Secur nd ity a S e e c r i a e
e s
P FES
Pr. Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent Pr. Mark Bolak Funteh Dr. Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri Mr. Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon Why is peace so elusive? Pr. Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent Pr. Mark Bolak Funteh Dr. Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri Mr. Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon Why is peace so elusive? Translated from the French by Diom Richard Ngong [email protected]
© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yaoundé (Cameroun), 2017. Tél. 00 237 222 21 29 96 / 00 237 222 21 52 92 B.P. 11 939 Yaoundé / Fax: 00 237 222 21 52 74 E-mail : [email protected] Site : www.fes-kamerun.org Réalisation éditoriale : PUA : www.aes-pua.com ISBN: 978-9956-532-05-3
Any commercial use of publications, brochures or other printed materials of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is strictly forbidden unless otherwise authorized in writing by the publisher This publication is not for sale All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photo print, microfilm, translation or other means without written permission from the publisher Table of contents
Acknowledgements ………………………………………………….....……………...... …………...... 5
Abbreviations and acronyms ………………………………………...... ……………………………...... 6
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………...... ………………....…...... 7
Chapter I – Background and context of the emergence of Boko Haram in Cameroon ……………………………………………………………………………………...... …………...... 8
A. Historical background to the crisis in the Far North region ……………..………...... 8
B. Genesis of the Boko Haram conflict ………………………………………………...... 10
Chapter II - Actors, challenges and prospects of a complex conflict ……………...... 12
A. Actors and the challenges of the Boko Haram conflict ……………………………...... 12
1. The Cameroonian Boko Haram faction and its support network……………...... 12
2. The political and military offensive by the Cameroonian government ……………. 16
3. Responses by regional organizations and international partners ……...…...... 16
4. Mobilization of vigilante committees ………………………………………………...... 18
B. The socioeconomic and political impact of the Boko Haram conflict crisis ……...... 18
C. Prospects for security in the Far North Region of Cameroon ………………...... 19
Chapter III – Why is peace so elusive?………………………………………...... ………...... 22
A. An inadequate security response ………………………………………………...... 22
B. The emergence of a crime entrepreneurship ………………………………………………...... 24
C. Lack of a de-radicalization strategy ………………………………………………...... 25
D. The impact of mal-governance ………………………………………………...... 26
Chapter IV - Recommendations …………………………...... ………...... ………………...... 27
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………...... ………………………………...... 29
References ……………………………………………………………………………………...... …………...... 30 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
Acknowledgements Commission (LCBC) and Mr. Amadou DIONGUE, Coordinator for the West This publication is the product of many Africa and the Sahel Peace and Security working sessions with experts of the Department of the African Union, who Security Think Tank set up by the Friedrich graciously accepted to travel from the LCBC Ebert Siftung (FES) Cameroon, to examine and the AU respectively, to shed light on the the various facets of the Boko Haram con- efforts being made by their institutions in flict and to suggest new approaches and the fight against terrorism in the Lake Chad collective responses. Basin. We would like here to sincerely thank all the Sincere thanks also go to Mr. Nkalwo Ngoula experts who actively participated and pro- Joseph Léa of the University of Douala who vided their multidisciplinary and multi-sec- drafted this publication. toral insights to this collegial effort. Finally we would like to especially thank FES hereby expresses its heartfelt gratitude the former Resident Representative, Mrs. to Pr. Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent, Director Susanne Stollreiter, and the Peace and of the Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes Security Program Coordinator, Mrs. Susan Politiques et Stratégiques (CREPS), Pr. Mark Bamuh Apara, who worked tirelessly to Bolak Funteh and Dr. Mbarkoutou Mahamat organize the security workshops and also Henri of the University of Maroua for their participated in the drafting and publication valuable academic contributions, expertise of this book. and suggestions that have enriched this work. M. Friedrich Kramme-Stermose We also express our appreciation to H. Resident Representative E. Mamman NUHU, Political Adviser to FES Cameroon and Central Africa the Head of Mission of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin
5 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
Abreviations & acronyms UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees ACF: Action against hunger ICG: International crisis group ACLED: Armed conflict location & event IED: Improvised Explosive Devices data project IGA: Income Generating Activities AFD: French Development Agency INS: National Statistics Institute ANIF: National financial investigation ISS: Institute for Security Studies agency JMTF: Multinational Joint Task Force AU: African Union LCBC: Lake Chad Basin Commission BH: Boko Haram MINEPIA: Ministry of Livestock Fisheries BIR: Rapid Intervention Unit and Animal Industries BUCRES: Central Bureau of Census and MSF: Doctors without borders Population Studies OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Hu- COPAX: Central African Peace and Security manitarian Affairs Council NGO: Non Governmental organization CSO: Civil society organizations PAIC: Community initiatives support DTM: Displacement tracking matrix program ECCAS: Economic Community of Central SME: Small and Medium Sized Enterprise African States UNDP: United Nations Development ELECAM: Elections Cameroon Program FAO: United Nations Food and Agricultural UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund Organization UNICEF: United Nations Children Emergen- FES: Friedrich Ebert Siftung cy Fund GABAC: Task Force on Money Laundering USAID: United States Agency for Interna- in Central Africa tional Development GIZ: German international development WB: World Bank cooperation Agency WDYP: World Dynamics of Young People GRIP: Group for Research and Information WFP: World Food Program on Peace and Security
6 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
GENERAL INTRODUCTION local populations to understand how indi- viduals and groups of individuals become The Far North Region of Cameroon is the radicalized (UNDP, 2017); and an instru- theatre of horrendous violence by the mental approach that seeks to understand terrorist sect Boko Haram. This part of the rationale behind Boko Haram attacks the country, with its exotic landscape, is as well as their military and communication suffering from what is arguably one of the strategies and tactics in Cameroon (Christian worst catastrophes of the Lake Chad Basin; Seignobos, 2015 ; Elodie Apard, 2015). a tragedy that has forcefully displaced per- This study has adopted a new and different sons and led to the death of thousands. In approach: it identifies the various actors in- spite of mobilization by the international volved, examines their political, economic, community and considerable efforts by the social and symbolic interests, and analyses Cameroonian government and its partners the correlation between the attainment of of the Lake Chad Basin, the terrorist threat these objectives and the prolongation of has not subsided; rather it has persisted the conflict. A close look at the interests as and is evolving constantly. The crisis is now well as the political and economic alliances bogged down, and recent events on the among the parties involved, can shed ground have given the lie to declarations new light on the dynamics of this complex by some government officials that Boko conflict. Haram is on its last legs. Even the research To achieve its objective, the Friedrich Ebert community has been unable to properly cir- Foundation organized a series of security cumscribe this complex phenomenon using workshops between 2016 and 2017 that traditional analytical tools. brought together experts from academic, A lot has been written about the Boko military, media, political and civil society in- Haram conflict in Cameroon. However, till stitutions as well as from international orga- date, this literature has focused more on nizations. This publication is the outcome of the general and specific descriptions of the discussions, semi-structured interviews with conflict than on detailed and innovative various stakeholders, relevant documentary analyses. The approaches adopted in the research and analyses of empirical data by studies so far can be grouped into three members of the working group. categories: a multi-causal approach that The study, which is based on an analyti- examines the social, economic, political, cal, empirical and prospective approach, security, cultural and religious environment, examines the genesis of the conflict and that fostered the growth of Boko Haram’s the context that led to the emergence violent extremism and terrorism in the Far and expansion of the Boko Haram threat North Region (Gwoda and Wassouni, vol. in Cameroon. It takes a look at the myriad 1&2, 2017 ; International Crisis Group, 2016); actors involved and the web of interests that and their socioeconomic and humanitarian are keeping the threat alive. It examines impacts (Saibou Issa, 2014); a psychosocial the modalities, changing interests and the approach that examines the experiences different reactions to the constantly shifting of former recruits as well as testimonies by threat in order to identify ways to effectively
7 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
end the conflict. It equally examines the com- scholars who had been recruited either plex actors-interests-context relationships in Nigeria or Sudan, Boko Haram started that are compounding and perpetuating the actively radicalizing and recruiting conflict. It finally makes concrete recommen- people in the Mayo Sava, Mayo Tsanaga, dations that could be implemented to boost Logone and Chari divisions as early as 2001. current efforts to bring peace and security According to consolidated data from the to the Far North Region, as well as to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report of south of Lake Chad. November 2016, between 3500 and 4000 Cameroonians, mostly men, joined Boko Haram for various reasons: opportunism, fa- naticism, vengeance, adventure, etc. Others, who had been abducted (more than 1000 in Chapter I – HISTORICAL 2014, according to the ICG), were enlisted by BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT force. The Mayo-Sava Division has supplied OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE Boko Haram with the highest number of militants, though the other border divisions BOKO HARAM PHENOMENON (Mayo Tsanaga, Logone and Chari) and IN CAMEROON towns like Maroua and Kousseri are not far behind. The activities of Boko Haram first came to Taking advantage of the wave of refugees the attention of the media and the public that flowed into Cameroon from 2012, in 2014, though the sect had already been some members of the sect from Nigeria in- operating in the country for a number of filtrated the group to recruit new members years. It had taken advantage of the fragile and to set up cells in the Far North. Isolated socioeconomic environment in the Far North and localized attacks were recorded that Region, to gain a foothold and build power- same year along the border in Dabanga, ful support networks in the region. Fotokol, Makari, and Kousseri. This was fol- lowed between 2013 and 2014 by a series A. Background to the crisis in the Far of abductions of Western expatriates and North local elites. The Cameroonian government, The first signs of the presence of Boko hesitant at first, since it initially considered Haram in Cameroon can be traced as far this new threat as a Nigerian problem, fi- back as 2009, when members of the sect nally decided to take the threat seriously by fleeing Nigerian security forces passed officially declaring war on Boko Haram on through, or settled in the border areas May 14th 2014. between Cameroon and Nigeria, particu- Since then, the region has been the larly in Fotokol, Mora, Maroua, Kousseri, theatre of a hybrid war that has alter- Amchidé, Kerawa, Djibrilli, Bornori, Tol- nated between conventional attacks komari, Kolofata, etc. Taking advantage (from 2014) and guerilla or asymmetrical of the local network of imams, itinerant warfare (from the summer of 2015) de- preachers, young Cameroonian Islamic pending on the operational capacities
8 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
of the sect in response to military force suicide bombings by Boko Haram occurred (Mbarkoutou, 2016). Estimates from data in the Far North Region between January provided by ACLED and ICG through its 2013 and June 2017. Since 2014, more than platform Crisis Watch and the journal l’Œil 150 soldiers and about 1,670 civilians have du Sahel - three open sources known for been killed in the conflict. According to l’Œil their rigor in monitoring this crisis since du Sahel more than 2000 civilians have been 2003- show that about 556 attacks and 77 killed since 2012.
