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THE FOREIGN REGIME IN TIMOR-LESTE: AUSTRALIA AND THE RISE OF

CRISTIAN TALESCO

Ph.D

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

2017

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The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Department of Applied Social Sciences

The Foreign Aid Regime in Timor-Leste: Australia and the Rise of China

Cristian Talesco

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 2016

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CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it reproduces no material previously published or written, nor material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

(Signed)

___Cristian TALESCO______(Name of student)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis carefully examines the foreign aid regime providing support to Timor-Leste, one of the youngest countries in Asia and heavily dependent on foreign aid from the West for its development. Australia, for example, has provided around U$600 million in aid to make its presence in humanitarian and political terms known in the region. However, in recent years, Chinese aid has made its way into Timor-Leste through building infrastructures that amounts only to U$60 million but are visibly imposing on Dili, its capital and its skyline. This led many commentators to see that China has been ‘invading’ Timor-Leste, most commonly known as the ‘backyard’ of Australia. In this context, using the framework of aid regime theory, this study intends to clarify if the presence of China’s aid is in competition with Australia, or whether it represents another way of aid delivery that could possibly evolve into a more cooperative mode of aid in Timor-Leste. Results are based on the analysis of the discourse and narratives gathered from political, diplomatic and local people on the role of Australian and Chinese aid in Timor-Leste. These narratives reveal how the discourse of development and underdevelopment has been created by the donors, and how the norms of the foreign aid regime are understood by the various recipient actors, ranging from East Timorese diplomats to farmers and students who have benefitted from aid coming from both countries as individuals or as a state in the post-independence era. Data for this study was collected through face-to-face interviews conducted in Timor-Leste, China and Australia and the informants were selected through purposive sampling. This thesis has found that both Australian and Chinese aid were given to Timor-Leste on three-core grounds: moral vision, national interests, and possible cooperation between the donor and recipient, balancing carefully among altruism, prestige, economic interest and partnership. In addition, East Timorese officials were generally very satisfied with Australian aid while feeling confident about Chinese aid, although they also saw both aids had problems in creating labour or work for locals. Those East Timorese studying in China on aid scholarships however seemed much more positive than the East Timorese farmers who believed that both aid from China and Australia would not be sustainable in the long-run regardless of the differences, in terms of approach in delivery and norms inherited in their aid delivery.

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This thesis maintains that Chinese aid seems to become a good alternative for Timor- Leste to expand its infrastructure with little political pressure. However, Chinese aid in its current state is unlikely to challenge and revise the Australian or Western aid regime as Timor-Leste prefers to maintain the status quo by playing the Chinese as a supplementary and cooperating aid partner.

Keywords: Foreign aid, China, Australia, Timor-Leste, Development, Regime Theory, Discourse Analysis

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PUBLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE THESIS

Talesco, Cristian. (2016, May 10). How East Timor’s Democracy Is Making It an Outcast. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/10/how-east-timors- democracy-is-making-it-an-outcast-asean-southeast-asia/

Talesco, Cristian. (2016, April). Peace Media Style is “decisive” in East Timor. The Peace Journalist, 5(1). http://www.park.edu/center-for-peace- journalism/Peace%20Jounalist%20Apr2016%20web.pdf

Talesco, Cristian. (2014). Foreign Aid to Timor-Leste and the Rise of China. Journal of International Studies, 10, 131-150. http://jis.uum.edu.my/images/pdf/10jis/8jis2014.pdf

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am thankful to all people I met and helped me in the last three years of this research. I acknowledge their help, suggestions and feedback. They have been generous in dedicating their time to my questions and doubts. I would like to thank my research supervisor from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Dr. David Ip, for his guidance. A special thank goes to all the East Timorese people I met in the course of my fieldtrip. I am also grateful to all the people I met in Australia and China, who answered to my questions even when ‘uncomfortable’ topics arose. Finally, yet importantly, I am very thankful to all the people at the Department of Applied Social Sciences, especially Ms Fanny Cheng and Ms Amy Chu for their patience in helping to solve problems.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY...... 3 ABSTRACT...... 4 PUBLICATIONS ARISING FROM THIS THESIS...... 6 ACNOWLEDGEMENTS...... 10 ABBREVIATIONS...... 14 MAPS OF TIMOR-LESTE...... 15

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION...... 18 1.1 Scope of Research...... 19 1.2 Project’s Significance and Value...... 20 1.3 Case of Study: Timor-Leste...... 21 1.4 Historical Background on Timor-Leste...... 22 1.5 Development Ethics: Doing Good for Those in Need...... 24 1.5.1 Development Ethics and China...... 25 1.5.2 The Ethics of Foreign Aid...... 26 1.6 Thesis Structure...... 26

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW...... 28 2.1 Definitions: Development and Official Development Assistance...... 28 2.1.1 Western Meaning of Development...... 28 2.1.2 Chinese Meaning of Development...... 31 2.1.3 Western and Chinese Meaning of Development Assistance...... 32 2.2 How China Came to Become Involved With Timor-Leste...... 35 2.3 Chinese Aid to Timor-Leste...... 37 2.3.1 Concepts of Chinese Aid: Policy, Tradition and Motives...... 40 2.3.2 Socio-Political Impact and Socio-Economic Impact...... 44 2.3.3 Is Chinese Aid: Effective Aid?...... 47

CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...... 49 3.1 Aid Regime Theory...... 49 3.2 Different Perspectives in Aid Regime Theory...... 51 3.3 Aid Norms and Practices: Chinese and Australian Perspectives...... 53 3.4 A Critical Perspective on Western Aid Norms...... 55 3.5 From Western Aid to the Rise of China...... 57

CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY...... 60 4.1 Discourse Analysis...... 60 4.2 Methods and Materials...... 62 4.3 Interviews...... 63 4.4 Other Primary Sources...... 64 4.5 Political and Diplomatic Discourses: Differences and Challenges...... 66 4.6 An Approach to Discourse Analysis...... 67 4.7 Validity of Research Outcomes...... 69

CHAPTER 5. WHY DO AUSTRALIA AND CHINA GIVE AID TO TIMOR- LESTE?...... 70 5.1 Chinese Aid Projects in Timor-Leste: How Did They Begin? ...... 70 5.2 Australian Aid Projects in Timor-Leste: How Did They Begin? ...... 71 5.3 Foreign Aid Motivations and Allocation of Aid...... 72 5.3.1 Protection and Alliances...... 75 5.3.2 Sovereignty and Authority...... 77 5.3.3 Prestige...... 80 5.3.4 Economic and Political Interests...... 82 5.3.5 Peace and Stability...... 83 5.3.6 Responsibility/Humanitarianism...... 86

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5.3.7 Altruism...... 87 5.3.8 Norms of Conduct in Foreign Aid...... 88 5.3.9 Cooperation...... 90 5.4 Conclusion...... 95

CHAPTER 6. ASSESSING AUSTRALIA’S AND CHINA’S AID: A TIMORESE PERSPECTIVE…………………………………………………………………….....97 6.1 Timor-Leste’s Perception of Chinese and Australian Aid...... 97 6.2 What Do Government Officials Think of Chinese and Australian Aid? ...... 100 6.2.1 Partnership with Donors...... 102 6.2.2 Timor-Leste’s Perception of the Donors – Recipients Relationship...... 105 6.3 The Impact of Foreign Aid on Timor-Leste’s Unemployment and its Cost of Living...... 109 6.4 Inflation Associated with Aid Giving ...... 112 6.5 Why is Timor-Leste losing Confidence in Australia?...... 113 6.6 A Critical Analysis of Chinese Aid in Timor-Leste: a New Colonial Power? ...... 116 6.7 Students’ Perception of China and the Crumbling of the Australian Image...... 118 6.7.1 Students Perception...... 119 6.8 The Perception of Timor-Leste’s Government on Chinese Scholarships...... 124 6.9 Chinese Scholarships Offered to East Timorese Students: Buying the Favour of the Elite? ...... 125 6.10 What Do East Timorese Think of Chinese and Australian Hybrid Rice Development Projects?...... 126 6.11 Conclusion...... 132

CHAPTER 7. TIMOR-LESTE’S MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN...... 135 7.1 The Argument for ASEAN Membership...... 136 7.2 Timor-Leste: an Asset or a ‘Laggard’ for ASEAN? Different Outlooks...... 140 7.3 Timor-Leste’s Application for ASEAN Membership...... 143 7.4 Timor-Leste: from a Colony to a Democracy with a Multi-Party System...... 146 7.5 Historical Role of Civil Society and the Media in Timor-Leste’s Struggle for Independence...... 148 7.6 Timorese and Indonesian Reconciliation: a Model for ASEAN Peace and Prosperity...... 152 7.7 Timor-Leste’s Post-Independence Democratic Developments...... 155 7.7.1 Consolidation of Multi-Party Democracy...... 155 7.7.2 Civil Society Organisations Uphold Civil and Political Rights...... 160 7.7.3 The Media Monitors the Government and the Constitution...... 161 7.7.4 Ombudsman: an ‘A’ Class Human Rights Institution...... 163 7.8 The Relevance and the Hindrances of Timor-Leste’s Democratic Credentials for ASEAN Membership...... 165 7.9 Conclusion...... 168

CHAPTER 8. THE DISCOURSE OF FOREIGN AID: CONTRASTING VISIONS, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND FUTURE SUGGESTIONS...... 171 8.1 Giving Aid: Interest, Friendship and the Moral Vision...... 172 8.2 The Rise of China’s Soft Power and the Norms of Cooperation with Australia...... 174 8.3 The Contrasting Moral Vision in Foreign Aid and Human Rights in Timor-Leste: Survival, Subsistence and Development...... 178 8.4 Foreign Aid in Timor-Leste: a Shared Experience of Different Donors’ Advantages...... 181 8.5 Corruption Promotion, Liberal Views and Chinese Aid...... 183 8.6 Conclusive Suggestions...... 195 8.7 Conclusion...... 199

9. CONCLUSION...... 201

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 206

APPENDIX 1 - DATA SOURCES...... 214

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APPENDIX 2 - INTERVIEWS’ FRAMEWORK...... 215 APPENDIX 3 - FIELDWORK TIMOR-LESTE 2016...... 218 APPENDIX 4 - FIELDWORK TIMOR-LESTE 2006 – FORM 2...... 219 APPENDIX 5 - FIELDWORK EXPERIENCES...... 220 5.1 Necessary Considerations before Undertaking Fieldwork in Timor-Leste...... 223 5.2 Out on the Field...... 226 5.3 Author’s Positionality and Power Relations during the Interviews...... 229 5.4 Author’s Selection of Informants and General Consideration...... 234

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ABBREVIATIONS ASDT East Timorese Social Democratic Association APODETI Timorese Popular Democratic Association AusAID The Australian Agency for International Development BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa CAVR Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste DAC Development Assistance Committee EU European Union ESSP Education Sector Support Program (ESSP) Eximbank China Export Import Bank FDTL Forças Defesa Timor Lorosae FONGTIL Forum of Non-Government Organisations Timor-Leste FRELIMO Liberation Front of Mozambique FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income IFIs International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund INTERFET International Force for Timor-Leste LICUS Low-income countries under stress MDG Millennium Development Goal MOFCOM The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ODA Official Development Assistance PSCDP Public Sector Capacity Development Program PFMCDP Public Financial Management Capacity Development Program PWD People with Disabilities RWSSP Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program UDT Timorese Democratic Union USAID United States Agency for International Development

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MAPS OF TIMOR-LESTE

Source: www.mapas-asia.org

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INSPIRING QUOTE FOR THIS PROJECT "There's no copy and paste system in foreign aid" Atifete Jahjaga, President of Kosovo (June 2012)

“Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything.” George Bernard Shaw

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Southeast Asia is a sort of battlefield for Australia and China in light of current trade and business opportunities. Australia is the ‘European-sister’ in Oceania. It shares western values in its foreign policy, and it contributes to the spread of the concept of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. Australia has helped several countries in severe financial problems, including Solomon Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste. The country has its own strategy based on western values; these however do not coincide with Chinese values. Until recently, China was focused on facing its own internal problems, and therefore, it was quite easy for Australia to push its own agenda in Southeast Asia. With the rise of China, things changed. Developing countries started to have an alternative outside the main Western aid regime. This has challenged most of Australia's plans, especially in Timor-Leste, which is rich in oil. But, in the case of Nauru the situation became more irritating for Australia. Nauru’s budget has been provided by Australia since the country fully consumed its phosphate resources. At that point, Nauru no longer had a sound economy and started to even sell its buildings and overseas investments. Then, Australia took power over the country and built refugee facilities, in an attempt to solve its illegal migration issues by sending immigrants to Nauru. Clearly, Australia did so because Nauru was in need and Australia - by financing the whole government budget - felt they could make such decisions in the little island. Australia has also pushed the East Timorese government to allow the construction of refugee facilities; however the local government was totally contrary to the idea. This aggressive behaviour has been played until recently, when China started to look at Nauru as a potential country for investment. Therefore, China started to inject aid money. This destabilised the role of Australia by juxtaposing it with China, who provided an additional income source for the population, but without Australia's conditions. The whole context, therefore, opens a debate over the future relationship of Southeast Asian countries with China and Australia, the two most powerful countries in the area- but whom each have a very different approach and different set of values. Overall, with the rise of China as the second biggest economy, and with a basket of norms and values which differs from the 1960s’ aid regime, the international aid agenda possibly needs to be restructured, or at least updated, by the role of the new global actor. The scope of the project is definitely to assert its findings with a relevant adherence to theoretical framework, but also to rely on political debates and qualitative analysis, and wherever available, also quantitative data. Regime theory must be taken into consideration in order

17 to ascertain the principles and norms on which China’s and Australia’s foreign aid put its roots. An analysis of the regime theory will also assist in determining why Australia might look at the rise of China in Timor-Leste as a threat.

1.1 Scope of Research Foreign aid forms an important part of a state’s identity within the international system. The established dichotomy saw developed countries giving aid, while developing countries were receiving it. Nevertheless, the rise of China, along with that of other emerging economies, changed such a dualist view; or at least undermined the concept. China is becoming a world power, it is the second richest economy, yet it is still within the developing countries group. However, it is providing a considerable amount of foreign aid worldwide. This is undermining the usual understandings of the aid regime set by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. In 2007 Moises Naim published an article in Foreign Policy, in which he stated: “What’s wrong with the foreign aid programs of China, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia? They are enormously generous. And they are toxic” (Naim, Rogue Aid, 2007). Unfortunately, there is a general belief that Chinese norms and rules of conduct are culturally incompatible with Western norms. However, a short policy article cannot consider the broad picture of Chinese aid. Naim failed to explain with a more compelling argument why these countries deliver rogue aid. He failed to identify norms and principles behind Chinese aid. He failed to analyse their involvements with the aid regime created by the DAC donors. He failed to analyse why recipient countries appreciated Chinese aid. This is something that needs to be addressed, and this project attempts to clarify such doubts. As such, the project seeks to answer the following questions:

1) How is the rise of China as an aid donor in Timor-Leste affecting the foreign aid regime set by Australia, the most prominent aid donor in the country? 2) What is the perception of the East Timorese in relations to China’s and Australia’s aid in Timor-Leste? 3) Does the case of Chinese aid in Timor-Leste rewrite the theory of aid regime?

These questions will be addressed by taking the following five steps:  Provide a definition of development for Timor-Leste from all the actors involved

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 Frame Chinese and Australian aid in Timor-Leste (i.e. why do they give aid to Timor-Leste?)  Critical analysis of Chinese and Australian aid principles and norms, and the outcomes of their aid programmes.  Critical analysis of the East Timorese perspectives on China’s and Australia’s aid  Find out whether cooperation will be achieved between different donors with different principles

The scope is to: 1) Understand the political influence of different models of aid (Australia and China) 2) Understand how foreign donors acts in foreign policy 3) Understand how cooperation amongst different models of aid can take place and benefit the recipient country and the different donors’ perspectives.

1.2 Project’s Significance and Value As mentioned above, the project, by answering the main research questions aims at enriching the ongoing studies on the aid regime. The rise of China in the foreign aid industry has been underestimated by the DAC donors, as well as by researchers. Hitherto, there is a growing literature on the new aid model that shapes the provision of Chinese development assistance, however up until now, it is not clear the degree of influence that China’s aid is exercising towards the traditional foreign aid regime. Until recently, many DAC donors have failed to recognise the strong influence that Chinese aid has in Africa and Asia, but they are also lacking an understanding of the challenges coming from the new Chinese norms. Such an understanding would be a must for the DAC donors to improve their aid regimes. The Chinese aid model - and its norms - is an opportunity for improving the international aid regime, making foreign aid more successful, and although it seems difficult for Australia to accept such a powerful role of Chinese norms in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, it is something that Canberra must take into consideration. Therefore, the findings of this project will inform the current theories on aid regime and interdependence, and development trajectories. It will try by means of comparing Australia’s and China’s aid regime in Timor-Leste to open a new comparative debate on the effectiveness and political influence of different modes of aid regime. Therefore, the project will be highly significant within the field of foreign aid and

19 international cooperation. It will fill the gap in the existing literature about the role of in Timor-Leste, by collecting qualitative data in a case study featuring Timor-Leste. Furthermore, the project will be highly valuable to the comparative studies on which it is based. The donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been “creating” the rules on which the foreign aid regime lies. The rise of China challenged this aid regime, and this study will be a milestone in providing further understanding. Therefore, the value lies within this new perspective that this project wishes to give to the traditional donors, pointing out the need to restructure their aid projects by looking at the Chinese rule of conducts as a complement to the established foreign aid regime. It will be an important step in understanding the development path of Timor-Leste, and it will prove that Australian donors cannot avoid facing the reality that is the rise of China.

1.3 Case Study: Timor-Leste Timor-Leste is one of the newest countries in the world. It is located in Southeast Asia and it consists of the eastern part of the Timor Island and the two islands of Atauro and Jaco, and the exclave (Oecusse) within Indonesian West Timor. Timor-Leste achieved independence on 20 May 2002 after more than twenty years of Indonesian invasion that left the country as one of the poorest and more unstable in Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste has a long story of instability since the Portuguese left in 1974 - after 400 years of colonization. The country was left without leaders, and local East Timorese had no knowledge of how to run the country. In 1975, Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste to annex it to West Timor and the invasion lasted for 24 years. After the 1999 referendum for Timor-Leste's independence - which passed with 78% of voters in favour - Indonesian soldiers, before leaving, destroyed 90% of East Timorese infrastructures. Indonesians killed more than 200,000 people during the occupation. This left the country in an extreme condition of poverty, but with the hope of achieving independence. Since 1999, the (UN) has run a mission for the transition of Timor-Leste to an independent country. Australia and Timor-Leste disputed the oil revenues of the Timor Sea, which is currently split at 50% to each country (Talesco, 2003). However, Australia and Timor- Leste does not have a defined maritime boundary, for which Timor-Leste is seeking a solution with Australia.

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The choice of Timor-Leste, for this project, is very specific, and there are factors which brought me to choose it. Timor-Leste receives the biggest share of Australia’s foreign aid, which in 2012 was U$283 million (OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/TLS.JPG). Timor-Leste also receives a considerable amount of money from the EU, but in the last few years China also increased its investments and aid. It provided Timor-Leste with military boats to patrol the country's border, and it built several government buildings as a gift. Clearly, the rise of China in Timor-Leste destabilised the role of Australia, and the government of Timor-Leste became also more critical of Australia’s aid, and its conditionality. In fact, conditionality is one of the biggest problems related to foreign aid assistance. Riddell (2007) argues that one of the most important aims for donors is to make aid effective. Therefore, donors believe that aid effectiveness passes through the application of conditional policies. Once again similar to what we can see in the European Union (EU), aid trances are related to conditional economic policies that must be implemented by recipients before getting the funds. However, in terms of global aid agenda, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has shifted the spotlight to “ownership” and other norms. Ownership, in the sense that, is where recipient countries implement aid policies, which best suit their own context. By receiving the funds they can try to implement policies best suited to reaching the developmental scope. However, if policies do not follow the path indicated by donors because of corruption or weak institutions, then conditions are attached to aid. This view has been influenced by Burnside and Dollar (2000), where they stated that aid spurs growth when recipient countries have effective institutions and implement good policies. Nevertheless, Timor-Leste is also a hot spot, particularly for strategic reasons and the oil and natural gas fields, which at the moment are exploited through the support of Australia. Therefore, Timor-Leste is the perfect country to analyse the raising competition between China’s and Australia’s aid.

1.4 Historical Background on Timor-Leste Timor-Leste is one of the newest countries in the world. It is located in Southeast Asia and it consists of the eastern part of the Timor Island and the two islands of Atauro and Jaco, an exclave (Oecusse) within Indonesian West Timor. Timor-Leste achieved independence on 20 May 2002 after more than twenty years of Indonesian occupation

21 that left the country one of the poorest and unstable in Southeast Asia. In fact, Timor- Leste has a long history of instability: when the Portuguese left in 1974 – after 400 years of colonisation – the country was left without leaders, and local East Timorese had no knowledge of how to run the country. In 1975, Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste to annex it to West Timor and the occupation lasted for 24 years. After the 1999 referendum for Timor-Leste's independence – where 78% of voters voted in favour of independence – Indonesian soldiers vindictively destroyed 90% of Timor-Leste’s infrastructure before leaving. It is estimated that Indonesian soldiers caused the death of more than 200,000 people during the occupation (Taylor, 1999, 25-43). This left the country in an extreme condition of poverty, but with the hope of achieving independence. Since 1999, the UN has run a mission for the transition of Timor into an independent country. Australia and Timor-Leste disputed the oil revenues of the Timor Sea, which currently has split ownership of 50% to each country (Grenville, 2014). Nevertheless, Timor-Leste is highly dependent on foreign aid. For example, Australia is Timor-Leste’s largest donor, and in 2012-2013 alone, it received almost U$108 million in aid (OECD-DAC, ‘Aid at a Glance: Timor-Leste’) while per capita Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2008 was U$253 (World Bank Indicator, Per-Capita ODA). Overall, Timor-Leste, has successfully established its constitution, its legal framework, and its status as an independent nation on one crucial point: individual rights. The government established a body of law that put the people on top of its agenda. The process of implementation is still ongoing, and much still needs to be done. However, Timor- Leste has not been free from internal conflicts. Undoubtedly, its fragility installs fear in ASEAN. Factors of Timor-Leste’s fragility include the following: maturity, government size, leadership and conflict (Mavrotas, 2010, 155). Timor-Leste is a new state which lacks maturity. In fact, longevity grants self-confidence and identity, which the newest countries do not have. Government size and leadership are interrelated issues. In 1999, Timor-Leste had no government and weak leadership. In 2002, the first president of Timor-Leste (Xanana Gusmão1) was elected because of his charisma, rather than for his political skills. Conflict, again, is a recurrent problem in a fragile state; Timor-Leste’s stability was affected by turmoil in 2006 and 2008. However, since then Timor-Leste has enjoyed a period of peace and stability, while other ASEAN members are still places of conflict.

1 Xanana Gusmão has been President of Timor-Leste from 20 May 2002 to 20 May 2007, and Prime Minister since 8 August 2007.

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Overall, the experience of Timor-Leste is one of a country that had to build its political system from scratch. When the Indonesians left in 1999, there was no remaining infrastructure, no trained rulers to govern the country, no rule of law, no functioning courts, no power or sanitation in rural areas, and poverty and food scarcity was present throughout the country. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Timor-Leste was no-man’s land: it was not an empty land, because its population was there, and it still relied on a balance of postcolonial and pre-colonial institutions. However, at the time of independence, its capacity to maintain the monopoly over the use of force on its territory was limited. In practice, Timor-Leste in 2002 was a state without the features of a state. Nevertheless, the resilience of East Timorese and the essence of the peace-building and state-building process deserve attention from ASEAN, if an effective implementation of the Charter is to be achieved.

1.5 Development Ethics: Doing Good for Those in Need Ethics is not just one of the many interesting words that a young researcher meets in the course of his/her research. Ethics is something more than just a word, it is “a system of moral principles” (BBC). It is a duty that must become the guidance of everyone’s research. Ethics has to do with values; it has to do with the willingness of each individual to do the right thing. However, doing the right thing does not necessarily correlate with a positive outcome. In fact, ethics is not about gain, intended in economical terms. Therefore, when an individual does the right thing, they can potentially been exposed to a bad outcome in economical terms. Nevertheless, values and moral principles are something related to the willingness to do good, irrespective of the result. The idea that there is not such a thing as economic growth, has made people blind towards the duty of doing the right thing irrespective of economic gain. In my specific field of research, international development (with a focus on foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy), researchers have massively focused on economic determinism, gain and interests. Arguably, there is less commitment about development in terms of enriching the different aspects of people’s life. Economic growth has blinded states, has made them greedy and has reduced the opportunity to live a life that a person wants to live (paraphrasing Amartya Sen, 1999). Nevertheless, this is not to argue that economic growth is not important for the development of one country, but that economic growth is successful only and only if moral principles, freedom,

23 political participation, security, respect, are taken as the priority in the development of a country’s society.

1.5.1 Development Ethics and China China’s development path has been dominated by one rule, one scope: economic growth. While this growth has been striking for the economy of the country as a whole, the benefits of such growth has not been enjoyed by the whole population. While many Chinese people are so rich to be able to buy the most superfluous objects and materials, one very relevant part of the population faces extreme poverty. Just recently the Morning Post published the heart-breaking pictures of Guangzhou’s mothers been forced to abandon their children because of extreme poverty of the family (SCMP, 2014). Unfortunately, the development path of China has been characterised by a strict economic determinism. This kind of development did not secure the promotion of moral principles, of freedom, of justice. It did not sufficiently secure, what Goulet (2006) sees as the scope of an ethical development, that is the promotion of life-sustenance, self-esteem, freedom. Therefore, development needs to be addressed not just as growth, but also in terms of basic needs, human rights, social justice. This is the path that development ethics advocates for. Goulet, already in 1971, in his famous work, The Cruel Choice, posed an important question: “How can moral guidelines influence decisions of those who hold power?” (Goulet, 1971, 335). The answer is not easy, especially since it seems that development cooperation is mostly driven by economic forces rather than moral grounds. Goulet explains that development ethics brings results only when actions taken by the public authority, together with the actions of private agents, promote improvements of the public community’s life. In the case of China, economic determinism has prevented further engagement on the social policies of the public community. Nevertheless, in recent years something has changed amongst those who hold the power. An agenda including human rights in development has been drafted in 2012, and concern has risen for social and economic inequality amongst the population. Therefore, the long run hope is that the Chinese development plan would take into consideration the development of basic needs and freedom. However, recent facts have also demonstrated that the Chinese government lacks ethics in international relations. In fact, the Haiyan typhoon, which has recently killed thousands of people in the Philippines, has proven that the Beijing government does not have moral principles attached to its provision of aid.

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1.5.2 The Ethics of Foreign Aid The ethics of foreign aid has two distinguished sectors of intervention. One aimed at disaster relief and one at development aid. The latter has an impact in the long run, while the former needs to address disasters mostly in the short run. Between the two, disaster relief has more moral standing, because it tries to help a country facing a terrible disaster. China, by giving a meagre donation of U$100,000 to the Philippines - after the tremendous consequences of the typhoon - has proven not to have any moral standing, especially given it is a country with the second biggest economy in the world and with a huge surplus in the balance of payments (Beach, 2013). It seems that China’s foreign policy in development is driven by gain, rather than by ethical choice. The reason behind such an unethical move has been related to the islands disputed between China and the Philippines. This means that the Chinese public authority is not ready to make something good for the public community abroad, when their economic and strategic interests are put into question. On the contrary, countries such as the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have demonstrated a more ethical behaviour by giving more funds and more support. Moreover, the Philippines themselves - irrespective of the islands disputed - have proven to have more ethics than China in terms of disaster relief. In fact, during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the Philippines donated U$450,000 to China (Pesek, 2013). Clearly, a huge effort from a small economy, such as the one of the Philippines, and one which shows the country’s willingness to do good for someone else in extreme need. However, while in disaster relief, countries have more compelling reasons to alleviate the immediate suffering of the population affected by disasters, development aid is different. Development aid has mostly focused on the promotion of economic growth, partially disregarding moral principles. Nevertheless, when the current aid regime was established in 1949, the USA promoted a plan of economic assistance for Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such a plan had a very ethical aim in helping the population affected by poverty and suffering. President Truman, in fact, argued in 1949 that the USA, by being a wealthy and technological advanced country, should have helped poor countries to develop in a way to realise the aspirations of their citizens (Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address, 20 Jan 1949). Truman’s view has been enshrined within the policies of the current Western aid regime, which is represented by countries belonging to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Later studies have proved that those countries gathered together not just for an economic benefit

25 out of development cooperation, but to do good; in other words as Lumsdaine (1993, 283) puts it, “the strongest source of support for promoting the economic development of the poor countries has been a sense of justice and compassion.” Nevertheless, doubts still remain about the effectiveness of the Western aid regime, and several scholars (William Easterly, Dambisa Moyo) have proved that in many cases aid has been given for political reasons rather than for justice and compassion. Nowadays, the moral scope of development aid has also been embraced by wealthy private individuals, first amongst several Bill Gates, who with the Gates foundation, invests in foreign aid much more than governments do. Gates understood that private gain cannot obfuscate the importance of doing good, especially for those who have a consistent wealth. In his own words people’s lives have equal values (Riddell, 2012), and that is why we should all contribute to help to lift poor societies. In conclusion, a more ethical path to development should aim to do good. Economic growth alone cannot achieve the overall development of one country. Actions need to be taken to improve the life of the public community in value terms. Development should focus on a theory of value which should guide the actions of governments and private individuals. This is not just a duty that any government should consider as a priority, but something that the whole community, including private individuals, should embrace. Justice, rights, freedoms should never be traded with economic gain. It is true what the proverb says that there is nothing worse than the blind man who does not want to see, and nothing worse than the deaf man who doesn’t want to listen. This is why democracies should never accept the limitation of those morals principles on which the community’s life should be based. There is no economic growth that can justify giving up on moral principles, on freedoms and on values. In an historical period in which countries are starved of leadership, the hope is that governments will re-focus their development aid towards the promotion of more ethical development.

1.6 Thesis Structure This thesis has ten chapters. The first six chapters set the main points of this thesis. After an Introductory chapter that explains why Timor-Leste is a good ground to test Australian and Chinese aid, the thesis develops into an assessment of how different theories would study the proposed topic. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on foreign aid and international development with a focus on Chinese and Australia aid principles and norms. Chapter 4

26 presents the theoretical framework, while Chapter 5 focuses on the methodology employed to gather and analyse the data. Chapter 6, instead, explains some of the issues faced during the fieldwork experience. The main body of data is presented in Chapter 7, 8, 9, 10. Chapter 7 explains why Australia and China are giving aid to Timor-Leste, Chapter 8, instead, focuses on the perceptions of East Timorese, both officials and students, on the aid provided by China and Australia, including an assessment of the hybrid agriculture implemented by both donors. Chapter 9 elucidates the current impasse of Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN, this chapter is especially important because during my interviews both Australian and Chinese officials have expressed the view that their aid is given to support Timor-Leste advancement to join ASEAN as soon as possible. Chapter 10, finally, critically analyses some of the findings in the previous chapters, explaining if cooperation amongst China and Australia can further progress and if there is a change or not in the aid regime.

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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW2

2.1 Definitions: Development and Official Development Assistance This thesis is dealing with two aid donors, China and Australia that have a different approach in delivering their aid assistance, therefore a definition of key terms is vital. Nevertheless, in the case of China a clear definition is not available due to sufficient information, data and white papers. Foreign aid is a very broad term, and scholars (Davies et al. 2008; Bräutigam, 2008; Riddell, 2007) have given many detailed interpretations of it. What is common, however, is foreign aid intended as a form of support and help given by one nation to another for purpose of development.

2.1.1 Western Meaning of Development A wide definition of development is needed in order to understand the assumption according to which scholars conduct their researches. Development, in fact, does not strictly mean growth, expansion, progress, improvements, but it first means change. Any under developed country needs a change in order to develop. This change must affect not only the economy of one country, but also its society. The path to development has common aspects amongst countries and governments, however most scholars have focused on development in terms of economic growth. Nevertheless, experience and analysis teach that one thing is to grow fast, and one thing is to see if the population benefits from this fast growth. Nowadays, many fast growing countries, ie. Nigeria, Botswana, still have a huge income inequality. Therefore, in many cases the benefits of growth are only shared by the richest part of the population. Moreover, development cannot be linked only to the economic sphere, but also to the social one. It must encompass economic and social purposes and values. Goulet (2006) tried to define development on the base of three core values. He said that development has to be related to life-sustenance, self-esteem and freedom. For life-sustenance he meant that

2 Part of this chapter has been published in: Talesco, Cristian. (2014). Foreign Aid to Timor-Leste and the Rise of China. Journal of International Studies, 10, 131-150. http://jis.uum.edu.my/images/pdf/10jis/8jis2014.pdf

28 development should be concerned with basic needs. Such approach was introduced by the World Bank in the 1970s and shared by scholars, amongst which also Amartya Sen. For basic needs the definition intends that a country to be considered developed needs to guarantee to its population: housing, clothing, food and primary education. This should lead the population to get out of poverty. For self-esteem, Goulet intends respect, independence and sovereignty. Countries should be considered developed if they are not exploited by others, and should be able to have international relations on equal terms. Basically, also developing countries should be able to talk amongst equals. In fact, the status of powerful countries, ie. the USA, or even China, is given by the leverage of their economies. However, by having a small economy, countries feel themselves inferior, and therefore lack confidence to talk with their “giant brothers.” For example, if we compare Rwanda with Germany, or the USA, or Timor- Leste with Australia and China. Freedom, other core component of development, which is also retaken by Sen in Development as Freedom – prescribes that people should be able to determine their own future. Goulet affirms that by having freedom, the population should be free from wants, ignorance and squalor. Freedom , here, means choice; people without choice are not free. If they have no education, they have no choice and so no freedom. By and large, these three components affect a country, ie., on the international scene, when a developing country has to deal with a developed one, and they affect the population from an internal perspective. When the population is poor, lacks life-sustenance, and so by lacking basic needs, it also lacks self-esteem. The lack of basic needs and self-esteem means that the population has no choice and so it is not free. This cyclic situation leads to what Galbraith (1980) defines as the “accommodation to poverty.” This is close to the concept of poverty trap, which see the trap as “any self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist” (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005, 326). Development, therefore, needs to address these traps by breaking the cycle. The core values of development studied by Goulet are very much interrelated to the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen (1999), which sees poverty as the deprivation of entitlements and capabilities. Clearly, amongst developing countries there are cases in which people have income, but they are still deprived of opportunities and liberties in terms of political freedom. Therefore, any definition of development which strictly fights poverty in terms of growth is reductive, in fact poverty is not just the lack of “minimum

29 necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency”, as defined by Rowntree (1901, viii). The capability approach is probably one of the most comprehensive way to describe development. In fact, Sen has seen economic development as an expansion of capabilities, where capabilities are intended as the full bunch of rights and obligations that a person has. When a person has rights is capable of acting within the society. These rights and obligations are not described by any indicators of economic growth. For example, rights and obligations include the rights to work and the ability to buy commodities, they includes the obligation to pay taxes as well as to receive health care, education and participation in society. If we put this in context, i.e., the favelas in Brazil, we would see that most of these people do not participate in the society, do not work, do not pay taxes, do not have access to health, they are emarginated. Therefore, making people capable of living means that they are free. By achieving freedom, countries achieve development (Sen, 1999). Freedom is at the same time the scope of development and the way to achieve development. By removing what Sen calls forms of unfreedoms people acquire choice and opportunities. Forms of unfreedoms are famine, food insecurity, scarce health, lack of basic needs, but also lack of political and civil rights. Eradication of forms of unfreedoms, therefore, can be indentified with the aims of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Therefore, development has to be seen as the expansion of those capabilities that people enjoy in the Western world. Not only economic growth, but eradication of forms of unfreedoms. In fact, economic growth is not an end in itself, but it is one of the mean to achieve the capabilities. This view clearly contrasts with the one of more conservative economists which sees economic growth as the aim of development. However, although economic growth is important because gives to people more disposable income, it is not the only parameter that can be considered for achieving development. On the contrary, economic growth is an unequal measure for development; many countries although wonderful performances have high income inequality. Only growth with equality in terms of wealth distribution can spur development. The capability approach permeated most of the studies of the World Bank since 2000, and it is today widely regarded by the international community. In conclusion, a definition of development can be summarised as what occurs “when there has been an improvement in basic needs, when economic progress has contributed to greater sense of self-esteem for the country and individuals within it, and when material

30 advancement has expanded people’s entitlements, capabilities and freedoms” (Thirlwall, 2011, 20).

2.1.2 Chinese Meaning of Development Dealing with Chinese development assistance is not an easy job for researchers and scholars. China does not collect data as the Western countries do. This lack of data is a problem for those interested in quantitative analysis. However, China publishes since decades these Five-Year Plans for National Economic and Social Development that promotes the development strategy of the country. The last one, the 12th, runs from 2011 until 2015, and it is a very wide document that helps to understand the meaning of development for China. Even though there is no clear definition of what development is, we can find out a provisional definition by analyzing the document. This is a national document that has emphasised until recently the importance of growth to spur development. However, with the last 12th plan things changed. Although growth remains important, the government is prioritizing strategies to achieve long-term prosperity for the whole nation. The core idea, of the 11th Five Years plan, was that economic growth would have spurred development, and so building of infrastructures, health facilities, etc. However, in the last plan China changed direction, because the reality of the limited perspective on economic growth showed to the government that rapid growth does not necessarily mean that it is sustainable. Furthermore, the country faced issues for pollution, excessive use of raw material and energy, income inequality (Xinhua, 2010). Therefore, the Chinese government learnt that a country by growing fast not necessarily develop in the hoped direction. This brought the government to understand development in a broader term. Not just economic growth, but also reduction of inequalities amongst the population. Today in fact China is an half developed country. While 10% of the population is very rich, the biggest part lives in poverty. Moreover the rural-urban divide is huge. This national plan, therefore, explains that China see development not just as an expression of growth, but as investment in the most remote area of the country. In fact, although big cities, ie., Beijing and Shanghai and other grew very fast, remote areas remained poor. The government has also understood that fast growth means pollution, fast waste of resources, and in order to guarantee a long-term development those resources need to be organised and properly used. China became also sensible to the environment.

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However, the idea of development for China did not encompass until recently the notion of human rights. The 12th Plan, in fact, concerns more with economic development and social disparities. Even if the country achieves them in a short period of time, this does not mean that the country is developed. What Amartya Sen argued with the forms of unfreedoms does not concern China. Political and human rights are still issue to be solved, and talking about them within a plan of development is a risk. The country is so big that any form of freedom could undermine the unity of the country. This is why the government avoids talking about development in terms of political and human rights. Nevertheless, in 2012, the Chinese government came out with a new plan called National Human Rights Action Plan of China that runs until 2015. The plan points out the need for respect and safeguard of human rights. This plan is opening a new path for the Chinese concept of development. Therefore, although the definition of development for the Western countries is quite homogeneous and well structured, for China the definition is still under construction. In the sense that China is facing so many challenges within its country that by understanding those challenges is improving its development strategy. Nevertheless, the core values are there. Western world and China share the concern for economic growth. They are both keen to solve inequalities, the rural-urban divide. Furthermore, it seems that China is also working towards a society were human rights are established and respected.

2.1.3 Western and Chinese Meaning of Development Assistance The concept of aid is different between Western countries, and in particular the DAC donors and China. The DAC definition of aid has been published in several paper of the OECD and it is a definition built on the agreement of all the donors. China instead is a single rider. An emerging economy, with more than U$3 trillion of surplus, and with many internal problems. China has always been outside the circle of the DAC donors, which is a sort of special club for exclusive countries. As China has always been seen a developing country, it was not regarded as an aid donor until the country started to make the difference; in other words aid has always been given by the DAC donors with their rules, but today there is an alternative: China and its rules. A definition of development assistance for the DAC donors and for China requires an analysis of the different approaches and implications of both donors.

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The DAC definition of aid - which is shared by its 24 exclusive members and include Australia - sees development as the “flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA [Official Development Assistance] flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. Lending by export credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export promotion—is excluded” (OECD, 2003). This thesis is not going to enter into the merit of the economic analysis of the definition. Nevertheless, a brief parenthesis is needed. In fact, the grant element of 25% (with a fixed 10% rate of discount) makes a loan a form of development assistance. However, a loan with a 25% of grant element could be more expensive than a loan taken at a private bank. Why could this happen? Because the definition has been structured in the 1970s, when interest rates were very high. Today, however, loans are linked to the London Interbank Offered Rate, which hover between 1 and 4 per cent (Bräutigam, 2011, 3). This means that a private loan could have an interest rate twice cheaper than a loan given as aid. Therefore, the concessionality of loans given by the DAC donors could be put into question. Such a definition of aid assistance is not used by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which rely on a higher grant element of 35% and use current commercial rate. Nevertheless, this problem is not the core matter of this thesis that points out more on value and norms behind aid assistance. Therefore, aid is given under the form of loans and grant for the economic development and the welfare of developing countries. This definition has been shared by the western donors at the point that in 2000 they gathered in New York to promote and sign the United Nations Millennium Declaration. This declaration has been signed by all members of the UN, which committed them to implement it. On this occasion they agreed to eight goals of development, the so called Millennium Development Goals, which points out the need to fight poverty, health issues, gender inequality, to promote environmental sustainability and global partnership. On the occasion countries agreed to give in aid 0.7% of the gross national income. Chinese definition of development assistance is similar. The country defines aid according to its concessionality. China gives aid as grant or zero-interest loans, or loans with a fixed or low interest rate. The Ministry of Commerce is the one in charge to give

33 aid grants or zero-interest loans. It does so through the China Export Import Bank (Eximbank), which also takes care of a mix of factors: diplomacy, development and business. In fact, aid assistance is for China a tool to develop long term relationship with the recipient country and possibly also business interests in the long run. What fallen under development assistance has been listened in the 1998’s “Budget Management of Foreign Aid” issued by the Ministry of Finance of China. The budget affirms that the following can by funded as aid assistance: a) plants general goods, military goods, and cash provided to recipient countries; b) training expenses of trainees accepted from recipient countries and salaries of experts and administrators sent to recipient countries c) cost of interest subsidies for concessional loans; d) funding of specified items in the portion borne by Chinese firms in foreign aid funded joint investment and cooperation projects; e) administrative charge paid by the firms to which aid projects have been contracted out and fees for their services acting on behalf of the government (Kobayashi, 2008). By being a tool of diplomacy aid play an important role for China. It is a tool to make relationships stronger, and on this ground China offers aid potentially to each country with which it has established formal diplomatic ties. However, Eximbank only offers those loans to creditworthy countries. For less creditworthy countries, instead, China offers to build tangible projects. For example, China built a geothermal power project in Kenya, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Timor-Leste. Other trustworthy countries instead receive loans and grants, ie. Botswana, which is now an upper-middle income country. Western donors could argue at this point that China gives aid in exchange for trade, oil and resources. Deborah Bräutigam (2009, 281) contends this by affirming that “the existing evidence suggests that China does not use its official foreign assistance budget to support bids for oil investments or natural resource concessions.” Again evidence could, instead, suggest the opposite she argues. In fact, several other scholars have proved that modernization is the primary scope of the Chinese leadership (see Saunders, 2006; Sutter, 2006; Li, 2010; Zhang, 2010). Within this plan, Chinese foreign aid as a tool of diplomacy “is likewise expected to serve the goals of national development” (Shimomura and Ohashi, 2013, 23). Modernization requires resources. Moreover, Li (2010) explains that Hu Jintao pressed the foreign policy staff to do anything feasible to promote the domestic political economy. Hu Jintao’s plan of the ‘two grand contexts’ (liang ge daju) aimed at promoting China’s development at domestic and international levels. Given that foreign aid is a tool of

34 foreign policy and economic diplomacy, it is usually seen in the optic to also promote national development. Furthermore, to meet the internal demand for resources the Chinese government has pressed Chinese companies to gain exploration or supply agreements with oil producer states (Cheng, 2012, 8). Hence, China’s interest in Timor- Leste does suggest a bid for oil; also the fact that China secures its loans in less trustworthy countries with oil and resources would be a sign that China’s interests are not different from the Western ones. Nevertheless, what China gives to another country through the Eximbank has the objective to “promote economic development and improve living standards in developing country, and to boost economic cooperation between developing countries and China” (Bräutigam, 2011, 4). This means that aid concessionality is emphasised by the DAC donors as well as by China, moreover, they both offer export credits, which, however, are not considered as official assistance. Therefore the core definitions of development and official assistance are in summary pretty similar. The scope why aid loans are given is at least on the ground based on the promotion of economic and social development.

