to the Government of Pakistan, in April Maharajah was inclined to accede to India. The current 1948, that the Indian army should not be allowed to Prime Minister of Kashmir had admitted on 21 Oc­ advance beyond a certain line for various reasons vital tober 1947, before a single tribesman had entered the to Pakistan, including the disruption that would have territory of Kashmir, that the Kashmir State forces been caused by c: further great influx of refugees, Among had been forced to withdraw in certain areas as the the objectives of the offensive had been the capture result of popular resistance. Forced to flee from his of the headworks located in Kashmir, of the irrigation capital, the Maharajah had asked for military aid from system supplying -the Pakistan part of the Punjab. In India. India had made it clear that it could not give that connexion, the Pakistan representative emphasized him military aid unless he offered to accede, so he had his country's dependence upon its water supplies and written a letter of accession on 26 October 1947. The the fact that India had on 1 April 1948 already taken Governor-General of India had signified acceptance of advantage of its position to cut off for a period the the accession on 27 October, on the morning of which flow of the waters of rivers rising in India and flowing day Indian troops had already occupied Kashmir. The through Pakistan. In the situation, the Pakistan Gov­ Pakistan representative asked whether that had been ernment had decided to send its own troops to stop the aggression on the part of Pakistan or whether it had further advance of the Indian Army. Pakistan had had not rather been aggression on the part of India against no international obligation of any kind towards bdia the people of Kashmir in support of the tyranny of in respect of that territory. His Government would the Maharajah. have been a traitor to its trust had it not taken that action. All that Pakistan had done had been to attempt 29. The Government of Pakistan could not be ex­ to ward off the dangers which its Commander-in-Chief pected to acquiesce in such an arrangement. The ac­ had pointed out. That was not aggression. It could ceptance of the so-called accession by India could not not possibly have been aggression because thf' territory but be regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an involved had at no time been'under the control or encroachment on Pakistan's sovereignty and territory military occupation of India, even as the result of the inconsistent with the friendly relations that should have supposed accession. existed between the two Dominions. The action of the Government of India had been considered by the 32. Reiterating that the assumption that there had Government of Pakistan to be a clear attempt to cause been a valid accession of Kashmir to India was en­ disruption in the integrity of Pakistan by extending tirely erroneous and unfounded and has never been ac­ the influence and the boundaries of the Dominion of cepted by Pakistan or the Security Council, the rep­ India in utter violation of the principles on which parti­ resentative of Pakistan recalled that, in his reply to the tion had been agreed l 1 pon and effected. The representa­ Maharajah on 27 October 1947, Lord Mountbatten tive of Pakistan noted that the words he had used had stated that the question of the State's accession were precisely the same as those used by the Prime should be settled by a reference to the people. That was Minister of India on 22 September 1947, in a tele­ indeed the question to be decided. The telegram of the gram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan regarding the Prime Minister of India of 8 November 1947 had also accession to Pakistan of ]unagadh, a State in a position made that clear by calling for a joint request of the 5 Represent two Governments to the United Nations to undertake 35. Pakistan had repeatedly accepted proposed solu­ that the a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date. The tions which had been rejected by India. D~spite its pUb­ auspices a Security Council had consistently taken the position that lic support for submission of disputes to international cil. the parties had agreed that the question of the acces­ arbitration and despite the obligation in this respect sion of the State to India or Pakistan should be decided which was laid upon the Government of India by its 39. In ing that t1 through the democratic method of a free and impartial own Constitution, India had refused several proposals plebiscite. However, it had gradually been insinuated for such arbitration on the meaning of the obligations view that carry out that the question to be decided was whether the people undertaken under the two UNCIP resolutions. It had of the State desired to continue the accession or not. rejected the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' proposal tion of 1.: The representative of Pakistan considered that to be to make available Commonwealth troops to facilitate a on the ba forces on on a par with other efforts made on behalf of the Gov­ plebiscite. India had rejected in all fourteen different ernment of India to evade its obligations undertaken proposals for solution of the question which had been armed for Pakistan E by way of acceptance of resolutions or agreements, or accepted by Pakistan. tions unde expressed through official documents. He emphasized 36. If the course of the dispute proved anything, it that paragraph 1 of the UNCIP's resolution of 5 Jan­ cite Admi was that Pakistan was anxious to proceed to the hold­ the functio uary 1949 stated that "The question of the accession ing of a plebiscite and thht India was not. It was an of the State ... to India or Pakistan will be decided nary 1949 academic question, therefore, to suggest that upon with­ 40. At through the democratic method of a free and impartial drawal of the bulk of India's forces from Kashmir, plebiscite". resentativf Pakistan would march in, discarding any possibility of a Kashmir 1 33. In any case, the representative of Pakistan con­ plebiscite's being held and inviting India to attack it tinued, the question was academic in view of the ac­ started on from the rear and occupy it. Though Pakistan's forces ted the in, ceptance by the two Governments of the two resolu­ had long been established in cantonments on the Kash­ tions of the UNCIP. The crux of the matter, as the rep­ was a cyn mir border, which were the result of a pre-partition stan-inspir resentative of India had said, was the implementation geographical distribution. India's troops were massed of that agreement. He endorsed the position that no revolt" ag~ on the Pakistan borders in West Punjab and India was ment in decision violating the two UNCIP resolutions could establishing permanent stations in that area. be accepted, but the difference was that while Pakistan earlier, ha had a record of being willing to translate its agreements 37. Another question to which the representative 41. Thf into actual fact, there was a sad record of evasion of India had referred was that of the declaration by the completed on the other side. The Pakistan Government had fully two Prime Ministers that all outstanding issues should ment by th accepted the obligations laid upon it and had through­ be settled peacefully. The representative of Pakistan latter had out been willing to carry them into effect. The United cited the exchange of correspondence between the Prime the accessi Nations Commission, however, had reported (S/1430) Ministers of the two countries in 1950, when the Prime to the peop on 9 December 1949, that "... India is not prepared Minister of Pakistan had stated his Government's readi­ and the S to withdraw such part of her forces in Kashmir as ness to reaffirm with the Government of India the fortunately might be characterized as the 'bulk', whether measured solemn engagements undertaken under the Charter of and eleme quantitatively 01" qualitatively, unless agreement with the United Nations. The Prime Minister had at that they occup Pakistan on the large-scale disbanding and disarming time declared that the solution would come when each of Kashmil of the Azad forces is reached". But the language of the side accepted adjudication of all issues that were justi­ 42. It I resolution of 13 August 1948 made it perfectly clear ciable and arbitration of all other issues and had stated State could that there was no such requirement. Yet it was argued his Government's readiness to do so on every issue. The preceded al that India would not accept any violation of the UNCIP trouble had been that India had been in possession of a stand-stit resolutions. There was nothing- in those resolutions, the greater part of Kashmir and refused to move to­ a neighbou moreover, which might cause misunderstanding on the wards a plebiscite. India had the power-which it had was even part of the Government of India regarding that ques­ exercised once-to cut off Pakistan's water and to con­ and peacefl tion. The UNCIP had consistently taken the line that vert the whole of Pakistan into a desert. It was to aggression ' the resolution of 13 August 1948 did ·.lOt contemplate the preserve that power that India had suggested that the gadh was i disarming or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces. The two countries should never fight with each other over contiguity, Government of India had known that fact and it was anything. PakistRn's reply had been to propose that the former Ind' quite clear that they had understood the two resolutions two Governments should settle the procedure through not apply il correctly. The Commission had informed the Govern­ which their disputes could be settled and then proclaim 43. Dea ment of India on 14 March 1949 that it had explained to the people that that was how they were going to tempt to de to the Government of Pakistan in August 1948 that reach peaceful solutions. stan, the re the resolution of 13 August provided for a military 38. Dealing with the joint draft resolution, he sub­ ernment ha balance during the truce period in that it did not call mitted that, having regard to the agreements that existed imposed tw for the disarming or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir and the needs on both sides, the numbers suggested there must forces, which the Commission had understood to num­ were not fair to the Pakistan side of the cease-fire cised that r ber approximately thirty-five battalions. line. He suggested that the proposal would set up an be immedia 34. The two sides had agreed, under paragraph 8 imbalance that would cause apprehension on one side over, Pakis of Mr. Graham's proposals, that the demilitarization that the cease-fire line might not be adhered to. Despite certain line, would be carried out in such a way as to involve no those considerations, Pakistan was prepared to go for­ of the UN threat to the cease-fire agreement. Yet, according to ward on the basis of that resolution also. Nevertheless, extended it India, there should be substantial military forces on there were two matters in which the proposal did not between Au its side of the cease-fire line and none at all on the appear to aim at achieving progress: first, the parties tinued to h other side. The representative of Pakistan asked whether were to seek out each other and go into conference; forcibly, w1 there would not be a serious threat to the cease-fire line and secondly. the parties were to report the results to of Pakistan in that event. It was clear that a certain number of the Council. The Council owed it to the United Nations 44. India forces had to remain on the Azad Kashmir side to main­ Representative, to the parties to the dispute and to the of disputes tain law and order and to maintain the cease-fire line. people of Kashmir to ensure that the United Nations 6 . : . Representative would retain the initiative in the matter, to warlike acts. The Pakistan representative had at­ solu­ that the conversations would take place under his tempted to dismiss the request for a joint "no-war" ; pub­ auspices and that he would report to the Security Coun­ declaration by asserting that it had no meaning unless tional cil. agreement was first rea.ched on methods and procedures ~spect 39. In conclusion, the representative of Pakistan, not­ for settlement of pending issues. The representaLve of by its ing that the representative of India had indicated India's India asked whether the fact that such an agreement posals view that a minimum force of 28,000 was required to could not immediately be reached was a reason for not ations carry out its responsibilities, proposed that the resolu­ declaring that force was to stand outlawed. As the t had tion of 13 August 1948 be implemented immediately Prime Minister of India had pointed out in his reply lposal on the basis that India would retain that number of to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, such a declaration tate a forces on its side of the cease-fire line, including State could assist in bringing about a change of atmosphere terent armed forces, and without armour or artillery. On the and details of procedure would only weaken the effect. been Pakistan side, Pakistan would carry out the full obliga­ 45. The Pakistan representative's attempt to claim tions undertaken by it under that resolution. The Plebis­ merit for acceptance of various proposals and at the ng, it cite Administrator would then take over and carry out same time to discredit India for inability to concur hold­ the functions entrusted to him by the resolution of 5 Jan­ was misleading. Pakistan had accepted and India re­ 1S an uary 1949. jected the Council's resolution (S/726) of 21 April with­ 40. At the 610th meeting (23 December), the rep­ 1948 (286th meeting). But that had been followed hmir, resentative of INDIA pointed out that the invasion of by Pakistan's invasion of the State, on one hand, and 'of a Kashmir by the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals had by India's co-operation and negotiation with the ck it started on 22 October, while the Maharajah had execu­ UNCIP, on the other hand, despite the grave provoca­ orces ted the instrument of accession on 27 October 1947. It tion offered by Pakistan's acts. Again, Pakistan had Cash­ was a cynical distortion of facts to describe that Paki­ accepted Mr. Graham's proposals of 16 July 1952, but tition stan-inspired and directed moveruent as a "popular on conditions that had nullified that acceptance. In the assed revolt" against the Maharajah's rule. The popular move­ same way, Pakistan had nullified its acceptance of l was ment in Kashmir, which had· started twenty years Mr. Graham's proposals of 4 September 1952, to which earlier, had been an entirely non-violent one. the representative of Pakistan had not referred, while ative 41. The legal requisites of accession had been fully India had considered that those proposals contained y the completed by the signing and acceptance of the instru­ the germ of a settlement. lOuld ment by the Maharajah and the Governor-General. The 46. As for tI1e question of canal waters in the Punjab, istan latter had unilaterally expressed the wish, in accepting the representative of India continued, the interruption 'rime the accession, that the "t'lestion be settled by a reference that had occurred in 1948 had been due to lack of ac­ 'rime to the people as soon as law and order had been restored tion by Pakistan and had been terminated on the initia­ eadi­ and the State had been cleared of the invader. Un­ tive of the Prime Minister of India. Fears regarding . the fortunately, the invader remained, and subversive forces that question, particularly when unfounded, could not :r of and elements continued to function in the territory justify invading the territory of a neighbour. India's that they occupied. That was why reference to the people forces had been moved back from the border in the each of Kashmir was being delayed. Punjab with the lessening of tension, the representative usti­ 42. It had been argued that the invasion of the of India stated. Indip. continued to adhere to its unequiv­ tated State could not be regarded as aggression since it had ocal assurance that it wished to live in peace and The preceded accession. But Pakistan had at that time had friendship with Pakistan, despite the latter's provoca­ In of a stand-still agreement with Kashmir. The invasion of tion. : to- a neighbouring State was an act of aggression which had 47. Dealing with the proposal made by the rep­ was even more flagrant when that State was a small resentative of Pakistan, she noted that according to it, con­ and peaceful one. After the accession it had become s to apparently, the formidable Azad Kashmir forces, which aggression against India as well. The reference to Juna­ were indistinguishable from the regular am,:' of Paki­ : the gadh was irrelevant, for the principle of geographical over stan, were to be regarded as a normality, and were not contiguity, an essential feature in the accession of all even to be subject to the restrictions in regard to ar­ tthe former Indian States to one Dominion or the other, did lugh mour and artillery that were to apply to the Indian and not apply in the case of J unagadh. State forces. The proposal was ingenuous enough, but laim 43. Dealing with the Pakistan representative's at­ g to it also reversed Mr. Graham's aproach and was basically tempt to defend the second act of aggression by Paki­ inconsistent with the two UNCIP resolutions. India's stan, the representative of India recalled that her Gov­ position, fully in conformity with those resolutions, was sub­ ernment had pointed out that Article 51 of the Charter that all proposals had to be based on a recognition of sted imposed two limitations on the right of self-defence: the integrity of the entire territory of Jammu,and Kash­ :sted there must be an armed atack on the Member that exer­ mir and of the responsibility which India had for its -fire cised that right and measures taken in virtue of it must defence. It followed from the UNCIP resolution of ) an be immediately reported to the Security Council. More­ 13 August 1948 that all Pakistan troops had to be side over, Pakistan contended that it had merely held a withdrawn and all armed formations, including the ;pite certain line, but both the majority and minority reports Azad Kashmir forces and GiIgit scouts, which were for­ of the UNCIP had made it clear that Pakistan had under Pakistan's control, fully disarmed and disbanded. less, extended its military control over the northern areas Under the resolution of 5 January 1949, the representa­ not between August 1948 and January 1949. Pakistan con­ tive of India continued, the Plebiscite Administrator :ties tinued to hold the territory it had been able to seize was only responsible for the disposition, that is, the lce; forcibly, while India did not seek to occupy an inch location, of the Indian forces, and could not by him­ s to of Pakistan territory. self bring about any reduction in their number. There ions 44. India relied on peacdul methods for settlement could be no reduction of Indian forces below the mini­ the of disputes and did not threaten war or have recourse mum necessary for the maintenance of law and order. ions 7

