A Joint Publication for US Artillery Professionals July

A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals July - August 2018

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters, Department of the Army. PB 644-18-4 http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 1 Table of contents 3 Rocket artillery and its place in decisive action By Capt. Clint Custer Editor Marie Berberea 7 Learning to speak maneuver Art Director By Capt. Joshua Urness Rick Paape, Jr. Assistant Editor 10 Fires supporting maneuver Monica Wood The need for an update The Fires staff can be reached by email at usarmy. By 1st Lt. David Brister [email protected] or by phone at (580) 442-5121. 12 The 2017 Knox, Hamilton and Gruber Awards Disclaimer 16 Resurrecting the light cavalry’s fire support Fires, a professional bulletin, is published bi- monthly by Headquarters, Department of the Army Restructuring the IBCT squadron fire support teams to under the auspices of the Fires Center of Excellence, maximize capability 455 McNair Ave., Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views ex- By Capt. Kyle Robert East pressed within are those of the authors and not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content 18 Head, heart, gut contained within Fires does not necessarily reflect the U.S. Army’s position or supercede information in oth- A personal, ethical decision-making methodology er official publications. Use of new items constitutes By Lt. Col. Seth Hall neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product -en dorsements. Fires assumes no responsibility for any 21 E-62nd THAAD and Patriot interop success unsolicited material. By order of Mark A. Milley, Gen- By Sgt. 1st Class Sergio Arana and Sgt. 1st Class Marcus Wofford eral, United States Army, Chief of Staff. Official: 22 Brigade deep battle 2.0 UAV-Fires teaming in support of the brigade deep fight By Capt. Joseph Schmid Gerald B. O’Keefe Administrative Assistant to the 25 US air defense artillery foreign advising Secretary of the Army The strategic NCO leveraging the operational art Auth. 1513304 By Maj. Christopher Garnett 27 Reactive counterfire Wilson A. Shoffner An algebraic approach Major General, United States Army By Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeremy Taylor and Capt. Steven Hojnicki Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla. 32 Preparing air missile defense, joint force Purpose Originally founded as the Field Artillery Journal, against near-peer threat Fires serves as a forum for the discussions of all Fires By Maj Bryan A. Card professionals, Active, Reserves and National Guard; disseminates professional knowledge about progress, 36 Artillery’s role in sea-based expeditionary development and best use in campaigns; cultivates a common understanding of the power, limitations and Fires application of joint Fires, both lethal and nonlethal; By Maj. Adam Ropelewski fosters joint Fires interdependency among the armed services; and promotes the understanding of and in- 38 Big sky, little bullet teroperability between the branches, all of which con- Tackling the Army’s airspace and joint Fires integration tribute to the good of the Army, joint and combined forces and our nation. problem Fires is pleased to grant permission to reprint; By Maj. Daniel Threlkeld please credit Fires, the author(s) and photographers. 42 Rethinking risk, airspace for decisive action By Lt. Col. Dave Pasquale 48 Going the extra 1,000 miles Preparing a field artillery brigade for a near-peer adversary By Maj. Rich Farnell and Capt. Brennan Deveraux 52 In the next issue of Fires

2 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club Soldiers of A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 130th Field Artillery, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Infantry Division, from the Kansas Army National Guard, work with U.S. Air Force crew to load two M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), pre-dawn, in preparation for the Oper- ation Diamond Torrent exercise, at an airbase in the United Arab Emirates. (Staff Sgt. Tina Villalobos/U.S. Army) Rocket artillery and its place in

Bydecisive Capt. Clint Custer action As a kindergartner, I remembered seeing know how to use rocket artillery to shape counter-insurgency (COIN) warfare eroded images on CNN of these large box-shaped their fight. our capabilities as we reorganized to fight a vehicles shooting hundreds of rockets into My next NTC rotation was no differ- different enemy. Emerging threats in North the sky when the Gulf War started. I asked ent. We were pushed to the side and rare- Korea and Europe have further highlight- my parents what was happening and they ly called upon to engage any target that ed the gap in firepower that has developed told me that in some place called Iraq, the wasn’t a stationary command post. I need- since the War on Terror began. Army was defending people that had been ed to know why my unit was seen as an af- Our maneuver brothers and sisters have attacked and needed our help. Fast forward terthought and not an asset and it was not forgotten our role in decisive action. When 20 years, and I found myself leading my very hard to find the answer. they stopped calling for our support, we own platoon of rocket artillery. Unfortu- Decades of fighting in Afghanistan and changed ourselves to stay in the fight. These nately, I saw just how much had changed Iraq against insurgent cells and terrorists changes have not been good. We are no lon- since I saw them in action on CNN. When I have decimated our Army’s rocket artil- ger organized to effectively support - ma was tasked to support a maneuver brigade lery capabilities. The Gulf War was the last neuver in a near-peer fight. Our weapons at the National Training Center with rocket time the U.S. Army successfully employed are not designed to provide mass firepower artillery, I was excited to see how effective rocket Fires in support of combined arms over a wide front. The Air Force has sup- we would be on the battlefield. Instead, I maneuver in a decisive action fight. The col- planted us in shaping the deep fight. All of learned that maneuver commanders do not lapse of the Soviet Union and the shift to these changes have negatively affected our

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 3 Marines with S Battery, 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, stage a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in preparation for a Command Post Exercise (CPX) aboard Camp Pendleton, Calif., Feb. 6, 2018. (Cpl. Andre Heath/U.S. Marine Corps) ability to fight and win our nation’s wars. Rocket Launcher System (MLRS) battalion tionally, there are only three field artil- It is critical we address these changes and was three batteries of nine launchers each lery brigades providing Fires to shape the take steps to reverse them or we will have for 27 launchers in a battalion. The same deep fight for maneuver. Eighteenth Field significant challenges shaping the fight for battalion has nearly half the fire power 30 Artillery Brigade supports special opera- our maneuver forces in the future. years later, reorganized as two batteries tions, 17th Field Artillery Brigade supports At the height of the Cold War, a Multiple of eight, for a total of 16 launchers. Addi- I Corps and 75th Field Artillery Brigade

4 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club tion, but without organic long-range Fires, they are little more than administrative headquarters. Giving DIVARTY organic rocket artillery would enable them to shape the fight without taking resources from the brigade combat team. Currently, Nation- al Training Center rotations simulating a decisive action fight only allocate a single platoon of rocket artillery to the division headquarters. What was 27 launchers at a minimum is now only four. The COIN environment has forced rocket artillery to innovate in order to stay relevant. This has led to increased focus on precision guided, high explosive weapons. The use of forward operating bases (FOB) has also changed how rocket artillery is employed in the field. Establishing and secur- ing a position area for artillery on the battlefield is a lost art among section chiefs and platoon leaders that never left the FOB. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HI- MARS) is a fantastic weapon system that enables long-range rocket and missile precision Fires to be readily employed around the globe. By reducing weight and placing the launcher module on wheels instead of tracks, it is air mobile, however, it sacrifices half the ammunition capacity of the M270. Another consequence of the War on Terror is the U.S. Army’s pivot away from Dual Purpose Incendiary Cluster Munitions (DPICM). DPICM creates unexploded ord- nance on the battlefield and that has many negative long-term consequences for military personnel and civilians alike. Those consequences do not make them less important in a conflict with a near-peer adversary. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rocket and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) are precise munitions that work great for high-value targets, but are not capable of disrupting large formations. The Russians have continued to use the BM30 Smerch against ISIS with great success and are clearly advancing their capabilities while we are content re- furbishing Reagan-era technology. This shift in priorities has given commanders the freedom to quickly move launchers from FOB to FOB in Afghanistan supports III Corps. To make matters worse, but it has not given DIVARTY any organic and Iraq to eliminate high-value targets 75th FA allocates three of its five rocket bat- long-range artillery to shape the fight for with precise strikes and virtually no collateral damage. As a platoon leader, executive talions on rotation to Korea. This leaves two the division. Division and even corps ar- officer, and fire direction officer at the bat- battalions from 75th FA to support III Corps tilleries previously had organic assets that tery and battalion level of a HIMARS unit, operations worldwide. could engage targets and shape the deep I know how effective this platform can be The Army has wisely reconstituted di- fight. However, these were deemed super- when used in the COIN fight. I also have vision artillery (DIVARTY) to be the force fluous in the COIN environment. Bringing experience with how ineffective this vehicle field artillery headquarters for divisions, DIVARTY back is a step in the right direc- is when employed as if it were a M270. The

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 5 A High Mobility Artillery Rocket System is fired by U.S. Marines with Headquarters Battery, 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Divi- sion, in support of Fire Exercise 2-18 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif. (Lance Cpl. Alexa M. Hernandez/U.S. Marine Corps) high weight of a launcher on a light me- To exploit our overmatch in the air and of the awesome capability rocket artillery dium tactical vehicle chassis leaves it sus- maximize our ability to fight across multi- brings to the fight and use it in conjunction ceptible to mud and limits its travel to local ple domains, it is absolutely critical to sup- with air support, not as a last resort. The road networks. When employed in a tradi- press enemy air defense. Rocket artillery is rocket artillery community continues to tional rocket artillery role, the HIMARS is one of the few platforms with the range and be overlooked in the Army, even by some actually less mobile and delivers less steel munitions capable of performing this mis- fellow Redlegs from the cannon world. A on target than its counterpart. This is not to sion. A platoon of M270 launches enough perception exists throughout the Army that say that the HIMARS is not a valuable asset rockets in one volley to saturate a 500M ra- our equipment is old and outdated and we to the Army, but it is not designed to tack- dius with DPICM. Anything within that cir- provide limited utility on the battlefield. It le the massed armored formations coming cle is going to feel those effects, moving or is our duty as field artillerymen to address through the Fulda Gap or crossing the 38th stationary. The GMLRS and ATACMS also this knowledge gap. Rocket artillery can shape the deep fight when air power can’t, Parallel. The tracked M270 certainly has provide the commander with the ability to due to weather or enemy air defense. In the its problems, but conducting operations in reach stationary targets at range regardless fight against a near peer, this capability is a decisive action fight is not among them. of how much enemy air defense is present, invaluable and it is our responsibility, as It outshines the HIMARS in this environ- eliminating the need to send an aircraft into fire supporters, to ensure commanders use ment. a dangerous situation. it effectively. Maneuver commanders have grown ac- We may have forgotten how critical Capt. Clint Custer is an Eighth Army fire customed to operating with air superiority. a role rocket artillery plays in combined support officer. Custer commissioned at the Our adversaries are aware of this and have arms, but our enemies have not. We need Virginia Military Institute and has been a field spent time developing and manufacturing more rocket battalions now, and they need effective air defense systems. Their doctrine to be structured within the DIVARTY in artillery officer for six years in all rocket units. states they will not contest our air superior- order to shape the fight for the division He has been a platoon leader for a High Mobility ity from the sky, but through a proliferation and brigade. The Army and Department Artillery Rocket System battery, a battery fire of man portable air defense systems and of Defense need to rethink their prioritiza- direction officer, a battery operations officer and surface-to-air missile systems. Operating tion of expensive, precision guided muni- battalion fire direction officer. He has participat- under the assumption that the AH-64 and tions and bring DPICM back into the fold. ed in three National Training Center rotations close air support will be available is wishful Commanders at the brigade level and their as the battalion fire direction officer and liaison thinking at best, and irresponsible at worst. fire support coordinators need to be aware to the brigade Fires cell.

6 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club Soldiers of 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, discuss their plan of attack during Decisive Action Rotation 17-08 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif. (Spc. Dana Clarke/U.S. Army)

ByLearning Capt. Joshua Urness to speak maneuver

I am not what you would consider to issue of the “Fires Bulletin,” brought back is what I described earlier as the “car per- be a “car person” which means that I usu- to life the complexities of cross-branch in- son” dilemma. ally pay for maintenance and don’t look tegration that I experienced transitioning To non-air defenders, our tactics jargon under the hood unless I see smoke. Some- from SHORAD to Patriot. McIntire, the and joint brevity-based lexicon could seem times when car people tell me about some U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School like a lot of car talk. Similarly, our lack of new upgrade they made to their car, I act commandant, used his SHORAD vision as experience with maneuver tactics and their like I understand, but my eyes glaze over a conduit to describe how the world had language could result in a similar glazed- because I have no comprehension of what changed, so the Army must also change. over effect for air defenders. The good news they are saying. When I arrived at my first He explained that the Army divested di- is that we can begin to address this chal- Patriot unit, I felt exactly the same way. visional air defense capabilities during the lenge immediately (unlike equipment and I had spent the first several years of my Global War on Terror, but since the rise of personnel availability) by institutionalizing career at an Avenger/Stinger unit, and to be peer adversaries, increased use of drones a process to prepare air defenders for inte- honest, we didn’t do a whole lot of Aveng- and greater threats to U.S. maneuver forces, gration with maneuver units. er/Stinger things. In fact, not too long after I SHORAD is needed now more than ever. In We can do this by visualizing the ele- left the Basic Officer Leaders Course at Fort summary, air defense will reintegrate with ments of a relationship that we want to have Bliss, Texas, we deployed to Afghanistan maneuver units in an effort that began last with our maneuver partners, and some where I conducted convoy security mis- summer and continues over the next sever- of the communication skills necessary to sions in support of NATO. al years. achieve that relationship. This effort can be Reading Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire’s I think that one of the first and central further improved through the leveraging of “Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Vi- challenges the air defense branch will face lessons learned by other technical branches, sion,” in the November-December, 2017 in the early stages of maneuver integration like cyber, that recently undertook a simi-