2.2 How China Came to Become Involved With Timor-Leste Newspapers have widely covered the disappointment of Australia’s government to see that Timor-Leste has turned to China’s aid and military support. Australia is the traditional donor par excellence together with USA and the EU institutions in Timor- Leste. Australia made the rules and set the agenda for global development with the DAC. However, Australia has proved that commitment is one story and disbursement is another story. They should match each other, but this is not always the case. Timor-Leste is a country in need, and when the local government realised that Australia was not a totally reliable partner, it turned onto China to address some of the imminent and long term challenges. Figure 1 shows the problem. Australia since Timor-Leste independence in 2002 committed to give a specific amount of aid that was not disbursed in total, especially during the key years 2005-2006-2007. In these three years Timor-Leste passed through a serious instability. Turmoil erupted between the military in Timor-Leste in 2006, this led the country towards a serious instability. Foreign intervention was necessary, Australia and Malaysia deployed soldiers to try to maintain stability. In this period of instability food was scarce, however Australian aid was reduced. This happened because Australia’s aid is attached to government effectiveness, and during turmoil usually governments fail

35 to maintain control of the country. Therefore, Australia reduced aid to push the country towards more good governance. However, Australia, since the attacks to the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001, has also committed to support the USA unilateralism, and the relative NATO operations. This move has been joined by most of the DAC donors. This has clearly affected their capacity to disburse the aid promised to developing countries. In fact, only the war to Afghanistan has cost to Australia AU$7.5 billion, and the lives of many soldiers (Brissenden, 2013). Moreover, when countries revise their annual budget most luckily when is about to cut on cost they will do it by reducing aid. In 2014, Australia approved a new budget cut on aid for AU$ 650 million, while military expenditures increased (Hall, 2014). The government of Tony Abbott made severe change to the foreign aid structure. First of all, dismissed the AusAid agency, and merged it into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in addition it hugely cut on aid. When traditional donors cut on aid, they create concerns in the recipient countries that heavily rely on foreign assistance. Timor-Leste is an aid dependant country, and particularly in 2006 during the political crisis aid and support was extremely needed. This is the moment in which China acquires the trust of the East Timorese government. In 2006 with the tremendous food scarcity, and the reduction of Australia’s support, China stepped in. The Beijing government donated 4,000 tons of rice and 500 tons of cooking oil (Peoples Daily, 2006). This helped the East Timorese government to ease the population and refugees demand for food. Since 2002 when China established diplomatic relations with Timor-Leste, the Beijing government has looked into economic opportunities in Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, strategic reasons were of utmost importance for the One China Policy. In fact, already before the independence of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão, claimed that China was a reliable friend, and he committed the little tiny Timor-Leste to a One China policy (Storey, 2006). China’s aid was particular evident in developing infrastructures. Nowadays, five main buildings in Dili are signed by Chinese aid. This has boosted East Timorese self-esteem, and it was seen as a practical form of aid. This has lead the current East Timorese Ambassador to China, Vicky Tchong to claim that: “We can get almost anything we want from China; all we need to do is to ask” (Horta, 2014). Similarly, Prime Minister Tuilaepa of Samoa accused Australia and New Zealand of been unable to help with development in some areas. Therefore, the countries has brought the Chinese in to help. Small countries are eager to catch up and develop, and if they see a

36 lack of interest from the West, are obliged to look for other sources of help (Radio Australia, 2012).

140 Australia’s Aid to Timor- 120 Leste (USD 100 million)

80 Commitment 60 Disbursement 40

20 Source: OECD

0

2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Figure 1 – Source: OECD

2.3 Chinese Aid to Timor-Leste China has established formal diplomatic relations with Timor-Leste since its independence on 20 May 2002. Before this time China has not been involved with Timor- Leste, even during the mass killing of the East Timorese by Indonesia. China believes that sovereignty must always be respected. Therefore, until East Timorese independence, China did not invest any money. The story of Timor-Leste has been structured on the roles and decisions of foreign powers. First, the Portuguese colonialist, then, the mass killer, Indonesia, finally the apparent “nice” neighbour, Australia. The country has always been weak, and it lacked the capacity building this is why it had to rely on foreign powers. China after eleven years tightened even more its ties with Timor- Leste. Today, even if Chinese aid is not as large as the one given by Australia or other DAC donors, it is an appreciated alternative for Timor-Leste. Most of Chinese aid projects are very visible and they impact on people’s mindset. However, China has relationships with Timor-Leste leaders since the 1970s. When Timor-Leste was invaded by Indonesia on 7 December 1975, most of European countries, Australia, the USA and even Russia avoided taking a stance on the invasion. Timor-Leste was a small region at the time, small population, and in the global vision was much better to have it annexed to Indonesia than independent. At the time, Canberra and Washington were afraid of the spreading of . By being alone Timor would have been

37 vulnerable to the interests of the Chinese, and the communist thinking of the followers of Mao Tse-tung. Such way of thinking is confirmed by one of the document of the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor. In particular, José Ramos-Horta, former Prime Minister and President of Timor-Leste and Nobel Prize Laureate for Peace, and Mari Alkatiri former Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, have been to China several times before Timor-Leste independence. But the Chinese have been far more important for Timor-Leste by giving support to East Timorese when they intervened at the United Nation Security Council, they tried to raise concern about what was happening in their country. The Chinese even recognised the first claim of independence of Timor-Leste after declaration on 28 November 1975. In that period not even the USA were caring of the human rights abuse in Timor-Leste. This seems a paradox in either ways considering the USA as the “chief” master in promoting human rights, and the current contradiction about human rights abuse in China. But what is less known is that since the Portuguese left after the Carnation Revolution in April 1974, China provided to Timor-Leste diplomatic and financial support to the resistance movement. This is probably something that was known by the foreign intelligence of USA and Australia that is why they were afraid of communism spread in Timor-Leste. East Timorese were basically alone in their fight for self-determination. No Western country was supporting their cause, even if the East Timorese had helped the Australian to fight the Japanese during WWII. In such a contest, in the 1970s, East Timorese pleaded help to China that in turn supplied military equipment to the resistance fighters. China tried to provide the resistance with a variety of light weapons. These weapons, however, have been blocked by the Indonesian army and the Australian naval force. In that period, only formal Portuguese colonies were supporting the cause of Timor- Leste. Therefore, the weapons were shipped by the Chinese in Mozambique, waiting better conditions to be delivered to Timor-Leste. This, however, did not happen. Such information was covered up by the media of the time. In Australia, the government did not want to upset Indonesia, because they were waiting to sign an important agreement for the exploitation of the oil of the Timor Sea. Such agreement later allowed Australia to fully exploit the field. This was maintained until the formal independence of Timor- Leste (Loro Horta, 2009). This strong interest for Timor-Leste by the Chinese was effectively motivated by the foreign policy of Mao Tse-tung epoch. In that period China supported revolutionary

38 movements as a way to undermine Western imperialism. Moreover, Van Ness (1970) found that the Chinese have provided substantial material support to foreign revolutionary movements. This was especially so when the host country adopted policies inimical to Chinese interests, especially in relation to Chinese sovereignty and UN support (Van Ness, 1970, 113). Scholars (Shambaugh, 1993, 147) who have researched on China’s engagement with its neighbours in Asia, disclosed that the role of threat perception in the formulation of Chinese policies has been key to the global engagement of China. In particular Chinese foreign aid and foreign policy is influenced by the way Asian neighbours interact with China (Shambaugh, 1993). However, Mao Tse-tung died in 1976, this made China more flexible in terms of foreign policy. Its moderate approach shifted its foreign interests at the point that China forgot about Timor-Leste and accepted its incorporation into Indonesia. Even in such a context China maintained some relationship with those who visited it during the 1970s, in particular with Mari Alkatiri, who then became the first prime minister of Timor-Leste. Alkatiri has always been very keen towards the Chinese, and in 1997 he was officially invited to attend the ceremony of handing over of Hong Kong to China. Later, in 1999, there was the referendum for independence of Timor-Leste, the population highly supported the separation from Indonesia. China immediately recognised the results and renovated its support to a free Timor-Leste, sending 55 civilian police to support the peacekeeping mission. This has been the first time China has deployed its soldier on a foreign ground. However, the decision has not been without pain. Russia and China are known to be reluctant to intervene overseas with mission. However, within the Security Council, strong countries pushed Russia and China to accept the peacekeeping mission called International Force for Timor-Leste (INTERFET) led by Australia. Their concerns were related to internal issues with Chechnya and (van Walsum, 2002). Chinese were reluctant towards Timor-Leste also because of the fear the new government would have recognised Taiwan. In fact, the Taiwanese government tried to open a Taiwanese Trade and Cultural exchange office in Dili, the plan was clearly hardly opposed by the Chinese. However, the Chinese obsession for Taiwan was clearly just an obsession. No one within the Timor-Leste government would have turned its shoulder back to the Chinese by recognizing Taiwan. It is also true that by being reluctant in establishing a peacekeeping force, the Chinese government lost its good image in the eyes of some important members of the future East Timorese government. Alkatiri understood

39 that Chinas was not reliable, this is why during his term as prime minister tried to establish strong ties with other big neighbours such as Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, the EU and the USA (Horta, 2009).

2.3.1 Concepts of Chinese Aid: Policy, Tradition and Motives When dealing with Chinese aid in Timor-Leste is quite complicated because there is not a strategy plan specific for the country. All the statistics scholars use, are mostly based on data provided by the OECD and the DAC donors. However, the Chinese strategy applied in Africa is the same applied in developing countries in Southeast Asia. Therefore, generally speaking Chinese aid to Timor-Leste is based on two main rules. First, no interference in the affairs of another country; hence respect for sovereignty. Second, aid has no conditions attached. They are both very relevant and innovative approaches to aid. The second in particular would be very attractive for recipient countries given the fact that Western aid has been criticised to have so many conditions attached. Nevertheless, China’s aid has “no strings attached”, like pushing for democracy or economic reforms (Wang, 2010). Untied aid, mutual benefit and equality are the core content of aid policy expressed in the 2011 White Paper. This white paper further digs into the opportunities to increase bilateral relationship between donor and recipient. The idea of mutual benefit for Timor- Leste and China is of extreme importance, as the next paragraph will analyse. China sees aid as a way to start cooperation between countries which can bring further economic benefits in the long run. However, it is relevant to see how the aid decision-making process is structured. Section V of the White Paper states that the decision-making power about foreign aid lies with the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But in order to strengthen the aid management the Chinese government has since ever given authorities to specific bodies to oversee the aid management. Currently, “the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the PRC is the administrative department authorised by the State Council to oversee foreign aid” (China’s Information Office of the State Council, 2011). The MOFCOM by being in charge of the foreign aid structure takes care of “foreign aid policies, regulations, overall and annual plans, examination and approval of foreign aid projects and management of the project execution” (China’s Information Office of the State Council, 2011).

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Chinese aid remains a bilateral way of relationship with recipients. The Ministry of Commerce also analyse what opportunities can come out following the aid assistance period. But a major role is also in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, which is also involved in policy decisions and international initiatives for aid. In particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes care through the Chinese Embassy in Timor-Leste of the relationship with the local government, of the needs expressed by the local people, which are then communicated to the MOFCOM (Lancaster, 2007). The choice of handing the aid management over the MOFCOM has been based on the need to develop trade ties. In fact, while China does not attach any strings to its aid, the government thinks in the long term benefits also for the country. Therefore, the link between foreign aid and trade is not a subtle story, but the engine which spurs Chinese interests in the world. Timor-Leste with its oil fields and with the needs of infrastructure and basic needs is a country that can bring long term benefit to China as well. So, the core idea of Chinese aid to Timor-Leste is very easy. China gives aid to Timor-Leste, and although it is not tied to any specific measures, in the long run China will benefit by established trade tie with the East Timorese. This is not negative; instead it is a further possibility of development for Timor-Leste. However, the current strong presence of Chinese in the country could potentially spur resentment amongst the locals. Resentment against Chinese in Africa is very common; this is especially so since in 2010 in Zambia two Chinese supervisors injured about a dozen local workers in mine that were protesting for better labour conditions (Knaup, 2010). Nevertheless, in order to make bilateral ties stronger it is important to establish official state visits. This is why the Chinese have invited in several occasions the East Timorese government and which in turn received the visit of the vice-Chinese premier. In conclusion, the aid management process is in the hands of the , which handed the oversee of the projects to the Ministry of Commerce. The latter analyses the situation in the local country with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and establishes projects and funds to be spend. Those funds or the projects are delivered through Chinese companies involved in Timor-Leste and with the support of the Chinese Economic and Commercial Attaché in Timor-Leste. The government, then, through the Eximbank gives loans and grants again with the support of the local Chinese embassy in Timor-Leste. The whole process is melted by the state visits, which are the glue to keep the bilateral relationships on the right track. Aid, as above mentioned, is given under the form of grants, zero interest loans, low

41 interest concessional loans (giving also subsides to the interest rates when needed). In the case of Timor-Leste, aid has been given mainly in material grants (infrastructure for example) and loans and grants. The percentage is small in comparison to the DAC donors, but the political debate is blistering the media in Timor-Leste and Australia. However, China has also merged foreign aid and investment in Timor-Leste. In fact, the country has been conducting field studies for further oil exploitation. The original plan was to build inland facilities, but it did not work out. The country is also investing in other sector, especially the private sector and for tourism. When looking at Chinese aid it is difficult to establish the amount of money involved. While the DAC donors always publish statistics about the amounts of aid and investment in the different sectors, China does not have a similar approach. The few statistics are published in term of Chinese RMB and not US dollar, so quite often there is confusion about the amount of money involved. The other point is that China leaves the choice to the recipient country to publish report and assessment. In this regard, the basic core difference between Australia and China is that China wants that its aid is eye-visible and so it invests more in infrastructure as it did in Timor-Leste. Australia, instead, and the other DAC donors take care more about the figure and the statistics, so more about numbers. This is why so many data are available about the amount of money involved in Timor-Leste by the DAC donors. However, it is clear that for the local population an infrastructure built by the Chinese - and Dili currently have more than five public buildings built by the Chinese - is more visible than Australia’s aid funds. However, this needs further judgment because the benefits of Australia aid are very well recognised by the rural population of Timor-Leste. As seen Chinese aid practices are based on mutual benefits for donors and recipient. In fact, China aims through foreign aid to gains access to the recipient market, how? By gaining labour and engineering contracts from the recipient country in exchange for the assistance provided. In other words as Berthelemy (2011, 16) puts it Chinese “development assistance is usually granted in kind, while financial assistance is given to finance contracts that are implemented by Chinese companies”. This trend is highly visible in African countries, such as Angola. Nevertheless, also Timor-Leste has been affected by the same policy. Chinese foreign aid has, in fact, been secured by contracts managed by Chinese companies. But China went much further in this concept of mutual benefits, by giving a much stronger role to old trade form of barter. Timor-Leste, in fact, has benefited by low-interest loans

42 which in the willingness of China needed to be secured by natural resources or other goods. However, by having signed an agreement with Australia, Timor-Leste was prevented to get aid with oil. Chinese, therefore, offered aid on the assurance that could make inshore oil research, which later did not have the hoped outcome. While China needs of resources shape its aid policy practices, it is true that such practices may be undermined by the presence of the DAC donors. The strong Australian presence in Timor- Leste makes the barter game much more difficult for China. In Africa instead has been slightly easier. In Gabon, for example, China was able to secure the exploitation of iron ore fields in return of loans and grant for the Gabonese public expenditure (Davies et al., 2008). Such practices are widespread in resource rich countries in Africa, and the newly born Southeast Asian countries are on the same track. Although, Deborah Bräutigam argues that Chinese aid cannot be linked to its needs of raw materials and resource, current Chinese practices would show the opposite. Although, many critics have been done against Australian aid practices, China is undermining its aid agenda by showing a clear interest in resources. By consequence, locals have been labelled China as the new colonial power. Such a negative perspective could be counter-balanced if such eye-visible aid was creating local jobs. But in the perception of the East Timorese, nothing is happening, because China brings in the country Chinese labour and Chinese material. This is why, although the huge infrastructure projects of China in Timor-Leste, there was no benefit in the unemployment rate – which is around 80% of the labour population. By giving aid for trade, someone could argue that China only invests more in resource- rich countries because of the trade opportunities. However, the Chinese government has a different perspective. In fact, the government by giving aid on the idea of mutual benefits and sovereignty respect, it has put all the countries, small medium and large, on the same ground. The meaning is that China treats all the countries as equals. By treating countries on an equal base does not mean that China’s aid driving motive is out of trade interest. On the other side, aid investments in Africa show that China is investing were no other country is doing it. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo lacks infrastructures and China is helping the government to start with those infrastructures. Therefore, in the view of Bräutigam (2009, 146), China is filling the infrastructures gap, whose other donors do not want to worry about. This is what China has done in Timor- Leste in the last decade with the building of public infrastructures. This again is a form of eye-visible aid. Australia, instead, focused aid more towards the MDGs. However, aid

43 is also given for strategic reasons in Southeast Asia. Many development projects, run by Australia, aim also at avoiding the arrival of refugees and illegal migrants. Therefore, although in the capital of Timor-Leste, Dili, the local population cannot see any huge building signed by the Australian government, in the periphery of the city and in the rural areas they can see the benefit of health improvements and water and sanitation facilities. The overall consideration that China does not discriminate about aid recipient is true and this is visible in its aid investment in Timor-Leste, and other small island-nations. However, what Bräutigam affirmed about the Chinese lacking interests in oil resources, is highly debatable and contradictory to what she also claims, that China’s aid is almost entirely tied to trade conditions (Bräutigam, 2008, 204). So, although it is not tied to democratic achievement as in the case of the DAC donors, it is tied to business opportunities for China. This interest has been proved by Davies et al (2008, 19) that establish that China assurances its loan with the collateral. Now, it is highly contradictory to split trade interest from resources interest. Why should China be interested in giving aid for trade but not for resources exploitation? Chinese aid whether for trade opportunities, or for oil bids, is tied to economic goals. Timor-Leste experience tells to researchers the same. China tried to exploit inshore oil. Most of infrastructures were built with Chinese goods and labours, labour that remained in the country, and now compete with the locals to find jobs. This competition does not benefit the low and middle classes of Timor-Leste. Moreover, it seems the Chinese Embassy is helping Chinese companies to gain access to the East Timorese developing market. Substantially, the section argued that although the different values on which Chinese aid is structured, the aid practice shows that it is given for strategic interest, which is not in terms of regional strategy, or geographic as it is for Australia, but to develop further economic opportunities. This is a form of tide aid which clearly push resentment within the local population, as much as the DAC donors aid does.

2.3.2 Socio-Political Impact and Socio-Economic Impact Kingsbury (2012) in his analysis says that aestheticism of China’s aid in Timor-Leste seems to be more attractive to locals than projects that maybe effective but not visible. In fact he reports that locals have said looking at the buildings of the Chinese aid projects: “Look what China has done for us. What has Australia even done for Timor-Leste?” (Kingsbury, 2012). It seems that locals have ignored the millions in aid invested by

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Australia in Timor-Leste. This kind of contradiction between what locals see about Chinese aid, and what effectively Chinese aid did to improve the quality of life of the locals is still contentious. Nevertheless, beside socio-political impacts, what are the socio- economic potential? Chinese aid in Timor-Leste is based on “practical, realist and achievable objectives” (Brant, 2011, 8-9). Timor-Leste even with a small population is a market consumer because of its willingness to develop fast. Moreover natural resources make the rest of the story. China aims to spur “economic growth and implementing a development model based on each country’s specific requirements and circumstance”, Brant (2011, 8-9) affirms. This intention to spur growth has been shown by the commitment China has to build infrastructures in Timor-Leste. China and Timor-Leste have been both enthusiastic about the economic possibilities behind this bilateral relationship. China pushed Timor-Leste to accept its help and at the same time attempted to make a self-gain out of the story. China’s soft power, therefore, have pushed the East Timorese government towards its aid agenda (Kingsbury, 2012). In fact, Loro Horta (2009) made a study about the economic impact of Chinese aid in Timor-Leste analysing the different sectors. It starts discussing about the energy sector, which is probably the one that was more attractive by the East Timorese government for the need of power. PetroChina has been conducting seismic studies to understand the extent of inshore oil deposits. This study has cost U$1.7 million, and Timor-Leste expected China to bid for the building of a new processing facilities and transportation from the interior to the coastal area. However, as the study did not bring the hoped outcome, PetroChina decided not to commit itself to such a big plan with the risk of losing rather than gaining. But there is much more than this. The Chinese wanted a full commitment of the East Timorese government to guarantee exclusive rights to PetroChina for oil and natural gas resources onshore. However, Mari Alkatiri, as widely asserted during his mandate as prime minister did fully trust the strategy of the Chinese, however because basically they refused to disclose information about the potential of the onshore deposits, he changed idea. Alkatiri, in fact dismissed the Chinese offer. However, he wanted to have the Chinese in the country to counter-balance the Australian presence and exploitation of the off-shore fields. But he did not want to commit the country to exclusive rights to the Chinese. Alkatiri has always been a smart political figure in defending East Timorese interests. What he then did, was to contact Indian and Malaysian oil companies to start further studies on the onshore fields. The other political speculation about economic development

45 was related to the supposed willingness of China to build process facilities for natural gas in Timor-Leste. This would have undermined the Australian plan to build the same facilities in Darwin in order to create jobs in the Northern Territory. Nevertheless, Australia and China have a strong bilateral relationship at the point that China became the largest trading partner since 2007. However, the Australian government does not cope well with the Chinese presence in the areas fundamental for the Australian security (Dodd, 2008, September 30). Australia - although has strong economic ties with China - does not want to have another powerful country in the areas of its interests. China becomes a competitor, and Australia cannot get the best trade and resource deals if the local recipient country has an alternative like China. On the other side Australia should not be worried about its economic tie with Timor-Leste because José Ramos-Horta affirmed in 2013 that “Today we enjoy unique excellent relations with our closest neighbours, Indonesia and Australia” (Ramos-Horta, 2013). However, he went on admitting that Timor-Leste had to develop the closest possible relationship with China. Of the same token, China will never try to damage any relationship with Australia, especially in consideration of the strong economic interdependence. Nevertheless, the need for resources plays an important role. China has interests in oil and gas as much as in manganese and blue marble deposits, and also fisheries. Fisheries in particular raised concern in the East Timorese government. Chinese have been able to obtain fishing rights in the East Timorese economic zone, however the East Timorese are not able to control the numbers of Chinese vessels and the quantity they fish in the East Timorese zone. It has been calculated that the loss is huge for Timor-Leste because of the over exploitation of the fishing zone. The current situation is an indiscriminate thief of the coastal zone of Timor-Leste. In conclusion, in the last decade China provided more than U$35 million in aid. Although, China increased its aid assistance on a year base, the overall figure is still modest in comparison to other donors. Australia, Portugal, the EU institutions, the USA have been provided more than U$1 billion. Portugal, in spite its economic crisis, has provided U$470 million in aid. However, even with such modest aid, China opened strong ties with Timor-Leste. Its aid has also been the cause of major political debates in Australia and Timor-Leste. Chinese aid is loud, while Japanese aid is not. Japan has spent a consistent amount of aid in Timor-Leste, but the Japanese government discretion has made its influence much less visible among the local population. Someone could argue here that

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Chinese aid is an affair of showing off that Chinese can do, that Chinese exists. Discretion is definitely a good attitude to keep international relations going on peaceful. Loudness of Chinese aid is not welcomed by the DAC donors, and it also risks undermining the effectiveness of different forms of aid projects by the different donors. Media have also their role in creating this dichotomy between Chinese and Australian aid. In fact the New York Times have quite often published about the situation in Timor-Leste, and it did point more about the infrastructure built by the Chinese rather than to focus on other donors project (Mydans, 2007), i.e., the Japanese project to modernise Dili’s harbour and the construction of the first East Timorese highway. On the other side Chinese diplomat had an important role in developing economic tie between China and Timor-Leste. All the ambassadors that served in Timor-Leste were fluent in Portuguese, by having previous experience in Portuguese speaking countries. They were much more active in comparison to their Western counterpart, by talking and listening the needs of the local East Timorese government. They built strong diplomatic ties, aimed at economic gain for both China and Timor-Leste.

2.3.3 Is Chinese Aid: Effective Aid? China has definitely achieved its aim to promote its own form of delivering development across Southeast Asia. As seen, norms and values differ from the one of the Western countries. China was able to deliver a new aid model, which seems politically attractive to recipient countries. Nevertheless, it is quite complicated to assess if the new Chinese aid model has also impacted on the life of the poor. The framework created by the World Bank to assess aid effectiveness in Low Income Countries Under Stress is of difficult applicability to Chinese aid. Such a framework relies on quantitative data, which are available for aid delivered by the DAC donors. This framework is strictly Western made; therefore applying it to Chinese aid would be difficult. The only possibility to construct an idea of the Chinese aid impact is through qualitative research and with the literature. Overall, Chinese aid is something visible in Dili, while it is not in the rural areas.In fact, China has concentrated its aid policy mainly in Dili, the capital. Therefore, while the population of the city seems to be admired by those huge buildings that are definitely shaping the skyline of the city, the population of the rural areas might have a different perspective.

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China basically does not run aid projects in rural areas. It did not invest in water and sanitation, in health, or other areas of basic needs. For example, when in 2006 there was a political and military arrest in Timor-Leste, China has provided tons of rice and cooking oil in a period of food scarcity. However, China did not invest to give the local East Timorese the instruments to produce the food by themselves. There was no investment in helping the East Timorese to improve the outcomes of their rice fields. However, the policy of giving food in period of food scarcity is an incredible soft power tool, because the East Timorese government was able to gain time to re-establish food security across the country. The same has been done by the Chinese in another former Portuguese colony in Africa: Guinea Bissau (Miller, 2006). By providing food, China helped the government of Timor-Leste to avoid further political and civil unrest. This clearly boosted the image of China in the face of the East Timorese. This has also been the policy of USAID around the world. Therefore, it appears that Chinese aid is more effective in political terms than in poverty alleviation. One important thing to be noted is that in August 2008 during the opening ceremony for the Chinese Olympics, José Ramos-Horta, at the time President of Timor-Leste, has been formally invited by the Chinese government to attend the ceremony. In that occasion, Chinese President Hu Jin Tao has met Ramos-Horta in a private session, even if his agenda was busy in those days. Furthermore, of more than 60 Heads of State, Hu Jin Tao only met Ramos-Horta and the president of Philippines (Xinhua, 2008). Although, critics argue that China is strictly interested in economic benefit and resources, on the other hand what Hu Jin Tao did, was a sign of respect for a small country like Timor-Leste, which is often disregarded by the Western countries. The meeting with Hu Jin Tao was a strong sign of Timor-Leste recognition as a state that can talk with another state on an equal base. This meeting had a strong resonance in Timor-Leste, giving the East Timorese a strong sense of identity on the international stage. Therefore, an important tool in term of aid effectiveness, which is often disregarded, is the importance of diplomacy, and Chinese diplomats, as well as Chinese politicians have shown this capacity better than their Western counter-parts. However, we currently do not know if Chinese aid reduced infant mortality rate, malaria, dengue fever, and improved the health care. But we know that China has been training East Timorese doctors, and the country sent even an hospital ship in Timor-Leste just after the US did it. Again is this done for improving the life of the East Timorese? Is it done to make aid more effective? There is no precise answer. However, hospital ships are

48 one of the strongest soft power tools. US have been spurring its image by sending navy to quake regions and developing countries. China built a hospital ship that has been sent in countries in need. No one knows if such a movement is strictly related to political achievements, however, the reality is that many poor East Timorese benefited of surgery that would have been never possible in Timor-Leste, for lack of infrastructures and for money. Only the US hospital navy Mercy in 2008 treated 9,800 patients, including surgery for 270 of them (Peacekeeping: Chinese Hospital Ships, 2008).The US in particular has scheduled further visits of the hospital ship in Timor-Leste in the near future. This particular strategy seems to be structured to counter-balance Chinese presence in the country. In conclusion, Chinese aid is definitely visible in Dili, while in the rural is not. This is mostly due to the limited amount of money involved. It is also true that Australian aid to Timor-Leste is much bigger in figure and its impact is much more visible to rural East Timorese. In the next decade, however, Chinese aid will have an increasing impact on the life of the East Timorese. History will tell if this aid will be in the interests of the poor, or just another way to access resources and a developing market, or in the best case a combination of helping the recipient country and spurring trade opportunities. On the other side, the Chinese aid model seems more effective in political terms. This means that Australia should try to improve its way of dealing with its foreign aid recipients. Diplomacy is one of the tools of aid effectiveness.

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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK A theoretical background assists to the findings of this thesis, and helps to clarify concepts such as the aid regime that currently shapes the provision of aid. Moreover as Chinese and Australian aid relies on different norms and practices, without a strong adherence to theory it is unthinkable to understand the way both countries use to deliver their development assistance. This section will also critically analyse aid norms and the foreign aid industry.

3.1 Aid Regime Theory Regime theory as defined by Krasner is “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations” (Krasner, S. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, 1983, 283). Principles are dogmas of facts, where causality or morality is put into place. For example, foreign aid helps the poor, international human rights. Norms, instead, are specific standards of behavior, which are generally defined as rights and obligations for the actors involved. For example, non-interference is one of the norms of Chinese aid, while pushing for democratic liberalism is one of the norm of Australian aid. Regimes, therefore, can change when a change happen in principles and norms, while when the regime is established a change of rule or decision-making will affect the regime from within. Furthermore, as argued by Jervis, a regime “implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest” (Jervis, 1982, 173). Basically, regime theory portrays a state of affairs where actors in the international arena concur upon principles and norms guiding their actions. Regime theory in this sense puts forward an agreement between states that is not in the form of an official treaty, but that has the meaning of sharing norms and principles which are not just rooted in self-interest. On this assumption the DAC donors created an aid regime by sharing norms and principles according to which all donors give aid. The notion of aid regime is therefore crucial to determine similarities and differences between Australia’s and China’s aid. This will allow the establishment of models of conduct in Timor-Leste. And although Lumsdaine argues that “the strongest

50 source of support for promoting the economic development of the poor countries has been a sense of justice and compassion” (Lumsdaine 1993, 283), more steps need to be taken to have an idea of the involvement of actors with the foreign aid regime. Lumsdaine’s view clearly puts order to the foreign aid debate since the 40s and the 50s, asserting that an aid regime was created based on a moral responsibility. He went on saying that economic and political interests alone cannot be fully accounted for the rise of aid projects since the 40s and 50s, and that poverty reduction was definitely a norm and a goal of the aid regime established since WWII. However other scholars, such as Pharo, see the aid regime, as a Western construction, and linked to the emergence of the Development Assistance Committee of the 60s (Pharo, 2003). The difference between Lumsdaine and Pharo is that the former points out the existence of a universal aid regime rooted in Western norms and principles, while Pharo links the aid regime strictly to the DAC. The thesis put forward by Pharo is an interesting one, he sees aid regime as the right expression to depict international relations in the hottest period of the Cold War. Western countries in fact were striving (joint with the US) to attract developing countries within their sphere of influence. Therefore, the aid regime was structured to avoid the spread of communism in developing countries, and so to counter balance the influence of the Soviet Union. Today, China and its communist party represent a similar scenario (at least in terms of foreign aid). Nevertheless, aid regimes also constrain actors. As pointed out by Ruggie (1983, 63), “International regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime’s domain.” Such limits lie in the feedback mechanisms proposed by Krasner, in which regimes can modify the actors’ estimate of how to make the most of their interests. But regimes are also a possible supply of power on which actors can rely upon (Krasner, Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables, 1983). The aid regime created by the DAC donors, for example, although it is a supply of power for its 24 members, it remains a source of constraint for the interests of its individual members, which have clearly to comply with norms and rules. But speaking about aid regime, it is very relevant to look at its configuration. And in this sense the view proposed by Young is rather helpful- who makes a distinction between a spontaneous, a negotiated and an imposed regime (Young, 1983). The Western aid regime created by the DAC donors has been the result of years of negotiations and changes, and it can also be argued that its creation has been imposed by a supreme power, such as the US. On the contrary Chinese foreign aid has been based on a spontaneous will to enter

51 into deeper relationships with those countries that had formal diplomatic relationships with China. Therefore, China in the last 50 years established very strong ties with developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia, and although it is contentious whether China is creating a new aid regime or influenced the DAC donors’ aid regime, it is true that Chinese aid norms and values are spontaneous in scope and definitely not imposed or negotiated. China in this sense is a single raider in the foreign aid industry.

3.2 Different Perspectives in Aid Regime Theory The aid regime theory can have different perspectives according to the analysis and direction given to the research. Theory of aid regime can be power-based, interest-based, knowledge-based and Marxist in nature. Power-based theory of aid regime has a realist perspective. They see foreign aid as a tool to push political power over recipient countries. This perspective sees national-interests and therefore absolute gain of utmost importance (Waltz, 1993). However, they still acknowledge that inter-state cooperation is a reality that is in need of explanation. They still argue that collective interests can bring some relative gain. Putting this perspective into the current aid regime, we could argue that Australia is in Timor-Leste exclusively for resource interest (oil exploitation in the Timor Sea), and for strategic reasons. China, also, has proved to look carefully at the resources of Timor- Leste, for example it led an exploration mission of oil field inland. Moreover, China has also signed an agreement on fishing rights in the Timor Sea, and had got support for the one China policy. Therefore, a power-based theory of aid regime would see China and Australia maintaining and fostering their influence overseas. An interest-based theory of aid regime belongs to the neoliberal perspective. This is still the most influential perspective of aid giving. It has been the mainstream approach of the DAC donors and tends to focus more on international institutions. The scope is to realise a common interest and this has been visible in the creation of the DAC aid regime on which Australian aid is grounded. However, this approach heavily relies on economic theories, and the one size fits all approach has proved ineffective in many cases. However, such an approach helps self-interested states to coordinate their behaviour. This is why today most of the DAC donors give aid according to common norms. A Knowledge-based theory of aid regime has a cognitivists approach. It focuses on the knowledge-dependence of international behaviour. It focuses and stresses the role of

52 normative ideas. Aid, therefore, becomes the expression of norms and values that are shared by the donors and recipients. This recalls the moral vision of aid of Lumsdaine (1993). According to this perspective Western donors gathered together to improve the quality of life of poor people. In the case of Australia and China, the moral vision can be found in their willingness to help Timor-Leste to rise out of poverty. The last perspective of a theory of aid regime is related to Marxism. This perspective reduces China and Australia to a bunch of colonisers and exploiters of Timor-Leste resources. This perspective would argue that rich states are the core and they dominate developing countries for their own sake. Aid is mostly tied to the export of goods and services from the donors. This is something visible especially in the relationship between China and Timor-Leste. Furthermore, donors secure access to raw materials, like Australia is doing by exploiting Timor-Leste oil, and China tried to do with inshore exploitation of oil. These four perspectives, although valid, do not give a full understanding of China’s and Australia’s aid in Timor-Leste, especially if they are taken individually. The realist approach would totally neglect the possibility of strong collaboration between China and Australia in development aid in Timor-Leste. They would argue that the game theoretic prisoner’s dilemma is about defection of the enemy. In this sense, China would be focused on gaining out of Timor-Leste. The same would apply to Australia. Realists would argue that no one in Beijing or Canberra have any interest in the economic development of this little tiny part of an island in Southeast Asia. This perspective has been the focus of the writings of Hans Morgenthau in the 1960s, who also claimed “what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes” (Morgenthau, 1962, 302). However, realism cannot explain why Australia and China signed an agreement for cooperation in the development of the pacific. Therefore, interest-based theory would be more appropriate to look at the current situation between Australia and China. In fact, although both countries maintain a degree of self-interest, they still coordinate their behaviour in giving aid. Both countries think in the long run benefit of collaborating (Axelrod, 1984). While at this stage seems premature to speak about a foreign aid regime that would include the instances of the new emerging donors, there are indications that in the long run cooperation will prevail, maybe, leading to a reassessment of the aid giving norms. For the time being neoliberal theory of aid giving seems more appropriate to describe the current situation of interconnectedness between donor to donor, donor to recipient, recipient to donor. The current form of cooperation and interdependence

53 between China and Australia, China and Timor-Leste and Australia and Timor-Leste, gives indication that a complex interdependence relationship between these three countries (Nye and Keohane 1977) would also assist the discussion of part of this thesis. The theory explains that since the end of WWII the world became much more interdependent. Nowadays, countries economically interdependent like China and Australia have less room to skip cooperation and adaptation. This has probably brought the two countries to sign a cooperation agreement for the development of the pacific. However, the neoliberal approach to the foreign aid regime cannot account for the whole net of relationships between China, Timor-Leste and Australia. In fact, values and norms also matters in both countries willingness to give aid to Timor-Leste. Norms and values of both models have a special standing in the path of development of Timor-Leste. This is why a knowledge-based analysis of foreign aid is necessary to explain the current situation in Timor-Leste. On the contrary, a Marxism approach would be very negative, and would point out that foreign policy - and hence aid of China and Australia - has been up until now toward the exploitation of Timor-Leste. Hence a form of new colonialism. This approach has been particularly sustained by Cingranelli (1993) in his analysis of American foreign policy in developing countries. This might have some ground of trust, especially in light of the oil’s exploitation by Australia, and the willingness of Chinese to exploit inland oil field. Moreover, Australia tried to push the government of Timor-Leste to accept the construction of refugee processing facilities. However, these specific situations cannot account for the whole aid giving idea at the base of the Chinese and Australian models.

3.3 Aid Norms and Practices: Chinese and Australian Perspectives The 2011 White Paper on China’s foreign aid states the scope of giving aid to developing countries as a way to “help recipient countries to strengthen their self-development capacity, enrich and improve their peoples’ livelihood, and promote their economic growth and social progress” (China’s Information Office of the State Council, 2011). Such a definition uncovers the main norm of the Chinese aid regime: promoting the capacity for self-development, which means not interfering with the political infrastructure of recipient countries. The definition grants a strong level of independency to the recipient, which is not forced by conditional aid, as in the case of Australian aid to Timor-Leste. But the white paper also argues in favour of a mutual advantage out of aid

54 assistance. Economic growth and social progress are strong achievements to be reached by recipient countries. Respect for national sovereignty makes Chinese aid more attractive and eventually more successful. The kind of aid projects that China runs are based on tangible achievements that the population can immediately see. An example of Chinese aid projects are: construction of bridges; stadiums; government-run factories; technical cooperation projects, such as on-site training, advice and learning by doing; material goods humanitarian aid, ex. disaster relief; training programme; concessional loan projects, such as higher technology exports or construction projects, which are needed by developing countries (Bräutigam, 2011). Nevertheless, the above mentioned norms declared in the 2011 White Paper, are not new. Already in 1964 the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, speaking in Accra (Ghana), said that “The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.”3 The speech also raised the importance of respecting the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and the way in which Chinese aid is provided: interest-free or via low-interest loans, plus Enlai clarified that Chinese aid tries its best to help the recipient countries, and in no way does it aim to make recipients dependent upon it. The issue of aid dependency has opened a very wide debate amongst scholars sceptical of foreign aid assistance. Especially because the DAC donors aid assistance has proved to make countries dependent upon it. The origin of Chinese aid projects lies in the 1950s, even though China is still considered an emerging donor. China has been providing aid only on the basis of formal diplomatic ties with countries, without discrimination of any sort (Bräutigam, 2008). Chinese aid, although underestimated by the DAC consensus, has been providing a total of U$30 billion to developing countries in just over the last 50 years, Premier Wen Jiabao affirmed in 2008. Asian countries were the ones who benefited most from those funds (Bräutigam, 2010). Australia, the other famous aid donor in Timor-Leste, sees the rise of China in the foreign aid industry as a way to undermine the norms established by the aid regime imposed by the DAC donors. Such regime has been based on promoting good governance, democratic liberalism, and poverty reduction. The established aid regime helped Australia to shape

3 Speech in Accra, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, 15 January 1964. Cited in: (Bräutigam, 2008, p.11).

55 its image of soft power in Timor-Leste, however the rise of Chinese aid has destabilised the Australian image. Chinese aid, on the contrary, as seen, promotes different norms: self-reliance, mutual benefit, and non-interference (Brant, 2011). However, the story of mutual benefit is an interesting one. It seems as though, China, as a donor of foreign aid to Timor-Leste, establishes a win-win situation. By doing it, aid might be more effective than what we have seen up until now in Timor-Leste.

3.4 A Critical Perspective on Western Aid Norms The actual norms of the foreign aid regimes are related to a post-Washington Consensus construction where good governance and poverty reduction are emphasised as the aims to be reached. In practice, we will see that good governance appear to be a pre-condition rather than just an end in itself. However, since the 1990s the World Bank has shifted its development agenda from a neo liberal perspective towards the promotion of economic freedom through good governance (World Bank, 2000). The so-called Washington Consensus has been based on three pillars: fiscal austerity, privatization and liberalization (Stiglitz 2002). However, in the experience of many Asian countries those pillars proved not to be effective. In fact, the success of countries such as South Korea and Taiwan has been due to a strong state intervention. Both countries managed to have a high percentage of economic growth, joint with good results in terms of employment, poverty reduction, and income equality. In Little (1982), these successful stories are seen as the positive impact of protectionism reduction, outward-oriented economic policies and the spurring of free market. However, Amsden (1992) has widely proved that South Korea’s outstanding growth and poverty reduction cannot be merely related to the free market without further consideration. South Korea was very equitable, because assets and especially land were allocated on average equally before the economic boom. In addition, Korea did not concentrate income and wealth in the hands of the few. Such pattern of development is related to policy decision made after the end of WWII, when Korea was freed by the Japanese colonialism. The first policies adopted were to nationalise companies previously owned by the Japanese. Some were broken up and redistributed to the population. Furthermore during the period of the boom - since the 1960s – foreign ownership was kept low. Korea, also, offered primary education to all, and helped the best students to carry on tertiary studies. Export boomed and the labor-force was almost entirely absorbed (Gillis, Perkins, Roemer, and

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Snodgrass, 1987). All these factors contributed to keep inequality low, and not only the rise of income per capita. Amsden’s accurate study prompts him to reveal that state intervention and an interaction between state and market, together with import- substitution and export-promotion, were the key factors to such incredible economic outcomes. This clearly led to revise the neoliberal perspective of political economy that sees state intervention as something that does not promote long-term economic benefit for the collectivity. This encouraged the international economic institutions to emphasise the importance of good governance, and so the need to develop the role of the state as a primary condition for market-oriented reforms. The international institutions perceived that poverty could not be solved merely by improving the growth performances of developing countries, but by taking into consideration the role of the state. Nevertheless, as argued by Soederberg (2004) donors can withhold funds until recipient countries do not comply with donors’ requests, hence aid is conditional. This means that the empowerment of developing countries is not an aim of aid assistance, because “the path to increased growth and prosperity lies in countries’ willingness and ability to adopt policies that promote economic freedom and the rule of law (private property, the commodification and privatization of land, etc)” (Soederberg, 2004, 281). This doubtful context has been prompted by the fact that most of least developed countries were categorised as “failed states.” This is in conflict with the role of an “effective state” such as Australia. China was in neither position. By virtue of Timor-Leste passing many years as a failed state, it suffered increased intervention from traditional donors, which understood that an intervention was needed to avoid Timor collapse. This kind of intervention delivered through foreign aid projects was deemed as essential, and in such a context respect for the sovereignty of the recipient country was put into question (Manjikian, 2008). Therefore the post-Washington Consensus norms can be summed up in the words of Leftwich (1993, 603) as expression of “democratic good governance”, which basically mean that democracy and good governance can be the keys to development, as the case of South Korea has proved. For what concern poverty reduction, it has been judged as a reformulation of previous imposed political reforms. As Barder (2009) argues, the meaning of poverty reduction has never been put into question. Donors have always focused their critics toward the internal situation of recipient countries. Therefore, donors have prompted a plan of domestic reforms, rather than to analyse and judge the international system. In fact the causes of unjust development need to have a global answer. This means that the burden

57 of such a situation is not only in the ability of recipient countries to comply with the imposed reforms, but also in the ability of donors to understand where they failed. But admitting such a failure is not in their willingness. A similar situation can be seen in the current financial jeopardy of the EU. Conditionality, on which the aid trances are given, puts pressure only on deficit countries to adjust, but the real issue is that also surplus countries within the Eurozone should adjust. In the foreign aid industry, the richer north is lacking an understanding of the global imbalances, of donor responsibilities towards aid effectiveness (Storey, Bulloch, Overton, 2005). Nevertheless, for the DAC donors, it is important to be part of the cycle of donors which comply with the aid regime established amongst the decades. Donors comply with the norms of good governance and poverty reduction, and little questions their projects about the impact they have. However, for those that are outside this constituted system, a role of anarchists is affixed. China - as well as other emerging donors - is regarded as the one that undermine the norms established in six decades of development experience. For China the path towards development is not a matter of good governance, of failed state versus efficient state. China’s aid is based on mutual benefits and non-interference, which means that the sovereignty of recipient countries is always respected, and aid is not conditional.

