The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy: Revolutionary Enough?

Ria Putri Santoso President University, Indonesia Anak Agung Banyu Perwita President University, Indonesia

Abstract

The security environment in East Asia has continuously evolved, particularly concerning China’s maritime expansion and North Korea’s provocative behavior. Japan, with its military that is being limited by its pacifist Constitution, has been steadily shifting its defense policy to respond to its strategic environment for its past three Prime Ministers: Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko Noda, and Shinzo Abe. Historical enmities, military capability, as well as territorial disputes have increased the threats from Japan’s neighbors to Tokyo’s national security. Since 2010, Japan has established a National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), shifted its defense strategy from the Basic Defense Force (kibanteki boei ryoko) to Dynamic Defense Force (doeki boei ryoko), revised its Three Principles on Arms Exports, created the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the Medium Term Defense Program (MDTP), as well as reinterpreted the Article 9 of its pacifist Constitution. While the NSC, NSS, MDTP, and Article 9 are conducted under the Abe administration, the claim that the steps Abe has undertaken to be revolutionary is misleading, as they are in fact a continuity from his predecessors despite coming from opposing political backgrounds. Despite of several significant changes in its defense policy, Japan still abides to its Constitution and its military is still limited.

Key words: Shinzo Abe, defense policy, Japan, defense force, military

Introduction has a lot to consider in its strategic environment. Located in the easternmost of East Asia, Japan is bordered by seas with other As of recent years, Japan seems to East Asian nations. On its western coasts, have been making bold moves in regards the Sea of Japan lies among North Korea, to its military and the constitution. The South Korea, and Japan. Furthermore, cabinet’s approval for a reinterpretation of China lies next to Japan’s southwestern its Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in most islands, separated by the East China order to help defend foreign countries Sea. With historical enmities with several under the notion of self-defense has now of Japan’s East Asian neighbors and given way for JSDF to fight overseas with territorial disputes, combined with its allies when they are under attack China’s maritime expansion, and North (Withitwinyuchon, 2016). The step has Korea’s missile and nuclear threats, Japan been met with criticism from its neighbor, China, whom believes that Tokyo has

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2016), pp. 156-177 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.1906.g1747 ©2016 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic Journal of ASEAN Studies 157 endangered the peace in the region (BBC paper elaborates the Japanese defense News, 2015). While it may seem bold, the policy under three different steps taken by Tokyo, however, are administrations: Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko derived from Japan’s security threats from Noda, and Shinzo Abe. its strategic environment that needs to be addressed to achieve its national security. Threat Perception of Japan

This article discusses the shift and As one of the nations located in continuity of Japanese foreign policy East Asia, Japan’s wellbeing is affected by related to the changes of its strategic the region’s strategic importance. Japan’s environment. Most often, the defense geographical location is surrounded by policies of states in a particular region are the seas (Figure 1), ensuring that maritime influenced by the geopolitics of the region. security is of critical importance to Japan. The purpose of this is to achieve the best ‚Japan is surrounded by the sea, and possible strategic environment so that has a long coastline, numerous remote national interests and ultimately national islands and a vast Exclusive Economic security will be attained. The significant Zone (EEZ). Japan is a maritime state interest of superpowers in a particular and dependent largely on region has altered the significance of that international trade for its supply of region’s geopolitics not only regionally, food and natural resources.‛ (Japan’s but also internationally. In particular, this 2014 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG))

Figure 1. Map of Japan

In its 2015 Defense White Paper Guideline (NDPG), Japan has identified and its 2014 National Defense Program itself as a maritime nation that depends on 158 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy sea transport to import resources such as Barry Buzan’s, Robert O. Tilman’s, and energy and hence achieving secure sea Janice Gross Stein’s elements of threats lanes as much more vital for Japan’s (structural, geopolitical, socio-cultural, survival (Ministry of Defense, Japan, economic, and historical), as well as Ole 2015). In fact, Japan’s focus on its Elgström’s level of threats assessment maritime capability goes as far back as its (specific/diffuse, immediate/remote, 2005 NDPG, where it has emphasized the probability/severe). The threat dimension need for maritime perimeter and can be specific to an issue or diffused. It strengthening its capability to deter can also be an immediate threat to the threats away from its shores (Ministry of national security or a remote one that is Defense, Japan, 2004). not as threatening. Last but not least, a threat dimension may be in the short-term ‚In considering Japan’s security, we (probability) or in the long-term (severe). have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited As shown in Table 1, North Korea strategic depth; long coast lines and poses a structural threat that is specific, numerous small islands; and a large immediate, and can be both in a number of important facilities in probability (long-term) and severe (short- coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan’s term) under the Kim Jong-un regime to geological and climatic conditions, Japan. The geopolitical system in East and the security of sea lines of Asia, where North Korea is an ally of communication which are another source of Japan’s threats, China, is indispensable to the country’s the same as its structural dimension: prosperity and growth.‛ (Japan’s 2004 specific, immediate, and can be both in the NDPG) long and short-term. China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner, as well as The authors use various literatures its main source of food, arms, and energy to analyze the level of threats and how it (Albert and Xu, 2016). Moreover, as the affects Japan’s strategic environment. most secluded country in the world Particularly, both North Korea and China (Davis and Jared Feldschreiber, 2013), who pose significantly more dangerous North Korean people are highly threats to Japan as compared to other homogenous and are subjected to long states in the region, bearing in mind their years of propaganda from their proximity. government (Uria, 2016). However, both ‚The fact that North Korea is carrying the historical and economic dimensions out nuclear testing and strengthening are more to a diffused, remote, and in the its ballistic missile capabilities is a long-term aspect of threat perception by significant threat to the safety of Japan. Japan and North Korea have not Japan.‛ (Japan’s 2010 Defense White had any direct war, and North Korea’s Paper) economy is not large enough to threaten The analysis on North Korea and Japan’s economy, considered be as one of China as threats perceived by Japan is the world’s worst economy especially based on the analysis of several authors. since its great North Korean famine in the The authors base it on a combination of 1990s (Eberstadt, 2016).