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 7 lar effort. In the following sections, I will vey the mission and intended effect with- ing because it assumes their lack of knowl- outline those elements, skills and some of out confusing technical jargon. Because it edge. Similar to the concept of “man-splain- the lessons that I found most compelling. seems natural, it denotes fluency. ing,” a term popularized across the internet I will do this through a “LESS is more” E: Education over the last year, “air defense-splaining” framework, the basis of a way of tackling The rise and preeminence of air threats is corrosive to relationships and does not the challenges posed by these initial stages on the battlefield pose a new and challeng- engender trust or mutual understanding. It of integration. “LESS is more” is a bumper ing dimension of warfare for maneuver should be something that we, as air defend- sticker created to make the concept sticky units that cannot yet be fully understood. ers, intentionally avoid and consciously de- and is based on the acronym LESS, which As a representative of air defense within a velop an awareness for. stands for learn the language, education, maneuver unit, we must own the respon- The greatest challenge of simplicity is simplify and storytelling. Similar to sim- sibility to educate our partners on how to that many of us believe our most signif- plicity or the old adages about being brief approach decision making and fight air de- icant contribution to any organization is and gone, “LESS is more” is intended to fense systems in this new dimension. This our technical aptitude, which we often draw on that same principle. education should be conducted formally conflate with effectiveness or intelligence. L: Learn the language through briefs and informally through ev- However, the mark of our effectiveness The first step to maximization of air de- eryday interaction. It should also be done and usefulness to other staff officers, staff fense contributions to the maneuver force smartly, taking into consideration the primaries and, by proxy, the maneuver should be the intentional pursuit by air de- needs of the audience with time and atten- decision maker, is based on our ability to fenders to research and learn the maneuver tion span, while focusing on enhancing rec- communicate an idea or concept in a way language. Because the maneuver language ollection or stickiness of key principles. that can be understood. In the case of max- is well established in doctrine and culture Cyber epitomized education in the cre- imization of the air defense contribution across the Army, the research part is not as ation of their messaging and products, on the battlefield, this challenge is further important as the intentional pursuit of its defining both capabilities and limitations, complicated by time, or the lack thereof, es- comprehension. It is, therefore, the key to while developing the audience understand- pecially in a rapidly developing situation. guiding our development of integration ing of threats. In the case of air defenders It should be noted that your effectiveness based concepts, concepts that maximize presenting a capabilities and limitations in maximizing the ADA impact on the bat- air defense strengths and meet maneuver brief to our maneuver audience, as many of tlefield begins long before the first shot is force’s needs. us may do as an initial step in our relation- fired with trust earned through our inten- The goal of learning the maneuver lan- ship-building activities, we must fight the tional pursuit of relationship. Simplicity is guage is fluency: our ability to fully- com urge to give the hour-long technical brief. especially important when communicat- prehend and communicate naturally in the Besides following the guidance on sim- ing resource requirements or constraints. given language. As many of us have expe- plicity (discussed in the next section) and Translating a need to an effect on the bat- rienced when trying to learn a foreign lan- language, be very clear about the digestible tlefield that is relevant and comprehensible guage, knowing the right words is simply concepts that you want the audience to re- is key. Demonstrating an awareness of your not enough. As in language learning, this member and make the concepts stick. In- audience’s needs and meeting those needs increase in fluency often occurs most- effi versely, what may resonate more with the through efficient communication will also ciently through observation and immersion audience is beginning with threat briefs. reinforce your credibility. in the culture and language location, not When developing a concept of operations, S: Storytelling abstractly from the comfort of our own cul- we always draw where the enemy is first. Stories or case studies take complex in- ture or home. Thus, learning the language Painting a clear and poignant picture of formation or concepts that could be highly is not an end in itself but a means by which the air threat to maneuver forces will clear technical and challenging to understand we attain fluency. In this way, through -ad some of the brush and skepticism off the and turn them into easily digestible cours- equate language preparation, fluency is trail and should empower you to discuss es. Stories also enhance the stickiness or achievable after immersion, in this case in- what you bring to the fight; what air- de retainability of an idea. They can be writ- tegration with the maneuver unit. fense can do for them. ten as complete fiction with the purpose of The culmination of this effort should be S: Simplify teaching a lesson or concept, or can be true the codification of language meaningful to If you are reading this quickly you may stories delivered in a way that emphasizes air defenders in the maneuver lexicon. This take this to mean that we should dumb lessons learned. One example of how the should be promoted at an institutional level down what we say when we are talking maneuver community uses stories to bet- through increased presence of ADA relat- to professionals outside of air defense. On ter understand how to make decisions is ed topics in documents like Field Manual the contrary, out of respect for our coun- the book, “The Defense of Hill 781,” which 3-0: Operations, the foundational work for terparts, through endeavoring to learn takes place at the National Training Center developing tactics at training centers and their language and culture, we also gain at Fort Irwin, Calif. This story (expected across the Army. The cyber community has an understanding for what really matters reading for maneuver officers) provides a adeptly learned the language of maneuver to them. What simplicity really means is to mechanism for how to solve problems at a and translated the effects of their opera- avoid “air defense-splaining.” That means tactical level based on a conventional war- tions into tactical mission tasks, such as de- to unconsciously or overtly explain an air fare context. It even includes an example of ception, blocking or denying. These words, defense-related topic, or concept, to some- failures of SHORAD to defend the maneu- customary in the communications of the one who is not an air defender, in such a ver force (based on what appears to be the maneuver community, efficiently -con way that could be perceived as condescend- “stinger under armor” concept).

8 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club A Soldier with D Troop, Regimental Engineer Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment talks on the radio during a Low Level Voice Intercept as part of Exer- cise Allied Spirit VII at the 7th Army Training Command’s Hohenfels Training Area, Germany. (Gertrud Zach/U.S. Army)

The cyber community has leveraged the ers read in professional military education be greatly increased through the sending of “LESS is more” principle to bridge their called “The Defense of Duffers Drift.” See more ADA officers to maneuver profession- own gap with maneuver forces. They did the citation below to read it for yourself. al military education, especially the Cap- this, without “cyber-splaining.” Instead I think a storytelling or decision making tain’s Career Course. Finally, greater em- they created a story-based product through (like choose-your-own-adventure but to phasis on “Project Warrior” type programs the Asymmetric Warfare Group, “The De- hone leadership or skill focused decision will surely enhance our branches ability to fense of Battle Position Duffer: Cyber- En making) based concept like this could serve dynamically adapt as we continue through abled Maneuver in Multi-Domain Battle.” the air defense-maneuver integration very this integration. These recommendations This product follows all of the elements well. of an ideal relationship that were outlined Adhering to the “LESS is more” guide- are certainly not a panacea of relationship above. It is simple and easy to read. It uses line and following the examples and les- building but they are a good first start to maneuver language to tell a story that fa- sons learned from our cyber counterparts, avoiding the “car person” dilemma. cilitates the creation of sticky concepts on air defense can efficiently bridge the gap Capt. Joshua Urness is an air defense artil- how to operationalize, exactly as the title with maneuver forces. Efforts such as a lery officer that has served in both Patriot and implies- maneuver conducted with support “Duffers Drift” type project could -be fur Short Range Air Defense battalions. He has de- from cyber. It also communicates how to ther complemented, as described earlier, by ployed to Afghanistan and the Kingdom of Bah- think about cyber threats that may be faced increased involvement in the development at a tactical level. The best part is that the of operational level concepts or key Army rain. He also serves as the editor for the "Weekly product tells the story through the conduit doctrine, such as FM 3-0: Operations. Addi- Interceptor," a product focused on air defense of a seminal work that all maneuver lead- tionally, our institutional knowledge could current events.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 9 Fires supporting maneuver The need for an update By 1st Lt. David Brister

With current technologies, artillery units Lasers, Vehicles, Units,” the Army wants tillery units were issued the M109A6 Pala- cannot effectively defend against any fu- artillery to play a more significant role in din. Its ability to lay itself and move with ture near-peer adversary with their outdat- future conflicts. However, artillery units any maneuver element assisted greatly in ed assets. Dave Majumdar, who wrote “The will struggle with adapting to updated Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, its abil- U.S. Military Isn’t Ready for a War with technologies as they have primarily been ity to carry its own ammunition, travel up Russia or China,” quoted Gen. Mark Milley conducting counter-insurgency operations to 60 mph, and defend itself with a crew- saying “While the United States would ul- for over 17 years. In order to succeed in a served weapon increased its lethality as a timately prevail in a hypothetical high-end near-peer conflict, many variables must be weapon system. The Paladin proved to be war, Washington would pay a high price in re-examined. From technologies, to train- a favorite for many Soldiers on the ground blood and treasure.” ing operations with foreign allies, artillery due to its ability to provide accurate and The current possibility of war with units are in need of an update to meet the responsive Fires. It is able to displace in North Korea, China or Russia has the Unit- demands of the Army. less than three minutes and occupy a firing ed States re-evaluating its assets to combat Since Operation Enduring Freedom was point in less than five minutes, however, these possible scenarios. According to Syd- launched Oct. 7, 2001, the United States all machines have their faults. The M109A6 ney J. Freedburg in his article, “Army Races Army has primarily focused on counter-in- consumes a significant amount of fuel. to Rebuild Short-Range Air Defense: New surgency operations. During that time, ar- The armor plating was reduced to make it

An M109 Paladin gun crew with B Battery, 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery Regiment, Division Artillery at Fort Bliss, Texas, fires into the moun- tains of Oro Grande Range Complex, N.M. 4-1 FA conducted a combined live fire exercise with 2nd Squadron, 13th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Division to maintain combat readiness. (Spc. Gabrielle Weaver/U.S. Army)

10 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club lighter for movement, but subsequently left locations. This was demonstrated during as War Fighter simulations with the U.S. it vulnerable to armor piercing 7.62 mm. the ongoing conflict between Russia and and South Korean Army are held. These It also limits the crew’s and chief’s move- Ukraine. The Russian MLRS destroyed simulations have demonstrated an increase ments due to its compact space. many battalions due to UAS flying over of cohesion between both countries to de- After considering all these problems, the Ukrainian units and sending the location feat a simulation against North Korea. Oth- U.S. developed the M109A7. It is current- to Russian command centers. These effects er examples include when the 2nd Brigade, ly being evaluated to see how it meets the raised awareness of the lethality of UAS not 4th Infantry Division deployed to Eastern demands of Soldiers and chiefs. It comes only in Europe, but how it can eliminate Europe to conduct presence patrols to deter with the Paladin Integrated Management U.S. maneuver units as well. the Russian Army from invading. NATO system, a 600 horsepower engine, provides Currently, the U.S. Army has no means forces alongside U.S. personnel conducted extra room to maneuver inside, holds ad- to combat UAS other than using the Aveng- large-scale transportation exercises, infan- ditional rounds and is heavier in order to er system or Patriot missiles. There are try maneuvers and war simulations. With reduce the recoil. Many countries have two active SHORAD battalions in the ac- further joint operations, near-peer conflicts similar capabilities of the Paladin, but none tive Army and only seven in the Natinoal can end more quickly due to the cohesion are able to operate with its effectiveness. Guard. This is mainly due to the Army’s between allied nations. The M109A7 upgrade will provide artillery decision to cut funding to SHORAD during In conclusion, technologies that are in units the ability to effectively combat any counter-insurgency operations. The Army development for artillery units will greatly enemy force. is now refunding SHORAD battalions as benefit the U.S. in a potential near-peer war. Other systems that are being updated to Russia and China’s current capabilities However, there is still room for improve- combat neer-peer adversaries is the Multi- grow and possibly outmatch the U.S. ment as a potential high-end war will bring ple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). It can The United States Army reached out more issues to light. Many adversaries are effectively range any target within a 60 kilo- to Boeing for assistance in developing a prepared and waiting for a chance to go to meter radius and provide effects that gave cheaper alternative to the Avenger system it the nickname “The Grid Square Removal to combat this problem. The alternative in war with the U.S. The past 17 years have al- System.” Its guided munitions proved true question is a laser that is positioned on top lowed them the time to combat our current to its name during the Afghanistan and Iraq of a Stryker that fires up to five kilowatts abilities and develop their own methods for wars. They gave lethal effects with limited of power to shoot down any UAS. It has combating our TTPs. Artillery units must collateral damage. However, the need for proven effective while also maintaining the rely on updating their technologies in order Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) and ability to carry up to nine Soldiers inside to combat air threats and support maneu- missile defense has peaked the Army’s the Stryker. This platform will still allow ver. The U.S has granted the field artillery need to conduct further testing with MLRS. for transportation of Soldiers while provid- more funding for its 2019 budget allocating Some MLRS units will be modified in order ing them with more effective defensive ca- for further advancements and training op- to be converted into a Integrated Fire Pro- pabilities. With further development, these erations. Corresponding with these greatly tection Capability (IFPC) to fire the AIM-9X lasers could be attached to artillery unit’s needed updates and additional training op- missile. The AIM-9X has the ability to de- prime movers in order to combat UAS and portunities, the U.S. military will surpass stroy a low-flying cruise missile from the counter-battery threats. any adversary for years to come. ground. In addition the IFPC will operate At the Fort Sill Fires Conference in 2017 1st Lt. David Brister is the 1st Platoon lead- off a new command and control network, Milley said, “Currently, if you are in a posi- er in B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artil- the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Bat- tion longer than three hours, you’re dead,” lery Regiment stationed at Schofield Barracks, tle Control System (IBCS). Freedburg said in response to how the U.S. would fare in a Hawaii. Brister trains Soldiers to be proficient this network will work off a wide array of near-peer conflict. in their gun line tasks and ensures they are radars to provide targeting data. According to Milley, U.S. radar systems The IFPC and IBCS will go into service in will need to be upgraded to not only com- prepared to take on any mission. He commis- 2020 and will potentially receive updates to bat counter battery, but small UASs as well. sioned as a field artillery officer in May 2016 fire lasers to combat ballistic missile threats. This is in direct response to North Korea’s after graduating with a Bachelors in Industrial Since the IFPC will mirror MLRS control and Russia’s military capabilities as they Technology from Tarleton State University in systems, artillery units can limit the need to have increased the use of their radar units. Stephenville, Texas. change established tactics, techniques and With the capability to combat UASs and References procedures (TTP) for operating the IFPC. counter battery, artillery and SHORAD “Laser in front, Grunts in the back: Boeing offer Anti-Aircraft Vehi- cles” Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. Aug 2, 2017. breakingdefense.com The IFPC will greatly benefit the Army battalions will be able to push more lethal “Army Races to Rebuild Short-Range Air Defense: New Lasers, Vehi- as a whole as it serves as a cheaper alterna- effects at any near-peer adversary. cles, Units,” Sydney J. Freedberg. February 21, 2017. breaking- tive to firing a Patriot missile in the event of Although the U.S. is more than capable defense.com “$86,000+5,600mph= Hyper Velocity Missile Defense,” Sydney J. a combat ballistic missile threat. of maneuvering artillery units in war, op- Freedberg Jr. January 26, 2018. breakingdefense.com Besides howitzer and MLRS units, erations with allied nations will need to be “Interoptibility Causes Mission Success,” 1st Sgt. Classvincent Abril. December 13, 2017. armytechnology.com SHORAD units are also about to receive reassessed. Relations with other nations “The US Military isn’t Ready for War With Russia or China,” Dave an update that will shape the outcome of have been engraved in our nation’s history Majumdar. September 17, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/ blog/the-buzz/the-us-military-isnt-ready-war-russia-or-chi- potential conflicts. The United States has since the Revolutionary War. Since North na-17728. discovered that unmanned aerial systems Korea has developed a nuclear program, “Tankers Up, Choppers Down, Artillery way Up in Army’s Old School 2019 Budget,” Sydney J. Freedburg. February 18, 2018. https:// (UASs) are a severe problem to maneuver joint operations have become more fre- breakingdefense.com/2018/02/tanks-up-choppers-down-artil- units due to their ability to observe unit quent. In a show of force, operations such lery-way-up-in-armys-old-school-2019-budget/