3.5. From Western Aid to the Rise of China More than six decades of aid regime to establish global aid norms that would make aid effective, did not prevented China to enter the aid industry business. Woods (2008) has widely questioned the current aid regime in light of the emerging donors. He argues that China, as well as, other emerging donors are challenging the DAC aid regime by not adhering to it. His critic is not in light of dismissing the new role of China, but rather to understand how the international aid regime could improve its performances by taking into consideration China’s achievements in the aid industry. Nevertheless, the current aid regime has been established by powerful Western donors, which are reluctant to accept critics by comparison to emerging donors. Critics often show failure in the way in which aid has been delivered, failure in the application of the so- called “one size fits all” method, which clearly did not work at the time it was attached to conditional policies that where the same for all recipient countries. But in recent years the

58 role of China in the foreign aid industry raised concerns, and questions to whether the aid regime could be improved. Many researchers have been examining the situation of the current aid regime. In most cases they arrived at the conclusions that the current aid regime has been put into doubt. Not least, when it comes to the regime legitimacy, the decision-making process, and its effectiveness. Dambisa Moyo, in Dead Aid, William Easterly in The White Man’s Burden, Robert Calderisi, in The Trouble with Africa, have been put into question the real effectiveness of aid projects. This has clearly raised issues whether such an established aid regime is something that provides benefit to the collectivity. Those concerns are worsened by the raising role of the emerging economies in the foreign aid industry. China, in fact, has been able to lift an increasing number of people out of poverty. It has seen a constant and increasing rise in economic growth, making the country the second biggest economy. Now, the question to ask is whether China will change international development or if such a change is already happening. Arjan De Haan (2010) tries to come out with an answer. China, he says, is definitely an international player. Developed and developing countries are highly interlinked with China. Its fast development and growth cannot be simply dismissed by the DAC donors. More problematic, however, would be an admission by the DACs that a country like China is spurring attractive development possibilities for least developed countries. By admitting it, DAC donors would see undermined their global role, they would see compromised the norms and rules on which they have based the delivery of foreign aid. But even worse, it would mean an admission of failure. This, however, will not happen, but definitely the DAC donors needs to engage with the new role of China in development and with the rise of new emerging global actors such as the BRICS. Nevertheless, the raise of those new actors must be seen as an opportunity rather than as a threat. In terms of aid effectiveness DAC donors, IFIs and new emerging donors should collaborate to make the best impact out of aid business. Sarah Cook (2009, 3) affirms that “[…]the new approaches and challenges to development assistance offered by China create an opportunity for serious reflection on the western development model”. This challenge to the current aid regime is not just posed by the rising role of China or the BRICS. NGO, the media, famous people, and the accessibility to the Internet are raising concern about the effectiveness of the current aid regime and its norms. Even Bill Gates (2003) made clear that he “get[s] furious when foreign aid is wasted.” Wasted aid and the lack of effectiveness is what actually is undermining the western aid regime. But

59 these concerns are not the backdrops of a treat to the aid regime, but the chance to re- examine the regime and improve it. China’s economic power makes of the country an international global player, which also prompts its role in international development. Therefore, as today’s Western world does not disregard China as international trade partner, it must not disregard China’s role in the foreign aid industry. The Western world, OECD, IFIs should really analyse and understand the impact of Chinese aid and the way Chinese development experience can contribute to improving the aid regime. As Todd Moss from the Centre for Global Development put it in 2011: “New players are breaking the traditional aid cartel. The old donor-recipient model dominated by OECD governments is becoming increasingly passé. New donors (China, India, the Gulf, etc.) play by different rules and with different aid models closely linked to commerce. Big private philanthropists now rival mid-size government donors in both size and influence. The Gates Foundation now distributes about U$3 billion per year, which would make it the same size as the median OECD donor (or roughly on par with the aid programs of Italy or Australia).”

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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY Major problem in this research is due to the lack of reliable data on Chinese foreign aid. While Lancaster (2007) points out that China seems to manage the aid structure without a central system, Australia used to deliver foreign aid through AusAID (until October 2013), a centralised agency that also assessed its aid projects. Nowadays, Australia is delivering aid through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The other problem with China is that very rarely has released White Papers and statistics. Maybe, China, by being a developing country itself and so by being a recipient of foreign aid, preferred not to expose its rising role of an aid donor. At the same time official statistics and assessment of foreign aid would expose the country to assessment and possible criticism. Nevertheless, in the last few years, the literature about China’s development assistance has expanded immensely in line with its economic growth, development assistance projects, and trade agreements. This project, therefore, takes into consideration the wide existing literature on the argument. Currently, there are two white papers on foreign aid published by China in 2011 and 2014, and a white paper on the Chinese Peaceful Development. There is also a consistent body of reports published by Australia and Timor-Leste, which helps to understand donors’ engagement in Timor-Leste. Moreover, essential primary sources are diplomats and politicians’ speeches, interviews and statements; newspapers; WikiLeaks cables on Timor-Leste and the new portal on aid transparency run by the Timor-Leste government (see Appendix 1). These textual materials are analysed using discourse analysis as the way to understand how the discourse of development and foreign aid has been constructed in Timor-Leste.

4.1 Discourse Analysis The aim of discourse analysis is to examine the latent meaning of a speech or other ways of communication. Discourse analysis implies a way of looking at the text that goes far beyond the “visible surface content” (Babbie, 1995, 312). Therefore, the focus of analysis is on language and its hidden and implicit meanings. Discourse analysis can reveal how donors create the discourse of development and underdevelopment. How the norms of the foreign aid regime are understood by recipients and other donors. Governments’ role and aid agency and NGO are also critical in this aspect. Discourse creation lays its foundations on different criteria that touch the social, political and economic spheres (Faille Dimitri, 2011, 1). Nevertheless, as argued by

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Pieterse (2011), discourse analysis is a good tool for a critical analysis, but not for policy formulation. Heargues that discourse analysis is a critical analysis of development policies, official texts, and development thinking (2011, 3). However, he goes on arguing that this approach needs to be supported by a political economy critique, which in development studies is an essential component together with discourse analysis. Yet, a balance between the two can be important for the outcome. This is why the analysis of data take into consideration political economy variables when available. Following this perspective, this thesis does not evaluate the foreign aid regime, neither attempts to assert which regime is right or wrong. Both ways of aid giving might be rewarding for Timor- Leste if cooperation, moral values and willingness to do good will prevail at some point over a pure deterministic interests. Rather, this analysis attempts to explore the different ways of aid giving in Timor-Leste, and the East Timorese perspective on aid. It attempts to understand the position of the different actors, including not only the states involved, but also the East Timorese involved in the post-independence era. Discourse analysis, as a tool of analysis of international relations, has been applied by several scholars (Watson and Shapiro, 1988), who were inspired by the work of post- structuralists like Foucault and Derrida. Foucault explains that when we think of discourse: “we must not think of a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominated discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that come into play in various strategies” (1990, 100). As Watson and Shapiro puts it, discourse is “a kind of practice” (1988, 11) that creates norms and values with language, as in the case of the foreign aid regime. Therefore, Foucault focuses on the power of language and its link to knowledge, which is not static, but change as it is happening with the foreign aid regime. In fact, while the foreign aid regime in the 1960s have been considered an effective way to help the underdeveloped world, an historical account reveals many issues with it, and the failure of a one size fits all approach. This is why today is more recurring the idea of the rising donors. This change has been the consequence of sharing ideas, and different norms from the mainstream. In the 1960, certain countries have been in particularly privileged (power) position to dictate the rules of the foreign aid regime, and dictate what it was believed to be an objective truth (knowledge). A Foucauldian approach would study the way these rules became legitimated and objectively accepted.

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In practice, as Escobar argues, after World War II the discourse of development aimed at improving the underdeveloped societies. This is the period in which the dichotomy donor- recipient is created, and until recently there was not much criticism of the failure of the foreign aid regime in addressing the challenges of development. Escobar (1995, 5) recognise that experts were not bothered by “the fact that most people’s conditions did not improve but deteriorated with the passing of time.” Therefore, this representation of development became the normality. The norms of Western foreign aid became the idealised norms of conduct, that affected those conforming to them or rejecting them. In this framework, any outsider of the exclusive club of the DAC, whether a recipient or a donor was categorised as inferior. Therefore, there was an existing hierarchy in that time that prescribed specific way of resolving underdevelopment issue. Still today scientific and positivist methods are preferred, to local or experimental expertise (Kabeer, 1994, 72).

4.2 Methods and Materials The project main outcome is based on a qualitative research. It involves analysis of data from fieldwork in Timor-Leste and Australia. For what concern the sampling, purposive or judgemental sampling has been adopted. As claimed by Silverman (2013, 250) “Purposive sampling allows us to choose a case because it illustrates some feature or process in which we are interested.” Moreover, this research is based on a case of study “examines a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, and particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, 13). The rise of China in the development trajectories of developing countries is a relative current phenomenon. Famous donors, like Australia, are only recently metabolizing the presence of a new donor working outside the leading aid regime. Moreover, the rise of China is a global phenomenon that is affecting the foreign aid regime worldwide. Therefore, this case of study is instrumental (Stake, 2000) to the scope of exploring the rise of China in foreign aid. It attempts to provide an understanding of China’s aid for Australia in Timor-Leste as part of a broader global phenomenon. Within the instrumental case studies approach of Stake, Yin (2003) further explains that instrumental case studies can be exploratory (theory seeking) or explanatory (theory testing). Therefore, taking into consideration the focus of this research, an approach based on an exploratory instrumental case of study helps to understand how China is affecting the Australian aid regime, and

63 how the meaning of foreign aid is constructed from donors and recipient perspective. However, the scope of the research is also to see whether cooperation can be achieved between different models of aid. If this happens then the convergence of interests between China and Australia in aid giving would also test the aid regime theory. Therefore, exploratory and explanatory approaches do not mutually exclude each other; while in the specific case of my study can both provide further insights. Within this design, suitable informants are diplomats, politicians and foreign aid practitioners. Therefore, I conducted interviews with East Timorese diplomats and politicians, and with Chinese and Australian diplomats. In particular, the key informants are ambassadors and officials of the countries involved in this research. The total number of informants is not relevant to the findings of this thesis, because the selection has been done according to the specific attributes of the informants, and a lower number of interviewees are more manageable and provide the possibility to interview them more than once in order to improve validity. A list of primary sources in provided in Appendix 1. However, for this thesis 27 people have been interviewed, including officials (politicians, diplomats and embassies employees), students and farmers. The number does not have a specific meaning, but I stop gathering information when I found a convergence of answers.

4.3 Interviews Interviews are based on how interviewees respond to broad issues relating to foreign aid and foreign policy. Semi-structured interviews will be used, with different formats according to the informant country of origin. Given the locations of these informants in several countries, during the first stage of my research I will use e-mail based interview. E-mail-based interviews have some important advantages: for the researcher it helps to face the tyranny of distance (travel costs, data transcription), while participants are able to control the timing of the response. Moreover, as argued by James and Busher (2006), informants can have more thoughtful answers. Nevertheless, there are some counter arguments. For example, e-mail interviews tend to produce rapid answers, and informants are not able to get clarification straight away. Yet, they are a useful tool that provides written official statements from my informants. The data gathered will be used to construct a deeper and detailed questionnaire for face-to-face interviews. Interviewees will be asked to answer three questions in an open and deep manner. In order to overcome the problem of rapid answers, interviewees will be informed to write an appropriate

64 minimum number of words. The questions to be addressed are the following: What is in your opinion a definition of development that fits the current status of Timor-Leste? Could you tell me more about Chinese (Australian) foreign aid in Timor-Leste? How is Chinese (Australian) aid delivered to Timor-Leste? How do you feel when you work with Chinese (Australian) diplomats and its development partners? On the basis of these e-mail based interviews, I will construct and prepare for face-to- face interviews. The purpose of interviews is to collect the following primary data: definition of development for Timor-Leste; Chinese and Australian development aid in Timor-Leste; China’s and Australia’s foreign policy; Chinese and Australian Aid Principles and Norms; Cooperation between Australia and China. In this second phase, the face to-face interview procedure will use open-ended questions. According to Yin (1994, 84) informants provide “the facts of the matter as well as [for] the respondents’ opinions about events”. Respondents’ opinion, in fact, is crucial, given that they are part of a country body, they can provide information about the current status of facts and their interpretation of those specific facts. Therefore, face-to-face interviews will have a relevant number of questions beginning with “how” or “what do you think of.” Since, I am dealing with three different countries, I framed three different sets of semi-structured interviews which will attempt to avoid any political conflictual points (see Appendix 2). Fieldwork interviews will be supported by observation of current Australian and Chinese aid projects. In the idea to understand the discourse of development in Timor-Leste it is also crucial to look at the physical way aid is delivered.

4.4 Other Primary Sources There is an extensive body of reports published by Australia and Timor-Leste; China currently released two white papers on foreign aid (2011 and 2014), and there is a white paper on Chinese Peaceful Development, which discloses about Chinese peaceful engagement in light of its economic growth. Timor-Leste has recently begun to publish data on foreign aid via its portal www.aidtransparency.gov.tl. This portal is a very useful source, because, I will be able to track down any aid projects on Australia and China since 2000 to 2014. The portal releases information on the amount of money spent by donors and in which sectors of the economy.

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Moreover, the Chinese and the Australian Embassy in Timor-Leste publish most of the speeches of their respective Ambassadors online. The government of Timor-Leste also publishes the speeches of the Prime Ministers and other relevant members of the parliament cabinet. In addition, several hundreds cables released by WikiLeaks in 2010 provide an excellent source of information. In particular, cable 08DILI56 specifically addresses the rise of China in Timor-Leste. Although these cables are released by the American Embassy in Dili, they still provide a source of information and ideas on the Western perception of Chinese engagement in Timor-Leste. In conclusion, also statements published on the media will be taken as reference.

4.5 Political and Diplomatic Discourses: Differences and Challenges Political and diplomatic discourses are both interrelated and in the case of this thesis will be used to make sense of foreign aid norms and rules as tools of foreign policy. Both discourses are defined by their actors or authors, hence politicians and diplomats (Van Dijk, 1997). Nevertheless, although diplomats and politicians in their statements influence foreign policy of one country, they have different qualifications and very often their attitude is dissimilar. Diplomatic discourse concerns the engagement of country’s representative in diplomacy. Which means that diplomats are skilled to deal with sensitive matters or people (i.e. with government of hosting states). A diplomat in his/her role must be tactful, and therefore the context in which discourse takes place, is relevant to understand the intended meaning (Donahue and Prosser, 1997). However, politicians are not necessarily skilled or properly educated. They can be elected as in democracies (Australia, Timor- Leste), or appointed (China) or self-designated (North Korea) (Van Dijik, 1997). Sometimes, politicians are also aggressive in their statements, which is not usually the way discourse develops in diplomacy. Moreover, political discourse would also include the masses, while diplomatic discourse very often is confined to the relationship of diplomats with the hosting state. Finally, the degree of formalities and etiquette that diplomatic discourse shows are not quite the same in the political discourse. Again political discourse would also have different characteristics and definitions to whether we consider it from a domestic point of view or from an international point of view. For the purpose of this thesis Australian and Chinese political and diplomatic discourses will be considered as a tool of foreign policy, while from the East Timorese perspective also the

66 domestic discourse must be included. Nevertheless, a foreign policy analysis very often is confined to official statements, and in this sense many researchers confine their analysis to text available without having any fieldwork practice. Neumann, in fact, defines this type of analysis an “armchair analysis” (2002, 68). Yet, Neumann argues that official statements can be corroborated by the lived practice of diplomats and other involved in the issue under study. Therefore, foreign policy analysis can be supplemented with interviews, focus groups and participant observations. Moreover, political and diplomatic discourse analysis do not include only those elites who work in the making of foreign policy, but also all those that are recipient of specific policies. In fact, while foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy, the basic idea on which it is given is to help less developed countries to rise out of poverty. Hence, foreign aid affect different recipients, including NGOs and therefore they must have a say. As Van Dijk (1997, 13) claims “from the interactional point of view of discourse analysis, we therefore should also include the various recipients in political communicative events, such as the public, the people, citizens, the ‘masses’, and other groups or categories.” East Timorese NGOs in particular gather and contribute together with other members of the civil society to the Development Partners’ Meeting organised by the government of Timor-Leste. These meeting included donors’ countries representatives. NGOs interact in the development process financed by foreign aid and by local funding. Therefore, I decide to include interviews and observations with the Development Partners Meeting and some NGOs.

4.6 An Approach to Discourse Analysis This section draws on a specific example, in order to look at the way discourse analysis deals with a text. In September 2014, José Ramos-Horta has been to Australia to receive the honorary Companion to the Order of Australia. The award is in recognition of Horta’s wonderful job in strengthening Australia - Timor-Leste bilateral relations. On the occasion he commented of the decision of Australia to reduce its aid commitment. He pointed out that Australia’s reduction of aid is a “huge mistake.” He argued: “Aid is part of soft power diplomacy and when you cut-off aid, you’re shooting yourself in the foot diplomatically. You diminish your engagement, your contacts, your influence in the region and beyond” (ABC News, 2014). A way to analyse this short text can rely on a balance between Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) and Fairclough’s discourse analysis, which combines micro, meso and

67 macro-level approaches to text. At micro-level the researcher considers the structure syntax, rhetoric and metaphors expressed. Meso-level deal with power relations in the text. At macro-level instead the researcher concern with a broad understanding of the text including a societal perspective, so the researcher goes beyond what the text says (Fairclough, 1998). Therefore, a possible analysis of these short comments of Ramos-Horta could look like the following:

. Micro analysis Informal Language (cut-off, shooting yourself). It seems he is talking to a friend not to the government of a country. Change of tone when the critical part comes into being (more formal when expressing the link between aid and soft power, then abrupt change with the use of cut-off). . Meso analysis The article is from ABC, a public funded media and usually considered left-wing. . Macro analysis Ramos-Horta is in Australia to receive an award of friendship; he is mentioning that a cut on aid affect soft power, but why for example he did not mention that a cut on aid affect an increase in poverty? He is addressing his talk and suggestions to a government, not to common people. Imply meaning: if you are not interested in people, the at least try to focus on your soft power in the area. It is a more appealing argument for Australia politicians.

Therefore, in discourse analysis the researcher do not look to whether Ramos-Horta’s statement is true or false, but rather what are the political implications of this particular representation. According to Wetherell (2001, 11) the researcher in analysing discourse should look at how representations are given meaning to be convincing and realise social action. Therefore, the researcher has to answer to few simple questions: What is the message implied in the text? Any hidden aspects? Why has a specific picture been chosen (if any)? What is he saying and what he is not saying? In fact, the concern of this analysis is rather on how language is construed to empower Timor-Leste, and this return to Kendall and Wickham (1996) and their steps to make Foucauldian discourse analysis. Both authors explain that FDA can be done via an examination of the discourse in

68 question, so looking at statements and how they are created. Furthermore, it must be examined what can be said and what cannot. In fact, discourse analysis looks at how statements create norms, values with language. Therefore, language assumes political power, and becomes what Walker (1986, 495) defines “a medium of both communication and mystification.” Hence, discourse analysis was used by post-structuralists to critically analyse how states and institutions make their foreign policies, and how they construct their identity and the one of other actors. On the contrary, a quantitative approach would verify whether this statement is true or false, and not about what the speaker is trying to say. Quantitatively speaking, this statement can be verified by making reference to the UN record vote, for example. Timor- Leste is a small country but by being in the UN has vote power to support or dismiss resolution or seat in the General Assembly. Given this position, Australian reduction of aid would imply loose of regional influence, and this in a positivistic analysis could be reflected into the UN vote recording by a reduction of support from regional neighbours. Rationally speaking if Timor-Leste receives less aid should reduce its support to Australia. Therefore, positivist would use foreign aid as an independent variable and see how a change in the amount of aid given overtime would affect the UN vote of aid recipient. Positivist would argue that the statement is true because a reduction of aid would be correlated to a shift in the support at the UN. However, this is not a general rule, and in other context or historical moments would proof false. Moreover, this approach cannot account for the whole difference in recipient responses to aid reduction. In particular, a positivistic approach cannot explain why irrationally Timor-Leste chose to support the bid for a UN seat of Australia in 2012, even with a planned reduction of aid. This is why an analysis of political and diplomatic discourse can help to understand what is created with language and how, and hence what is Ramos-Horta trying to say across the line of this message.

4.7 Validity of Research Outcomes The notion of validity is still highly contentious. On one extreme, Smith (1984) argues that the criteria of reliability and validity – usually linked to quantitative research – are not important to qualitative research. On another hand, Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that qualitative research highlights the credibility and dependability of the findings. Although, it seems that full trustworthiness in qualitative research is impossible to be

69 achieved, the researcher can make efforts to produce a qualitative research that is “plausible, credible, trustworthy, and, therefore, defensible” (Johnson, 1997, 282). Nevertheless, qualitative research is a powerful tool to understand people, to fill the gap with what quantitative research cannot find out. Hence, the researcher has to make sure that some criteria of validity are put in place during the whole process of research. Therefore, I will put into place the following strategies to guarantee the highest degree of trustworthiness of this qualitative research: reflexivity, triangulation, peer review, literature review, participant’s feedback. Johnson (1997) argues that researcher bias is a potential threat to the validity of qualitative research. In this research, and especially during the field work, I will make sure to rely on reflexivity. I will adopt a critical perspective about any potential bias since the beginning. Therefore, a qualitative research involves the reflexivity of the researcher. This should be an obliged step during the research process; the researcher has to reflect on his role (Davis, 1998). Retrospection and introspection are crucial elements for a researcher to understand if his/her life experience is affecting its data collection and interpretation (Reviere, 2001). Often, locals label Western researchers in developing countries as another Western coming to exploit the place. Therefore, I will need to create trust, especially, in the case of the East Timorese and Chinese respondents. Therefore, I need in some way to deconstruct the perception that by coming from a Western democratic country I would take a stance in favour of Australia. Hence, I will have to approach my fieldwork in a more critical way about the values on which I was raised, and that reflect the current status of Australia. Moreover, triangulation will be used where necessary to back up my information. For diplomats, politicians and NGOs groups, I will try to confirm the findings with them. Furthermore, peer review will be put into being to increase the validity of my research. I will consult with my supervisor, friends in Timor-Leste, Australia and China, and external people for extra feedback on the research design, the participants chosen, the methods for collecting data, and the method of analysis. Two friends from Australia and Portugal will also help me to make sure that the transcription of the interviews is correct. In fact, English and Portuguese are not my first language and they will not be the first language of some of my interviewees. In this context some misunderstandings could happen. Therefore, I will make sure that anything I transcribe is what my participants will say. Qualitative research has to comply with the standards of descriptive and interpretive validity. In other words, validity is essential to overcome the doubt posed by Bosk (1979,

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193): “All field work done by a single field-worker invites the question, why should we believe it?”. My expectation, in fact, is to make sure that my description of phenomena is actually what has been expressed in the interviews. This is why I rely on peer review. This also helps to guarantee an interpretive validity, which can be achieved with participants’ feedback. This process is not very easy. I am aware that some participants have very little time to dedicate to me, especially diplomats, and therefore, I will not be able to counter check my interpretations and conclusions every time. Nevertheless, I hope that I can perform more feedback mechanism to my findings. Some ethical considerations are important to further grant validity to my research. Before each interview I will clearly state the purpose of the research and ask for verbal consent for recording the interviews. Participants in the interviews will be informed that they are not obliged to make the interview. Confidentiality will be maintained at all level when necessary and anyone have the right to withdraw from the study. I do not press people for information or to answer to questions they do not want to, since interviewees will be free to express what they want to say. Moreover, participants can terminate the interview. Anonymity is extremely important; however it will be maintained only on specific request of the informants.

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CHAPTER 5. WHY DO AUSTRALIA AND CHINA GIVE AID TO TIMOR- LESTE? This chapter, and the following one, attempt to answer the first question of this thesis, hence disclosing how Chinese aid in Timor-Leste is affecting the most prominent donor, Australia. It does so by explaining the discourse of aid giving from the donors’ perspective, thus the reasons behind aid allocation. It begins explaining how a Chinese and Australian aid project began in Timor-Leste.

5.1 Chinese Aid Projects in Timor-Leste: How Did They Begin? The Chinese development project in Timor-Leste began with an official governmental visit, respectively by Timor-Leste officials or Chinese officials (Brautigam, 2008, 14). Chinese officials have been strongly emphasising China’s willingness to help Timor- Leste (Chinese official) while other times Timor-Leste’s government asked for help (Timorese official). Subsequently, the government of China decides whether to help Timor-Leste and the amount of resources involved. If there is an agreement of the parties involved then the Chinese government through the Ministry of Commerce delivers its foreign aid project (MOFCOM). The Ministry of Commerce directs Chinese companies in implementing the projects in Timor-Leste with the support of the Chinese economic and commercial attaché in Timor- Leste. The Ministry of Finance, instead, has an advisory function and collects information from the field to improve the implementation of the project and along with the latest information (Brautigam, 2008, 14). The role of MOFCOM is key in the planning and implementation of the project in Timor- Leste. First, the MOFCOM inquiries into the project, which gives a complete background of information. Then via a tender process, sometimes contended because of corruption involved, the MOFCOM explores which Chinese company is best suited to implement the project (Chinese official). This first part concludes the planning part, in favour then of the implementation. The MOFCOM then suggests the amount of money donated for the project to China’s Eximbank, informing the bank of the recipient of the money and the relevant conditions. China’s Eximbank also gives loans directly to the government of Timor-Leste; these loans are concessional in character but usually attached to resources as collateral (Timorese official).

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China’s Eximbank was launched in 1994, mainly to promote Chinese trade and investment in foreign countries. The following year, Eximbank began to release concessional loans to developing countries, beginning a massive plan of loans to Africa, Southeast Asia and South America, improving the Chinese engagement on the foreign aid industry. Funds from China’s Eximbank are used to finance Chinese materials, technology and infrastructures. Sometimes these funds have been employed to finance projects of cooperation between Chinese companies and foreign companies involved in Timor-Leste. This has been evident in the partnership between China and the USA in Timor-Leste, or China and Australia in Papua New Guinea, where an anti-malaria project was implemented, as well as in Rarotonga between China and New Zealand in implementing a water treatment plant. Currently, there are no cooperation programmes between Chinese and East Timorese companies, nor between Australia and China in Timor-Leste. However, cooperation has been implemented via the role of the local government to align the donors with the local priorities. Hence, Australia and China have been particularly important through their different expertise to improve the policing in Timor-Leste. While China has provided the infrastructure and the barracks for the police, Australia has trained the police officers. This kind of indirect cooperation has been possible with the key role of the recipient government in directing the donors according to their comparative advantage. In this sense, China and Australia do not compete but rather they offer different advantages useful for the recipient. Hence, alignment to the recipient’s priorities is the key to successful aid and cooperation between different donors.

5.2 Australian Aid Projects in Timor-Leste: How Did They Begin? Until October 2013, the foreign aid projects of Australia were delivered with the support of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid). This governmental organisation provided support and feedback to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the right development policies to face the plague of poverty and how to coordinate aid to be more effective. AusAid was very effective and extensive with many diplomatic missions overseas, especially in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Most of AusAid employees focused their work on improving the basic needs of the population.

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In Timor-Leste, under AusAid from 2009 to 2014, Australia committed to assist the government and the people of Timor-Leste to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Poverty reduction, and support to weak institutions was at the core of the programme. Australia was also committed to help increase employment opportunities for East Timorese, as well as government accountability, transparency and integrity (Australia-Timor-Leste Country Strategy 2009-2014). When AusAid merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, things changed. While Australia remains committed to reduce poverty and help the livelihood of the East Timorese, today there is a stronger emphasis to help Timor-Leste to use its own resources and improve the economy and trade opportunities (Overview of Australia’s aid program to Timor-Leste).

5.3 Foreign Aid Motivations and Allocation of Aid Figure 2 summarises the coding of the interviews about aid allocation of Australia and China in Timor-Leste. These coding represent the motivations behind aid allocation.

Cooperation Moral Vision Interest-Based between donors (Cognitivism) aid and recipient

Sovereignty and Protection and Altruism Authority Alliances

Peace and Prestige Stability Partnership

Responsibility / Economic and Norms of Humanitarianism Political Interest conduct

Figure 2 – Foreign Aid Allocation in Timor-Leste (Coding from the Fieldwork Interviews)

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Chinese and Australian aid to Timor-Leste have similar and basic reasoning behind it. Both countries give aid on the assumption that it is something necessary to developing countries, as well as something in the interest of the donor. Through the analysis of the interviews, I came out with nine different codes which describe the reasons behind aid allocation of China and Australia in Timor-Leste. These areas are: 1) Protection and Alliances; 2) Sovereignty and Authority; 3) Altruism; 4) Economic and Political Interests; 5) Peace and Stability (Interdependence); 6) Prestige/Victimhood (Chinese Syndrome); 7) Responsibility/Humanitarianism; 8) Cooperation; 9) Norms. These codes can be categorised under three main areas of aid giving in foreign policy: the moral vision, the interest-based vision, and the cooperation partnership. The moral vision includes: Altruism, Peace and Stability, and Responsibility/Humanitarianism. The interest-based vision of aid giving: Sovereignty and Authority, Prestige, Economic and Political Interests. The cooperation partnership includes: Protection and Alliances, Cooperation and Norms. A prima-facie analysis of these codes reveals that aid giving in Timor-Leste is a balance of knowledge-based approaches (cognitivism), hence the moral vision of the aid regime, with an interest-based perspective when it comes to political and economic interests, prestige and power. Within these two opposite categories of knowledge versus interest, lies the possibility of cooperation, alliances and specific norms of conducts even for those donors who have a different political system. This chapter presents the whole findings in terms of aid allocation in Timor-Leste, however, Chapter 10 will deal more in depth with the cooperation partnership between different donors. Therefore, the practice of aid giving is a balance of doing good for those in need (especially when you can and have an economic surplus), and protecting the interests of your country domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, geopolitics still matters in international relations. This perspective would support the interest-based view of the regime theory, which sees interest as the primary source of aid giving, with a minor role of the moral vision and increasing cooperation amongst donors. Interest-based aid underestimates the power of cognitivism; in fact, China as an aid donor and an emerging economy with a high surplus, considers aid giving also a moral obligation “not just the Western countries, but also China must do its role internationally. The peaceful rise of China is in consideration of sharing our achievements with countries in need. Hence in

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Timor-Leste we feel we can help and do our part as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, etc” (Chinese official). China and Australia combine altruism in aid giving with geopolitical interest. A Chinese officer contended that giving aid to Timor-Leste “is something that has to be done given the surplus of China, it can help a little young country like Timor-Leste. It is also in the interest of China’s foreign policy to establish friendship in the area” (Chinese official). Of the same token, Australia as the foremost liberal democracy in the region “gives aid to help to promote democracy and stability in Timor-Leste. Moreover given the proximity, Timor-Leste is a strategic country” (Australian official). Nevertheless, there is a difference here. A liberal democracy like Australia has given aid to Timor-Leste also to avoid the establishment and strengthening of Communism or other forms of government except for democracy. “Australia is a democracy and we want to promote further democracy in Timor-Leste. It is essential our engagement there to avoid the strengthening of foreign powers based on authoritarian regime. Authoritarianism is also widespread in Southeast Asia” (Australian official). The obvious reference is to China. The fear that a poor country with weak institutions like Timor-Leste is vulnerable to foreign powers is shaking the walls of Canberra. Obviously, new donors like China who do not press for political reforms create serious problems to Australia. At the same time Australia has not been a convincing donor for Timor-Leste in light of the Timor Sea dispute. In 2002 when Australia signed the agreement to share the oil fields in the Timor Sea, the country was spying on the East Timorese government’s cabinet to seek a better deal on the share of oil. This news came to light thanks to Wikileaks in 2010. Australia has been using aid money through its former aid agency, AusAid, promising the government of Timor-Leste to refurbish several rooms of the government buildings. On this occasion the Australian government bugged the cabinet rooms spying on the East Timorese government. This shows how a country like Australia used its aid funds to profit of the weakness of a poor country like Timor-Leste. This unfair use of aid risks undermining the credibility not just of the aid regime, but also of a liberal democracy like Australia. The former president of Timor-Leste, José Ramos-Horta, was clear in asserting that "had we known that Australia was spying on us and spying on our friends, the Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his wife, well if [that] news had transpired before the vote for the Security Council a year ago, I doubt Australia would have secured the seat" (Lloyd, 2013). The spying case has threatened the long-standing friendship between Timor-Leste and Australia. Furthermore, the behaviour of Australia is in contradiction with its way of

76 pursuing rights and democracy. Australia has often lectured its poor neighbours on foreign policy, but it acted wrongly, undermining its reputation. As Ramos-Horta puts it, the spying case “has not been a very good example of transparency and honesty" (Lloyd, 2013). An Australian academic, Clinton Fernandes, argued that Australia “spied on and bullied the East Timorese government into signing an unfair treaty” (Xenophon, 2015). The treaty known under the name of Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea prevents Timor-Leste from seeking a settlement of the maritime boundaries with Australia for 50 years, which leaves room for Australia to continue exploiting the oil in the Timor Sea. Timor-Leste, after discovering the spying story, has attempted to void the treaty for unfair behaviour by Australia. Today, there is an ongoing dispute at the International Court of Justice to try to settle the maritime dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia. These facts have - as this chapter reveals - increased the lack of trust in Australia from East Timorese officials. In addition, Chapter 8 further reveals the lack of trust of students, who seek better opportunities in China. The perception of students is aligned with what Clinton Fernandes argued that Timor-Leste “is Australia’s biggest foreign aid donor – this is not a typo” (Xenophon, 2015). The current situation, and the unfair way that Australia used with Timor-Leste has left space for China to access the development trajectories of Timor-Leste. As argued by Nick Xenophon, an Australian federal senator: “Our foreign and defence policies are acting in a contradictory fashion: The defence interest is in a peaceful and stable East Timor that is not subject to third part influence. But in denying them their fair share of the oil and gas, and in refusing to negotiate a fair maritime border, our foreign policy is pushing in the opposite direction” (Xenophon, 2015).

5.3.1 Protection and Alliances Foreign aid has also a geopolitical perspective, which is very strong on both sides. China and Australia consider aid as a defence tool. Aid helps to establish ties and friends in order to avoid conflicts: “We invest on aid to create ties in Southeast Asia” (Chinese official). Another Chinese officer contended that: “We give aid to Timor-Leste, because it is also something we have received. And it is something important for us. We need to secure good and peaceful relationships with our neighbours. Timor-Leste is going to be

77 the next member to join ASEAN, so we need support from Timor-Leste to improve the relationship with ASEAN” (Chinese officer). China is trying to establish strong ties with Timor-Leste especially in consideration of the dispute with other ASEAN members. The Chinese image is currently under scrutiny, by the international community, for what is happening in the South China Sea. Giving aid helps to establish new friends, or to mitigate international suspicion. Timor-Leste is key to help China to lessen suspicion particularly in ASEAN. Further emphasis on the importance of ASEAN came from another Chinese officer based in Beijing: “For us helping Timor-Leste is key to our relationship with ASEAN, in addition we want to understand how Timor-Leste managed to have peace with Indonesia. Development might be an important component in these two aspects” (Chinese official). Maintaining a good relationship with Timor-Leste is also important for Australia. It is not just a matter of proximity, but also of support at the United Nations and in the democratic promotion in the area. “We have interests in the region. Our aid is committed to fulfil our foreign policy agenda. We also need to reinforce our relationship with Timor-Leste... and spur the goodness of Australian norms in ASEAN” (Australian official). The perception amongst China and Australia is also that aid establishes “new” friends and helps to reduce the investment in military expenditures. Friendship through aid reduces the risk of enmity, which in turn channels the donors towards a peaceful approach in foreign policy. This is something important for China especially in light of the current global anti-Chinese feeling in the rise because of the South China Sea dispute. “Giving aid helps to establish new friends, in turn we should reduce our expenditure for the military and invest more in aid. For us Timor-Leste is an important friend in the area, and thanks to its government we are confident that they will help us in reducing the diatribes with other ASEAN countries” (Chinese official). Australia, by being a democratic powerhouse in Southeast Asia, has lots of domestic pressure in investing in aid rather than in military expenditure. Contrary to democratic thinking, Australia today spends seven times more in military expenditures than in foreign aid. According to the 2015 World Military Balance 2016 (for the year 2015), Australia spent about U$22.7 billion in military expenditure, while only U$3.22 billion has been given in foreign aid according to the OECD (OECD, 2016). Chinese obligation to help a country in need is based on mutual benefits, hence a mix of altruism and interest. The other way round, when a country is not in good relations with China might reveal that an obligation to help is not so strong, even if it is necessary. When

78 in 2013 there was a massive and destructive typhoon in the Philippines – where about 2000 people lost their lives – China offered a meagre help - initially only U$100,000. This was not just a shocking move, but very unpopular internationally for a country that is aspiring to compete with the long established powers like the USA. This story reveals some truth about the Chinese character in foreign policy when two countries are not friends: China does not help those countries who do not favour it or challenge it when it comes to foreign policy, and the Philippines have challenged China internationally on the disputed Paracel islands in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, in terms of humanitarian aid, the promptness of foreign countries to intervene to help another country from a disaster is not just a compelling moral obligation, but a powerful tool for establishing a good reputation for a soft powers countries. The way China acted against the Philippines initially has lacked consideration from its foreign policy officers. This move expressly damaged China, also in consideration that the Philippines have given support to China after the Sichuan earthquake in 2012, donating around U$450.000. During that event even a developing economy like Timor-Leste sent money to China to face the immediate problems of the disaster. The moral obligation of humanitarian aid is also a good way to understand which countries are friends to whom, and which are not. Notwithstanding, Australia has also recognition and respect for the help received during World War II by the East Timorese that died to stop the advancement of the Japanese. Today, aid is also given based on this long-term friendship: “Australia supports its friends. Timor-Leste so far has been a trustworthy friend. We cannot forget the help received during World War II” (Australia official). Likewise, China also has a longstanding relationship with Timor-Leste. During the Indonesian invasion, China tried to help and support the struggle of the East Timorese. Chinese government officials had a strong relationship with the East Timorese officials since the 1970s. In the last fifteen years, these key people have been in and out of the East Timorese parliament and the government buildings and they helped to establish formal ties with China. For China, it is like helping an old friend: “We help Timor-Leste also in light of the long friendship with its political leaders” (Chinese official).

5.3.2 Sovereignty and Authority Given the importance of both China and Australia in the future of Timor-Leste, donors perceive that aid increases their influence in the area. China, as an emerging donor, is

79 interested in expanding its influence in Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste is strategic in this sense. For China, “increasing our influence in Timor-Leste is crucial. The more we invest in aid, the more we will be able to influence government’s perceptions in the area” (Chinese official). Further to this, another Chinese officer sustains that: “Helping Timor- Leste is important. It helps to boost our authority and sovereignty internationally and regionally. Our partners must respect the One China policy and our territory” (Chinese official). Australia, as a donor, has also the view that caring just about its internal problems is not the right approach to foreign policy for a regional power. “In order to strengthen Australia’s position regionally and its economy we need to aid our neighbours and especially Timor-Leste” (Australian official). An interest-based perspective of aid regime would be justified by this position of China and Australia, which seek a gain through aid. The power of influencing and shaping the preference of others, and pressing other countries through aid is as old as international relations studies gets. In particular, for China as an emerging donor it is of outmost importance to establish a strong position regionally and globally. The participation of China and its rising role in international institutions is the way to assert China’s global and regional influence. Regionally, Timor-Leste is a great partner especially in light of its future admission in ASEAN. In fact, “Chinese engagement with the aid regime helps to promote our influence and authority. China and its fast development process have to find space close to the current aid regime. In our current role in Timor-Leste we are looking at finding ways to assert our model of development, our presence and promote our integrity” (Chinese official). In the Australian case, the perception is that by giving aid: “We increase the respect Timor-Leste has for us and we are able to influence the politics, however, by reducing aid we undermine our authority. The government is wrong if does that (emphasis added)” (Australian official). Usually power in aid giving is strengthened by the amount of money involved. The established target for the DAC donors was to achieve 0.7% of the national income. While this amount has only been reached by Scandinavian countries, Australia has done its part until a change of government, in 2013, reduced its committed aid. The government of Tony Abbott decided to merge AusAid into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade. Moreover, the Abbott government decided to reduce the amount of aid delivered in developing countries. However, in the word of an Australian official, “I believe the government was wrong in taking that decision. We need to increase our commitment in

80 the developing world to assert that Australia stands by those in need. In Timor-Leste we should do more” (Australian official). In fact, in 2014, José Ramos-Horta pointed out that Australia’s reduction of aid is a “huge mistake.” He argued that “Aid is part of soft power diplomacy and when you cut-off aid, you’re shooting yourself in the foot diplomatically. You diminish your engagement, your contacts, your influence in the region and beyond” (ABC News, 2014). Horta went on arguing, "It’s in Australia's interests to contribute to further stabilising Timor-Leste and to create prosperity in Timor-Leste" (ABC News, 2014). In other words, power and influence are promoted through aid. As a consequence, a country that relies heavily on aid is exposed to the willingness of donors. As an East Timorese official puts it “we need aid to develop, but if we rely just on aid, we become slaves, and exposed to the authority of the donors” (Timorese official). On the other side, China is steadily increasing its commitment in the aid industry giving more aid and loans every year. The Export Import Bank of China recently approved a new loan to Timor-Leste for U$50 million to expand and improve the Dili sewage system. This loan comes with a 2% interest rate over a period of 20 years, and there is a grace period of five years. In addition, the loan comes with a grant element of 27.76% of its total value (MacauHub, 2015). This is clearly in opposition with a reduction of aid in the West. In Timor-Leste, China’s impact is still limited but China is increasing its willingness to help (Timorese official). The reshuffle of the Australian commitment in international development is also an indication of the change in the balance of power in international relations. Furthermore, the need to change and update the norms of international behaviour in aid giving is something that is coming to light with China’s and other emerging donors in international development. It is also recognition of the increasing soft power of China in international development. Foreign policy observers (Ding, 1955) share the view that China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the West is an indication of a new soft power status. Diplomacy, foreign aid, commerce and foreign direct investment, and the immense Chinese market, make China an effective soft power model - as effective as other powerful Western countries (Ding, 1955). China has a new charming image, which is portrayed through a benevolent appearance. China is peacefully pursuing a model of foreign policy with participation in the global forums, with foreign aid and with increasing trade. The role of China in Southeast Asian development is not to underestimate. Some foreign policy analysts have argued that the

81 rise of China in Southeast Asia is consistent with the poor engagement of the United States and Australia (Majid, 2012). The term ‘soft power’ has been coined by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye. It refers to the capacity of shaping the preferences of other countries to accept one scope or perspective (Nye, 1990). Other forms of influences in Southeast Asia have been determined by hard and soft power like the USA. Australia is a soft power in Southeast Asia, and especially in Timor-Leste. The East Timorese are attracted by the Australian culture, democratic values, universities, schools, institutions, human rights, high living standards and technology. However, Australia, as seen, has seriously damaged its image by showing its selfishness with the oil and maritime boundaries dispute, its poor treatment of refugees and its desperate attempts to off-shore migrant facilities in Nauru, Timor-Leste and Cambodia. In this framework, China’s rise in Southeast Asia and in Timor-Leste is mainly due to its practical basket of ‘goods’: foreign aid, commerce and investment (Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, 2008).

5.3.3 Prestige Prestige equals respect in the foreign aid regime, and it is an important component in shaping the international image of countries like Australia and China, and increasing their soft power. Australia as a regional power has engaged in developing countries with a combination of interest and a moral vision of helping the poor (Australian official). China on its side uses aid to increase its image and reputation globally but also feels compelled by its economic surplus to do something overseas for developing countries. The Chinese approach to aid claims, “if we focus on infrastructures other countries from the West will understand that developing countries need them. It is very clear that a country like Timor- Leste is in desperate need of more and more infrastructures” (Chinese official). China wants to build a model in the aid regime that other countries can follow; it is building a reputation in the aid regime, which is welcomed in the developing world, while still under suspicion from Western donors. Australia, on the other hand, has a strong image on the international scene. In the words of an Australian official: “We do not use aid to build up our image. Australia has already an established and well-received image in Timor-Leste. Overall, we are the champion of democracy and human rights in the region” (Australian official). While this perspective overestimates the role of Australia in aiding Timor-Leste, it clarifies the standing position

82 of the government of Australia, which is self-confident about its overseas image. For China it is different. From the interviews I discovered that China suffers a complex of inferiority in international relations, however, I had the perception that Chinese officials tend to portray China too much as a victim. One official told me that: “Aid to Timor- Leste helps us to boost our image. We need to create an image. Australia has a reputation but not us. We need to build trust in Timor-Leste and aid is the right tool to establish a good relationship and reputation” (Chinese official). This position is understandable for a developing country, which is growing fast and taking the stage of the world economy. However, as I kept on interviewing Chinese officials, I discovered that Chinese officials tend to feel like victims when it comes to China’s international image: “We give scholarships to the elite students because we need to build a reputation. We are not Australia; we have no tradition of respect from our neighbour” (Chinese official). This possibly relates to the strained relations with Japan and generally with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, this way of portraying China’s victimhood seems to undermine the possibility of having a strong position in the aid industry. China, as an emerging and global donor, needs to build up its prestige. Aid giving is crucial in this quest for a global reputation. In one sense, China is building up itself as a regional power, especially in Asia, the Pacific and Africa, by virtue of its aid and trade commitments. This, however, has not been out of criticism. While the West has claimed that China is giving aid to African dictators, and investing on importing Chinese human capital rather than relying on the local one, the country is taking on the stage in the development of poor and underdeveloped areas of the world. China’s reputation in Timor- Leste is building up steadfastly, at the point where the ambassador of Timor-Leste in Beijing claimed that Timor-Leste “can get anything we ask from China” (Horta Loro, 2014). The Chinese willingness to help Timor-Leste is also based on the old cultural values enshrined in Confucius teachings. The perception of improving the lives of society as a whole and maximise the use of the resources for benefiting all, is part of building up a reputation of a country who is willing to free the world from wants. Perhaps, this overemphasis the capacity of China as the saviour of the poor. However, the perception I came across the interviews with China officials has confirmed this long-term vision. Similarly, Australia, with its humanistic view of the world based on the Western democratic values, wants to do its part in tiny Timor-Leste. Therefore, aid is a way of portraying overseas a sense of national identity and what Australia is as a regional power.