This conflict has produced a wave of a capacity of only 39,000) and in neigh- refugees from Nigeria to Cameroon. boring villages which today have close to The UNHCR has registered more than 33,000 refugees. There are also many inter- 90,000 who entered the country through nally displaced persons in the villages of the Kewara, Amchidé, Fotokol, Tourou, region (Mémé, Makary, Kousseri, Afadé), Mogodé and many of them have been a situation that is creating enormous hu- settled in the Minawao camp (since July manitarian challenges. As of September 2013 it has had a population of 59,000 2017, the region has 325,589 displaced per- refugees in spite of the fact that it has sons, 235,913 of them internally displaced
9 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
persons, 30,278 refugees and 59,398 re- and refugees are settled in makeshift camps turnees. 91% of these persons have been along the major highway (Maroua-Kousseri, displaced as a result of the Boko Haram Kolofata-Mora). These alarming figures conflict (DTM, 9 July 2017). About 60% of show the magnitude and gravity of the the internally displaced persons are living problem caused by a menace that has taken with local families, which themselves are advantage of a favorable environment to already vulnerable. Other displaced persons flourish.
B. Context that led to the emergence Chad Basin, an area that is home to many of the Boko Haram conflict trans-border ethnic groups like the Kanuri ethnic group which extends from Borno The Islamist violence in the Far North region State in Nigeria to the Mayo Sava and of Cameroon today is the historical outcome Mayo-Tsanaga divisions in Cameroon. of the cultural, sociopolitical and economic dynamics of the region. Because of its geo- In spite of its small surface area, the Region graphical location, the region finds itself at has a large population, making it one of the crossroads of many chronic conflicts, a the most densely populated regions of the situation that, when coupled with the poor country with an estimated population of socioeconomic environment, has enabled 3.5 million inhabitants (BUCREP, 2010). Un- Boko Haram to thrive. fortunately government policy makers have not paid it the attention such a demographic The Far North Region is far removed from weight deserves. Indeed, there has been a the policymaking center of the country and systematic socioeconomic and institutional is located to the north east of Nigeria - the disengagement by the State, as can be seen epicenter of the Islamist insurrection – with in the alarming socioeconomic indicators which it shares boundaries as well as histo- provided by the National Statistics Institute rical, socio-cultural, linguistic and religious and the World Bank. More than 70% of the bonds. It is also in the proximity of the Lake
10 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
population of this region lives below the where it has had problems imposing its au- poverty line and 50 to 70% of children there thority. For decades, it has been considered are suffering from chronic malnutrition. as a hotbed for organized trans-border Apart from Maroua, the headquarter of the crime, which has evolved continually in Far North Region which hosts most public response to coercive actions by the State. institutions and which has infrastructure Such criminal activities include abductions, that is comparable to that in the southern hijacking of public transport vehicles and part of the country, the rest of the region is camp raids (Saibou Issa, 2006; 2010). The very underdeveloped with little or no road, region is also a hub for drug trafficking, energy or education infrastructure and smuggling of fuel, medications and auto practically no industrial facilities. There is a spare parts, as well as small arms and light gaping development chasm between urban weapons from Sudan, Chad and the Central areas and rural areas and between the entire African Republic. region and the regions to the south of the This criminal activity is also bolstered by the country. This fracture is the source of anger climatic instability of the region, which suf- and feeling of marginalization that is being fers from a harsh Sudano- Sahelian climate nursed by the population of this region. characterized by recurrent floods (due to Ignorance has also played a major role in the short, sudden and torrential rainfall the growth of extremism in the region. At in the months of August and November), the level of education, the region is lagging low rainfall and severe droughts that dry far behind. The literacy rate of those 15 up water points, damage pasturelands and and above stands at 40.1% in the Far North destroy crops. Region as against a national average of Climate change has impacted negatively on 74.3%; the school enrolment rate of children the life of the community: increase in food in- between 6 to 11 years is 63.0% compared to security (35% of the population was exposed the national average of 85.1%; electricity even before the emergence of the conflict use stands at 21.4% compared to a national according to the WFP) and an acceleration average of 62.1%. This can be explained not of criminal activity by nomadic cattle only by the reluctance of parents to send breeders who want to make up for losses their children to western schools but also by caused by the destruction of pastureland. the preference for local madrassa or itinerant Their predatory activities often result in schools. In the absence of a standard educa- tion or practical training, young people from inter- and intra-community conflicts in the such schools are not only uncompetitive on Logone and Chari, Mayo-Danay, Mayo-Sa- the job market, they also lack the skills to va and Diamaré divisions. Climate change develop income generating activities and as has also exacerbated conflicts among local such, become easy targets for radicalization fishermen, farmers and animal breeders, and exploitation. especially in the flood prone plains of the Logone, along the Logone and Chari rivers The Far North Region has always been re- and also on the banks of Lake Chad. garded by the government as a difficult area
11 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
This structural problem played a role in Chapter II – ACTORS – the growth of religious fundamentalism CHALLENGES AND that attracted many young people. The introduction of Wahabism and Salafism PROSPECTS FOR PEACE disrupted the religious order in the far North and created new fractures along A. Stakeholders and challenges of the denominational lines. Traditional mosques Boko Haram conflict suddenly had new rivals in small, more active and more dynamic mosques known A close look at the actors involved highlights as juulirde which popped up in almost every the complex nature of the relationships be- neighborhood, attracting mostly the youth. tween the local, national and international Their preaching was virulently against the stakeholders. Each of these has their own Sufi religious order, and their admiration for specific objectives and enjoys economic, Boko Haram ideology was often denounced political, symbolic and emotional benefits by religious and traditional authorities. All from the conflict. of this was playing out against the backdrop 1. The Boko Haram faction in of a latent generational conflict in an en- Cameroon and its support network vironment where political representation had been confiscated by a senile political The sect causing such havoc in the Far North elite. The old guard that had a firm and of the country is made up of a diverse mix of unyielding control of both the traditional actors from religious, political and economic Sufi establishment and the modern politi- backgrounds. cal order suddenly found itself challenged At the centre of this complex web are leaders by an ideological movement spearheaded and combatants of the terrorist sect who mostly by youth from border regions, are inspired by Salafist Jihad. Boko Haram who had come in contact with gurus and or “association of the people of the Sunnah preachers from Nigeria. Under the com- for preaching and Jihad” (as they refer to bined effects of a difficult geographical themselves) turned to armed insurrection in environment, outdated methods of pro- the north-eastern part of Nigeria in 2009 with duction and trade ill-adapted to a modern members from diverse backgrounds, including economy, a religious and socioeconomic fanatics, opportunists and abductees. The landscape vulnerable to extremism and a modus operandi of the group has evolved strong and dynamic trans-border ethnic constantly in response to the military solidarity, the Boko Haram sect took root responses of the States of the Lake Chad and flourished in the northern part of the Basin. The group which had first adopted a country, with support from criminal entre- traditional and frontal approach to the fight preneurs, religious and political leaders and gradually changed its strategy and resorted ethnic sympathizers. to asymmetric and hybrid techniques such as
12 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
suicide bombing, improvised explosive de- cattle, fish, red pepper, cigarettes, pharma- vices, stealing cattle and abducting villagers ceutical drugs, motor bike spare parts, etc. for ransom. At first limited to the Nigerian The methods used for support are well territory, Boko Haram slowly increased its developed: financial intermediaries create activities in Cameroon which it considered shell companies or open bank accounts to as a base for its combatants fleeing the Nige- raise funds from terrorist organizations rian army and as a means to secure a supply abroad or to launder money from drug traf- route for human, logistical, material, infor- ficking. According to the National Financial mation and food resources. The declaration Investigation Agency (ANIF), more than of war against Boko Haram by Cameroon in 38,789 billion FCFA (about 59,500,000 Euros) May 2014, followed by the highly publicized is alleged to have been raised by a single in- oath of allegiance to Daesh in March 2015, dividual between 2012 and 2015. The report led Boko Haram to consider the Cameroo- by the Action Group against Money Laun- nian territory as a legitimate front for Jihad. dering and funding for terrorism in Central To build a strong base and protect its supply Africa describes a number of endogenous lines, the Islamist sect enlisted the services of methods used in financing the activities of criminal networks in Cameroon and Chad Boko Haram. These include ransom pay- that controlled real estate and land transac- ments, illegal operation of border exchange tions and the main roads used in smuggling bureaus, hijacking of public transport vehi- goods like the Kousseri – Ndjamena, Mora cles, theft, enlistment of microfinance insti- – Maiduguri roads, and even those crossing tutions, trans-border cattle theft and cattle Kolofata and Banki (village where smug- trade, and supply of products used for ter- gled fuel from Nigeria is stored). Indeed, rorist acts (GABAC, 2017). Also, clandestine Boko Haram combatants often used the transporters smuggle arms on motorcycles, same roads as smugglers, cementing an sometimes hiding such contraband in sacs of operational alliance of great tactical impor- cereals piled on their bikes; traffickers hide tance to the terrorist group since it enabled currency in goods and traders help to sell in them to master the roads and shortcuts, and local markets, products stolen from cattle helped them to circumvent check points and farmers by the terrorist group. sensitive security areas in the Cameroonian The terrorist group attracted not only traf- territory. fickers and informal sector actors, it also at- In addition to these crime entrepreneurs, tracted small bands of people specialized in Boko Haram also receives support from mercenary work who had been living in the private individuals, financial intermediaries, region for decades. These included former clandestine transporters and smugglers. Chadian, Sudanese and Central Africa rebels These supporters and intermediaries, who experienced in guerilla warfare, who had form a complex and highly integrated un- formed criminal gangs to exploit the poor derground network, have enabled Boko security situation of the region. These war Haram to take control of a large part of the professionals joined the ranks of Boko local informal economy of the region which Haram, providing them with valuable war- revolves around the trans-border sale of fare experience at a very high price.