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 11 The 2017 Knox, Hamilton and Gruber Awards The U.S. Army Field Artillery School has an- nounced the winners of the 2017 Knox, Hamil- ton and Gruber awards for excellence within the field artillery branch. These awards are presented annually and recognize excellence by unit (active and National Guard) and individual. Congratu- lations to the 2017 award winners.

12 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club AWARD HENRY A. KNOX FIELD ARTILLERY

Soldiers assigned to C Battery, 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, fire a M777A2 howitzer in support of Iraqi security forces at Platoon Assembly Area 14, Iraq, Dec. 7, 2016. C Battery conducted the fire mission in support of Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, the global Coalition to defeat ISIL in Iraq and Syria. (Spc. Christopher Brecht/U.S. Army)

The Knox Award is named after the first rate. Upon returning from their deployment, Chief of Artillery and first Secretary of War, C Battery quickly reset and initiated an inten-

Maj. Gen. Henry A. Knox. Originally called sive training regimen driven by the lessons the Knox Trophy and Medal, the award was learned from their previous deployment. established in 1924 in order to recognize the Beginning in May and ending in September best field artillery battery and best enlisted 2017, the battery conducted two platoon air Soldier. The award was lost during World assault artillery raids, one battery air assault War II, but reinstated in 2002 for active-duty infiltration operation, Table VI through XV FA units, with the individual Soldier award certifications and a battery field training exer- being replaced with the Gruber Award. For cise. They also completed the battery artillery accomplishments in the year 2017 congratu- readiness test concurrently with an emergen- lations are owed to C Battery, 1st Battalion, cy deployment readiness evaluation. In keep- 320th Field Artillery Regiment (101st Air- ing with the battery’s high level of excellence borne Division, Fort Campbell, Ky.) as the and commitment to the mission Staff Sgt. recipients of the Henry A. Knox Award. Nicholas Davis stands out as an individual During their deployment for Operation who embodies the battery’s call to communi- Inherent Resolve, C Battery massed 2,079 ty service. Davis received the Soldier’s Medal rounds against enemy forces in Mosul and after he saved the lives of two civilians with Northern Iraq. During that same deployment, no regard for his own well-being. C Battery C Battery impressively earned the coveted stands out as a testament to its high level of Gold Air Assault streamer for achieving high- dedication to mission, standards and adher- er than a 90 percent air assault qualification ence to the Army Values.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 13 AWARD ALEXANDER HAMILTON FIELD ARTILLERY

Top: Soldiers of A Battery, 1st Battalion, 129th Field Artillery Regiment, Missouri Army National Guard, pose for a unit photo. Bottom: Soldiers of A Battery, 1st Battalion, 129th Field Artillery Regi- ment, Missouri Army National Guard, conduct a live-fire exercise. (Courtesy photos)

The Hamilton Award is named after the pleting all mandatory tasks, online training first Secretary of the Treasury and Continen- requirements, annual briefs, Warrior Tasks tal Army Artilleryman, Alexander Hamilton. and Battle Drills in addition to howitzer sec- The award was established in 2002 in order tion and crew training. When A Battery is to recognize the best Army National Guard not putting steel on target in the field, itis field artillery battery. For accomplishments accomplishing assigned missions at home in the year 2017, congratulations are owed to station during individual duty training (IDT) A Battery, 1st Battalion, 129th Field Artillery weekends. Preparation and robust training is Regiment, Missouri Army National Guard, the unit’s focus during IDT weekends which as the recipients of the Alexander Hamilton drives excellence and high levels of morale Award. and retention. The unit excelled in all organi- Fiscal Year 2017 was an outstanding year zational inspections, including a commend- for A/1-129th FAR. The unit’s excellence in all duties exemplify the outstanding traits and able rating on its S1 combined staff inspec- characteristics for which Alexander Hamilton tion and a satisfactory rating on the training stood. A Battery earned the battalion’s covet- management inspection. ed Thunder-Stick award for demonstrating A Battery is an organization that isex- superiority in all objectives, outperforming tremely proud, motivated, and determined other units in the 1-129th FAR. to face any challenge and to produce remark- A Battery continuously exceeded the- de able results. The Soldiers of A Battery live up mands of its higher headquarters by com- to the battalion motto of “Send your mission.”

14 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club AWARD GRUBEREDMUND L. FIELD ARTI LLERY

Sgt. 1st Class Jaime Castro (left) is congratulated for being awarded the 2017 Edmund L. Gruber Award. (Courtesy photo)

The Gruber Award is named after a noted in future versions. His progress and abilities field artillery officer, Brig. Gen. Edmund L. to work through current technological defi- Gruber, who as a first lieutenant in 1908 com- ciencies has been noticed, highlighted and posed the “Caisson Song,” which was later his implementations have been provided to adapted to the “Army Song” in 1952. The the Fires Center of Excellence, the FSRs and award was established in 2002, but was once AFATDS software designers to ensure the part of the Henry A. Knox Award from 1924. progressive efficiency of the field artillery’s The award recognizes the best field artillery force operating equipment. Soldier for their significant contributions to Taking his understanding and expertise enhance the field artillery. For accomplish- within the realm of the field artillery and ments in the year 2017, congratulations are its application, Castro has a truly advanced owed to Sgt. 1st Class Jaime M. Castro, 5th

understanding of his craft and has worked Battlefield Coordination Detachment,- Ha to great lengths to make our “inter-branch” waii, as the recipient of the Edmund L. Gru- cooperation more efficient. Castro’s efforts ber Award. Castro’s performance as the senior fire to integrate the Army and Air Force mission control noncommissioned officer for 5th BCD command systems on Global Command and during Fiscal Year 2017 has been nothing Control System-Joint ensured that the Joint short of exceptional. Through his own initia- Forces Land Component commander was tive, he worked directly with Advanced Field able to transmit their equities to the Joint Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Forces Air Component commander and en- field support representatives (FSRs) -to im sure targets were collaboratively and holisti- prove the functionality and capability of the cally serviced regardless of domain or kinet- AFATDS software that will be incorporated ic/non-kinetic effects.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 15 First Lt. Logan Wilson, Sgt. Alec Pawloski, and Spc. Dakota Davis celebrate the completion of Mountain Peak 18, an 18-day Brigade Culminating Training Exercise at Fort Drum, NY. Their fire support team conducted over 70 calls for fire while supporting A Troop, 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment's reconnaissance and security missions. (Courtesy photo) Resurrecting the light cavalry’s fire support Restructuring the IBCT squadron fire support teams to maximize capability By Capt. Kyle Robert East “Reconnaissance assets, like squadron. Currently, troop commanders fire support teams, we are unable to utilize are faced with the challenging decision the M1200 Armored Knight’s full capability artillery assets, are never kept between utilizing the fire support team’s while simultaneously supporting the troop in reserve. When committed, M1200 Armored Knight to execute their fire commander’s directed placement of their support plan, or retain their fire support supporting FSO. Ultimately the long-term reconnaissance assets use all officer (FSO) within the troop command solution requires a modification table of post to conduct fire support planning. It of their resources to accom- organization and equipment change which has become common practice during troop our battalion is working to address through plish the mission.” field training exercises and combined arms white papers. Still, we must continue to live-fire exercises for troop commanders to - Chapter 1: Reconnais- support the squadron with the resources only utilize Option 2 when employing their sance Field Manual 3-90-2 fire support team. This results in the team’s currently available within the artillery bat- Over the course of the last year, 2nd M1200, the brigade’s most capable target talion. We have identified a course of action Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment location platform, to remain in the troop that, with minor changes to the current fire has identified significant shortfalls in the command post instead of observing mis- support structure inside an infantry bri- utilization of our three fire support teams sion critical targets. gade combat team’s field artillery battalion, (FSTs) tasked to support the reconnaissance Due to the current manning within our would fully support the troop commanders

16 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club while providing three precision weapon teams to the squadron. Currently the cavalry squadron in an IBCT is comprised of two mounted and one dismounted reconnaissance troops. The two mounted troops consist of three platoons and are supported by a three-Soldier fire support team. The dismounted troop consists of two platoons and is supported by a seven-Soldier fire support team. The issue arises due to the M1200 Armored Knight requiring three Soldiers to operate, while troop commanders require their FSOs to remain in their troop command post (CP). We have proposed the addition of one 13F20 and three 13F10 Soldiers to allow moving the troop fire support officer into the troop commander’s vehicle. The addition of these four Soldiers would allow A and B Troop to retain the fire support officer within their CP, and have a precision weapon team (PWT) with the capability to perform similar to the combat observation lasing team concept. C Troop’s typical fire support team would remain dismounted with their troop CP, however the addition of a 13F20 and two 13F10’s would allow for a third PWT within the squadron. These PWTs would have the capability and flexibility to support troop, squadron or brigade targets, while keeping an FSO in direct support of their assigned troop. Not only does this significantly increase the squadron’s capability, but it falls in-line with doctrine by not keeping reconnaissance and artillery assets in reserve. The cost associated with this restructuring is to under-man other FSTs in order to weigh the troop FSTs. Additionally with the fire support officer inside the commander’s vehicle, this would require the troop to in- stall an additional 92F system in order for the FSO to monitor the squadron and troop Fires nets. Second Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Figure 1. Current cavalry fire support team configuration. Figure 2. Proposed cavalry fire support Regiment will validate this restructuring team Diagram. (Courtesy illustrations) of our squadron fire support teams during become an integral piece of the light cav- ron, 89th Cavalry Regiment in Fort Drum, the brigade’s Joint Readiness Training Cen- alry’s reconnaissance and security mission ter 18-08 rotation this summer. The intent N.Y. East has participated in numerous brigade of this validation is to re-establish the ne- in order to truly meet the fundamentals of and squadron level training exercises. Previous- cessity of the brigade’s best equipped and reconnaissance. ly he was 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s highly trained fire supporters being delib- Capt. Kyle Robert East currently serves in Combat Observation Lasing Team platoon lead- erately utilized to shape the brigade’s fight. the 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment er and a D Company, 52nd Infantry Regiment Additionally, these fire supporters must as the fire support officer supporting 1st Squad- fire support officer at Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 17 Head, heart, gut A personal, ethical decision- making methodology By Lt. Col. Seth Hall