'" . , . " 48. The representative of Pakistan had already 53. Turning to other points he reiterated that the would b pointed out that the position of the Government of Pakistan forces, even in the northern areas, did not RepreseI India on the issue of accession had been that, on the take over any area which had been occupied by or had graph t acquisition of independence, the sovereignty of the States been under the control of, the Indian armed forces at ters of tl vested in the people, and he had stressed the fact that, any time. As regards the question of ] unagadh, the rep­ UNITED long before the alleged accession, there had been a dif­ resentative of Pakistan said that it was not as irrelevant amendm as it had been made out to be since it was one of the ference between the Maharajah and his people which 57. T had reached the point of revolt. matters pending before the Security Council. The fact that ] unagadh was not contiguous to Pakistan by land not see' 49. The representative of India had recalled her would not take it out of the category of an independent lution aI Government's undertaking to submit the question to a state, the ruler of which belonged to one community ing the plebiscite and had said that that had not taken place while the majority of the people belonged to another. that poi because the invader was still in Kashmir. The tribes­ He had cited the case of ]unagadh merely to show by both men had withdra\vn, however, and the regular Pakistan India's inconsistency in having different criteria in dif­ resolutio Army had always been ready to withdraw in accordance ferent cases. Referring to the Canal \Vaters Dispute be­ continua with the UNCIP resolution of August 1948. It could not tween the two countries he declared that West Punjab ment w be argued that the people of the State, who had taken as a result of the diversion of water by India had become proposal up arms in August 1947, were invaders who had to a deficit food area while East Punjab was beginning joint dr withdraw. \Vhat was delaying progress in organizing to be surplus. The representative of India had stated sho'..11d and holding the plebiscite was the refusal of the Gov­ that officers of the International Bank were investigating nance 0 ernment of India to withdraw its forces in accordance the possibility of greater utilization o~ avai}able wat~r~, more th paragra with the two UNCIP resolutions that it had accepted. but in spite of repeated requests, and 111 spIte of IndIa s Nowhere in those resolutions was the security of the agreement that supplies would not be interfered with, zation w State made the sole responsibility of India. The reference India was going on with the construction of works, by no thre to "due regard to the security of the State and the which India could div·ert every drop of water from \Vest that pro freedom of the plebiscite" dealt \vith the functions of Punjab. Kashmir the United Nations Representative, succeeding the resolutio UNCIP, and the Plebiscite Administrator, who, after 54. At the 61lth meeting (23 December) the rep­ that que the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces and resentative of the NETHERLA"ns said that the delay in posals 0 when the Representative was satisfied that peaceful reaching a solution of the question was a matter of and disc conditions had been restored, were to determine, in great regret, the more so since the parties involved had would t1 consultation with the Government of India, the final agreed on the fundamental point that the question of tarizatio disposal-not disposition-of Indian and State armed the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Kashmi forces. India or Pakistan would be decided through the demo­ mainten cratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted 50. The difficultv had been to determine what was the agreeme under the auspices of the United Nations. He thought For the "bulk" of the Indian forces. Since the representative ti~.lt it was agreed that the presence in the State of a of India had indicated that her Government needed a there wc considerable number of forces belonging to one or both maintem force of 28,000 to carry out its responsibilities, he had of the parties would not create or facilitate the condi­ been prepared to accept that figure and not insist on agreemel tions necessary for a free and impartial plebiscite. It State an the fact that the determination was to be macIe by the followed that the territory had to be demilitarized to Commission according to the resolution of August 1948. that den the greatest possible extent in order to ensure absolute way as The question of disarming the Azad Kashmir forces freedom of choice, and there also had to be a reasonable was a controversial one, and that was why that ques­ ment ha proportion between the military forces on either side Mr. Gra tion and the Indian figure of 21,000 had been left aside. of the cease-fire line. Though the figure of 28,000 was a high one, his Govern­ in parag ment was prepared to accept it in order to go for­ 55. Pointing out that the parties had not revoked cease-fin ward. The question of the disbanding and disarming the agreement embodied in the UNCIP resolutions of borne ir. of the Azad Kashmir forces would arise when the Plebi­ 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, he observed that on each· scite Administrator took over. The wording of the any attempt to revert to the origin of the conflict would represen U:'~CIP resolutions in that respect was exactly the be a step backwards. For the previous two years, the ment ha same as that used with regard to the Indian and State Council had endeavoured to pave the way for the truce side wot forces: "final disposal". It must have the same meaning agreement. The United Nations Representative had tive anc in both cases. succeeded in narrowing the problem to the number and mand. character of forces to remain on each side of the cease­ 51. The Pakistan representative agreed that the 58. fire line, and it was that issue which the joint draft Mr. Gr matter of armour and artillery was relevant. What­ resolution sought to settle. The joint proposal took into resolutio ever armour and artillery was withdrawn from one account a difference in the basic position of the two United side should also be withdrawn from the other. As for parties and recognized a difference in the responsibility Pakistan control of the Azad Kashmir forces, he pointed the pos of the remaining forces on both'sides of the cease-fire to negot out that upon its withdrawal the Pakistan Army would line in that it referred to the principles and criteria cease to exercise any operational control over those and the contained in the United Nations Representative's pro­ sponsors forces. posal of 4 September 1952. was no 52. His Government ~greed with the view that there 56. The representative of the Netherlands felt that which \ should be no departure f:-om the two UNCIP resolu­ it would be advisable to allow some flexibility in the question tions. India maintained that view, yet, when called proposed negotiations and also that the role of the was co upon to adhere to the resolutions, it started asking for a United Nations Representative should be clarified. He to be lef great deal more which was not provided for at all by the therefore submitted an amendment (S/2881) to the zation p resolutions or which was not provided for during the joint draft resolution providing in the fourth operative it clear stages in which India required it. paragraph that the negotiations betwee.n the parties the Cam

8 led that the would be "under the auspices of the United Nations trator, would be responsible for determining the final ~as, did not Representative" and deleting the provision in that para­ disponal of the armed forces, in consultation with the d by or had graph that the negotiations be held "at the Headquar­ Government of India, such disposal to be "with due ed forces at ters of the United Nations". The representatives of the regard to the security of the State and the freedom Idh, the rep­ UNITED KINGDOM and the UNITED STATES accepted the of the plebiscite". The freedom of' the plebiscite and 1S irrelevant amendment. the security of the State were both matters to which ; one of the considerable weight had to be attached and in regard :il. The fact 57. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM did not see any inconsistency between the joint draft reso­ to which some kind of balance might have to be struck. ,tan by land Clearly, the United Nations Representative and the independent lution and the two agreed UNCIP resolutions. Analys­ ing the provisions of the joint draft resolution from Plebiscite Administrator would pay the fullest attention community and attach the greatest weight to the views of the to another. that point of view, he noted that it had been accepted by both parties that the provisions of the two UNCIP Government of India when they consulted it on the :ly to show matter. So far as the other side of the cease-fire was teria in dif­ resolutions should be combined so as to produce one continuous demilitarization process. The only extra ele­ concerned, the resolution of 5 January 1949 made the Dispute be­ United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Ad­ Test Punjab ment which had been introduced into Mr. Graham's proposals of 4 September, and consequently into the ministrator responsible for the final disposal of the had become armed forces "in consultation with the local authori­ 5 beginning joint draft resolution, was that the number of forces sho·..lld be det~rmined with due regard to the mainte­ ties". had stated 59. The joint proposal dealt with the character of westigating nance of the cease-fire agreement. But that did no more than reflect the agreement already reached in the forces to remain by incorporating, by reference, lble waters, the provisions of paragraph 7 of Mr. Graham's pro­ e of India's paragraph 8 of Mr. Graham's proposal that demilitari­ posal of 4 September 1952. The United Kingdom repre­ 'fered with, zation would be carried out in such a way as to involve t works, bv no threat to the cease-·fire agreement. He submitted sentative believed that it was entirely consistent with from West that provision was made for the disposal of the Azad the two UNCIP resolutions that the forces on each Kashmir forces under paragraph 4 Cb) of the UNCIP side of the cease-fire line should be, broadly speaking, resolution of 5 January 1949. Mr: Graham had covered of the same kind. .) the rep­ that question by providing, in paragraph 7 of his pro­ 60. Referring to the demilitarization proposal made he delay in posals of 4 September, for a large-scale disbanding by the representative of Pakistan, the United Kingdom . matter of and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces. There representative believed it to be entirely in accordance lvolved had would therefore be, at the end of the period of demili­ with the first UNCIP resolution. If it was considered :juestion of tarization, the minimum number of forces on the Azad together with Pakistan's undertaking to accept what­ <:ashmir to Kashmir side of the cease-fire line required for the ever decision the United Nations Representative and the demo­ . maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire the Plebiscite Administrator might jointly take under ~ conducted ) agreement with due regard to the freedom of plebiscite. the resolution of 5 January 1949, regarding the strength :re thought For the Indian side, Mr. Graham's proposal was that of the forces, including the Azad Kashmir forces, even­ State of a there would be the minimum of forces required for the tually to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at me or both maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire the time of the plebiscite, it seemed to his delegation the condi­ agreement, with due regard to the security of the to be a proposal which, at any rate, deserved careful ebiscite. It State and the freedom of the plebiscite. The condition and sympathetic stuc1Y. itarized to that demilitarization should be carried out in such a re absolute 61. The representative of the UNii'ED STATES OF way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agree­ AMERICA said that nothing contained in the joint draft reasonable ment had been accepted by both Governments, and either side resolution stood in the way of either one or both of Mr. Graham was therefore entirely logical in including, the parties coming forward with suggestions of their in paragraph 7 of his proposals, maintenance of the own. The joint proposal rested four-square on the )t revoked cease-fire agreement as one of the requirements to be agreement embodied in the two UNCIP resolutions. )Iutions of borne in mind in fixing the final number of forces In that connexion, he observed that it was unnecessary ,erved that on each side of the cease-fire line. The United Kingdom to re-examine the basis of those resolutions. He there­ flict would representative understood that the Pakistan Govern­ fore did not propose to discuss the charge of aggression. years, the ment had agreed that the forces on the Azad Kashmir The Council must not lose sight of the United Nations r the truce side would have to be separated from the administra­ Representative's view that an early agreement on tative had tive and operational control of the Pakistan Com­ demilitarization would have as one immediate practical 11mber and mand. result the induction into office of the Plebiscite Admin­ the cease­ 58. The two alternative approaches mentioned by istrator, who could then proceed with his necessary oint draft Mr. Graham had been combined in the joint draft study of the entire problem of a plebiscite. [ took into resolution only after the most careful thought. The 62. The representative of BRAZIL supported the joint ,f the two United Kingdom Government thought it wise to avoid draft resolution. He found it hard to believe that two ponsibility the possibility that one of the parties might choose nations with so many ties and so much in common cease-fire to negotiate in accordance with one of the alternatives would be unable peacefully to settle their differences. Id criteria and the other party in accordance with the other. The A new effort should be made to reach agreement on live's pro- sponsors of the joint draft resolution believed there the question of demilitarization, as envisaged in the was no incompatibility between the two alternatives, joint proposal. 5 felt that which were complementary to each other. As for the 63. The representative of CHINA observed that no ity in the question whether the United Nations Representative member of the Council, apart from the parties involved, ,le of the was competent to assess the strength of military forces had ever discussed the charges of aggression. Instead, rified. He to be left behind in the State at the end of the demilitari­ the Council had accepted the basic agreement of the !) to the zation process, the resolution of 5 January 1949 made parties that the question of the accession of the State operative it clear that the Representative, as the successor of should be decided by a fair and impartial plebiscite le parties the Commission, together with the Plebiscite Adminis- under the auspices of the United Nations. He hoped

9 that the joint proposal might serve as a basis for the 69. For those reasons, the Soviet renewal of successful negotiations. Union delegation could not support the joint draft resolution. 64. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET 70. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM SOCIALIST REPUBLICS said the fourth report of Mr. observed that if the United Kingdom and the United Graham, like the preceding documents submitted States of America had been actively engaged in trying earlier, showed the futility of attempts to seek agree­ to establish an aggressive base in Kashmir, they had ment between India and Pakistan on the demilitariza­ been singularly unsuccessful. It would be a reflection tion of Jammu and Kashmir and on the holding of on the integrity of the Governments of India and a plebiscite under United Nations auspices. All of the Pakistan to suggest that they would be likely to agree successive measures adopted at the insistence of the to any such proposal which, it must be obvious, would United Kingdom and the United States of America be completely opposed to the known policies of both had not brought the parties any nearer to a common parties. Should the Council ever consider recommend­ ground for solution of the question. ing the establishment of a neutral force in Kashmir, it would always 65. The be open to the USSR representative policy of the United States and the United to oppose the relevant Kingdom regarding resolution. He did not see, how­ Jammu and Kashmir was, he said, ever, what the USSR could clearly imperialistic in character. do should the parties ever Those countries were agree on some proposal for establishing unceremoniously intervening in a neutral force. the internal affairs of 71. The representative Kashmir under cover of the United Nations. of INDIA pointed out that his Taking Government had already stated on the noble role of "peacemakers", the United States that it was unable to and the United Kingdom accept the joint draft resolution. It was not prepared for five years had done all to in their power to delay a be a party to any talks on the basis suggested in settlement of the question, the seventh to aggravate the situation in the paragraph of that proposal. With those subcontinent and to explicit reservations, create such conditions as would justify the introduction however, the Government of In­ dia, in line with its readiness of so-called "neutral", that is, foreign, troops into the to explore all avenues territory of Jammu and towards a peaceful settlement, would be prepared to Kashmir in order to turn the join area into their strategic base. and continue in any talks in connexion with the dispute. If the Council still considered it useful or 66. The USSR delegation had already drawn atten­ necessary to proceed with the draft resolution, his Gov­ tion to the fact that Mr. Graham, without authorization ernment could only profoundly regret the decision. from the SecLrity Council, had asked the Governments Decision: The joint draft resolution of India as amended and Pakistan whether they were ready to agree (S/2883) 'Was adopted at the 611th to the United meeting, on 23 De­ Nations making armed forces available cember 1952) by 9 votes to none) with 1 despite India's rejection abstention of the same proposal in the (USSR). Pakistan did not participate in the voting. draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America on 21 Februarv 1951 c. Fifth report of (S/2017). Despite repetition of India's position, the United Nations Representa­ Mr. tive for India Graham had returned to that question in his fourth and Pakistan report, where the proposal took the form of operational 72. On 23 January 1953, the United Nations Repre­ j and administrative control by the United Nations sentative informed the Security Council (S/2910) that cl through "neutral" or local officers over part of the the Governments of India and Pakistan had agreed a Azad Kashmir troops, so as to remove them from the that a meeting of representatives of the two Govern­ d authority of the Pakistan High Command. The pro­ ments at ministerial level should be held in Geneva, fi posal to send United Nations troops into Kashmir under the auspices of the United Nations Representa­ was being used by the authors of the joint draft resolu­ tive beginning 4 February 1953. The negotiations were tion as a weapon of intimidation designed to make to be continued on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions the parties accept the joint draft, which itself was of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, bearing in mind tantamount to an ultimatum requiring the parties to the assurances, clarifications and elucidations given to agree on the number of troops set forth in it. the Governments of India and Pakistan by UNCIP. That basis was 67. Like to be without prejudice to a further all earlier resolutions on the question, the consideration, if necessary, joint draft resolution, of the twelve proposals of which was based on the in­ the United Nations Representative. admissible principle of intervention in the internal 73. By a letter affairs of Kashmir, excluded any possibility dated 27 March 1953 (S/2967), of settle­ the United Nations Representative ment of the Kashmir question by the transmitted his fifth people of the report to the Security 6 State without outside pressure or Counci1. In the report, the Rep­ Anglo-American in­ resentative set terference, and ruled out any possibility forth the views of the parties on the of the Kash­ implementation of part miri people using their lawful right to self-determina­ II, A (1) and (2), and B (l) tion. and (2) of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948. The results of the meetings and conversations on that 68. The only correct way for the Security Council question, the United Nations Representative reported, to solve the question would be to refrain from sanction­ had led him to the conclusion that agreement was not ing interference in the internal affairs of Kashmir possible at that time between the two Governments and to enable the people of Kashmir to decide freely on a truce agreement based solely on part II of the their own fate in accordance with the principles of the 13 August 1948 resolution, and it had appeared to him right of self-determination set forth in the Charter of that the same difficulties which had existed as early the United Nations. That could be done, he declared, as 1949 were still the main obstacles in the way of by having the status of Kashmir determined by a con­ carrying out the commitments embodied in part n. stituent assembly elected by the people of Kashmir themselves on a democratic basis. 6 See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth. Year, Special Supplemeltt No. 1. . 10 'i''jr:' "Ii' He had not felt that he could continue that approach tained, amounted to a clear indication to the Govern­ because the figures proposed by each side were not ment of India that its sustained attitude of intransigence .Ho·l negotiable with the other side. In accordance with the would ultimately procure the formulation of a truce 'DOM !~! terms of reference agreed upon between the two Gov­ agreement on its own terms. nited E ernments for the conference, further consideration of ~ 77. After thorough consideration and further con­ 'ying .. the Representative's twelve proposals had ensued. versations with the parties, the United Nations Repre­ ~ad F 74. Having met separately with the representatives sentative had felt that there was no ground left at that ctlOn 11 of the two Governments, on 14 February, the United stage on which to continue the conference and there­ and i Nations Representative had presented to them for dis­ fore, in agreement with the two representatives, he had *' cussion revised proposals, the text of paragraph 7 pro­ decided to end it. ~~~1d ~ viding, inter alia, that, at the end of the period of both j 78. Dealing with the issue covered in paragraph 7 demilitarization, there would remain on the Pakistan of his proposals, namely the number and character .end- t side of the cease-fire line an armed force of 6,000 sepa­ of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, lmir, . rated fr0111 the administrative and operational command ltive ; the United Nations Representative said that he held of the Pakistan High Command and without armour or 10W­ no brief for the lower figures of 3,000 to 12,000 or artillery. At the end of that period an Indian armed the higher figures of 6,000 to 21,000. As a mediator ever force of 21,000, including State armed forces, was to Jrce. whose responsibility had been to keep striving for a remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. That settlement, he had hoped that a basis for the negotia­ this force was also to be without armour or artillery. tion of an agreement might be found. It appeared obvi­ e to ~ 75. Among the comments of the parties on para­ ous that the Government of India, under the two ared graph 7 of the revised proposals were the following. UNCIP resolutions, had some larger responsibilities d in The Government of India was unable to agree to reten­ on its side of the cease-fire than had the local authori­ !lose tion of any military forces in the so-called Azaa Kash­ ties in the evacuated territory on the other side. With­ In­ mir territory. It held that the function of preventing out recognition of the Azad Kashmir Government and tlues i violations of the cease-fire line on the Azad Kashmir without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State, it 1 to I side could be effectively performed by a civil armed also appeared obvious that there should be in the the r force consisting of 2,000 armed and 2,000 unarmed l or . evacuated territory effective local authorities and effec­ men. The Government of India was willing to agree tive armed forces. In the Azad Kashmir territory ;ov- i to some increase in the numbers of that proposed civil those armed forces would be organized out of the n. armed force. remainder of the Azad Kashmir forces without armour wed 76. The Government of Pakistan held that para­ or artillery, and thereafter would be commanded by De­ graph 7 contravened the Security Council resolution local officers under the local authorities, under the tioll (S/2883) of 23 December 1952. The arbitrary raising surveillance of the United Nations. The United Na­ ~ ·mg.I" i of the figure of the numbers on the Indian side to tions Representative observed that the difference over ! 21,000, as against 6,000 Azad Kashmir forces, would definite numbers, important as it was, was not as great nla· i put the security of the Azad Kashmir area in serious as the difference between inducting and not inducting jeopardy and would destroy the safeguard that the the Plebiscite Administrator into office. The transfor­ ! demilitarization should be carried out in such a way mation in the situation which would come from the pre-[ simple fact of induction into office of the Administra­ that. as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period of demilitarization. The tor was most important for the great objective of the :eed I figures proposed, the Government of Pakistan main- self-determination of the people of the State. ~rn- f ~I:; I lindlons l' 1 to :IP. I ~h~~ r , i7), i ifth ! ~ep- ! the' (1) • 148. :hat ted, not ~nts I the .um..I trly I n.of I