13 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
The numerous attacks by Boko Haram com- by the Mobeur and Boudouma (Bakary batants and suicide bombers, that are today Sambe, 2016), the situation in Cameroon able to successfully evade detection by is different where the ethnic factor plays a Cameroonian security services show just how rather minor role (Christian Ségnobos, 2014; well the sect knows the terrain, that is, if it is ICG, 2016). However, outside Kanuri, the Is- not already on the terrain. This knowledge lamist sect has a strong ideological influence is provided by the extensive network of local on some mainly Moslem ethnic groups like informants who support the Boko Haram the Choa Arabs, Mandara, Kotoko and ideology. Haussa. In a region where Islam cohabits Many Islamist preachers had paved the way with other religious groups (a religious by propagating the teachings of Moham- population divided between 2/5 Moslem, med Yussuf (founder of the Boko Haram) 2/5 Christian and 1/5l animists), Boko Haram in towns and villages of the region. Mar- also relies on supporters from other mostly ginalized and sidelined by local political animist or non Moslem ethnic groups like and traditional religious leaders, itinerant the Mafa, Mada and Kapsiki. preachers and young scholars controlling This shows that though the conflict has small mosques also contributed by preaching all the appearances of a religious war, it is against the governing elite and Sufi reli- fostered more by economic and symbolic in- gious leaders. Their objective was to create terests, as well as exploitation of the bonds a new society based on Islamic law in which of ethnic solidarity that exist among the they would no longer be marginalized. people living along the borders with Nigeria Their actions were complemented by those than by religious beliefs. of bodies promoting Jihadist propaganda, The unemployed and under educated youth mostly international Islamic NGOs with of the Far North have been victims of indif- links to terrorist networks in Africa and in ference and marginalization for years. Un- the Middle East. According to ANIF, these employed or under employed, many young organizations have been collecting and people in the affected areas accepted to channeling funds to Boko Haram under join Boko Haram. Recruiters generally pro- the guise of charity work. ANIF also alleges pose a motor bike and a recruitment bonus that Boko Haram has been using fictitious (between 300 to 2000 dollars), promise of associations to transfer money from its sup- a salary between 100 and 400 dollars per porters abroad. On the whole, non lucrative month, and a wife for the most deserving. organizations in central African countries are Such offers are tempting to vulnerable young vulnerable to the risk of funding terrorism people with no prospects who often end up (GABAC, 2015). accepting them. It should also be pointed Exploitation of the cleavages within the eth- out that some young people from well to do nically and religiously heterogeneous local families have joined the ranks of Boko Haram. population has been part of the strategy These young men who are sons of religious, adopted by Boko Haram. Although in Nigeria political and traditional authorities join for the group is supported strongly by the Kanuri reasons other than economic. Growing up ethnic group which is made up in large part under a social and political environment that
14 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
sidelines the youth and concentrates all po- as Mayo-Sava Divisions were also arrested litical, traditional and religious power in the between January 2015 and January 2016. It hands of old and senile people, these young is alleged that they had acted as informants, people see the imaginary Caliphate as the suppliers and hosts to Boko Haram militants. only viable path to social upward mobility However, not all traditional rulers acted for and political participation. The ease with money. Some collaborated out of fear of which these young people have been lured reprisals. Many traditional chiefs in villages is also indicative of the push and pull fac- like Leymarie, Fagme and Foueram have tors prevalent in the region: many children been assassinated for allegedly providing in- from large families come in contact at a very formation to the authorities. In the absence young age with militants of the sect when of State security structures, other rulers who attending a madrassa or when they are out are involved in licit or illicit trans-border begging, smuggling, working in call boxes, trade are forced to collaborate with Boko fishing or hawking on the streets. Such Haram militants to protect their trading children are easy targets for radicalization activities on routes controlled by the sect. and manipulation (transportation of timed Government officials are not left out. In the bombs, collection of information, etc.) Logone and Chari Division, the commercial Many traditional rulers, local government hub for trans-border trade with Nigeria, and elected officials are also suspected of Cameroon and Chad (affectionately re- collaborating with the sect in Cameroon. ferred to as “honey” by some customs of- Such collusion is often determined by eco- ficials), traffickers and even some militants nomic interests and ethnic solidarity. In of the sect, have paid large sums of money this region, trafficking is one of the most to government officials who then turn a lucrative economic activities, and tradi- blind eye to their activities. Rama Moussa, tional rulers have often benefited from the former mayor of Fotokol and former gov- income generated by it. It is this source of ernment contract officer with the Customs income that makes it possible for the rulers administration who was arrested in 2015, to maintain a certain standard of living, buy is alleged to have colluded in the abduc- political positions of power and fund the tion of the wife of the Vice Prime Minister, social responsibilities associated with their Amadou Ali and to have helped to sell cars leadership positions. This longstanding as- in Cameroon stolen from Nigeria by Boko sociation between criminal enterprises and Haram for a fee. Even politically vulnerable local traditional and political institutions persons have seen the crisis as a means to simply found new expression in the security make a political comeback as can be ob- context created by the Islamist insurrection. served in the opportunistic involvement of More than thirteen third class chiefs, known municipal councilors, business persons, etc. as Lawans, in the Mayo-Moskota in the with the sect. Many persons that govern- Mayo-Tsanaga Division were arrested and ment asked to help negotiate the release remanded in custody in December 2014 of hostages have been arrested and locked for alleged collusion with Boko Haram. up. These include Abdoulaye (son of the Others from the Logone and Chari, as well
15 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
parliamentarian Abba Malla), Abdallah fight against the common enemy. Inside the Adamou, Baba Talba, Waziri Isma, Aissami country also, the fight against Boko Haram Ousman, etc. has given the regime not only the opportu- This insecurity has led to an extensive se- nity to affirm its political legitimacy but also curity and humanitarian response from to neutralize the opposition. The rhetoric actors on the other side of the fight. about the indivisibility of the Union, the an- This riposte is being conducted by State titerrorism law and the political exploitation actors as well as local, regional and in- of the victories of the military against the ternational organizations. However, all sect have all been used to great political these parties are not necessarily pursuing advantage by the regime. the same objectives. As for Cameroonian defense forces, they have fought hard to stop the progression of 2. The political and military the terrorist movement. Pivoting from the offensive by the Cameroonian defensive stance observed at the beginning Government of the conflict, it adopted a more offensive Even before Cameroon officially declared strategy in February 2015 with operations war on Boko Haram in 2014, it was already Emergence 4 and Alpha. These operations, grappling with many security threats in the that are also being carried out at bilateral eastern part of the country, caused by the (Chad-Cameroon; Nigeria-Cameroon, etc.) crisis in the Central African Republic, and in and multilateral (with the Multinational the coastal regions from pirates and high- Joint Task Force) levels, have dislodged the way robbery by former rebels from Chad terrorists from many of their strongholds, and CAR in the north of the country. destroyed training camps and warehouses in Following the uptick in the number of ter- which explosive devices were being manufac- rorist attacks and the swell of refugees from tured, and blocked many of the supply routes Nigeria into the Far North, the Cameroo- used by the Jihadists. These vigorous actions nian government decided to go into action. have considerably reduced their operational However, apart from the avowed objective capabilities and forced the sect to adopt asym- to stop terrorist attacks and stem the flow of metrical tactics which Cameroonian soldiers refugees, the move by Yaounde was also are having trouble countering. determined by a number of political and 3. Response by regional diplomatic calculations. The declaration organizations and international of war on the sect by the Cameroonian partners government led to an improvement of diplomatic relations with Paris. These re- World powers as well as regional and inter- lations which previously had been cool, national organizations have joined forces to with both leaders keeping away from combat the Islamist terrorist group at the mili- each other, grew warmer following tary, humanitarian and socioeconomic levels. the release of the French nationals who had The fight against Boko Haram has been been abducted by the Islamist group. They a boon to some floundering organiza- later improved considerably during the tions. One of these is the Lake Chad Basin