Journal of ASEAN Studies 159

Table 1. North Korea as a Threat to Japan

Structural Geopolitical Historical Socio-cultural Economic Dimension System Dimension Dimension Dimension Specific    Diffuse   Immediate    Remote   Probability      Severe   

‚China is increasing its activities in China Sea activities and its South China waters close to Japan. The lack of Sea ones (Dingli et al., 2016). Table 2 transparency of its national defense below shows that in terms of geopolitical policies, and the military activities are system, historical, and social-cultural a matter of concern for the region and dimension, China is a perceived threat to the international community, Japan that is specific, immediate, and both including Japan, and need to be carefully analyzed.‛ Japan’s 2010 probable and severe. This is so as China’s Defense White Paper proximity is very near to Japan, while its size is enormous. The historical enmity China also poses a threat to Japan’s has shown considerably the bad blood national security, whose structural between the two nations. The threat of dimension is specific, immediate, and Beijing is exemplified with the rapid both probable and severe. China’s regime economic rise of the state (Ministry of under Xi Jinping has been more assertive, Defense, Japan, 2015), and has also especially in its maritime expansion become a specific, immediate, and both (Matsuda, 2014) and has increased more long-term and short-term. pressures to Japan both through its East

Tabel 2. Japan's Threat Perception to China

Structural Geopolitical Historical Socio-cultural Economic Dimension System Dimension Dimension Dimension Specific      Diffuse Immediate      Remote Probability      Severe     

As such, bearing in mind that utmost importance to preserve Tokyo’s Japan is surrounded by seas, and its position and stability. Identifying itself as location in East Asia is in proximity to a maritime nation (Ministry of Defense, both North Korea and China that are seen Japan, 2015), its maritime and naval as threats to its national security as prowess is at the front of its focus, mentioned in Japan’s 2014 and 2015 especially considering China’s expansion Defense White Papers respectively, the of its open seas activities. strategic environment of Japan is of the 160 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

The vulnerabilities of Japan’s Weapon Defense Unit, and the Special security, combined with threats perceived Operation Group (Ministry of Defense, from its East Asian neighbors, have Japan, 2015). contributed to the need to reassess Japan’s defense strategy and doctrine. The MSDF consists of the Self- Defense Fleet with several main units Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF): An such as the Fleet Air Force, the Fleet Overview Escort Force, and the Fleet Submarine Force. They are responsible in defensing Japan’s military force is a the sea areas surrounding Japan through conundrum; despite of its status as the its mobile operations (Ministry of Defense, military of the state, it relinquishes its Japan, 2015). The MSDF also has regional right to wage wars and the use of force or district forces that mainly protect their threat of force in ‘settling international territories as well as support the Self- disputes’ as means since the end of World Defense Fleet. War II which then puts Japan’s military as ‘abnormal’ in statehood (Hagstro m and Meanwhile, the ASDF has the Air Gustafsson, 2015), despite of the reform of Defense Command consisting of three air Article 9 that now enables Tokyo to assist defense forces as well as a Southwestern of its allies under attack (Fackler & Composite Air Division. They are tasked Sanger, 2014). As such, its military force for general air defense tasks (Ministry of focused on self-defense and is known as Defense, Japan, 2015). The ASDF also has Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). its Air Defense Force made of several key units such as air wings, Air Defense Established after World War II Missile Groups, and the Aircraft Control (Gady, 2015), and despite of its heavy and Warning Wing. limitation, the JSDF is the world’s sixth best-equipped troops (Fitzpatrick, 2013). Japan under the Democratic The JSDF is comprised of its Ground Self- Party of Japan (2010-2012) Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self- Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self- The two Prime Ministers prior to Defense Force (ASDF). Their operations Shinzo Abe were from the Democratic are not limited to each branch specialty, Party of Japan (DPJ), and were the but rather can also be done in joint precursors to Japan’s military reforms. operations (Ministry of Defense, Japan, With mounting tensions and a 2015), which will be explained further in deteriorating security environment in the Section …. East China Sea, the then Prime Minister of Japan, Naoto Kan, and his administration The GSDF is comprised of multiple released a new defense guideline called divisions and brigades, directly controlled the National Defense Program Guidelines units with five regional Armies in charge (NDPG) (Berkofsky, 2012). His successor, of the defense of their respective regions. Yoshihiko Noda, further expanded the Its divisions and brigades are made of reform by approving the Three Principles combat and logistic support units. It also on Arms Exports. has its Central Readiness Force consisting of helicopter and airborne brigades, the The DPJ is the leading opposition Central Readiness Regiment, the Central of Japan’s current Prime Minister Shinzo Nuclear, Biological, Or Chemical (NBC) Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party Journal of ASEAN Studies 161 of Japan (LDP) (Liff, 2015). However, the defense posture trend that predated Abe’s course of actions done by the two Prime return as the prime minister in 2012 was Ministers from the DPJ prior to Abe’s centered on reforms of security-related administration was reflective of the institutions, and steady expansion of the increasingly important need for Japan to geographical and substantive scope of the defend itself from the changing strategic JSDF’s operations (Liff, 2015). The DPJ environment. In particular, the need came initiated Japan’s most significant reforms from North Korea’s ballistic missiles and that continue until Abe’s administration nuclear threat, as well as China’s maritime today. ambitions and expansions. In fact, Japan’s