m" li 11 &, PART IT Other matters considered by the Security Council

Clzapter 2 ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: As indicated in the previous (i) A draft resolution submitted by Pakistan on annual report (A/2167, paras. 407 f.), the question 17 January 1952 (S/2483) concerning the admission of admission of new Members was included in the of the United Kingdom of Libya: agenda of the Security Council at the 577th meeting "The Security Council, on 18 June 1952, with the following two SUb-para­ "Having considered the application of the United graphs under that general heading: Kingdom of Libya for admission to membership in (a) "Adoption of a recommendation to the Gen~ral the United Nations, Assembly concerning the simultaneous admission to "Takes into account that on 24 December 1951, membership in the United Nations of all fourteen States in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 289 which have applied for such admission"; (IV) of 21 November 1949 and 387 (V) of 17 (b) "Consideration of General Assembly resolution November 1950. the United Kingdom of Libya has 506 (VI)". been constituted as an independent and sovereign The Council also had before it the following USSR State; draft resolution (S/2664) : "Decides that in its judgment the United King­ "The Security Council dom of Libya satisfies the conditions for membership "Recommends that the General Assembly should in the United Nations laid down in Article 4, simultaneously admit to membership in the United paragraph 1, of the Charter; and Nations the following States which have applied "Recommends to the General Assembly that it therefor: Albania, Mongolian People's Republic, admit the United Kingdom of Libya to membership Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portu­ in the United Nations." gal, Ireland, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and Libya." (ii) A draft resolution submitted by the United At its 591st meeting (9 July 1952), the Council de­ States of America on 28 August 1952 (S/2754) con­ cided to postpone consideration of the question until concerning the admission of Japan: 2 September 1952. "The Security Council, "Having received and considered the application A. Adoption of the agenda of Japan for membership in the United Nations (S/ 2673 of 23 June 1952), 79. The Council resumed discussion of the question "Decides that in its judgment Japan is a peace­ at its 594th meeting (2 September 1952), when the loving State and is able and willing to carry out representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (the the obligations contained in the Charter; and accord­ President for the month of August) stated that a meet­ ingly ing of the permanent members of the Security Council "Recommends to the General Assembly that it had been held on 21 August 1952 to give the perma' admit Japan to membership in the United Nations." nent members an opportunity to confer on the pending applications for membership. An effort had been made (iii) A draft resolution submitted by France on to find a basis for agreement, but agreement had not 2 September 1952 (S/2758) concerning the admission been possible and the permanent members had not of Viet-Nam: changed their positions. "The Security Council, 80. Under the item "Admission of new Members" "Having received and considered the application the provisional agenda of the 594th meeting included, of Vietnam for admission to membership in the in addition. to the two sub-items noted above, a new United Nations (documents S/2446 of 19 December sub-item (c): "New applications for membership (S/ 1951 and S/2756 of 29 August 1952), 2446, S/2466, S/2467, S/2672, S/2673 and S/2706)". "States that in its opinion Vietnam is a peace-lov­ The PRESIDENT (the representative of Brazil) ex­ ing State, able and willing to carry out the obliga­ plained that he had felt it advisable to include the tions imposed upon it by the Charter; and, therefore, sub-item so as to enable the Council to consider the applications on which it had not yet reported to the "Recommends the General Assembly to admit General Assembly and which it had not considered Vietnam to membership in the United Nations." on an individual basis. (iv) A draft resolution submitted by France on 81. At that stage, the Security Council had before 2 September 1952 (S/2759) concerning the admission it the following proposals: of Laos:

12 "The Security Council, of the other members of the Security Council. In addi­ "Having received and considered the application tion, the United States had resorted nine times to the of Laos for admission to membership in the United "hidden veto", that is, by abstaining it had made it Nations (document S/2706 of 16 July 1952), impossible for an applicant to obtain the necessary "States that in its opinion Laos is a peace-loving number of votes. The case of the abstention on the State, able and willing to carry out the obligations Tunisian question by the United States and other imposed upon it by the Charter; and, therefore, members of the Council had shown that such "absten­ tion" was in fact nothing but a vote "against", since "Recommends the General Assembly to admit Laos it prevented, or interfered with, the adoption of a to membership in the United Nations." decision by the Council. Once again it had been demon­ (v) A draft resolution submitted by France on strated that the United States and its supporters, the 2 September 1952 (S/2760) concerning the admission l:nited Kingdom and France, had no intention of reach­ of Cambodia: ing agreement on the admission of the fourteen States "The Security Council, to membership in the United Nations. d by Pakistan on "Having received and considered the application 85. Dealing with the economic progress and broad ning the admission of Cambodia for admission to membership in the democratic development in the peoples' democracies, United Nations (documents S/2672 and S/2675 of the USSR representative cited various facts and sta­ 23 June 1952), tistics which, he said, showed the pacific policies and ition of the United "States that in its opinion Cambodia is a peace­ genuine democratic development of those countries after to membership in loving State, able and willing to carry out the obliga­ the Second World War, and decisively refuted the tions imposed upon it by the Charter; and, there­ assertions of the United States and United Kingdom representatives that the peoples' democracies were not ~4 December 1951, fore, lly resolutions 289 peace-loving, that they did not meet the requirements "Recommends the General Assembly to admit of Article 4 of the Charter, and consequently could d 387 (V) of 17 Cambodia to membership in ,the United Nations." not be admitted to membership. Such assertions were ;dom of Libya has nothing but hostile slanders fabricated by the Anglo­ ent and sovereign 82. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET So­ CIALIST REPUBLICS stated that consideration of the American imperialists in an effort to mask their own applications listed in the new sub-item, in particular policy of hostility and hatred towards the Hungarian, the United King­ the applications of Japan, Laos, Cambodia and Bao Romanian, Bulgarian and Albanian peoples. Contrast­ inS for membership Dai's Viet-Nam, would not be opportune. The USSR ing those countries with the States regarded by the >wn in Article 4, draft resolution included all of the applications on which ruling circles of the United States as "peace-loving", I a decision could be reached. He added that there was he said that the United States had revealed the real Assembly that it no need to include Libya's application under the pro­ motive involved, namely, that the ruling circles of the bya to membership posed sub-item since that application had already been. United States opposed the admission of the peoples' considered by the Council and by the General Assem­ democracies and tried to force them to change their bly and it was, in any case, covered by the USSR internal system of government because of the hatred ~d by the United draft resolution. Moreover, Libya's application was in­ of the Anglo-American monopolies for countries which '52 (S/2754) con- cluded by impiication under sub-item (b2, since Gen­ were free, independent and sovereign in the true sense > i eral Assembly resolution 506 (VI) covered the appli­ of the word, which had freed themselves forever from f: cation of Libya. the domination of foreign capital, and which had closed ed the application 83. After some discussion, the Security Council their resources to predatory foreign monopolies. In that connexion he recalled the $US100 million allocated by nited Nations (S/ decided, by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (USSR), to include the new sub-item (c) in the agenda. the United States Government in 1951 for the purpose of organizing sedition, sabotage and anti-popUlar acts Japan is a peace­ against the peoples' democracies and the USSR. IIing to carry out B. Consideration of the USSR draft resolution arter; and accord- (Sj2664) 86. The United States' position, he said, was not only a gross violation of the internati, he declared, irrespective and to provoke a new series 01 so-called USSR "vetoes" Ol whether It was accompamed by the negative votes for propaganda purposes. The USSR representative said that if in the interest (1f justice and in defence representative of the USSR, M:. Gromyko, ha? h~ld mUlll standards. I of the lecra! rights of the States whose admission the that the Council \vas bound to diSCUSS each applIcation to the question as United States and the United Kingdom were prevent­ separately and had said that he was unable to agree live up to those in IT a USSR veto was necessary, it wDuld be applied. tD the proposal that the Council should adopt a resolu­ pelled. E~~ry USSR veto was a legal and just action taken tion for the "wholesale" admission of eight countries. 93. The repre, by the LTSSR for the purpose, l1rst, of defending its The Council should act in accordance with the Charter AMERICA also 01 own leo'al ri~hts and interests in strict accordance with by considering each application separately, and by tak­ l::> ~ I. Each applicant f the provisions of the United i\ations Charter anc Its ing a decision on the merits of each case. rate consideratio main principle--unanimity of the permanent members 91. The representative of GREECE pointed out that listed in the US of the Council-and secondly, of defending the legal US~R did not consider ricrhts and interests of States whose right and interests the United States proposal of 1946, to which the th~ representative had refe~r~d, h~,d called. for the ~dmls­ there were other Anglo-American imperialists were trying to trample the CSSR draft, underfoot. sion of all the then elIgible and qualIfied applIcants. The strong stand of the USSR representative in .de­ had a particularl 8S. The problem of the admission of new l\Iembers fence of Article -+ :n 1946 had been taken at a time Nations, and wh had reached such dimensions that it could only be when the applications of the eight countries in question not be forgotten b soh'ed in the way suggested by the USSR, nan:ely by had been thoroughly examined by the Committee on listed in the USS admitting simultaneously the fourteen States which had the Admission of New J\Iel11bers. The USSR proposal that Austria, Cey applied for membership. There was nothing in the was based on a false interpretation of the principle of Libya, Nepal an Charter to prevent the admission of several States universality as embodied in the Charter. To set aside should be admitte under a single resolution. Moreover, the United States the conditions of Article 4 by admitting candidates itself had created a precedent at the 54th meeting of 94. There had en bloc when some of the candidates were, to say representative co the Council on 28 August 1946 by proposing that t~e the least, not qualified for admission, would be a fla­ eight States which had then applied for membership dealinl{ with the grant violation of the principles of the Charter, includ­ other question, h should be admitted simultaneously. That proposal had ing the principle of universality. He contended th~t ~he been supported by the Secretary-General, and also by because of the ne "popular democracies" were not qualified fer ad~lsslon delegation had in the representatives of Br3zil, China, Mexico and Egypt. under Article 4. The argument that the opposItIon to The method being advocated by the USSR was the tions which it felt the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania Charter, but in n same as had been advocated by the United States in and the Mongolian People's Republic. was. due only to 1946; and it did not involve any threat to the Charter. alone prevented a the internal structure of those countrIes did not corre­ applications had 89. At the 595th meeting (3 September), the repre­ spond to the facts. Yugoslavia was also a communist negative vote bec sentative of the NETHERLANT"S said it was clear State, but that did not prevent his country and.all the will of the m that there was a growing tendency to make the United other non-communist Member nations from havmg vote of the USSR Nations as nearly universal an organization as possible peaceful and friendly :elations with it. Alth?u~h his -subject, d course, to the requirements of Artide 4 .delegation would readIly vote for the admiSSion of 95. The repre of the Charter. At the same time, the Advisory Opinion the other States listed in the USSR proposal, and emphasized that given by the International Court of Justice on 28 May regretted their exclusion from the United Nations by taken by the Uni 1948,7 according to which the admission of one State the USSR veto, he would vote against the USSR draft under the Potsdarr could not be made conditional upon the admission of resolution. stated in the pre another, could hardly be neglected. Since the General following form: ", Assembly had felt at its sixth session that the whole 92. The representative of CHINA opposed the USSR Associated Power problem of the admission of new Members should 0t;ce proposal. It did not include the Republic of Korea become a Me::nbel again be thoroughly examined at t~e sev~nth sess.lOn whose exclusion his Government could not accept. merely "enabling « and since the gap between the OppOSllll!. pomts of view Moreover, the Charter required that admission to the the signatories WOl in the Security Council continued to exist, little prog­ United Nations must be by individual State.' How tion. ress could be expected from further discussions in the Article 4 of the Charter should be interpreted had been authoritatively stated by the International Court of 96. The United Council at that time. His Government therefore fa­ importance to the voured postponing further consideration of the l11at~er Justice: the admission of any State could not be made conditional upon the admission of other States. He Nations, and was until the General Assembly had had an opportulllty was called univers at its seventh session to give a clearer picture of the therefore requested that the applications of the four­ teen countries listed in the USSR proposal be put to dude countries wi views of all the members of the Organization. Should government, and tl the Council decide to pronounce itself on the various the vote separately. Should the USSR representative object to such a separate vote, the USSR draft resolu­ whatsoever of disc proposals before it, however, his delegation would cause it might hav reaffirm its previous position, which was based on tion would be in contradiction to the Charter and should be ruled out of order. If the Council were forced ment which his Gc Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and.the Advisory United Kingdom I to vote on that draft resolution as a whole, without ; Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May each candidate s is 1948. a preliminary separate vote, he would vote against it. He also pointed out that the USSR draft resolution accordance with 90. The representative of TURKEY pointed out that included certain States which his delegation regarded stated in the opi the USSR draft resolution departed from the rule laid as not qualified for membership. He challenged the Justice, it was w down in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter in that facts adduced by the USSR r~presentative in support one applicant a c it made the admission of countries which fully met the of the applications of the so-called peoples' democra­ applicant had to qualifications required under that Article dependent cies. Citing developments and conditions in Eastern given the most lib upon the admission of other countries backed by the Europe, he declared that every organization had cer­ of the countries I USSR. He recalled that, during the discussion of the tain unwritten laws and unwritten articles. For admis­ could hardly be question by the Council in 1946, to which reference sion to the United Nations, States must meet certain Article, although had been made by the TTSSR representative, the then minimum conditions not laid down in the Charter and Ceylon, were because the framers of the Charter had thought that 97. At the 596t 7 See Advisor'} Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State sentative of FRAN to Membership il~ the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) those conditions could be taken for granted. The five rc.!. Reports 1948, page 57. States backed by the USSR did not meet those mini- the attitude which