18 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club “The regulation defines a spiritually fit per- The final element is gut. Gut is instinct “Ethics involves not son as someone who ‘recognizes there are and intuition. It is the embodiment of years multiple dimensions that make up a human of experience and practice. Gut pays atten- only our thinking, but being and seeks to develop the total person tion to head’s logical arguments and heart’s concept … needed to sustain one during passionate pleas, equally weighing individ- also our feeling.” times of stress, hardship, and tragedy.’”2 ual justice and mercy against justice and An ethically actualized leader does not mercy for all. It informs every challenging -Valdemar Setzer behave ethically because he or she fears the decision one must make. Some researchers, Ethics and ethical behavior is not mere- stick or seeks the carrot. Instead, his or her such as Malcolm Gladwell, author of “Blink: ly the intellectual determination of right ethical behavior is an outward expression The Power of Thinking Without Thinking,” and wrong. It goes much deeper. To fully of an inner conviction that defines him or would classify gut as a cognitive response/ understand and validate the ethical frame- her as an adult, a person of integrity, and an feeling based on pattern recognition.3 Glad- work from which a person claims to live, Army officer. The countless lessons taught well’s writing seems to reject the idea that one must understand the foundation on to me by my parents, in combination with the gut element is distinct from the head. which that framework rests, the resulting the values instilled in me by childhood Instead, he advocates that as one develops decision-making process used by the indi- counselors, manifest themselves in the life as a leader, one becomes more adapt at rec- vidual and the manner in which one con- I choose to live. I have distilled all the mo- ognizing patterns quickly and determining ducts his or her professional life. This paper rality lessons and spiritual education into a course of action that leads to a successful explores three components as they relate to three, single-syllable words that espouse outcome. Therefore, Gladwell would likely an ethical, decision-making philosophy; a my ethical philosophy: head, heart, gut combine head and gut leaving only two el- philosophy that acknowledges moral abso- (HHG). ements, head and heart. lutes, rejects relativism and maintains the Throughout my adult life, especially With all due respect to Gladwell, there is flexibility to make decisions based on indi- during my years of service as an Army of- room in the model for head and gut. Think vidual variables. ficer, I have come to understand that when of head as an intentional process through Each officer’s personal, ethical -frame these elements align, I am living honorably which each piece of new information is sys- work is unique to him or her. To best illus- and leading ethically. Furthermore, using tematically, meticulously and consciously trate this decision-making process, I’ll share HHG, I can make difficult decisions and evaluated to form the decision. Contrast- mine. Mine rests firmly on two supporting experience inner peace about them. Before ed with gut, a process that one truncates, pillars. Each one embedded in me at an ear- offering this ethical decision-making phi- typically subconsciously, through pattern ly age and, on which, I continue to build losophy to others, it is important to define recognition. during adulthood. The first supporting pil- each of these elements and explain how Head, heart and gut are unique lens- lar of my ethical foundation is my parents. they relate to each another. es through which one views the ambigu- My mom and dad have always been peo- The first element is head. Head is the ous decisions one must make as a leader. ple of few words. The lessons they taught intellectual exercise of determining right Through experience and practice, one can me were never overtly stated. Instead, they from wrong and choosing right. Head re- transform this decision-making process were modeled by how they lived their lives. moves emotion from the equation and sim- from the intentional to the subconscious. They intentionally cultivated ideas in me ply applies logic to facts to make the best With practice, these individual elements such as a man’s word must be his bond, decision. The world is black and white. only become conscious when they are in and honor is something for which to fight. Head rejects a moral relativist point of view disagreement. It is during those times one To them, reputation is everything. These that claims truth is subjective. Head’s base must learn to intentionally slow down his principles do not make them popular. Their of knowledge originates from scholarship, or her decision-making process and seek circle of trusted friends is small, but to this head values cold, hard facts. It receives trusted counsel, if possible. Conversely, the day, they remain fiercely loyal to those they and processes data on its face, without decision one is making is most likely legal, love and everyone with whom they inter- sentiment. It is essential to this philosophy moral, ethical and “best” for the organiza- act respects them. Both traits I learned as a because it demands that the standard be tion when all three elements align. child and emulate today. upheld. Without head, absolute right and Although I believe very firmly in this The second supporting pillar that influ- wrong would not exist as a decision-mak- ethical philosophy and trust it implicitly ences my ethical perspective is my faith. ing authority. as my decision-making mechanism, I ac- Personally, I follow the teachings of the Heart opposes head. Heart cannot re- knowledge a potential criticism. HHG em- Bible. One example of the many verses by move emotion from decision because heart phasizes the spirit of the law over the letter which I try to live my life is Proverbs 22:1, is emotion. It is empathy and compassion. of the law, a position that some could la- “A [good] name is to be chosen rather than Rather than thinking of the world as black bel moral relativism. In response, consider great riches.”1 and white, heart feels only shades of grey. the following words, “The President of the I strive to allow God to guide my Heart forgives and redeems. Heart empa- United States has reposed special trust and thoughts, words and interactions with thizes. Heart is essential to this philosophy confidence ….”4 others and doing so affects all areas of my because, without it, decisions would be Commissioned officers must take their life. According to Army Regulation 600-63, cold and uncaring. oaths seriously and execute their respon-

1 Multiple Authors, “The Bible.” (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999), 1640. 2 US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-63, Army Health Promotion. April 1996. 3 Gladwell, Malcom. “Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking.” Boston, MA: Little, Brown Company, 2005. 4 US Department of the Army, DA FORM 71, Oath of Office – Military Personnel. July 1999.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 19 Finally, about gut, a field-grade officer’s As an officer’s decision-making responsi- intuition may be challenged as the scope of his or her responsibility increases. The bilities change from the company-grade breadth and complexity field-grade officers face increases exponentially, allowing less level to field-grade level, so too should his pattern analysis to enable decision-making and potentially exposing gut’s shortcom- or her ethical decision-making mechanism. ings. The good news is that in the model sibilities with the utmost professionalism sition is the increased responsibility placed gut does not make decisions alone. Head and care. Unlike the oath of enlistment on organizational-level leaders and the in- and heart work in conjunction to inform taken by Soldiers and noncommissioned creased ability to influence more Soldiers. each decision. The gravity of field-grade de- officers, commissioned officers do not As a field-grade officer, one does not have cisions, combined with the amount of new swear to obey anyone. This omission of the time to communicate a personal, ethical and dissimilar decisions, should cause the obedience was not an oversight. Instead, philosophy to each Soldier in the forma- decision maker to intentionally slow down commissioned officers are charged with tion. Instead, field-grade officers must work the process when the situation allows. using their experience and judgment to with other senior leaders to develop an eth- Words are cheap. The ideas mean noth- make judgment calls. Leadership demands ical climate. A climate in which Soldiers ing unless one’s actions match them. Dif- more than merely reading a regulation or evaluate new, potentially ethically ambig- ficult, ethical decision-making must be in- manual and following a step-action-drill uous situations and act ethically without tentional and systematic. When performed to administer reward or punishment. If it direct supervision. As Edward Hennessy, correctly, the ethical decision-making phi- were that simple, computer programmers WWII veteran and former Chief Justice of losophy of head, heart, gut informs one’s could write “leader algorithms” to generate the Massachusetts Supreme Court, said, conscience and one’s decision-making stimulus and response leadership. Authen- “Ethics must begin at the top of an organi- process. It rejects moral relativism and si- tic leadership demands more and Soldiers zation. It is a leadership issue, and the chief multaneously retains the necessary flexibil- deserve more. Thoughtlessly following the executive must set the example.”5 ity to account for the individual variables letter of the law obviates the responsibili- As an officer’s decision-making respon- unique to each situation, thereby creating ty of real leadership. When HHG align, a sibilities change from the company-grade and enforcing an objective organizational consistent, ethical standard is maintained, level to field-grade level, so too should his standard. AND the uniqueness of every situation re- or her ethical decision-making mechanism. As one’s rank and responsibility in- ceives consideration, for the best decision As it relates to head, a field-grade officer creases, the complexity of the professional to be reached. should grow in two ways. First, a field grade decisions one must make also increases. The Army’s expectations of officers officer’s general knowledge base should be Therefore, it is imperative that leaders in- changes from company-grade to field- more significant than it was when he or she tentionally select the manner in which they grade. “Iron majors” are the engine that was a company-grade officer. For example, will make those difficult decisions. Head, runs the Army’s staffs, from battalion to one’s knowledge about warfighting func- heart, gut would serve them and their Sol- corps. Field-grade officers must embrace a tions and its role in combined arms opera- diers well. natural evolution in their primary leader- tions must increase. Second, one’s ability to Lt. Col. Seth Hall is Cameron University ship style from direct, which serves them process more information and at a greater Army ROTC professor of Military Science. Hall well at the company-grade level, to organi- speed should increase. Simply put, dots holds a bachelor’s degree in Public Administra- zational, which offers them a broader scope have to connect quicker. tion from the University of Northern Iowa and of influence over more Soldiers. Field-grade As this transition relates to heart, a field- a master’s degree in Organization Psychology officers who embrace and master organi- grade officer should exercise more- empa with an emphasis in Leader Development from zational-level leadership set themselves, thy towards Soldiers. It may seem coun- Columbia University. His assignments include and more importantly their units, up for terintuitive, the farther away one gets from platoon leader, battery executive officer, and success. Those field-grade officers who do direct-level leadership, the more empathet- not understand this necessary change in ic one should become. While discussing a battery commander at Fort Lewis, Wash., and leadership style often work very hard, but Soldier’s explanation for failing to meet the tactical officer at West Point, NY. do not succeed because the scope of their standard during his Uniform Code of Mil- References Gladwell, Malcolm. “Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Think- responsibilities outpaces what they can ef- itary Justice hearing, a tired battery coming.” Boston, MA: Little, Brown Company, 2005. fectively influence, directly. Regardless of mander remarked, “The sad stories are not Hennessy, Edward. “Edward Hennessy Quotes, 2013) http://thinkexist.com/quotes/edward_hennessy/ (accessed 19 March 2018). one’s position, he or she must not change sad anymore.” Multiple Authors, “The Bible.” (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999), their ethics. They must remain resolute as Of course, all leaders tire of taking 1640. Setzer, Valdemar. “Valdemar Setzer Quotes, 2013) http://thinkexist. one transitions from direct to organiza- corrective action on Soldiers who fail to com/quotes/valdemar_w._setzer/ (accessed 19 March 2018). tional leadership. The two primary reasons achieve the standard or live the Army val- US Department of the Army, Department of the Army Form 71, Oath that one’s morals must remain constant ues, but a field-grade officer cannot allow of Office – Military Personnel. July 1999. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-63, Army Health through the direct to organizational tran- him or herself to become jaded or callus. Promotion. April 1996.

5 Edward Hennessy, “Edward Hennessy Quotes, 2013) http://thinkexist.com/quotes/edward_hennessy/ (accessed 27 March 2018).

20 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club E-62 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Picture taken upon first historical Gunnery Certification, completed at Fort Hood, Texas, Sept. 21, 2017. E-62nd THAAD and Patriot

Byinterop Sgt. 1st Class Sergio Aranasuccess and Sgt. 1st Class Marcus Wofford During their first ever Missile Defense and weakness of the new hardware and The success of this mission is just a small Agency Flight Test, Soldiers from Battery E, software before it is fielded to the Army. taste of the potential working relationship 62nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 69th Without these type of tests, Army leaders that both THAAD and Patriot have togeth- Air Defense Artillery Brigade and 4th Bat- cannot accurately assess the effectiveness, er. With the most recent THAAD deploy- talion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, suitability and survivability of the systems ment to South Korea, alongside Patriot, this 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade conduct- to accomplish their assigned air and missile test gives way to the possibility of other ed a Congressionally mandated interop- defense missions,” said Chief Warrant Offi- such deployments not only to the Pacific erability test between the Terminal High cer 5 John Fallin, ATEC. Command theater but to other operations Altitude Area Defense and Patriot weapons During the test, Soldiers using the around the world. at White Sands Missile Range, New Mex- THAAD and Patriot were able to detect the Read more here: https://www.army.mil/ ico April 6, 2018. The test was designated short-range Lynx target and exchange Link article/195987/69th_adas_thaad_battery_ Flight Test Other-35 (FTX-35) and was ex- 16 messages with data produced by each of is_mission_qualified ecuted by MDA as an operational test with the weapon systems. This created a com- Sgt. 1st Class Sergio Arana is currently the Army Test and Evaluation Command and mon air picture and supported situational E Battery, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment Director of Operational Test and Evaluation awareness of the target and what asset it fire control platoon sergeant at Fort Hood, Tex- oversight. was threatening. The Link 16 information as. Arana has served as a launcher crewmem- While the Army has plans to further in- was constantly exchanged between both ber, team leader, Terminal High Altitude Area tegrate the two weapon systems within the weapon systems and allowed Soldiers op- Defense System maintenance noncommissioned next two years, this testing focused on what erating them to conduct simulated engage- officer, sensor platoon sergeant, launcher- pla can be done now. Prior to the test, E-62nd ments. toon sergeant and fire control platoon sergeant. THAAD made history while stationed Not only did this test prove THAAD He was part of the first THAAD deployment at Fort Hood, Texas. They were the first and Patriot could work concurrently, but to Guam in 2013 as the system maintenance THAAD unit to qualify on the weapon sys- it also gave THAAD Soldiers the ability to NCOIC, the unit movement NCOIC and the tem, breaking in their new site on West Fort test THAAD 3.0 software upgrades, mak- Hood. After receiving equipment, the unit ing E-62nd THAAD the first unit to use forward base evaluations and training NCOIC. was designated as the test battery for the such software. The upgrades are crucial to Sgt. 1st Class Marcus Wofford is the E Army’s THAAD program which prompted not only improving THAAD radar capa- Battery, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment them to assume the mission of FTX-35. bilities but also strengthening the THAAD launcher platoon sergeant at Fort Hood, Texas. FTX-35 progressed in three phases, interceptor arsenal. Wofford served as a Patriot launcher crewmem- which led to the culminating live-fire “This was an excellent training experi- ber, team chief, section chief, Patriot launcher event. The success of the mission ultimate- ence to give our Soldiers the opportunity to platoon sergeant, Advanced Individual Train- ly means a more layered defense for the air grow tactically and become more efficient ing instructor/writer, and Patriot Training defense community and is slowly shaping on their weapon system. Being a part of Assistance field team liaison. He has deployed the future of the way air defense fights. these software upgrades gives our opera- in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in “Conducting tests such as FTX-35 in an tors direct influence on what is crucial to 2012 and was part of the first mobile training operational environment utilizing trained the warfighter during real world applica- team to Taiwan in 2015 where he served as a pri- and certified THAAD Soldiers is absolutely tions,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Benja- mary instructor for the Patriot Launcher Sta- vital to understanding both the strengths min Schunn, E-62nd battery trainer. tion Enhanced Operator/Maintainer Course.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 21 Brigade deep battle 2.0 UAV-Fires teaming in support of the brigade deep fight By Capt. Joseph Schmid During the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian [suffering] a Russian fire strike destroying either artillery Fires or with other aircraft, conflict, military professionals through- two mechanized battalions with a combi- and relay those targets to either the ground out the globe witnessed Russia’s ability to nation of top attack munitions and -ther controllers or actually control and observe systematically project “annihilation Fires” mobaric warheads.”3Following the almost those Fires ourselves.”4 leveraging nascent unmanned aerial ve- instantaneous loss of two mechanized in- The VMU3’s RQ-7B Shadow became hicles (UAVs) teamed with massed rocket fantry battalions, the imagined CAB will yet another sensor proficient in providing and cannon artillery. In their article titled, likely no longer be able to perform basic rapid targeting data for responsive artil- “Russia’s New Generation Warfare,” Phil- warfighting functions. Consequently, its lery strikes based off the target selection lip Karber, president of the Potomac Foun- remaining combat power could no longer standards recommended by a fire support dation, and Joshua Thibeault, a member successfully close with and destroy a com- coordinator. of the Russian New Generation Warfare paratively sized adversarial near-peer for- Larson’s UAV-Fires scenario described study team, detailed the debilitating ef- mation. This troubling observation from above was internalized by the 25th Infan- fects of Russian UAV-Fires teaming. They the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has decidedly try Division Artillery after they coupled state “Ukrainian units have observed up to hastened our own UAV interoperability, es- manned unmanned teaming (MUM-T) eight Russian UAVs overflights per day … pecially at echelons above battalion. with traditional lethal Fires to generate a The increased availability of overhead sur- Numerous training exercises, both real paradigm for the purpose of maximizing veillance combined with massed area Fires and virtual, have led to improvements in lethality and target handoff in a contested [have produced] … approximately 80 per- regards to our own organic UAV-Fires division deep area between the division cent of all casualties.”1 teaming. During Rim of the Pacific Exercise coordinated firing line (CFL) and the fire Russian UAV-Fires teaming served the 2016, the Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehi- support coordination line. The initial con- dual purpose of instantly attriting whole cle Squadron 3 (VMU3) tested their RQ-7B cept by Maj. Bobby Sickler, Maj. David battalions of Ukrainian mechanized infan- Shadow’s ability to perform a tradition- Henderson and John Hansen in their arti- try as well as having the uncanny effect al call for fire. Maj. Jarrod Larson, VMU3 cle titled “Deep Battle 2.0: An Integrated of disrupting the Ukrainian OODA Loop executive officer, said, “One of the things Division Deep Fight,” was “broken into decision cycle (observe, orient, decide, we’re designed for and we do really well is four distinct phases: Shape, find, destroy act).2 Imagine a U.S. combined arms bri- that forward observer role. We can go very and accomplish the mission.”5 During the gade (CAB) “in a three-minute period … deep in the battlespace and call for fire with shape phase the DIVARTY tactical opera-