Figure 2. Timeline of Japan's Prime Ministers from 2010 to Present

Naoto Kan (DPJ) Yoshihiko Noda Shinzo Abe (DPJ) (LDP)

•January 2010 - •September 2011 •December 2012 September 2011 - December - present 2012

2010 National Defense Program southern islands to address its security Guidelines – Naoto Kan challenges: North Korea’s destabilizing influence and China’s maritime ambitions The 2010 National Defense and expansion. Program Guideline (NDPG) was adopted by Tokyo in December 2010 under the ‚China is stepping up and expanding Naoto Kan’s administration. It outlines maritime activities in the region’s Japan’s ten-year defense strategy to surrounding waters, and these restructure and relocate Japan’s armed activities, coupled with the lack of transparency shrouding China’s forces (Berkofsky, 2012) and has mapped military and security aims are of out a significant changes in the Japanese concern to the regional and global defense policy, decision-making process, community.‛ (Japan’s 2010 NDPG) and force structure (Fouse, 2011). The 2010 NDPG is the fourth Defense Program Seeing China as a threat, the 2010 Guidelines in the postwar era after the NDPG also outlines the relocation of JSDF first three released in 1976, 1995, and 2004 troops and defense capabilities from north (Fouse, 2011). of Japan to its south, which includes its southern island chains closest to China In particular, the 2010 NDPG and Taiwan (Berkofsky, 2012). focuses on increasing the capability of JDSF and equipping them to be able to At the same time, the NDPG react to any crisis situations going past the highlights Japan’s conceptual shift of its defense of Japanese territory on the defense strategy from its Basic Defense Japanese mainland, and developing Force (kibanteki boei ryoko) that was in Japan’s intelligence, surveillance, and place prior to the 2010 NDPG to Dynamic reconnaissance (ISR) prowess in its Defense Force (doeki boei ryoko) (Fouse, 162 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

2011). The shift to Dynamic Defense Force there is an exceptional reason to do so that is highly mobile (Liff, 2015) enabled (Wallace, 2012). The only exception to this Japan to react accordingly to its perceived was the United States (U.S.), or ‘individual security needs, instead of just maintaining exemptions’ particularly during the Cold its minimum defense capacity. Moreover, War period in 1983. Another exception to highlight Japan’s focus on the was the 2004 Ballistic Missile Defense maritime/navy, it substantially reduced (BMD) weapons and non-BMD weapons the amount of tanks and heavy artillery produced by co-development and co- and increased its number of submarines production between the two states that and Aegis destroyers (Fouse, 2011). could be exported to the U.S.