14 mum standards. Indeed, consideration shou~d be.given USSR proposal in February 1952 (573:d meetin~). to the nuestion as to whether Members whIch dId not l-~ othing had happened since to make hIS. delegat~on live up"l to those elementary conditbns should be ex­ ('hange those views. The USSR delegatlOn, whIch pelled. ciaimed to respect the principles <;>f .Articl~ 4 .of the Charter, could not without contradlctlOn mamtmn that 93. The representative of the UNITED STATES. OF Italy, Jordan, Ireland and Po.rtugal were n~t pea~e­ AMERICA also opposed the USSR draft resolution. lovina States and at the same tIme request theIr admIS­ Each applicant for membership was entitled to .sepa­ sion to the United Nations, even as part of a collective rate consideration and there were certain apphcants admission simultaneously with the applicants sponso~ed listed in the USSR proposal which his Government by the Soviet Union. The USSR thus agreed to VIO­ did not consider qualified for membership. Moreover, late the principles of the Charter and .overlook t~e there were other applicants which :vere not listed. in criteria established in Article 4 by acceptmg the applI­ the CSSR draft such as the Repubhc of Korea, wluch particula~ly cations recommended by the other members of the had a close connexion with the United Council, on condition that those members did the same Nations, and whose just claim to membership wo~ld O~ cOt~ntnes for the USSR proteges. His delegation did not accept not be forgotten by the United States. the the baraain. The French representative added that he listed in the USSR proposal, his delegatlOn conslderrd Italy~ did notthink that it was the simultaneous admission that Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Jordan, of the fourteen States that the USSR really proposed, Libya, Nepal and Portugal, were fully quahfied and but their collective admission, in a manner which made should be admitted to membership. the admission of anyone conditional upon that of 94. There had been no instance, the United States the others. representative continu~d, in which a c;lraft res.olution dealin~ with the questlOn of memb~rshtp, or wIth anr 98. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS emphasized that not one of the other question, had failed of adoptlOn. m the Counc.ll admissi~n because of the negative vote of the Umted States. HIS applications of the States the indiscrimin.ate a delegation had in the past voted against ~arious applica­ of which had been proposed by the Umted States m d tions which it felt did not meet the reqUlrements of the 1946 had then been considered by the Security Council. 1 Charter but in no instance had the United States vote Contrary to what other speakers had endeavoured to a ~xpressed alone p;evented a recommendation sinctf none of those argue, the USSR delegation had at that time p e~ch applications had received seven affirm~tiv~ votes. A the view that it would be proper first to consIder ti negative vote became a veto only when It thwar~ed application separately and then to settle the questton f the will of the majority. That was what the negative of the admission of all the States. The USSR had never vote of the USSR had done repeatedly. objected to individual consideration of each application and did not object to individual consideration at pres­ 95. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM ent. He pointed out, however, that each of the five emphasized that the "obligations" supp?sedly.under­ applications from. the peo~les' democracies-I:!ungary, taken by the United States and the Umted Kmgdom Romania Bulaana, Albama and the Mongol!an Peo­ under the Potsdam Agreement and the peace treaties­ ple's Republic~had been considered by the Council not stated in the preamble to the peace treaties in the once but three times. He also cited the fact that the following form: "... thereby enablin? the ~lli~d and other applications listed in the USSR draft resolution Associated Powers to support . . . s applIcatlOn to had been considered "separately" and "individually" become a Member of the United Nations .. ." were from two to five times each. It would consequently be merely "enabling clauses", a statement of the fact ~hat senseless once again to consider each of the applications the signatories would be enabled to support an apphca­ from the beginning. tion. 99. The USSR was not haggling; it was proposing 96. The United Kingdom Government attached great a broad political approach to the S?lution ~f the. qu.tS­ importance to the broadening of the base of the United tion. The USSR was prepared to WIthdraw Its obJectlOn Nations, and was influenced by the concept of what to the favourites of the Anglo-American bloc despite a was called universality. The United Nations should in­ the fact that it was legally entitled under the Charter clude countries with different ideologies and systems of to oppose the admission of some of those States. On re government, and the United Kingdom had no intention the other hand, it urged the Anglo-American bloc, and m; whatsoever of discouraging the entry of a country be­ particularly the United States of America, to refrain th cause it might have an ideology or a system of govern­ from its policy of discrimination and diktat towards the on ment which his Government disliked. Nevertheless, the group of applicants whose internal structure was not to re United Kingdom still believed that the application of the liking of the ruling circles of the United States. each candidate should be considered separately, in That proposal provided a basis for agreement and a S accordance with Article 4 of the Charter, and that, as way out of the existing situation. Explaining why the ac stated in the opinion of the International Court of USSR had chosen that position, he stated that it had th Justice, it was wrong to attach to the admission of become clear that the principal aim of the United States w one applicant a condition to the effect that another ruling circles was to turn the United Nations into a wi applicant had to be admitted at the same time. Even blind arid obedient instrument of their aggressive policy given the most liberal interpretation of Article 4, s0!Ue and their preparation for an aggressive world war, and of the countries listed in the USSR draft resolutlOn to prevent the Organization from continuing as a world could hardly be said to fulfil the conditions of that organization of free nations. Indeed, it was clear also Article, although most of the countries, such Cl;s Italy that the United Nations was, in fact, no longer so much and Ceylon, were fully qualifiec fnr membershIp. a world organization as an American one acting in ac­ 97. At the 596th meeting (5 September), the repre­ cordance with the interests and needs of the United sentative of FRANCE said that his delegation maintained States aggressors. The United States thus con~idered the attitude which it had stated with regard to a similar every application for admission through the prIsm of

15 • ,..,.~~'. t ~~~_<:£W~~~~:.~~~~~~ _.:li ,:-~ ~, ••,"'....--=o<.~__ .. _. !fi:3mM!II.1IIIlIII~, ••lIililiiliii.....,.-'~...,.. its policy of aggression and preparation for a new C. Consideratnon of resolution 506 (VI) of the 112. The rep worl.d 'yar, and it was prepared to support only the G~n:ra.l Assembly and of new applications for had voted agait apphcatlons of States which were either members or at anmlSSlon that Libya wou least prospective members of such organizations as 106. The Security Council then proceeded to take mitted to the NATO ANZUS and MEDO. up the General Assembly's recommendation (resolution cussed in the 100. The United States and the United Kingdom 506 (Vn) that it reconsider all pending applications considered direc went so far as flagrantly to violate their definite and for adnl1ssIOn. There was some discussion as to whether support any re direct obligations, assumed at Teheran and Potsdam or not the action already taken by the members of the applications und and unde~ the peace treaties, to support the applications Council had in effect fulfiller that recommendation. 113. The re, of Bulgana, Hungary, Romania, Finland and Italy for 107. The representative of CHILE noted that the AMERICA prop admission to the United Nations. pr.ospect did not seem very promising since the situ­ considered by t 101. As for the contention that the United States had atIon foreshadowed the faIlure of the reconsideration to the Committe th~ not used veto, the USSR representative declared requested by the Assembly. He believed that the only Decision: T that the Umted States had voted against the admission thing that could be done was to stress a number of plication of Jat of the peoples' democracies no less than six times. It considerations which his delegation had already set ence to the Co had also voted against the USSR proposal for the ad­ forth. previously with a view to creating favouraJ-. 1e (USSR), 'luith missi.on of fourteen States on 6 February 1952 (573rd ch~nge T~e co.ndIhons for a future in the situation, Which meettng). argument that the proposals involved mIght assume such a senot~s aspect in the General 114. The rep had not receIved seven votes was not valid in view of Assembly that the permanent members of the Council of the decisions the fact that the United States exerted all its efforts ity open to his prev~nt might well be convinced. 'While the application of the to seven favourable votes from being cast. In rul~ .of t~na~imit¥ in. matters of security cot.Id have posal to the eff conclUSIOn, the US~R representative stated that the Cambodia and Sov~et polItIcal JustIficatIOn, It had no such justification with Union supported the position that the United regard to the admission of new 'Members. He also curity Council. Nations should be an international organization of free believed that the requirements of Article 4 of the Decision: T ar:d sove~eign S~ates with different political structures, ~hfferent Charter should be interpreted in a realistic manner. It of Viet-Nam., IdeolOgies and different ways of life, but united was obviously impossible to admit a State which openlv ered directly b'j tn 0x:'e. noble idea and desire-to live in peace together an~ flagrantly violated the most essential principle~. 8 votes to 1 and Jomtly to fight for the strengthening of international ~eace an~ a? 111 the case of a country committing acts of aggres­ Pakistan). security on the basis of free and equal rela­ SIOn. The standard generally applied. however, coule! tions.. GUIded by those principles, which were just and not be more rigorous than the standard used in jud!!in

16 112. The representative of CHILE explained that he on 22 November 1948,8 there was a declaration to the had voted against the proposal because of his feeling effect that the Democratic Republic had been recognized that Libya would stand a better chance of being ad­ by the French Government as a sovereign, independent mitted to the United Nations if the matter were dis­ State under an agreement dated 6 March 1946. cussed in the Committee than if its application were considered directly. For the same reason he would not ApPLICATION OF LIBYA support any request for direct consideration of the S~ptember), applications under discussion. 123. At the 600th meeting (16 the representative of PAKISTAN said that his delegation had 113. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF supported the USSR draft resolution calling for the AMERICA proposed that the application of Japan be admission of fourteen States because that course seemed considered by the Security Council without reference to be the easiest and quickest way to remedy the para­ to the Committee on the Admissioh of New Members. lysis with which the Council was seized in connexion Decision: The Ullit.?d States proposal that the ap­ with the admission of new Members, because it be­ plication of Ja.pml should be cOllside1'cd u.'ithollt refer­ lieved that admission of the countries listed would be ence to the Committee was adopted by 8 votes to 1 a source of great strength to the Organization and (USSR), with 2 abstentions (Chile, Fm-nce). because, to be usefu; and real, the United Nations must reflect as faithfully as possible the political state of the represeni:~tive 114. The of FRANCE said that in view world. His delegation had hoped, at the time when of the decisions taken by the Council, the only possibil­ Libya applied for membership, that Libya would not ity open to his delegation was to submit a formal pro­ be added to the list in the USSR draft resolution. He posal to the effect that the applications of Viet-Nam, now hoped that it would not be difficult to detach Libya Cambodia and Laos be examined directly by the Se­ from that list. It was important to do so because the curity Council. case of Libya was unique in the United Nations, which Decision: The French proposal tlUll the applications could easily claim that the independence of Libya was of Viet-Nam, Ca.mbodi{l. and Laos should be consid­ one of its greatest achievements. He recalled that the ered directly b'y the Security Council '

17 Decision sovereignty and independence had been brought about not only failed to take advantag-e of those opportunities 1952 the P with the assistance of the Organization. In view of to permit Libya to become a Member but, on the con­ admission 0 that fact, and of the General A:.semoly resolution to trary, had twice voted against the proposal to admit result of tl which other representatives had referred, the Council Libya together with the other thirteen States which had (USSR). j was amply justified in making a favourable recom­ applied for admission. It was no longer a secret that lIcgative vot mendation immediately. the United States supported the admission of only Cmmcil. 127. The representative of CHILE, stressing the re­ those countries which were already members of its sponsibility of the United Nations towards Libya, said agressive bloc or which it considered as possible allies that it ' .... as incumbent upon the Organization to help in case of war. The existence of military bases on 138. At tl to maintain the independence of a country born under Libyan territory and the position of Libya in the mili­ sentative of its auspices. The cnited Nations had given Libya its tary plans of the United States were no longer a secret. the Japanes( independence at a' time when social and economic con­ The imperialistic colonial Powers were the ones re­ to rebuild a ditions in that country had been deplorable. Referring sponsible for the extreme proverty of Libya, to which tttre of go to various facts in that connexion, he said that the peo­ the representative of Chile had referred. who knew ple of Libya must be given the right to speak and to 133. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF application vote so as to be able to demand that the United Nations AMERICA said that the repetition of the unrealistic con­ of the Trea should meet the responsibility it had undertaken dition laid down in the case of the application of Libya into effect 0 towards them. was apparently the only obstruction to the admission a sovereign of that country. Referring to the various resolutions nized its du 128. As for the allegations, e.."pressed in the course in declaring, of the sixth session of the General Assembly, that the of the General Assembly on Libya, he said that mem­ bership in the United Nations was no more than that to apply fo Libyan Government was taking orders from other gov­ in all cirCUIT ernments and had granted them certain bases, the country deserved from the Organization, which was so intimately connected with the creation of Libya. Charter. By representative of Chile said that he did not believe that that pledge the Libyan Government was taking- orders. If Libya 134. The representative of FRANCE said that Libya international was actually dependent upon other Powers, its absence was a State which undoubtedly fulfilled all the condi­ had co-opere from the United Nations would merely increase its tions laid down by the Charter. He drew attention to It h~d co-op dependence. If it was not dependent, its absence would the fact that his country had administered part of Libya ing- with th~ cause it to become so. for several years and to the role played by France in of the Secm 129. The representative of CHINA had no doubt the development of that country. The friendly and good­ of most of t about Libya's qualifications for membership and said neighbourly relations between France and Libya were tions. His C that the admission of Libya was but the completion of an additional reason for his delegation's desire that the was a peaCl the policy pursued by the United Nations with regard Council should unanimously recommend that Libya he out its oblig-~ to that country. admitted to membership. lacked the n 130. The representative of TURKEY emphasized that 135. The President, speaking as representative of needed colle Libya fulfilled the conditions for admission. He warned BRAZIL, pointed out that the United Nations had spon­ The United the members of the Council that failure to accomplish sored and promoted the establishment of Libya as an people. r an obvious duty might have a more depressing effect independent State and urged that that work should 139. The ) than was realized on the hopes of millions of people not be undone by a vote or by a veto in the Council. declared tha1 i and on world public opinion as a whole. He appealed to the USSR delegation to reconsider its be a Membe 131. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET position in the specific case of Libya, stating that he necessary to did not see why the USSR should not, as in the case Japan qualifi, • SOCIALIST REFUBLICS reiterated his delegation's view r that Libya's application could not be regarded as a new of Indonesia, foregoo its so-called right of veto under eign, peace-I. l:- one, since it had already been discussed both by the the existing circumstances. the obligatiO! General Assembly and by the Security Council. He 136. The representative of CHILE reiterated his belief 140. The declared that the USSR had never opposed in the past that Libya, like all under-developed countries, could that though t and did not then oppose the admission of Libya to mem­ only emerge from its state of poverty and dependence could not be bership in the United Nations on the same basis as with the decisive help of the United Nations and believed that other, equally eligible, States. The USSR favoured throug-h effective participation in the Organization's ereign nation f. the simultaneous admission to membership of the four­ activities. ways and str and remain teen States, including Libya, whose applications had 137. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET already been considered in the United Nations on that connexic SOCIALIST REPUBLICS declared that no mention of In­ with Japan, several occasions, and categorically opposed the ad­ donesia had ever been made in the peace treaties, which mission of certain selected States and the rejection of ratified, stat did refer, nowever, to Libya and also to Italy. Bulgaria, Member of t others. He declared that it must be perfectly clear that Romania, Hungary and Finland. The USSR, the Libya had not yet been admitted solely because of the contained in United States and the United Kingdom had undertaken the United ~ attitude adopted by the United States Government and in those treaties to support the applications of those those who followed its lead on that question. Had States for membership in the United Nations. How­ 141. The the United States and the countries following it adopted ever. while the USSR respected the treaties, the United his country an objective and fair-minded attitude on the question States violated them, and as long as it continued to had signed, of the admission of new Members, without discriminat­ do so, the Council would not be in a position to take a Treaty of Pe ing ag-ainst some States and favouring others, Libya decision on the question of the admission of new Mem­ ized by the would long since have received the positive recom­ bers, including- Libya. The President should rather of reconciliat mendation of the Security Council. appeal to the United States to fulfil its oblig-ations under great Japane 132. He pointed out that the USSR delegation had the treaties and not to intervene in the domestic affairs ideals and t already given the United States two opportunities to of other States, and should urge the United States to implement th make good its pledge to vote in favour of Libya's ad­ be guided by the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter in the directi mission at the first opportunity. The United States had in considering applications for membership. tries in Asia

