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The Khalifate Is Way Cool: the Role and Method of Hizb Ut-Tahrir US in the Proliferation of Party Ideology Worldwide

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The Khalifate Is Way Cool: the Role and Method of Hizb Ut-Tahrir US in the Proliferation of Party Ideology Worldwide Center for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper Series I (Hizb ut-Tahrir), No. 2 The Khalifate is Way Cool: The Role and Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir US in the Proliferation of Party Ideology Worldwide Madeleine Gruen* Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United States (HTUS) is advancing slowly but steadily. Its membership is on the rise, as is the number of major American cities and university towns in which it is present. As a result of its superior propagandizing skills, HTUS is a rising player in the global HT network. It is also gaining valuable ground for the global jihad movement because it is able to sell radical extremist ideology to moderate Muslims by making rejection of Western governments and doctrines seem “cool.” Because HTUS members have been raised on a steady diet of pop culture, they are endowed with the unique ability of being able to export HT and jihadist ideology to a world that dislikes America but loves its entertainment industry. Until 2003, it was easy to spot the HT presence in the United States. Representatives could be found at group-sponsored conferences and at college Muslim Students Associations. Ideology was circulated in magazines published by adherents in New York and California,1 and US-based Web sites bearing the name Hizb ut-Tahrir popped up by the dozens. Yet, since 2003, public mention of HT in the US became scarce, leading to a potential impression that group adherents have thrown in the towel, grown up, and moved on. Not so. HTUS has in fact experienced a revival; however, due to its now-clandestine operations, its presence is apparent only to law-enforcement investigators and to those who can recognize HT ideology. HTUS operates in much the same way as it does in other parts of the world: it recruits new members, teaches them party ideology in closed groups, builds its party apparatus, and generates party propaganda. Since the propaganda generated in the US does not bear the name “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” adversarial entities are unlikely to impede circulation; as a consequence, the material can reach an even greater audience. Now that HTUS propaganda is consumed more widely, the US branch is likely regarded as a more valuable asset to the global network. * Madeleine Gruen is an intelligence analyst with the New York City Police Department. 1 HTUS disseminates party ideology using a variety of schemes, which include the use of front companies, Web sites, chat boards, games, hip-hop bands, and blogs. All of these methods share a common theme: pop culture. Hizb ut-Tahrir Feeds the International Appetite for American Pop Culture Although its means are professed to be non-violent, HT’s revolutionary vision for a world ruled according to sharia law does not differ from the vision of players in the al-Qaeda movement. While al-Qaeda movement does have a sympathetic audience in the Muslim world, a majority of its prospective recruits would not provide direct support it because they are opposed to their violent methods. In the years since its inception, HT has been able to present extreme concepts in a reasonable light in many countries, thus sharpening its ability to win support for radical doctrines with audiences that may have been lost by more violent jihadist groups. Its ability to cast a wide net has been one of HT’s trademarks. For example, in order for HT to succeed in establishing a unified umma, it is necessary for its propaganda to speak to all Muslims, regardless of the interpretation of Islam to which they adhere. Therefore, the message must be disseminated in a commonly-understood vernacular that transcends cultural and linguistic barriers. HTUS has capitalized the international youth culture’s love of American pop culture; which is evident on chat boards, blogs, and Web sites originating everywhere from France to Singapore. The notion of an Islamic state is discussed, digested, and endorsed on Internet chat boards that would be regarded as non-Islamic by many militant jihadist groups, since these sites also host conversations about dating, movies, and music. The HT propaganda generated by US members (along with some Canadian adherents) bears the hallmarks of the work of individuals raised in a society dominated by popular culture. North American HT members are able to express themselves in the international lingua franca more authentically and skillfully than anyone else. Their material promotes HT concepts by incorporating American humor, film themes, pop art, rap music, and urban and gang culture. Further, American members are fluent in the vernacular used in electronic communications, which is based on American urban slang. With these innate abilities, HT members are more readily “listened to” on the World Wide Web than others who are less able to express themselves in the current online writing style. By framing the concepts of a unified umma and the virtues of an Islamic state in American pop culture terms, HTUS is successfully making the ideology seem hip, alternative, and thus attractive to young people. By presenting doctrines in this manner, the reception of HT ideological concepts by many young and Westernized Muslims has evolved from flat-out rejection of these ideas to acceptance of them as almost mainstream. 