Three Principles on Arms Exports – Although several exceptions have Yoshihiko Noda been done in the past, however, the new Three Principles on Arms Exports has After three months in office, Prime now ‘institutionalize*d]’ arms exports in a Minister Yoshihiko Noda lifted a forty- comprehensive manner (Dawson, 2011). year self-imposed ban on Japan’s weapon Even though the ban has long been shipments that barred Japanese arms considered to be reinterpreted even before manufacturers from joint development Noda’s term in office, the move has not and export of military technology been green-lit until under his (Dawson, 2011) by relaxing its Three administration. Principles on Arms Exports. The move aimed to reduce costs for developing and The Three Principles on Arms manufacturing advanced technology such Exports has been reinterpreted under as jet fighters and ballistic-missile defense. Yoshihiko Noda’s administration to The Three Principles on Arms Exports facilitate more collaboration in developing were to abstain from arms exports and and producing weapons for international was mapped out in three principles to trade under the notion of humanitarian prevent exporting to 1) communist and peaceful purposes (Reuters, 2014). At nations, 2) countries subject to a United the same, it also enabled Japan to achieve Nations (UN) resolution or arms embargo, an indigenous production and and 3) countries involved in armed procurement of its military that is state-of- conflict or in the midst of entering armed the-art and avoided being too costly to conflict (Wallace, 2012), and to further strain Japan’s defense budget, especially strengthen Japan’s image of a pacifist state with Japan’s fiscal conditions (Ministry of (Dawson, 2011) prior to the decision to lift Defense, Japan, 2004). The 2011 easing of the ban. the arms exports law allowed Japan to also take part in joint development The reinterpretation of the Three projects on arms, as well as supplying Principles on Arms Exports ensured a equipment for humanitarian purposes more lenient approach as compared of the (Harlan, 2011). version prior to this revision that is reminiscent of the 1967 one. In order to Japan under the Liberal Democratic reassert Japan’s pacifist sentiment Party of Japan (2012-present) domestically and internationally, it further limited the 1967 Principles on Arms Shinzo Abe, as part of the LDP, Exports in 1976 to include all types of was elected for the second time on military technology to all countries unless December 2012 as Japan’s prime minister Journal of ASEAN Studies 163 and has since then built on and As such, there is a continuity from accelerated Japan’s defense reforms (Liff, Abe’s two DPJ predecessors that has now 2015). Within a year of his administration, become the foundation to his Abe started three major pillars of the administration’s defense policy. However, current Japanese security policy: Japan’s at the same time, Abe’s establishment of first-ever National Security Council new institutions such as the NSC and NSS (NSC), far-reaching National Security as well as the recent reinterpretation of Strategy (NSS), and the revised NDPG. Japan’s military law are bold steps that Although the steps Abe has undertaken reflect Japan’s steps towards military seems to be revolutionary – from pacifist- normalization process (Spitzer, 2016). centered ideology to proactive pacifism – Japan’s declaration as a maritime state what he has done are based upon his two (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015) and the DPJ predecessors, Naoto Kan and rapid expansion and advancement of Yoshihiko Noda’s acceleration of Japan’s China’s high seas operations further defense policy reforms. Moreover, the accentuate Tokyo’s direction on its security threats faced by his predecessors defense policy that is centered on its have not dwindled, but rather, elevated to maritime and naval operations through its a new level. ‘The Gray Zone’ ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ contingencies initially mentioned in (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2014). Japan’s 2010 NDPG are situations that are not peacetime but which remain below the National Security Strategy (NSS) threshold of armed attack. This term has The NSS was the first for Japan in become pivotal to major documents under terms of policy concerning national Abe’s administration (Liff, 2015). security focusing on foreign affairs and ‚There are ongoing regional conflicts defense policy. It outlines which involving various countries as well as approaches Japan should take according an increase in the number of so-called to the long-term outlook of its national ‚gray-zone‛ situation, that is, neither interests. The NSS replaced the ‘Basic pure peacetime nor contingencies over Policy on National Defense’ that Japan territory, sovereignty and maritime used as a foundation for its defense policy economic interests. prior. In turn, the NSS was used as the ‚… North Korea has also repeatedly basis for the NDPG and both are designed heightened tension in the region by for the next decade. The NDPG was conducting military provocations in devised for a medium to long-term the Korean Peninsula and by outlook and the Medium Term Defense escalating its provocative rhetoric and Program (MDTP) highlights the budget behavior against Japan and other limit and the total of defense equipment countries. acquisition in the next five-year period to ‚… China is rapidly expanding and accomplish the defense posture and intensifying its activities in the capability as has outlined in the NDPG. maritime and aerial domains in the Japan’s NSC along with other basic region including the East China Sea and the South China Sea… and has foreign and defense policies regarding intruded into Japanese territorial Japan’s national security create the NDPG. waters frequently and violated Japan’s The NSC was established on November airspace…‛ (Japan’s 2014 NDPG) 2013 based on the ‘Act of Partial Revision of the Establishment of the Security 164 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

Council.’ The NSS, NDPG, and MTDP based on relevant situations, as outlined then become the foundation to determine in Figure 3. Japan’s annual budget and appropriate it

Figure 3. Relations Among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Annual Budget

Japan’s NSS is constructed on the  ‚To maintain its sovereignty principle of ‘Proactive Contribution to and independence; to defend Peace based on the Principle of its territorial integrity, to International Cooperation’ as its base, ensure the safety of life, person outlined in the 2015 Defense White Paper, and properties of its nationals, in which Tokyo reasserts itself as a major and to ensure its survival while player in international politics and as a maintaining its own peace and peace-loving nation to seek of its own security grounded in freedom security and peace and security in the and democracy and preserving Asia-Pacific region. Japan also believes its rich culture and tradition; itself as ‘a proactive contributor to peace’  To achieve the prosperity of through the basic principle of Japan and its nationals through international cooperation, and thus will economic development, provide ‚more than ever before to peace, thereby consolidating its peace security and prosperity of the and security; and international community‛ (Ministry of  To maintain and protect Defense, Japan, 2014). international order based on rules and universal values, The NSS is also based on Japan’s such as freedom, democracy, national security objectives and national respect for human rights, and interests. In particular, Japan clearly states the rule of law.‛ its national interests in the 2015 Defense White Paper (Ministry of Defense, Japan, Furthermore, Japan also highlights 2015) as follow: its national security objectives to achieve Journal of ASEAN Studies 165 its national interests (Ministry of Defense, 4. Proactive Contribution to Global Japan, 2015) as follow: Efforts for Peace and Stability of the Global Stage,