18 ." ....._------.. Decision: At the 600th meeting on 16 September Nations, provided it was in accordance with the Charter, dties 1952 the Pakistan draft resolution recommending the was doubly welcome to his country, he said that his con­ admission of Libya (Sj2483) was put to the vote. The delegation had not the slightest doubt that Japan ful­ imit result of the vote was 10 in favour and against filled the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter. had 1 that (USSR). The draft resolution was not adopted) the 142. The representative of TURKEY said that Japan lIegative vote beitlg that of a permanent member of the was a great and peace-loving country which fulfilled Dnly Com~c£l. its the conditions required by the Charter. He supported llies ApPLICATION OF JAPAN the United States draft resolution. on 138. At the 601st meeting (17 September) the repre­ 143. The representative of CHILE believed that the nili­ sentative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA said that admission of Japan, which met the requirements set :ret. the Japanese people had succeeded in their undertaking forth in Article 4, wou1d serve the interests of all Mem­ re­ to rebuild a new Japan and had produced a new struc­ bers of the United Nations and particularly those of his lich ture of government, bringing into le&dership those own country, which was also situated on the Pacific who knew the ways of freedom and d peace. The Ocean, as well as those of the Japanese people. For OF application of Japan came as a logical consequence those reasons, and because his country had ratified :on- of the Treaty of Peace with Japan whicb had entered the peace treaty, which explicitly called for admission ~ya into effect on 28 April 1952, re-establishing Japan as of Japan to the United Nations, he would vote in favour aon a sovereign and independent State. Japan had recog­ of the United States draft resolutio.... ons nized its duties as a member of the family of nations 144. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET ~m­ in declaring, in the preamble of the Treaty, its intention SOCIALIST REPUBLICS reiterated his view that the time :hat to apply for membership in the United Nations and had not come to consider the application of Japan. SO in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Dealing with the current position of Japan as a State, Charter. By its acts, Japan had shown that it honoured he said that the principles that were to guide the gov­ that pledge and had taken its place in the organized ~ya ernments of countries at war with Japan in their rela­ international community. He pointed out that Japan tions with that country had been laid down in such in­ ldi­ had co-operated with the United Nations in many fields. to ternational agreements as the Cairo Declaration of It had co-operated in combatting aggression by comply­ 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and the Yalta lya ing with the resolutions of the General Assembly and in Agreement of 1945. The first of those principles had of the Security Council. It was a responsible member prohibited any revival of Japanese militarism, and the ld­ of most of the specialized agencies of the United Na­ ere second had called for the removal of all the obstacles tions. His Government was of the opinion that Japan placed by that militarism in the way of the movement to­ the was a peace-loving State, able and willing to carry be wards democracy among the Japanese people. Following out its obligations under the Charter. As a State which Japan's surrender, the United States had nevertheless lacked the necessary armaments for self-defence, Japan violated those recognized principles and had treated of needed collective security as envisaged in the Charter. Japan as a conquered province. The USSR, guided by m­ The United Nations needed that nation of 85 million those principles, had repeatedly pressed for the rapid an people. conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan on a democratic lId 139. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM basis in the interests of the people rather than an im­ :i1. declared that it was so obvious that Japan ought to perialistic one. He said that Japan should be a peaceful its be a Member of the United Nations that it was only democratic country and that it should enjoy peaceful he necessary to say that his delegation considered that relations on a basis of equality with other countries, lse Japan qualified for membership since it was fully sover­ and especially with its neighbours. Planning to convert ler eign, peace-loving. and able and willing to carry out Japan into an obedient instrument of its policy of ag­ the obligations of the United Nations Charter. gression in the Far East, the United States had im­ ief 140. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said posed upon Japan a separate peace treaty. That treaty, Id that though the role of Japan in the Second World War both in its content and the action taken to implement ce could not be easily forgotten, his delegation hoped and it, was not a peace treaty, but a treaty for the prepara­ ld believed that Japan, which had been restored as a sov­ tion of a new war. It contained no guarantees against l'S ereign nation, would adopt in its international relations the revival of Japan as an aggressive State, and no ways and standards which would enable it to become re<;trictions with regard to the size of the Japatlese and remain a loyal Member of the Organization. In armed forces, whereas the peace treaties concluded with <:T that connexion, he pointed out that the Treaty of Peace other States after the Second World War, especially n­ with Japan, which his Government had signed and that concluded with Italy, contained dear and precise :h ratified, stated that Japan, even before becoming a provisions limiting the size of their armed forces. a, Member of the United Nations, accepted the obligations There was no justification for placing Japan. in such a le contained in Article 2 of the Charter. He supported special, privileged position. ~n the United States draft resolution. le 145. Describing the military, naval and air bases ,­ 141. The representative of P AKISTAN recalled that established in Japan by the United States and the extent :d his country was among the forty-eight countries that to which Japan's resources and manpower were being :0 had signed and the twenty-five that had ratified the used for'the war in Korea, which was being conducted a Treaty of Peace with .Tapan. which han been character­ illegally by the United States under the flag of the United Nations, the 1- ized by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan as a treaty USSR representative stated that :r of reconciliation and justice. During recent years the the United States Government had grossly violated the :r great Japanese people had dedicated themselves to new international obligations which it had assumed jointly 'S ideals and they had been working most sincerely to with other States and was doing everything possible o implement those ideals. Pointing out that any step taken to restore Japanese militarism. and to convert Japan r in the direction of remedying the fact that certain coun­ and the Japanese war industry into a United States base tries in Asia were not yet represented in the United and a military arsenal. thus inevitably creating a threat to peace and security in the Far East. Japan was still although there was secret worry over the fact that recogni under foreign military occupation, from which the the Yalta Agreement had placed the USSR power at defence Japanese people were suffering greatly. Progressive the very door of Japan. Individual freedoms and stand­ danger leaders were being persecuted mercilessly and the activi­ ards of living in Japan, he considered, were on a par fore re ties of democratic organizations were being suppressed. with the world level and were considerably superior to stationI Since the aggressive war in Korea, the occupation of those existing in the countries behind the "iron cur­ more ( Japan had been intensified. It had become a dependent tain". Japan, and, in fact, a colonial country. It was quite obvious 149. The representative of GREECE said that his coun­ seeing that it could not be regarded as an independent and try, one of t,lOse that had signed the Treaty of Peace rity pa self-sufficient sovereign State since it had been deprived with Japan and thus assumed a moral obligation to States of all independence in both its internal and its external work for its admission to the United Nations, regarded until th policy. Under the circumstances, Japan would not be in Japan as fully qualified for membership in the United and sel a position independently to fulfil the obligations incum­ Nations. It was to be regretted that Japan was, from auspice bent on Members under the United Nations Charter. a strictly formal point of view, still at war with the ing the the res 146. Furthermore, by their action the ruling circles USSR, but certainly Japan was not to be blamed for of the United States had imposed on Japan a separate that state of affairs. In that connexion, he cited a report Japan 1 peace treaty, thereby depriving Japan of the possibility to the effect that the Japanese Foreign Office had in­ men to which \ of concluding a normal peace with its nearest neigh­ dicated that Japan was ready to conclude a peace treaty oours, the USSR and the People's Republic of China. with the USSR at any time. forces I The United States was preventing the establishment 150. The representative of FRANCE said that since the render tion in of normal relations between Japan, on the one hand, entry into effect of the Treaty of Peace of San Francisco, and the Soviet Union and China, on the other, in order which his Government had signed and ratified, there charges ing tyra to keep Japan as a submissive and obedient tool for was no doubt that Japan had recovered its full status carrying out their aggressive policy against China, and its full capacity as a sovereign and independent was su therefOl Korea, the USSR and the peoples of Asia and the Far State. There was every reason to believe the assurances East. Japan continued to be in a state of war with two given by the Japanese Government dissociating itself repudia support States which were permanent members of the Security from the past and affirming the determination of Japan Council. to attune all the acts of its international life to the prin­ ·154. plicatio 147. The USSR representative stated that the United ciples of peace and co-operation incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations. A democratic and peace­ strengtl States ruling circles were using not only Japanese war improv~ industries but also Japanese manpower for aggression ful Japan would make a valuable and fruitful contribu­ tion to the work of the United Nations. principl against the Korean people. In those circumstances, Japan Settlem could not be regarded as a peaceful and peace-loving 151. The President, speaking as representative of BRAZIL, said that his delegation was fully satisfied that admittir State. He concluded that it was quite obvious that stateme! Japan's application for admission was, to say the least, upon the signature of the Treaty of Peace, which his country had signed, Japan had regained its status as an tember untimely. Its admission would cover up th·c United United States policy in Japan and would also serve a~ a smoke­ independent and sovereign State. The time had come when every possible effort should be made to eliminate willing screen for the exploitation of Japan's manp<"Jwer in the quireme ,var against the Korean people. The Uaited States the remaining post-war factors that stood in the way of sound and stable international co-operation. The ad­ ter VI ( Command was already using Japanese for that pur­ for merr pose, but was obliged to do so secretly. The admission mission of Japan would ensure the fuller participation of Japan to the United Nations would eml.ble the United of Asia in the work of the United Nations. He regretted 155. States openly to accept Japan as a co-participant in the that the USSR, considering itself as still at war with SOCIALI: aggression against Korea under the cover of "Japanese Japan, seemed determined to oppose any settlement of defence aid" to the United Nations. Admission of a country the situation in the Far East. United, which had been deprived of its independence and sov­ 152. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET of Japan ereignty and had already been dragged into the war SOCIALIST REPUBLICS replied that if the representative on the 1 by the American aggressors would be not only harmful, of Brazil could prevail upon the United States to with­ United but dangerous. It would also constitute a crude viola­ draw its armed forces from Japan and to give that coun­ countrie tion of the Charter. When the Japanese people and State try and its people their complete freedom and inde­ hold th were free, independent and sovereign and when Japan pendence, Japan would be admitted sooner to the United conditio! concluded normal peace treaties with the USSR and the Nations on a free and equal footing with other States. press th People's Republic of China, it would be possible, under In the position in which it then found itself, Japan could network normal conditions and in accordance with normal proce­ not become a Member of the United Nations. USSR, dure, to consider the question of its admission and ac­ preparin 153. At the 602nd meeting of the Council (18 Sep­ fighting cept it into the United Nations on the basis of free and tember), the representative of the UNITED STATES OF equal relations. strength AMERICA stated that what the USSR representative he cited 148. The representative of CHINA declared that his called a "separate peace treaty" was one signed by the in Japan Government had decided, in the midst of its resistance forty-eight States, all of which were Members of the under L against Japanese aggression, that every effort should United Nations or applicants for membership. If the cerning be made after the war to turn the Far East into a USSR was still at war with Japan, that was the wish to a tota shining example of countries living as close neigh­ of the Soviet Union. He recalled that the USSR had also cite bours and strong friends. The roads of peaceful endea­ refused to become a party to the settlement reached Japan b vour were to be kept wide open to the Japanese people. with Japan, although it had sent a delegation to San one of t For that reason, and because of the close oonds of Francisco ,ostensibly for the purpose of signing the sive blo( blood and culture between his country and Japan, his treaty. As for the charge that Japan was still under delegation strongly supported the application of Japan. foreign military occupation, he pointed out that the 9 See 0 He stated that there was no desire in Japan for war, signatories of the peace treaty, including Japan, had Si01I.• PIe'!

20 ... lct that recognized that Japan, lacking the means of self­ 156. There was no factual basis for the statement that )wer at defence, could not exist in a power vacuum with the the USSR had opposed the Treaty of Peace with Japan. 1stand­ danger of aggression in the world. The treaty had there­ The USSR representative at San Francisco had sub­ 1 a par fore recognized that foreign armed forces might be mitted six amendments calling respectively for the pro­ erior to stationed in Japan under agreement between one or hibition of the revival of Japanese militarism; for the )n cur- more of the Allied 'Powers, on the one hand, and withdrawal of foreign occupation forces and for the Japan, on the other. The Japanese people, clearly prohibition of the establishment of foreign military bases s coun­ seeing the danger of aggression, had concluded a secu­ on Japanese soil; a provision that Japan should not be f Peace rity pact with the United States, under which United allowed to enter into coalitions or military alliances tion to States troops would be retained in Japan temporarily, directed against any States which had taken part in the ~garded until the danger had passed or until international peace war against Japan; the settlement of territorial problems United and security had been assured under United Nations in strict conformity with the existing international agree­ s, from auspices or a collective security arrangement. Regard­ ments on that question; the ensuring of democratic ith the ing the allegation that the United States was fostering rights and freedom for the Japanese people; and the :led for the resurgence of militarism in Japan, he stated that unhampered development of peaceful Japanese indus­ . report Japan had only a national police reserve of some 75,000 tries, the development of Japan's trade with other coun­ 11ad in­ men to maintain internal order and security, a force tries and its access to sources of raw material. Although ~ treaty which was being expanded to 110,000 men. Its armed those amendments were fully in line with the Charter f{)tces had been completely demobilized after its sur­ and with the principles of other treaties of peace with European countries, they had been opposed by the nce the render in 1945. There had been no Japanese participa­ tion in the United Nations action in Korea. The USSR United States. In explanation of the United States op­ LIlcisco, position as regards the sixth amendment submitted by , there charges that Japan was undemocratic, that it was be­ ing tyrannized by the United States, that its sovereignty the USSR, the USSR representative cited figures in­ status dicating the extent of American control over, and ex­ lendent was subject to United States control and that it was ploitation of, Japanese industry and trade. It was in view Irances therefore ineligible for membership, had already been repudiated by the members of. the Security Council of that control and exploitation that the USSR said that ~ itself supporting Japan's admission. Japan had been turned into an American dependency. Japan ·154. The Soviet Union's opposition to Japan's ap­ The Japanese people would not be misled as to who e prin­ threatened them. in the plication and its threat of a veto should, he said, peace­ strengthen the interest of those who had long considered 157. The remarks of the United States representa­ ntribu- improvement of the means of executing policies and tive on the question of liberalizing the voting procedure principles under Chapter VI or the Charter, "Pacific of the Security Council meant that he wished to be able Settlement of Disputes", and of the procedure for to impose any proposal favourable to the United States we of by manipulating a subservient majority. The "veto" ~d that admitting new Members. In that connexion he recalled a statement made to the General Assembly on 17 Sep­ had been provided for in the United Nations Charter ich his so that no single permanent member of the Security ; as an tember 1947 in which the Secretary of State of the United States had said that his Government would be Council would be able to turn the United Nations into I come its blind and obedient weapon, since such a situation minate willing to accept the elimination of the unanimity re­ quirement with respect to matters arising under Chap­ was fraught with serious consequences for peace and e way international security. The United States representa­ he ad­ ter VI of the Charter and such matters as applications for membership.9 tive's remarks were in fact aimed at destroying the .pation United Nations. The fatal illness from which the United :retted 155. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET Nations was suffering was not caused by the veto; it r with SOCIALIST REPUBLICS replied that the ~o-called lack of was caused by the indiscriminate use which the United ent of defence measures in Japan had been invented by the States was making of the mechanical majority it pos­ United States as an excuse to continue the occupation sessed. So long as that situation continued, there could ;OVIET of Japan by United States forces. The myth of aggression be no solution to the question of the admission of new Itative on the part of the USSR was being exploited by the Members. with­ United States to frighten and deceive a number of countries including, in particular, Japan, in order to Decision: At the 602nd meeting, on 18 September coun­ 1952, a vote was taken on the United States dmft res­ inde- hold those countries in subjugation, impose on them conditions favourable for the United States monopolies, olution rec011tmending the admission of Japan (SI Jnited 2754). There were 10 votes in favour and one against )tates. press them into military alliances and tie them up in a (USSR). The draft resolhdion was not adopted, t.'11? could network of military and economic agreements. The USSR, however, was a peace-loving State and was not negative 'l!ote being tlwl of a permanent me11'tber. preparing to attack anyone. Whereas the USSR was \ Sep­ fighting for peace, the United States had revived and ApPLICATIONS OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND 'LAOS. AND 'ES OF strengthened Japanese militarism. In that connexion, OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM ltative he cited reports on the setting up of aviation schools )y the 158. In addition to the three draft resolutions sub­ in Japan and on the training of Japanese military pilots mitted by France proposing the admission of Viet-Nam, )f the under United States instructors and press reports con­ [f the Laos and Cambodia, the Security Council had before it cerning the increa~e of the reserve Japanese police corps the following draft resolution (S/2773), which had wish to a total of 300,000, including artillery and aircraft. He { had been submitted by the representative of the USSR on also cited figures on the purchase of war supplies from 15 September 1952: ached Japan by the American Army. Japan was included as "The Security Council, ) San one of the principal links in the United States aggres­ g the sive bloc in the Pacific. "HG'l!ing 1'eceived and considered the application under of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for admission It the 9 See Official Records of the General Assembl:',l, Secolld SI'S­ to membership in the United Nations (document , had Si01I., Pl(!1ta,·y Meetings, volume I, 82nd meeting. S/2466). 21