2 Methods and Means of Dissemination Members of HTUS operate numerous businesses and activities that allow for continued access to their target audience. Examples include: hip-hop bands, music-promotion Web sites, film-production companies, personal blogs, clothing and accessory lines, and board games. A hallmark of HT-run front organizations is the frequency with which they pop up and fade away. Even though few of these organizations have been publicly exposed as HT- affiliated, HT nevertheless places a priority on making itself a moving target. It is thus able to establish itself as a trend setter while at the same time not giving intelligence or law enforcement authorities enough time to catch on to its tactics. By always bringing out “the next new thing,” HT ensures that its ideology will always be the current topic of conversation with its target audience. HTUS is also feeding a market that is generally overlooked by commercial marketers; delivering products and trends that help shape young Muslims’ political and social identities. Front companies and organizations: Several North American That's just some of the stuff at this online shop: Khalifah HT members operate Klothing. Web-based businesses, Lol, is cool n made me laugh. :D which have low overhead and can be easily run out Oh oh oooh, and they have other stuff too! of their homes. Most Aww, look at this, so cute ma sha Allah (it says 'Islam' on the often, the products are front-incase you can't see it): entirely unique and designed for mass consumption. An excellent example is “Khalifah Klothing,” an urban-style online clothing boutique which is run by an HT adherent from British Columbia, Canada. Items for sale And they have mugs n clocks n mouse mats n stuff like that too! include bandannas, t- I WANT ONE! Ahem. shirts, mouse pads, coffee mugs, messenger bags, - from algerianlass88.blogspot.com and trucker hats—each donning original designs with Islamic themes that reflect urban tastes and trends. The designs subtly convey HT and other jihadist doctrines: a bandana or t-shirt can feature the word “Jihad” written in a flamboyant graffiti style; the crossed Islamic flags bearing the shahadah; or a bold design stating “1 Ummah.” 3 Ummah Films, launched in January 2006, is the brainchild of a Los Angeles-based HT “circle.” This company has begun by producing short video vignettes on Islamic topics. Ultimately, its stated hope is to produce full-length features and documentaries that can be shown at film festivals.2 The core members of the LA HT circle are recruiting children and teenagers from the local masjid youth program to work as production assistants3—a tactic consistent with HT’s previous practices, e.g. hosting youth retreats as means of recruitment and indoctrination. Muslim Wristbands, operated by the same HT members behind Ummah Films, capitalizes on the popularity of silicone wristbands (a trend originally sparked by Lance Armstrong’s Livestrong foundation). The wristbands, which bear the word “Muslim,” do not specifically reflect HT ideology; however, since they are inexpensive to produce and have mass appeal, they are actually used to raise funds for Ummah Films: “What if you can sell something that is cool, unique, and inexpensive? Something that will help build awareness of your production company and would create a buzz. How about wristbands that say the work "MUSLIM" on it. Better yet, how about getting them in like in a bunch of different colors and they GLOW IN THE DARK! Now that's cool. So I invested everything I had and bought like 12000 wristbands and start selling them like hotcakes. Launched the Muslim Wristbands Website and used the money to buy supplies for Ummah Films. Selling wristband at $2 each (or 3 for $5) is super easy when people see they glow in the dark. You're probably wondering how I'm going to link a "MUSLIM" embossed glow in the dark wristband to Ummah Films. Well, in the inside of the wristbands (which you can't see unless you turn the wristband inside out), it says www.muslimwristbands.com. I will connect the two sites out and let people know that they can support Ummah Films by buying a cool wristband (much easier than getting donations).”4 “Mecca to Medina” is a card and dice game that was created by, and sold by, one of the Los Angeles circle members. The game is sold through www.muslimgames.com and through multiple private distributors.
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