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Developing countries often aspire to become similar to their donors. So far, Timor-Leste has considered Australia as a model, irrespective of the current strained political situation (Timorese official). However, Australia as a model of development, with its regional reputation, is not what actually Timor-Leste should aspire to be. Australia and Timor- Leste are in a different stage of development, and Timor-Leste, today, needs to develop basic needs. Young people in Timor-Leste are often deviated from the real needs of the country in favour of working for more lucrative aid agencies. These jobs very often are part-time and then young people are attracted to remain working in the government or any easy job which requires a chair and a desk and a laptop (Timorese official). However, the country needs to be built, and many young unemployed should work and specialise in more urgent fields for development like plumbers, electricians, bricklayers, builders, nurses, medical doctors, etc. The quest for strengthening its reputation features China as an important donor in Timor- Leste also in comparison to Portugal and Brazil which are countries linked by a cultural and linguistic heritage with Timor-Leste. China, in fact, is doing more than the others and is going to increase its commitment with Timor-Leste when required (Chinese official). In 2009, the former Chinese Ambassador to Timor-Leste claimed that China is “one of the major development partners of Timor-Leste […] providing development assistance in all areas including infrastructure, agriculture, education, professional training, public health, social relief, security, sports” (Remarks by Mr. Su Man, Ambassador of China, 2009). Overall, aid giving is a rewarding task for building up reputation, especially for a country like China with an old civilisation. In fact, China is not new in aid giving although it is playing a more important role now by consequence of its economic leverage. Australia, at the same time, has a strong commitment to ‘civilise’ its neighbours. Given that Australia has been ‘civilised’ by the West and the British colonisation, the country today feels empowered with a civilised role in the area on the tradition of the West. Therefore, Australia answered the call for help from its neighbours with massive aid giving projects. The AusAid agency has been efficient for a long time and grew immensely before merging with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013.

5.3.4 Economic and Political Interests Today, China’s engagement in the aid industry is highly criticised because critics claims that it is attached to trade opportunities and natural resources (Chileshe, 2010). China is

84 more competitive in producing cheaper and affordable goods for developing countries in comparison to Australia. In fact, Timor-Leste cannot afford to import from Australia, given the cost of labour in Australia and the cost of final goods. China, instead, becomes an opportunity for importing goods that the population itself needs at an affordable price. In 2014 Timor-Leste imported U$41 million of goods from China and U$18 million from Australia (RDTL, External Trade Statistics – Annual Report 2014, 14), while the Observatory of Economic Complexity at the MIT in Boston claims that imports from China amounted to U$60 million, around 10% of East Timorese imports (Timor-Leste Country profile, 2014). However, amongst the top destinations of Timor-Leste exports China does not appear. In other words, Timor-Leste’s trade with China is one-way and in favour of China’s gain. There is widespread criticism that Chinese aid is secured with resources and this is partially true especially in the case of the loans granted by the China’s Export Import Bank. However, from a Chinese point of view, “the practice of securing loans with resources is not new. China is doing something common in foreign policy. Any bank that gives loans, secures them. We secure them with resources or trade. With Timor-Leste we are doing the same” (Chinese official). While this view might be criticised, it is an approach already taken also by Western donors. In one of its official documents from 1975, Italy stated that aid should be channelled towards the developing countries that have raw materials for the industry, like minerals (Cardia, Italy, III Commissione, 27 November 1975, 16). Similarly, Belgium in 1965 stated that aid should aim at opening up the market, increasing trade opportunities (Van Offelen, Belgium, Parlamentaire Handelingen, 30 March 1965, 41). Therefore, the perception that aid can contribute to the development of a country as much as to investment opportunities and new markets is as old as the aid regime. Therefore, what China is doing today is not different from the Western approach to aid.

5.3.5 Peace and Stability Most of the aid and development policies aimed at stabilising developing countries. As a matter of fact, instability of poor countries has been one of the core concerns of aid giving in the regime. After the 1999 referendum for independence in Timor-Leste, Australia immediately took over a UN mission. The idea that a newly independent country, heavily underdeveloped, could undermine the stability of the region prompted Australia’s

85 engagement in Timor-Leste. Today, aid is still given on “the premises that instability in Timor-Leste, threaten the whole region. And Australia wants stability in Southeast Asia” (Australian official). For China stability of Southeast Asia is also of utmost importance, “we care about the stability of the region. Especially in ASEAN countries. Aid must aim to stabilise countries. Timor-Leste as a tiny country with a small economy can be vulnerable to market, currency and resources shocks, therefore we need to act to help its government to stabilise the country” (Chinese official). Another Chinese diplomat argued that “We have a choice. Give aid or not give aid to Timor-Leste. But the country is in need of help…. And we need to help to make the region safer and peaceful” (Chinese official). China also see the stability of the region as something that can be secured with foreign aid. Another interesting question to answer would be, what if Timor-Leste would not have received any aid since the 1999 referendum? From the Marshall plan in the post WWII era, aid has been given on conditions of helping European countries; otherwise, these countries eventually would have become unstable and dangerous for the whole world (Hogan, 1989). Nowadays, there is a similar understanding about Timor-Leste. “If we do not help Timor-Leste, the country may turn undemocratic”, Australia affirms, while from a Chinese perspective not intervening with aid, would mean that Timor-Leste might be condemned to an existence of poverty and underdevelopment. In addition, for China the future of developing countries is China’s own future (Chinese official). If Timor-Leste would be unstable, the whole area and China as a neighbour would be affected by turmoil. For China, it is also important to give more space to the UN - as a global actor - in aid giving practices (Chinese official). Australia, instead, is also concerned with the environment. Following the 1987 Brundtland report, developing countries and the poor have usually been blamed for environmental pollution and degradation, since they tend to deplete the immediate resources available (Hueting, 1990). Timor-Leste’s environmental damages are actually of utmost importance to Australia, especially because of its vicinity. Therefore, Australia wants to limit the environmental concerns by helping to establish strong and peaceful institutions in Timor-Leste (Australian official). In this quest to achieve peace and stability in Timor-Leste, there is one core difference between both donors’ aid practices. Chinese aid, given to Timor-Leste, is in the form of social policies, while Australia focuses more on aid as a public policy. This difference is given by the domestic situation of both countries. For China, development is a social issue (Chinese official). Hence, the challenges to poverty in Timor-Leste must be fought by

86 improving the health system, provide doctors on the ground and food security. For Australia, instead, solving poverty in Timor-Leste is a matter of investing in the government and its capacity to face the plague of poverty (Australian official). This is a subtle difference but important in determining the different approaches between the two countries. China and Australia in Timor-Leste appear to be complementary in the development path of the country. While there is a political contentious issue between the two countries, the reality on the ground is that they complement each other by offering Timor-Leste different expertise and approaches to progress according to their stages of development. The Rostow’s model of economic growth prescribes five separate stages (Rostow, 1992). According to Rostow, Australia is in the last stage of high mass consumption, while China is in the third stage of growth, hence in the take-off stage. Timor-Leste, instead, is progressing from a traditional society to the creation of the conditions for take-off. Another difference is that for Australia, foreign aid to Timor-Leste should be seen in a form of a tax that taxpayers could decide to devolve in their annual declaration (Australian official) by deciding to donate part of their taxes to specific countries. Timor-Leste would benefit greatly from the compassion of the population in Australia. For China, instead, this system of tax should be put into place at multinational level, via the international institutions like the UN. However, in the words of a Chinese official “the international system is not ready to develop the aid regime into a system of national tax” (Chinese official). For Australia engaging in Timor-Leste also means supporting one of the few functioning democracies in Southeast Asia. While in the current historical moment ASEAN has a democratic regression, Timor-Leste has proved to be a democratic powerhouse. Therefore, in the quest to strengthen democracy and human rights in the region, Timor-Leste is a perfect ally for Australia. Australia’s engagement in Timor-Leste aims at strengthening the capacity of Timor-Leste, making the country stronger and credible in these democratic areas for further advocacy in the region (Australian official). This depends on how important is for Australia to continue promoting democratic liberalism as a core principle of foreign aid giving. For China, clearly, the political system of an aid recipient country is not so important, since China bases its foreign policy on mutual respect. “China accepts and respects the government of Timor-Leste, irrespective of the system of government. We care about its stability” (Chinese official).

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5.3.6 Responsibility/Humanitarianism One core component of the foreign aid regime in post WWII is that America felt compelled to help European countries that faced poverty and destruction after the war. This obligation remained in the mind-set of European countries as well as in the whole Development Assistance Committee. The accepted view was that as a circle of rich countries, all of them were compelled to give aid and help the countries in need. At the time there was a balance of interest and a moral vision in aid giving. Some countries have been more morally engaged, like Scandinavian countries, while others more on the interest side. France, for example, has always been supporting former colonies. This was not out of criticism, as France was accused of maintaining dictators in many French speaking African countries (Fong, 2008). China has also been the recipient of aid for a long time; the country knows the importance of receiving and using aid for development. Therefore, “we also feel obliged to give aid to countries like Timor-Leste. We need to give back the help we received” (Chinese official). Furthermore, China “participates in international organisations, and […] seat on the Security Council, so we need to do our job in international development” (Chinese official). It is different for Australia. While Australia knows the moral obligation of giving aid, the country has never received aid as in the form and amount of China. Australia, in fact, has not been damaged by WWII as other European countries, therefore, it was not in need of help in the 1950s and the 1960s. Hence, while there is the view that helping the poor is a moral duty and something that Australia must do - “we should share some of our richness” (Australian official) - in reality Australia has limited knowledge of the challenges of a developing country because it has never been in that position. In the specific case of Timor-Leste, Australia feels guilty for not having done much during the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste. Not to mention the support the East Timorese have given to Australia to fight the Japanese during WWII. “We have been selfish during the Indonesian invasion. We did not want to see what was going on in Timor-Leste. Today we must take the burden of helping Timor-Leste with more strength and determination” (Australian official). The current foreign policy of Australia is still very nonsensical against Timor-Leste, especially in consideration of the maritime boundaries, but today several officials recognise the mistakes of the past. Many officials at governmental level are, in fact, aligned with public opinion in demanding respect for Timor-Leste.

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Another aspect of China feeling obliged to help Timor-Leste is that 2% of the population in Timor-Leste is of Chinese ethnicity and background (Timor-Leste Country Profile. Nations online). Moreover, during the Indonesia era of Suharto, Chinese people were discriminated and many escaped to Timor-Leste. Therefore, China feels particularly attached to Timor-Leste and its old leadership for these historical reasons. In addition, by helping Timor-Leste, China wants to establish solid relations with Indonesia where another relevant number of Chinese Indonesians live (Chinese official). For China it is particularly interesting to understand the process of reconciliation between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, because China wants to have a respectable relationship with Indonesia (Chapter 9 will deal in details with the process of reconciliation). As part of its commitment to help Timor-Leste, China “is willing to continue and increase its aid assistance according to the demand of the local government” (Chinese official). Hence, China’s aid will add more resources to the East Timorese government. China will increase its aid, also, in relation to what other countries are doing in Timor-Leste (Chinese official). China wants to take a position in the aid regime although from a different standpoint and principles. In fact, China partially lets the local government decide the destination of the funds, while Australia pushes the local government to implement specific policies as structural adjustment (Australian official). This has particularly been accused of making poverty and unemployment persistent instead of helping the poor.

5.3.7 Altruism The Australian moral vision in aid giving has been based on reducing inequalities between poor and rich countries. “We aimed to reduce inequalities with aid. Clearly the economic gap between Timor-Leste and Australia is huge, but with time Timor-Leste can catch up” (Australian official). Therefore, Australia aimed at helping reduce inequalities and its effects, mostly caused from current globalisation (Holton, 2014). The Western model of aid giving puts Australia and Timor-Leste in a vertical order, where Australia is the donor and Timor-Leste the poor recipient to be saved from poverty. This hierarchical model has been part of the Western aid regime since its inception. Nevertheless, in recent years, this model has been challenged by the language of Chinese aid. The moral vision of Chinese aid aims to help a country in need of assistance that shares the same challenges in development. China, in fact, by being a developing country itself

89 is well aware of the challenges of development in countries like Timor-Leste. “We help Timor-Leste because we know the challenges of its government. We faced these challenges and there is still a long way to go for China” (Chinese official). Therefore, China can potentially understand better what a developing country needs. Here, the moral vision of aid is not based on reducing the gap, rather it is based on friendship, partnership, trade opportunities and mutual benefits for both countries. Solidarity also plays an important role in aid giving, especially when public opinion is strong. This has been important in shaping the role of Australia during the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste. Solidarity, instead, from the Chinese perspective means sharing the same challenges of development, and is based on the Confucius teaching and the Mao Zedong plan of helping friends. In fact, the East Timorese FRETILIN party during the Indonesian invasion was very close to China and sympathised for its government. China, in fact, has provided assistance to its members in exile in Mozambique (Storey, 2006). For Australia, solidarity is also a matter of religious perspective. The biblical vision of cooperation in helping the poor is strong in a country like Australia; its Christian population amounts to 61%, of which 25% are Roman Catholics, the main East Timorese religion (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). “In our plan of aid giving to Timor-Leste, there is a religious component that is shaping our engagement. Furthermore, Timor-Leste is a Catholic country and the people are so committed to the goodness of the religion. We cannot skip from our moral commitment to help them” (Australian official). Religion has been playing a role in aid giving since the 1950s, and especially in Timor-Leste, the Catholic Church has had a key role during the Indonesian invasion in protecting and helping the population.

5.3.8 Norms of conduct in foreign aid Australia points out that it is in a position to progress democracy and human rights and the rule of law through aid in Southeast Asia, “Timor-Leste is a democracy thanks to the financial assistance of Australia, and it can help to stabilise and promote more democracy in ASEAN” (Australian official). For China, instead, the basic norm in foreign aid is to “respect every political system in each country. We respect the democratic government of Timor-Leste. Our model of aid aims to help countries to build the infrastructure system and not to change the government, and Timor-Leste needs help with its infrastructure. We believe that aid serves the scope of development when it helps to increase the

90 infrastructures needed to reduce poverty and to help the government to take on the challenges of development” (Chinese official). This powerful statement discloses the current approach China is taking in developing countries, and also paves the way for a new form of aid giving based on different priorities, hence more on nation-building and local identity creation - with a core component being the infrastructure system of countries in need - rather than pressing for democracy or a political change. Both Australia’s and China’s position in aid delivery determine different norms of conducts and respect for the local government. From a Chinese perspective, using aid to push for a change of government goes against its principle of non-interference. Moreover, a Chinese officer believes, “democracy is not the answer to solve forms of underdevelopment. Although, from a Western perspective development without freedom equals to no development, also freedom without development is problematic. For us, while Timor-Leste is a democracy, it is still struggling to face the challenges of development” (Chinese official). By comparison countries like Brazil, which are democratic, in reality fail because the greatest part of the population does not have the necessary facilities to vote, or the right knowledge about who and when and where to vote. For example, the millions of Brazilians living in the favelas, very often, are paid and taken by political candidates with massive trucks to the polls for voting. Hence, corruption dominates the scene of many poor democracies. For Chinese officials, “Democracy delays development” (Chinese official). India, for example, is a massive democracy, in population size comparable to China, but much smaller in economic terms. Democracy, in fact, costs. Organising elections, giving sufficient information to the population, preparing the knowhow, are challenges not easily faceable by developing countries. Timor-Leste as a developing country faces huge problems in organising elections, which so far have been supported by the UN. Therefore, from a Chinese perspective, rather than a change in the system of government, what helps development in a developing country is the construction of the facilities necessary to reduce poverty. Investment in infrastructures, roads, schools, government buildings, hospitals are keys to the needs of developing countries, and China understands this well by being a developing country itself. However, Chinese position hinders one key point: China does not press for a change of government in recipient countries, because China does not want to be pressed itself. Australia appears to be more aware of the need to deliver more practical aid, rather than strictly pushing for making the recipient institutions as a copy and paste of the Western

91 government. “We need to rethink our strategy in a more flexible way. We cannot strictly push for democracy anymore, without understanding the challenges of development. Timor-Leste has serious problems in implementing our aid conditionality. We must give the government more time” (Australian official). Overall, institutional change and the maturity of domestic institutions require time, and Timor-Leste is not yet ready to jump the stages of growth towards a Western democratic system. China, instead, reaffirms its key component in foreign aid delivery: “We respect the national government of any country, irrespective of their political system. If the Timor- Leste’s government needs our help we are ready. We give respect, and we expect Timor- Leste not to interfere with our domestic policy and integrity. We respect democracy but we want other countries to respect our political system” (Chinese official). Apparently, the Chinese position is flawless. Mutual respect is a core component of dealing in foreign policy. However, this position reveals that need for China to avoid any foreign pressure about the poor situation in Xinjiang, Tibet, and with Taiwan and Hong Kong. Australia, while still pursuing and defending democracy, may have understood that better economic development and granting time to the recipient government can ensure the future of democracy.

5.3.9 Cooperation Amongst Western donors and emerging donors there is also the perception that the aid regime is a kind of supranational institution, not legally binding but still important in terms of international relations amongst countries. The presence of China in foreign aid is very significant. It is important that all countries are contributing to global development in different terms. China is, obviously, looking to get a space in the aid regime and Timor- Leste is a good ground to increase its presence in the aid trajectories in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. For Australia, aid to Timor-Leste is also a matter of cooperation amongst donors. “All should do their part. Aid to Timor-Leste is a collective obligation to stabilise the region” (Australian official). This perspective is aligned with the Western aid regime, which also channel aid via multilateral and bilateral channels. For China, as a rising donor, in Timor- Leste, “aid is a matter of solidarity, bilateral friendship, and cooperation with other donors to Timor-Leste” (Chinese official). This clearly explains the different standing points between Australia and China in Timor-Leste. While the former sees aid as a collective

92 delivery between the DAC donors and other friends donors (including Indonesia), China sees aid as a matter of friendship between donor and recipient but also recognises the importance of cooperation. China also “believes in cooperation. We already signed an agreement for cooperation with Australia. In the Pacific, we successfully cooperate with Australia, the USA and New Zealand. In Timor-Leste we have already cooperated with Australia through the local government” (Chinese official). At the same time, Australia affirms that “Cooperation with China is ongoing. China is a reality that we cannot disregard. Its achievements in reducing poverty are remarkable, and as a donor of foreign aid, we must learn from China” (Australian official). Therefore, from both sides there is recognition that cooperation is key to the benefit of one country’s development and interstate relationship. Both donors, in fact, have signed an agreement for cooperation in development in the Asia-Pacific area. The Memorandum of Understanding for a Development Cooperation Partnership, signed in April 2013, on the occasion of an official visit of the Australian government to China has the intention of promoting partnership on three levels: 1) Mutual respect for the contribution of both donors; 2) Recognition of the comparative advantage that China and Australia can bring; 3) Possibility to expand the partnership including other multilateral and bilateral donors (Memorandum of Understanding for a Development Cooperation Partnership between the Ministry of Commerce of China and the Austrain Aid Agency, 2013). During the Australian government’s visit to China, the then Foreign Minister of Australia, Bob Carr went on affirming that “China, once a recipient of Australian aid, will now partner with Australia to deliver aid in the region” (Carr, 2013). The words of Bob Carr are recognition of the global status of China in the foreign aid delivery. In fact, while until 2012, Australia was one of the ten main donors of aid to China, today Australia fully recognises China as a donor, and not anymore as a recipient of aid. When in 2013 Tony Abbott of Australia decided to cut on aid, China was the first country to be removed from the list of recipient (Table 1 shows that China does not receive aid from Australia). This is recognition that China has a global economic status and that in the delivery of aid to Timor-Leste as well as to other Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific, China is ready to take on the global challenges of tomorrow and be an effective partner. However, China is strong in asserting that while it is important to cooperate both donors have different approaches and expertise to international development, and the cooperation agreement strictly focus on preserving mutual respect for differences. In other words, while China is ready to cooperate, it is not yet ready - and probably never will be - to

93 accept the norms of conduct and the principles of the Western aid regime. The strict perception model of the West does not fit the vision of current development challenges of China.

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Table 1 OECD: Foreign aid to China

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5.4 Conclusion This chapter has presented the findings and an initial critical analysis of the allocation of aid in Timor-Leste. This chapter begins to answer the main research question (How is the rise of China as an aid donor in Timor-Leste affecting the foreign aid regime set by Australia, the most prominent aid donor in the country?) by looking at the differences in the practice of aid giving by both donors. From the interviews of Australian and Chinese officials some clear categories came out as main points of aid giving. Both donors, in spite their political differences give aid to Timor-Leste following three-core reasoning: moral vision, interest-based aid, and cooperation between donors and recipient. Within these categories, there are sub- categories which show a balance between altruism, prestige, economic interest and partnership. While there are common grounds for aid giving, both donors have differences in their approach. Australia pushes consistently for democratic liberalism and human rights as a condition in aid giving. However, the notion of human rights in aid giving has a different understanding in China in comparison to Australia and the West. Chapter 10 critically discusses this difference. China, instead, leaves Timor-Leste to find its own path to development without pushing the recipient in one specific direction, except for accepting the One China policy, for which China demands total commitment to it from its partners. Therefore, those countries who do not follow and respect the sovereignty of China will firstly receive poor help from China, and also possible retaliation, as seen in the case of the Philippines and the meagre support received after the Hainan typhoon. The humanitarian perspective is still strong in both donors. Australia as a developed and democratic country feels compelled to help Timor-Leste, and China as an emerging donor, with a huge surplus of resources feels compelled to help Timor-Leste. Both are interested in pursuing stability and peace in the area and both put a strong emphasis on the importance of supporting Timor-Leste to join the ASEAN regional grouping. In terms of responsibility, both Australia and China feel close to Timor-Leste because the latter helped Australia during WWII to stop the Japanese invasion of Australia, and it also helped Chinese citizens find a safe place from the harsh Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia. Therefore, today both donors feel the responsibility of giving back what they have received. China is also a developing country and knows the challenges of development very well. Therefore, it attempts to help Timor-Leste on the basis of its own experience.

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China, in fact, has considered development as a social issue, hence investing in the health sector and the infrastructures, while Australia has focused more on aid as a public policy, hence helping the country to strengthen government effectiveness. From an interest-based view both donors have specific interest in Timor-Leste. China, in particular, is building up its image becoming a new soft-power able to shape the preferences of the recipient. Australia, however, wants to ‘civilise’ its neighbours, trying to push its specific model of development. In terms of building alliances, China is seeking through aid, support from Timor-Leste in case of an escalation of the South China Sea dispute. Therefore, China is strongly committed to helping Timor-Leste join ASEAN. For China, aid giving is also important to assert the rules of conduct, hence the importance of mutual benefit and non-interference in the domestic politics of one country. China respects Timor-Leste’s democracy, but claims that democracy is not the answer to development. Hence, it is advice to Timor-Leste - you follow your path, we help you as long as you respect our own government and its integrity. Mutual respect assumes a huge importance in foreign policy matters. Australia, at the same time, is still committed to promote and strengthen democracy via aid in Timor-Leste, however, its government is aware that Timor-Leste needs time to implement specific policies, and that it cannot be rushed and pushed on jumping the stages of development. In terms of cooperation, there is recognition that China is an important partner in international development. Australians have perceived that China’s engagement in Timor-Leste, at the end, can be an advantage to focus on specific sectors of development. Sharing the burden of development via aid can help achieve faster and better development in the recipient country. Overall, this chapter has set the reasons behind aid giving for both donors. There is a balance of moral vision, interest and possible cooperation between China and Australia in the future of Timor-Leste’s development. Clearly, Chinese aid is affecting the role of Australia, which today has to face the Chinese reality in Timor-Leste. Australia while committed to promote democracy and human rights in Timor-Leste with its aid policy is changing the discourse of development towards a more practical way of aid giving. Lastly, the signing of the memorandum of understanding with China for the development of the region is also important recognition that China is a regional power in shaping the future of the region.

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CHAPTER 6. ASSESSING AUSTRALIA’S AND CHINA’S AID: A TIMORESE PERSPECTIVE This chapter attempts to establish the East Timorese perception of Chinese and Australian aid. There are different levels of analysis and people interviewed. The first part introduces the amount of aid given from 2000 to 2014 from Australia and China to Timor-Leste, the second part focuses on the East Timorese government’s perspective about foreign aid, including the perception of the donor-recipient relationships. An analysis of the impact of aid on labour creation and the rising inflation follows. Furthermore, this chapter will deal with the changing trust in the role of Australia, and the fear of a new colonial rule of China via foreign aid. The last part of this chapter discloses the perception of East Timorese students in relation to Chinese aid, and analyses the current status of the agricultural hybrid plantations of Australia and China in Timor-Leste.

6.1 Timor-Leste’s Perception of Chinese and Australian Aid For Australia, Timor-Leste has, for a long time, represented the poor and underdeveloped neighbour, with no electricity and no water. Therefore, Australia, as a developed country, felt compelled to help. Similarly, the moral vision of the 1950s was that developed countries had a moral duty to teach underdeveloped countries how to live, progress and prosper. China, instead, supported the view that Timor-Leste needed infrastructure to reduce poverty, and to create a market for exports and imports. Table 2 gives an idea of the amount of aid given from China and Australia to Timor-Leste from 2000 to 2014. Australia, in this period, has donated about U$519 million in aid to Timor-Leste, while China has given around U$66 million. There is clearly a huge difference in the amount of money involved. However, as this chapter will reveal, China is still making an impact in the country. An impact which deserves attention, by Australia and other foreign donors. Overall, China recognises the needs of Timor-Leste on the basis of its own experience. In fact, Chinese development strictly focuses on infrastructure development to help to achieve economic development (Li, 2005, 49). This domestic view in development is also exported in the development plan overseas. Given that China is still a developing country, its government understand that development is achieved via infrastructure improvements. Hence, China focuses more on the nation building, which is something important for Timor-Leste, given that it was left without infrastructure, due to the Indonesian invasion.

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The Chinese approach to development is also visible in Timor-Leste, where China has improved the infrastructure of the country. Through infrastructure building, China promoted the creation and establishment of a functioning country and government in Timor-Leste. Since the beginning of Chinese involvement in Timor-Leste, China has been building several key buildings, and infrastructure in the country. China has also invested in other sectors, in particular the health sector. Nevertheless, these contributions are smaller than the infrastructure investment. China has a medical team in Timor-Leste, which has been there more than a decade. The team is doing an important job, one which has an impact on the local population (Timorese official). China has also promoted cultural exchanges with Timor-Leste. In particular, there are many East Timorese students studying in China at the moment. Several have already successfully graduated (Timorese official). China is also aiding in the agricultural sector. China has implemented a hybrid rice project in many areas of Timor-Leste. These projects aimed at improving the outcome of the rice field. In particular, the yield of every acre of land was temporarily improved via a combination of hybrid rice seeds, chemical fertilisers and machiner (Timorese official). This project was very successful in the testing phase. However, several problems arose in the long-run. Soil degradation and dependency from the hybrid rice seeds are amongst the many problems East Timorese farmers are experiencing. Australia has mostly focused on the state building of Timor-Leste. Most of its aid funds have been spent in establishing and training the police in Timor-Leste. Other major projects have improved water and sanitation, agriculture, and rural development. The police development programme has been found by Australia since early 2000. It has fifty-four advisors, communication and intelligence people. The Timor-Leste government also employs Portuguese police officers who are providing further support and training in Timor-Leste. Australian police officers are fully supported by Australian aid (Timorese official). A problem of trust in Australia is visible here. It seems that there is more acceptance for Portugal than Australia because of the situation and the perception that Australia “has always a second aim in aid giving in Timor-Leste” (Timorese official). The government also recognises that while Australia has spent hundreds of million in aid since 2000, “Australia did not get anything in exchange. Most of the contracts so far are to Indonesian companies” (Timorese official). Portuguese police officers in Timor-Leste get paid two, three times more than in their countries. In addition, they also get a Portuguese salary from Portugal. Further to this, the

100 perception is that Portuguese integrate more easily in Timor-Leste than Australians, or Chinese.

Table 2 – Foreign aid in Timor-Leste

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“Portuguese are more integrated, but Australians (and Chinese) are more closed/conservatives” (Timorese official). “Australians they go to the beach with armed vehicles, to the restaurant with pistols, etc” (Timorese official). This constant perspective and perception of fear is strange amongst Australians, but it can be understood in light of the distance between a Western approach, based on donor to recipient relationships, in which the donor has always something to lose and in which its security is constantly under threat. However, Timor-Leste has the lowest crimes in the pacific. Timor is generally safe. “Chinese, while they live in their own communities, tend to relate more to locals, and in any case they do not show this fear and the need of always protecting themselves” (Timorese official). While this perspective overestimates the integration of Chinese people, the reality on the ground is that Chinese Timorese, and the new Chinese migrants tend to only socialise within their communities, but that they depend on local people’s patronage within their businesses.

6.2 What Do Government Officials Think of Chinese and Australian Aid? The East Timorese perception of Chinese and Australian aid, seems prima facie similar. However, there is a different key reading that comes out from the data. While the graphs present similar results that emerge from the interviews, the perceptions amongst politicians and diplomats about the motivation of aid, are different. Australian aid presents a very positive outcome in terms of perception (9 out of 14 – table 3). This is in line with the idea that the Western foreign aid model is always positive and promotes the support of countries in needs. This relates to the view of Lumsdaine and his moral vision in the international aid regime. Most Timorese officials believe Australian aid is a “bless of God” (Timorese official), and that Timor-Leste is lucky to be very close (geographically and politically) to an important democracy like Australia. This perspective resembles also the moral vision of the Marshall plan in the 1950s.

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Table 3 Perception of Timor-Leste’s officials Interview to Positive Impact Neutral Negative Impact Not willing to Timorese express their politicians and judgement diplomats Chinese Aid 7 2 5 0 Australian Aid 9 1 4 0

Perception of Chinese Aid

Positive Neutral Negative

Perception of Australian Aid

Positive Neutral Negative

Similarly, East Timorese politicians see Chinese aid as mostly positive (7 out of 7). Hence, 50% of the outcome of my interviews described the experience of Chinese aid as something that benefited Timor-Leste. While less positive than Australian aid, Chinese aid is shaping the political perception of the East Timorese politicians. First of all, China is considered a relatively new donor from the Timorese, “we are learning to know each other”, a Timorese diplomat asserts. Therefore, this positive perception for a relative new

103 donor is something very progressive and successful for the Chinese foreign policy makers. This positive perception of Chinese aid, also reinforces the view that China is an effective alternative donor of aid giving. Xanana Gusmão affirmed that “Timor-Leste values China as the most important partner in East Asia, and appreciates China's long-term assistance for Timor-Leste's national independence and development” (Yi, 2014). As seen in the first chapters, the reasons behind aid giving are very different between China and Australia, therefore, the implied acceptance of both sources with different scopes clarify that both ways of giving aid have some positive impacts on the recipient governments. The case of Timor-Leste is peculiar in comparison to other small countries, like in the pacific (ex. Nauru or Kiribati). Timor-Leste is in some sense, less vulnerable to foreign powers and its aid assistance, because it can balance them and also rely on its resources (oil) to plan development.

6.2.1 Partnership with Donors There is more equality in foreign policy between Timor-Leste and its donors precisely because Timor-Leste has its own revenues from oil. In addition, officials in Timor-Leste are used to democracy, freedoms and transparency; therefore, they are not going to accept any dishonest behaviour, whether from Australia or China. “We have less pressure [from donors] because we have our own finances” (Timorese official). Nevertheless, the current relation with Australia is complicated because of the oil dispute in the Timor Sea and the related maritime boundaries dispute, and the spying cases of its diplomats. The problem with Australian aid is Australia’s behaviour in foreign policy. “Australians continue to nag, and nag on the same issue, even if we do not agree. They want us to do it in that way” (Timorese official). In other words, Australian aid requires specific conditions that must be implemented by the recipient state. Hence, Australia gives the money once specific conditions are met. Australia is famous to push for good governance implementation. In foreign aid, some of the projects, are assigned by tendering. While Australia and Timor-Leste follow a tendering process, China doesn’t. In Timor-Leste, all projects are assigned through regular tender applications made by companies. “We put everything online in a transparent way” (Timorese official). China instead puts the money for the project at the condition to use Chinese physical means. Hence, there is no tendering

104 application with Chinese aid. Therefore, aid money is spent directly by the government on Chinese companies that gain access to a recipient country. This aligns with the track of the policy of Chinese presidents to ‘going out’. In 2009 Wen Jiabao, the then premier of China, affirmed “Beijing will use its foreign exchange reserves, the largest in the world, to support and accelerate overseas expansion and acquisitions by Chinese companies. We should hasten the implementation of our ‘going out’ strategy and combine the utilisation of foreign exchange reserves with the ‘going out’ of our enterprises” (The Economist, 2009, 21 July). Along these lines, Chinese companies are also attempting to gain development contracts by participating in the tendering process of developing countries, including Timor-Leste. China’s model of development reflects the relationship between traders of the donor and the recipient country. The neutral result is pretty similar, which overall does say only one thing: that diplomats and politicians in Timor-Leste have a clear idea of what is good and bad about Australia’s and China’s aid. In every step of my research, I had the perception that Timorese officials are well knowledgeable about their development partners. Their ideas are white or black about China and Australia. This might be considered negative by some critics. However, given more than a decade of Australian aid, and the rising Chinese engagement, the relationship between the Timorese freedom fighters of the 1970s and the Chinese government and the betrayal of the Australian government during the Indonesian invasion, East Timorese know their donors well. In fact, in terms of the negative perception of Chinese and Australian aid, both donors score again very similarly: Australia 4 out of 14, and China 5 out of 14. The result is more alarming for Australia. If Australia is the ‘good guy’ of the foreign aid regime – following the moral vision of the 1950s – this feedback score of four, should be more than a concern in Canberra. It is an indication that something is changing in the perception of officials in Timor-Leste. The reason behind such a criticism is that Timorese officials are losing trust in Australia, and the goodness of its aid programs. “They used aid money to spy on us. Our relationship with Australia is not like before, and we take the spy story in serious consideration” (Timorese official). Australia is currently keeping a low profile, after the news of spying on Timor-Leste, and other Asian countries, became known. What Timor-Leste is currently doing is an attempt to see its rights established and to stabilise its foreign policy relations with Australia. “Now, we need to rebuild bridges with Australia” (Timorese official). Timor-Leste has

105 clearly alternative sources of aid, so it is not going to be bullied by Australia (like Nauru, etc). All donors, whether is Australia or China and the European Union, if they bully and push us we pay them back, but they are our neighbours and we must keep good relationships” (Timorese official). In fact, Australia immediately helped during turmoil in 2006. Portuguese needed three days to come. In case of an emergency, countries like Australia can send immediate help within hours. Therefore, it is key to the future of Timor-Leste to maintain a peaceful relationship with Australia. However, Timor-Leste will not accept being lectured anymore by Australia. The oil revenues and the Chinese aid are providing an alternative to balance the pressure from Australia. Timor-Leste has today more than an option to counter-balance the assertiveness of Australia in the area. Therefore, if Australia applies complicated conditions to its aid, or allocates the money in areas not considered useful for the Timorese government, then Timor will say no to Australian aid (Timorese official). Nevertheless, by comparison, if they behave like this in places like Kiribati or Nauru, their governments have no other choice than to accept Australian aid and its conditions at any costs, and mostly for lack of alternatives. The negative perception of Chinese aid scored 5 out of 14, and also reveals a lot about what kind of logic is crossing the political room in Dili. Timorese diplomats are clearly sceptic about Chinese development assistance. For example, in 2004 the Chinese state- owned oil group, China National Petroleum, did a seismic study off shore. They found commercially viable resources. But, they wanted exclusive rights, because the investment was too expensive. Mari Alkatiri rejected the Chinese proposal (Head, 2006). Then, China did not release the results. East Timorese are also aware that the main interest of China is not strictly the Timorese oil. China’s aid in Timor-Leste aims at: making sure they have some friends in the South China sea dispute; potential investment for Chinese companies in Timor-Leste; securing the life of Chinese-Timorese; making sure Timor-Leste does not side with Taiwan (Timorese official). China is expanding globally, and it is economically and politically concerned about asserting its integrity. China wants to secure its neighbours and increase support, especially with the current South China Sea dispute. “It is natural that China is engaging with us. The geographic area is a hot spot for China” (Timorese official). It is what appears more a strategic choice, in line with Australia’s geopolitical engagement in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Therefore, this negative perspective goes to the core of the realist view of international relations, where donors

106 give aid out of interests. This however, does not exclude that part of their motives are based on the goodwill of helping the recipients.

6.2.2 Timor-Leste’s Perception of the Donors – Recipients Relationship Figure 3 represents the current relationship between the donors and the recipient of the aid, in Timor-Leste. So far, Australia as part of the DAC regime, has maintained a vertical relationship with its aid recipients, where it promotes its specific norms. China, instead, has provided aid via bilateral relationships, promoting a one-to-one liaison based on a horizontal level. China does not use the language of donors and recipients, but puts its foreign aid policy on a horizontal level. China and Timor-Leste deal amongst equals. “As Timorese we feel comfortable to deal with Chinese. They share our challenges, and they do not put us on a vertical list of priorities” (Timorese official). Similarly, President Mogae of Botswana affirmed “I find that the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former subjects” (Hanauer and Morris, 2014, 57). The relationship is more between partners in facing the challenges of development. This has been further reinforced by the words of , the Chinese Premier, who said that "China always upholds that countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, should promote cooperation and seek development on the basis of mutual respect and equality" (Xinhuanet. 2014, 9 April). The perception of dealing amongst equals is recurrent in Chinese foreign policy discussions. According to Li Keqiang, "Both developing countries, China and Timor- Leste face the tasks of developing their economies, improving people's living standards and fighting poverty" (Xinhuanet. 2014, 9 April). However, the Western model of aid giving is based on a vertical relationship between donor and recipient. This model is in some way discriminatory towards those countries that have less economic advantages amongst recipients of aid. What the Western aid regime has proved in a long time is that rich donors have sometimes little respect for the local government of recipient countries. It is not meant to say that they do it on purpose, but it comes out from the policies of the aid regime to dictate to recipient donors what to do to solve their problems. “The feeling we have with Australian aid is that we are never really free to use it for what we need and we think it is better for the country. If a more compelling priority rises, we cannot use money determined for another project.” In addition, “it seems Australia dictates to us about what we have to do for our development”

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(Timorese official). The problem here is that even if Australia’s moral vision of helping Timor-Leste is something good to do in the eyes of the government and the public opinion, the way it has been done so far has shown little understanding of the local point of view. An important question to be answered by the donors is: Who better than locals knows what to do in terms of development? The answer is clearly in empowering the local people with more freedom of choice in using aid money in the projects they think are more important for the country. During my interviews, I did not clearly get an answer from China and Australia as donors of aid to Timor-Leste to the above question. Both countries, in fact, are influenced by their perception of their domestic development. But priorities in Timor-Leste’s development, might be different in comparison to China and Australia. However, there was a change of language in the discourse of development from the Australian side. In fact, today Australia is rethinking its engagement with donors. Also Timorese officials recognise that some Australians involved in the foreign aid delivery are “more accommodating than before” (Timorese official). Today, Australia is on the way to recognise the importance of dealing equally and creating a stable horizontal relationship with its neighbours. Recently, Australia has claimed that “Since Timor- Leste's independence in 2002, Australia has been its largest development partner” (Overview of Australia’s aid program to Timor-Leste. DFAT). Today, the language of international development is slightly changing from a donor- recipient perspective to a partner-to-partner. This perception follows the approach established by China in this last decade of foreign aid assistance and diplomatic relationships.

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A Graphic Representation of the Global Aid Regime and Donor-Recipient Relationship (Figure 3)

Western Norms 1. Good governance Regime Australia DAC (OECD) 2. Democratic liberalism – 3. Poverty reduction Vertical order

Timor-Leste

Chinese model Norms (Bilateral China Timor-Leste 1. Self Reliance regime?) – 2. Mutual Benefits Horizontal 3. Non-interference order

6.3 The Impact of Foreign Aid on Timor-Leste’s Unemployment and its Cost of Living One important outcome of foreign aid delivery is the creation of jobs in the recipient country. Both Australia and China in their aid delivery to Timor-Leste create jobs for Australians, Chinese, other foreigners and local citizens. China has been criticised for building its infrastructure strictly with Chinese materials and labourers, while Australia tends to spend most of its aid on consultancy. Several East-Timorese officials have shared with me their frustration with the increasing number of Chinese migrants (some illegal) into their country. I have been told that they come as workers of Chinese companies, for example with the donated buildings, and then they remain in the country establishing a small business. On the other side, Australia has a notable number of Australian people paid out of aid money, involved in aid delivery in Timor-Leste. Many work in Australia, while others have spent years in Timor-Leste (Australian official). However, criticism arose because several of these Australian people involved in Timor-Leste are paid huge salaries, which is in contradiction with the widespread poverty in Timor-Leste. In fact, while Timor-Leste received around U$5 billion in aid, only 10% has benefitted the poor. 90% of the aid money was spent on “international salaries, foreign soldiers, overseas procurement, imported supplies, consultants, etc.” according to La’o Hamutuk, a Timorese-based think- tank (La’o Hamutuk, 2009, September). However, former AusAid also employed local qualified East Timorese in several projects. According to government officials “many Timorese and young graduates are employed in the foreign aid programme of Australia” (Timorese official). Therefore, Australian aid has an impact in job creation also at local level. But, according to La’o Hamutuk most of the resources end up paying for consultancy and aid impact assessments, which is clearly disappointing from the perspective of using aid to solve poverty. Overall, La’o Hamutuk (2009, September) estimates that between 1999 and 2009, only U$0.15 US per person, was delivered through foreign aid projects to Timor-Leste, which is far lower than the poverty line. However, Timorese officials recognise that issues such as “corruption within the government, poor infrastructure, weak institutions and governance have reduced the possibilities of creating jobs” (Timorese officials). There is clearly a series of problems that affect a young independent state like Timor-Leste. Given that the institutions had to be built from zero, this process is not unscathed by corruption. In fact, according to the

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2015 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Timor-Leste ranks 123 out of 168 (Transparency International, 2015). In several occasions the then Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, Mari Alkatiri, has challenged the expenditures of the government, questioning Gusmão’s government for the expenditure of U$2 billion between 2007-2009 from the oil reserve funds. However, it is also true that Alkatiri was part of the opposition in the government at that time, which perhaps undermines the amount of corruption claim involved (Tempo Semanal, 2009, 7 September). This kind of governmental issue led Australia to push for governance change and transparency in Timor-Leste, and the tying of its aid delivery to specific achievements of the recipient country. For what concerns China and its lack of local job creation, it seems that while China had to comply, and agreed to employ local Timorese in its development projects, “only a minimal part has been employed” (Timorese official). Moreover, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a building donated by China, has a ‘manual of instructions’ in Chinese. Hence, lift and other technologies present in the building are only provided with Chinese language manuals, which makes it difficult for the locals to learn how to fix them when they break (Timorese official). This clearly makes Timor-Leste dependent on the continuous support of China. The weaknesses of the East Timorese government are seen by these same officials as the cause that allows “the Chinese to smuggle illegal migrants in Timor-Leste via foreign aid projects” (Timorese official). This view is widely shared by African countries as well. French, in his 2014 book, China’s Second Continent: how a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa, argued that most Chinese people who were brought over to Africa with the Chinese aid projects ended up creating new businesses and create new families. Some of them remained illegal in Africa. Others are creating huge economic empires. Nevertheless, the standing point of China is clear in terms of its mission to create labour for its own people, and not for the recipient country’s population. A Chinese officer contends that China is the most populated country in the world, and for this “the government sustains its citizens migration to work in Chinese development projects in Timor-Leste” (Chinese officer). This practice is a good way for the Chinese government to also reduce unemployment in China, and the demographic pressure. As Yang Liu argued on Vox Europe, China’s unemployment is a big issue and reached very high rates in recent years (Liu, 2009, 19 July). The government of Timor-Leste is aware of the

112 practice of importing Chinese workers. However, “we cannot force China to employ locals. For us at the end of the day, it is important to have the infrastructure built” (Timorese official). Therefore, the need to improve the infrastructural system of Timor- Leste supersedes the necessity to push donors to give work to local people. From the Chinese counterpart, however, it is important to work steadfastly in completing an aid project and this “can be achieved with Chinese workers” (Chinese official). Chinese companies believe that to implement their aid projects, working with Chinese employees is essential. Chinese workers work harder than local East Timorese and can be controlled easily. Fear of obeying the minimum wage, labour conditions, strikes by East Timorese and the local rights based system- all prompt Chinese companies to employ almost exclusively only Chinese (Chinese official). In Africa, in particular, there has been criticism towards the poor labour conditions with Chinese firms. While locals tend to protest, especially in democratic countries, Chinese are more keen to work and face the challenges of hard labour. In Zambia, in 2012, the government had to face the poor labour condition of Chinese projects by shutting them down (Kabemba, 2012, 10 October). In Timor-Leste youth unemployment is very high; around 40% of youth of working age are unemployed. Therefore, job creation with aid is crucial to the development of the country. Australia, from this perspective, has attempted to target this problem by investing its aid in: increasing agricultural productivity; improving infrastructure with labour intensive initiatives; promoting vocational education, and promoting the private sector development with microfinance. In these areas, Australia has trained women and men in rural areas, increased access to credit, improved water and sanitation, roads and hybrid rice fields (AusAid, 2014). Moreover, Australia is running the Seasonal Worker Programme, which creates job opportunities for the pacific islands, including Timor-Leste. When Australian companies and farmers are not able to find enough local labour, employers can rely on this programme to hire foreign workers for a season (Department of Employment, 2016). The East Timorese government is aware that donors have their own way of looking at things. Not always are they able to create sufficient jobs for the locals. Sometimes, like in the case of China, their model of development is to not use local labour standards. Australia, on the other hand, actively attempts to hire locals and increase job opportunities through foreign aid projects, while its government hires Australians for consultancy roles.