16 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
Commission whose influence and mandate Resolution 2,349 (2017), the first on the con- suddenly increased as a result of the conflict. flict, though without making any financial Its Executive Secretariat is now piloting the commitment on behalf of the MNJTF. political activity of the Joint Multinational The logistic support provided by world Joint Task Force that officially has 10,000 powers has specific security and economic soldiers divided into 4 sectors in Cameroon objectives. Through the liaison and contact (sector 1 in Mora), Chad (sector 2 in Baga-So- military detachment established by France la), Nigeria (sector 3 in Baga) and Niger in Maroua, and the deployment of some 100 (sector 4 in Diffa). American soldiers “to conduct airborne in- The African Union (AU) has also participated telligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the strengthening of security cooperation operations in the region” (Obama, 2015), in the Lake Chad Basin. Its Peace and Security international partners have clearly shown Council provided the legal backing by grant- their determination to eradicate Boko ing a formal authorization to the Multina- Haram from Cameroon. This commitment tional Joint Task Force. Since the signing of is not altogether altruistic; it can also be ex- a protocol agreement on October 20th 2015 plained by the desire to maintain security in on the role of the AU Commission and of the a region whose destabilization would harm Secretariat of the LCBC in the operation, the their economic and strategic interests. It is AU has been responsible for the strategic also part of the effort to destroy terrorist piloting of the MNJTF through the Strategic networks in the Sahel region and prevent Support Cell. The Cell supervises the activities Daesh from developing a base in West of the MNJTF and mobilizes funding from Africa. In addition, this military cooperation donors has a commercial objective for countries that The Economic Community of Central today have been overtaken by China, Spain African States (ECCAS) is also involved. It and Russia in supplying military equipment activated the Mutual Assistance Pact be- to Cameroon. Windfalls from this security co- tween member States and granted urgent operation today include arms sales, training financial assistance to the tune of 50 billion of Special Forces and sale of communication FCFA to Cameroon and Chad. A favor to two equipment and surveillance drones. countries that play a vital role in COPAX (the In spite of all these robust countermeasures, Central African Peace and Security Council) the terrorist group is still carrying out deadly France and the United States are also playing attacks and claiming lives. To lessen the a crucial role. Their logistic support is highly suffering of the population, UN agencies appreciated by many observers, though it is (UNHCH, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA) and not enough to meet the needs of the States humanitarian NGOs (MSF, ACF, Red Cross, in the region. Unfortunately, they have not Public Concern, Secours Catholique, Cari- been very active on the diplomatic front, tas, etc.) have been providing refugees and to provide a legal framework and political displaced persons and other Boko Haram legitimacy for the MNJTF through a UN Se- victims with much needed humanitarian curity Council vote. It was only in March this assistance. Development agencies (AFP, GIZ, year that the Council unanimously adopted USAID and UNDP) have provided funding
17 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
for projects run by local and international is to improve the efficiency of government civil society organizations to strengthen authorities and security services by providing the resilience of local communities, prevent them with information and intelligence and violence and revive sustainable develop- by reporting suspects. ment in the Far North Region. More than 42 On the ground, these vigilante groups have organizations running about 156 projects played a major role not only in providing (OCHA, Feb. 2017) are working with govern- information but also in helping to prevent ment structures, to meet the humanitarian suicide attacks and reduce casualties some- and socioeconomic challenges in the Far times at great risk to their own lives. The North and East regions of Cameroon. fact that they live in the said communities The Boko Haram conflict has greatly boosted and master the local geography, history, lan- “charity business”, humanitarian personnel guages and cultures makes them a powerful and local populations: funding for projects, asset to Cameroonian security services in the appropriation of new mandates, publicity fight against the insurgents. Their contri- for humanitarian organizations, creation butions have earned them accolades from of local jobs, enhancement of professional government authorities as well as great careers, etc. Indeed, the crisis in the Far North attention and support from the media. has helped to revive the entire humanitarian Unfortunately, some of the members have and development industry. tarnished the image of these community based groups by falsely reporting people, 4. Mobilization of vigilante extorting money and even collaborating committees with the Islamist group. The sheer number of terrorist attacks in the The various contributions by the parties in- country is indicative of the extent of local ac- volved in fighting the sect have considerably complices working with the sect. To reduce weakened the Jihadist group in Cameroo- this local support and gather intelligence, nian territory and relieved the suffering of the Cameroonian government revived the its many victims. However, in spite of mili- self defense concept in Cameroon which tary reversals, its ability to cause havoc has is based on the idea that “armies on their remained intact, and the consequences of own cannot save a nation, but a nation de- the war on the local economic, political and fended by its people is invincible” (Speech socio-cultural environment are immense. by Ahidjo, 15 August 1970). Using the in- B. The socioeconomic and political ter-ministerial Instruction of 1962 to set up impact of the Boko Haram conflict self defense groups, the Governor of the Far North Region, Augustin Awa Fonka, signed The poor security climate in the Far North an order to reactivate the units under the has exacerbated the already difficult so- appellation “local vigilante committees”. cioeconomic conditions in the region. The This led to the proliferation of vigilantes key sectors of the local economy (animal who are estimated today at 16,000 in breeding, agriculture, trans-border trade almost all the towns and villages of the Far and tourism) have been devastated by the North (ICG. Feb. 2017). Officially, their role Boko Haram conflict. Farming has stopped
18 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
in areas where the sect is sowing terror. led to agro-pastoral conflicts about the use Cattle farming has slowed down because of water points, pastureland and firewood of the disruption of the seasonal transhu- (UNDP, 2015) mance, and the constant cattle raids on The political landscape has also been drasti- farmers who venture into high risk areas. cally affected by the conflict. Many second Most border transits have been closed and third class chiefs lost influence and (Djanabou, 2014) and only internal markets power because their subjects had fled the like those in Kousseri, Maroua and Mora are villages. Weakened by the loss of influence still open, though with serious shortages and impoverished by the loss of subjects and skyrocketing prices. This has worsened who used to pay them dues and taxes, many the living conditions of the inhabitants of of these chiefs themselves have been forced this area. The tourism sector has witnessed a to become refugees and displaced in towns sharp decline as the national parks, natural like Kolofata, Mora, etc. The war has also reserves, beautiful landscapes and spectacu- increased the clout of administrative and lar mountains that used to attract visitors to military officials in the region to the detri- places like Waza and Rhumsiki have all been ment of traditional rulers who before the abandoned. The sharp drop in the number security crisis had complete power over their of tourists has harmed the tourism industry subjects. and led to the disappearance of hundreds In addition to the economic, social and po- of local jobs: trackers, craftsmen, art dealers, litical consequences of the conflict, there etc. (Gonne, 2014). are new local and national factors that may The social sector has also been affected as impact negatively on security in the region. children have abandoned school, and civil servants have deserted health centers. Even C. Prospects for security in the Far villagers have been forced to abandon their North homes, cattle and farms as they flee from The changes caused by the conflict and the violence. According to WFP (2017) one out dynamics of the sub-regional economy do of every three families is suffering from not bode well for a quick end to the Boko food insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin. Haram conflict. All these disruptions have created a social The difficulties faced by Nigerian refugees malaise that is not conducive for peaceful in Cameroon are a factor that can prolong cohabitation in a region that has witnessed the conflict. Those in the Minawao camp are an influx of refugees and displaced persons living in extremely difficult psychological since 2013. The invasion of habitable spaces, conditions, in spite of the efforts by the State the occupation of farmlands, crops destruc- and its partners (HCR) to improve the level tion by the cattle of displaced persons and of humanitarian assistance. Discouraged the stigmatization of some refugees have all and poorly informed about the situation in created intercommunity and social conflicts their country, some refugees (about 13,091) (Mbarkoutou, 2017). The arrival of displaced tried in April and June 2017 to return to persons in towns closest to the conflict Banki and Pulka, areas which themselves are zones like Kousseri, Mora and Mokolo has