 ‚Strengthen the deterrence 5. Increasing Collaboration necessary for maintaining According to the Universal Values Japan’s peace and security and to Settle International Issues, for ensuring its survival, thus 6. Consolidation of the Domestic deterring threats from directly Basis that Provisions National reaching Japan, and defeating Security and Endorsing Domestic such threats and minimizing and International Understanding damage if by chance such threats should reach Japan. Japan acknowledges the  Improve the security importance of the security environment environment of the Asia-Pacific surrounding Japan as its national security region and prevent the challenge. With the U.S.’s focus shifting emergence of and reduce direct on the Asia-Pacific region, the balance of threats to Japan, through power is also altered. Nation-states strengthening the Japan, U.S. possessing large-scale military force and Alliance, enhancing the trust in possession of nuclear weapons, such as and cooperative relationships China and North Korea, are considered as between Japan and its partners challenges to Japan’s national security. within and outside the Asia Japan’s 2015 Defense White Paper further Pacific region, and promoting mentions on the ‘gray-zone’ situations practical security cooperation. with North Korea and China.  Improve the global security environment and build a Japan’s National Defense Program peaceful, stable and Guidelines prosperous international Similar with the 2010 NDPG under community by strengthening Naoto Kan, Shinzo Abe’s administration the international order based emphasizes and expands upon ‘the on universal values and rules, Dynamic Joint Defense Force’ as the center and by playing a leading role for Japan’s peace and security. Focusing in the settlement of disputes.‛ on ISR activities, as well as improving Tokyo has also outlined its NSS Japan’s deterrence and response into six main points (Ministry of Defense, capability, Tokyo pursues more on joint Japan, 2015) as follow: operations, improving its equipment and hire in handling activities, and developing 1. Solidification and Expanding defense proficiencies in terms of its Japan’s Capabilities and Positions, quality and quantity (Ministry of Defense, 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Japan, 2015). Alliance, 3. Reinforcement of Diplomacy and Compared to its predecessor, the Security Collaboration with 2013 NDPG has increased its authorized Japan’s Allies for Peace and number of personnel from 154,000 in 2010 Stability in the Global Stage, to 159,000, active duty personnel from 147,000 in 2010 to 151,000, and reserve- 166 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy ready personnel from 7,000 to 8,000 capability of North Korea, Japan (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015). specifically mentions its commitment to enhance its readiness, sustainable The 2013 NDPG under Abe’s response, and simultaneous engagement administration emphasizes on the security capability (Ministry of Defense, Japan, environment challenges, paying particular 2015). focus on North Korea and China. At the same time, it also reinforces Japan’s status Although putting the term as a maritime state, especially considering ‘maritime supremacy’ in its 2015 Defense its geographical characteristics and belief White Paper, Japan uses a combination of that it needs to address several issues both maritime and naval forces to defend concerning security challenges and its surrounding focus. As maritime and destabilizing ones that are more naval supremacy is one of Tokyo’s focus prominent and severe through reinforcing in 2013 NDPG (Ministry of Defense, its defense architecture, and also Japan, 2015), the MSDF also undergoes promoting bilateral and multilateral significant changes in terms of its quality security cooperation with other countries. and quantity. The MSDF will have an As its long-time ally, the U.S. is viewed as increased number of destroyers to 54 new vital to Japan’s security (Ministry of destroyers that have the capability to Defense, Japan, 2015), especially when detect submarines and minesweeping needing further deterrence from the U.S. underwater vehicles (Ministry of Defense, when it comes to nuclear weapons threats. Japan, 2015) (Figure 4) to enhance Japan’s response capabilities in patrols and to In responding to Japan’s security defending Japan’s surrounding waters. environment challenges, it believes the Moreover, the MSDF architecture is also role of is the JSDF is vital to deter and enhanced to be able to increase its response to various situation (Ministry of capability in information gathering as well Defense, Japan, 2015). An emphasis on the as surveillance and warning activities. As sea and airspace surrounding Japan is of such, Japan has increased another Escort the utmost importance, followed by Division in its Omura based in the responding to attacks on remote islands, southwestern territory of Japan – close to as well as ballistic missile ones, as China and North Korea. The majority of outlined in Japan’s 2015 Defense White the MSDF are also concentrated in the Paper. The emphasis on the seas south of Japan such as in Kure, surrounding Japan calls for a maritime Komatsushima, Omura, Sasebo, Kanoha, supremacy as well as air superiority. and Naha. Moreover, to respond to ballistic missile