1 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, Russia’s New Generation Warfare, Army Magazine, June 2016 issue, accessed on Feb. 28, 2018. 2 MacCuish, Donald A. 2012, “Orientation: Key to the OODA Loop - the culture factor,” Journal of Defense Resources Management, Vol. 3, Issue 2. 3 Phillip Karber, Examining Russia’s Policy Near, Abroad, and Around the World, 2015 AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition, Washington D.C., Oct. 12-15, 2015. 4 Megan Eckstein, RIMPAC 2016: Marines Test UAVs for Artillery Calls for Fire, Close Air Support, U.S. Naval Institute News, Aug. 1, 2016. 5 Maj. Bobby Sickler, Maj. David Henderson and John Hansen, An Integrated Division Deep Fight, Deep Battle 2.0, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), February 2017 issue, p. 1.

Soldiers fire an M119A3 howitzer during a live-fire exercise. (Courtesy photo)

22 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club tions center (TOC) reduced “the enemy air of these arguments will set the necessary and movement were frustrated. Our efforts defense posture to a level acceptable to em- conditions for 3-4th CAV to impose cata- to conduct surveillance within the brigade ploy rotary-wing aviation with a relative strophic disruptive Fires focused wholly deep fight along likely avenues of approach level of freedom of maneuver.”6 Kinetic on dynamic targets presenting real-time were routinely denied resulting in rotary strikes, usually in the form of M26 rockets threats between the forward line of troops and Fires’ inability to initially disrupt ad- fired from High Mobility Artillery Rocket and the division CFL. vancing columns of mechanized infantry Systems, exploited targeting data acquired During our recent 18-04 JRTC rotation, and armor. The failure to project disruption by organic Gray Eagle UAV to destroy ad- I believe two phases of the battle presented Fires within the brigade deep fight during versarial air defense assets. “The find and unique friction points that would have ben- the defense led to increased attrition of our destroy phases took place in a continuous efited from the incorporation of deliberate maneuver battalions during their direct en- loop within the EA [engagement area].”7 UAV-Fires teaming. These events include gagement. This failure stemmed from our Lethal indirect Fires were employed for 3-4th CAV’s initial advance into the en- collective inability to bypass the enemy’s targets such as adversarial long range artil- gagement area in support of 3rd Brigade’s disruption zone in an effort to acquire tar- lery, light skinned vehicles, command and forward passage of lines (FPOL), as well as gets behind the forward edge of battle area. control nodes and target acquisition radars. their screen of 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Both circumstances, the initial entry of 3-4th Armored targets would be passed to rotary Regiment during the defense. During sce- CAV and the brigade’s defense, highlight wing. With this system of systems, it’s key nario one, 3-4th CAV’s establishment of an inadequate ability to routinely project to note that one umbrella organization, the 3rd Brigade’s FPOL, 3-4th CAV retained coordinated disruptive lethal Fires into the 25th DIVARTY, collocated both the UAV as- TACON of one M119A3 105 mm howitzer brigade deep fight during key elements of set able to transmit targeting data and the battery, which generally received calls for the battle. Consequently, we’ll now tran- firing unit able to rapidly receive the target, fire (CFF) from fire support teams (FISTs), sition to blending select characteristics of compute firing data and fire. using traditional observation techniques, Henderson’s Division Deep Battle 2.0 theo- During fiscal years 2016-17 this construct on-ground collocated with their respec- ry with emerging cavalry doctrine in order was validated in numerous command post tive CAV troops. CFF’s would be initiated to generate the conditions needed for rapid exercises such as Yama Sakura 71, Talisman upon dismounted platoon-sized elements lethal Fires within the brigade’s contested Saber, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, and culmi- or lightly skinned adversarial vehicles, of- deep fight, synchronized by an aggressive nated in 25th DIVARTY’s Warfighter 2017 ten after making initial contact. Overall, light cavalry squadron TOC, acting as a performance. Key to success was the collo- any remnant forces the cavalry squadron UAV-Fires umbrella organization. cation of Gray Eagle feed directly adjacent encountered were destroyed or retrograd- In an Armor Magazine article titled, to the fire control element, contributing to ed and the screen resulted in a successful “The Return of Cavalry: A Multi-Domain rapid lethal responsiveness upon target FPOL with her sister 2-27th IN and 3rd Bri- Battle Study,” Majors’ Nathan Jennings, identification. gade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division Amos Fox, Adam Taliaferro, David Grif- Keeping in mind the advantages of battalions. However, in the process,- ad fith and Kyle Trottier state, “It has become UAV-Fires teaming portrayed above, while versarial forces were allowed to make ini- increasingly vital for advance ground el- exploiting 3rd Brigade’s recent experience tial contact with ground elements of 3-4th ements to integrate indirect, aerial … and at Joint Readiness Training Center 18-04 CAV. Lt. Col. Scott Pence, commander of informational Fires to dynamically shape rotation, in the following pages, I will por- 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry (Airborne), re- battlefield outcomes.”9 tray how the incorporation of deliberate counts from his JRTC experience “The op- The incorporation of deliberate UAV- UAV-Fires teaming may have increased 3rd posing force used light humvees to quietly Fires teaming during 3-4th CAV’s estab- Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment’s ability to and slowly occupy dismounted observa- lishment of 3rd Brigade’s FPOL, could have project combat power deep within our own tion points, gain visual contact and harass potentially shaped the battlefield more to- heavily contested brigade deep fight area. the rotational unit with indirect Fires.”8 ward our favor. Imagine, upon FPOL estab- Drawing on past experiences gained as a Therefore, the underlying problem rests lishment, all squadron RQ-11 Ravens were troop fire support officer as well - asaDI with allowing the enemy to gain a position leveraged to observe pre-planned likely av- VARTY battle captain, I will isolate certain of relative advantage, which granted them enues of approach. CAV small unmanned “Division Deep Battle 2.0” characteristics the ability to collect positional information aerial systems (SUAS) Raven teams would and apply them to the brigade deep fight in on our most forward formations. We were traverse three to four kilometers in front of an effort to synchronize dynamic UAV tar- unable to maintain a favorable stand-off their troop formations effectively extend- get acquisition efforts with a light cavalry distance between ourselves and advancing the likelihood of observing the adver- squadron’s tactical control (TACON) artil- ing adversarial forces. Conversely, adversary for the purpose of dynamic targeting. lery battery. Ultimately, I will argue for the sarial forces imposed favorable stand-off Think of the Raven section, possibly teamed establishment of a deliberate UAV-Fires cell distances in the latter stages of the battle as with a troop FIST, as a multi-domain op- inside the 3-4th CAV TOC able to act as an 3rd Brigade busied itself establishing a de- eration version of the combat observation umbrella organization coupling UAV target fense with two infantry battalions abreast and lasing team of the early 2000’s which acquisition efforts with a TACON fire direc- and 3-4th CAV screening forward. All at- “augmented the platoons for an additional tion center (FDC). I believe the realization tempts to ascertain enemy force posture target acquisition capability.”10

6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Lt. Col. Scott Pence, 2017. “The Lethality Imperative: Training Cavalry Squadrons to Fight for Information.” Armor, Summer 2017, p. 4. 9 Maj. Nathan Jennings, Maj. Amos Fox, Maj. Adam L. Taliaferro, Maj. David Griffith and Maj. Kyle Trottier, 2017. “The Return of Cavalry: A Multi-Domain Battle Study” Armor, Summer 2017, p.18. 10 Robert S. Davidson, 2000. “R&S lessons learned-brigade reconnaissance troop employment.” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Vol. 26, Issue 4. p. 62.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 23 vancing adversarial forces. Now transpose the above described system onto both the FPOL and the brigade defense scenarios we encountered in JRTC. I’d argue by first in- troducing, then enacting the Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 Theory described above, 3-4th CAV teamed with 3-7th FA and rotary elements of 25th CAB can achieve greater destructive lethality. In conclusion, the Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 Theory is simply “a way” to achieve enhanced synchronization between a light cavalry squadron, SUAS, and its TACON artillery battery. By layering indirect- as sets teamed with SUAS infiltration teams we maximize windows of opportunity to attrite advancing adversarial forces, while simultaneously granting increased survivability for forward positioned CAV units. This system can project the destruction ob- A Raven unmanned aerial vehicle flies overhead during a training exercise. (Courtesy photo) served within Russian UAV-Fires teaming Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 simply takes a sition. Artillery begins raining down on the onto adversarial forces seeking to disrupt Vietnam-era aerial observer concept and unsuspecting [enemy] troops.”11 Brandt’s 3-4th CAV objectives. And finally, by inte- repackages it for today’s modern technol- scenario illustrates the enhanced lethality grating air, land and cyber domains with- ogy in order to maximize UAV-Fires team- CAV SUAS infiltration teams coupled with in UAV-Fires teaming, 3-4th CAV can nest ing within a light cavalry squadron. As the a TACON indirect fire asset, can bring to more firmly within the Army’s emerging adversary attempts to probe the FPOL site the brigade deep fight. multi-domain battle concept. each troop’s Raven acquire targets, trig- The CAV SUAS infiltration teams have Capt. Joseph Schmid is the 3rd Squadron, gering the operator’s CFF. All CFF’s are the potential to enhance the comprehensive 4th Cavalry Regiment fire support officer. He centralized within the 3-4th CAV Fires and layering of indirect and rotary-wing weap- holds a bachelor of arts in English from West effects coordination cell (FECC) located ei- on systems in which forward-positioned Florida University. Schmid attended Field Ar- ther inside or slightly offset from the 3-4th Ravens, under centralized control of the CAV TOC. Similar to 25th DIVARTY’s tech- 3-4th CAV TOC, engage in MUM-T with tillery Basic Officer Leaders Course at Fort Sill, nique of collocating Grey Eagle feed with the 25th CAB’s rotary wing assets. The ded- Okla., prior to serving in the 82nd Airborne the fire control center, one of the TACON icated TACON artillery battery would pro- Division as A Troop, 1st Squadron, 73rd Caval- artillery fire direction centers will be either vide the CAV’s long reach into the brigade ry Regiment fire support officer and B Battery, inside or slightly offset from the 3-4th CAV deep fight targeting primarily advancing 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery TOC directly adjacent to the 3-4th CAV infantry dismounts, light-skinned technical Regiment fire direction officer, platoon leader FECC. This sensor and shooter collocation vehicles, and especially any ADA threat at- and executive officer. He attended the Captains will promote responsive UAV-Fires team- tempting to deny freedom of maneuver to Career Course at Fort Sill and is now stationed ing as well as grant the FDC enhanced ma- friendly rotary wing. As armored targets at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Previous articles neuver situational awareness, something present themselves, CAV SUAS infiltration include “Cross domain Fires executed in Light- battery and platoon FDC’s have collectively teams utilize MUM-T by sharing targeting struggled with. data with the 25th CAB. Remnant forces, ning Forge 2017” and “Calling for improve- The idea of exploiting SUAS, such as the who survive the initial artillery disruption ments on US Army’s cannon artillery.” Phillip Karber, Examining Russia's Policy Near, Abroad, and Around portrayal above, is not new. Capt. Christo- Fires, may continue to advance towards the World, 2015 AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition, pher Brandt, Headquarters and Headquar- 3-4th CAV troop positions, still tracked by Washington D.C., Oct. 12-15, 2015. Megan Eckstein, RIMPAC 2016: Marines Test UAVs for Artillery ters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 89th Cavalry CAV SUAS infiltration teams, and subse- Calls for Fire, Close Air Support, U.S. Naval Institute News, Regiment commander, makes use of this quently engaged by 120 mm mortars. Any Aug. 1, 2016. Maj. Bobby Sickler, Maj. David Henderson and John Hansen, An In- emerging concept in his article titled, “The remnant forces of these two targeting cycles tegrated Division Deep Fight, Deep Battle 2.0, Center for Army Future of Unmanned Systems in Cavalry will be severely attrited and dispatched by Lessons Learned (CALL), February 2017 issue, p. 1. Lt. Col. Scott Pence, 2017. “The Lethality Imperative: Training Cav- Squadrons.” He opens with a vignette in 50 cal. and/or M240B fire. This echelonment alry Squadrons to Fight for Information.” Armor, Summer which small cavalry teams, not unlike the of fire coordinated by 3-4th CAV and sup- 2017, p. 4. Maj. Nathan Jennings, Maj. Amos Fox, Maj. Adam L. Taliaferro, Maj. Raven/FIST combination advocated for ported by 3rd Battalion, 7th Field Artillery David Griffith and Maj. Kyle Trottier, 2017. “The Return of previously, infiltrate adversarial lines for Regiment, is what creates a wood chip- Cavalry: A Multi-Domain Battle Study” Armor, Summer 2017, p.18. the purpose of generating calls for fire. He per-like scenario, ensuring the maximum Robert S. Davidson, 2000. “R&S lessons learned-brigade reconnais- states, “At the press of a button, the drone lethality of all weapons systems, while sance troop employment.” Military Intelligence Professional lazes the target, and it delivers a set of trian- maintaining an appropriate stand-off range Bulletin. Vol. 26, Issue 4. p. 62. Brandt, Davidson, 2014. “The Future of Unmanned Cavalry in Caval- gulated set of coordinates to the enemy po- between forward CAV elements and ad- ry Squadrons.” 2014 Starry Writing Competition Finalist. p. 1.