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6.4 Inflation Associated with Aid Giving Foreign aid generally tends to generate cash inflow in the recipient country, and labour creation: increasing the number of foreign employees and investments in development. These conditions determine an increase in inflation in the recipient country. As previously seen, Australians involved in aid, as well as other development practitioners, have generated the need to develop fast the hoteling infrastructure to accommodate the rising number of foreigners. Today, Timor-Leste is becoming absurdly expensive, especially in the capital Dili, where the majority of foreigners are concentrated; increasing the difficulties of the poorest part of the population. In the years immediately after independence, inflation in Timor-Leste was relatively low. However, beginning from mid-2006, the trend changed seeing an average annual inflation rate of 9 percent (Varapat and Nozaki, 2008). A huge inflation in prices is dangerous for the competitiveness of the country, and can seriously hurt the non-oil economy. But it can also erode the living standards, making the life of the poor more complicated. Western aid donors have hugely increased the cost of accommodation and food across Dili. An average 3 star hotel costs around 45-50 U$ per night. Food also, in some shops, is very expensive. In fact, since Timor-Leste’s independence, there was an increase in the number of hotels and accommodation with Western style standards. This had an impact on the cost of living. Most of these Western aid providers are also paid huge salaries, in comparison to the monthly wage of local East Timorese. Renting a house is also costly in Dili. According to Expatistan, which publishes the cost of living index, to rent a house of 85 square meters in a wealthy area of Dili, costs around U$2.200 per month (Expatistan. (2016, June). However, the Chinese aid practitioners have a much smaller impact on the inflation in the country. Chinese aid workers and diplomats seem more adaptable than their Western counterparts. The Chinese doctors’ team, working in the country, has adapted to their work and live in very basic conditions, while few from the West have accepted a change in their lifestyles. Similarly, Cuban doctors in Timor-Leste have adapted very well to the local standard of living, and they interacted well with local people (Timorese official). Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that an Australian consultant (or those coming from liberal democracies) working in international development, would be content to live with very basic facilities. Therefore, since independence, there was a rush to build accommodation of Western standards, to accommodate the thousands of aid workers, diplomats, and UN officials that would have come in the following decade for

114 development reasons. China, by comparison, by being a developing country and an emerging fast economy, shares many of the challenges of Timor-Leste. Overall, Chinese people can understand better some of the problems of low development in Timor-Leste. In the path to development, Timor-Leste does not need to become as developed as Australia. Both countries are in different stages of growth. These stages of growth cannot be skipped, as the countries need to advance at one-step at a time. China, instead, is knowledgeable that at this stage Timor-Leste needs infrastructure. However, with this influx of foreigners whether involved in aid or not, it is pushing the locals towards more lucrative opportunities, by investing in those businesses that provide services and support to foreigners. Foreign interventions in Timor-Leste has in some way disrupted the old system of living, and this has also affected the way the local economy and markets run In the capital of Dili: “I can see the difference today from when I was a young guy in the colonial area. Many locals were using barter as a form of trade. Today, instead, with so many foreigners, locals are compelled by lucrative opportunities to just make and make money. This is challenging our economy” (Timorese official). The challenges of Timor- Leste are far greater than short-term earning. The aid delivery is too centralised in Dili, most of the foreigners reside there and only few, and for a short period, are involved in rural areas. Therefore, the urban-rural divide is also huge in Timor-Leste. Finding good quality accommodation outside Dili is very difficult, where it is almost impossible to accommodate the needs of the Western aid practitioners: “when I first arrived in Timor- Leste it has been very complicated for me to adapt, especially in rural areas. Luckily I worked only for a short time in Aileu, then I moved to Dili” (Australian official). For Chinese, instead, is quite different. Many of them involved in aid have been working in rural China, which clearly has similar challenges to rural Timor-Leste. “I did not find any difficulty in adapting in rural Timor-Leste. I have worked for 3 years in a health project in rural Sichuan. So I know how to live with basic facilities” (Chinese official). These kind of differences have clearly developed a different perception by local authorities and local people about Australia’s and China’s aid. But even with different degrees the influx of foreign aid, and the influx of foreign aid providers, determine a rise in inflation.

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6.5 Why is Timor-Leste losing Confidence in Australia? Irrespective of the amount of money Australia has granted in aid to Timor-Leste, its image is seriously damaged by the perception that the country is not willing to find a solution to the oil dispute. Australians recognise it: “we have tried to help Timor-Leste, but we did not do our best in consideration of the way our government is dealing with the oil dispute” (Australian official). The perception amongst East Timorese politicians is that Australia is earning much more from the unfair division of the Timor Sea, than what Australia has actually provided as aid. “The feeling we have is that Australia is paying its aid policy to Timor-Leste out of the revenues of the Timor Sea. Basically we are not getting aid” (Timorese official). Unfortunately, Australia’s claim about respecting the law, in particular the law of the seas, is pure rhetoric. Australia’s Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, went to the USA in 2016, for his first official speech as prime minister before the American congress. There, he claimed that China should commit to the law of the seas, and respect its international law commitments in the South China Sea dispute and the Paracel Islands. However, Turnbull did not clearly mention the poor compliance of Australia with international law in regard to Timor-Leste, and the maritime boundaries dispute (Clarke, 2016, 24 March). This contradiction between what Australia claims and its practice, is seriously undermining its image on the international arena and as a regional actor in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Many commentators have judged the Australian foreign policy standing as twofaced and hypocritical (Allard, 2016, 25 January). Australia seems determined when it comes to its regional interests in challenging China’s claim in the South China Sea, but Australia is not ready to comply with the law when it comes to its neighbour, Timor-Leste. At the same time, Australia has not been a convincing donor for Timor-Leste. In 2002, when Australia signed the agreement to share the revenues from the oil fields, the country had been spying on the Timor-Leste’s government, to seek a better deal on the division of oil. This news became known in 2012. It was discovered that Australia has been using aid money to bug key people of the Timor-Leste’s government. Through its former aid agency, AusAid, Australia promised the government of Timor-Leste to refurbish several rooms of the government buildings. In those occasions, the Australian government installed hidden microphones into the cabinet rooms in order to spy on the government of Timor-Leste, in a period in which both governments were signing the Timor Sea Treaty for sharing the oil revenues. Mari Alkatiri, who was prime minister in 2004 at the time

116 the Treaty was signed, declared that the Australian abuse of aid money to enable them to bug East Timorese politicians “in terms of International law it’s a crime” (Cannane, 2015, 26 November). This shows how a country like Australia has used its aid funds to profit from the weakness of a poor country like Timor-Leste. In fact, the then foreign minister, Alexander Downer, who authorised the bugging of the Timor-Leste’s government, has claimed in 2014 that bugging “was for legitimate intelligence gathering… it gave commercial and economic advantage to the Australian government” (Aarons, 2005, December). This unfair use of aid is currently undermining the credibility not just of the Australian aid regime, but of a liberal democracy like Australia. Today, there is an ongoing dispute at the International Court of Justice to try to settle the maritime boundaries between Timor-Leste and Australia, and to void the Timor Sea Treaty signed between the two countries. However, criticisms rose from the public opinion in favour of Timor-Leste. The public opinion of Australians has prompted a movement against the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as a current movement of protest against the Australian government and its lack of commitment to a fair division of the maritime boundaries. Also in Timor-Leste, thousands of people gathered on 22 March 2016 in front of the Australian Embassy in Dili, to protest against the Australian government’s unfair behaviour in its foreign policy (Davidson, 2016, 22 March). Public opinion in Australia has always had an important impact on governmental decisions. The general perception amongst Australians is that Australia as a wealthy, developed and democratic country has a duty to help developing countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The government of Timor-Leste, always has also recognised the role of the public opinion, “We trust our friendship with the Australian people. So far, we have been helped and supported by the public opinion of Australia, although its government has not always been keen towards Timor-Leste” (Timorese official). In recent years many Australians have argued against the good faith of Australian aid programmes in Timor-Leste. Chip Henriss - a commissioned officer who served in the Australian Regular Army between 1991 and 2001 - was deployed in Timor-Leste as part of the INTERFET mission to bring peace, stability and democracy to Timor-Leste in 2001. Chris affirmed in an article on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that after sixteen years from his deployment in Timor-Leste, he “wonder whether [the Australian government] motive was pure, or if they were just eyeing off oil and gas fields” (Henriss, 2015, 23 September). Initially, Australia appeared to follow its values in helping the plight of the East Timorese. People

117 in Australia were proud that a rich, democratic and free country was coming to help the East Timorese after many years of Indonesian invasion. However, recently, many questioned “was our government’s motivation as pure as it would have us believe? Were we in East Timor to selflessly end the bloodshed?” (Henriss, 2015, 23 September). In fact, in 2015, Xanana Gusmão, appealed to the Australian public opinion to help Timor-Leste in solving the maritime dispute with Australia. Gusmão affirmed that “if we go to the media and if we raise awareness, it is not because we want people to be against Australia but just to say ‘oh yes, it is unfair” (Reuters, 2015, 15 November). Timor-Leste’s government is willing to win the support of the public opinion of Australia and activists who have supported Australia during the years. Many Australians have lived for a long time in Timor-Leste, not just simple people, but development practitioners, peacekeepers and soldiers. The hope is that the situation will be solved with a fair division of the maritime boundaries for both countries. Clearly, the leverage of a small country like Timor-Leste can come only from the public opinion in Australia, in support of Timor- Leste.

6.6 A Critical Analysis of Chinese Aid in Timor-Leste: a New Colonial Power? China has been heavily criticised for being a new colonial power in Africa in its quest for resources; this is especially so given that China has poor resources in its vast land (Nolan, 2012, 70). Therefore, in order to cope with its, until recently double digit growth, China has inherently needed to get resources from other countries. China is a country that is developing industrially, and most of the resources are put into the industrial sector. Little has been done to improve the agricultural sector, and China still relies on huge amount of imports for food, including soybeans from Brazil (47%) and USA (42%) (OEC, 2014). There is also a current rush to buy farms in Australia and New Zealand by Chinese investors, which allows for the offshore production of fruits and vegetables in trustworthy countries. Today China is heavily reliant on the import of oil, metals and mining resources from Latin America, Africa and Asia (Nolan, 2012, 70). For some countries in Africa, China has become a key importer of oil, for instance. Angola and Sudan receive their foreign cash out of trade with China. Sudan exports 50% of its oil to China (Nolan, 2012, 71). Brazil and Chile also have a huge percentage of their GDP supported by the goods imported by China. Nevertheless, China is also an exporter to these regions, especially of

118 labour intensive products, which has spurred the perception that Chinese products are damaging the local production and labour (Nolan, 2012, 71-72). Chinese companies have also played an important role in establishing China as an important partner in these regions of the world. Chinese companies have built massive infrastructure in the underdeveloped world, making an important impact in the lives of people and helping the nation building of several countries in Africa and Asia. Chinese loans, from the Chinese Eximbank to the developing countries, have been secured with resources or projects by Chinese companies (Nolan, 2012, 73). It has been estimated by the Financial Times that in 2009-2010 China has given more than U$110 billion in loans to developing countries (Dyer, 2011, 17 January). Chinese companies in the quest for nation building in developing countries have been competitive in comparison to their counterparts in the West. For countries like Timor-Leste more practical aid has been needed to build the infrastructure of the country. “We are grateful to Australia and the other donors. But sometimes their aid practice is too tricky. We need more practical projects, and we need them in a short time” (Timorese official). In fact, Australia’s aid appears to be too bureaucratic which makes the government of Timor-Leste impatient as they want to see everything done soon, well and ‘yesterday’, in the sense that Australian aid takes a long time to be put into practice and requires a tendering procurement that seems complicated. China therefore, offers a competitive option of having what Timor- Leste needs without many passages. China does not have a tendering process in the way it is understood in Australia for infrastructural investment in developing countries. Clearly, democracy requires openness to specific rules and duties of competitiveness. In the vision of China, this might be tricky and complicate things more. Therefore, China appears to be a good alternative to have something built in a short time. Chinese companies in fact, can build a bridge, pave a road, or build a building in a short time, and make it cheaper than that of other donors- given the cheap and obedient workforce in China. As seen, low-cost Chinese labour is brought into Timor-Leste every time a building is to be built. These Chinese workers are “reliable, hard-working and willing to live in simple conditions” (Nolan, 2012, 73). This however, prompted resentment amongst the local Timorese, who believe they are capable of doing the job the Chinese are doing in the country. In fact, in consideration of the high unemployment in Timor-Leste, most unskilled workers could be employed in the Chinese projects of development. However, this has not happened so far. The Timorese government is aware of their people’s resentment. “We know that Timorese would like

119 to be employed more in the development projects, especially the unskilled ones. It is not easy for the government to deal about this with China. Sometimes we have just to accept what a donor offers without recrimination” (Timorese official). The Timorese government is aware that Timorese can do as good as Chinese workers. However, local people are empowered with working rights, therefore they would never work as much as the Chinese. Most of East Timorese are hard workers but believe in their labours rights, and therefore they would never work longer than legally required. This relays how China can manage to build infrastructure at a low cost. Clearly, in Timor-Leste unskilled labour is not as competitive as Chinese labour. Timorese have been brought up with rights and democracy, values that made them free, so they would never give up their working rights. The anti-Chinese feeling is not something known in developing countries. In Timor-Leste it is still a minimal consideration, given the limited amount of Chinese development assistance. In other parts of the world, and especially in Africa, where Chinese aid has been massive, the anti-Chinese feeling is on the rise. The same would apply to South East Asia. Nevertheless, Peter Nolan makes a case that China, in spite of its global engagement, is far from buying the world (Nolan, 132). This perception is threatening the peace and the relationship amongst global actors. Overall, China’s outstanding performance in terms of economic growth, its global engagement in development and its model of aid delivery, is something to be looked at especially in an epoch of liberal globalisation. As any global actor who is shaping the world, China’s rise features plenty of recognition and criticism.

6.7 Students’ Perception of China and the Crumbling of the Australian Image Students are important in creating the definition of a donor country. Their perceptions help to create the future of the foreign policy relationship between Timor-Leste and its donors. Today, the Chinese government is increasingly adding university scholarships to its foreign aid programmes in Timor-Leste. So far, more than 50 students have graduated from Chinese universities (Timorese official). One of the Wikileaks cables published on 20 February 2008, revealed that the Chinese embassy in Timor-Leste “extends 4-5 full scholarships annually for long-term higher , and that these were consciously aimed at ‘children of the elite’ (Wikileaks Cable, 2008, 20 February). This explains how China is building up its international image and preparing for a long run relationship with Timor-Leste. China expects that these students one day will run Timor-

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Leste and therefore, by speaking Chinese and by having a positive opinion and memory of China, it will help to improve the relationship between China and Timor-Leste. The perception of Timorese students in China is mostly positive. Overall, complaints from students were minimal. So far – the East Timorese embassy in Beijing explains - 1- 2 people did not graduate (Timorese official). East Timorese students study Chinese full time for one year, then they begin their university degree. At the moment, one of the Timorese students who graduated in , is also working with the Chinese team in Dili. According to the East Timorese Embassy in Beijing, after graduation students work with Chinese companies in Timor-Leste.

6.7.1 Students Perception The East Timorese students involved in China and Australia under scholarship programmes, are often involved in internship periods at their embassies. Those who study politics and international relations have to complete a compulsory placement at their embassies. I conducted several interviews with those students in Beijing during their internship period. Their perspective is interesting because most of them aim at becoming diplomats or politicians or government officials once they go back home. Nine major recurrent themes have developed during my interviews (Figure 4): 1) Chinese scholarships are allocated in accordance with the Timor-Leste’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, therefore a formal way of delivering scholarships is followed by the Chinese embassy; 2) They do not push for previous Mandarin knowledge. They understand student difficulties, hence initially English is used; 3) The application is competitive, more students want to go to China; 4) ‘Rising China’ as a global actor, is attracting more interest; 5) Students are losing trust in Australia; 6) China’s image is boosted thanks to students’ word of mouth; 7) China is building trust thanks to its foreign policy and help to students; 8) Cultural sensitivity. Chinese are keen to help students in settling down; 9) Positive university experience. Timorese students had a fruitful .

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Formal Way of Delivery Scholarship Positive No initial University pressure for and Life Mandarin experience

More Cultural students Sensitivity want to go to China

Building Rising China Trust in as a global China actor

Building Breaking Chinese Trust in image Australia

Figure 4: Students Perception in Beijing Table 4 East Timorese Students’ quotes on China’s scholarship Int. 25 China gives scholarships via the Ministry for Foreign affairs of TL Formal way of delivering scholarship Int. 27 They require students to have a good understanding of English. They No push for test us. Putonghua Int. 27 The scholarship is competitive. There are hundreds of applications More students want for just a few places. to go to China Int. 27 I decided to apply to go to China because I was interested in Rising China discovering China. I believe the country is important for the future development of Timor-Leste. Moreover, I was already trained under a Portuguese education system, and I received a lot of information about the West. I thought that it was time to learn more about China. Int. 28 I had the opportunity to apply for an Australian Development Breaking Trust Scholarship, but then I decided to apply only for China. I did not want to go to Australia. I have the impression that Australia would have paid my scholarship with the Timorese oil. I am disappointed about Australia Int. 29 I applied for China because I heard from a friend that he had such a Building Chinese nice experience in China. image. Int. 30 Chinese diplomats were very gentle and efficient. I loved their Building trust pragmatism. They helped me from the beginning. They booked my flight, organised my visa. Everything has been very easy. Int. 30 I arrived in Beijing with 2 other colleagues. Two Chinese students Cultural sensitivity and two Timorese students met us. They accompanied us at the accommodation inside the Beijing Language and Culture University. The following day we registered, and they provided us immediately with an allowance for the next two months. Int. 29 I studied Chinese for one year and then I moved to Liaoning Positive university University. I have been in China for 2 years now. Professors are very experience good, they know I still have problems with Chinese. Writing exams is so difficult. So they invite us foreign students to use as much Chinese as we can, and if we can’t, we can use English.

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Most of these students in China focus their studies on political economics, education, politics and international relations. Others study to become medical doctors or engineers. The ones involved with their embassies are very keen to become useful for their country of origin at the end of their studies. These students have several ways to get a scholarship. Several donors, in fact, offer scholarships, but they also get scholarships via the East Timorese Ministry of Education. Until 2010, education in Timor-Leste was conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. This language is widely spoken in the country. However, after 2010, Portuguese has been reintroduced as the official language with Tetum, and as the official means of education and the language of the government. Many of these students who are now studying in China and Australia, studied in a Catholic school. “I studied at the Salesians schools. I had a seminary education, and I also studied English” (Timorese student). Usually students have more options to get a scholarship. Joao (name invented to preserve the informant) “had two choices: I could apply for China in January, or wait in April for the Australian Development Scholarship. I had the impression that if I applied for both I would have lost both. So I calmed down, and I decided to follow with an application for just one. I choose China” (Timorese student). Most of these students were interested in exploring and knowing more about China, and in learning Mandarin. “The world is every day more interrelated with China, also Timor-Leste is increasing its relationship with China, so I was interested to know more about China” (Timorese student). The perception is that the future of Timor-Leste is more linked to China than Australia, so many of them decided to study and learn Chinese. So far, Timor-Leste had long-term relationships with Australia, but not much has changed in terms of development, and the current strained relationship for the Timor Sea dispute is affecting the youth’s perception. “Honestly, I am upset about Australia. The perception that a rich and democratic country is stealing from Timor-Leste has affected my mind. Australian scholarships are paid out of our oil. How can a liberal democracy do it to us?” (Timorese student). Therefore, today, many students choose China as a rejection of Australia. The feeling of being betrayed by the foremost democracy in Asia and closest neighbour is present. Moreover, most East Timorese students in one way or another, have been exposed to the Australian culture and teaching, therefore many of them think that by going to China they “could learn new skills helpful for Timor-Leste” (Timorese student).

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Most of East Timorese students are able to speak at least three languages. Many speak their local language, Tetum (the official national language) and Bahasa Indonesia, and they study English at school, others can also speak some Portuguese. The new generations will be more exposed to Portuguese since it was reintroduced in schools as a mean of instruction. However, most of those who went to study to China could only speak one or two words of Chinese before their arrival (Timorese student). The Chinese government provides an intensive full-time course during the first year of students’ arrival. Usually, students stay at the Beijing Cultural University to learn Mandarin. The course is intensive, and after one year, they begin with their bachelor or master degrees, moving to their cities of destination in China. The selection process is interesting. While courses in China are taught in Mandarin, during the selection of the students in Timor-Leste, the Chinese embassy requires a good level of English. One contradiction that arose from my interviews is that while Timorese students have told me that the scholarship to China is very competitive (around 300 applicants per year), the East Timorese embassy in Beijing told me that China, usually, is not students’ first option, and that while the Chinese want to increase the number of scholarships, they are not able to find sufficient students (Timorese official). According to the embassy, the reality is that most of the students tend to look for opportunities in Australia, USA or Portugal because they manage better with the languages of these countries. Usually, the Chinese embassy in Timor-Leste chooses the ten top students out of the total number of applicants. Then, students are interviewed by Chinese diplomats, who choose the best. Interviews are conducted in English. The overall impression is that Chinese diplomats are very gentle and accommodating and they offer a five-year scholarship for bachelor students (Timorese student). One important component - which makes the difference between the Australian Development scholarship - is that Chinese diplomats help students with everything (Timorese student). Visas and flights are quickly organised and booked by the Chinese authorities. Students do not need to spend any cash in advance, which might be difficult considering the cost of flights in and out of Timor-Leste. At their arrival in Beijing, Timorese students know the address where they will study. As part of the project, Chinese students are sent to welcomed the new East Timorese students at the airport and help them with the initial bureaucracy and enrolment. Usually, other Timorese students already in China join the Chinese students in welcoming the new

124 cohort of Timorese (Timorese student). After the arrival, they go directly to the Beijing Language and Cultural University. They enrol and receive an allowance for the first two months, and they reside in the university hall. For the Australian scholarship, instead, students are required to organise everything themselves, and pay upfront for their flights. In particular, when students arrive in Australia, accommodation is not provided, nor do they receive official help to look for it (except from the recipient University). “When I arrived in Australia, I had to rely on my Timorese friends to look for an accommodation and to face the first problems” (Timorese student in Australia). Australian scholarships are good and very competitive but students receive little help to settle down in the country. After their first year in China, East Timorese students move to different cities according to their field of study and university expertise. Some remain in Beijing or go to Shanghai, while others go north or further south to the Guangdong region. At the beginning of their degrees, students study directly the Chinese curriculum. “It is all in Chinese. Learning is still difficult. But I try to pick up the main points, and then go back home and use internet to try to understand things” (Timorese student). Language still poses a great barrier for these students. But many of them study hard, and they practice – daily – Chinese writing. However, Chinese professors are very encouraging, according to this Timorese student: “Whether we do not arrive with Chinese language, we are allowed to use English. However, Professors push us to use as much as Chinese we can” (Timorese student). The fact that professors are welcoming and understand the students’ problems, are making these East Timorese students more confident to learn Chinese. The Australian education system is, of course, less open to this kind of help. Most East Timorese students in Australia shared with me their frustration, because when they needed help or extensions because of language problems, this was sometimes considered an excuse (Timorese student in Australia). Given the number of foreign students in the Australian tertiary system, many of whom come from a culture where plagiarism is permitted, it is understandable that professors may appear less keen to help and support students who provide excuses for not being able to complete the work. Australian universities, as with all anglo-universities, take for granted student’s knowledge of English before they enrol. Most of these universities have very selective entrance tests for English, therefore, excuses due to later language issues, can flag to professors that something is not as it is meant to be. While Australia is still one of the main destinations for East Timorese students, especially in light of its high-ranked universities, the overall experience in China is very positive. “China is rich of traditions,

125 it is a great country in international relations, modern technology, heritage culture. I feel I am lucky enough to study in China. After 2 years and 4 months, I feel well and positive about my studies” (Timorese student in Beijing). This positive view about China is interesting. The construction of reality and the notion of China as a country with long- standing culture and tradition makes it more appealing than the relatively ‘young’ Australia. This perception is going to affect these students in the long-run. They share the idea that overall, they have already been trained according to Western perspectives. Therefore, it is time for them to begin to learn other views of the world. This is one of the main reasons these students ended up in China. As above mentioned most of them studied in Catholic schools. As such their perspective of the world goes along the lines of the European civilisation, common to the Australian framework. However, China represents another viewpoint of the world. Both are valid, but China seems currently more interesting in light of its traditions and its global engagement. The problems that Timorese students experienced are not connected with the scholarship bureaucracy, nor can be attached to a failure of the Chinese officials. In most cases, they miss home and have language barriers, but in this second case the Chinese university system has provided support at least for the first year, which might not be sufficient to reach a reasonable knowledge of Chinese.

6.8 The Perception of Timor-Leste’s Government on Chinese Scholarships The government perception of Chinese scholarship appears slightly different from the students. According to Timorese government officials, China is not the first option for their students (Timorese official). The perception, at governmental level, is that East Timorese students - by being good at English - prefer Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, for their studies. “They go to China as a last resort” (Timorese official). However, the government official agrees that if students learn Mandarin then they improve their job opportunities back home. Contrary to the perception of students, East Timorese officials affirm that their government does not ask for more scholarships to China, because overall they do not have enough people to apply for the scholarships currently offered. Nevertheless, students in Timor-Leste are aware that there are good universities in China, and that they can acquire good skills. But, the government insists that the main and foremost skill in which the East Timorese students are interested in, is “to learn the language” (Timorese official). As

126 such, on the track of choosing China as a last resort, the government officials agree that students apply to go to China because “studying in China is better than not to study” (Timorese official). One student complained at its embassy that the course he was supposed to study (tourism), ended up to be a course in economics, for which he did not have any expertise (Timorese official). It has happened that students applied for a specific university but then ended up in another university. The Chinese government is improving the quality of its scholarship delivery, coping with bureaucratic problems. China is eager to catch up with the rest of the world. Today, the East Timorese officials sustain that “the Chinese have a better level of confidence, which clearly makes also our students more confident to go to study to China. At the same time, many of our students are afraid of the current strained relationship with Australia. Students are afraid that Australia will disengage with Timor-Leste’s development” (Timorese official). In this framework, learning Chinese and studying in China, will give them more opportunities for work in light of the increasing trade with Timor-Leste. Students look at the long-run opportunities. In some senses, the perceived poorer way in which Australia is treating Timor-Leste is turning more East Timorese towards China, favouring and strengthening the image of China.

6.9 Chinese Scholarship Offered to East Timorese Students: Buying the Favour of the Elite? The overall experience of East Timorese students in China is very positive. Most of them emphasised how good they were treated, and how helpful all the people they have met were with them. This might appear an exaggerated vision of China’s scholarship programme. In fact, the government of Timor-Leste is not so positive about this programme, reducing the Chinese scholarship to a ‘choice out of no-choice’ for East Timorese students. However, the opposite views might reveal a more interesting key reading of the foreign policy game that China is playing. First of all, as revealed by Wikileaks in 2008, most of Chinese scholarships to Timorese students go to the sons and daughters of the elite. In other words, those Timorese who have a father or a mother or a relative in a key position, will definitely have a greater chance to get a scholarship to study in China. This reinforces the perspective that China tends to corrupt recipient countries of aid (Chapter 10 will deal with this aspect more in depth).

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In fact, I interviewed in total eight students, seven of which have a mother or a father working in the government of Timor-Leste in a high ranked position. Another one, instead, has his brother in a key position in a company working in Timor-Leste’s oil industry. This illustrated that all eight students were strategic choices for China, irrespective of the student’s own personal merit. This not only reinforces the perspective that China promotes corruption, but clarifies that the positive experience of students is related to a long-run perspective of the Chinese government. China is building up its image buying these students, who will most likely have a vast chance of being in power one day in Timor-Leste. The discrepancies between the government’s perception - about lacking student applications to fill these Chinese scholarships - and the students’ vision of a competitive application- might reveal that China only gives those scholarships strictly to the relatives of the elite. Therefore, unless the Chinese government is able to collect applications from the relatives of the elite, they will not assign the scholarships. Hence, not the qualified East Timorese, but only those who have a key relative in power within their families, will be entitled to a Chinese scholarship. In spite of the discrepancies and the possible corruption involved, many of these students are having a great experience learning about China. Their language skills improved, and they are progressing with their studies. China is offering few scholarships, and it is providing an alternative opportunity to study a model that is different from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and Malaysia. What is also interesting from the students’ perception is the rejection of Australia by some of them. The maritime dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia, and the perception of a rich country stealing from a poor country, is also affecting the trust of these East Timorese students, which today are more keen to study in China and under the Chinese model.

6.10. What do East Timorese Think of Chinese and Australian Hybrid Rice Development Projects? This part provides an analysis of Australia’s and China’s hybrid rice projects in Timor- Leste. Through eight interviews of farmers in two areas of Timor-Leste regarding Manatuto (China’s hybrid rice) and Baucau (Australian Seeds of Life), this part attempts to establish what is the perception of East Timorese farmers in relation to agricultural aid from China and Australia.

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Hybrid rice development projects in Timor-Leste have been vastly implemented by China and Australia in the last decade as part of their foreign aid policies. Therefore, they provide an important ground for testing both countries in their aid giving practices. This kind of testing permits an understanding of how local people and officials have received and digested both donors’ involvement in the production of food. Very often, what officials think of donors’ aid, does not match what local people think. In Timor-Leste, food scarcity has been a problem especially during the 2006 turmoil. China, in more than one occasion, has been the safe valve of the East Timorese government in providing food. In 2006-2007, China provided tonnes of rice and cooking oil to the East Timorese government to cope with the lack of food in a period of political instability. This way of aid giving - with food donation in a period of crisis - is a very effective tool of foreign policy to boost the image of the donor before the recipient’s government. Nevertheless, it is important to look at the long run effects of Chinese engagement in Timor-Leste with the rice field and to see how far Chinese agricultural technologies have gone to help the people of the island. China began implementing the hybrid rice development project in 2008, with a U$8 million project called, The China-East Timor Agricultural Cooperation on Hybrid Rice Technology. The Chinese government, through the Longping High-Tech International Exchange Center, provided experts to support the implementation of the hybrid rice in Timor-Leste. The Chinese have produced hybrid rice by crossing two inbred genetically fixed varieties of a particular crop. The outcome was a ‘superior’ seed that increased the yield. As Prof. Longping, the scientist who breeded the rice argues, “China has used hybrid rice technology to help feed more than 20% of the world’s population using just 10% of the world total arable land” (Jiming, Yeyun and Longping, 2009, VI). Prof. Longping coined the slogan “developing hybrid rice to benefit people all over the world” (Jiming, Yeyun and Longping, 2009, VI). Today, China implements the hybrid rice in more than 20 countries with high-risk food security, at the point that Chinese hybrid rice has been considered as a tool of diplomacy, being labelled ‘Hybrid Rice Diplomacy’. These hybrid rice projects have brought huge revenues from the seeds and agrochemical sales to Chinese companies. The first impression that comes to light by analysing the title of the project is the word “technology”, especially in agriculture. Before this hybrid rice project was implemented, the agricultural mechanisms in Timor-Leste have been, overall, very simple and without technologies, in comparison to the fast developing countries and the West. The

129 agricultural cycle in Timor-Leste was very simple, as Figure 5 shows. People tended to use cattle and donkeys to plough the soil. The soil preparation included also the composting of animal made fertiliser (like horses, cattle and donkeys manure).

Soil • Cattle and donkeys used to preparation plough the soil

• Animal made compost (horse, Fertilizer cattle and donkey manure)

Planting the • the whole family works seeds together

Irrigation and Labour done by weeds hand, family removal based

Unified Harvesting family based

Figure 5 - Traditional Agricultural Cycle in Timor-Leste

After the soil preparation, the whole family would contribute to planting the seeds. Usually, East Timorese have specialised in cassava and other kinds of basic foods. Irrigation and weed removal was done by hand. Hard work was a component of the East Timorese agriculture. When the time of harvesting came, the whole family would work together with neighbours and friends. “The harvesting time has been a moment of solidarity; we used to cooperate closely and help each other when the moment of harvesting came” (Timorese farmer). Usually, there was a sharing between people of the workforce during this important period. After the harvesting was completed, usually, the farmers would separate the crop in three parts. One part saved for the next plantation, one part as family food, and one part sold on the local market (Timorese farmer). There was also a huge solidarity between farmers and extended families especially in a period of storms and bad weather when the harvesting would be affected. This simple cycle would begin each year, in a manner in which economic interest was not the predominant motivation; rather farmers were focused in producing, first, sufficient

130 food for their families, second, in saving food for emergencies in order to avoid famine and the consequences of drought. This simple agricultural cycle has changed with the intervention of foreign donors and their development projects. Initially, “we have all welcomed donors [China and Australia] of rice projects” (Timorese farmer). However, the long-term effect after several years of foreign intervention has provided a critical ground for these farmers to consider if the outcome has been positive. Many of the farmers interviewed have used the past tense, which in some sense discloses the nostalgia for a simple way of producing food and making the best outcome out of the land. The past tense actually discloses lack of satisfaction with what has been the result of foreign intervention. Initially, Chinese hybrid rice has produced massive increments in the yield per hectare. “Overall, we were very happy with the increased production, this put less pressure on our subsistence and we were less afraid of remaining without food” (Timorese farmer). With the old agricultural system, farmers were vulnerable to plant diseases and bad weather. Therefore, they rely on each other and friendship to cope with these kinds of climatic changes. With the increased production of rice, however, farmers were less afraid of remaining without basic food. In fact, the positive aspect of the Chinese hybrid rice project was that rice yield per hectare of land increased to 8 tonnes against the 2 tonnes of the traditional agricultural cycle. In the wrods of an East Timorese farmer: “We changed crop because hybrid rice provided major yield and also more lucrative opportunities. It also helped to meet the country’s current demand for food” (Timorese farmer). The improved estimate of rice per hectare has been confirmed by the Chinese embassy in Dili as well as the government of Timor-Leste. The Chinese Embassy of Timor-Leste claims that hybrid rice has produced up to 13 tonnes of rice per hectare (Chinese Embassy of Timor-Leste, 2011, 27 October). In a grandeur plan of solving the poverty issue of Timor-Leste, the Chinese Embassy of Timor-Leste stated that “Planting Hybrid Rice becomes a new way for local farmers to say goodbye to poverty” (Chinese Embassy of Timor-Leste, 2011, 27 October). Nevertheless, the areas affected by the Chinese hybrid rice were poor and are still poor whether absolute or relative measures of poverty are applied (see Chapter 2 for poverty definition). While the yield of rice increased in the short-term, providing a sense of the goodness of the hybrid rice technology, reality became soured. Many East Timorese farmers did not want to change their way of farming their lands. However, the government guaranteed the outcome of the hybrid rice project. Farmers, at the end, did not have a choice. “We just accepted that the

131 project was in the interest of the people, especially because our government guaranteed about it” (Timorese farmer). Nevertheless, the long run effects are evident today. Hybrid rice requires very intensive production, which tends to degrade the soil. This is happening now in the areas of Chinese engagement in Timor-Leste. Therefore, yield has reduced. Furthermore, locals need to buy rice seeds from China, which means that this creates dependency. Farmers must return to the company every cropping season to get the seeds (GRAIN International, 2010, 19). To buy seeds, locals need to save sufficient money from selling part of the production, unless the local government decides to subsidise the seeds. The Chinese hybrid rice project has also another serious side effect: the use of pesticides. East Timorese farmers are not used to dealing with chemicals. The only form of fertilising the land was the use of animal manure, a natural way of composting the land. In addition, the shift from root crops or fruit to hybrid rice has provided lucrative opportunities, but has also destroyed the production of widely accepted and eaten food. In substance, hybrid rice has destroyed the cultivation of the original crops present in Timor-Leste. Farmers complained that “hybrid rice has destroyed our original crops. We have a long experience in cultivating roots, but not rice. We have been forced into rice by the expectation of having a huge harvest, income, and food” (Timorese farmer). Australia has also invested since 2000 in the hybrid rice sector. From 2000 to 2014, Australia invested more than U$30 million in Seeds of Life (see Table 2 - Aid Portal – Timor-Leste government). Seeds of Life is now towards its end, by being in its third and last phase. This development project is organised in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Australian Aid, and the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, and the University of Western Australia. The scope of the project is to increase yield in agriculture by selecting and distributing ‘improved’ varieties of superior genetic quality. The varieties are: maize, sweet potato, cassava, rice and peanuts. The positive outcomes have been in line with Chinese hybrid rice: a higher yield. Australia, however, used organic fertilisers rather than chemical ones. More varieties of staple food were planted, rather than focusing on just rice. Overall, it increased the amount of food available. The passage from subsistence agricultural to intensive agricultural is considered positive at the government level and generally speaking in international development terms, however, not all East Timorese farmers see this change as positive: “Technology can help us in preparing the land, however, a massive change from subsistence to intensive agricultural has not been in the interests of the people” (Timorese farmer). In other words, it seems intensive agriculture provided lucrative opportunities

132 only for the lobbies and the middle classes and the few massive landowners. Meanwhile, most of the little and family-based economy (predominant in Timor-Leste) has not beneficed by this technology’s implementation. The negative aspects of Australian agricultural projects are several. Farmers complained about the taste of the root crops: “it is different and less tasty than the original plantation” (Timorese farmer). It seems that some crops present more sugar, and diabetes has spread across the population (Timorese farmer). The Australian agricultural project has also created dependency as the China’s one. Farmers have been dependant on their government providing and subsidizing the seeds. However, when foreign aid and government subsidies will terminate, a problem will arise for these farmers. In 2016, this project will come to an end, and so far it is difficult to make previsions about its sustainability, especially if farmers will not be subsidised by the East Timorese government, and their savings will not be enough to buy the needed seeds. Traditional farming was based on cattle as the means to plough the soil and do the hard work, but intensive agriculture requires also investment and maintenance of the technological apparatus. One negative outcome of the food project of China and Australia in Timor-Leste is that they have increased the lucrative opportunities for landowners, which have affected the traditional way of life. As the Bismarck Ramu Group, an NGO in Timor-Leste, argued: “With the hybrid rice project, the locals are forced into a new culture of cash-crop farming completely at odds with their traditional practices and food system. To the locals, rice can thus pose a real threat to their local crops and culture” (Grain, 2010, 30 April). Solidarity has been supplanted by lucrative opportunities. People used to share what they produced. “There was solidarity between us” (Timorese farmer). Farmers were helping one another in case of poor harvesting. Today lucrative opportunities of selling the crops in the domestic and foreign market are destroying this traditional solidarity. Overall, hybrid rice projects appear to be more an issue for small farmers. As a study of Grain International, an NGO working in agricultural development, has shown, the implementation of hybrid rice technology to solve the scarcity of food had mostly rewarded the companies involved in the seed creation and project implementation. In fact, the companies have immense return on their seeds and chemical sales. Irrespective of the initial claim that hybrid rice helps to produce more rice per hectare, Grain sustains that “[hybrid rice] is best suited to the kind of large-scale, high-tech, plantation-style agriculture that local and foreign investors are currently interested in” (Grain, 2010, 30 April). Foreign companies, foreign governments and the local lobbies are interested in

133 controlling the farming market. In Timor-Leste, the outcomes of the hybrid rice projects have made the country dependent on the imports of the resources necessary to implement them. In the cases of Chinese and Australian hybrid rice, we have seen that farmers are obliged to return to the company to buy seeds every year or every cropping. This clearly increases East Timorese farmers’ dependency on the donors. Control increases political influence and profits as well. This business has become immense for China and its Longping Institute, which deliver hybrid rice projects in many countries around the world. According to Grain, the hybrid rice technology “is a big business that has little to do with agricultural development” (Grain, 2010, 30 April). In other words, the dictum: teach a man to fish and he will become independent, is not quite what foreign donors are doing in Timor-Leste, not to mention the disruption of traditions, in fact, East Timorese farmers have stopped to produce their local root-foods in favour of more lucrative hybrid rice. The consequences, however, are in the long-run and Timor-Leste and its people will still have to face them.

6.11 Conclusion This chapter has presented the perception of East Timorese about Chinese and Australian aid. The assessment is done at different levels, including the perception of East Timorese officials, students and farmers. This chapter helps to complete the answer to the first research question, and provide a clear answer to the second question of this thesis. This assessment is crucial to see the way foreign aid from both donors, has been understood on the ground in Timor-Leste. Overall, East Timorese officials have expressed a very positive judgement about Australian aid, 9 out of 14 are satisfied with the Australian commitment to East Timorese development. China, however, has also achieved a good positive impact for a fairly new donor in the development of Timor-Leste. There is, however, a relevant negative perception about both donors. In the case of Australia, this is determined by its behaviour in foreign policy. The current dispute in the Timor Sea for the oil, the bully attitude, the lack of commitment of Australia to legally divide the maritime boundaries, and the spying case on the East Timorese government, are seriously undermining the regional image of Australia. For what concerns China, there is still scepticism in consideration of the lack of clarity and transparency with Chinese foreign policy and aid practice.

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In terms of the relationship between donors and recipients, Australia and China have different approaches. Timor-Leste feels more confident to deal with China, which tends to behave with aid recipients on a horizontal level, hence somewhat as equals. While Australia still maintains a vertical relationship with the recipient of its aid. This behaviour is common to most of the Development Assistance Committee donors. While Australia is changing the discourse of ‘donor-recipient’ into one more of partnership, Timor-Leste still does not feel comfortable in dealing with Australia as an equal country. In terms of aid impact on local jobs, unfortunately Chinese aid tends to be delivered using Chinese labour and materials. This has generated a great deal of criticism not just in Timor-Leste, but in most of the countries where China is delivering its aid. Australia, instead, is criticised because some of the aid is wasted on consultancy, and huge salaries to Australian people. There is a further problem with the presence of many Westerners in Timor-Leste, who have an inflationary effect on the cost of living. In fact, accommodation in Timor-Leste, nowadays, is terribly expensive making life harder for locals to live. For what concerns the East Timorese students’ perception of Chinese scholarships, they tend to be very positive. This might be in light of the Chinese clearly stated goals (on Wikileaks and interviews) of offering scholarships to the children of the East Timorese elite. This is a long-term strategy of building up a Chinese image and a generation of leaders able to speak Chinese. Nevertheless, China is competing with the Australian scholarships, in fact, an increasing number of East Timorese students want to go to China. They perceive China as more important in the economic future of Timor-Leste. Australia, however, remains important in the education of East Timorese’s young generation. In fact, contrary to the opinions expressed in the interviews with the eight government-connected East Timorese students, but according to that of the government of Timor-Leste- China is seen as simply the least preferred choice for scholarships. The last part of this chapter presented findings from interviews with farmers involved in the hybrid agriculture promoted and supported by Chinese and Australian aid. In both cases, there is a negative outcome; both make East Timorese farmers dependent on the hybrid seeds. While the agriculture of Timor-Leste was traditional and survived without technology, today Chinese and Australian aid in agriculture have mandatorily introduced technology, chemical fertilisers and hybrid seeds; those things and methods are totally new and strange to local East Timorese. This intensive agriculture has initially produced an increase in the yield per hectare, but in the long-run, East Timorese farmers are facing the reality: soil degradation and lower production. Moreover, Chinese fertilisers are not

135 organic like the Australian ones, increasing the pollution of previously uncontaminated areas. This chapter has overall provided an understanding of the perception of both donors in Timor-Leste. As it is clear, China is taking its stance in the development of Timor-Leste. Its aid is contributing together with Australia, to impact the local people. Both approaches are not always positive, however, they still work in developing Timor-Leste. The perception of the East Timorese although critical, recognises the importance of having both donors for the future of the country’s development. Both donors provide different expertise that has been successful in the case of strengthening the police sector in Timor- Leste. Therefore, China is a relatively new reality that in spite of its political differences, can be an advantage for the recipient and for the donor government.