19 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
facing serious security threats. In the past are incarcerated there (Amnesty Interna- months, the sharp increase in the number tional, 2016), a number that is three times of terrorist attacks in Mayo-Sava has created the capacity of the prison infrastructure. This suspicion about Nigerian refugees, some of is even more troublesome because as expe- who are considered sympathizers of the ter- rience in the West and in the Middle East has rorist sect. Between January and June 2017, shown, prisons are the most common places about 4,317 new refugees living outside where people are radicalized and where refugee camps were rounded up and force- Islamist networks are formed. The risk fully sent back to the border by Cameroonian that this prison will become a future Jihad security forces (CHCR communiqué of 14 academy should not be underestimated, July 2017). In addition to the difficult con- even though it should also be pointed out ditions they will face once back in Nigeria, that the majority of the extremists detained they are also likely to be mistreated by the in Maroua and Yaounde are opportunists Nigerian army which will suspect some of who secretly collaborated with the terrorist them of complicity with Boko Haram. Such group for economic gain rather than for ill-treatment can lead to resentment and ideological reasons. cause them to fall prey to extremist propa- Even though vigilante committees are ganda. It is alleged that Islamist militants appreciated for their enormous sacrifices, have already infiltrated these communities there are concerns about the security risks and are actively recruiting members from that these groups may pose in the future. them. Indeed, according to Ahmed Satomi, Are they going to become the new security Director of the agency responsible for man- threat post-Boko Haram? Will they increase aging emergencies in Borno State, about security risks when the Jihadist group is nine suspected Boko Haram fighters and eliminated? Increasingly, vigilante commit- 100 accomplices who had infiltrated the tees are becoming a problem rather than group of refugees from Cameroon were a solution. This is the fear being expressed arrested in July. This situation is similar to by those who worry that vigilante groups that of internally displaced persons whose will evolve into criminal organizations or socioeconomic vulnerability and social militias to prey on, or sponsor violence in stigmatization can lead to intercommunity their communities. Even the composition of conflict. This risk is likely to increase with the these groups is cause for concern: some of approach of local elections and the inevi- the members are former convicts, brigands, table rhetoric by political candidates about smugglers and traffickers who, as soon as ethnic identity, indigenes, foreigners, etc. their sources of income will dry up with the as they try to mobilize support within the end of the war, may revert to their former community. criminal careers. Many heads or members The packed prison in Maroua in which many of these committees who had collaborated suspected Boko Haram militants awaiting with Boko Haram or who have received part trial have been detained should also be a of the booty from the fight against insecuri- cause for concern. More than 1,000 people ty are dishonest and unpredictable persons arrested as part of the fight against the sect capable of turning on their communities. As
20 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
a matter of fact, some heads and members The call by Shekau in the propaganda video of these vigilante committees have been published on 1 April 2017 inviting supporters arrested for collaboration or complicity to attack towns in Cameroon and even the with Boko Haram. These include the heads country’s political capital is an indication of of the vigilante committees of Mozogo and the possible shift in strategy by the sect. Kolofata and members of the vigilanted The countries involved in the war against groups in Moskota, Wallasa, Tolkomari, Boko Haram have been facing many eco- Djakana, etc. There are also fears that these nomic challenges as a result of the drop in oil groups may be politicized and used by local prices since 2014. Despite the slight uptick and national politicians in their efforts to in prices recently, Cameroon, Chad and hang on to power, especially in a context of Nigeria are still having trouble recovering. uncertainty as to what will happen to the They are also facing challenges which not country after Biya or during heated political only include financing for infrastructure campaigns. projects and social programmes, but also .The possibility that Boko Haram will adopt funding for security and military operations the methods used by Daesh and its approach and for the MNJTF. A double challenge that to war are for now remote because of the Cameroon will have difficulty meeting if the lack of operational support from the Islamic sect changes its offensive strategy. Worse State to this sect, but it should not be over- still, the MNJTF, which was initially formed looked. As we know, the military defeats to halt the expansion of Boko Haram and and loss of territory suffered in Iraq and push it out of territories it controls is still Syria have forced Daesh to adopt a more de- not fully operational. The commitment by centralized and individualized Jihad, which member countries seems to have waned is being exported to Europe. Their new ap- because of the high costs involved and the proach calls for the use of vehicular attacks, economic difficulties they are facing. It will knives, gas bottles, etc. to avoid detection not be easy for this force to fully counter by intelligence services. This type of Jihad, attacks by Boko Haram if the sect were to which is inspired by Abu Musab al-Suri in his again revert to frontal attacks. The Nigerian book The Global Islamic Resistance Call, is in- and Niger armies are already paying a high tended to irreversibly polarize the Western price for the withdrawal of the Chadian society, and in the long run create a civil war army from bilateral operations. It is alleged between the majority population and the that Boko Haram has already recaptured Moslem minority. Collaboration between parts of its former strongholds in the north the Islamic State and Boko Haram can pave east of Nigeria and around Lake Chad that the way for the importation of this theory had previously been captured by Nigerian which has already been adopted by many and Chadian troops. Some hold that the extremists in the West, especially as the loss poor economic prospects of member coun- of Boko Haram strongholds can cause the tries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission will sect to radicalize, and encourage supporters also have a negative impact on the conflict. to carry out attacks in major urban areas All these are reasons for concern about the with no military operational commands. prospects for security in the northern part of
21 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
the country. However, there are areas which opt for a mainly military response; but this decision makers can focus on to ensure a choice now seems inadequate in the face of more positive security outcome. One of the ever changing strategies of the enemy. these should be to analyze the reasons for Between May and August 2014, some thirty the perpetuation of the Boko Haram con- attacks occurred along the borders in the flict in Cameroon. three divisions most affected by the crisis. The setting up of the 4th military region, reorganization of operational war zones into operations Alpha and Emergence 4, deployment of new military units in the far Chapter III – WHY IS PEACE North and the intervention of the Chadian SO ELUSIVE? army are some of the measures that were implemented between 2014 and 2016. These military responses, with all their at- The delay in destroying the sect and the tendant human, geographic and strategic sudden increase in terrorist attacks in limitations, show a tendency to rely heavily the past months shows that the conflict on the military. Civil society organizations is far from over. In the months of June, on the field have consistently decried the July and August 2017, some thirty sui- lack of a collaboration mechanism that can cide attacks and numerous kidnappings help prioritize actions to be carried out. took place in the Mayo-Sava and Logone They have also complained that because of and Chari divisions. There were also the heavy reliance on the military, the other violent confrontations between the army types of responses being proposed by hu- and the insurgents in the Logon and Chari manitarian and development organizations Division some of which left many Cameroo- are often ignored. nian soldiers dead. These heavy losses show The indiscriminate militarization of the the resilience of the enemy. The failure to areas affected by the security crisis in the quickly destroy the sect can be explained far North has crippled the resilience of these by poor operational and security choices, communities. Mora, Waza, Kolofata, Ashi- personal gains for some in the prolongation gachia and Bargaram have been the main of the conflict and poor governance that is targets of Boko Haram attacks because of hampering the efficient prosecution of the the military bases there. Faced with the war. increasingly asymmetric nature of the con- flict, and still smarting from being unjustly A. An inadequate security response suspected of involvement in highway rob- The Cameroonian response to the Boko bery (most of them were instead taken for Haram crisis is, for now, still heavily com- the enemy by some undiscerning security partmentalized, military-centered, patchy forces when they denounced highway rob- and national. The attacks, incursions and bers), the population has been reluctant to infiltrations by Boko Haram from 2014 cooperate. The indiscipline of some soldiers caused the Cameroonian government to who take pleasure in tormenting villagers,
22 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