11 Brandt, Davidson, 2014. “The Future of Unmanned Cavalry in Cavalry Squadrons.” 2014 Starry Writing Competition Finalist. p. 1.

24 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club US air defense artillery foreign advising The strategic NCO leveraging the operational art By Maj. Christopher Garnett

Working themes Ad in Lack of v standard a training is r managment T e Get them to see themselves Immature Overreliance logistics on advisors

Heavily No IAMD Culture Vision centralized C2

Safety Immature OPSEC IAMD INTEL PME Work within the HN system No joint Incomplete doctrine vision Lack of SME-E Conscription Procurement Immature Not sharing

maintenance BPs e De ning systems success

c Not sharing Keep it simple

n Tactical sites Threat INTEL lessons learned e USG/USC not

Inexperienced working within Sustainment

u Senior Leaders the HN System

Experience A

Regional s I

Inuence HN has no s

i &

s exercise model Stay on message

n I

Patience: capabilities take time to mature A Rubrick’s Cube is used to depict some of the challenges faced during the train, advise, assist, inform and influence phases along with the themes to overcome the challenges. (Rick Paape/information provided by Maj. Christopher Garnett)

As the global trend for air defense capa- immature systems and processes, the ad- bilities to deter regional actors continues, visory team leaders must be able to prop- Inform and influence Broad LOOs: train, advise and assist, so will the need for U.S. Army air defend- erly assess both the current defense forces’ inform and influence and interagency in- ers to possess the operational flexibility to as well as the advisory team’s capabilities. tegration. Advisory operations begin-and- conduct theater security cooperation or This will ensure they devise a realistic plan end with influencing decision-makers. U.S. State Department-led Foreign Military with broad lines of operation (LOOs) and Therefore, making it an independent LOO Sales’ long-term advisory missions in order realistic lines of effort that are supported is a safe starting place. For air defense oper- to train, advise, and assist foreign militar- with attainable objectives. ies. Though the officer has a defined strate- ations, creating three to four classes with a For training basic-to-intermediate gun- gic role on the advisory team, it is the non- specified target-audience addressing battal- nery and campaign planning implementa- commissioned officer that must be able to ion-level maintenance and sustainment option to be effective while working in small operate at the tactical level while being able erations class (targeting battalion-level staff teams, advisors must go beyond simply to influence leaders at the strategic level officers), Battery Commander’s Class- (fo providing foreign disclosed documents thru key leader engagements, classes and cused on battalion and battery command- and training manuals in an effort to train briefings. This article provides both a con- er’s, current and future), and a ‘Patriot 101’ the host nation defense forces. While work- cept and considerations for advising for- Class (targeting division-level and higher ing with host nation defense forces with eign air defense forces with the end-state of leaders). highly centralized decision-making, and “working oneself out of a job.” Maintenance and sustainment systems

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 25 expertise from an advisory team, a clas- sic and genuine decentralized approach of assigning advisors to individual battalions and brigades, while operating inde- pendently over extended periods of time, provides the most influence. This approach rapidly allows the sharing of host nations’ observations, best practices, insights and lessons learned amongst the advisory team and enables the team to identify trends while analyzing and assessing the operational needs. Soldiers from C Battery, 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, 10th Army Air and Missile -De Green-suiter-contractor teams fense joined armies across Europe to celebrate and officially mark one hundred years of the Republic ADA advisors will find U.S. contrac- of Estonia. (Courtesy photo) tor system support within the host nation. In lieu of operating parallel to each other, and processes, globally, shows a lack of saging. This vertical and lateral approach constructing two-man green-suiter and knowledge for the level of support needed to messaging maximizes the efforts and ap- contractor teams can have added value and to sustain air defense operations without plies the correct level of support as the host create a balanced approach to messaging impeding operational readiness. A further nation defense forces mature in capability. training value to the host nation. As the ad- concern, regardless of region, is the spe- Keeping the host nation’s military and eth- visory team leader, matching personalities cial operations force threat against Patriot nic culture in mind, the following 10 advis- with contractors will create a significant operations and the need to defend against ing themes are examples during specific influencing force when messaging is rein- asymmetric threats. Addressing tactical phases throughout an advisory mission: forced from both parties, as well as having site manning and design considerations in 1. Work within their system: It’s mul- the organizational reach-back (i.e., doctrine order to enhance survivability for battery tiple-centuries old. We’re not here to and training as well as material and system commanders is a class that provides lead- change their culture, we’re here to work support). ers alternative considerations based on the in it. Exercising genuine decentralized op- regional threat. 2. Put them into position to see themselves: erations by assigning capable ADA NCO Lastly, a class that broadly discusses Host nations won’t understand it until advisors to battalions and brigades, with basic Patriot capabilities and limitations they experience it first-hand. broad guidance while operating in a de- with senior leaders addresses training and 3. Build the bench: Broaden a host nation gree of ambiguity, unleashes a tremendous readiness observations made and allows to train more crews, not just the top per- amount of influence while simultaneously advisors to directly discuss with key deci- formers. Focused training wins out. demonstrating trust among the team. Push- sion-makers. This often results in immedi- 4. The Beatles effect: U.S. advisors have ing the envelope by enabling the profes- ate decisions being made. Having a LOO immediate legitimacy before walking sional growth that these highly qualified focused solely on informing and influenc- into the room. Be careful on what you ADA NCOs gain by exercising the opera- ing leaders at all levels, is a critical compo- advise as it can quickly become policy. tional art of linking the tactical to strategic nent to advisory operations while setting 5. The human connection: The best objectives is not only a concept that should conditions for institutional changes needed. hip-pocket training with the host nation to be embraced, but also a quality that is to talk about your family and interests Interagency integration needs to be celebrated. Working with other U.S. agencies re- back home. Maj. Chris Garnett is the 2nd Battalion, quires an understanding of their culture, 6. BP-OILLs: Best practices and obser- how they operate and their expectations vations, insights, and lessons learned. 44th Air Defense Artillery battalion opera- and previous experiences in working with Spread them and emphasize them. tions officer, at Fort Campbell, Ky. He recently the U.S. Department of Defense. However, 7. Test and gauge: Use initial host nation completed a one-year tour with the U.S. State at the end of the day “people and personali- engagements to test and assess their un- Department in the Far East leading a team of ties” ultimately prevail as the single indica- derstanding of operations, training and seven U.S. Army air defense artillery non- tor of success for interagency relationships. sustainment requirements. commissioned officers and one warrant officer Similar to a good marriage, striving for 60 8. Patience, staying on target: Emphasize advising foreign defense forces on establishing percent in a supporting role of the partner- the small things and keep the messag- Patriot PAC-3 air defense capabilities. Previous ship leads to success. This includes adopt- ing simple. Basic capabilities take time assignments include D Battery, 3rd Battalion, ing their jargon, dress attire and genuinely to mature. 2nd Air Defense Artillery commander and supporting their organizational objectives. 9. Centralized control: Don’t let the frus- Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 31st Advising themes trations detract from staying on course. In lieu of clear-cut objectives while ad- 10. Tactical assessment messaging: Doc- Air Defense Artillery Brigade commander. Gar- vising, themes at designated phases and trine, doctrine, doctrine. nett’s education includes both the U.S. Marine levels of leadership across the host nation’s Decentralized operations Corps’ Expeditionary Warfare School and Com- organization enables synchronized mes- In order to maximize the subject-matter mand and Staff College, Quantico, Va.

26 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club Reactive counterfire

ByAn Chief Warrantalgebraic Officer 3 Jeremy Taylor approach and Capt. Steven Hojnicki The threat of high volume near-peer on the battlefield and conducting a surviv- and in conjunction with the brigade current adversary indirect fire is a reality for- al ability move within minutes. To counter operations cell who clear ground and air. lied and partnered artillery units stationed this threat U.S. and allied brigade combat Once approved for execution, targets are throughout the world. Potential adversary teams (BCTs) employ a counterfire system sent to the field artillery battalion fire direc- weapon systems cannot only range farther, that spans multiple nodes. tion center which in turn selects the firing but can displace quicker, thus making our The system starts with the tactical acqui- unit or units to deliver the desired effects. Doctrinally designed to provide effective counterfire problem one that is more diffi- sition of enemy rounds by Firefinder radar. destructive Fires on enemy artillery sys- cult to solve. Systems such as the 2S19M1 Acquisitions are then sent to the brigade’s tems, the counterfire system in execution are capable of delivering devastating effects counterfire cell, which processes the target, does not always reflect reality. Top: Figure 1. Total counter fire average time by exercise day. (Rick Paape) Bottom: Figure 2. The Every month at the Joint Multinational reactive counterfire variables. (Courtesy illustration) Readiness Center, the Vampire Fire Support Team observes units struggling to decrease 15:00 counterfire times. In fact, over the last year the average counterfire time (acquisition to 13:60 shot) across a wide variety of U.S. and multinational units hovers around 12 minutes. Our team observed is that many variables 12:20 come into play when dealing with counterfire and that it is more than a simple time standard, it is an algebraic expression. By 10:80 breaking down the variables of the counterfire problem, we can start to understand 9:40 the distinct challenges BCTs have with their counterfire systems and how by isolating and accounting for various variables, units 8:00 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 can start to improve their sensor-to-shooter times.

Tactical Field Artillery Battalion Common Variables Enemy Variables Acquisition BN FDC: 35 seconds • Weapon System (Light vs Heavy) OPFOR displacement times • Terrain (Mountainous vs Flat) 2S12: 3 mins 10-60 seconds BTRY/PLT processing time: • Coordinating Altitude 2S9-1: 1 min 45 seconds (Analog) • Fire Support Coordination Measures 2S23: 1 min 35 seconds (Digital) • Asset Availability D-20: 2.5 min Within 10 seconds if round • Clearance of Fires D-30: 3.5 min height is corrected by digital Time at the Guns: • Desired effects 2S19M1: 1-2 min maps, 20 seconds if height is • Weather effects G6: 1 min corrected manually, and 60 30 seconds (M119A3) seconds if height is corrected 45 seconds (M109A6) • Pattern Analysis BM-21: 2 min by voice). 1 minute (M777A2) • AI vs CAS allocation 9P140 Uragan: 3 min • Unit Proficiency 9A52-2 Smerch: 3 min *Ref TC 3-09.8 NOV 16 *Ref TC 3-09.8 NOV 16 • Drop Card vs Digital (CTC only) *Ref WEG- Volume I - Dec 2015

Target Acquisition + FA Battalion + Common Variables = Unit Reactive Counterfire time 10-60 seconds + 100-140 seconds + Common Variables = (110-200)+X seconds

(Enemy Variables + Common Variables) - Unit Reactive Counterfire time = Success (+) or Failure (-)

*All three CTCs have confirmed there is not a clear doctrinal explanation of what reactive counterfire time standard should be.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 27 Soldiers fire the Paladin weapon system during a live-fire training exercise. (Courtesy photo)

tion table of organization and equipment lines. Additionally, factors such as weather Field Artillery Battalion provides the personnel and equipment that conditions, adversary threat and incorrect makes the entire system work and therefore ammunition allocation across the battalion Battalion re direction plays a vital role in effective return of Fires. also increase response times. center: Starting with its sensors, the organic radar Common Variables 85 seconds crews have a time standard between 10-60 Adversary tactics, techniques and proce- seconds to receive and process acquisitions. dures in combination with the capabilities Battery/platoon processing This process is generally smooth and not to emplace, shoot and displace in an expe- times: the source of a lot of additional time add- dited manner give the BCT a limited time 45 seconds (analog) ed to the BCT’s overall processing time. to return effective Fires. This time, called 35 seconds (digital) Typical factors to consider when trying to target decay time, is what the BCT places reduce time with radars include crew pro- in their target selection standards (TSS) and Time at guns: ficiency and digital connectivity with the decision support matrix. It sets the time 30 seconds (M119A3) counterfire element. standard that the BCT must achieve to have 45 seconds (M109A6) Whereas radars typically do not inhibit an effective response. Both the friendly and 1 minute (M777A2) counterfire times, the field artillery- battal adversarial forces face a multitude of com- ion can influence the overall time signifi- mon variables the BCT needs to consider Ref. TC 3-09.8 Nov. 2016 cantly. The FA cannon battalion is allotted when determining target decay time. Exec- 1:40- 2:20 minutes standard by doctrine to utors continuously find themselves chasing process and fire a mission. The time begins acquisitions while staying frustrated with Figure 3. The field artillery battalion’s process- at receipt of mission by the battalion fire all the clearance procedures that prolong ing times. (Rick Paape) direction center. This part of the algebraic friendly response times. problem is the area that the FA battalion The total amount of time the BCT has Field artillery battalion time has the most control of. It is also the area to respond to adversary Fires is a gap that standards that needs the most focus and repetitions currently resides in doctrine from sensor The field artillery battalion owns the to elevate the training competency of the to shooter. Current doctrine accounts for BCT’s counterfire process. Their modifica- crews at the fire direction centers and gun the time it should take to process a tactical