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CHAPTER 7. TIMOR-LESTE’S MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN

What comes to light in Chapter 5 is the evidence that both Australia and China are interested to see Timor-Leste as a member of ASEAN. Therefore, both donors are delivering aid to strengthen the capacity of Timor-Leste and its stability. Australian and China has political and economic interest in ASEAN. For Australia ASEAN is an important market, but also is important that Timor-Leste is stable, and the membership can provide more stability. ASEAN is also an important market for China, and Timor- Leste could be an important friend to reduce the current hatred for what China is doing in the South China Sea. China is also interested to understand how Timor-Leste managed to have a peaceful solution with Indonesia. In fact, Timor-Leste peaceful attitude, and the ASEAN membership provide China with a possible solution in its internal divisive problems with Xinjiang and Tibet. Following the neoliberal perspective of the aid giving, both donors have an economic interest to see Timor-Leste in ASEAN. The small little island will be a reliable friend helping both donors in dealing with other ASEAN members. However, the process of membership is ASEAN has not been an easy one for Timor- Leste. In 2011, Timor-Leste submitted an application to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To date, Timor-Leste membership remains stalled largely due to arguments that its economic credentials are not up to par to join the group. In light of the strong emphasis put by Australia and China in giving aid to support ASEAN membership, this chapter, therefore, will revise the current situation of Timor-Leste membership in ASEAN, highlight a set of credentials that Timor-Leste does possess and that can help ASEAN to progress. Since its independence, Timor-Leste has become a multi-party democracy; held free and fair presidential and legislative elections; developed an active civil society that promotes civil and political rights both locally and regionally; and in 2002 established an Ombudsman which has been rated ‘A’ class by the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions. As a result, this chapter will argue, Timor-Leste’s democratic and human rights advances are compelling grounds for granting Timor-Leste membership into the regional grouping. Thus, Timor-Leste’s application should not be assessed on a merely economic basis, as it possesses political credentials which the ASEAN actually needs itself to enable it to “strengthen democracy [and] promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” as stated in art.1 of the ASEAN Charter.

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7.1 The argument for ASEAN Membership In April 2013, on the occasion of a conference organised by the Dili Institute of Strategic and International Studies (DISIS) and supported by the Chinese Embassy in Timor-Leste and the Asia Foundation, many scholars debated the issues that thus far has prevented consensus among ASEAN members on Timor-Leste’s application to join the regional grouping. One key opinion to emerge from the conference was that Timor-Leste’s admission into ASEAN will make it a credible member “capable of voicing greater democracy happening inside ASEAN to the rest of the world” (Dili Institute of Strategic and International Studies (DISIS), 2013). While most of the conference papers focussed on ways to achieve membership and overcome the economic impasse, little has been said about what kind of contribution Timor-Leste can make to ASEAN, hence explaining why Timor-Leste is an asset for the group. In fact, Timor-Leste’s experience can help to promote the agenda set in the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) Work Plan 2016-2020, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and in the recently signed ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together (ASEAN 2025), as well as to find ways of dialogue to solve many socio-political matters within ASEAN (ex: Rohingya, West Papua). From its beginning, ASEAN focussed on accelerating “the economic growth, social progress and cultural development” (ASEAN, ‘Overview’) of Southeast Asia, as well as promoting political stability and regional security. Today, there have also been some measures to include elements of democracy and human rights within the ASEAN body of law. In November 2015 the ASEAN countries gathered in Kuala Lumpur for the 27th ASEAN Summit to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In this occasion they endorsed a document, the ASEAN 2025, which consists of three sub-documents - the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint 2025, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 2025 - which stress the need for ASEAN to become:

an inclusive and responsive community that ensures our peoples enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as thrive in a just, democratic, harmonious and gender-sensitive environment in accordance with the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law (ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together’, 2015).

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Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have been key concerns in the ASEAN body of law since years. Art.1 of the 2007 ASEAN Charter declares the importance of working to “strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” (ASEAN Secretariat, ‘The ASEAN Charter’, 2008). The 2009 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community already established that the “ASEAN Political and Security Community shall promote development in adherence to the principles of democracy, rule of law and good governance […]” (ASEAN Secretariat, ‘The Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015’, 2009). In addition, human rights and democracy have been emphasised by the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012. Further to this, the AICHR Five-Year Work Plan 2016-2020 focus on achieving a “community […] free from fear, war, aggression, and poverty” as well as “the aspiration of the people of ASEAN on human rights, strengthening AICHR, promoting and protecting human rights in ASEAN […]” (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, ‘AICHR Five-Year Work Plan 2016-2020’, 2015). Therefore, if strengthening democracy and promoting and protecting human rights are amongst the objectives of ASEAN, and if - as stated - the desire of the people in ASEAN is of achieving peace and justice, and promoting human rights, then the political credentials of Timor-Leste should be seen as an asset for ASEAN. Nevertheless, there are major challenges with these objectives for ASEAN. In fact, the AICHR is an intergovernmental organisation that does not have enforcement mechanisms to secure human rights protection; because of this it has been labelled as an organisation without teeth (Emerlynne Gil , 2014). Furthermore, the variety of political systems within ASEAN does not ease the process of democratisation nor promote human rights. These political systems differ as democracy ‘under construction’ (Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia), military rule (Myanmar), soft-authoritarianism (Malaysia and Singapore), communism (Vietnam and Laos), one-man rule (Cambodia) and sultanate (Brunei Darussalam) (Sukma, 2009). Nevertheless, Malaysia and Singapore are showing signs of democratic activity with the opposition in both countries making some positive gains in their last respective general elections. These two countries are deemed partly- free in the Freedom in the World Report 2014, which gauges the level of civil and political rights around the globe. Figure 6 shows that ASEAN is currently divided between partly- free and not-free members. In this framework, Timor-Leste is a key member for further

139 democratisation within ASEAN, which, as seen, is in line with the stated objectives in the ASEAN body of law.

Figure 6: Freedom in the World 2014

Source: Freedom House

Moreover, Timor-Leste can also help to face the impasse which is lacerating the society in Myanmar with the issue of the Rohingya people - amongst the most persecuted people in the world according to the Economist (Editorial, The Economist, 2015). This event totally contradicts the document ASEAN 2025, which claims the need to have an inclusive community that protects the rights of “vulnerable and marginalized groups” (ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together’, 2015, 104). Protecting rights prescribes that all ASEAN members should abide by their commitments with the ASEAN documents they signed. Hence, countries like Laos should be questioned by ASEAN about the disappearance of Sombath Somphone, an eminent member of Lao civil society. These cases cannot simply be dismissed by the member states as internal affairs. So far ASEAN has also been lacking an efficient way to communicate with the civil

140 society in Southeast Asia in order to address the human rights concerns (Emerlynne Gil, 2014). Nevertheless, when in 2009 the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community was signed by the ASEAN Members during the 14th Summit in Thailand, it was established the need to promote the principles of democracy and human rights with specific activities and groups, including seminars, training programmes with youths, civil society organisations (CSOs) and think-tanks, in order to share experiences and different perspectives (ASEAN Secretariat, ‘The Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015’, 2009). This, however, did not reveal into practice, in spite the member states agreed to “ensure its [the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community] timely implementation” (ASEAN Secretariat. Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), 2009). Nonetheless, Timor-Leste has been a champion in the promotion of democracy, human rights, and dialogue with the CSOs, and it was achieved despite the difficulties associated with its newly acquired status as an independent nation (having succeeded from the Indonesian invasion in May 2002). As this chapter will highlight later, these efforts ought not to be disregarded by ASEAN. Timor-Leste has good relationships with all its Asian neighbours, especially Indonesia and Australia. It has to date attempted to comply with all the criteria to join the ASEAN group, and in 2016 will complete the last requirement of opening an embassy in every ASEAN country. In addition, the role of CSOs in Timor- Leste is of extreme importance. The Timor-Leste government has engaged with CSOs in the years since independence. Nowadays, there are hundreds of organisations that advocate for democracy and human rights and serve as a check and balance for the government. CSOs, as well as media in Timor-Leste, have been the key to prevent unconstitutional laws from being passed. In this light, this chapter will argue that Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN is an asset in the quest for democracy, human rights, and peace and stability in the region. To this end, this chapter will first present a brief account of Timor-Leste’s history and a literature review of the topic. Then, it will examine Timor-Leste’s multi-party democracy, the role played by media and CSOs in the promotion of civil and political rights after independence, and the current status of the National Human Rights Institution. The chapter’s final analysis will demonstrate why Timor-Leste is an important asset for ASEAN, especially taking into consideration its successful participation and achievements in many regional forums such as the Asia Pacific Forum and the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institutions Forum.

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7.2 Timor-Leste: an Asset or a ‘Laggard’ for ASEAN? Different Outlooks The literature on Timor-Leste has immensely expanded since mid-1970s, and publications about democracy, human rights and justice are countless. Unsurprisingly, the literature concerning Timor-Leste and ASEAN has been predominantly based on a one- way direction: examine what issues are preventing Timor-Leste to join ASEAN. Most of comparative studies point out more at the commonalities and differences in the human rights/democracy discourse with Cambodia, although others have addressed comparisons with African countries (i.e. Rwanda and Sierra Leone). The political system of Timor-Leste has been investigated by several scholars locally and internationally (Cummins and Leach, 2012; Leach, 2009; Kingsbury, 2007, 2009, 2014; Leach and Kingsbury, 2012, Shoesmith, 2003; Graça Feijó, 2014; Guterres, 2008; Joseph and Hamaguchi, 2014). Democratic transition and consolidation are key issues in a young country like Timor-Leste. Kingsbury (2014) has addressed those issues, and the author observed that East Timorese elections, overall, have been free and fair, and although some ups and down, the country has suffered little violence since independence. Of the same token, The Politics of Timor-Leste, edited by Leach and Kingsbury (2012), analyses in depth the democratic multi-party system, and the constitutional debate. A further analysis, about the political system of Timor-Leste, has been conducted by Rui Graça Feijó - a Portuguese academic - in an edited book called O Semi-Presidencialismo Timorense (2014), which also collects the view of key East Timorese politicians. The literature is also enriched by the views of practitioners and volunteers, as much as by political figures such as José Ramos-Horta (1994), Mary Alkatiri (2005) and Xanana Gusmão (2004). The recent book by Abraham Joseph and Takako Hamaguchi - two practitioners working for the UN and UNICEF in Timor-Leste - Timor-Leste: the History and Development of Asia’s Newest Nation (2014), very generously recalls how Timor-Leste, Asia’s newest democracy, managed to have peace and sustainable development. The 2007 presidential elections have been widely assessed by Kingsbury (2009), who recognises people in Timor-Leste as key actors in the process of democratic consolidation. East Timorese brought about a change by democratically choosing their government “that responded to their needs and wishes.” (Kingsbury, 2009, 218) Similarly, a East Timorese academic, José Cornelio Guterres (2008), concluded that the population in Timor-Leste was well aware of the significance of free and democratic

142 elections. He mentioned that women and men have been peacefully waiting for hours at the polling station to express their free vote. The literature developed around the value of human rights in Timor-Leste is ample and full of first-hand accounts and perspectives. Most of comparative studies again focus on Cambodia and Timor-Leste. In particular the comparison relates to the notion of genocide (or attempted genocide), which occurred in Cambodia at the same time of Timor-Leste, and the establishment of an international tribunal. Kiernan (2003) analyses the death toll in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, arguing that one-fifth of the population of both countries has been wiped out. Others (Katzenstein, 2003; Linton, 2002) points out at the quest for justice in Timor-Leste, and make a case for the establishment of a hybrid tribunal or an internationalised domestic tribunal. A more recent research (Hao Duy, 2012) has looked at the way to establish a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights, which would help to further protect human rights in ASEAN and address some the past and current issues in human rights abuses. In this quest, Hao Duy considers Timor-Leste a pivotal member for such a mechanism in ASEAN. Overall, human rights abuses in Timor-Leste have been analysed by many scholars (McCloskey and Hainsworth, 2000; Taylor, 1991, 2000; Dunn, 1983, 2003; Robinson, 2006, 2009; Cristalis, 2009), who mostly reach the common, shocking, conclusion that human rights abuses in Timor-Leste included inhumane practices of widespread killings, “starvation, deaths from preventable diseases, torture, forced movement of populations, coerced sterilization of women, rape and imprisonment without legal redress” (McCloskey and Hainsworth, 2000, 4). Taylor (1991, 2000) has also provided an historical account of the events of the abuses, and has given voice to the story of individuals. One of Taylor’s interviewee recalls the fear of the Indonesian military and the arbitrary killing: “I saw a Missionary Sister helping two men from Quelicai who were injured when some soldiers suspected them of being guerrillas. They were stoned to death in front of me and the nun, by Indonesian soldiers from battalions 315 and 731” (2000, 109). These individual accounts have been accompanied by other accounts about foreign countries silence and connivance during the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste. James Dunn (1983, 2003), former Australian consul in Timor-Leste, explains the way diplomatic relations worked during the Indonesian invasion; he also, sometimes passionately, discloses about his country poor standing before the human rights abuses by the Indonesian . Amnesty International (1994) and Human Rights Watch (1994)

143 have also prepared two detailed reports on the human rights violations by Indonesia in Timor-Leste. Both reached the conclusion that arbitrary use of power affected Indonesia’s bad record in human rights term. Nevertheless, there is a necessary publication to which any scholar writing on Timor- Leste and human rights should make reference. This is Chega! (Enough!): the report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste (CAVR, 2005). This report is the most comprehensive piece of writing on what happened in Timor-Leste between 25 April 1974 and October 1999. It seeks the truth on the Indonesian human rights abuses in Timor-Leste, addressing violations related to widespread killing and disappearances, displacement, detention, torture, sexual abuses, self-determination, etc. The report is also made freely available on the internet, in the intent to objectively and impartially dealing with the horror of a bloody invasion. For the scope of this chapter, the report is deeply important. It recognises the key role of civil society in upholding the principle to self-determination of Timor-Leste, and in fighting the indifference of other governments (ASEAN, Australia, the US), which turned a blind eye on the atrocity perpetrated by the Indonesians (CAVR, 50). Moreover, the report itself has been inspired in June 2000 by a workshop on transitional justice organised by the East Timorese civil society, the Catholic Church and community leaders with the support of the Human Rights unit of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The aim of the CAVR was also to reconcile with Indonesia, in the intent to acknowledge “past mistakes including regret and forgiveness as a product of a path inherent in the process of achieving justice” (CAVR, 18). Yet, justice, in the form of bringing the human rights abusers before a court, remains largely unachieved. Cristalis (2009, 263) poses a very relevant question: “reconciliation, but where is the justice?” In fact, independence and reconciliation are not enough to heal the wounds of those who suffered loses. Only justice in the form of a tribunal could have relieved the feelings of the East Timorese. Dunn (2001) and Robinson (2006) have been commissioned a report from the UN on the human rights violations, and they both suggested that a tribunal needed to be established. This however did not happen. Both Ramos-Horta and Gusmão suggested that reconciliation was of utmost importance, rather than a focus on justice. The discourse of human rights in Timor-Leste gleans also on the literature involving the role of domestic and international civil society organisations. Webster (2013) argues that human rights is the language used to support and inform the cause for an independent

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Timor-Leste, and this has been achieved by virtue of a transnational support network. Based on a case of study of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), Kraft (2002) claims that these networks are expression of a civil society movement that transcends borders and nationalities in its quest for human rights advocacy. This view is further strengthened by the extensive analysis of civil society and activism in Timor-Leste by Wigglesworth (2006, 2008, 2010, 2013), who points out that student movement has pushed for a human rights and an advocacy agenda to advice the international community of the brutality of the Indonesian invasion. Conversely, the literature is also rich in critical perspective. These accounts are mainly driven by economic considerations. In August 2014, Narasimhan’s article in the Foreign Affairs, “The World’s Youngest Failed State: Letter from East Timor”, has spurred resentment amongst the East Timorese politicians because the author failed to recognise the normative achievements of Timor-Leste, and the challenges to create a functioning democracy with a human rights mechanism in place in just twelve years.

7.3 Timor-Leste’s Application for ASEAN Membership Timor-Leste achieved observer status into ASEAN in 2002, and formally applied for membership in March 2011, during the Indonesian chair. The request was formally accepted during the 19th ASEAN Summit and Timor-Leste had hoped to gain membership in 2012 for the tenth anniversary of its independence. In terms of membership requirements, according to the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, “the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region” (ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration, 1967) and scholars (Fry, 2008, 14) agree that Timor- Leste geographically is part of ASEAN, since its land is comprised by the east side of Timor Island, and the Oecusse enclave within Indonesian West Timor. However, the ASEAN body of law evolved with the 2007 ASEAN Charter, and according to Art. 6, new members must have the consensus of the ASEAN Summit to be admitted; so far Timor-Leste did not reach a full consensus. Moreover, Timor-Leste needs to establish embassies in all ASEAN countries, which according to the Government of Timor-Leste will be established in the remaining countries: Laos and Myanmar (Xanana Gusmão, 2014, 11 November). Timor-Leste has been further preparing to qualify for ASEAN membership. In 2009, its government established the ASEAN National Secretariat with the support of South Korea

145 and other ASEAN Dialogue Partners; since then they have been providing training to government officials (ASEAN Secretariat, Timor-Leste opens ASEAN National Secretariat to intensify its preparations to join ASEAN, 2009). Moreover, Timor-Leste has an extensive number of CSOs that have demonstrated their willingness to engage with the challenges of ASEAN membership (da Costa Pinheiro, 2014). Timor-Leste also has a Secretary of State for ASEAN Affairs who has the role of overseeing the country’s preparation in joining ASEAN and in participating in the meetings of the association. In November 2014, Roberto Soares, the current Secretary, had a meeting in Jakarta with the ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh and reinforced the commitment of Timor- Leste to join ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat News, Timor-Leste Remains Committed to Join ASEAN, 2014). Nevertheless, to date, the Working Group established in February 2011 by the ASEAN Coordinating Council to discuss the matters concerning Timor- Leste’s membership is still evaluating the country’s application (Sally Piri and Bandar Seri Bengawan, 2013). Delays in the membership process, and scepticism, have been mostly driven by the Singaporean government’s position on the matter. The city-state, in 2011, has expressed concerns that Timor-Leste was not prepared to take on the challenges of ASEAN membership, and that it would potentially delay the establishment of the AEC by 2015 (Palatino, 2011). The obvious reference is to the poor economic development of Timor- Leste and the lack of human capital to participate in the hundreds of annual meetings. This view has been supported by a study published in 2014, in which the author depicts Timor-Leste as a regional “laggard” and as a state “quietly on the path to becoming a failed state” (Narasimhan, 2014). Nevertheless, this analysis focuses extensively on economic reasons, and quantitative data appears short-sighted in normative terms. They disregard all the achievements in terms of human rights, and the democratic political system that was established in a short time, which has been functioning since then to form a framework for equitable economic development. Yet, as stated by Rodolfo Severino former General Secretary of ASEAN, “there are no other conditions for membership, certainly none […] in terms of economic policy other than those pertaining to regional economic integration and cooperation” (Severino, 2006, 51). Severino continues on, arguing that when Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) joined ASEAN, many commentators asked him why they were admitted. This is in consideration of their poor economic development, which is still a sore issue in these countries today. He answered this question by posing another question: “on what grounds

146 should ASEAN have rejected them?” (Severino, 2006, 51). In fact, at the time economic reasons were not taken into consideration as benchmarks for membership. This, however, is not being reciprocated with the membership process of Timor-Leste. Furthermore, the economic concerns raised by Singapore and Laos have been influenced by the poor performances of Timor-Leste in terms of non-oil GNP, which in 2012 was at 22% of the total GDP, about U$1.246 billion (Forum ONG Timor-Leste, 2015, 6). Although the country has huge revenues from oil, youth unemployment is still very high and this is an alarming indicator for some ASEAN countries, which want the AEC. The perception is influenced by the belief that Timor-Leste might be more a liability than an asset (Wijaya, 2011). Nevertheless, although a new member means new challenges, the country’s development data reveal that Timor-Leste has progressed more than CLMV countries. In 2012, Timor- Leste reached a Human Development Index of 0.62, while Cambodia and Laos were at 0.58, and Myanmar at 0.56 (UNDP, 2015, 170). This value has been reached by Timor- Leste in only a decade after independence and places the country far above many African and Asian countries. Additionally, Timor-Leste has strong support for its membership by other prominent ASEAN members such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. In fact, already in 2011, President Aquino affirmed “The Philippines supports East Timor’s bid to become a member of the ASEAN family at the soonest possible time” (Chichi, 2011). By the same token, in 2011, Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, speaking in relation to the ASEAN enlargement to Timor-Leste, affirmed the following: “If Indonesia is so supportive of Timor-Leste joining ASEAN now, why should any of us object?” (Ramos-Horta, 2011). So far, Timor-Leste has revealed that its government is taking on the challenges of ASEAN membership. Legal requirements enshrined in the ASEAN body of law clearly dismiss economic reasons as a standard for exclusion. In addition, the inclusive growth agenda of the AEC aims at “addressing the concerns of all peoples of ASEAN on matters related to welfare, social protection, women empowerment, gender equality, promotion and protection of human rights […]”, (ASEAN Secretariat, 107) which means, according to this document, that economic development should be accompanied by a more just and inclusive approach that correspondingly has an agenda on human rights. In other words, poor economic development should not be a justification for delaying a new membership. Furthermore, CLMV countries have been allowed to join ASEAN in the 1990s even when their development was less than what Timor-Leste achieved in thirteen years of

147 independence. In addition, the Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General to Timor- Leste has suggested the value of Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN (UNESCAP, 2014); and both Ramos-Horta and Gusmão have clarified that Timor-Leste will not ‘beg’ for money; rather, it will become a faithful member of ASEAN in the quest for peace and security.

7.4 Timor-Leste: from a Colony to a Democracy with a Multi-Party System The concept of democracy in Timor-Leste has to be traced back to its history of colonialism by Portugal and bloodshed invasion by Indonesia. In particular, democracy in Timor-Leste is linked to the inception of what Huntington (1991) sees as the third wave of democratisation. In 1974, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal dismissed a long- standing dictatorship. This opened the way to independence to many former Portuguese colonies, including Timor-Leste. Portugal chose to turn out into a democracy since its own people have experienced the violence and the fear of an authoritarian system. In the same decade, Spain and Greece moved towards democracy, and later in the 1980s many Latin American and Asia-Pacific countries experienced a transition to democracy. Nevertheless, Portugal’s sudden disengagement in Timor-Leste was also a problem. The Portuguese had given to locals, very limited preeminent roles in the administration and politics of the colony. In 1974, Portugal appointed a Governor general, Mario Lemos Pires, who had the role to organise the path towards elections (Pires, Amaral, 1991). The first decree he enacted was to authorise the formation of political parties. This was thought to be a first step towards elections. Since locals have never been used to politics, they ended up being exposed – at least at the beginning - to the notions of multi-party system, and democracy without really understanding the meaning of it. However, as Pires admitted in 2003, Portugal failed to prepare Timor-Leste for democracy. Such blame is more related to the fact that Portugal never prepared a local elite to run the country. Portugal itself was not a democracy until 1974 (Radio Australia, 2003). However, Pires, by enacting the decree for a multi-party system, also avoided the establishment of a one- party state. Then, East Timorese organised themselves into different political parties. The two main parties established in 1974 were the ASDT (Associação Social Democrática Timorense, East Timorese Social Democratic Association), which was established and supported by educated East Timorese and students living abroad, mostly in Portugal (Ramos-Horta, 1987). However, another party was supporting integration with Indonesia,

148 the APODETI (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense, Timorese Popular Democratic Association). It is believed that this party was supported by the Indonesian intelligence, which at the time was pushing for integration of Timor-Leste into West Timor (Ooi, 2004). Later, the ASDT, which had a strong support around the country, became more radical in its quest to achieve independence. Since 1975, the party became known under the acronym of FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionário do Timor-Leste Independente or Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), which was inspired by the revolutionary groups in Mozambique, FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique). The other main party that was supporting democracy and eventually independence for Timor-Leste, was the UDT (União Democrática Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union). This party was established and supported by civil servants of the colonial Portuguese government, which originally were also supporting a Timor-Leste in association with Portugal. However, they turned out in favour of independence when they discovered that Portugal was not interested in maintaining Timor-Leste. This party was also supported by the liurai, the traditional elite of Timor-Leste, who were appointed by the Portuguese colonial administration or were descendants of these appointees, so they were very faithful to the Portuguese. Liurai had an extensive network due to their role; this led the UDT to be initially the strongest party, until the anti-colonial sentiment shifted the balance of power in favour of the FRETILIN (Kingsbury, 2009). This party, by being a front, claimed that it was “the only legitimate representative of the people of East Timor” (Nicol, 1978, 79). Other smaller parties were also established, but their impact was minimal. The influence of these educated East Timorese on the FRETILIN has been crucial to understand the importance of directing the politics of the country towards the desires of the ordinary people and the willingness to become independent. Nevertheless, clashes between the two parties pro-independence erupted in 1975, however, FRETILIN succeeded at the point to establish on 28 November 1975, the Democratic Republic of East Timor (RDTL, Republica Democrática de Timor-Leste). Timor-Leste was immediately recognised as an independent sovereign state by twelve countries and the UN (McCloskey and Hainsworth, 2000, 3). This, however, lasted only few days, because on 30 November 1975 Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste with the scope to annex, the little eastern part of the Timor island, as its 27th province (Ramos Horta, 1987). Indonesia justified its move because the other two main parties the UDT and APODETI signed the Balibo Declaration in favour of integration with Indonesia.

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The most prominent members of the FRETILIN went in exile in early December 1975. They attempted to gain international recognition for the cause of Timor-Leste, they only returned in the country in 1999 after the independence referendum. These members were heavily influenced by the FRELIMO already before their exile in Mozambique. This party was originally supporting the model of a one-party state. However, in the 1990s FRELIMO abandoned the Marxist-Leninist view of a one-party state in favour of a multi- party system. In Timor-Leste the Indonesian invasion also disrupted the possibility to establish a one-party regime by FRETILIN. However, an effective implementation of a democratic state also was the consequence of the involvement of the international community in Timor-Leste since 1999. In fact, the scope of the UNTAET was to support establishing a liberal democracy in Timor-Leste. FRETILIN, therefore, has to accommodate the incontestably requirement of a multi-party liberal democracy (Richmond, 2011).

7.5 Historical Role of Civil Society and the Media in Timor-Leste’s Struggle for Independence As Holloway puts it, East Timorese created non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an “instrument or tool for their values, their beliefs, and their desire to do something useful for their new country of Timor-Leste” (Holloway, 6). This philosophy has been at the core of the resistance movements and also after the 1999 referendum another challenge took on: building a state. The process of state-building requires a change in the mindsets of the population of a post-conflict state. This again can also be achieved through an engagement with the civil society and the media (Chandler, 2007). CSOs are a handy way for people to engage with those issues outside the normal daily routine with the family and work. Hence, civil society becomes what Kraft (2002) defines as a track three diplomacy, in other words it includes all those normative movements that support an avant-garde hypothesis, something different from what is advocated from the government or the economic determinism of today’s policies. In this way civil society is the expression of people’s thoughts vis-a-vis the government and the market. Yet, civil society has also a role of balance and check of the government, making the latter more accountable (Wigglesworth, 2013). The role of civil society in the path to independence, democracy and human rights in Timor-Leste is twofold. There was an internal movement and an international movement

150 that supported the country during the Indonesian invasion and after independence. After the Portuguese left in 1974, East Timorese civil society has been organised via informal networks and clandestine groups, opposing the brutality of the Indonesians. Churches and student movements also played a role, together with the East Timorese living abroad. This situation was maintained until the referendum for independence on 30 August 1999. Therefore, the way civil society is understood in Timor-Leste from 1974 to 1999 is slightly different from the way it is defined today. For the World Bank the term civil society means “the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 2013). This definition describe the civil society as organizations which are nowadays established under one country law, that are able to collect funds, and receive public and private financial assistance. Thus, a better definition of civil society movements, that fits what happened in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian invasion, would be the one given by Diamond (1994, 5) “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a [...] set of shared rules.” The rules in the case of East Timorese civil society were to resist for independence, emphasises the suffering of the population and a human rights discourse to lobby the international community towards their cause. These rules have been the result of the directions given by the resistance leaders in the country as well as the representatives living abroad and members of the Catholic Church. Firstly, Xanana Gusmão, the independence leader, changed its view in the 1980s claiming that his “political philosophy is only the liberation of my country” (Domm, 1990, 8). The same sense of identity - of being a nation - has been portrayed by bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, who in a letter to the UN general secretary in 1989, affirmed, “We are dying as a people and as a nation” (Kohen, 1999, 137). This was further echoed by the work of Ramos- Horta at the UN in the 1980s and 1990s. The civil resistance of the East Timorese can be compared with the Solidarność (Solidarity) movements in Poland, or the Burmese pro- democracy activist, Aung San Suu Kyi. All three moments of civil resistance were the keys to limit an authoritarian regime. Solidarność advocated for workers’ rights and social change, which eventually succeeded to stop authoritarian repression by the government, which finally accepted to negotiate (Roberts and Ash, 2009). A similar way of civil resistance was adopted by the East Timorese, who eventually succeeded in a social and political change in their country when Indonesia opened to the possibility of a referendum

151 for independence. In other words, as Samuel Huntington puts it, civil society constitute “the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control” (Huntington, 1984, 204). Hence, East Timorese civil society has worked the way Huntington portrayed: during the Indonesian invasion by facing an authoritarian invasion of the country, and currently by controlling the democratic state put into place (ex. the protest against the media law, or the role of the Ombudsman, or the resilience after the 2006 political crisis). Although, the Portuguese authority has never invested in giving sufficient education to the East Timorese, since Portuguese left youth and students’ movements grew in number, moreover the Catholic Church was widely present around the country; overall the resistance movements became the way to assert the willingness of the people to be a free nation. Therefore, all the period under Indonesian invasion most of the East Timorese civil society was basically “unlawful.” Even the different Catholic communities risked a lot by hiding East Timorese and helping CSOs in their resistance. However, after the 1999 referendum and the engagement of the international community the status of the CSOs was “upgraded” and legally established. More groups arose to support women and youth, and also media groups were established. Nowadays, these CSOs are officially registered with FONGTIL, the NGO Forum, which is the umbrella organization for national and international NGOs that work in Timor-Leste. New CSOs join the FONGTIL and/or register with the Ministry of Justice of Timor-Leste. However, in 1998, in the pre-referendum period, around 14 NGOs were registered in Timor-Leste (Hunt, 2004). Most of these NGOs were promoting human rights and advocating for the people. People’s advocacy has been stronger in Timor-Leste and well agreed by the whole population. In fact, after the referendum, CSOs grew exponentially in number. Many NGOs were created even with little resources to advocate for the different spheres of human life. In 2002, there were already 231 local NGOs registered in Timor-Leste (Wigglesworth, 2008). Most of them have been created with the support of aid donors (Australia, the EU, the USA, Japan). Since 2002, many foreign experts entered Timor-Leste and worked closely with the locals NGOs. However, their inexperience in comparison to international NGOs resulted in the marginalization of East Timorese NGOs (Wigglesworth, 2006). Additionally, the Catholic communities have had an important role in supporting the discourse of human rights amongst the people. They have been key actors in civil society during the pre-independence referendum. The Catholic Church has protected many individuals against death at the time of the Indonesian invasion, and has

152 also played a key role in public advocacy for independence (Field, 2008). A crucial event has also been the visit of the Pope, John Paul II to Timor-Leste in 1989, and the 1996 Nobel Peace prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta. Mass media are also historically important in Timor-Leste’s independence. Mass media roles can be separated into two periods: before the 1999 referendum and after. Before August 1999 most of the journalists advocating for Timor-Leste were foreign journalists, while after 1999, and, in particular, after Timor-Leste independence in 2002, there was a balance between international and local journalists. Foreign journalists have been the key to bring the cause of Timor-Leste on the international stage at the time of the Indonesian invasion. Some have been killed to report the struggle of East Timorese. This recalls the tremendous killing of the five Australian journalists on 16 October 1975 in Balibo by the Indonesian military. Later, another Australian reporter, Roger East, was killed in an attempt to draw information on the five killed journalists (Kine, 2014). Moreover, the world had already in mind the picture of the massacre of unarmed people at the Cemetery of Santa Cruz on 12 November 1991. On that occasion hundreds of East Timorese gathered at the cemetery to mourn a young pro-independence activist killed days before. The mourning became the opportunity to protest against the Indonesian military, which in turn shot hundreds of people. Some foreign journalists joined the event and even got beaten by the Indonesian. However, a British journalist, Christopher Wenner - known under the name of Max Stahl - was able to shot footage - In the Cold Blood: the Massacre of East Timor - that was shown on the UK television in early 1992. This footage, plus the story of two foreign journalists beaten by the Indonesian military and the killing of a New Zealand human rights activist draw global attention to the human rights abuses in Timor-Leste. The footage was shown all over the world, rising concern amongst activists. This led to the establishment of new CSOs, such as the famous East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) in the USA in November 1991, which supported the independence of Timor-Leste. This network is still very active today in advocating for Timor-Leste, and at the time it was also able to push the US government in reducing its military assistance to Indonesia. However, also Indonesians advocated for Timor-Leste, especially those who knew the harsh status of Suharto’s New Order. An example is Tahanan Politik (TAPOL), which stands for political prisoner. It is a London-based organisation run by former Indonesian political prisoner, Carmel Budiardjo. The organisation was advocating for the rights of Indonesian political prisoners since 1973, and after the massacre of Santa Cruz, it also joined the

153 international and local CSOs in claiming that serious crimes against humanity were going on in Timor-Leste (Weldemichael, 2012). Further support was received at all level in Australia and the European Union, were local CSOs pushed for their governments attention to the situation in Timor-Leste. This is a key event in the discourse of human rights that Timor-Leste tried to push internationally. Timor-Leste was not strong enough to face a military war to gain independence; yet, by inserting human rights as leitmotiv, it used the so called “weapon of the weak” (Scott, 1985). A discourse based on human rights was the only “weapon” strong enough to gain international recognition and protection against the brutality of Indonesian military. Timor-Leste won its battle for independence by using a diplomatic mean, which in its case resulted more successful that any bloody war. It was a way to assert that what Indonesia military was doing was unacceptable. The Santa Cruz Massacre and the 1996 Nobel Prize for Peace are key events in the path to independence for Timor-Leste. The emphasis on the discourse of human rights by José Ramos-Horta, bishop Carlos Belo, Xanana Gusmão and all the civil society movements inside Timor-Leste and internationally, brought to an end 24 years of Indonesian invasion in September 1999, when Indonesian military pulled out, but not before having further destroyed the last standing infrastructure. Another reporter who supported the cause of Timor-Leste internationally has been John Pilger, an Australian-British journalist, who managed to clandestinely enter Timor-Leste in 1993. In this time he shot a movie called the Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy. The movie was screened in the UK and Australia and raised awareness and concern about the human rights violation. Not to forget, Marie Colvin, a British journalist, who in 1999 refused to leave a compound with 1500 women and children surrounded by Indonesian military (Greenslade, 2012).

7.6 Timorese and Indonesian Reconciliation: a Model for ASEAN Peace and Prosperity In 2005, Timor-Leste and Indonesia established a bilateral Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF), which also investigated the violence perpetrated by the Indonesian military. The CTF submitted a final report on 15 July 2008 to both presidents of Indonesia and Timor-Leste. In that occasion, although Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did not formally apologise, he expressed his and the country regret over what happened. He accepted the report and expressed remorse (The Associated Press, 2008).

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The CTF report, however, has not been considered as much trustworthy as the CAVR report. CSOs, in particular the Aliansa Nasional Timor-Leste ba Tribunal Internasional (Timor-Leste National Alliance for International Tribunal – ANTI), complained about the lack of consultation with victims and of parliamentarian approval of the commission. ANTI - in a letter to the commission dated 15 July 2008 and whose object state: “We have the Truth, now we need Justice” - pointed out that the CFT report was nothing new that what was already discovered in the CAVR report Chega!. There was a difference however, the CAVR report gives a strong emphasis on the establishment of an International Tribunal “to try cases of 1999 crimes” (CAVR, 10), it further recommends the UN and the Security Council to remains committed to achieve justice for crimes against humanity in Timor-Leste (CAVR, 187). On the contrary, the CTF avoid the justice issue by claiming that institutional responsibility rather than individual responsibility is assigned to Indonesia. This according to ANTI goes against the principles of international law and against article 160 of the Timor-Leste constitution, which states that “Acts committed between the 25th of April 1974 and the 31st of December 1999 that can be considered crimes against humanity of genocide or of war shall be liable to criminal proceedings with the national or international courts” (Constitution of RDTL). Although, ANTI emphasised the importance of reconciliation with Indonesia, had the view that justice for the victims was a cornerstone for a true reconciliation. This follows the lines of the reconciliation definition adopted by the CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense - National Council of Timorese Resistance) in August 2000, which states that “Reconciliation is a process, which acknowledges past mistakes including regret and forgiveness as a product of a path inherent in the process of achieving justice” (CAVR, 18). Nevertheless, scholars at the War Crimes Studies Center at the University of California Berkeley, who have been involved in the CTF have argued that in spite criticism, the report can be acknowledged as credible (War Crimes Studies Center, n.d.). Moreover, recognition of crimes and regret by Indonesian president is indication of the right direction taken in the discourse of reconciliation. Yudhoyono regrets and his commitment to support Timor-Leste bid to ASEAN membership is a real indication of the willingness of Indonesia to close with the wrongs of the past and look at a positive, progressive and peaceful future of relationship. The philosophy of José Ramos-Horta, as well as, Xanana Gusmão, has been in light of reconciliation and forgiveness of Indonesia, this is a further indication of the willingness to live in peace, and in a stable society. This perspective has not been easy to accept by many East Timorese. Ramos-Horta, himself,

155 lost two brothers and one sister killed by the Indonesia militia, and of his brothers he does not even know where they are buried. Many have been criticizing Ramos-Horta for being too forgiving, as in 2008 he forgave the men who attempted to kill him, he has also supported the forgiveness of reconciliation with those Indonesians and the militia who committed a genocide in Timor-Leste. However, Ramos-Horta has an interesting perspective about justice, which is one that is not granted by the judgement of a tribunal, but rather from the historical happenings in Timor-Leste. He affirmed in 2012, “[...] the greater justice is that we are free”, adding “[…] let us forgive those who did harm because God gave us a greater gift: our independence. Let’s forget about an international tribunal – it will never happen”(McDonnell, 2012). Many East Timorese have disagreed with him, however, in a progressive way Timor-Leste has to look at the future. The capacity of Ramos-Horta and Gusmão to forgive for the wrong of the past is in light of achieving peace and stability, two factors that can grant the long-run development of Timor-Leste. Both of them knew that Timor-Leste would have developed faster by having good relationship with its neighbours; this is why reconciliation was on the top of their political agenda. Gusmão - talking in a lecture in Singapore in 2013 - affirmed that for his country was very important to pursue reconciliation. He clearly stated that fighting on the style of Palestinian Intifada was not in the interest of his country. In order to prosper countries need peace, and Timorese leaders realised it very soon (Timur, 2013). Moreover, on the same occasion, Gusmão made clear that pursuing a claim of crimes against humanity against Indonesian military, would have made responsible also all those countries that have furnished weapons to Suharto, and several Western countries would have faced such a blame. This led Robinson (2009) to question the reasons of such a position about justice by the East Timorese leadership - who successfully relied during the whole period of the resistance on the principles and mechanisms of International Human Rights Law. Robinson suggested that Ramos-Horta and Gusmão had no interest in jeopardizing the relationship with Indonesia. They knew that the economic development of Timor-Leste would have been unquestionably related to the relationship with Indonesia. Nevertheless, Robinson (2014) has pointed out that the resistance movements have also been responsible for serious crimes during the Indonesian invasion. Therefore, any tribunal would have probably affected those who are currently running Timor-Leste. Overall, Indonesian military, as well as, the people at the government, are well aware of the wrongs perpetrated against the East Timorese. Nowadays, Indonesia is strongly supporting Timor-Leste in ASEAN. A key reading of this event is that also Indonesia

156 wants to look forward to a peaceful and democratic coexistence in the Southeast Asian region. However, although Ramos-Horta did not call for a tribunal like in the case of Cambodia and Rwanda, the responsibility of Indonesia for the killing of thousands of East Timorese is at least on moral ground a national shame for the country. In other words Ramos-Horta leaves to Indonesia the choice to prosecute - before or later - the responsible people for the attempted genocide in Timor-Leste. This attitude is in line with the recognition to award Ramos-Horta and famous Catholic bishop in Timor-Leste, Carlos Ximenes Belo, of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1996. During the ceremony, the chairman of the committee, Francis Sejersted, affirmed that this prize is in recognition “for their long-lasting efforts to achieve a just and peaceful solution to the twenty-year-old conflict in East Timor” (Sejersted, 1996).

7.7 Timor-Leste’s Post-Independence Democratic Developments In the post-independence period a post-conflict Timor-Leste had to face some big challenges. Nevertheless, Timor-Leste, with the support of the international community and through free and fair elections, established a democratic system. Further, civil society has been in constant engagement with the government and has assisted, together with the media, to monitor any unconstitutional movements. In addition, the country’s human rights institution is highly ranked internationally, imbuing the country with the right political credentials for ASEAN membership.

7.7.1 Consolidation of Multi-Party Democracy Timor-Leste is a multi-party democracy established by a constitution, which entered into force in 2002. Scholars (Feijó, 2014) have suggested that Timor-Leste has a semi- presidential political system, while others (Kingsbury, 2012) have interpreted it as having a parliamentary structure. Nevertheless, the president holds very limited executive power. Indeed, when Ramos-Horta4 in 2007 attempted to pass a budget for poverty reduction, the proposal was deemed unconstitutional because the president has no executive power (Guterres, 2008, 361-362).

4 José Ramos-Horta has been Prime Minister of Timor-Leste from 26 June 2006 to 19 May 2007, and President from 20 May 2007 to 20 May 2012 157

Nevertheless, Timor-Leste’s democracy has consolidated in the last decade with two free and fair elections and one pre-independence referendum – where the national constituency has freely expressed its vote. Presidential and parliamentary elections have been held in 2007 and 2012, and both events have been referred to as free and fair by international standards. The 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections have been the first free elections since independence. According to the Constitution, elected organs are chosen by universal suffrage; political parties have a right to democratic opposition, and equality of opportunities and treatment is guaranteed by law. The first round of the presidential elections featured eight candidates, three of which had sufficient support to win the elections – Francisco Guterres5, Fernando de Araujo (Democratic Party) and José Ramos- Horta (independent candidate) (Kingsbury, 2009, 171). Figure 7 shows that during the first round, no candidate achieved the majority vote of 50% plus one. A second round was therefore organised one month later, and Ramos-Horta won the election (see figure 8). The campaign was peaceful and hundreds of international observers were deployed on the ground. Only minor events disrupted the elections, and citizens queued orderly overall – most from the early morning – and there was no evident pressure by political parties outside the poll. The Solidarity Observer Mission for Timor-Leste (SOMET) suggested some shortcomings during the electoral process (e.g. voters’ fingers not being properly checked for ink or lack of information at the ballots) that were fixed in the second round (Guterres, 2008, 361).

5 FRETILIN party. Frente Revolucionáriodo Timor-Leste Independente - Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. 158

Figure 7: Presidential Elections: First Round on 9 April 2007

Total Electors 522.933

Voters (Turnout 81.79%) 427.196

Invalid and Blank Votes (5,45%) Francisco Guterres "Lu Olo" (27.89%) José Ramos-Horta (21.81%)

112.666 88.10277.459 Fernando Lasama de Araújo 58.12557.589 (19.18%) 23.257 Francisco Xavier do Amaral (14.39%) Source: STAE and CNE.6 Figure 8: Presidential Elections: Second Round on 9 May 2007

524.073

Total Electors 413.177

Voters (Turnout 81%)

285.835 Invalid and Blank Votes (2,66%) Francisco Guterres "Lu Olo" (30.82%) José Ramos-Horta 127.342 (69.18%)

11.298

Source: STAE and CNE.

6 Timor-Leste’s Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) and National Elections Commission (CNE) (cne.tl, Timor-Leste: Eleições Gerais 2012, online: (2 October 2014). 159

Parliamentary elections had around twelve parties campaigning for about one month. The most popular parties were CNRT7 and FRETILIN. Nevertheless, a coalition government was formed and Xanana Gusmão (leader of the CNRT) became the prime minister. Overall, both elections, presidential and parliamentary, had an impressive popular participation, around 80% of the constituency. In 2012, thirteen candidates have been legitimated by the Court of Appeals to participate in the presidential elections. Ramos-Horta, the incumbent President, was again a candidate together with the three major contenders Major-General Taur Matan Ruak (independent candidate), again Francisco Guterres, and Fernando de Araujo (see Figures 9 and 10). The first round had a turnout of 78% of the constituency, and decreed Taur Matan Ruak and Francisco Guterres were the most popular candidates. Eventually, Taur Matan Ruak won the second round (Feijó , 2012, 43).