Journal of ASEAN Studies 167

Figure 4. Japan's New Destroyer and Plans to Increase in 10 Years

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015

Japan also emphasizes its joint establishment of a new 13th squadron and operations as part of the Dynamic Joint the increased number of squadron stations Defense Force and plans to move its ASDF in Naha to two are also located at south of fighter aircraft units, air warning and Japan. One squadron is added to each air control units, as well as air warning and control units as well as air refueling/transport units deployment refueling/transport units (Ministry of from the northern part of Japan to its Defense, Japan, 2015). southwestern territory (Figure 3). The

Figure 5. Changes in Major Units of the ASDF

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 168 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

Medium-Term Defense Program devised to better defend Japan’s territorial waters and its surrounding seas as part of Created based on the NDPG, the its Dynamic Joint Defense Force against MTDP is comprised of six programs to incoming security threats, particularly achieve the targeted number of defense from Japan’s neighbors. The new coast buildup. The programs are in line with the observation unit in Yonaguni and area aforementioned NDPG (Ministry of security unit under the GSDF, as well as Defense, Japan, 2015) as follow: its ‘Amphibious Rapid Deployment 1. Emphasize on ISR, intelligence Brigade’ (Ministry of Defense, Japan, capabilities, response to ballistic 2015), are part of Japan’s strategy to missile attacks, and attacks on defend its territory from incoming attacks remote islands; that is largely defensive in nature.

2. Prioritize development of Revised ‘Three Principles on Arms capabilities to achieve maritime Exports’ and air supremacy, rapid deployment, preparations for Following the move by his invasions; predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, Shinzo 3. Efficiently secure defense Abe’s government further relaxed the proficiencies in quality and ‘Three Principles of Arms Exports’ on quantity; March 2014 and renamed it as ‘Three 4. Endorse processes to restructuring Principles on Defense Equipment its personnel management system; Transfers.’ The new rules allow for 5. Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance transferring defense-related equipment to to achieve greater deterrence and foreign governments and to international response capabilities; institutions as long as it is to ‘contribute to 6. Obtain greater efficiencies and peace and be helpful for the active streamline the defense forces’ promotion of international cooperation’ buildup. and ‘Japan’s national security’ (Takashi, 2014). The MTDP, most importantly, highlights the reorganization of JSDF Despite the revision under Abe’s units, with the GSDF having the largest administration, however, the re-entry of reform since its establishment. To be able Japan into the international arms market to achieve better cooperation in its joint still faces several setbacks. Its joint arms operations amongst units, the GSDF development plan with Turkey in 2014 established a Ground Central Command failed just three months after the revision (GCC) and a coast observation unit and under Abe due to concerns of usage of area security units to better respond to Japanese arms to conflict-ridden states. At any attacks on Japan’s remote islands, the same time, domestically, the new particularly in its southwest region Three Principles on Arms Exports also (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015). face scrutiny and criticisms (Knowler, 2016) in light of its failed deals. Successful The plan of relocation of the GSDF submarine deal with Australia would since 2010 from northern part of Japan to have strengthened Abe’s bid for Japan’s its southern and southwestern territory is new proactive pacifism, that is, to also Journal of ASEAN Studies 169 establish or expand Japan’s military also indirectly threaten Japan’s survival industry technological coordination and (Figure 6 and 7). The scope is no longer integration with its allies (Harner, 2014). limited to only an attack on Japan and the Yet, the deal failed, and the failure was United States, but also other Japanese credited to the lack of apt strategy by the allies (Figure 7). government (Knowler, 2016) and the industry that signifies Japan still has more The reinterpretation of the to tackle before it is able to enter the Japanese pacifist Constitution, especially international arms market as a fully- in terms of the allowance of its military to fledged player (Sentaku Magazine, 2016). now conduct overseas operation under the self-defense term, seems to imply Japan’s Overseas Military Operations Japan’s plan to extend its defense to the nearby South China Sea, if there is an The Japanese military currently escalation of conflict. More is at stake functions as a self-defense force to Japan when it involves the Spratly Islands, and is unable to conduct campaigns especially when one of the key threats overseas outside of the notion of self- perceived by Japan, China, is heavily defense according to its constitution. involved in the South China Sea dispute However, Japan’s reinterpretation of its (Dingli et al., 2016) where it is the gateway pacifist Constitution is reflective of a more to the East Asian region. offensive move of a defensive purpose. Military Modernization Japan reinterpreted its pacifist Constitution, allowing the JSDF to combat In lieu of Japan’s military focus on foreign soil for the first time since its change from its Basic Defense Force pacifist Constitution was established after (kibanteki boei ryoko) that was in place prior World War II (McCurry, 2016). The to the 2010 NDPG to Dynamic Defense security law is the reinterpretation of Force (doeki boei ryoko) (Fouse, 2011), Article 9 of the Constitution (Ford, 2015) Tokyo has continuously modernized its that also enables Tokyo to aid its allies in military to better equip the Dynamic overseas conflicts under the term of Defense Force. Japan is considered as one collective self-defense. The move by the of the most powerful military forces in the Japanese parliament is said as the biggest globe today (Mapp, 2014). In particular, its shift in Japan’s defense policy since World MSDF and ASDF are armed with state-of- War II (McCurry, 2016). The the-art aircrafts and ships (Mapp, 2014). reinterpretation itself was motivated by the changing security environment of The Japanese Ministry of Defense Japan, especially with North Korea’s (MOD) has plan to convert its GSDF to be nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as mobile and can be transferred to the East Chinese naval activities in the Japanese China Sea quickly when crisis occurs by surrounding waters (Fackler and Sanger, 2023 (Gady, 2015). At the same time, the 2014). 2016/2017 shopping list for the JSDF includes amphibious assault vehicles, as After the reinterpretation, Japan well as tanker aircraft, Aegis destroyers, has been able to use force in the event of and mobile missile batteries. an attack on a foreign country that would

