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Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction Molinism reappeared in the late twentieth century, vying to be the best account of divine providence and the best solution to the divine foreknowledge dilemma. Adherents of Molinism claim that the theory can provide an account of strong libertarian free will that is compatible with God’s foreknowledge. It achieves this alleged status by occupying the position between theological determinism on the one hand, and open theism on the other. Occupying a ‘between’ or middle position is not necessarily a virtue, although ‘between’ suggests that it might have something new to offer, composed of the merits, but not the failings, of each of the two alternate positions. To succeed in explaining how God plans and has control over future contingents, and especially actions of contra- causally free human agents, while also having full foreknowledge of these undetermined actions, would be a very remarkable achievement indeed. Stated simply, contemporary Molinists make two main claims: The Solution Claim 1: Molinism is the best solution to the foreknowledge dilemma. The Model Claim 2: Molinism is the most plausible model of divine providence—better than Calvinist/Augustinian models, and better than the various models of open theism. These claims are interdependent.1 The truth of each claim depends on the truth of the other. If Molinism fails as a solution to the foreknowledge dilemma, then its virtue as the best model of providence would fail, because providence depends in part on 1 Alfred Freddoso writes that the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and divine providence are intertwined, which generates important consequences for the reconciliation of divine foreknowledge and free will (Freddoso 1988:5). 1-1 foreknowing the future, or more precisely, of having middle knowledge of what would happen if a particular world were actualized. Alternatively, if Molinism fails as a theory of providence, then it cannot reconcile foreknowledge with free will. It is argued by the Molinist that if God can foresee what could or would happen, then he can plan accordingly in a way that a Simple Foreknowledge model of God cannot. To some, simple foreknowledge has been thought not to be providentially useful to God as it comes too late. Once God foreknows something, he cannot do anything about it.2 On the other hand, the reciprocal interplay between foreknowledge, (or rather at this point, middle knowledge), and the divine will, creates Molinism’s alleged success as a theory of providence. Nevertheless, there has been some concern expressed in the literature that this view of God makes him out to be too controlling and even ‘manipulative’. Indeed, if God’s middle knowledge is providentially useful because he can choose which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF) to actualize, potentially this power is a double-edged sword.3 It shows God’s power over creation, but it may also show that he has too much power over free creatures. If that which is unique about Molinism is that which makes it successful both as a solution and a model—if it is ultimately because this conception of God is manipulative—then this undermines its efficacy as a solution to the foreknowledge dilemma as well as its status as a viable model. 2 Simple foreknowledge is rejected by thinkers such as Hasker (1989:59-63) because it comes too late to be useful for God for providential control. David P. Hunt argues the case for simple foreknowledge in Beilby and Hunt (2001:96-101), and in Hunt (1993:394-414). David Basinger takes the view that simple foreknowledge could not aid God in providence (1993:421-427). It is also rejected by John Sanders as providentially useless (1998:200). The Hunt/Hasker debate continued with William Hasker (2009:537-44) and David Hunt’s response (2009:545-550). 3 The acronym ‘CCF’ and its variations are fairly common in the literature. I refer to the work of Perszyk and Mares (2011) for a good working definition, “Counterfactuals of freedom are conditional propositions stating with respect to one or more creatures that God may create, or creaturely essences God might instantiate, what each would do if placed in some possible (complete) situation in which they were left free” (Perszyk 2011:96). 1-2 There are different senses of ‘manipulation’ that have been applied to Molinism, yet all of these at first glance are to varying degrees critical of Molinism. For the moment, I distinguish three senses of manipulation: 1. Literal, morally-neutral manipulation of impersonal objects: God has power to control events, circumstances and states of affairs for a particular goal, much as a physician manipulates limbs, or an accountant manipulates numbers. It could be said that any risk-free model of providence entails that God manipulates in this manner, hence this indictment might be leveled not just against Molinism. 2. ‘Objectionable manipulation’ of persons: Manipulation, whether divine or human, implies control over other impersonal things or objects, but over another person it is wrong and improper. Levy and McKenna call this objectionable manipulation which undermines “the proper operation of our capacities as morally responsible agents” (Levy and McKenna 2006:107). This sense of manipulation is put forward by some as freedom undermining. Gale’s nomenclature is much more emphatic, as he writes of freedom cancelling control (1990, 1991). However, just because objectionable manipulation undermines the moral capacities of an agent, it might not undermine freedom. In this case manipulation and freedom might be compatible, but the agent is exploited. The above two senses are distinguished in terms of whether manipulation is of persons (2) or of things (1). Sense (2) is far more serious than (1) and invites discussion on whether a person remains free if they are manipulated by another agent to perform A. A third sense of manipulation put forward is that: 3. God has too much power to control events, circumstances, etc. That is, God does not take risks, but controls everything in every detail. This may include the manipulation of people, as well as their circumstances, or more generally of 1-3 events and states of affairs. This is like an exaggerated version of sense (1) in that God is too skilled at manipulating events and circumstances and does not offset this with risk. This can be understood as the vice of manipulation in (1). My purpose in classifying the manipulation challenge against Molinism in this way is to ask if there is any particular kind of manipulation in Molinist theory that distinguishes it from other non-benign senses of manipulation, as in (1). That is, does the kind of God presented in Molinism manipulate in such a way that he manipulates free creatures improperly (2) or too much (3). This second sense of manipulation is the most serious for a model of providence. If it transpires this second claim is proven, then the kind of God presented by Molinist doctrine manipulates free creatures in a way that somehow undermines their freedom. This potentially has the reciprocal effect of presenting God as morally culpable or at least responsible, by analogy with strong morally-repugnant human manipulation. This cluster of possible objections against Molinism has been deemed more a matter of its ‘application’ to theological issues than a direct objection against the coherence of middle knowledge itself. Perszyk distinguishes the species of objection that I am interested in as a member of the class of ‘alternative line of objections.’ This ‘alternative line of objection’ relates middle knowledge to providence. The question of control relates to the “negative overall effects on God’s providence” engendered by middle knowledge. It may give God too much or too little control. Too much control robs him “…of his ability to create free creatures or relate to them in the right way” (Perszyk 2011:10).4 This is the same general field or ‘line of objection’ that I wish to investigate, yet I do not think that the root problem that I am investigating is an ‘application problem’ if it 4 Perszyk considers Zimmerman (2009) as representative of this line of objection. Alternatively, too little control would rob God of his sovereignty, a charge brought by Thomists against Molinists (Perszyk 2011:10). 1-4 is interpreted as just an application. Rather, I believe the essential core concepts of Molinism itself are tainted when taken to their logical conclusion, despite the fact that these core concepts are viewed by some as ‘applications’ of Molinism.5 To be precise, the problem here is not middle knowledge per se, but what God does with it; how the will interplays with his knowledge. This is no mere application of Molinism. If the charge of too-much-control against Molinism succeeds, whether over things or persons, it then starts to look like a version of Calvinism: a model of divine providence that has generally been criticized for its strong divine determinism and correlative inability to account for creaturely freedom. Though adherents of the Calvinist model of providence generally think that libertarian free will is a misguided notion, the corollary of this view for non-Calvinists is that God’s responsibility increases because of his increased control. A moral problem emerges from providential models that are strongly deterministic and controlling over other moral agents, and a theodicy is required to defend them.6 Calvinist models do not have a ‘divine foreknowledge problem’, since if God predetermines p then God also foreknows p. This lack of a ‘problem’ sounds like a positive, but it is negated by the transfer of moral responsibility from the human agent to the divine, since God predetermines p. Generally, it is thought that Calvinist models require a theodicy more than other models.
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