Figure 9: Presidential Elections: First Round on 17 March 2012

626.503 Total Electors

Voters (Turnout 78.20%) 489.933 Invalid and Blank Votes (5,15%) Francisco Guterres "Lu Olo" (28,76%) Taur Matan Ruak (25,71%)

José Ramos-Horta (17,48%)

133.635 119.462 Fernando Lasama de Araújo 81.231 80.381 (17.30%) 49.952 Others (10,75%) 25.272

Source: STAE and CNE.

7 Congresso Nacional para a Reconstrução de Timor-Leste / National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor-Leste (CNRT). 160

Figure 10: Presidential Elections: Second Round on 16 April 2012

627295

Total Electors

458.703 Voters (Turnout 73,12%)

Invalid and Blank Votes (1,92%) 275.471 Francisco Guterres "Lu Olo" (38.77%) 174.408 Taur Matan Ruak (61.23%)

8.824

Source: STAE and CNE.

The parliamentary elections were held on 7 July 2012 with twenty-one political parties seeking election. This fragmented vote has been influenced by the financial assistance provided to political parties, and the good salaries offered to elected members of parliament (Shoesmith, 2011, 9). The political turnout was remarkable at around 74%, and the most prominent parties were again CNRT and FRETILIN, which gained 30 and 25 seats, respectively. Xanana Gusmão was again elected prime minister. Two rounds of free and competitive elections have proved that East Timorese not only widely participate in the political advancement of the country, but are also ready to peacefully accept election outcomes. In 2012, Ramos-Horta, well-known leader across the country, was defeated in the presidential elections, showing that people’s choice can affect a change of government. Feijó notes that “in the context of South-east Asia […] this is an achievement that reveals the success of Timorese democracy and must be largely credited to Timorese efforts to root their democracy in their cultural habits, and to the establishment of a credible electoral administration” (Feijó , 2012, 52).

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7.7.2 Civil Society Organisations Uphold Civil and Political Rights In post-conflict countries, civil society provides channels for democratic participation and helps to rebuild citizens’ trust in governments (McConnell, 2011). In Timor-Leste, civil society has been instrumental before and after independence to promote the discourse of democracy and human rights (Hunt, 2004). While in the pre-independence period, CSOs were basically ‘unlawful’, and organised as a resistance against the Indonesian invasion, after independence the status of the CSOs was ‘upgraded’ and legally established. In 2002, 231 local organisations were registered in Timor-Leste (Wigglesworth, Dureau and da Costa Magno , 2008, 2). The government of Timor-Leste has been careful to enshrine within the constitution free rights of association, assembly and demonstration as per section 42 and 43 (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Constitution, 2002). In 2006, Ramos-Horta, at the time Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, affirmed that the government of a young nation must interact with civil society. He mentioned the Catholic Church and the heads of villages as key actors “to mobilise the society towards the development process” (Niner, 2007, 46). The same logic has been maintained by the V Constitutional Government elected in 2012, which sees civil society as a ‘vital part of the process to develop the young Timorese Nation” (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Program of the V Constitutional Government 2012-2017). The government further strengthened its relationship with civil society by establishing the Office of the Adviser on Civil Society in 2007, which is part of the Office of the Prime Minister (Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, 2011). Timor-Leste also has a legal framework that grants CSOs the legal personality necessary to access public funding. Decree-Law No.5/2005 legitimises the requirements for CSOs to register with the Timor-Leste Ministry of Justice. The decree further recognises that “the role played by the associations in the exercise of democracy and of citizenship is undeniable” (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Decree-Law No. 5/2005). CSOs can also join with FONGTIL, the NGO Forum, which is the umbrella organisation for national and international organisations that work in Timor-Leste. The NGOs Forum also advocates for human rights and democracy within the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), an organisation based on membership and joined so far by 47 members all around Asia. In 2012, Forum-Asia debated with its members the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: the meeting strongly criticised the drafting of the declaration and the lack of consideration of civil society (Forum-Asia,

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2012). In addition, the government has an open dialogue with CSOs in the formulation of the development priorities. FONGTIL, for example, is involved in the Development Partners’ Meeting for the formulation of national priorities. CSOs also advocate for civic education as ways to empower communities about their democratic rights. In fact, “although Timor-Leste has not yet escaped the consequences of conflict or emerged from poverty, [people] rejoice in the space opened by democracy, stability and peace” (FONGTIL, 2012, 1) - a space where the whole society can freely discuss with the government, and which allows improvements to the rule of law, transparency and accountability. CSOs are also fundamental in upholding the civil and political rights guaranteed by the constitution. They have intervened several times to prevent undemocratic or unconstitutional moves. In 2004, the government drafted a law8 - adopted in January 2006 - that attempted to limit the freedom of assembly and demonstration. The Judicial System Monitoring Programme – an organisation based in Dili that advocate for justice and human rights – claimed that such a law contradicted a basic democratic value: freedom of assembly and expression (JSMP, 2004). A case was brought before the Court of Appeal, which found two provisions of the law unconstitutional.9 Gusmão (at the time President of Timor-Leste) barred the law, which was later amended and passed.

7.7.3 The Media Monitors the Government and the Constitution Mass media are an integral aspect of civil society, contributing to the liberalisation of countries, advocating for people’s rights and well-being, and limiting and monitoring governments’ policies. Today, Timor-Leste has the freest press in Southeast Asia, according to the Press Freedom Index 2013. This index, published by Reporters Without Borders, considers that ‘democracies provide better protection for the freedom to produce and circulate accurate news and information than countries where human rights are flouted” (Reporters Without Borders, 2013). Nevertheless, some studies (Cheema, de Speville, Nieminen-Makynen, Mattiske, Blunt, 2006, 49) have claimed that media in Timor-Leste have restricted capacity and experience.

8Law on Freedom of Assembly and Demonstration No. 1/2006 (2006) (TL), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=89744&p_country=TMP&p_count=58 (12 October 2015), Art. 5. 9 Court of Appeal, Ruling of the Court in Case No. 01/2005, On the Constitutionality of the Law on Freedom of Assembly and Demonstration, 9 March 2005. 163

So far, it is undeniable that some newspapers such as, for example, Tempo Semanal, have done an impressive job in monitoring and reporting government corruption and anti- constitutional laws. The effectiveness and capacity of media is also restricted by the inadequate coverage of radio and TV and the distributive chain of newspapers, which are not readily available across the whole country. Yet, the Constitution of Timor-Leste has been designed to guarantee the independence of media according to section 41. This right has been recently challenged by the government of Timor-Leste, which tried via a new media law to reduce media’s freedom. In fact, while this law was not a complete turn down of the right to freedom of speech, it posed some threat to newspapers like the Tempo Semanal. If the new media law would have entered into force, then exposure of corruption could have led the government to react with legal action, claiming that such a report would be a threat to public interest and democratic order (Kine, 2014). In a functioning democracy like Timor-Leste, with a parliamentary political system and a constitution, when such laws attempt to disrupt the course of democracy, a president and a court can intervene to peacefully settle any doubt. In fact, Timor-Leste’s president holds some competencies according to the constitution: precisely the ratification of legislation. On the other hand, it is in the Court of Appeal – currently the highest court in Timor-Leste – to decide about constitutional interpretation. Since this new media law raised an extraordinary debate and criticism in the country and abroad, the current president of Timor-Leste, Taur Matan Ruak, did not ratify it, but rather sent the media law before the Court of Appeal to inquire about its constitutionality. The Court of Appeal on 20 August 2014 declared such a law unconstitutional because several articles opposed the constitution. This exercise of democracy is decisive in showing the capacity of the judiciary to read and interpret the constitution, and to prevent any unconstitutional move by parliament. It also proved that the civil society, including East Timorese journalists – who peacefully protested and argued against this law – made clear that people know about their constitutional rights and that they will protest when such rights may be limited by an unconstitutional law. José Belo, an investigative journalist of Tempo Semanal, has been strongly advocating against this law. When the court judgment was released, he claimed that “the courts today have upheld our constitution, which we fought so hard for. This is a victory for the East Timorese people. The government is trying to stop freedom of the media and freedom of expression” (McDonnell, 2014). This law, if ratified, would have also impacted on the work of foreign journalists, as affirmed by the La’o Hamutuk, the Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis (Underbjerg, 2014).

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7.7.4 Ombudsman: an ‘A’ Class Human Rights Institution Timor-Leste’s national human rights institution began to take shape in March 2002, when the Constituent Assembly of Timor-Leste approved the constitution in light of full independence. Section 27 reveals attention to human rights as the basis for the establishment of the Ombudsman for Human Rights (Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justiça). Later, on 26 May 2004 the National Parliament of Timor-Leste approved the statute of the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice.10 The Office began operating in March 2006 when the two deputies of Human Rights and Justice, and Good Governance and Anti-Corruption, were also appointed. The Ombudsman of Timor-Leste became fully part of the Asia Pacific Forum11 (APF) in 2007, which was set up in 1996 in Australia with the scope of advancing human rights in the region. In 2008, the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions recognised the East Timorese Ombudsman as an ‘A’ class institution12, which means that its Ombudsman is at the level of Australia, Canada, and even better than some European countries. Timor-Leste had also been admitted to the APF as a full member in 2010, and during the same year, on 15 and 16 November, the country has also been admitted to the 7th Annual Meeting of the Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institutions Forum (SEANF). On the occasion, Timor-Leste became a full member of a forum that discussed regional concerns that affect and can threaten the current peace and stability of ASEAN. Since SEANF’s creation in 2004 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, the only new member admitted prior to 2012 and allowed to participate in the quest for an effective human rights mechanism was Timor-Leste, a non-member of ASEAN. Finally, in 2012, Myanmar’s Ombudsman was allowed to join SEANF, although it is only an associate member of the APF because it is still implementing the Paris Principles.

10 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, ‘Law No. 7/2004 Approving the Statute of the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice’, 26 May 2004, http://www.jornal.gov.tl/lawsTL/RDTL- Law/RDTL-Laws/Law-2004-7.pdf (30 October 2015), p. 1. 11 The APF provided support to governments in the establishment of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) and to comply with the Paris Principles, which once implemented decree the NHRI as credible and operative. The Paris Principles prescribe that the NHRIs must be established by the constitution, and should cooperate with the CSOs, and have a functioning infrastructure, and sufficient funding to be independent from the government. Asia Pacific Forum, ‘International Human Rights and the International Human Rights System’, July 2012, http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/Documents/International%20HR%20System%20Manual.pdf (12 October 2015), p. 108. 12 International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC), ‘Chart of the status of National Institutions, Accreditation status as of December 2011’. 165

Therefore, it seems a contradiction that a non-ASEAN member like Timor-Leste can participate as an effective member in a forum that aims to “advise their respective governments to take necessary steps to establish an appropriate ASEAN human rights mechanism and/or any organ in the ASEAN Charter” (South East Asia NHRI Forum). Yet, at the same time, Timor-Leste is apparently deemed unworthy of ASEAN membership. Nevertheless, the presence of Timor-Leste is rather positive, and shows that other forms of regional integration consider Timor-Leste a real asset in the quest for a human rights mechanism. A further confirmation that Timor-Leste is a credible member of the human rights international regime is given by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 13 This UN agency organises international workshops on the establishment of NHRIs worldwide. In the case of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, only Portugal and Timor-Leste have NHRIs accredited as class A. The methodology chosen prescribes a preeminent stage for Timor-Leste and Portugal, because of their strong and accredited human rights institutions. Both countries’ representatives – recalling their progressive experience – discuss human rights with other Portuguese speaking countries, suggesting methods of implementation.14 The East Timorese Ombudsman received 75 complaints about human rights abuses in 2010 alone; most of these were related to the behaviour of security forces. Together with the help of the civil society, it is also addressing the many cases of domestic violence and abuses of the rights of children and people with disabilities. Both the Ombudsman and the CSOs are working together to improve East Timorese’s well-being, and the consolidation of democracy and human rights. In this light, Timor-Leste chose to be free from capital punishment, and today has the necessary framework for gender equality and women’s rights.

13 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Establishment of national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles: a Workshop for Portuguese speaking countries’, Praia, Cape Verde, 15-19 October 2012, http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/Portuguese/DocumentsPage/Concept.paper%20Lusophone.21.6.2012.L S.pdf (12 October 2014), p. 2. 14 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Establishment of national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles: a Workshop for Portuguese speaking countries’, p. 5. 166

7.8 The Relevance and the Hindrances of Timor-Leste’s Democratic Credentials for ASEAN Membership It has been widely acknowledged that Timor-Leste meets Art.1 of the ASEAN Charter. In just twelve years since independence, the country has established a multi-party democracy consolidated by two free and fair elections; CSOs have an established legal framework for enrolling with the Ministry of Justice and with the NGO Forum; media together with civil society have amply contributed to the check and balance of the government; unconstitutional laws were vetoed or amended; and the Ombudsman has achieved a class ‘A’ rating and has already served the claim of hundreds of cases. The picture portrayed so far matches the Democracy Index (see table 5), which ranks Timor- Leste as the most democratic country in Southeast Asia, with the highest scores in civil liberties (7.94 out of 10) and in electoral processes (8.67). The table provides evidence of the current achievements of Timor-Leste by comparing it with the best performing country, Norway, and the worst one, North Korea.

Table 5: Democracy Index of Southeast Asian countries 2013 Overa Rank Elector Functioni Politic Political Civil Regime ll al ng al Culture Liberties Types Score Proces Governm Partici s ent pation Norway 9.93 1 10.00 9.64 10.00 10.00 10.00 Full Democracy Timor- 7.24 43 8.67 7.14 5.56 6.88 7.94 Flawed Leste Democracy Indonesia 6.82 54 6.92 7.50 6.67 6.25 6.76 Flawed Democracy Malaysia 6.49 64 5.92 7.86 5.56 5.25 5.88 Flawed Democracy Philippines 6.41 66 8.33 5.36 5.56 5.63 6.76 Flawed Democracy Thailand 6.25 72 7.83 6.07 5.56 5.00 6.76 Flawed Democracy Singapore 5.92 80 4.33 7.14 3.89 6.88 7.35 Hybrid Regime Cambodia 4.60 109 4.42 6.07 2.78 5.63 4.12 Hybrid Regime Vietnam 3.29 134 0.00 3.93 2.22 5.00 3.24 Authoritarian Regime Myanmar 2.76 149 1.50 2.14 2.78 4.38 2.35 Authoritarian Regime Laos 2.21 156 0.00 3.21 1.67 5.00 1.18 Authoritarian Regime North 1.08 167 0.00 2.50 1.67 1.25 0.00 Authoritarian Regime Korea Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. *Note: Data for Brunei are not available.

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Timor-Leste’s democratic credentials can lead the way for ASEAN to improve the shortcomings of the ASEAN Charter in addressing the need for an effective human rights mechanism. For example, the Charter does not establish any procedures for the consultation of the civil society by the ASEAN governments. The role of civil society is not institutionalised, and the only reference appears in Art. 5.4 of the AICHR terms of reference, which mentions that governments can consult appropriate stakeholders, although it does not specify the meaning of stakeholders (Duy Phan, 2012, 107). Yet, Gomez and Ramcharan have strongly argued in favour of a formal engagement of civil society in the human rights discourse in ASEAN (Gomez and Ramcharan, 2012). Just after the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration on 18 November 2012, the two authors in an article for The Malaysian Insider pointed out that such a declaration has been structured without the inclusion of the CSOs. Unfortunately, the lack of a consultation mechanism institutionalised within the body of law reduced the ability of CSOs to advocate for human rights improvements within ASEAN. Nonetheless, both authors affirm that it is undeniable that a human rights regime is emerging in Southeast Asia. This is happening despite the shortcomings of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration to formally implement a protection mechanism and the lack of consultation with the CSOs. However, up until now, it appears that CSOs have been seen by ASEAN governments as a threat to their national interests. It seems that national interests and economic development superseded any talk about the importance of democracy and human rights in a country’s development (Ciorciari, 2012, 704). Additionally, Phan makes a case for a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights. In doing so, he argues that Timor-Leste, with its democratic credentials, is an essential founding member of such an institution, especially since its scores in human rights terms are much more positive than other ASEAN members (ex. CLMV) (Duy Phan, 2012, 132). In fact, soon after independence, Timor-Leste ratified most of the human rights treaties, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In the quest to strengthen its democratic credentials, Timor-Leste human rights’ performances are periodically assessed by the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). In one of the joint submissions to the UPR by the Timor-Leste’s Ombudsman and CSOs, methods for improving the human rights system in the country were highlighted, especially in the health and education sectors, and for women’s rights (United Nations

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Universal Periodic Review , 2011). Furthermore, the joint work of the Ombudsman and the CSOs put emphasis on the importance of protecting local cultures and traditions. In other words, a democracy with a functioning human rights mechanism can only increase the protection of cultures and traditions, but will not wipe them out. Hitherto, Timor-Leste has proved that universal human rights and civil and political rights are reconcilable with the path to economic development. In October 2014, Xanana Gusmão, intervening at the VII Bali Democratic Forum, claimed that ASEAN countries “must search for new ways of sustainable development, […] without losing sight of universal values because, we all agree, these values can ensure human dignity” (Xanana Gusmão , 2014, 10 October). In fact, the “proper observance of human rights promotes the security and well-being of all people [and] the reduction of friction within society” (Australian Human Rights Commission). This is in line with what has been established during the ASEAN summits, and recently reaffirmed with the document ASEAN 2025. As argued by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice, there is something inviolable that people hold and it is “founded on justice that even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls, 1971, xii). Hence, human rights’ frameworks - by granting individual dignity, freedom, justice, peace - make people feeling secure in their own country which in turn reflect on a higher national productivity. 15 The East Timorese choice of democracy was a rejection of dictatorship and authoritarianism, as well as it was needed to establish human rights, given that the population experienced violence and widespread killing by Indonesia, and more than 400 years of Portuguese colonisation. In other words, as Kingsbury puts it, democracy is the “most desirable form of political organization” (Kingsbury, 2007, 96). Given a free choice, people would choose a consistent political system that allows them to be free, and to express their voices. Nevertheless, in authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships, democracy and human rights agendas would threaten the power. Consequently, one may argue that economic reasoning for delaying Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN only hides another position of the Singaporean and Lao governments. Both countries may fear that another democratic member within ASEAN would undermine the power of their current authoritarian governments; hence the existing status quo of the People’s Action Party (Singapore) or the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (Laos).

15 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Business and Human Rights: a Progress Report’, Geneva 2000, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BusinessHRen.pdf (31 October 2015), p.5. 169

Unfortunately, the Singaporean government is apprehensive that a new member like Timor-Leste could possibly disrupt the implementation of the AEC (Siahaan, 2012). Yet, this perspective fails short of evidence, and maybe implies exaggerated expectations out of the AEC. In fact, as Severino points out, the AEC is not a target, rather a further step towards regional integration (Severino, 2014). Hence, the AEC will have to face many problems along the way. Severino correctly explains that ASEAN is not yet economically integrated, and that it still misses “a number of targets defined in the AEC Blueprint” (Severino, 2014). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the AEC will be a success. The date of 2015 is really only the starting point of a complicated path. Thus, the AEC should not be taken as a pretext to withhold Timor-Leste’s application for membership into ASEAN. By and large, Timor-Leste has the capability to help ASEAN to advance integration, democracy and human rights. The country is a model that can be followed to implement the Paris Principles for human rights, and its rounds of free and fair elections make Timor- Leste a frontrunner in the implementation of Art. 1 of the Charter. Timor-Leste’s experience can definitely be applied to the CLMV countries and can help to understand how individual rights are actually just as important as economic development. Timor- Leste’s experience teaches that both can go hand in hand.

7.9 Conclusion Timor-Leste, when it applied to join ASEAN in 2011, received immediate strong support not just from Indonesia, but also from Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Brunei, the Philippines and Myanmar (Ramos-Horta, 2011). On the other hand, it did not encounter the support of Singapore, which was concerned that a young, new member would have delayed the achievement of the AEC, becoming a liability, rather than an asset. Nonetheless, such a concern is short-sighted by economic determinism. Timor-Leste has sufficiently proved to be a credible member in many regional and international forums; its achievements in terms of democracy, human rights and engagement with the civil society denote why it is an asset to fully implement what the ASEAN Charter established in 2007. Hence, Timor-Leste, together with Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, can help to reassess the norms of the ASEAN international regime towards a more democratic and humanistic approach.

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Timor-Leste is the paradigm of how a country can establish democratic and human rights institutions in a short transition period. This has been achieved by working closely with the CSOs, which played an important role during the Indonesian invasion, and after independence as well. Nevertheless, building strong democratic institutions requires time, and a combination of political, economic and social development. So far, Timor-Leste’s engagement with the UN bodies for human rights and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries indicates that the youngest Asian nation is not just ready to join ASEAN but to contribute to advance integration in the region. Other forms of regional integration in Southeast Asia, like SEANF and APF, have already understood that Timor- Leste is an asset to advocate for democracy and human rights. Therefore, Timor-Leste is a potential valuable member for the ASEAN, especially in light of the ASEAN 2025 plans of regional integration Nevertheless, it is important for ASEAN members to understand that when a country performs well in democratic and human rights terms, then its people can live with dignity, which in-turn increases their productivity. The East Timorese experience teaches that human rights ought not to be bartered with or postponed because of economic or national interests. This is why the country tried to comply with all the international standards for human rights. Furthermore, the willingness of Indonesia to support Timor-Leste’s membership into ASEAN is a sign that the direction of international relations in Southeast Asia is towards the positive development of a peaceful agenda. If ASEAN is ready to accommodate Timor-Leste and to support the country’s transition to membership, then the region will acquire more credibility on the international arena. So far, ASEAN’s lack of implementation means for democracy and human rights have undermined the association vis-a-vis the international community. ASEAN’s regional integration must be strongly based on a universalistic approach to life based on human rights, democracy and freedom, which in the case of Timor-Leste – as the chapter has shown – are not a Western construction, but a choice made by the people, the civil society and the government. Democracy was a rejection of authoritarianism. That said, it is time for ASEAN to seriously commit to implement the Charter. Economic integration cannot disregard the normative power of democracy and human rights. A balance between economic and normative integration is needed to complete this discourse, and Timor-Leste’s inclusion into ASEAN could help fulfil the normative aspect. Meanwhile, ASEAN could help Timor-Leste with the economic aspect. The aim

171 of regional integration is to make people better off in social, political and economic terms. It is time for ASEAN to increase its normative agenda and its international credibility by fully implementing the norms set out in the ASEAN Charter. It is something that can be achieved by working closely with Timor-Leste, and making regional integration in the area stronger than what has been seen up until now.

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CHAPTER 8. THE DISCOURSE OF FOREIGN AID: CONTRASTING VISIONS, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND FUTURE SUGGESTIONS

This chapter critically analyses the official discourses about foreign aid presented in Chapter 7-8-9 in light of the aid regime theory, to answer the third research question about: ‘Does the case of Chinese aid in Timor-Leste rewrite the theory of aid regime?’ This chapter further analyses some of the differences in the aid regime norms when it comes to delivering aid and promoting democracy and human rights, nation and state- building. The chapter finally sustains that the time is not mature for a revision or massive change of the aid regime. The regime theory presented in Chapter 4 prescribes that a regime is “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983). In the case of foreign aid, Australia - together with the DAC committee - have agreed to specific rules that have guided the delivery of aid. These rules have been widely shared: democratic values, good governance and poverty reduction. China, on the other side, has pursued specific rules in aid giving: mutual benefit, self- reliance and non-interference. Both donors have widely engaged in Timor-Leste - as seen in chapters 7-8-9, at different levels, but both with their specific model of development. China and Australia are beginning to cooperate, especially since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for a Development Cooperation in the delivery of aid. However, the norms of conduct remain largely different and based on each donor political system and understanding of international politics. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous chapters, both donors are unlikely to create a new model of aid giving in Timor- Leste. Chinese aid in Timor-Leste is appreciated, but it is not going to change the norms of Western aid. Both models have some different understandings, evident in Chapter 7 and 8. The notion of democracy and human rights in the delivery of aid has contrasting visions for China and Australia, and this chapter will shed some light on these differences. It is too early for talking about a new aid regime. However, cooperation between Australia and China can take place in consideration of the comparative advantage of different aid models. Some of the recent key opinions of Chinese and Australian officials may suggest that in the future more cooperation in the aid sector will eventually further change or update the norms of conduct and the priorities in the foreign aid regime.

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8.1 Giving Aid: Interest, Friendship and the Moral Vision Hans Morgenthau in its famous 1967 article for Foreign Affairs, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene” argued that “the supplier of foreign aid holds the power of life and death over them [recipients]. If a foreign nation supplies aid it intervenes; if it does not supply aid it also intervenes. In the measure that the government must depend on foreign aid for its own and its nation's survival it is inevitably exposed to political pressures from the supplying government. Many of the recipient governments have been able to minimize or even neutralize these political pressures by keeping open alternative sources of foreign aid and by playing one supplying government against the other” (Morgenthau, 1967, April). Morgenthau’s perspective on aid, recalls the received by India and Egypt in the 1960s from the USA. Morgenthau, in fact, contended that aid for many young and underdeveloped nations is an advantage that cannot afford to lose; for instance, newly independent countries, like Timor-Leste, are compelled to accept aid in order to survive. Morgenthau’s example of India and Egypt explains that for the Indian economy aid was crucial to avoid a collapse, while for Egypt aid prevented a famine thanks to external food supply. This perspective, however, reduces the aid regime to a realist relationship between countries. Yet, it discloses several important points, including the necessity of aid for the recipient and the interest of donor’s countries. While it overemphasises the realist view on the influence of political power over the recipient, which might be more relevant and stronger in the 1960s, the current situation for Timor-Leste might be different. In fact, its government, while in need of aid, still has other sources of finances like the oil revenues. This generates a balance of specific economic, strategic and moral interests in the donors. Timor-Leste balances the aid received from both donors in a way to minimise the political pressure and increase the economic benefits. In fact, what comes out from the interviews is that Timor-Leste is aligned with Australia and the Western donors on matters of democracy and human rights, however, when it comes to its internal development it is open to different donors and what they can provide. China, therefore, becomes a good alternative to balance an excessive presence and pressure from Australia. While, Timor-Leste is committed to democracy and human rights, an effective democracy needs time to come into being. External pressure from Australia through aid, actually, undermines the capacity of the East Timorese government to continue the democratic reforms. Very often donors do not give sufficient time to

174 recipients in terms of political reforms. This recalls very much on the point expressed by Morgenthau about the political pressure of donors; therefore, Chinese aid in this sense is a benefit to reduce the political pressure of prominent donors like Australia. However, donors have also double standards and contradictions between the aid giving reasoning and the practice. While Timor-Leste is aligned with Australia in terms of democracy and human rights, during the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste, and exactly between the 1975 until 1982, Timor-Leste did not get the necessary support at the UN level from Australia. As table 5 shows, between 1975 and 1982 there has been eight different resolutions at the UN level on the tremendous situation in Timor-Leste. Evidence shows that China was giving full support to Timor-Leste’s self-determination, Australia, instead, rejected its very core values of democracy and human rights by blindly rejecting five resolutions, abstaining in two, and accepting one. Australia mostly supported Indonesia and disregarded the suffering of the East Timorese for a long time and the human rights abuses. China has been, apparently, a more reliable ‘hidden’ friend by supporting UN resolutions on Timor-Leste’s self-determination. Nevertheless, such a position of China is not strictly pure - as it appears prima facie - in its scope.

UN General Assembly Votes on East Timor (1975-1982)

Indonesia N N N N N N N N

China Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Australia Y A A N N N N N

Source: ETAN (East Timor and Indonesia Action Network) http://etan.org/etun/UNvotes.htm

China’s engagement in Timor-Leste also has the scope of further isolating Taiwan from an independence claim, as well as mitigating the disagreements with its neighbours. The South China Sea dispute is undermining the Chinese image in Southeast Asia and globally; the rising anti-Chinese feelings in Southeast Asia are widespread. Therefore, Timor-Leste becomes a strategic partner in improving the Chinese image in the area. Timor-Leste, in fact, is attempting to become a member of ASEAN, which is an important

175 market for both China and Australia. For China, given the islands dispute with several ASEAN members, a key partner as Timor-Leste would help to support its cause at the ASEAN level. Therefore, both Australia’s and China’s engagement in Timor-Leste aimed also at promoting and supporting the necessary capacity building for achieving ASEAN membership. China, in addition, is interested in the peaceful process of friendship with Indonesia and the way Timor-Leste managed to face the hanger for the killing of thousands of people. In fact, the peaceful solution and the current peaceful relationship with Indonesia makes Timor-Leste a reliable partner for any donor which wants to engage in a mutually beneficial relationship.

8.2 The rise of China’s soft power: ‘No Thucydides Trap’ and the norms of cooperation with Australia The expression coined by Prof. Allison, ‘Thucydides Trap’ expresses a status in international relations in which a new rising power (ex. China) generates fear in other countries, already powerfully and globally established such as the USA. This may lead to war. In particular, Allison argued that calculation and emotions in foreign policy can lead international competition into war (Schott’s Vocab, 2011, 31 January). in his speech in Seattle in 2015 argued that “We should strictly base our judgment on facts, lest we become victims to hearsay, paranoid or self-imposed bias. There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation; they might create such traps for themselves” (Thucydides Trap). Escaping from this rivalry is important to China, which strictly focuses its international engagement on improving its economy and development. Xi Jinping in that occasion clearly stated that countries should: 1) understand each other’s strategic interests correctly (this in order to avoid conflicts); 2) advance a win-win cooperation; 3) manage differences properly and effectively; 4) foster friendly sentiments among our peoples (Xi Jinping, 2015, September 29). This speech is in line with the promotion of a global mutual strategy that can benefit the economy of the whole world; in this sense the speech, apparently, seems not to push for power as a major drive in international relations, but for the benefit of the economy and cooperation, which are a more liberal approach. Again, apparently, the friendly sentiments between different countries seem to indicate that the moral vision still matters in international relations. Today’s interconnectedness between countries explains the

176 balance between the liberal and the moral vision of aid giving. Putting this further into the relationship between China and Australia, President Xi Jinping argued in November 2014, while addressing the Australian parliament: “We need to put one’s self into the other’s shoes and look at each other’s intention from the other side’s stand point of view” (Thomas, 2015, 15 March). In other words, Xi Jinping has attempted to indicate the way for a peaceful relationship with Australia, where mutual understanding of differences and culture will prevail to maintain order and peace. This clearly opens the possibility to further and improved collaboration between China and Australia in Timor-Leste. The 2014 speech in Australia was in line with the 2015 speech in Seattle. In this way, China is attempting to show that its help to Timor-Leste is in light of having a new friend, irrespective of a different political system and that there is no willingness – at least apparently - to compete with other donors, including Australia. China seems to understand the cultural and political differences and accept them as a valuable contribution to a world which is different since its creation. Differences, in fact, should not be seen as a way to attack or undermine another country. It seems that for China it is important to refrain from asserting the hegemony of one single, narrow way of looking at the political system of a government. This view, however, did not actually become practice when it comes to China sovereignty, as in the South China Sea dispute, where hegemony and arrogance have been shaping the political stage in the last decades. The Chinese government was clear in arguing that democracy does not work for China, and while from a Western perspective this might be intolerable, Australia, should take into consideration the effectiveness of the Chinese model in reducing poverty within the country. In terms of cooperation, Xi Jinping suggested to strengthen the Four Bonds between China and Australia, including: mutual trust, economic interests, people-to-people exchange and strategic dialogue. This policy began by China during the government of Tony Abbott in Australia. At the base of these four bonds between Australia and China there are three unwavering norms: Peaceful Development, common development, promoting cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific (Thomas, 2015, 15 March). Nevertheless, Xi Jinping’s words cannot be taken for granted or as they appear. The peaceful rise of China and the spirit of international collaboration are part of the Chinese political rhetoric. China claims to be remaining a ‘developing country’, which at the international level appears more in light of a political reason or for politeness. However,

177 at the national level, China justifies its developing country’s current status to pursue its traditional development doctrine – developmentalism and development at all cost, or development first and everything else comes later. A similar speech like Xi Jinping to the Australian parliament was delivered by the President of the USA, Barack Obama in 2011. Obama’s speech was argumentative and remarked the importance of democracy in the development of one country. In fact, Obama argued that “prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty” (Obama, 2011, 17 November). While this might be true from the Western view of the world, from a Chinese perspective freedom without prosperity might also be another form of poverty. Hence, while countries achieve impressive democratic standards, their population often remains poor and cannot even access the so-called ‘benefits’ of democracy and freedom. Therefore, for China, giving aid on the premises of maintaining, changing or supporting a specific political system is not so important for development. The USA, in fact, while being a stronghold of democracy has still to cope with widespread poverty across the country, which may lead to think that individual rights at the end are not guaranteed to all if the poor cannot have easy access to democracy mechanisms. Timor-Leste itself is a democracy, but there is a consistent and increasing number of poor. Brazil, another democracy, has to cope with the rising population and poverty across the favelas, which have a poor understanding of the democracy process in the country. Therefore, from a Chinese perspective, democracy is not appealing and when it comes to solving problems of poverty, for China it is more important to employ people, build infrastructures, schools, and improve the education system than turning into an expensive democratic experiment. Obama, in his 2011 speech in Australia, went further in his critique of China, without actually mentioning the name of the country. He pointed out, talking about human rights, that while: “Every nation will chart its own course. Yet it is also true that certain rights are universal; among them, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and the freedom of citizens to choose their own leaders” (Obama, 2011, 17 November). This perspective might be true; however, Obama, in his speech, forgot one of the most important forms of freedom: freedom from want, which is at the core of USA former president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, famous Four Freedoms Speech. On 6 January 1941, Roosevelt mentioned the four freedoms: of speech, of worship, from want and from fear. Obama continued arguing that human rights are “not American rights, or Australian rights, or Western rights. These are human rights. They stir in every soul, as we’ve seen

178 in the democracies that have succeeded here in Asia. Other models have been tried and they have failed -- fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee. And they failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the ultimate source of power and legitimacy -- the will of the people. Yes, democracy can be messy and rough […], but whatever our differences of party or of ideology, we know in our democracies we are blessed with the greatest form of government ever known to man” (Obama, 2011, 17 November). This speech has underestimated the cost of democracy, as well as the achievements of undemocratic states in terms of development. In fact, today, after five years since Obama’s speech, there is a democratic regression in Asia. Very few democracies have achieved a good level of development in Asia. Furthermore, Thailand after the 2014 military coup turned into a country run by a military junta. Democracy in the Western sense is not seen as way of development in Asia. Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, China are just amongst the few examples of political systems which progressed development without democracy. Australia, however, seems more conscientious about the role of China in international development. In fact, in 2014, Tony Abbott talking at the American Chamber of Commerce affirmed - talking about the American people - that “As citizens of a great power, it’s understandable that Americans should be wary of potential rivals, [but] for Americans to begrudge what the Chinese haven’t achieved more than to admire what they have is out of character - especially as the movement, in just a generation, of hundreds of millions of Chinese into the middle class is a transformation unparalleled in human history” (McGeough, 2014, 27 June). Australia recognises the achievements of China; in spite of not being a democracy, China has achieved remarkable steps in addressing poverty. Australia, however, has been further criticised by the USA for being too dependent on Chinese imports. Hillary Clinton in June 2014 argued that more trade with China “makes you [Australia] dependent, to an extent that can undermine your freedom of movement and your sovereignty, economic and political. Well that is a mistake. It’s a mistake whether you’re a country, or a company or an individual to put, as we say in the vernacular, all your eggs in the one basket” (McGeough, 2014, 27 June). Nevertheless, Australia is not putting all its eggs in one basket, although trade with China has shockingly increased. Timor-Leste, at the same time, has made this statement its own, by differentiating its sources of aid shifting from mostly Western aid, especially Australia,

179 to a rising engagement with China. Timor-Leste’s politicians have intended Chinese aid as a further good opportunity to improve the country. In fact, as the Nigerian Nobel prize for literature, Wole Soyinka, said about Chinese aid: “If somebody comes to me with a very good deal, and I check with my lawyers, very carefully, and I know there’s no small print, […] which could escape my noses (sic), I think I’ll go for the deal - wherever it comes from. I’ll just make sure that I secure the integrity of my business, my environment, and then leave the rest to the gods of markets” (Volodzko, 2015, 7 December).

8.3 The Contrasting Moral Vision in Human Rights: Survival, Subsistence and Development Foreign aid is a tool for promoting human rights, however, the core notions of human rights have different forms, according to donors’ aid policies. As seen in Chapter 7, the notion of human rights in Australia and China has dissimilar connotations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the human rights’ debate was mostly related to opposite views about the concept and its implementation. One big influence in the choice of pursuing different types of human rights is related to the diverse level of economic development of Australia and China. This has influenced the way both countries promote human rights domestically and internationally through foreign aid. In Timor-Leste, the discourse of human rights has been critical in the struggle for independence and current development, as Chapter 9 has explained. A discourse about human rights - intended according to the Western tradition of liberal democratic principles - has been portrayed on the international arena to attract recognition of the struggle of the population. In light of this, Australia has continued to foster human rights in Timor-Leste via its programme of foreign aid. However, Chinese human rights’ perspectives lie behind its cultural and historical background. The influence of Confucius, with the Analects, is something that has characterised the rise of China globally. The notion of human rights is not something strictly Westernised or Western made. China gives importance to basic social rights that are achieved with development (fazhan quan) and rights to subsistence (shengcun quan) (Jiang Zemin’s speeches, cited in Garrick and Bennett, eds., 2016, 159). For the Chinese government, rights to freedom, and political rights are inconsistent with the lack of basic development. This is aligned with the Chinese understanding of its national challenges. Jiang Zemin stated that “China is a developing country with more than 1.2 billion population; this national situation determines that the rights of sustainability and development are the

180 most fundamental and important . If the problem of how to feed the people and keep them warm cannot be solved, it is impossible to pursue other types of rights” (Jiang Zemin’s speeches, cited in Garrick and Bennett, eds., 2016, 166). This view makes sense, especially in the daily life of East Timorese who face poverty and lack food. So far, China has believed that growth as a necessary step to promote freedom from wants can be exported to Africa and Asia. In the words of an African studies professor: “Common sense about human rights and sovereignty is only one of the common values shared by China and Africa.” He continues… “There is no doubt that China’s success in Africa has partly benefited from it, and those common values have laid solid foundations for further promoting bilateral relations in future” (Condon, 2012). According to the writings and speeches of Jiang Zemin, the notion of human rights is something Western made, and hostile to China. Human rights were seen as a way to interfere with Chinese politics and as a threat to the integrity of China. Human rights as a way of asserting independence, political freedom, self-determination could have undermined the process of unification, including giving rights to independence in Tibet and Xinjiang, and Taiwan, Hong Kong (Garrick and Bennett, eds. 2016). The core differences between China’s and Australia’s principles of development are related to different perceptions of human rights and political development. As seen from the interviews (Chapter 7) it emerges that China’s understanding of human rights for the people of Timor-Leste equates providing the locals with the necessary infrastructure to be able to produce food, going to school, and having a healthcare system. These conditions are essentials for China, and apparently, if they fail then there is no point in talking about human rights as forms of freedom, when freedom from wants is not primarily met. Nevertheless, this position may reveal the fear of a change to the status quo in China. All forms of freedoms could be reconcilable and achievable; when this does not happen then political interests and power protection shape the development agenda of countries like China. Overall, the starting points of China and Australia in terms of delivery development aid reflect their history and political system, and understanding of the world. So far, Australia has rewarded democracy and human rights, intended as individual freedom for development in Timor-Leste; for China, instead, democracy does not work for the future of China and it is not intended as a crucial component of development for Timor-Leste. As Xi Jinping argued in April 2014 talking in Bruges (Belgium) at the College of Europe: “constitutional monarch, imperial restoration, parliamentarianism, a multi-party system

181 and a presidential system, we considered them, tried them, but none worked” (Ruwitch, Blanchard and Popeski, 2014). Xi continued arguing that China has its own development path that does not fit the model of others. He suggested that countries should be left free to choose their development model. Overall, donors can accompany and support the development path of developing countries. In the case of Timor-Leste the country is still poor; a democratic system is in place and needs to be improved as much as the lives of people. However, in no case would an East Timorese barter its freedoms for development at any cost. China, in fact, as a part of its domestic doctrine of development at any cost, is exporting the ‘One Belt, One Road’ development plan. According to this plan, China wants to increase its trade opportunities and its space within the world economy by building the Silk Road Economic Belt, which will grant easy access to Europe, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. This will help to connect China to Southeast Asia and the Arab countries. Therefore, China’s strategy in development has a strong component in terms of increasing trade, which lies at its basis in the liberal views of development (Yun Sun, 2015). However, China is also attempting to export a model based on making countries self-sufficient. In other words it is helping countries to fight poverty and improve its sense of being a nation. Nevertheless, the One Belt, One Road campaign is interesting because of its political implications - immediately it puts China into a category of donors like the US and Australia, i.e., donor with a global vision, but using a different language (not democracy, but development). Most countries on the belt also know this well - there is no free lunch in the aid regime: China is building all these infrastructures to benefit also itself as its own economy is encountering some major bottlenecks, especially in having surplus steel and labourers. Its export is slowing down and domestic consumption is not rising fast enough to consume what the economy has produced, including housing and high-end commodities. In other words, what underlies China’s development ideology and hence its philosophy of aid is that a) development is paramount for both the recipient nation and donor and b) politically it also must contribute to China’s stability, integrity and sovereignty (through patriotism, or national identity as evidenced from the recent reactions the general public had after the South China Sea verdict was announced).

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8.4 Foreign Aid in Timor-Leste: a Shared Experience of Different Donors’ Comparative Advantages

The perception that aid should be shared amongst donors is key to the current situation in Timor-Leste. Even the Australian side recognises the importance of engaging various donors. “While in foreign policy there are contentious issues with China, Australia alone cannot afford to help a country like Timor-Leste to solve its problems” (Australian Official). This return to the notion of comparative advantage of Ricardo where donors can offer help according to their capabilities. Today, China with its infrastructure development can help to build roads, schools, hospitals, something that East Timorese are eager to have in consideration that Indonesia during the bloody invasion in the 1970s and 1980s destroyed more than 75% of the infrastructure. Australia, at the same time, can provide help and support for state-building as it has been doing so far. There is an indirect cooperation, evinced in Chapter 7, amongst Australia and China that is happening with the military. While China has built the military barracks, Australia has been training the police. They have different expertise in international development that can help developing countries face the challenges of development. Cooperation can be achieved even between governments of different political systems. The role of the recipient government is pivotal to donors’ cooperation. Australian recognition of China’s importance in aid giving portrays a state of affairs in which anarchism in international relations is not reasonable. In fact, by sharing the burden of development, donors’ countries recognise the importance of the benefits of cooperation as well as the power of ideas involved in other models of development. Australia and China - with their respective models of aid giving - assert specific knowledge about a process of development that can be transferred to an aid recipient country. The willingness to be close to institutions as the current aid regime - even with huge differences - is also relevant to cooperation with the regime itself. Hence, both perceive that a sharing role of donors is important and can help developing countries, and make the regime more effective in accommodating the moral vision of aid giving, and respective interests. Similarly, Australia - a country that has always been part of the Western aid regime - think that engaging with the aid regime further, and in particular, including new donors with their approaches is important. Overall, it is a way for Australia to increase its relationship with China as well. “Australia recognises the rise of China in the development trajectories of Timor-Leste and in other pacific countries of our regional interests. We expect to increase

183 our engagement with China’s aid model. So far we are not just economically interrelated but also we are commonly taking on the challenges of development and poverty reduction” (Australian Official). Chinese engagement with the aid regime is becoming more evident. China “can contribute to the aid regime by advocating a different way to look at aid. While the Western donors focus on institutions and its political system. We believe aid can serve the scope of development in terms of freedom from wants and needs in developing countries. And nation-building is extremely important with the relevant infrastructures needed. This is especially vital here in Timor-Leste” (Chinese official). According to China’s second white paper in 2014, foreign aid should serve the scope of “improving [...] people’s livelihood and organizing public activities” (Chinese White Paper, 2014). In order to do this, China highlights capacity building: infrastructures, public facilities, affordable houses; all these areas represent the places where a social life can take place, hence focusing on strengthening the identity of the recipient, and reinforcing the sense of belonging to that country. The society for China assumes a higher value than the individual. This identity creation legitimises the public power within a defined territory. This is in line with China’s emphasis on the importance of the society in its domestic sphere. China’s main areas of intervention have also included the promotion of trade development and recently environmental protection (China’s White Paper, 2014). By improving the liberal democratic principles, Australia has invested its aid in strengthening the state-building of Timor-Leste in the areas of rule of law, government effectiveness and social policy (Evans and Grant, 1991, 144-151). Nevertheless, China and Australia engage at different levels with the process of state and nation-building in Timor-Leste. State-building focuses on re-establishing the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (Weber, 1984, 91). Therefore, the establishment or strengthening of the public power in a territory is important to the future stability of the country. Statehood, in post-independent Timor-Leste is something to be achieved, and Australia has hugely aided in this. As seen, around U$110 million have been spent in training the East Timorese police. China, instead, has mainly focused on nation-building, helping to legitimise the public power of Timor-Leste, hence on identity creation (Von Bogdandy, Häußler, Hanschmann and Utz, 2005). Nation-building and state-building are not interchangeable, but they face similar challenges in creating and strengthening the capacity of a country. One core difference

184 between China and Australia, which comes to light in Chapter 7, is that Australia extensively sees Timor-Leste as always in need of help. Hence, Australia categorises Timor-Leste as a failed state in need of help to assert its capacity to control the use of force in its territory. For China, instead, the respect of the existing political structure is the main condition, principle and norm of its relation with Timor-Leste.