170 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

Figure 6. Reinterpretation of Japanese Legislations

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015

Figure 7. Reinterpretation of Armed Attack Situations Response Act

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 Journal of ASEAN Studies 171

On April 2013, the Japanese Japan has also increased its Cabinet approved the Basic Plan on Ocean defense budget and military spending as Policy – an initiative to ensure security of of recent years. Japan has increased its the oceans through: military expenditure in 2015 (Table 3), which further highlights and increases -range ‚reinforcement of the wide threats from North Korea and China routine system of surveillance, (SIPRI, 2016). Furthermore, in August systematic improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles, 2016, Abe’s administration has further strengthening of the system of requested for another increase in collaboration between the SDF and spending for the JSDF, particularly to Japan Coast Guard, and development expand Tokyo’s missile defenses (Rich, of a system of collaboration to ensure 2016). order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands.‛ (Japan’s 2015 Defense White Paper)

Table 3. Japan’s Defense Budget Comparison, 2014 and 2015

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015

The new proposal is budgeted at amphibious warfare capabilities, as well $50.2 billion, another increase of Japan’s as a lighter Dynamic Joint JSDF (Ministry military spending for the past five years of Defense, Japan, 2015). (Gady, 2015). The new proposal is also a 2.3 per cent increase in budget as As shown in Figure 8, Japan has compared to the year prior (Rich, 2016). increased its procurements on tanks, As shown in Table 3, there is quite a vessels, as well as aircrafts. The MOD has significant increase from fiscal year 2014 increased the number of all three military to 2015. The increase in Japan’s defense vehicles in response to the growing budget is expected to create more security risks in Japan’s regional environment.

172 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

Figure 8. Current Status of the Unit Price and Acquisition Quantity of Defense Equipment

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015

The MSDF are equipped with 50 combat aircraft, and is planned to further modern guided missile destroyers, as well purchase the F-35 multirole aircrafts. The as the general-purpose frigates on par F-35 multirole aircrafts are connected into with the U.S. Navy. These sophisticated a state-of-the-art command and control guided missile destroyers have the system network that also includes the capability of anti-ballistic missile. Figure 8 Airborne Warning and Control System has also shown Tokyo’s plan to continue (AWACs) aircrafts. Furthermore, Japan to increase its destroyers for the next ten has also been extensively constructing its years. A large helicopter carrier, dubbed anti-aircraft missile system that would as a destroyer by the Japanese, was also have the anti-ballistic missile launched in August 2013 by the MSDF to proficiency according to the PAC-3 be able to better project its power. missile. Table 4 below shows other plans for Japan’s acquisition of new state-of-the- Moreover, the ASDF is also art aircrafts, naval vessels, and other equipped with over 300 fourth-generation military equipment.

Journal of ASEAN Studies 173

Table 4. Japan's Plans for Its Military Modernization

Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015

Japan has also focused on replaced with the fifth-generation ones. modernizing its southern and western Moreover, the budget for Japan Coast hemispheres, as evidenced in Japan’s Guard (JCG) was also increased to buy Interim Defense Review in July 2013 more ships and jets, while the navy would (Mapp, 2014). Japan planned to obtain receive modern Aegis destroyers made by military capabilities best for defense, the U.S. Other planned purchases were 21 especially in terms of striking down patrol ships, seven reconnaissance jets, enemy forces, missile forces in their home and addition of its AEGIS destroyers from bases, increase in surveillance capability, four to six. amphibious forces, and brand new naval vessels. Moreover, the focus is on Japan under the Liberal Democratic improving the Japanese capability in Party of Japan’s Shinzo Abe: interception scrambles by ASDF aircraft to Revolutionary Enough? incoming Chinese aircrafts into Japan’s During his visit to Washington in airspace. February 2013, then newly-elected The focus on modernizing the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe southwestern parts of Japan has been in proclaimed that ‚Japan is back‛ (Sakaki, the picture since as early as 2011, under 2015). As a right-wing nationalist, Abe Prime Minister Naoto Kan and then had been criticized for attempting to move followed by Yoshihiko Noda. The MTDP away from the traditional aspects of for fiscal year 2011-2015 highlights on Japanese security policy (Sakaki, 2015) to restructuring Japan’s armed forces in all proactive pacifism. The introduction of a three branches where there will be NSC and SCC, the relaxation of the ‘Three relocation of all three to Japan’s Principles of Arms Exports,’ and the southwestern parts. The ASDF’s defense reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution on capabilities were planned to be upgraded, its JSDF have given more concerns to its and its F-4 fighter aircrafts were to be East Asian neighbors (Sakaki, 2015). 174 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