extorting money from passengers and con- intelligence and denounce sympathizers fiscating cattle recovered from Boko Haram of the sect hiding in the communities. The militants as well as the recurrent fatal acci- continuation of attacks and abductions is dents involving military vehicles has slowly proof positive that this strategy has not whittled confidence and trust in the soldiers worked and that Boko Haram still has a sent to fight the Islamist sect. powerful network of supporters within Travel restrictions have also impacted nega- these communities. tively on the economy of the region and The response by public authorities also has a helped to prepare the ground for radica- number of shortcomings: funding for local lization. The closing of markets, including public development initiatives which falls cattle and border markets, has disrupted far short of actual needs does not help to trans-border trade which the population of enhance the resilience of the community; the region relies heavily on. Other restrictive confining support and assistance organi- measures (ban on some agricultural products zations to early recovery programs instead and on the movement of motor bikes) that of enabling them to focus on sustainable were implemented without providing al- development; the chaotic management and ternatives have forced hundreds of young unregulated access to the resources of Lake men into unemployment, and caused many Chad (silty soil and basin rich in fish resources “teachers, nurses, agricultural monitors and exposed by drought) are not addressed in animal breeding technicians who travel to development plans, a situation that can lead remote areas to provide expertise and assis- to conflicts. Exploitation by Boko Haram of tance”, (Saibou Issa, 2014) to stay home for the fight among the Buduma, Hausa and lack of means of transportation. All these Pheul communities over access to and con- measures have fuelled resentment and dis- trol over the resources of the Nigerian side of Lake Chad should be a serious cause for like for government authorities and turned concern for Cameroonian authorities. the region into a fertile ground for Boko Haram recruiters. It should be pointed out that most of the responses from public authorities are limited Some of the measures taken by administra- to the Cameroonian territory whereas the tive authorities have violated fundamental threat is trans-border in nature. Apart from human rights. Many of the violations of the MNJTF which is the fruit of sub-regional human rights (well documented by NGOs) security cooperation, all humanitarian and by Cameroonian security services during se- development measures are national. This curity operations were against civilians, a sit- is likely because during strategic planning, uation that has impacted negatively on the the issue of Boko Haram in the Far North population’s confidence in, and readiness is always perceived as a secondary preoc- to cooperate with the army. This has con- cupation, reason why there is no major trasted with the avowed strategy to fight regional emergency investment plan that the insurgency by winning the hearts and can sustainably reduce poverty. minds of the population which would then be willing to provide the army with
23 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
B. Development of crime Moudogoa, Kimdjidji, Hourbetch, Ldaoutsaf entrepreneurship in 2014, later resulted in the massive return of some 400 men, women and children in In a region where crime and trafficking are April 2017. Others, for opportunistic rea- seen as a means to earn a living and make sons and also because they could no longer money in a tough socioeconomic environ- tolerate the humiliation and stigmatization ment, the economic crime rate has grown suffered by their community, decided to join with the decline of the formal economy. their relatives in the Islamic group. The development of a local criminal entre- preneurship took place as follows: - The second form of domestication of terror Development of the smuggling sector. has been the formation of local criminal The insecurity caused by Boko Haram revived gangs. These criminal groups made up of trafficking and contraband activities which assorted members roam border villages to many thought had been stamped out for steal cattle, foodstuff or to hijack transport good. Boosted by demand from Islamic vehicles. These gangs also target defense militants, traffickers increased and diversi- forces, security services and vigilante com- fied their activities, especially with the entry mittees. Their use of explosive devices on of former smugglers whose main objective these targets has resulted in serious casual- was to fill their pockets (Funteh, 2014). Re- ties in operational units of the Cameroon gardless of whether it was goods smuggled army and in Section One of the Multina- from Nigeria, merchandise from Cameroon or tional Task Force. Whether they are fighters distribution networks in the Central African of, or merely working for Boko Haram, the Republic and Chad with connections as far number of Cameroonians in the sect is one as Sudan, the war environment provided an of the reasons why the conflict is likely to ideal framework for the development of crim- last for long, if an amnesty program is not inal entrepreneurship and organized crime. put in place. Appropriation of terror at the local Relapsed former criminals. These are level. The first step in the domestication of former criminals who join vigilante groups terror is the formation of groups made up and who are considered risk factors be- of members from the same village. Many cause of the possibility of them reverting people in areas like Kolofata, Moskota and to criminal activity. The opening up of the Fotokol, for instance, joined their children, borders and the resultant mobility of per- parents or relatives in Boko Haram. Whether sons and cattle stolen from cattle farmers by force or voluntarily, this method of joining and abandoned by Boko Haram thieves, Boko Haram was observed with the depar- have encouraged complicity between the ture of entire villages. Data collected shows population and Boko Haram as well as the extent to which these communities were criminal activity by members of the vigi- able to become part of the Islamic network. lante groups. A case in point is the arrest of The voluntary participation of villagers the notorious head of the Mozogo canton, from Bornori and Karawa or the forceful Kolofata and Djakana vigilante group in enlistment of people from Gousdat-Vreket, 2016 (L’Œil du Sahel, No. 869, December
24 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
2016), which exposed the criminal methods to Kofia and Darak in Cameroon, or to is- used by gangs. A look at the data collected lands in Kinasserom and the neighboring from 2013 and published in June 2016 by regions of Guité and Mitériné in Chad. the decentralized services of the Ministry of Livestock Fisheries and Animal Indus- C. Absence of a deradicalization tries (MINEPIA) shows that more than strategy 31,101 cattle, 19,306 small ruminants and Contrary to what obtained in Nigeria, Chad 4,003 chickens, have been stolen since and Niger which are implementing a peace the outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis in building program that grants amnesty Cameroon. The financial losses are estimat- to former militants, Cameroon seems to ed at 8,553,414,500FCFA (about 13,000,000 believe that the military option is the only Euros). This represents about 15% of total solution. While it is true that the amnesty ini- losses incurred as a result of the fight tiative has not always yielded the expected against Boko Haram (according to some results, it must be admitted that it is the only MINEPIA estimates). policy that can sustainably build peace by Control of production and resources. reintegrating the thousands of combatants, The forming of autonomous groups to who have no other option but to return to sow terror at local level was observed in their communities of origin. Political and islands in Lake Chad. Indeed, some islands military authorities as well as community in Nigeria and the Hile-Alpha commune leaders know that some of the attacks in in Cameroon developed their own ability the villages of the far North region, were to produce violence, even overshadowing the handiwork of their own children and Boko Haram - the real terrorists. Some even community members who now have no formed strategic alliances with the group. place to turn to. It would be a good idea Fishermen in these villages, tired of playing to come out of this impasse, which leaves second fiddle to, or of acting as interme- Boko Haram members with only a choice diaries and subcontracting fishermen for between a slow death in prison, or a quick big traders living in cities of Cameroon, death in battle, and give them the opportu- Chad and Nigeria saw in the advent of the nity to repent. However, we know that this Boko Haram conflict in Lake Chad, an op- solution is not some magic wand. The amnes- portunity to take back control of the abun- ty program and the permission to return must dant resources of the lake. Using terror be based on a number of conditions some of tactics, they successfully wrestled control of which must be consent by the community re- these resources from, and severed all bonds ceiving the former militants and the ability of dependence on, and subordination to of the State to set up and implement a de- the major traders (Seignobos, 2015). As we radicalization program. We would be foo- can see therefore, the Boko Haram conflict ling ourselves if we believe that there can has created ambition in some communities be sustainable peace in the affected areas, and spawned new forms of local violence if some of these young men are left to roam and crime. There is great risk of exportation in no man’s land with no hope of return. of such models to other islands, particularly
25 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