8.5 Corruption Promotion, Liberal Views and Chinese Aid According to liberal views of foreign aid, mutual economic benefit is the main priority of Chinese involvement in Africa, Asia and the world. China has heavily relied on foreign aid along the years, and therefore, it sees foreign aid as a way to solve poverty. In the words of a Chinese diplomat, “We Chinese had to make the same hard decision on whether to accept foreign investment many, many years ago. You have to make the right decision or you will lose, lose, lose. You have to decide right or you will remain poor” (Brautigam, 2009, 193). China has already proved to many in Africa that it is becoming “an assertive power and a leading economic investor in Africa” (Munene, 2016). China’s influence in Africa is visible and increased hugely in the last decade. Ambitious projects, increasing trade and aid have channelled billions of dollars in the African states. Currently, China is aiming at building an impressive railway project, which will link Mombasa to Kigali. In 2017, the first leg of the railway from Mombasa to Nairobi will be completed. This project has created 25,000 jobs, including also Kenyan people. It is expected that once completed it will save on transportation costs. This will increase the exchange between Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda (Munene, 2016). This massive global Chinese investment - not just in Africa but also in Southeast Asia - has generated widespread criticism about the possibility that Chinese aid promotes corruption and maintains power in dictators. During my interviews with the East Timorese students in China, it became clear - on the track of what revealed by Wikileaks - that China gives scholarship to the elite students in Timor-Leste. This might promote corruption at the highest level of government in Timor- Leste. From my interview it was not possible to establish whether Chinese aid has promoted corruption neither if it increased. Nevertheless, the practice of favouring the sons and daughters of the elite clarifies that China has long-term interests in the country that serve the scope of domestic development, rather than supporting the most capable

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East Timorese students. This may indicate that in the long-run Chinese aid can promote and spread corruption at the government level. Today, there is consistent literature that gives an overview about the link between Chinese aid and corruption. Two German researchers have identified that Chinese aid projects are consistent with regional favouritism, which in turn may affect the effectiveness of Chinese aid. They explain that Chinese aid funds very rarely leave Chinese hands, with China and its companies controlling projects’ management and implementation. Both authors affirm that there is a lot of red tape going on in the aid delivery, which makes sense in the way China is buying the favour of aid recipient (Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky, and Tierney, 2015). In Timor-Leste, as Chapter 7 has revealed, China is attempting to build up an image, and get support for its One China Policy, as much as on the international arena and within ASEAN. Other authors (Kishi and Clionadh, 2015) claim that China’s aid is mostly intended to benefit China. They discovered evidence that developing countries with weak rule of law receive more funding. This makes sense in consideration that weak rule of law can help promote Chinese development without barriers. In Timor-Leste, the democratic system prescribes a public tendering process which may affect the capacity of China to get easy access to contracts. The government of Timor- Leste has also been criticised on some occasions when projects of development have been assigned to China without an official process. Perhaps, this might be seen as promoting corruption. However, for a developing country like Timor-Leste, development needs to be achieved, and the tendering process, very often delays development. As Chapter 8 explained in relation to donor-recipient relations, democracy requires bureaucracy to have building done. Australian aid, therefore, requires time to be achieved, while China is much faster. Nevertheless, the fast development advertised and implemented by China, has specific costs which may affect the corruption index of the recipient country in the long-run. Chinese aid has promoted growth at any cost even if this means that corruption and human rights are not taken into consideration. It is not a surprise that corruption is widespread amongst Chinese businesses. Transparency International in 2008 ranked Chinese companies as highly corrupted, because they tend to bribe key people in developing countries to gain access to contract and infrastructure projects. It has been seen that Chinese infrastructural development in Africa, has negatively affected human rights. Namibia, South Africa and Zambia are amongst the countries

186 heavily affected in terms of human rights violations. In these countries, it has been seen that the minimum wage has not been respected, and social security has not been paid by Chinese aid investors. In Timor-Leste the Corruption Index of Transparency International ranked the country 123 out of 168 (Corruption Index 2015, Transparency International). The ranking is actually very negative and in the last years worsened. Some scholars (Kishi and Clionadh, 2015) have criticised Chinese aid for promoting and supporting violence in some countries. In Ethiopia, for example, human rights abuses have been spreading, with Chinese infrastructure aid supporting the forcible migration of people in the Eastern area of the country. In fact, in order to develop a large infrastructure for solar, wind and water energy projects sponsored by Chinese aid, the government has forcibly removed people to other places. However, aid from Western countries has specific conditions attached which prevents human rights abuses of this kind and tends to protect the social well-being of people (Kishi and Clionadh, 2015, December 2). In the case of Ethiopia, Roudabeh and Raleigh (2015) have found out that violence against civilians has spread in those areas where the Ethiopian government has directed Chinese aid rather than traditional forms of aid. A further example is Zimbabwe, where traditional donors have long-standing problems in delivering their foreign aid. Corruption and human rights abuses have increased under Mugabe’s government and its party. Nevertheless, while Mugabe has not been able to find support for development from the West, Chinese engagement in Zimbabwe increased. Another important case is Uganda, where homosexuality has been made illegal and prohibited. Usually, Western donors tend to press against such laws which affect the human rights of people. However, China becomes an alternative source of aid, if pressure from the West tends to force the local Ugandan government (Kishi and Clionadh, 2015).

8.6 Conclusive Suggestions As Joseph Nye has suggested in his 2013 opinion piece in the New York Times, containment does not work with China, and power is also about cooperating (Nye, 2013, 25 Jan). At the same time, Australia in its 2013 Defence White Paper has been clear in asserting that “No major power with hostile intentions establishes bases in our immediate neighbourhood” (Australian Government, 2013). The Chinese government’s interests are

187 mostly inward looking and focuses on China becoming powerful, economically and politically independent and a wealthy country that can compete with other super and regional power. As statements from Chinese politicians showed in Chapter 7 and 8, China’s diplomacy is mostly risk-averse and embedded into national interests. China, in foreign policy, tends to adopt a non-violent and non-controversial approach. However, its assertiveness is stronger when it comes to Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights and the disputed islands in the South China Sea. China’s foreign diplomacy is mostly based on protecting its national integrity and increasing its wealth through trade. For China, domestic development and integrity of its territory is of utmost importance. This has been visible in the way Chinese aid is given or reduced by China in retaliation of unfriendly foreign policy (ex. The Philippines). In comparison to the USA, China is not a true global power; David Shambaugh sustains (Shambaugh, 2013). It is definitely a global actor, and a regional superpower in Asia. Its foreign policy is linked to domestic policies which are reactive to certain events (friendship, enemies, criticism), and are resource driven. This view is supported by Li (2010), and contended by Deborah Brautigam. China’s engagement in Asia is affecting the role of main regional power such as Australia. In the near future, the rising presence and assertiveness of China’s ‘soft power’ in Timor- Leste will pose an increasing challenge to Australia, which has geopolitical interest in Timor-Leste. A rising power like China with its basket of norms related to an authoritarian political vision can undermine the effectiveness and depth of Australia’s engagement and development practice. For Australia, protecting and increasing its political engagement in Timor-Leste requires the promotion of political stability in Timor-Leste. Foremost, Australia should really commit to the principle of helping Timor-Leste to the moral vision, if the government wants to prove that Australia is a democratic stronghold in the region. Doing this requires Australia to find a peaceful way of settling the Timor Sea dispute, arranging a maritime boundary diplomatically; this will increase the trust in the goodwill of Australia in Timor-Leste. In addition, Australia should be constructive in Timor-Leste, caring about its internal security. If Timor-Leste is secure and stable, and on the process of achieving a successful development path, in turn it will increase the security of Australia, notwithstanding the international support that Timor-Leste will give to Australia. Overall, Timor-Leste will stand-by its closer friends in the international arena.

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However, in terms of development in Timor-Leste, donors should not consider each other as competitors. They all have different advantages. Australia and China should not compete, but bringing about different expertise. The signing of the 2013 agreement between China and Australia in the development cooperation of the Asia-Pacific area acknowledges that both countries irrespective of their political system can contribute in the development of poor areas in the region. If Australia will show the willingness of rightly sharing the Timor Sea resources with Timor-Leste, and that the country is committed to purely helping East Timorese people, than Australia will mesmeric remind Timor-Leste, where its true friend is. Australia has already proved that irrespective of the current and poor South China Sea dispute, cooperating with China through a development cooperation agreement is a way to explore the opportunities coming from Chinese experience in development. At the same time, Australia has to explore the areas in which China cannot provide support to Timor-Leste and engage in those areas. As Chapter 7 and 8 have revealed Timor-Leste is not interested in creating a ‘bidding war’ between its donors, nor between Australia and China. Timor-Leste is interested in developing its country, in having infrastructures, in creating jobs for its people and having a voice as an independent, sovereign country. Aid can help, and whether it comes from China or Australia does not make much difference to a country in need of help. Timor-Leste has already proved to be a trustworthy friend and support Australia, however, the Australian spy story and its use of aid money to wiretap government officials is seriously undermining the trust in Australia. Australia has to be reminded that the East Timorese lack of trust can seriously undermine its position in Southeast Asia. The abuse of aid for bugging on Timor-Leste is unfair behaviour, which have forced Timor-Leste to look for other sources of aid. However, so far, Timor-Leste has proved to be a good friend of Australia, willing to be in peace for its development path. Timor-Leste needs support from major donors to continue its development; however, donors should not exploit this situation. China today is an assertive power, and in Timor-Leste it is not different. China is increasing its presence and strategic projects. The hybrid rice diplomacy of China is an example of its rising presence and global strategy. The support of the elite students and the infrastructure development are part of this global engagement of China with the politics of the recipients of its aid. Timor-Leste, a country in need of help, may rely on various donors. Australia is geographically close; both countries share the maritime boundaries. Australia and Timor-

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Leste share also part of the oil and the revenues from the Timor Sea. Hence, the rising presence of China, whether for aid purpose or not, is seen with concern by Australian officials. China’s aid assistance to Timor-Leste has developed with several key buildings: the presidential palace, the foreign ministry building, the defence headquarters and military residential quarters, including training programmes. When Timor-Leste further decided to upgrade its naval defence forces with two Chinese boats - according to Peter Alford in The Australian - it fuelled concern in the strategic interest of Australia in the area. Alford’s article claimed that Xanana Gusmão, at the time Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, appreciated and admired Chinese no-strings-attached in its aid policy. The $9 million delivered to build Timor-Leste’s defence headquarters without conditions and in a short time is highly appreciated by the recipient government. Nevertheless, the biggest concern coming from the Chinese patrol boat is that part of the deal required Chinese soldiers to operate them and train the local Timorese. This, therefore, raised further concern that China has been using its aid to acquire presence in the area. Moreover, the presence of Chinese soldiers on the patrol boats could mean that China would possibly misuse these boats to acquire information on Australia, given the vicinity to Timor-Leste (Alford, 2010, 30 August). Nevertheless, Timor-Leste as an independent country is free to choose its development path, donors, and security strategies. Timor-Leste is eager to develop and catch up; its willingness to join ASEAN shows that Timor wants to have a say in the global arena. Aid is an essential component of Timor-Leste strategy to catch up. However, its membership path in ASEAN has been problematic. The then Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo visited Timor-Leste from 17 to 19 August 2010. Yeo pushed the government of Timor-Leste to get prepared for ASEAN, and not to hurry to join the group. Yeo’s message was clear: further development is needed for Timor-Leste to aspire to join the group (Singaporean Government, 2010, 18 August). Hence, China and Australia, and other partners with their aid assistance become important to this end. Nevertheless, it appears that Yeo’s message aimed to look at the political standing position of Timor- Leste in relation to ASEAN principles. Democracy and human rights in Timor-Leste are more than a concern for other ASEAN countries, and non-democratic regime. Therefore, the idea of further development may hide another reality.

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8.7 Conclusion

As seen from the interviews China is not keen to become part of the DAC committee, even if a real possibility of being a part of it would actually be feasible. In this current historical moment, even the DAC committee is not ready to accept a country not committed to its basic principle of democratic development. However, cooperation is still possible and actually in place between Australia and China in Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Both donors are working on tackling malaria in PNG. Australia cooperated by putting the finances, $4 million in a period of three years, while China will provide the technical expertise and in-kind contribution (Bishop, 2015, 8 November). Another visible example of China engaging with other Western donors is the partnership with New Zealand in Rarotonga, and the partnership with the USA in Timor-Leste. Chinese and Western donors have different comparative advantages in international development and foreign aid. The Theory of Ricardo about the comparative advantages of countries is very relevant in the case of international development. While China has a competitive advantage in building infrastructures, by virtue of its manpower and cheap labour, Western donors and Australia in particular, have the advantage of delivery aid in state-building, which is happening in Timor-Leste. As seen, Australia recognises the achievements of China in reducing its domestic poverty. Therefore, there is recognition that Australia and China can share their knowledge for the benefits of development in Timor-Leste and in other areas of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. While in terms of principles and norms Australia and China remain distant – for instance when it comes to democracy and human rights – both con contribute and cooperate on a more practical term. In spite of the current cooperation agreement the norms of conduct and the priorities of both donors do not match each other, therefore, China, while is an important donor in Timor-Leste, is not changing neither challenging the existing regime. However, China today offers a good alternative source of aid. Concerning the promotion of democracy and human rights, China has different priorities and understanding of what rights to pursue in development. For China, human rights equates to freedom from want. Hence, people in Timor-Leste need to be fed first. For Australia instead pushing for democracy remains something extremely important, therefore it works on state-building. Xi Jinping has further secured that the rise of China is not a Thucydides trap. China’s peaceful rise is in line with looking for mutual benefits between donor-recipient, and

191 donor-to-donor. Sharing experience and knowledge is important for China, while different donors maintain different political systems. In spite of the great achievement of the foreign aid model of China, there is a widespread sense that Chinese aid fuels corruption in developing countries with weak institutions. During my interview with East Timorese officials and students, I could not verify whether some corruption was going on, however, the fact that China is giving scholarships to the sons and daughters of the East Timorese elite is an indication that some form of corruption may happen or that it is already going on. Overall, Australia and China still have a long way to go and to know each other in the development of Timor-Leste. The discourse of development in Timor-Leste is going to take different tracks following the engagement of new donors and the change of politics in recipient countries. For the time being, it is clear that Australia and China have contributed at different levels to the development of Timor-Leste. However, it is early to claim that the Chinese way of aid giving is going to change the long established Western model of development, to which Australia subscribes.

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9. CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored the discourse of foreign aid in Timor-Leste, by comparing one major donor, Australia and a rising donor, China. The scope has been to answer three important questions related to foreign aid: 1) How is the rise of China as an aid donor in Timor-Leste affecting the foreign aid regime set by Australia, the most prominent aid donor in the country? 2) What is the perception of the East Timorese in relation to China’s and Australia’s aid in Timor-Leste? 3) Does the case of Chinese aid in Timor-Leste rewrite the theory of aid regime? This thesis has attempted to inquire two different models of aid giving, by providing the reasoning behind foreign aid and the perception amongst the local people about donors. The thesis has developed into 10 different chapters. The first six have introduced the topic and the methodology, while the last four have provided an in-depth analysis of how the discourse of aid is shaping and affecting donors and the recipient. In fact, Australia is the foremost donor of aid to Timor-Leste, since its independence in 2002. Moreover, Timor- Leste is geographically close to Australia and in its sphere of influence. Therefore, the rise of China as a foreign aid donor in Timor-Leste has awakened the foreign policy analysts in Australia. In fact, the first question of this thesis attempts to establish how the rise of China is affecting the foreign aid regime set by Australia. It did so by establishing the reasoning behind - and the differences - in aid giving. From the interviews with Australian and Chinese officials it became known that both donors give aid to Timor- Leste following three-core categories: the moral vision, the interest-based aid, and cooperation between donors and recipient. These categories have sub-categories which show a balance between altruism, prestige, economic interest and partnership. In spite of the commonalities of these categories for both donors, there are evident differences. Australia presses the recipient country, Timor-Leste, to comply with democratic liberalism and human rights as conditions in aid giving. China, instead, does not press the government of Timor-Leste to comply and follow a specific political system, except for the One China policy, for which China demands total commitment to it from its partners. In spite of the political interests of both donors, the humanitarian perspective is still strong. Both are willing to help Timor-Leste. Australia is a developed and democratic country and has the moral duty of helping Timor-Leste, China is an emerging donor, it is the second economy by size, and with its global engagement and economic surplus, it also feels compelled to help Timor-Leste. Both donors are interested to have a stable and

193 economic integrated Timor-Leste, and soon be part of ASEAN. Australia and China have been helping Timor-Leste because both have received help from East Timorese in the past. East Timorese died to prevent the Japanese invasion of Australia during WWII, at the same time East Timorese helped Chinese citizens to escape from the authoritarian dictatorship of Suharto in Indonesia. Both donors have the responsibility to give some of the help received back. China, however, has an advantage by being a developing country understand the challenges of development for Timor-Leste. China considers development a social issue in need to be addressed by providing the basic for conducting a good life. This is why China invests in helping Timor-Leste to create an infrastructure, almost destroyed during the Indonesian invasion. Australia and China have different rules of engagement in foreign aid. China gives aid in the following: mutual benefit and non-interference in the domestic politics of one country. Australia, as seen, pushes for democratic liberalism and human rights as conditions of aid. While China respects Timor-Leste’s democratic system it is aware that democracy is not the answer to development. Therefore, its way of aid giving without political conditions resulted more appealing to East Timorese, which in any case need time to strengthen their democracy. Australia, in fact, by pushing for democracy via aid in Timor- Leste, tends to complicate the role of the East Timorese government, which does not have the capacity of old and strong democracies. Change needs time, and China has proved to be more practical on its aid delivery to Timor-Leste than Australia. Overall, Australia has begun to recognise the importance of China in aid delivery. Australians, today, perceive that China can provide help to developing countries and participate with the West to share the burden of global development. Therefore, China is changing the global panorama of the aid delivery, and Australia’s recognition of China’s presence is sign that Australia itself is affected by China’s presence in Timor-Leste. Australians have recognised this presence and the capacity of China to be an effective donor in the development of poor countries. However, differences remain. In this light of recognition of China as an aid donor, also the recipient of aid has its own view. Chapter 8 - about the perception of East Timorese in relation to both donors - provides an answer to the second question of the thesis and further strengthens the answer on how China is affecting Australia’s aid model. East Timorese officials are generally very satisfied with Australian aid, and they are confident about Chinese aid. In both cases there is a negative perception - not that strong

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- which is generated in the case of Australia by the spying story on the Timor-Leste’s government to gain a better deal on the shared oil fields. In the case of China, instead, is generated by the lack of transparency of Chinese behaviour in foreign policy. However, East Timorese officials feel assured to deal with Chinese aid officials because they treat small and big countries at the same level. Chinese officials do not tend to bully their counterpart in developing countries as Australia has been doing for a long time. The East Timorese are also very critical about the impact of Australian and Chinese aid on labour creation. In fact, China delivers its aid shipping materials and manpower from China. Australia, instead, pays huge salaries in consultancy and also employs mostly Australians. In both cases, the impact of aid is limited on job creation. The presence of Australian development practitioners has also increased the inflation in Timor-Leste. Following, the perception of East Timorese students in China seems very positive; they receive consistent scholarships and support from China to study in the mainland. This is in line with the Chinese long-term plan to build ties with the sons and daughters of the East Timorese elite. This practice boosts China’s image internationally, and prepares the future of the foreign policy relationship with East Timor. East Timorese students are obviously treated very well, because it fits the long-term plan of China. China is competing with Australia in offering scholarships to East Timorese students, and while the East Timorese government supports the view that China is just a last resort choice, students have expressed the opinion that China is a better place to study in light of future economic opportunities. Chapter 8 has also inquired into the hybrid agricultural projects of China and Australia. Both donors invest in developing a new agricultural system, which increases the yield. China has developed a hybrid rice project, while Australia has developed a hybrid plantation with different varieties. Both donors have introduced technology, fertilisers and hybrid seeds; these technological methods, and intensive agriculture are new to East Timorese farmers. Both have increased the yield, at least in the first years since the implementation, however in the long-run several problems arose: hybrid seed dependency and soil degradation. In addition, Chinese have introduced chemical fertilisers, which tended to pollute the soil, while Australia had a more environmentally friendly approach, with organic fertiliser. Overall, the perception of East Timorese about Chinese and Australia aid is a mixture of positive and negative feelings. East Timorese officials have demonstrated to be satisfied about Chinese and Australian aid, which relates to the need East Timorese have of foreign

195 aid. However, the negative perception is also widespread, and very clear in terms of foreign policy behaviour and scepticism about both donors. The hybrid plantation has also been problematic and not sustainable in the long-run. Notwithstanding, China as a new reality in foreign aid is still welcomed by East Timorese officials and it helps to balance the assertiveness of Australia. One important aspect that came to light in chapter 7 is that both, Australia and China, are pressing and helping Timor-Leste to join the ASEAN regional grouping. Both have specific interests in ASEAN. For China and Australia, ASEAN countries represent a massive market and huge economic profits. Therefore, Timor-Leste in ASEAN can be a useful member. Both donors are helping Timor-Leste to increase state and nation-building to make its membership closer and successful. However, so far, some ASEAN members have been critical of the poor economic development of Timor-Leste which could potentially undermine the progress of the association. The study provided in Chapter 9 has attempted to understand the current situation of Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN and what it can provide to the association. Chapter 9 has revealed that Timor- Leste can be a potential member to help ASEAN to progress democracy and human rights. Timor-Leste as a member of ASEAN would be more stable and economically integrated in the region, this latter point is extremely important to China and Australia, and their respective foreign aid projects. In conclusion, as the interviews have shown, China and Australia have distances caused by their respective model of aid giving based on different norms. This distance is caused by different visions of norms. Giving aid is a matter of human rights, however, both donors have a different vision of what human rights mean in development. For China, development is a matter of social rights that are achieved with development and the rights to subsistence. China privileges the society over the individual. Australia, instead, is committed to individual rights in its foreign aid delivery. The position of China is simple and clear, and does not leave room to talk about democracy. Chinese aid is more practical in one way than Australia. In addition, China pushes for mutual benefit and non- interference, Australia, instead, is strongly committed to promoting and strengthening democracy and human rights. This last point is not easy to come by for a developing country with poor capacity. Therefore, Chinese aid becomes a good alternative that can also contribute to increase the infrastructure of the country with little political pressure, and definitely not related to something domestic. Differences between China and Australia are still consistent and in the current historical moment a revision of the aid

196 regime is impossible. While China is contributing to the developing world, and is indirectly cooperating with Australia also in Timor-Leste, cooperation is happening thanks to the local government who is managing the different donors. China and Australia have signed an agreement to cooperate in the development of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The agreement is still at the beginning, and also Xi Jinping, talking at the Australian parliament has set the norms across which both donors can cooperate: mutual trust, economic interests, people-to-people exchange, strategic dialogue. This, however, remains primordial, while steps have been taken, time is needed to talk about a revision of the aid regime, as well as to see whether China is a pure and responsible donor. Australia and China are aware of their respective capacities and advantages to progress the development of Timor-Leste. While scepticism is always strong in foreign policy and given the authoritarian political system of China, it is very unlikely that in the next decade its aid model will have a strong impact on the norms established by the DAC in the post- WWII era. Recognition of the achievements of China in helping the developing world is only a step that grants China an initial position in the development arena. The future is likely to change and the continuous economic advantage of China will definitely have an increasing impact in shaping the foreign aid regime.

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Appendix 1 - Data Sources

A. Existing Documents

Australia: 1) Aid Program Performance Report (AusAid) - External Trade Statistics – Annual Report 2012 2) China Development Cooperation Report 3) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for a Development Cooperation Partnership between AusAID and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM)

China 1) China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 2011 and 2014 2) China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 2011 and 2011 3) Chinese Peaceful Development

Timor-Leste 1) Millennium Development Goals Reports 2004-2009-2010 2) Development Partners’ Spending 2009-2010 3) Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting (Speeches and Statements) - 4) Timor-Leste Development Cooperation Report 2012 - https://www.mof.gov.tl/wp- content/uploads/2013/06/Dev_Coop_Overview_Dev_Coop_Report_2012.pdf 5) Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 - http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp- content/uploads/2011/07/Timor-Leste-Strategic-Plan-2011-20301.pdf 6) Program of the Fifth Constitutional Government 2012-2017 Legislature - http://timor- leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Program-of-the-5th-Constitutional-Government.pdf

B. Fieldwork 1) Interviews with Australian, Chinese and East Timorese Diplomats and Politicians and development practitioners 2) Observation Development Partners’ Meeting – Lao’Hamutuk – NGO Forum

C. Other Documents Diplomats and Politicians Speeches Newspapers (Australian, Chinese (English), Macau Hub, Jakarta Post, Jakarta Globe, Timor Post) Press Agency: Xinuanet News Agency; IRIN (Humanitarian News and Analysis); WikiLeaks Cables on Timor-Leste Aid Transparency Portal - https://www.aidtransparency.gov.tl/

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Appendix 2 – Interviews’ Framework

Timor-Leste Officials - Australia Timor-Leste Officials - China

Definition of Development according to the Recipient of Aid What is in your opinion a definition of development that fits the current status of Timor-Leste? What does Timor-Leste need? In your opinion, what type of aid can deliver the greatest benefits to Timor-Leste? (Please, explain why) Which areas should deserve more focused aid?

Framing Australian Development Aid Framing Chinese Development Aid Could you tell me more about Australian foreign aid Could you tell me more about Chinese foreign aid in in Timor-Leste? How is Australian aid delivered to Timor-Leste? How is Chinese aid delivered to Timor- Timor-Leste? Leste? What are the positive and negative aspects of What are the positive and negative aspects of Chinese aid? Australian aid? Do you see China as a reliable partner in development? Do you see Australia as a reliable partner in Is China aligned to the government priorities in development? development? Is Australia aligned to the government priorities in Secondary questions: development? Does China make an environmental impact assessment Secondary questions: before any aid project? Does Australia make an environmental impact Does Chinese aid require project planning and assessment before any aid project? management? Does Australia aid require project planning and Does China engage in rural areas? management? Does Australia engage in rural areas?

Australia in Foreign Policy China in Foreign Policy How do you feel when you work with Australian How do you feel when you work with Chinese diplomats diplomats and its development partners? and its development partners? In your opinion why is Australia upset about the “rise” Do you regard China as a developing country? If yes, does of China in Timor-Leste? it make more comfortable to deal with China? Australia is regarded as a developed country. Does it Samoa President said that China fills the gap of Oz and make more difficult to deal with Australia? NZ, by giving flexible aid. Then, what was wrong with In 2013 it was revealed that Australia has spied on the Australian aid? What kind of gaps is China filling in government of Timor-Leste at the time the oil treaty Timor-Leste? was signed. Does this affect your trust in the real Several commentators see Chinese aid as rogue aid. How motivation behind Australian aid in Timor-Leste? do you regards such statement in connection to China’s aid in Timor-Leste? Secondary Questions: During the 2013 Typhoon Hainan China has allocated a meagre U$100.000 to the Philippines; does this event affect your trust in the Chinese government? In the past China tried to get full rights for oil exploration. Do you think there is a connection between China’s engagement in Timor-Leste and the resources Timor-Leste have? Australian Aid Principles Chinese Aid Principles

Australia gives aid according to the following China gives aid according to the following principles: non- principles: democratic liberalism, good governance, interference, mutual benefit, self-reliance. poverty reduction. Does the government agree with these principles? Does the government agree with these principles? Is Is there a convergence between these principles and the there a convergence between these principles and the way the government intend the development of Timor- way the government intend the development of Timor- Leste? Is there any problem with them? If self-reliance is Leste? Is there any problem with them? Why? intended as to make Timor-Leste fewer dependants on aid and more integrated into the world economy, how can it be achieved? How did Australian aid developed and/or changed since the independence of Timor-Leste? How did Chinese aid developed and/or changed since the independence of Timor-Leste?

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Outcomes of Australian aid in Timor-Leste Outcomes of China’s and Australia’s aid in Timor- How do you see the role of Australia aid in Timor- Leste Leste? Does it have an impact on the Government and How do you see the role of Chinese aid in Timor-Leste? the people? Does it have an impact on the Government and the people? So far, Australia provided hundreds of millions in aid, So far, does Chinese aid in infrastructure had an impact on did it have an impact on the population? Were locals the population? Were locals employed? employed? Chinese aid seems generally focus on infrastructures. Most What is preventing Australia aid to be more effective? of these infrastructures built in Timor-Leste were actually Is the logic of Donor-Recipient changed in favour of for government use. Many of my friends in Timor-Leste partner? (Australia) shared the view that Chinese engagement in Timor-Leste is pure utilitarian and only a way to “buy” the government. How to you see the decision of the Australian How do you see such a criticism? government to cut on aid? Timor-Leste has often criticized Australian aid for being “all over the places.” Can you have the same freedom of critics with Chinese aid?

China’s aid built several key building in Timor-Leste. The government clearly needed those buildings. However, why did not you ask more commitment of Chinese aid towards those projects aimed at helping the poor?

Cooperation amongst donors Cooperation amongst donors What do you think about possible cooperation of What do you think about possible cooperation of China China and Australia in aid giving in Timor-Leste? and Australia in aid giving in Timor-Leste?

In 2013, Australia and China signed an agreement for In 2013, Australia and China signed an agreement for cooperating in international development. Do you cooperating in international development. Do you think think that cooperation between China and Australia is that cooperation between China and Australia is in the in the interest of Timor-Leste? interest of Timor-Leste?

Interview to Australian Officials Interview to Chinese Officials

Australia aid to Timor-Leste Chinese aid to Timor-Leste Could you please tell me more about Australian aid in Could you please tell me more about Chinese aid in Timor- Timor-Leste? Why do you give aid to Timor-Leste? Leste? Why do you give aid to Timor-Leste? What is in your opinion a definition of development What is in your opinion a definition of development that that fits the current status of Timor-Leste? What does fits the current status of Timor-Leste? What does Timor- Timor-Leste need? Leste need? In your opinion, what type of aid can deliver the In your opinion, what type of aid can deliver the greatest greatest benefits to Timor-Leste? (Please, explain benefits to Timor-Leste? (Please, explain why) why) Which areas should deserve more focused aid? Which areas should deserve more focused aid?

Australian aid principles Chinese aid principles What are the principles and rules of conduct of What are the principles and rules of conduct of Chinese Australian aid? aid? Does Timor-Leste’s government cope well with the Does Timor-Leste’s government cope well with the principles and the rules of conduct attached to the principles and the rules of conduct attached to the Chinese Australian aid? aid?

Critical perspective of Aid (Australia) Critical perspective of Aid (China) How important is democracy and good governance for How important is self-reliance and non-interference for Australia? China? Can we have development without democracy? Can we have development without democracy? Would you keep helping Timor-Leste if it turns out What kind of problem do you face in the aid delivery with undemocratic? the local government? Do you have an idea of how Chinese aid works in New Zealand and China are collaborating in giving aid to Timor-Leste? Rarotonga. Do you think the same degree of collaboration can be applied to Timor-Leste aid delivery?

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Do you think that Chinese aid in Timor-Leste is filling Can you speak Portuguese, Tetum, etc? the gap of Australia? How important is the moral vision about aid in Timor- Several commentators see Chinese aid as rogue aid. Leste? Do you think that’s the case for Chinese aid in Timor- Leste? The current Australian government talks about aid-for- trade, which is what we have seen in the Chinese principle of mutual benefit. Does the government think this is the way to improve aid effectiveness? Is this recognition of China’s successful principles? Can you speak Portuguese, Tetum, etc? How important is the moral vision about aid in Timor- Leste? Do you think that Chinese engagement in Timor-Leste reduce the capacity of consolidating democracy?

Cooperation (Australia and China) Cooperation (Australia and China) What do you think about possible cooperation of What do you think about possible cooperation of China China and Australia in aid giving in Timor-Leste? and Australia in aid giving in Timor-Leste? In 2013, Australia and China signed an agreement for In 2013, Australia and China signed an agreement for cooperating in international development. Is this cooperating in international development. Is this cooperation taking place in Timor-Leste? cooperation taking place in Timor-Leste? Do you share information about development in Do you share information about development in Timor- Timor-Leste with China? Leste with Australia?

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Appendix 3

Fieldwork Timor-Leste 2016

Interview - Basic Info Date: Location:

Name of Interviewee:

His/Her Role:

How was I treated?:

General Feeling:

Main Points:

1)______

2)______

3)______

4)______

5)______

6)______

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Appendix 4

Fieldwork Timor-Leste 2006 – Form 2

Living Accommodations

Type

Cost

Location

Condition

Facilities Available in the area

Public Transport

Electricity

Internet

Food Store

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APPENDIX 5. FIELDWORK EXPERIENCES Doing fieldwork in Timor-Leste require preparation, especially for an outsider like me. I have been researching on China and Australia in Timor-Leste, therefore I was involved with three countries and cultures which neither of them are my own. While I visited and lived in all of them across my life, my perspective remains one of an outsider. This provided few challenges to overcome (acquire the trust of the informants), but in my opinion has also provided me with the necessary distance to analyse the outcome of the interviews. The most intensive period of my fieldwork has been spent in Timor-Leste. The little tiny island present several physical and mental challenges, which this section addresses. While doing fieldwork in China and Australia did not present specific issues, especially because people interviewed were mostly government officials, Timor-Leste is still a developing country with lack of facilities, therefore an attentive preparation is needed. Before leaving is important to get basic information about weather, culture and people of the locations where fieldwork will be conducted. I have previously been to Timor-Leste, so I knew what kind of challenges I would have faced. However, in 2007 – during my first visit – the country was far less developed than what I have seen in 2015. Nevertheless, in Timor-Leste development is mostly centralised in the capital, leaving the rural areas still far from the city in terms of transport and facilities. The urban-rural divide is huge in Timor-Leste. For example, health facilities outside the capital, Dili, are very basic, often lacking the basic instruments to take care of simple diseases. Furthermore, it is very difficult to find an ATAM machine outside the main urban center. One important consideration, Timor-Leste is not a cheap destination. Dili, for example, has a massive concentration of Western people involved in the development of the country. Beside embassies and media, Dili is also the headquarter of the United Nations Development Project. Therefore, in order to cope with the massive presence of foreigners, many hotels and accommodation – with a Western-style of commodity – have been built in the city. These accommodations are very expensive, ranging from U$30 to U$150 or even more. While in 2007 there was mostly one main hotel in Dili, the Hotel Timor, today the city has also a commercial center, and several restaurants and bars also run by foreigners. Flight to Timor-Leste are also expensive and not easy. Currently three companies serve Dili airport. Air North from Darwin, Silk Air and Air Timor from Singapore, and Garuda Indonesia from Bali. The lack of competition makes the trip to Dili very expensive. Therefore, expensive accommodation, lack of efficient transport, language barriers, lack

232 of health facilities, lack of electricity, the tropical weather require consideration before engaging in a fieldwork. A previous assessment of the working condition in Timor-Leste also helps to organise better what to carry in the luggage. The tropical and wet weather can be a real challenge. For example, I delayed three days to arrive in Metinaro where I had to explore the hybrid rice project of Australia and China, because a heavy rain has affected the condition of the road. In addition, longer fieldwork in rural areas require health preparation. Malaria and Dengue fever are endemic in Timor-Leste, not to forget hepatitis A and other infectious diseases. I have been over a month in the rural areas to explore the rice field, this was not that long in comparison to anthropological research. This later point of study require a higher level of preparation, including the language. In many places across Timor-Leste I did not have electricity to power my laptop, therefore, before arriving in the country I printed many preset form (see Appendix 3) in order to gather the basic information on my interview, general feelings, how I was treated and the key points of the interview. A second form (see Appendix 4) helped me to have a track record of my expenses and facilities availability in the places where I have been. Visa is another thing to consider. Usually, visa is issued on the arrival after a payment of U$30. It is important to carry the cash in American dollar, because there are no ATM machine at the arrival and no currency change. I was lucky because on May 2015, the European Union signed an agreement for a free-visa with Timor-Leste, which allowed me to enter without a visa. There is however a departure tax to be paid of U$10, which applies to all people.

5.1 Necessary Considerations before Undertaking Fieldwork in Timor-Leste It is always good to travel light and carry only basic items. I travelled with a small luggage of about 15kg. First of all, the airline from Darwin to Dili has limit of weight which impede people to take more stuff. Second, given the poor public transport and the lack of spaces in buses it is better to travel light. It is still common in Timor-Leste to see people travelling on a bus roof. While the climate of Timor-Leste is mostly tropical, with a wet and dry season, in the mountains can be very chilly at night. Therefore, it is crucial to know the places to visit. I carried summer clothes, and some jackets for cooler nights. Trekking shoes have accompanied me during my fieldwork. I have also carried stationary with me. Pencils, erasers, notes are essential tools for a fieldwork in a developing country. Those things are not readily available in Timor-Leste. Other essentials tools for fieldwork:

233 computer, voice recorder, camera, batteries, charger, mobile phone. It is not easy to find a place where to charge a computer or the voice recorder, especially outside the urban centres. Before leaving for Timor-Leste I bought a voice recorder that used simple AA batteries. This are more available also in developing countries, and I carried extra with me. While instead of using my laptop, I took notes in the old style with a note. Food and water are another challenge in Timor-Leste. The hygiene conditions are basic, therefore the risk of hepatitis A is high. Clean, bottled, water can be bought also in rural areas, but the normal tap water can only be used for taking shower with precautious. Tap water is not disinfected and safe. For those with food allergy can be very challenging in Timor-Leste to know if specific ingredients have been used.

5.2 Out on the Field After the arrival in Timor-Leste I gathered with local friends I made during my studies in Australia. They helped me to settle down in the country. Having a local to guide you at the beginning has been decisive. Timorese people are very friendly and helpful, and the country, generally speaking, is safe. Dili is somehow a multicultural city with the presence of many foreigners. It is easy also to communicate because in the capital people can easily speak Portuguese and English. However, Tetum is the language mostly spoken by locals. During the first part of my fieldwork, mostly with Chinese, Australian and Timorese officials, I had no language issues because they could speak fluently English; sometimes I used Portuguese as a mean of communication with old Timorese officials. While I moved to the rural areas, for the hybrid rice field part, I met some problem because of linguistic barrier. However, I managed to once again use Portuguese which is mostly spoken by the old famer generation. Transportation to the rural areas can be a real challenge. Routes and timing from the capital city are not easily available, in most cases I had to ask around to get the information and wait for long time before a bus for that specific destination passed. Transport are unreliable and never on time, also due to the poor road conditions. My study is not an inquiry into culture; therefore, I did not ‘go-native’ - borrowing the expression from ethnographer. However, during my fieldwork I recorded a diary with impression and the main outcome of every interview, and consideration of the place where I was and how I was treated. This also helped me to reflect on the genuine answer

234 people gave to me. A friendly behaviour has been my key to acquire the trust of the people in a short time. Being simple and friendly is appreciated by the Timorese, whether simple people or government officials. Previous knowledge of Timor-Leste and its history and culture is also a must to establish the trust of my informant. In addition, this proof respect for the local culture and its traditions. Nevertheless, when I met with Chinese and Australian official, I used a higher degree of professionalism and distance. It is important to have a standing position about the seriousness of the topic under study. In the foreign policy structure Chinese and Australian require more formalities. Dressing code is especially important with Chinese officials. In all cases, it is a good practice to respect the schedules and routines of the people and regulate the appointments according to officials’ comfort. In many cases, while I had fixed an appointment with an official, I was obliged to wait a long time for conducting an interview. Some of these officials have important commitments, which may affect their schedule; however, the researcher must be always on time. One key rule is not to impose ideas upon these officials. It is better to avoid any talks about politics and comments that can position the researcher on one side or the other. A neutral position during the fieldwork is indication of the quality of the information received. Sometimes, I felt marvelled by the answer I received from my interviewees, I learn by doing that a researcher should never be marvelled by an answer, because this may affect the rest of the interview. Neutral position helps to increase the quality of the data. The data collection has been mostly based on face-to-face interviews. However, given that I spent a longer time in Timor-Leste, from time to time it happened that I met the people I interviewed in bars or restaurants or just in the street of Dili. Very often, these officials have asked me how the research was going and we start again talking about the project. While these meetings were unofficial, they also provided me a further insight into my research. I mostly recorded the interview and later I transcribed them. However, in the course of the interview I have taken notes of the main points and key themes developed, putting an indication of which minute of the recording that specific theme has come out. One important consideration is the ethics. In most cases I have met my informants more than once, sometimes officially, sometimes unofficially. In both cases, I tried to make clear that what was mentioned in the discussion would have been used for the thesis. I realised this practice of making everything clear to my informant increased their trust in

235 what I was doing. One of the reason I met my informant more than once, was to make sure that what I recorded was actually what they wanted to express. This method increase the validity of my research. Some of the people who I was not able to meet in person a second time, I tried to contacted them via email or phone, and especially when I had doubts about what I recorded.

5.3 Author’s Positionality and Power Relations during the Interviews Whenever a research enter into a new reality, hence in the field, he/she becomes connected to the new environment. This connection is not always strong. For ethnographer, the connection with the field is a necessary condition for understanding culture, while for other form of research it is not. However, when I entered Timor-Leste, irrespective of the time spent there, in one way or another I immediately felt connected to the place, especially in consideration of the suffering of the poor and the children you see in the street, and all the other sad images that a developing country present before a researcher eyes. For what concern the relationship with my interviewees I guess I was considered a half- way between an expat and a tourist. Expats in Timor-Leste are mostly those who work for NGOs, diplomats and missionaries, therefore, people that are living in the country since long time. However, some of these expats still live according to Western lifestyle; hence they are not properly integrated with the local lifestyle. Several missionaries instead have ‘gone native’, living according to the local way of living. Beside these two categories of foreigners, there are the tourists, who just visit the country because of the beautiful and wild environment. I was ‘categorised’ in the grey areas that lie between expats and tourists. I was not a tourists and I was not an expat given my short time in the country. I basically changed several places, and had a total of five months in Timor-Leste. Overall, for my research topic was not needed to have a longer presence in one specific area, managing my time in order to meet more informant more than once has been crucial in validating my data. The fact that I was not Timorese, Australian, neither Chinese, but an Italian and European citizen, made my informants more interested to know why I was interested in Timor- Leste. Before beginning my interview, many informants asked about my studies, life, interests. While I was honest in my answers, I tried to be neutral, in order not to affect their later

236 consideration. The fact, that I was Italian helped to acquire the trust of the Timorese and the Chinese. In fact, they did not consider me as someone who could be biased by my original culture. If this study would have been conducted by an Australian, a Chinese or a Timorese would definitely take another stance. In some sense I was considered as an external voice, with an external perspective. Overall, I was someone who had spent time in Australia, studying there, in Hong Kong and China, and in Timor-Leste, therefore, I had knowledge of the countries I was researching about. Talking about power relations during the interview. Power relation between the researcher and diplomats and government officials very often assume a vertical relation, in which the researcher is at the base and the diplomat at the top. This, sometimes, makes the interview complicated. This is so when some question result uncomfortable for them to answer. Some diplomats and politicians, however, are very friendly and keener to talk deeper also about uncomfortable questions. Interviews with students and farmers have a different power relation, in which the researcher is at the top, and farmers and student at the bottom. This sometimes can create problems, because students and farmers always try to be polite in their answer, especially if they think that by being honest their life could be affected. Therefore, it is an essential skill to acquire the trust of the people. This level of interviews require less formality, which helps to acquire more trust.

5.4 Author’s Selection of Informants and General Consideration My informants were politicians, diplomats, farmers and students. Initially, I contacted the diplomats following the official website of the embassies. Often, I got an answer from the secretary, who pointed out how busy was the ambassador and the people of the embassies. Anyway, I kept insisting. In other cases Timorese friends provided me the direct phone number of Timorese diplomats. I was able to contact Chinese official in Beijing with the help of the East Timorese Embassy in Beijing. I have also phoned directly to the embassies in order to fix an interview appointment, and while in Timor-Leste I have been directly to the office of the people I needed for my interviews. The Timorese students I interviewed I met them via the East Timorese embassy in Beijing and Australia. Most of student interviewed are required to conduct an internship with their embassy, and most of them were studying political science or international relations, which further increased my interest to know their point of view about China and Australia. This student, overall,

237 will be the people who will run Timor-Leste in the future. Therefore, the perception they get of China and Australia today will guide them in the future. Further consideration are needed about conducting interviews with diplomats and politicians. Very often ambassadors or politicians are not sufficient to provide the information needed on the topic of inquiry. Many of them they are in power for 3-4 years, then change country or department or even job. Hence, their perception of the foreign aid regime might be limited and narrow in their value judgment. However, through ambassadors and politicians I was able to know the people who worked closely to them, other officials, who were working in that position for a decade or more. These people can provide a better understanding of foreign aid in Timor-Leste. Therefore, better and more reliable information are provided by embassies officers and practitioners.

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