At the first glance, Abe’s expanding and deepening cooperative administration seems to be radical in relationships with other countries‛ shifting Japan’s direction from a pacifist (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2014). country to proactive pacifism. Various However, the change itself is not out of documents under the Abe administration the ordinary when we observe the have continuously used the term of security environment and the geopolitics ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace,’ namely surrounding Japan in the past six years. the 2014 NDPG, which states that Japan Abe’s two predecessors, Naoto Kan and will achieve as such by ‚proactively Yohihiko Noda of the DPJ, have built securing peace, stability and prosperity of upon the foundations to the more the international community while prominent shifts done by Abe’s achieving its own security as well as peace administration towards Japan’s military and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by normalization process.

Table 5. The Shift and Continuity of the Japanese Defense Policy

Naoto Kan (DPJ) Yoshihiko Noda (DPJ) Shinzo Abe (LDP) NDPG   Three Principles on Arms Exports   NSC  MTDP  Article 9 

As shown in Table 5 above, Naoto security challenges of its region since the Kan pioneered the modified concept of era of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. NDPG, which altered the concept of the previous Basic Defense Force to Dynamic Abe seeks to protect Japan’s Defense Force. Shinzo Abe continued this national security from threats in the concept in the 2014 NDPG and expanded region, as well as to better increase it with the additions of NSC and MTDP to Japanese influence for the nation’s create a more comprehensive Japanese advantage. Abe has also established a defense policy. Furthermore, Abe also more substantial shift towards Japanese further revised the initial reinterpretation military normalization as compared to his of the Three Principles on Arms Export predecessors, namely, the establishment under Noda’s administration. The of the NSC and the NSS, as well as the subsequent additions by Abe are reinterpretation of Article 9 of the indicative of a shift to ‘proactive pacifism.’ Constitution. As such, defense reforms under Abe’s administration are notable, The focus on maritime and naval but not radical and are still limited under activities is reflective of Japan’s geography its ‘self-defense’ umbrella. and geopolitics of the region. Both North Korea and China pose great threats to Conclusion Japan’s national security. The increase in Japanese defense policy is threat levels of its strategic environment continuous, but also evolving: it responds has resulted in measures to counter the to its strategic environment but ultimately still follows by its maritime focus. With Journal of ASEAN Studies 175 the rise of China and its maritime Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian ambitions and expansion, as well as North National Resilience Council (Dewan Korea’s threats of ballistic missiles and Ketahanan Nasional). nuclear arsenals, Japan has to shift its defense policy to protect its national Reference security from external threats. Albert, E., & Xu, B. (2016, February 8). The What the last three Prime China-North Korea Relationship. Council Ministers of Japan – Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from Noda, and Shinzo Abe – have done are all http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north- a combined effort that takes years to come korea-relationship/p11097 into fruition to address Japan’s security BBC News. (2015, September 19). China issues. Ultimately, when considering Warns Japan over Expanding Military Japan’s security environment, the course Role Abroad. Retrieved from of actions taken by Japan is nothing out of http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- the ordinary. Whilst reorganizing its 34301456 military and reinterpreting its Article 9 of its pacifist Constitution, Japan still abides Berkofsky, A. (2012). Japan's Defense and by its pacifist Constitution – its military is Security Policies: What's Old, What's still under the context for peace and self- New, What's Ahead. Country Report. defense only and are still a far cry from a Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung normal military albeit being dubbed under a new name, the Proactive Pacifism Cropsey, S., & Milikh, A. (2012). Mahan's under Abe’s administration. Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?. World Affairs, 85- About the Authors 92.

Ria Putri Santoso obtained her BA Davis, C., & Jared Feldschreiber, S. L. in International Relations from the School (2013). World's Most Isolated of International Relations, President Countries. World Policy Journal. University. She is currently a research assistant at the School of International Dawson, C. (2011, December 28). Japan Relations, President University. She has Lifts Decadeslong Ban on Export of won several awards at International Weapons. The Wall Street Journal. Humanitarian Law (IHL) National Debate Retrieved from Competition and Model United Nations http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014 (MUN) during her undergraduate study. 2405297020347910457712371003118040 She has special interests in Security 8 Studies. Dingli, S. et al. (2016). China's Maritime Anak Agung Banyu Perwita is a Disputes. Council on Foreign Relations. professor of International Relations at the Eberstadt, N. (2016, December 29). How School of International Relations, North Korea Became the World's Worst President University. He obtained his MA Economy. The Wall Street Journal. in International Relations and Strategic Retrieved from Studies from Lancaster University and his http://www.wsj.com/articles/how- Ph.D. from Flinders University, Adelaide. He is also involved with the Indonesian 176 The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy

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