. " "Decides that in its opinion the Democratic Re­ Cambodian people had elected.its legisl~tiv~ a~sel1;1bly public of Vietnam is a peace-lovin~ S~ate, whic~ is in 1941 in free and proper electlOns, and It.S mstlt~tlOns expl able and willing to carry out the obhgatlOns contamed were functioning normally throughout ItS terntory. agai in the Charter; and France had recognized the full independence and sov­ of t Inde "Recommends that the General Assembly should ereignty of Cambodia, and associated States of the French Union by the treaty of 8 November 1949. That to t1 admit the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to mem­ follow~d thir~y-thr~e State~, a co bership in the United Nations". example had s'ince been by with several of whom Cambodia entertamed diplomatic the c 159. The representative of FRANCE said that yiet­ relations. There was no doubt that Cambodia was fully had Nam, Cambodia and Laos had already been recognIzed, qualified for admission. mov had by the great majority of the governments represented 162. In being the first to recognize those thret; States on the Council as sovereign and independent States cont as free, sovereign and independen~,.the Fren~h qov­ whie associated with' France. The State of Viet-Nam, suc­ ernment had acted in the same spmt as had msplred cessor to the ancient Empire of Annam, was on~ of terri the provisions of the Charter concerning the devel?p­ offic the three States now forming the State of Indo-Chma. ment of national institutions by Non-Self-GovernIng Placed under French protectorate by the Treaty of Han Territories. There was no better proof of the French the 1884 it had regained its full independence by the agree­ Government's sincerity than its request for the admis­ ment of 8 March 1949. Dealing with a reference by on 2 sion of those States to the Organization, in which the colo the representative of the USSR (600th meeting) to relations of the three States with all Members and with the so-called "agreement of 6 March 1946", he stated to r France itself could be based solely on the principle of Gov that, in the text concerned, which had been a "pre­ whi~h respect for sovereign equality, a principle on their of \i liminary convention", the French Government had relations with all the members of the French UnIon and reco211ized the principle of the independence and sov­ and with all the States which had recognized them were The erei;nty of Viet-Nam; it had never ',:ithdrawn that already based. recoo-nition and all that it had done smce had been mad a~pli£y 163. The representative of GREECE regarded Viet­ lica.r to its termsand solemnly confirm its scope. It Nam Laos and Cambodia as fully qualified for admis­ had not been the fault of France if the government with arrn sion 'to the United Nations. They were peace-loving elect which it had conducted negotiations in 1946 and with States which were able and willing to carry out the n~odus elect which it had subsequently signed the v£vcnd£ obliaations contained in the Charter, and their admis­ ber _ of 14 September 1946, had later vio~ated t~~ clauses sion°was the more desirable because Asia was undoubt­ emb of that instrument and, after progressively dlsmtegrat­ edly under-represented in the Organization. ing had ceased to be the qualified representative of the stru co~ntry and had become the spokesman of a minority 164. The representative of the NETHERLANDS, re­ up t group, finally taking refuge in the jungle, from which it viewing the rapid emancipation of some of the peoples mint directed the clandestine activities of its partisans. France of South-East Asia since the Second World War, said the had dealt with the State of Viet-Nam and not with the that in Indo-China the people and the administering the Vietminh party. It was that State whose independence Power had been faced with an extremely difficult and of B and sovereignty it had recognized, and it was with the complex situation, despite which the French adminis­ nial new Government of Viet-Nam, called to power by the trators had laboured unceasingly to encourage local Wit} with failure and disappearance of the 1946 government, that it autonomy and to further the evolution of those nations had concluded the instruments ratified by the French towards statehood and independence. That work had been Marl Parliament, which sanctioned its renunciation of the pro­ proved a success. His Government was satisfied that tectorate, defined the position of Viet-Nam in the French Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia had attained a full form Union, and thus enabled Viet-Nam to take its place on a measure of sovereignty and independence. It was con­ of V footing of equality as a free, sovereign and independent vinced that they were peace-loving and considered that nize< men1 State in the community of nations. Viet-Nam had a their admission to the Organization might contribute to the achievement of a just peace in their part of the assUl government freely appointed by the Head of the State, troo national representation and its own administration and world. It would also bring them into the growing sys­ tem of collective security. ensu army. Its existence as an !t.Iternational entity had b~e?­ recognized by more than thirty Powers. It had particI­ 165. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM Viet been pated in the San Francisco Conference on the Treaty said that his Government considered Viet-Nam, Cam­ of Peace with Japan and belonged to many international bodia and Laos fully qualified for membership. In their aWl bodies. Viet-Nam fulfilled the conditions of Article 4 capacity as representatives of Asia, those States should able< Han of the Charter and was constantly proving its ability to be able to make a special and valuable contribution to the United Nations. 90p carry out the obligations of the Charter by its efforts the to organize the democratic foundations of the State, 166. At the 603rd meeting (19 September), the rep­ pubr despite all the difficulties still caused by the action of resentative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, citing subversive elements with foreign support. the constructive contributions made by Viet-Nam, Laos publ and Cambodia to the United Nations and to the prin­ relat 160. The democratic constitution of the Kingdom of 16 Laos had been proclaimed on 11 May 1947 and the ciples of the Charter, said that those applicants had shown their desire to participate in and contribute to men treaty solemnizing its entry into the French Union as Unit a free sovereign and independent State had been signed the development of international co-operation. The United States would support each of those three appli­ did on 19' July 1949. It had been recognized by more than cations. neXl thirty States, was a member of most of the specialized 167. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET and agencies and undoubtedly met the requirements of lessll Article 4 of the Charter. SOCIALIST REPUBLICS said that, as early as 1940, the French ruling circles had concluded an agreement with appr 161. The Kingdom of Cambodia had had a consti­ the Japanese imperialists, giving them full control over (S/< tutional democratic regime since 6 March 1947. The Indo-China and affording them every opportunity to not caus 22 'e assembly institutions exploit the territory of Indo-China in the struggle ordinary measures were therefore being taken to in­ , territory. against the Chinese people. Long before the outbreak crease the authority of those puppet regimes, such as :e and sov­ of the war in the Pacific, France had thus renounced proposing their admission to membership in the United Ltes of the Indo-China. The answer of the people of Indo-China Nations. The French Command had been urged by 1949. That to that transfer from one colonizer to another had been the United States Secretary of State to establish a Iree States, a courageous, heroic struggle. The partisan army and puppet military force in Indo-China so as to use the diplomatic the democratic front for the independence of Viet-Nam tried and proven colonial method of pitting Viet-Namese a was fully had been established in 1941. The strength of the against Viet-Namese. It was not difficult to under­ movement had been such that the Japanese imperialists stand the attempt to have the Franco-American puppets had had to set up a "puppet" national State under their in Indo-China admitted to the United Nations when hree States control, headed by feudal and reactionary elements those facts were considered. The ruling circles in the 'end. Gov­ which had previously served the French colonizers. The United States intended to use them as a screen behind Id inspired territories liberated by the democratic front had been which United States forces could openly and publicly le develop­ officially combined into a single liberated area. In be sent to participate in the aggressive war against the ·Governing Hanoi, on 19 August 1945, authority had passed into people of Viet-Nam, using the same technique as had the French the hands of the National Liberation Committee, and been used against the Korean people. To admit those the admis- on 25 August, Bao Dai, the puppet both of the French puppets would be a national insult to the people of which the colonizers and of the Japanese, had been compelled Indo-China. The only State which could conceivably 's and with to renounce the throne and recognize the Provisional be considered for admission was the free and indepen­ lrinciple of Government of the Republic. The Democratic Republic dent Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Govern­ iVhich their of Viet-Nam had been proclaimed on 2 September 1945 ment of which had stated, in its application (S/2466) Union and and a Declaration of Independence had been adopted. on 29 December 1951, that it was the only legitimate them were The defeat and surrender of imperialistic Japan had Government of Viet-Nam. It had been acknowledged made it possible to establish the authority of the Repub­ as such by France under the treaty of 1946, which the rded Viet­ lican Government throughout Viet-Nam before the French Government now disavowed. for admis­ arrival of French and other foreign troops. In general 169. The representative of CHINA praised France ~ace-loving elections held on 6 January 1946, 92 per cent of the for having taken the step of restoring independence to l'y out the electorate of the Republic had taken part. On 8 Novem­ Indo-China, a step which was viewed by his Govern­ eir admis­ ber 1946, a democratic constitution had been introduced ment and people as part of the policy followed by the 5 undoubt- embodying the achievement of the Viet-Nam people's United States in restoring independence to the Philip­ struggle for liberation. The Viet-Nam people had taken pines, by the United Kingdom in restoring independence ~ANDS, re­ up the task of peaceful construction. British and Kuo­ to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, and by the he peoples mintang troops, however, had invaded Viet-Nam under Netherlands in restoring independence to Indonesia. War, said the pretext of disarming the Japanese, and after them Unfortunately, the new States of Viet-Nam, Laos and ninistering the French colonizers had returned and, with the help Cambodia faced difficulties. There was in Viet-Nam fficult and of British colonial troops, had begun a predatory colo­ a rebellion inspired and sustained by international com­ I adminis­ nial war to restore their suzerainty in Indo-China. munism. the purposes and interests of which it was rage local Without sufficient forces at their disposal, and meeting designed to serve. As those difficulties were removed, Ise nations with staunch resistance, the French authorities had the energy of the three new States would be devoted work had been obliged to begin a series of manoeuvres. On 6 m0re and more to peaceful development and they would isfied that March 1946, the French Government had signed a rely less on the friendly aid of France. In so far as led a full formal agreement with the Government of the Republic those difficulties were relevant to the debate, they : was con­ of Viet-Nam under which the Republic had been recog­ argued for the admission of the three States because dered that nized by France as a free State having its own Govern­ admission to membership in the United Nations would contribute ment, parliament, army and finances. France had also give them the moral encouragement and comfort de­ lart of the assumed the obligation not to allow the number of its served by any country or people struggling to be free. )wing sys- troops in Viet-Nam territory to exceed 15,000 and to 170. The President, speaking as representative of ensure that all French troops were withdrawn from BRAZIL. said that his delegation felt that there was no Viet-Nam territory by April 1951. The treaty had soon KINGDOM reason for delaying the admission of Viet-Nam, Laos am, Cam­ been crudely violated by the French, who had initiated a widespread colonial war by an attack which had en­ and Cambodia. By admitting them, the United Nations I. In their would express its appreciation for, and give its endorse­ abled them to seize several coastal towns, including tes should ment to, the successful effort made hy those Asian ibution to Hanoi. As the result of national resistance, however, 90 per cent of the territory of Viet-Nam had been under peoples towards a fuller participation, on an equal the control of the Government of the Democratic Re­ footing, in the normal, peaceful relations of the com- I, the rep­ munity of nations. . public at the beginning of 1952. The Democratic Re­ CA, citing public of Viet-Nam had established normal diplomatic Decision: At the 603rd meeting, on 19 September ram, Laos 1952, the French draft resolutions (S/2758, S/2759 the prin­ relations with a number of countries. 168. Despite all the efforts of the French Govern­ and S/2760) recommending respectively the admis­ cants had sion of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia were put to the tribute to ment, with the support of the ruling circles of the United States, the puppet regimes set up by the French vote. In'each case there were 10 votes in favour and 1 ion. The against (USSR). The draft 1'esolutions were not lree appli- did not enjoy the support of the people. In that con­ nexion, the USSR representative cited various French adopted, the negative vote in each case being that of a permanent member of the Council. IF SOVIET and United States Press reports concerning the hope­ 1940, the lessness of the situation in Indo-China. Indeed, in its 171. The representative of FRANCE considered that nent with application for membership in the United Nations there was no need for the Council to consider the USSR ltrol over (S/2756) Bao Dai's Viet-Nam admitted that it had draft resolution recommending the admission of a poli­ rtunity to not been able to set up representative assemblies be­ tical faction completely lacking all the qualifications cause of "circumstances beyond its control". Extra- and characteristics which made the difference between a government and a mere de facto Power. The parlia­ of the existence of the Democratic Republic of Viet­ ment of that so-called government had been appointed Nam, of its army, Government and parliament and, in 1945 in· conditions denounced at the time by all above all, of its people, neutral observers a.!ld had never subsequently exer­ 174. The representative of CHINA said that he would cised the smallest measure of control over public affairs. vote against the USSR draft resolution because the All those who before 1946 had dared to oppose that persons who had submitted the application contained so-called parliament had been arrested and had disap­ in document S/2446 had no right to make such an peared. What might remain of it represented only the application. Vietminh party, the sole party of a bogus State purged of all opposition. Furthermore, he considered that the Decision: At the 603rd meeting, on 19 September, Security Council's vote on the admission of the State the USSR draft resolution (S/2773) recommending of Viet-Nam constituted a moral sanction both of the the admission of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam existence of that State and of its right to represent the was ?'ejected by 10 votes to 1 (USSR). whole of the Viet-Nam nation in intemational matters. 175. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF The vote should exclude any possibility of considera­ AMERICA explained that he had voted against the draft tion of a draft resolution which, cloaked in non-justified resolution because the so-called Democratic RepUblic claims, called upon the Council to vote on the candidacy was not a State but simply a name given by Vietminh of Viet-Nam for a second time. to their armed rebellion against organized authority. 172. The representative of the UKITED KINGDOM 176. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET supported the position taken by the representative of SOCIALIST REPUBLICS stated that the United States of France. America was now bearing the main burden of the war 173. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET against the people of Viet-Nam. That was why the SOCIALIST REPUBLICS pointed out that the French Anglo-American bloc was voting against the admission Command reportedly kept 188,000 men in lndo-China. of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Moreover, the Viet-Nam Army Command had stated 177. At its 604th meeting (19 September) the that over 200,000 enemy soldiers had been killed during Council decided to submit a special report to the Gen­ the war of liberation against the foreign interventionists. eral Assembly (A/2208j1° on its disctlssion of the He asked how a non-existent State, army, Government question of the admission of new M embers, in accord­ and people could require the presence of such a number ance with resolution 506 (VI) of the General Assembly. of troops or how they could have killed so many. The It agreed that that report should state that the Council most convincing argument in support of the application had not dealt with the applications of the Republic of of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was the fact Korea (S/2452) and of the Democratic People's Repub­ that the French ruling circles, with the assistance of lic of Korea (S/2468). the United States of America, had waged an intensive armed struggle for over five years against the Demo­ 10 See Official Records of the Gelleral Assembly, Seventh cratic Republic and its people. That constituted a proof Sessioll, Alllle%es, agenda item 19. l\ f' ~ Chapter 3 I APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARlaiGENERAL

178. With a letter dated 10 November 1952 United Kingdom requested that a meeting of the Secur­ (Sj2846) Mr. Trygve Lie tr'J.nsmitted to the President ity Council should be summoned to consider the recom­ of the Security Council the text of a letter (A/2253) mendation which the Council should make to the which he had sent on the same day to the President General Assembly on this question. of the General Assembly. In his letter to the President 180. The Security Council considered the question of the General Assembly he recalled that, in a confiden­ at six private meetings held between 11 and 31 March tial conversation on 11 September, he had informed 1953. the President that he had decided to submit his resig­ 181. At the 612th meeting (11 March) the repre­ nation as Secretary-General of the United Nations.. It sentative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA proposed had been his intention to take that step at the openmg that the Council should recommend the appointment of the seventh session of the General Assembly. How­ of Brigadier General Carlos P. R6mulo as Secretary­ ever, he had delayed doing so until the arrival of the General. The representative of the UNION OF SOVIET Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the permanent mem­ SOCIALIST REPUBLICS proposed that the Council should bers of the Security Council, in the hope that agree­ recommend the appointment of Mr. Stanislaw Skrzes­ ment on the appointment of his successor would thereby zewski. The representative of DENMARK proposed be facilitated. He requested the President to propose that the Council should recommend the appointment of the inclusion of the following new item in the agenda Mr. Lester B. Pearson. of the seventh session of the General Assembly: "Ap­ pointment of the Secretary-General of the United Decisions: At the 613th meeting on 13 March 1953 Nations",u these three proposals were put to the vote by secret ballot, but none was adopted. The United States pro­ 179. In letters dated 6 and 7 March 1953 (S/2948 posal received 5 votes in favour and 2 against, with 4 and Sj2947) the representatives of France and the abstentions. The USSR propomi received 1 vote in favour and 3 against, with 7 abstentions. The Danish proposal received 9 votes in favour and 1 against (the 11 The General Assembly decided, at its 396th plenary meet­ ing held on 13 November 1952, to include the item in the agenda negative vote being that of a permanent member), with of its seventh session. . 1 abstention.