A de-radicalization initiative in Cameroon still not recognized the importance of this must be implemented as part of a broader strategy in the fight against terrorism and counter-radicalization policy. Understood violent extremism at the level of the mind. as a mechanism for the prevention of radi- The lack of an organized response to the calization, counter-radicalization is still not return of some 400 Boko Haram fighters, well understood in Cameroon, especially who have been confined to a section of the in policymaking circles. A number of some Mozogo council area in the Mayo-Tsanaga concrete actions have been implemented, Division since April 2017, clearly shows that notably in the Far North Region by United there is a deficit in long term solutions to Nations agencies (UNDP, UNFPA), civil so- the Boko Haram crisis at the national level. ciety organizations, international NGOs (PAIC, Plan International…) and the State. D. Impact of poor governance These actions, which include labor intensive Many governance problems have aggra- projects, income generating activities, and vated the security crisis in the far North. An training for the youth in affected areas example of this is the phenomenon referred vulnerable to radicalization, are intended to as “petit couteaux” that is, people whose to address the socioeconomic and socio-cul- participation in the Boko Haram enterprise is tural factors that lead to radicalization driven by opportunistic considerations. Many through: strengthening of intercommuni- public officials have found in Boko Haram ty and interreligious cohesion; setting up an opportunity to line their pockets. Some of regional platforms for social cohesion security officials like heads of police identifi- and dialogue; building the capacities of cation posts, commanders of brigades along civil society in peace building; training of the borders and heads of military units at the mayors and traditional rulers on living to- front, are actively participating in contra- gether mechanisms; improving the capacity band activities (Fotokol), trafficking (Darak) of communities to manage new and old and selling of national identity cards (Bogo). conflicts; and addressing ideological factors This generalized corruption has no doubt by involving religious leaders and inter-re- facilitated the infiltration into and fostered ligious associations in the implementation the activities of Boko Haram in Cameroon. of awareness programs in churches and Near Lake Chad, a Barnawi unit is alleged to madrassas. Unfortunately, these initiatives, have smuggled dry fish into Niger with the which are implemented mainly by orga- full knowledge of Cameroonian soldiers who nizations that provide support for early had received bribes and accepted to turn recovery, do not fall under an organized a blind eye to the activity (Hans de Marie national counter-radicalization framework. Heungoup, February 2017). This involvement This structural deficit highlights the absence in the corruption chain has either hampered of de-radicalization whose effectiveness the dismantling of terrorist cells or provided would depend on the cognitive deconstruc- openings for Jihadists to enter Cameroonian tion of radical convictions. The lack of a territory to commit heinous acts. counter-radicalization and de-radicaliza- tion framework shows that, Cameroon has
26 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
Chapter IV – . Set up early warning systems against crisis RECOMMENDATIONS and catastrophes. .Move from early recovery initiatives, to The Boko Haram conflict is like a large veil more ambitious sustainable development that conceals the complex web of political, plans that can reverse the trend of poverty economic, social and symbolic interests that and ignorance. we have identified here. The solutions pro- Draw up and implement a Regional Emer- posed so far have not taken these interests gency Plan and include it within the devel- into consideration and have failed to ad- opment framework. dress the multiple challenges posed by the To render collective actions against conflict. The following recommendations Boko Haram more efficient, member are intended to improve the efficiency of States of the Lake Chad Basin Com- the responses that are currently being im- mission, the African Union and their plemented, so as to accelerate the pacifica- international partners could : tion of the Far North Region. Set up a civilian component within the To improve the quality of responses MNJTF that would handle the socioeco- by public authorities, the State should nomic, religious and political dimensions among others : of the conflict. Strengthen coordination of activities of Involve traditional rulers of the affected the various stakeholders by setting up a areas in the prevention and fight against permanent platform for consultation be- tween state institutions, CSOs, academics the radicalization and enlistment of the and development partners, and a national youth. They should also strengthen the bureau for the coordination of humani- council of traditional rulers of the Lake tarian activities. Chad Basin. .Improve local transparency and governance Set up a special sub-regional fund for socio- by demilitarizing the management of the economic reintegration which would also crisis and involving elected officials (mayors, finance regional programs to eradicate fac- parliamentarians and senators), and decen- tors that foster terrorism, such as the Tiwara tralized services of the relevant ministries. program that the French Development Government should always consult the Agency wants to implement in the Sahel. population before taking major adminis- trative decisions. Establish trans-border markets to increase trading activites and the movement of per- Respect human rights and comply with in- sons, while also protecting the civil status ternational humanitarian laws by setting up a joint commissions, to follow up and registration. assess the situation of human rights on Implement regional development programs the ground and report cases of abuse by in border areas to increase economic op- security forces and vigilante committees to portunities and foster peace and security. public authorities.
27 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
To make it possible for the various and security. These skills will also be needed stakeholders, including crime entrepre- by the other vulnerable groups for whom neurs and all who benefit from the con- labor intensive projects, particularly in the flict, to enjoy the dividends of peace, development of local resources, should be extensive reforms must be carried out : implemented. Such support should not only .The State with support from its international go to vulnerable groups, but also to Small partners should draw up and implement an and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) to amnesty and socioeconomic reintegration help them to grow and create jobs. program to encourage militants to leave Authorities should also halt the prolifera- the Islamic sect. tion of vigilante groups and make it easy for The Boko Haram network is mostly sup- civilians to provide information to security ported by youths who are forced by the forces. The terms of reference for vigilante circumstances of unemployment, social committees should be clearly defined and insecurity as well as political and social their work limited to specific tasks. The exclusion. Unfortunately, the fight against State and its foreign partners should also Boko Haram has rather worsened their have a demobilization and socioeconomic plight by destroying the economic fabric reintegration plan for the members of of the region. It is therefore necessary for these committees. the State, civil society and international Authorities should monitor the activities donors to urgently implement programs of NGOs that belong to religious institu- that go beyond the current early recovery tions and fundamentalist groups in order projects, to promote strategic initiatives to limit their ability to finance terror and that can foster development through Islamist extremism. Their activities as well reviving whole sectors and modernizing as the background of their leaders should agricultural, fishing and animal breeding be verified, and their sources of income practices. Providing support to micro- and bank accounts identified when they projects and encouraging the gradual are seeking authorization from public development of a formal trading sector authorities. in the region are also crucial in the efforts . Securing the trading route between Maidu- to eradicate the clandestine economy that guri and the Far North Region and all other promotes smuggling and terrorism. In this border crossings is crucial for reviving trade regard, incentives such as free coaching, and reducing inflation caused by the dis- access to credit facilities and tax waivers can ruption of supply chains. Inflation should be of great help. Young people, whose live- be controlled through subsidies and tax lihood has been affected by the war, espe- waivers for some heavily consumed basic cially those in the tourism sector, will need products from Cameroon in the Far North. new skills to enable them to take up other This will make local goods cheaper than activities while waiting for the tourism contraband and thus discourage smuggling sector to recover with the return of peace and trafficking.
28 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
The elections planned for 2018 should be CONCLUSION an opportunity to correct past political mistakes. Political parties should nomi- The Boko Haram conflict in the Far North nate more young candidates and involve of Cameroon with all its appearance of a them in campaigns to accustom them to new threat is in fact just another manifes- democracy and political participation. tation of the chronic security problems, The recent communiqué by ELECAM which have plagued the region for decades. on voter registration in the region is This crisis is the result of the vulnerabilities encouraging. The Far North Region, as of the region and has been sustained by of July 2017, had the highest number the complex web of evolving interests. of new registrations in the country with It is the pursuit of these interests that 1,104,270 registered voters. This could be a has prolonged the conflict. The security sign o of renewed interest in politics. Civil situation of the Far North region today is society organizations should also carry out still poor. The renewed violence these past “community organizing” campaigns to months shows that the sect, which was build the collective capacity of the popu- believed to be in distress, is still not only lation and help them to develop and inter- active but has a strong presence on the nalize a democratic culture, citizen control Cameroonian territory. The shortcomings and responsible governance. of the responses to this threat have rather .Cameroonian authorities, who have shown exacerbated the crisis, created a new exemplary hospitality so far, should contin- generation of sympathizers of the sect and ue to treat refugees with compassion and in pushed others into extremist violence or compliance with international conventions organized crime. New security approaches on the rights of refugees. They should, in against Boko Haram must take these new partnership with the UNHCR, ensure that actors into consideration. Holistic and in- voluntary departures of refugees are orga- clusive responses that are beneficial to all nized under humane and proper security the parties involved should be envisaged, conditions. to convince leaders of organized crime to Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities change. For this reason, the objectives of should strengthen cooperation by conso- the fight should be redefined and short lidating and enlarging formal and informal term measures implemented to restore the relations between the Nigerian and Camer- economy of the region, improve the com- oonian armies on the frontline, to address petitiveness of the formal economy, revive other threats such as highway robbery, traf- democratic participation at local level and ficking in wild animals, roaming of criminal pave the way not only for the rehabilitation gangs along the borders and smuggling of victims, but also for the reintegration of that are worsening the security crisis. returning militants.