28 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club quired for occupation and target decay BCT can prevent violations of these mea- Common Variables time. Here is where we ask ourselves, how sures that require coordination to clear. • Weapon system (light much time do we have to respond to the Violations caught during sensor-to-shooter threat? Does this target align with the high technical rehearsals can resolve issues prior vs heavy) payoff target list (HPTL), target selection to operations, decreasing surface-to-surface • Terrain (mountain vs at) standards (TSS) and attack guidance matrix response times. This will reduce violations • Coordinating altitude (AGM)? An additional element to consider that require coordination with the creator • Fire support coordination is if the delivery platform is a joint asset. If of the coordinating measure. measures so, does the echelon possess the requisite 4. Asset availability • Asset availability mission command apparatus to facilitate a Allocation of assets to achieve the com- timely response? Is the delivery asset a light mander’s desired effects for each phase of • Clearance of Fires or heavy artillery unit? Can they shoot and the operation is vital. Dedicating assets in • Desired eects move prior to the target decay and still sup- response to adversary Fires during a high • Weather eects port additional fire support tasks? operational tempo (OPTEMPO) period is • Pattern analysis 2. Coordinating altitude and challenging. Commanders, through their • AI vs CAS allocation airspace coordination staffs, must visualize the area of operation measures and area of influence, but conceptualize the • Unit prociency The coordinating altitude (typically area of interest to truly allocate resources • Drop card vs digital (CTC recommended by the Airspace Control and assets deliberately and dynamically only) Authority and approved by the joint force in time and space. Units must focus on the commander), may be adjusted to accom- attrition of adversary fire support systems modate specific missions or phases of the in the area of interest through targeting. Figure 4. Common variables for the field artil- operation. An increased coordinating al- This effort can reduce the adversary’s capa- lery battalion. (Rick Paape) titude in the early phases of an operation bilities to conduct deliberate and dynamic acquisition, for the field artillery battalion creates a permissive surface-to-surface Fires before they can influence the area of fire direction center to process a (fire for Fires environment, enabling the attrition of operations. Reducing the adversary’s ca- effect) counterfire mission, for the battery adversary air defense and artillery threats pability to deliberately target or respond fire direction center to process a battalion and increasing friendly response times. to friendly actions allows friendly delivery counterfire mission, and the time for the de- Environmental assessments (mountainous systems to remain in position long enough livery asset to execute the mission. This gap versus flat terrain), adversary air threats, to deliver the required volume of fire to exists at the brigade, regardless of whether phases of the operation and operational ob- achieve the commander’s desired effects. the counterfire cell resides at the field artil- jectives should continuously be evaluated Through these efforts we can decrease in order to affect a changes to airspace con- friendly response times in the area of oper- lery battalion or the brigade. The operation- trol measures. Additionally, proper analy- ations and mitigate the chances of friendly al aspects and multiple common and adver- sis and synchronization of fire support and assets (Army and joint) becoming over- sary variables that must be considered for airspace coordination measures placement whelmed during high OPTEMPO periods. each counterfire make it extremely difficult, of assets by phase can assist in creating a This is where the decision to mass friendly if not impossible, to establish a comprehen- permissive surface-to-surface environment FA assets factors into position selection. A sive doctrinal time standard from sensor to therefore decreasing friendly response common BCT practice that is encouraged, shooter. times and mitigating the time it takes to is to give the opportunity to mass the BCT’s Staff sections can help mitigate some of clear air space. indirect assets while dedicating a counter- the frustrations during the planning process fire battery. The table below depicts the by considering the variables (mission, ene- 3. Fire support coordination benefit of massing. my, terrain, troops available, time and civil- measures The BCT must monitor and scrub co- ian considerations) in its entirety. By doing 5. Desired effects ordination and control measures in their Any single delivery platform can en- so, planners can truly conceptualize how area of operations in real-time. If included gage a target in a timely manner, but can to select and position each radar, recom- in rehearsals and maintained in real-time it achieve the commander’s desired effects? mend howitzer positioning guidance and throughout the execution of operations, the The commander’s desired effect and type integrate other sensors; tying all sensors to available shooters. This is a cyclic process, Firing time 54 Average Adversary window not a “fire and forget” one. Throughout Number of tubes rounds displacement time for effect the planning process, planners must also 18 1 min. 7 min. consider additional variables to facilitate a decrease in friendly response times. Below 14 1 min. 7 min. are some of the most important variables, 12 2 min. 8 min. though this list is not all-inclusive: 6 3 min. + 6 min. 9 min. 1. Weapon systems and size of 5 5 min. 11 min. the element 4 8 min. 14 min. The artillery weapon type and the size of the element will determine the area re- 3 12 min. 18 min.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 29 of munition determines the standard firing tern analysis can contribute to an increase response times by informing call for fire order to achieve effects on the target. Dy- in response times because the BCT now has zone placement and proactive counterfire. namically synchronizing and de-conflicting to react to the adversary instead of focusing 7. Air interdiction vs close air multiple delivery platforms to engage a their efforts in a proactive nature. Pattern support target to achieve the commander’s desired analysis provides the staff with the type of The apportionment (based off the weight effects will inherently decrease overall re- adversary weapon system, times the adver- of effort) and allocation (mission type by sponse times. Understanding, visualizing sary attacks, locations the adversary occu- percentage i.e., offensive counter-air, - de and planning for the amount of resources, pies and what the adversary is targeting. fensive counter-air, air interdiction, strike the amount of ammunition and type of as- Prior to conducting reactive counterfire, coordination and reconnaissance, close air set(s) required to achieve the commander’s the BCT uses this analysis to feed into their support) affects how and when joint Fires desired effect is paramount. The BCT can targeting process. This process synchroniz- engages adversary fire support assets. Joint reduce the time required to achieve these es detection and delivery assets across the assets have the ability to be extremely re- desired effects through massing of -indi BCT and prioritizes the requests for joint sponsive if, through the targeting process, rect or joint assets. Through massing and assets from higher headquarters. Concep- they are allocated to the BCT. Understand- dispersion of their own indirect assets, the tualizing how the adversary arrays its own ing the prioritization and allocation of joint BCT can further complicate the adversaries counterfire solution by forcing the -adver detection and delivery forces on the battle- assets, by phase, and the process to request sary to choose which one of the possible 18 field is crucial. Understanding the -previ them will guide our request efforts to independent acquisitions they will conduct ously stated elements in addition to the sur- achieve effects on the BCT’s HPTL. Further, counterfire on. rounding terrain and mobility corridors to we must begin to consider and plan for the 6. Pattern analysis and from possible artillery movement areas contested air effort that a near-peer threat The BCT can decrease the response times and radar positioning areas will assist in possesses which may ultimately reduce the by using historical data to facilitate pattern the overall analysis. Pattern analysis helps apportionment and allocation of joint assets analysis. And to add to that, a lack of pat- confirm or deny predictions and decreases in support of brigade operations.

A 2S19M1 Russian artillery system. (Vitaly Kuzmin/Wikimedia)

30 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club and throughout each phase of the opera- using digital (preferred) or voice commu- Enemy Variables tion. Enemy displacement times help de- nications. A quick-fire channel allows for OPFOR displacement times velop our target decay time by each target rapid engagement of radar acquisitions by type. Once the BCT detects the adversary’s streamlining the sensor to the shooter pro- • 2S12: 3 min. indirect fire, target decay is the length of cess. The unit’s ability to establish a quick- • 2S9-1: 1 min. time the BCT has to engage the target be- fire channel that is linked to a dedicated • 2S23: 1 min. fore it displaces. A gap resides in deter- delivery element, will result in a decreased • D-20: 2.5 min. mining accurate target decay time for each response time, enabling rapid engagement • D-30: 3.5 min. target type that we may encounter. Factors of radar acquisitions. that must be considered are doctrinal dis- The challenging terrain in the Hohenfels • 2S19M1: 1-2 min. placement times (as depicted in Figure 5), Training Area creates realistic communica- • G6: 1 min. type of terrain, weather, age of the equip- tion challenges within the BCT’s counterfire • BM-21: 2 min. ment, volume of fire, crew proficiency and system, causing the counterfire cell, on oc- • 9P140 Uragan: 3 min. size of the element. These seven factors casion, to route missions through battalion • 9A52-2 Smerch: 3 min. (not all-inclusive) may increase the time we to forward them to the designated coun- have to achieve effects prior to target decay. terfire battery, inherently increasing the The depicted displacement times are per response times and causing the brigade to Figure 5. The opposing forces displacement system. These doctrinal displacement times reach target decay time. times. (Rick Paape) do not factor in how the common vari- While the task of decreasing average ables affect the adversaries displacement counterfire times is daunting, it is certain- 8. Unit proficiency time; such as type of terrain (mountainous ly not impossible. The best units are those Understanding the three components of or flat), weather (muddy or dry), age and who make counterfire a priority for the joint fire support: target acquisition,- com condition of the enemy equipment, and the entire brigade and consistently work to de- mand and control, and attack/delivery sys- size of the element (a single system, pla- sign efficiencies into the system prior to -ar tems — tying sensors (layered intelligence, toon, battery, battalion, brigade, etc.). riving at a combat training center. Further, surveillance and reconnaissance) to shoot- Recommendations this process is continually refined by the ers is vital. Rotational units at the Joint Mul- Realistic sensor-to-shooter technical re- BCT and in doing so, the BCT does not rel- tinational Readiness Center throughout the hearsals are essential to success in driving egate this as strictly a “Fires” problem, but last 12 months averaged around 12 minutes down the total processing time for coun- as a BCT problem. Training on counterfire from sensor to shooter. Different geome- terfire missions. Rehearsals such as the bri- must be dynamic and allow realistic vari- tries and common operating pictures cre- gade fire support and technical rehearsals ables to influence the system. In doing so, ated unnecessary coordination violations, help the brigade synchronize the formation units begin to understand which variables increasing response times. Additionally, and create a common picture of how the affect them and the adversary the most and units struggled with publishing the attack brigade will employ its joint Fires assets. start working effective mitigation steps to guidance matrix and target selection stan- Brigades must ensure that time is prop- address those adding the most time. dards which resulted in increased response erly allocated to execute these rehearsals Capt. Steven Hojnicki is a field artillery of- times. Without an AGM or TSS from high- in order to ensure that the entire fire sup- ficer serving as the 7th Army Training Com- er, units often attempted to determine the port system understands their role and is mand, Vampire Team senior Fires analyst, at the proper delivery asset and desired effects able to work out problems within the plan. Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Ho- through their default settings on their dig- Counterfire injects must be included in all henfels, Germany. He has previously served in ital tactical Fires systems, which was rou- rehearsals to provide a realistic complex 4th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, tinely insufficient. Further points of friction combat environment. Counterfire injects that increase response times are Advanced add a dynamic component to a deliberate 5th Battlefield Coordination Detachment and Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AF- plan. Counterfire injects during rehearsals 7th Army Training Command. Operational de- ATDS) operator proficiency and proper allow time for the field artillery battalion, ployments include one in support of Operation manning. Units typically under-resource the brigade and both staffs to conceptualize Enduring Freedom. the counterfire cell, dedicating individu- detection and delivery assets in time and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeremy Taylor is a als that do not understand how to operate space, without overwhelming either. Addi- 131A, targeting officer. He is currently a 7th the AFATDS. Furthermore, the counterfire tionally, counterfire injects during technical Army Training Command, Vampire Team ob- cell is typically undermanned, forcing in- rehearsals allow the staff to validate the po- server coach/trainer, at the Joint Multinational dividuals to focus solely on the reactive sitioning of the delivery element while tak- Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He side, neglecting the analysis required to be ing into consideration the trajectory of the entered the military in March of 1999 as a 13B proactive. Units that establish and rehearse round and gun target line with respect to cannon crewmember. In 2009 he transitioned to a counterfire battle drill saw a decrease in active coordination measures (fire support the rank of warrant officer. He has previously response times and provided the unit suf- and air) based on known friendly howitzer ficient time to conduct analysis on each ac- locations and enemy-predicted firing loca- served in 25th Infantry Division, 434th Field quisition to establish a pattern analysis. tions. An effective tactic, technique and pro- Artillery Brigade, 101st Infantry Division, Enemy variables cedure to facilitate responsive counterfire is 3rd Infantry Division, and 7th Army Training Enemy variables are considerations we the establishment of a quick-fire channel. Command. He has two operational deployments must account for in the planning process The quick-fire channel can be established in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 31 Soldiers, with the 5th Battalion 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, stage Patriot missile defense systems for a Patriot Shock exercise in Capu Midia, Romania. The weeklong exercise tests the unit’s quick response deployment readiness and increases joint interoperability with Patriot missile systems and their Romanian partners. (Tech. Sgt. Brian Kimball/U.S. Air Force)

Preparing air missile defense, joint force against near-peer threat By Maj Bryan A. Card