24 . epublic of Viet­ 182. The Council then requested the permanent 186. After further consultations between the per­ parliament and, members to hold consultations concerning the recom­ manent members, the discussion was continued at the mendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General 617th meeting (31 March) . The represer.tative of id that he would and to report to the Council by 3 p.m. on ':::'hursday FRANCE proposed that the Council should recommend ion because the 19 March. the appointment of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold as Secre­ :ation contained 183. At the 614th meeting (19 March) the repre­ tary-General. make such an sentative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REP"JB­ Decision: At the 617th rneeting the Council~ voting LICS proposed that the Council should recommend the by secret ballot, adopted the proposal of the representa­ t 19 September, appointment of Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit as Secre­ tive of France by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention. recommending tary-General. lie of Viet-Nam Decision: At the 614th meeting the USSR pro­ 187. In a letter dated 31 March (S/2975) the I posal was put to the vote by secret ballot and was not President of the Security Council informed the Pres­ [TED STATES OF adopted, 2 votes being cast in favour and 1 against, ident of the General Assembly of the Council's decision with 8 abstentions. recommending to the Assembly that Mr. Dag Ham­ Lgainst the draft 2 Icratic Republic 184. The Council requested the permanent members marskjold be appointed as Secretary-GeneraU en by Vietminh to continue their consultations and to report to the 1ized authority. Council by 3 p.m. on 24 March. 12 At its 423rd plenary meeting, on 7 April, the General As­ 185. The Council continued its consideration of the sembly adopted the Security Council's recommendation that ION OF SOVIET Mr. Dag Hammarskjold be appointed as Secretary-General. Jnited States of question at the 615th and 616th meetings (24 and 27 Mr. Dag Hammarskjold was installed as Secretary-General at rden of the war March). No nominations were made at those meetings. the 426th plenary meeting on .(\ April. t was why the ;t the admission 1. leptember) the art to the Gen­ "cussion of the ~£:rs, in accord­ fleral Assembly. hat the Cottncil ~he Republic of ":}eople's Repub- ssembly, Seventh

g of the Secur­ ider the recom­ make to the d the question and 31 March ch) the repre­ >RICA proposed .e appointment , as Secretary­ [ON OF SOVIET Council should nislaw Skrzes­ ARK proposed lppointment of

'3 March 1953 vote by secret ed States pro­ ~gainst, with 4 ued 1 vote in '. The Danish 1 against (the nember), with ...__i!illI!' ...--...... 1IO'.3""'·... -. M!i~ ;;;;1'7--Q---...1

PART ID The Military Staff Committee Matters brougl

Chapter 4 WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE C

A. The status of the work of the Military Staff gation, the A. Committee text of which is enclosed, be issued and Letter dated 2 included with the above-mentioned report of the Mili­ manent repre 188. The Military Staff Committee has been func­ tary Staff Committee. ident of the S tioning continuously under its draft rules of procedure (Signed) M. MARTINOV during the period under review. It held a total of 26 Colonel, 189. In a letter d meetings Soviet Army without making further progress on matters Acting Chief Military Representative addressed to the P of substance. of the USSR in the Military Staff the representative 0 Committee, tion to pronouncem U.N. Chief B. Letter dated of Staff of the 30 June 1953 from the Chairman Minister, on of the Military Staff STATEMENT MADE I;Y THE USSR DELEGATION 15 allC Committee addressed to AT THE taining threats again the Principal Director MEETING OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE, in charge of Political pendence of Israel. and Security Council Affairs UNITED N.\tIONS, ON 25 JUNE 1953, ON THE QUES­ I have the honour TION OF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE SAID to transmit herewith a copy of COMMITTEE the letter which was sent to me by the USSR delega­ B. Report tion in connexion with the drafting The Central People's Government of the of the annual report of the Chinese Supervision 0 on the work of the Military Staff Committee, which People's Republic had stated in the past that it does was the subject of not recognize cisions taken my covering letter of 30 June 1953. the right of the representatives of the missions· Kuomintang Group to represent durin (Signed) M. PENETTE China and to speak to 30 October in the name of the Chinese people. The Central People's General de Brigade, French Army Government of China had stated that it considered the 190. In a letter Chairman presence of Military the representatives of the Kuomintang and Add.l) the Chi, Staff Committee Group in the organs of the United Nations as illegal sion Organization St and demanded their exclusion from these organs. LETTER DATED 26 JUNE 1953 FROM THE ACTING CHIEF taken by the Mixe JIv~ILITAR.Y REPRESENTATIVE The USSR delegation in the Military Staff Com­ the period 1 N ove!n OF THE USSR IN THE mittee supports MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE this just demand of the Central People's report also .ex.amme ADDRESSED TO THE Government of China. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE discussed w1thm the At the same time the sions. namely, At the meeting USSR delegation states that the ' of the Military Staff Committee on it does not recognize the Commission, 25 June 1953, Kuomintang General as a the H during the discussion of the report on representative of China in Mixed the work of the Military Staff Com­ Armistice the Military Staff Committee (MS/704), mittee and considers his presence Mixed Armistice the USSR delegation in the Committee as C raised the question of the illegal. Mixed Armistice Co: Chinese representation in the Military Staff Committee The USSR delegation and made a statement on that question. states that only persons ap­ i pointed by the Central People's f·' Taking into account the importance of this Government of the question, Chinese People's Republic can represent C. Letter h I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to issue instructions China in the dated 2l r. Military Staff Committee as well as in the ister for I that the above-mentioned statement of the USSR dele- other organs Forei l, of the United Nations. the report of , Supervision 0

191. In a letter d the Minister for Fe to the Secretary-Ge upon the section of. with the Israel-Syn

D. Report concerJ in Jerusalem 192. In a cabled and Corr.!), the C vision Organization fire in Jerusalem 01

26 I!i Alii ... *N:. jE¥*...i· ..... db.MU • g._

PART 1'1 Matters brought to the attention of the Security Council but not discussed in the Council

Chapter 5 COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION

A. Letter dated 2 September 1952 from the per­ taken by the Truce Supervision Organization 111 that manent representative of Israel to the Pres· connexion. ident of the Security Council 189. In a letter dated 2 September 1952 (S/2762) E. Report on ~he results of the inspection held addressed to the President of the Security Council, in the demilitarized zone of Mount Scopus the representative of Israel drew the Council's atten­ 193. In a letter dated 14 May 1953 (S/3015) the tion to pronouncements made by Colonel Shishakly, Chief of Staff communicated to the Secretary-General Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army and Deputy Prime for transmission to the President of the Security Coun­ Minister, on 15 and 16 August .1952, allegedly con­ cil a report on the results of the inspection held in taining threats against the territorial integrity and inde­ the demilitarized zone of Mount Scopus on 28-30 April pendence of Israel. 1953.

B. Report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce F. Cablegram dated 8 June 1953 from the Chief Supervision Organization concerning the de­ of Staff addressed to the Secretary-General cisions taken by the Mixed Armistice Com­ transmitting a report on the Israel-Jordan Local missions during the period 1 November 1951 Commanders Agreement to 30 October 1952 194. In a cablegram dated 8 June 1953 (S/3030) 190. In a letter dated 30 October 1952 (S/2833 the Chief of Staff informed the Security Council that and Add.l) the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervi­ conversations between Israel and Jordan delegates to sion Organization submitted a report on the decisions the Mixed Armistice Commission had resulted in the taken by the Mixed Armistice Commissions during conclusion, on the same date, of an Israel-Jordan Local the period 1 November 1951 to 30 October 1952. The Commanders Agreement with a view to suppressing report also examined in some detail the complaints illegal crossing of the 'demarcation line. discussed within the four Mixed Armistice Commis­ sions. namely, the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel G. Cablegram dated 19 June 1953 from the Chief Mixed Armistice Commission. the Israel-Lebanon of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization Mixed Armistice Commission and the Israel-Syrian addressed to the Secretary-General Mixed Armistice Commission. 195. In a cablegram dated 19 June 1953 (S/3040) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization transmitted, C. Letter dated 28 February 1952 from the Min­ for the information of the Security Council, the text ister for Foreign Affairs of Syria concerning of a letter dated 16 June 1953 addressed to him by the the report of the Chief of StaB of the Truce Acting Director General of the Israel Ministry for Supervision Organization Foreign Affairs concerning the demilitarized area of Mount Scopus. 191. In a letter dated 28 February 1953 (S/2956) the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria submitted to the Secretary-General his Government's comments H. Cablegram dated 30 June 1953 from the Chief upon the section of the Chief of Staff's report dealing of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization with the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. addressed to the Secretary-General transmit­ ting a report for the Security Council D. Report concerning violation of the cease-fire 196. In a cablegram dated 30 June 1953 (S/3047) in Jerusalem Major-General Vagn Bennike, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, informed the Security 192. In a cabled report dated 8 May 1953 (S/3007 Council of an agreement made at a meeting iOn 29 and Corr.1), the Chief of Staff of the Truce Super­ June between the Senior Military Commanders of Israel vision Organization described violation of the cease­ and Jordan that both parties would take certain mea­ fire in Jerusalem on 22 and 23 April and the action sures to curb infiltration.

27 Chapter 6 COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION A REPOR NOTE: As indicated in the Council's annual report tions which had commenced on 10 July for the period 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951 between 1951 (A/1873), representatives of the opposing military commanders the item: "Complaint of aggression upon the of Republic in Korea, and which led to the signing, on 8 June 1953, of Korea" was removed from the agenda of the Bl Council of an agreement on the question of the exchange of on 31 January 1951,18 Communications relating to the prisoners re Korean of war. Communiques issued by the head­ question received between that date and 15 quarters of that of July 1952 Command also continued to be re­ were dealt with in the reports covering that ceived from the representative period (A/1873 and Aj2167). of the United States of America during the period under review. 197. During the period covered by the present re­ port, the representative of the United States of America 198. By a note dated 1 April 1953 (S/2979), the QUESTION OF continued to transmit to the Council reports delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics OF 1 on the to the course of action taken under the United Nations Com­ United Nations transmitted to the Council the mand, including information text of report No. 5 from the Commission of the on the armistice negotia- Central U Committee of the United Democratic National Front IS an See Official Records of the Getleral Assembly, Si.'rth Ses­ of Korea, charging the United States and Republic sion, Supplement No. 2, chapter of In 4, section E. Korea forces with perpetrating atrocities in Korea. ba th

Chapter 7 COMPLAINT OF FAILURE BY THE mANIAN GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY MEASURES INDICATED WITH PROVISIONAL BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE ANGLO·IRANIAN OIL COMPANY CASE G of 199. As indicated in the last annual report of the 200. On Security 19 August 1952 the Secretary-General com­ th Council (Aj2167), the Security Council de­ municated to the cided at members of the Security Council for the 565th meeting on 19 October 1951 to their information a adjourn debate copy of the judgment of the Inter­ on the agenda item "Complaint of fail­ national Court of J ustice,15 I ure by the Iranian given on 22 July 1952, in \ Government to comply with provi­ which the Court, sional by 9 votes to 5, found that it had no measures indicated by the International Court jurisdiction in the of Justice case (Sj2746). It was noted that in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case" the Court's Order of until the International 5 July 1951 indicating Provisional Court of Justice had ruled on Measures of Protection in the Anglo-Iranian G~ its own competence in the matter Oil Com­ of the proceedings pany case (S/2239) ceased to be operative upon delivery COl instituted in that Court on 26 May 1951 by the United of this judgment su': Kingdom and that the Provisional Measures of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in lapsed at the same time. ( connexion with the application of the Agreement of 1933 between the Imperial Government of Persia and 15 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (jurisdiction), Judgment the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd.14 of 22 July 1952: I.e.J. Reports 1952, page 43.

14 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 2, chapter 3, section D. APPOINl

fo Chapter 8 ad ca REPORT ON THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS ti B 201. By letter to the Secretary-General un dated 2 regulations as the United States Government might April 1953 (S/2978), the representative of the United prescribe. States of America notified the Security Council that, effective 2 April 1953, Bikini Atoll in the Trust Ter­ 202. On 17 April 1953, ritory of the Secretary-General trans­ the Pacific Islands was closed for security mitted to the Security Council reasons pursuant the report on the Trust to the provisions of the Trusteeship Territory of the Pacific Islands (S/2989) Agreement in order that the for the period United States Government from 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952 received might conduct necessary atomic experiments. from the 208. By letter Entrance representative of the United States of America to the into the closed area would be in accordance with such United Nations. Secretary-General, Guatemala describ Guatemalan revol hostility and a th affairs of the Re communication ha States and to the

28 Chapter 9 A REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH.UNITED STATES ZONE OF THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE :n 203. By letter dated 30 September 1952 (S/2794) addressed to the President :5 of the Security Council, the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great ), Britain and Nurthern Island and the United States of America transmitted a If report on the administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory l- of Trieste. The report covered the period from 1 January to 31 December 1951. :- Cllapter 10 e QUESTION OF AN APPEAL TO STATES TO ACCEDE TO AND RATIFY THE GENEVA PROTOCOL 5 OF 1925 FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF BACTERIAL WEAPONS e 204. In a note dated 1 October 1952 (S/2802) the representative of the .1 USSR requested the Secretariat to issue as a document of the Security Council t and to communicate to all delegations to the United Nations a "Report of the f International Scientific Commission for the investigation of the facts concerning bacterial warfare in Korea and China", which his delegation had received from the Secretariat of the World Peace Council.

Cllapter 11 REPO~T OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION 205. By a letter dated 13 October 1952 (S/2812), addressed to the Secretary­ General, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, pursuant to paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), transmitted to the Security Council the Commission's second report concerning its work.

Clwpter 12 REPORT OF THE COLLECTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE 206. In October 19$2 the Collective Measures Committee, established by General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) (section D) of 3 November 1950 and continued under General Assembly re.lolution 503 A (VI) of 12 January 1952, submitted its second report to the Security Council and the General Assembly (A/2215).16

16 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Sllpplement No. 17.

Cllapter 13 APPOINTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMISSION 207. By letter of 20 November (S/2858), the Secretary-General transmitted for the information of the Security Council the text of resolution 696 (VII) adopted by the General Assembly on 6 November 1952, reappointing for the calendar years 1953 and 1954 the same fourteen members of the Peace Observa­ tion Commission, established by General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) (section B) of 3 November 1950. The terms of reference of the Commission remained unchanged.