29 Ntuda Ebode Joseph Vincent - Mark Bolak Funteh - Mbarkoutou Mahamat Henri - Nkalwo Ngoula Joseph Léa
References 13. GABAC, 2017, « Le financement du terrorisme en Afrique Centrale », April 1. Afrique Contemporaine, 2015, Com- 2017. prendre Boko Haram, Dossier No 255. 14. Guibbaud, P., 2014 « Boko Haram : Le 2. Amnesty International, 2016. “Right Nord-Cameroun dans la tourmente ? », Cause, Wrong Means”, July 2016. GRIP, Eclairage. 3. Amnesty International, 2017. “Camer- 15. Heungoup, H., 2015 « Radicalisme re- oon’s Secret Torture Chambers: Human ligieux : quel attrait sur les jeunes? », Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Grain de sel, No 71. fight against Boko Haram”, July 2017. 16. Heungoup, H. 2016. “In the Tracks of 4. Apard E., 2015. «Boko Haram, le jihad en Boko Haram in Cameroon”, International vidéo», Politique Africaine, n°138. Crisis Group. 5. Assanvo, W., Ella J. & Sawadogo, A. 2016. 17. Heungoup, H. 2017, “Boko Haram’s «La Force multinationale de lutte contre shifting tactics in Cameroon: what Boko Haram : quel bilan ?», ISS, No 19. does the data tell us?”. Africa Research 6. Berghezan, G. 2016. “Eradicate Boko Institute. Haram: Multiple actors, Uncertain out- 18. ICG, 2015, « Cameroon: The Threat of come”. GRIP. Analyis. Religious Radicalism”. Repport No229. 7. Caillet, R. 2016. « Boko Haram: du centre 19. ICG, 2016, “Boko Haram on the Back Ibn Taymiyya de Muhammad Yusuf à la Foot?”. Briefing N°120. Wilaya de l’État islamique en Afrique 20. ICG, 2016, “Cameroon: Confronting de l’Ouest d’Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi » Boko Haram”. Report No241. Religioscope, September 2016. 21. ICG, 2017, “Watchmen of Lake Chad: 8. CBLT, 2012. Programme d’action straté- Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram”, gique pour le bassin du lac Tchad, Inver- Africa Report N°244. sion des tendances à la dégradation des terres et des eaux dans l’écosystème du 22. INS, 2010, « Rapport régional de progrès bassin du lac Tchad. des objectifs du millénaire pour le déve- 9. Conférence idées pour le développement, loppement de l’Extrême-Nord », 2010, 2016. « Face à Boko Haram, comment MINEPAT, INS, UNDP. agir dans le bassin du lac Tchad ? », June 23. Kongou, L., 2014, Boko Haram: le Ca- 2016, l’AFD. meroun à l’épreuve des menaces, Paris, 10. DMJ, 2015. L’enrôlement des jeunes L’Harmattan. dans les groupes armés au Cameroun. 24. Luntumbue, M., 2014, «La CBLT et 11. Ewi, M. 2013. « Le Cameroun et la les défis sécuritaires du Bassin du Lac menace terroriste », L’Œil du Sahel - Tchad», GRIP. Note no14. N°564, Décembre 2013. 25. Mbarkoutou Mahamat H., 2016, « Boko 12. France 24, 2014. «Sommet africain de Haram: évolution des modes opératoires Paris : la «guerre totale» déclarée à Boko au Cameroun », Revue Le Didiga (Côte Haram », May 2014. d’Ivoire.), n°14, pp. 55-76.
30 The Boko Haram conflict in Cameroon. Why is peace so elusive?
26. Musila, C., 2012, « L’insécurité dans l’extrême-nord du Cameroun, transfrontalière au Cameroun et dans le Revue Kaliao special edition, University bassin du lac Tchad », Note de l’IFRI. of Maroua. 27. Nkalwo, L., 2015 «L’Etat islamique en 36. Saïbou I., (dir), 2016. Les musulmans, Afrique de l’ouest (ex-Boko Haram) : La l’école et l’Etat dans le bassin du lac stratégie de diversion face à l’assaut de Tchad, L’Harmattan Cameroun. la coalition armée », Thinking Africa, 37. Saïbou I. 2004, « L’embuscade sur les NAP n° 30. routes des abords du Lac Tchad », Poli- 28. Ntuda, J., 2010, Piraterie et terrorisme: tique Africaine, n° 94. de nouveaux défis sécuritaires en 38. Saibou I. 2006, « La prise d’otages aux Afrique centrale, Yaoundé. FES, Presse confins du Cameroun, de la Centrafrique Universitaire d’Afrique. et du Tchad : une nouvelle modalité du 29. OXFAM International, 2017, “Red Gold banditisme transfrontalier », Polis/Revue and Fishing in the Lake chad Basin. Re- Camerounaise des Sciences Politiques, storing destroyed livelihoods and pro- Vol. 13, N° 1-2. tecting people in Niger’s Diffa region”. 39. Saïbou I., 2010, Les coupeurs de route. 30. Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A., 2015, Histoire du banditisme rural et trans- « Boko Haram et les enjeux régionaux de frontalier dans le bassin du lac Tchad, l’insurrection », Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Terrains du siècle, Karthala, Paris. Note n° 246. 40. Sambe, B., 2016, « Boko Haram dans le 31. Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A., 2015, bassin du lac Tchad. Au-delà du sécuri- « Premier bilan de la coalition contre taire, le danger ethniciste et le désastre Boko Haram », Fondation Jean-Jaurès, humanitaire », Timbuktu Institute, Ob- Note n° 259. servatoire des Radicalismes et Conflits religieux en Afrique. 32. UNDP, 2015, « Conflits et mécanismes de résolution des crises à l’Extrême-Nord du 41. Schomerus, M. 2017, « What political Cameroun », July 2015. economy analysis for programmes does and does not tell us— and some 33. UNDP, 2017, Journey to extremism in thoughts about South Sudan », Dakar, Africa: drivers, incentives and the tipping Worshop Autor FES, May 2017. point for recruitment, Regional bureau 42. Seignobos, C. & Tourneux, H., 2002, Le for Africa. Nord-Cameroun à travers ses mots. Dic- 34. Pommerolle M.-E., 2015, « Les violences tionnaire de termes anciens et modernes dans l’extrême-nord du Cameroun: le relatifs à la région. Paris: Karthala. complot comme outil d’interprétation et 43. Wassouni F. & Gwoda A., (dir.), 2017, de luttes politique », Politique Africaine, Boko Haram au Cameroun: dynamiques n°138. plurielles, Editions Peter Lang S.A. 35. Saïbou I., (dir), 2014, Effets économiques et sociaux des attaques de Boko Haram
31 Printed in december 2017 Yaounde - Cameroon FES Peace and Security Series No. 21
About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series As a political foundation committed to the The lack of security is one of the key impediments values of social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert- to development and democracy in Africa. The Stiftung (FES) aims at strengthening the existence of protracted violent conflicts as well interface between democracy and security as a lack of accountability of the security sector policy. FES therefore facilitates political dialogue on security threats and their national, regional in many countries are challenging cooperation and continental responses.The FES Africa Peace in the field of security policy. The emerging and Security Series aims to contribute to this African Peace and Security Architecture provides dialogue by making relevant analysis widely the institutional framework to promote peace accessible. The series is being published by the and security. FES Africa Security Policy Network.
About this publication Since the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001 Fleeing Borno State after the Nigerian offensive,its in the USA, terrorism has become the main members settled in the border areas of the Far threat to peace and security, and a major political North Region and started recruiting new members. challenge in the world today. In Africa, the Poor and feeling abandoned, hundreds of young threat is even more serious in a context where people joined the group as early as 2009. Since poverty, poor governance and ethnic solidarity 2013, the events that have unfolded show that are creating fertile grounds for extremism. the terrorist threat is constantly changing. Costly There are three main terrorist organizations in national, regional and international responses the continent: AQIM in the Sahel, Al-Shabab in (military, humanitarian, logistics, etc.) are still being Somalia and Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. deployed with little to show for the effort. Boko Haram was created in 2002 by Imam From September 2016 on, the Friedrich Ebert Mohammed Yusuf in the north east of Nigeria. Siftung (FES) initiated a series of 4 workshops The sect has three methods of action: suicide attacks on authorities and civilians, deadly Yaoundé and Ngaundere to analyse these armed attacks and abduction of civilians. It problems and recommend new collective has been accused of war crimes and crimes security responses in order to combat the against humanity and classified as a terrorist phenomenon of Boko Haram. organization by the Security Council of the Through this publication,the fruit of discussions United Nations since 22 May 2014. among experts from different fields, the FES is In Cameroon, Boko Haram took advantage of contributing, to the search for solutions that the compassion shown to displaced persons and can sustainably address the security challenges refugees. plaguing the Far North Region.
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