Cllapter 14 COMMUNICATION FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GUATEMALA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 208. By letter dated I April 1953, addressed to the 209. By letter dated 15 April (S/2988), the per- Secretary-General, the permanent representative of manent representative of Guatemala to the United Guatemala described a series of developments since the Nations requested that the above-mentioned communi- Guatemalan revolution of 1944 amounting to open hostility and a threat of intervention in the internal cation should be laid before the Security Council as affairs of the Republic of Guatemala. Copies of this a body at its next meeting so that high authority might communication have been transmitted to all Member take note of the developments described therein. States and to the members of the Security Council.

29 Ill.

Meelinll 592nd (private) 593rd APPENDICES (private)

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council 594th 595th Lcballon10 The following representatives and deputy, alternate 596th Dr. Charles Malik and acting representatives were accredited to the Secu- 597th rity Council during the period covered by the present Dr. Karim Azkoul report: M. Edward Rizk 598th ~ 599th 17 20 : Brasil N etherlallds 600th M. Joao Carlos Muniz Mr. D. J. von Balluseck 601st M. Alvaro Teixeira Soares Dr. J. M. A. H. Luns 602nd Chile Baron D. W. van Lynden . 603rd Sr. Hermin Santa Cruz Pakistan Sr. Rudecindo Ortega Masson 604th Senora Ana Figueroa Prof. Ahmed S. Bokhari Sr. Alfredo Lea Plaza Mr. M. Asad (until 31 October 1952) 605th Sr. Horacio Smlrez Mr. Syed Itaat Husain (until 17 June 1953) Sr. Gonzalo MonU Mr. A. H. B. Tyabji (until 31 October 1952) 606th Dr. V. A. Hamdani China Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang Turkey20 607th Dr. C. L. Hsia M. Selim Sarper Dr. Shuhsi Hsu M. Adil Derinsu Mr. Chiping H. C. Kiang Uniol~ of Soviet Socialist Republics Colombia18 IV. Dr. Evaristo Sourdis Mr. Yakov A. Malik Dr. Carlos Echeverri-Cortes Mr. Valeryan A. Zorin Sr. Eduardo Carrizosa Mr. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky Mr. Semen K. Tsarapkin Denmark18 Mr. William Borberg United Ki,tgdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Mr. Birger Dons Moller Sir Gladwyn Jebb France Mr. J. E. Coulson Mr. P. M. Crosthwaite M. Henri Hoppenot M. Francis Lacoste (until 22 April 1953) United States of America M. Charles Lucet (from 22 April 1953) Mr. Warren Austin M. Pierre Ordonneau R. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Greece Mr. Ernest A. Gross M. Alexis Kyrou Mr. John C. Ross M. Stavros G. Roussos Mr. James J. Wadsworta

17 Term of office ended on 31 December 1952. 10 Term of office began on 1 January 1953. 18 Term of office began on 1 January 1953. 20 Term of office ended on 31 December 1952.

H. Presidents of the Security CouncE The following representatives held the office of Presi- Greece dent of the Security Council during the period covered M. A. Kyrou (1 to 31 January 1953) by the present report: Lebanon United Kingdom of Great Britain and N orthem Ireland . Dr. Charles Malik (1 to 28 February 1953) Sir Gladwyn Jebb (16 to 31 July 1952) Pakistan United States of America Prof. Ahmed S. Bokhari (l to 31 March 1953) Mr. Warren R. Austin (l to 31 August 1952) ihtion of Soviet Socialist Repltblics Brazil Mr. A. Y. Vyshinsky (l to 30 April 1953) M. J. C. Muniz (1 to 30 September 1952) Chile United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Mr. H. Santa Cruz (l to 31 October 1952) Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1 to 31 May 1953) China United States of Amel"ica Dr. T. F. Tsiang (1 to 30 November 1952) Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1 to 30 June 1953) France Chile M. H. Hoppenot (l to 31 December 1952) Mr. R. Ortega Masson (l to 15 July 1953)

30 Ill. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1952 to 15 July 1953

ltfeeling Subject Date Meetillg Subject Date 592nd Report of the Security Council August 1952 December 1952 (private) to the General Assembly 19 608th The India-Pakistan question 8 593rd Report of the Security Council 609th The India-Pakistan question 16 (private) to the General Assembly 26 610th The India-Pakistan question 23 September 1952 mncil 594th Admission of new Members 2 611th The India-Pakistan question 23 595th Admission of new Members 3 612th Recommendation for the appoint- (private) ment of the Secretary-General March 1953 596th Admission of new Members 5 of the United Nations 11 Admission of new Members 8 597th 613th Recommendation for the appoint- 598th Admission of new Members 10 (private) ment of the Secretary-General 599th Admission of new Members 12 of the United Nations 13 600th Admission of new Members 16 614th Recommendation for the appoint- 601st Admission of new Members 17 (private) mcnt of the Secretary-Ge..Tleral 602nd Admission of new Members 18 of the United Nations 19 603rd Admission of new Members 19 615th Recommendation for the appoint- (private) ment of the Secretary-General Admission new Members 604th of 19 of the United Nations 24 October 1952 616th Recommendation for the appoint- 605th The India-Pakistan question 10 (private) ment of the Secretary-General November 1952 of the United Nations 27 606th The India-Pakistan question 6 617th Recommendation for the appoint- December 1952 (private) ment of the Secretary-General 607th The India-Pakistan question 5 of the United Nations 31

IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principa: Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

(16 July 1952 to 15 July 1953)

REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE

Delegation of China Period of Service Lt.-General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Air Force 19 June 1953 to present time Commodore Kao ]u-fon, Chinese :\"avy 16 July 1952 to present time Delegation of France General de brigade M. Penette, French Army 16 July 1952 to present time Commandant L. Le Gelard, French Air Force 16 July 1952 to 27 April 1953 Capitaine de fregate P. Mazoyer. French Navy 16 July 1952 to 10 September 1952 Capitaine de fregate M. Sanoner, French Navy 11 September 1952 to present time Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Major-General Ivan A. Skliarov, Soviet Army 16 July 1952 to present time Lt.-General A. R Sharapov, USSR Air Force 16 July 1952 to present time Delegation of the United Kingdom. of Great Britain. and N orthem Ireland Major General W. A. Dimoline, British Army 16 July 1952 to present time Group Captain A. M. Montagu-Smith, RA.F. 16 July 1952 to 17 June 1953 Air Vice Marshal J. D. Breakey, RA.F. 18 June 1953 to present time Commander R H. Graham, RN. 16 July 1952 to present time Delegation of the United States of America Lt.-General Willis D. Crittenberger, United States Army 16 July 1952 to 31 December 1952 Lt.-General W. A. Burress, United States Army 1 January 1953 to present time Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, United States Navy 16 July 1952 to present time Lt.-General H. R. Harmon. United States Air Force 16 July 1952 to 30 June 1953 Lt.-General L. W. Johnson, United States Air Force 1 July 1953 to present time CHAIRMEN AND PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES

Date Chairma.. Principal Secretary Delegatio" 1952 11~ly 186th 24- COlnmodore Kao Ju-fon, CN Major Shaw Ming-kao, CA China

A1191/,sl 187th 7l General de brigade M. Penette Commandant Georges Brochen France 188th 21 5 French Army French Army September 189th 4l Colonel M. G. Martinov Colonel P. T. Gituljar Union of Soviet 190th 185 Soviet Army Soviet Army Socialist Republics October 191st 2} Major General Vol. A. Dimoline Group Captain A. M. Montagu-Smith United Kingdom 192nd 16 British Army R.A.F. 193rd 30 November 194th 13} Lt.-General Willis D. Crittenberger Colonel C. E. Leydecker United States of 195th 26 USA USA America December 196th 11} Commodore Kao Ju-fon, CN Major Shaw Ming-kao, CA China 197th 23 Ja1l1Ulry 198th 8} General de brigade M. Penette Commandant Georges Brochen France 199th 22 French Army French Army Febr1ta.fY 200th 5} Colonel M. G. Martinov Colonel P. T. GituIjar Union of Soviet lOlst 19 Soviet Army Soviet Army Socialist Republics March 20Znd 5} Major General W. A. Dimoline, British Army Group Captain A. M. Montagu-Smith United Kingdom 203rd 19 Group Captain A. M. Montagu-Smith, R.A.F. R.A.F. April 204th 2} Lt.-General H. R. Harmon, USAF Colonel C. E. Leydecker, USA United States of 20Sth Vice Admiral A. D. Strub1e, USN America 206th 30 May 'Z07th 14} Commodore Kao J u-fon, CN Major Shaw Ming-kao, CA China Z08th 28

JWIC 209th 11 } General de brigade M. Penette Commandant Georges Brochen France 210th 25 French Army French Army Jldy 21lth 9 Colonel M. G. Martinov, Soviet Army Lt.-Colonel D. F. Poliakov Union of Soviet Sovie~ Army Socialist Republics r

32 NIT

SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS EN

ARGENTINA FRANCE PERU Editori.1 Sud.mericene SA. AI.ine soo. Edition. A. P.done, 13. rue soumot. Librerrll Intern.cion.1 del PerG, 5.11.• Bu.nos Aire•• Peri. V. Lim••nd Ar.quipo. ss AUSTRALIA GREECE PHILIPPINES H. A. Godderd. 255e Georg. St•• Sydney. "Erefth.roud.~is." PI.c. de I. Constitu· Alemer's Book Store, 749 Riz.t Av.nu•• BELGIUM tion, Ath~n.s. M.nir•. Agence .t M.ss.geri•• d. I. Press. S.A.• t'ORTU~AL 14-22 rue du P.rsil, Bruxell.s. GUATEMALA Goubaud & cr•• Ltd... 5•• Avenid••ur Livr.ria Rodrigues, IB6 Ruo Aureo.li.boo. W. H. Smith & Son. 71-75. boulev.rel 28. Gu.tem.I•• Adolph.-M.x. Brux.II••• SINGAPORE HAITI The City 800k Store. Ltd.. Wincnester BOLIVIA House, CoUyer Quoy. libr.rr. S.leccion.s, C••iII. 972, L. P.t. libr.irie "A le C.r.v.II.... Boite pod.l. Eighth III-B, Port-.u-Princ•• SWEDEN BRAZIL HONDURAS C. E. Fritze's Kungl. Hovboln.nd.1 A-B, LiVfttria Agir, R~a Mexico 98~B. Rio de Fr.dsgat.n 2, Stockholm. Jonoiro: Sao Peulo. Solo Horizont". librerra P.n.meric.n., C.U. del. Fu.nte. Tegudgalp•• SWITZERLAND CANADA Gen~ve. Ry.rson Pr.ss, 299 Qu.en St. W.st. INDIA .Libr.irie P.yot S.A.. Leus.nne, Toronto. Oxford Boo~ & St.tionery Co.. Scindill H.n5 R.unh.rdt, Kirchg.ss. 17. Zurich I. Periodic•• 4234 d. I. Roch •• Montr••1. House, New D.lhi. IInd 17 P.rk Stra.t. SYRIA C.lcutta. Librllirie Univef5e'Io. Dom.s. CEYLON P. Var.d.ch.ry & Co.. 8 Linghi Chetty Th. Assod.ted N.wsp.p.rs of Ceylon St.. M.dr•• I. THAILAND Ltd.. L.k. Hous., Colombo. Prllmulln Mit Ltd.; 55 Ch.haw.t Roed. INDONESIA W.t Tuk. B.ngkok. CHILE Jej"'Q Pemb.ngun.n. Gunung S.h.ri 84, librerr. Iv.ns, Moned. 822, S.nti.go. Dj.k.rt•• TURKEY Editori.1 del P.crfico, Ahum.d. 57, libr.irie H.chette. 469 ••tlkl.1 Codde'i. S.nti.go. IRAN Beyoglu. I.t.nbul. Ket.b-Kh.n.h D.ne.h, 293 SII.di Av.· CHINA nUB, Tehron. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA The World Book Co. Lld.. 99 Chung King Van Sch.ik's Bookstore (Pty.). Ltd.. Box Rood. 1st Section, Taipeh, Toiwon. IRA9 724. Pretoria. Commerci.1 Press, 211 Honon Rd.. Sh.ng­ M.denzie·s Boohhop, B.ghd.d. h.i. ISRAEL UNITED KINGDOM COLOMBIA Blumstein's Boohtore. Ltd., 35 AUanby H.M. St.tionery Office. P. O. Box 569. libr.rr. L.tin.. C.".r. 6•., 13.05.. Ro.d. Tel Aviv. London. S.E. I (IInd lit H.M.S.O: Shop.). Bogo16. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ubr.rr. Americ., Medellin. ITALY Int'1 Documents S.rvice, Columbia Ulliv. o Libr.rr. N.don.1 Lld•., B.".nquill•. Colibri S.A., Vi. M.rc.m 36, Mil.no. Press, 2960 Bro.dwIlY. New York 27, N. Y COSTA RICA LEBANON URUGUAY honour Tr.io. H.rm.nos. Ap.rt.do 1313. S.n Librairie Universelle, Beyrouth. Representad6n de Editorial.s, Prof. H. Jo.6. LIBERIA D'Elr., Av. 18 d. Julio 1333. Montevideo. session CUIA J. Momolu Komoro, Monrov;o. VENEZUELA Le C••• Belg., O'Reilly 455, L. H.b.n•• LUXEMBOURG Distribuidor. Escol.r S.A., Fe"enquln • CZECHOSLOVAKIA libr.irie J. Schumm.r. Lux.mbourg. Cruz de C.nder.ri. 178 C.r.c.s. Ce.kosloven.ky Spi.ov.tel. N6rodnr Trrd. 9. Pr.h. I. MEXICO YUGOSLAVIA Editori.1 Hermes 5.11.. Ign.cio M.- isc.1 Drzavno PreduzecB. JugosfovBns~o Knjigo. In DENMARK 41, Mexico, D.F. M.rs.l. Tit. 23-11, Beograd. Ein.r Munhgaard. Lld.. Nll"egade 6, Kpbenhavn, K. NETHERLANDS an expl N.V. M.rtinu. Nijhofl, L.ng. Voorhout 9, DOMINICAN REPUILIC 's·Grovenhage. Un;'.cI Nation. publicotions con 0110 lie Ubr.n. Dominic.n., Mercede. 49, Ciu· ab'ain.cI from 'he fallowing firms: d.d Truiillo. NEW ZEALAND United Notions Association of New' Zea­ AIlSTRIA ECUADOR r.nd, C.P.O. lOll, Wellington. 8. WijllerstorH, W.agplatz. 4. S.lzburg. Libr.rr. CienHfic., Guay.quil and Quito. Gerold & Co.. I. 6rllben 31, Wien. E(iYPT NORWAY Libreiria "La Renaissance d'Egypr8." 9 Joh.n Grundt T.num Forl.g, Kr. lIu. GERMANY Sh. Adly P.sha, Cairo. gustsgt. 7A, Oslo. Elwert & Meur.r. Houpt.tr.sse IDI. Berlin -Schoneberg. IL SALVADOR PAKISTAN W. E. Sa.rb.ch, Fr.n~enstrosse 14. Koln Manu.1 N.v.s y cr... le. Av.nid. sur 37, Thomas & Thom.s, Fort M.nsion, Frere -Junkersdorf. S.n Selv.dor. Road, K.r.chi~ 3. Alex. Horn, Spiegelg.sse 9. Wi••boden. Publishers United Ltd.. 176 Anark.Ii, IYHIOPlA L.hore. JAPAN Ag.nc. Ethiopienn. de Publicit6. Box 128. Meruzen Compeny, Ltd., 6 Tori·Nicnome Addis Abeb•. PANAMA Nihonb.shi, Tokyo. Jose Menendez, PI.t. de Ar.ngo. P.n.m6. 'INLAND SPAIN Aht...minen Kirj.~.uppe. 2. Kes~u.~atu, PARAGUAY Librerlll Bosch. iI Rondll Universicllld, H.lsin.;' Moreno Hermono., ....~unci6n. B.rcelonll. (53EII

Orden and Inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Circulation Section, Uniled Nations. New York, U.S.A; or Sales Section. United Nations Office. Palais del Nations, Genwa. Switzerland.

Printed in U.S.A. Price: $U.S. 0.30; 2/-stg.; Sw. fr. 1.20 22925--August 1953--2800 (or equivalent in other currencies)