32 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club phasis is missile defense training because The current lack of a joint training re- “against near-peer threats, today’s AMD quirements for Patriot crews hurts the [Air and Missile Defense] force is unfortu- readiness of the entire joint force. First, the nately far too susceptible to suppression.”3 air battle scenarios that Patriot Soldiers cer- In order to mitigate risk against the near- tify and train with do not typically include peer threat, Patriot operators need to reg- advanced, complex threats incorporating ularly participate in joint training and ex- near-peer tactics. Patriot training is based ercises such as Red Flag and United States on air battle management levels (ABML), Air Force Weapons School Integration which specify a certain number of threats (WSINT). These events provide complex, and different threat types — e.g. ballistic joint environments to learn about these ad- and cruise missiles, fixed- and rotary-wing vanced threats and friendly operating stan- aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. dards and capabilities, as well as provide However, there is no requirement to de- the opportunity to develop and hone joint velop a comprehensive threat presentation tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). using advanced adversary tactics, nor to Such training will ensure that both Patriot incorporate joint TTPs.7 Lacking a realistic operators and the rest of the joint force are scenario presentation can make it difficult prepared to employ an integrated air de- for Patriot operators to determine friend fense system against a near-peer threat. from foe in the ambiguity of a contested Currently, neither Patriot operators nor environment with electronic attack impact- the joint force is postured to effectively em- ing communications, GPS, radar returns ploy the Patriot system against a near-peer and identification, friend or foe receivers. threat. Last year, Capt. Michael Schwartz Second, by failing to mandate recurring highlighted some of these challenges in a joint training for the Patriot unit, the joint Fires Bulletin article. He posits that “The force has little exposure to Patriot TTPs and majority of Patriot battalion deployments to limited opportunities to work with Patriot Central Command … have not likely tested Soldiers to develop new, joint TTPs incor- leaders’ abilities to encounter a wide range porating the Patriot system to contend with of mixed air threats and complex, integrat- near-peer threat. ed attacks,” such as those that would be Joint training opportunities encountered in a conflict with a near-peer Red Flag is the Air Force’s premiere air- adversary.4 to-air combat training exercise. It offers the Near-peer adversaries possess sophisti- opportunity to interact with the “air forces cated airpower platforms and the ability to of the United States, its allies and coalition add more fog and friction to the operation- partners,” incorporating “all spectrums of al environment by denying and degrading warfare, including command and control, many of the systems and capabilities that real-time intelligence, analysis and ex- the joint force has come to rely upon, thus ploitation and electronic warfare.”8 WSINT creating a complex threat environment.5 is the capstone to the five-and-a-half-month Schwartz goes on to state “the norm- pro Weapons Instructor Course, bringing all In 2014, two events changed the global duced in this unopposed, low air threat era Air Force Mission Design Series together security environment: the Russian invasion has not flexed air defense artillery leaders’ for joint integration and synchronizing ef- of Crimea and China’s militarization of is- tactical decision-making skills and high- fects. Of particular interest to the Patriot lands in the South China Sea.1 These events lights the need to prepare for a paradigm community is the defensive counter-air increased the probability of interstate war, shift to the future battlefield.”6 (DCA) mission, which presents “nearly an which means the United States needs to As a result, it is clear that Patriot oper- impossible problem where ‘blue’ forces are reemphasize countering near-peer capabil- ators need to train against the advanced outnumbered nearly four to one.” Patriot ities in a complex, joint environment.2 One threats posed by near-peer adversaries in a planners develop defense designs along- area in particular that requires special em- joint environment, on a regular basis. side some of the most talented air defense

1 “Air Force Update: Remarks by General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the 2017 Air Warfare Symposium,” 02 March 2017, 3: http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/csaf/letter3/CSAF_Mar17_AFA_ Transcript.pdf 2 “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015,” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015, 4: www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_ Strategy.pdf 3 Thomas Karako and Wes Rumbaugh, “Distributed Defense: New Operational Concepts for Integrated Air and Missile Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Lanham, MD: January 2018, Rowman and Littlefield), 1. 4 Michael Schwartz, “Leader development: The air defense artillery transformation’s biggest challenge,” Fires, March April 2017, 17. 5 Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s First Fifth-Generation Fighter Jet Enters Service with the PLAAD,” The Diplomat, 14 March 2017: http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-first-fifth-generation-fighter-jet-enters-service- with-the-plaaf/ and Jeffery Lin and P.W. Singer, “China Builds Its Own ‘Wild Weasel’ to Suppress Air Defenses,” Popular Science, 29 December 2016: http://www.popsci.com/china-builds-its-own-wild-weasel-to- suppress-air-defenses#page-5 6 Schwartz, 17. 7 “32nd AAMDC Training Circular 3-01.86 Supplement,” 32nd AAMDC, August 2016, 101. 8 Zade Vadnais, “Air Force Conducts Red Flag 17-2 Exercise at Nellis AFB,” Department of Defense News, 6 March 2017: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1103651/air-force-conducts-red-flag-17-2-exercise-at-nellis-afb/

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 33 planners in the Air Force.9 For instance, at peer-weapon system to DCA fighters, and WSINT in 2012, Patriot exercised advanced, not simply a counter-missile system. integrated air defense in a complex air Another benefit of this interaction with and missile threat environment, requiring the joint air defense community is the detailed integration of friendly DCA air- knowledge gained can be brought back craft—to include fifth generation fighters— to improve in-house Patriot training. The into a joint engagement zone (JEZ). The more that is learned about friendly TTPs, defense planning and execution created a the more accurately those TTPs can be rep- situation where “Patriot was considered resented in Patriot ABML training, leading a peer weapon system to fighters, versus to more realistic unit training. DCA combat a capability of last resort.”10 Red Flag and air patrols can also be represented accurate- WSINT delivers at least five opportunities ly based on the desired engagement zone per year to learn about joint air operations, with correct air-to-air intercept ranges. This hone TTPs, and “experience realistic com- will support realistic JEZ operations and bat scenarios in order to prepare and train DCA aircraft-to-Patriot engagement hand- for future conflicts” such as those posed by offs in ABML scenarios. Additionally, joint near-peer adversaries.11 sensors such as the Control and Reporting Training at Red Flag and WSINT pro- Center’s TPS-75 radars and the E-3 AWACS duces several benefits that prepare both can be better incorporated into training sce- Patriot Soldiers and the joint force for the narios to more accurately represent the sen- near-peer threat. First, Patriot planners with sor network displayed on the tactical data- their joint counterparts will work through link network. Finally, the composite threat presentation at Red Flag and WSINT will the mission planning process against chal- help Patriot trainers create training scenari- lenging, if not near impossible, threat pre- os that reflect the near-peer threat environ- sentations. They will help develop new ment. By integrating knowledge gained on tactics to counter these threats and execute friendly operating standards and TTPs as them in practice, learning from their mis- well as the likely adversary threat presenta- takes during the debrief process. They will tion into daily Patriot training, Patriot Sol- also have the opportunity to brief Patriot diers will be better prepared to identify and capabilities and limitations to the joint au- protect friendly aircraft in the ambiguity of dience and lead mission briefs, enhancing a contested environment, while at the same the credibility of the Patriot community. time, engage advanced threats presented All of these benefits will in turn help by near-peers. build mutual understanding, trust and Red Flag at Nellis AFB, Nev., occurs confidence between the Patriot and joint three to four times per year and WSINT is a communities. This relationship building biannual exercise, allowing multiple oppor- will then carry over to actual operations. tunities for Patriot Soldiers to train on a re- By regularly training with the joint force curring basis. Ideally, Soldiers would train in challenging threat environments, the on actual Patriot equipment at these events. confidence that is built will translate into However, this is not cost effective or logis- trust during actual operations. Tactics de- tically feasible. Virtual training presents a veloped during these training events will realistic alternative to utilizing the actual play aircraft to the operator as organic Pa- also carry over to TTPs used in theater to Patriot system and, fortunately, the Air De- triot radar tracks. These systems simulate counter the near-peer threat. Furthermore, fense Training Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, terrain and actual detection ranges, and can since each theater’s area air defense com- has supported both of these events with participate on the tactical datalink network, mander (AADC), usually a senior Air Force the Reconfigurable Table Top Trainer (RT3) further enhancing realism. This virtual officer, sets the rules of engagement (ROE) and Virtual Patriot (vPat) on an ad hoc ba- training closely mimics the training that a for Army air and missile defense (AMD), sis since December 2014. The RT3 and vPat real system affords, allowing operators to greater exposure to the joint force during allow Patriot Soldiers to participate in Red seamlessly interact with live aircraft and air exercises can have a positive impact on Flag and WSINT without having the actual controlling agencies operating on the Nellis theater ROE.12 By instilling trust in the Ar- Patriot system by utilizing the Nellis Test range. Virtual training is an effective use of my’s ability to protect friendly aircraft and and Training Range Network, which tracks training dollars as it allows a greater num- confidence in the Army’s ability to execute the location, speed and weapons state of ber of Patriot Soldiers training opportuni- specific TTPs to counter advanced threats, nearly all aircraft on the Nellis range. This ties than would be available if a Patriot bat- the AADC may grant additional responsi- aircraft information is passed to the RT3 talion’s equipment had to be deployed to bility to Patriot units, treating Patriot as a and vPat simulators, which in turn can dis- support every training event. Thus, the RT3

9 Kevin Tanenbaum, “USAFWS: Defensive Counter Air,” Nellis Air Force Base Website, 18 January 2017, http://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Article/1054502/usafws-defensive-counter-air/ 10 Edward O’Neill, Michael Cochrane, and Doug Blanchette, “Joint Tactical Air Picture: A Technical Approach to Gaining Clarity in the Air Domain,” Fires, March-April 2013, 33. 11 Ibid. 12 Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-30, “Command and Control,” 7 November 2014, 36, 38 and JP 3-01, “Countering Air and Missile Threats,” 23 March 2012, III-10 and III-16.

34 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club Sgt. Eric Terlau (right) and Pvt. 1st Class Draney (left), Soldiers with the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, brief members of the Romanian Air Force on Patriot Missile Launcher capabilities during a Patriot Shock exercise in Capu Midia, Romania. (Tech. Sgt. Brian Kim- ball/U.S. Air Force)

and vPat simulators allow Patriot Soldiers on a recurring basis. This will allow Patriot using the actual or virtual Patriot systems, to train with the joint force in a complex Soldiers to learn from other service part- will be a joint force that is much better pre- environment against near-peer threats on a ners and in turn, will teach joint partners pared to deal with the near-peer threat. regular basis and work with joint partners about Army AMD while developing TTPs Maj. Bryan Card is the 710th Combat Oper- to plan missions, develop TTPs to deal with to counter the near-peer threat. Once vali- ations Squadron chief of weapons and tactics at advanced threats, and to debrief what went dated, this practice can be adopted for use Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va. He is responsible wrong and what can be done better. in theater and the relationships developed for training and tactics development and evalu- “Train as you fight” is a familiar phrase between the Patriot and joint communi- ation to support air component operations. He in the Army and for good reason—you ties during training will help build mutual recently returned from the U.S. Air Force Cen- will fight as you have trained. Currently, understanding, trust and confidence, ulti- tral Combined Air Operations Center where he both Patriot Soldiers and the joint force are mately leading to the utilization of Patriot worked as a non-kinetic duty officer, integrating ill-prepared to utilize the Patriot system as a peer-weapon system to DCA aircraft. air, space and cyber capabilities into joint opera- against the near-peer threat simply because In order to facilitate this increased joint Patriot Soldiers are not regularly training training regimen, virtual Patriot training tions. Card is also a Fires Center of Excellence’s with their joint partners to combat this systems should be utilized to incorporate as Capabilities Development and Integration Cell threat. In order to overcome this training many Patriot Soldiers as possible and grant project manager. He provides command and shortfall, Patriot Soldiers should deploy to the widest exposure to the joint communi- control and tactical data link support to the Nellis AFB to train at Red Flag and WSINT ty. The result of such joint training, whether Army and Joint Staff.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 35 Artillery’s role in sea-based

Byexpeditionary Maj. Adam Ropelewski Fires Fire support and maritime history was off a Navy combat ship was required from magazine. It was important for us to use made in late October 2017 during exercise the Navy’s Weapon System Explosive Safe- the ship’s organic systems to move the Dawn Blitz 2017. R Battery, 5th Battalion, ty Review Board (WSESRB). A variant of rocket pod, so we could demonstrate to the 11th Marine Regiment supported the 1st the HIMARS fire control software was de- force the transportability of the rocket pod Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Expe- veloped by Lockheed Martin Company to within an LPD-17 class amphibious ship. ditionary Strike Group 3 by successfully enable firing from a moving platform. Ap- No special or unusual steps were required demonstrating the ability to fire a Guided proval to use this, yet-to-be widely fielded by the HIMARS section to load the rocket Multiple Launch Rocket-Unitary (GM- software on a Navy ship, was required from pod and the selected stowage point provid- LRS-U) from an M142 High Mobility Ar- the Navy’s Software Safety and Technical ed sufficient room to load the pod without tillery Rocket System (HIMARS) off the Review Process. Lockheed also developed moving it too far from the elevator. flight deck of the USS Anchorage (LPD-23), a blast pad to protect the Anchorage’s flight Once the HIMARS was loaded, it was an LPD-17 San Antonio Class Amphibious deck. One of the intents behind the demon- driven to the flight deck and secured. All Ship. stration was to leave the ship undamaged system initiation steps were recorded for There were two training objectives for and able to fully participate in the remain- purposes of the demonstration evaluation. the sea-based expeditionary Fires (S-BEF) der of the exercise. Due to the complexity Before initialization, the HIMARS and blast demonstration: the successful launch of of the exercise, our window to execute the pad were secured to the flight deck by a one GMLRS-U rocket from an amphibious demonstration was small, and with a busy combination of the ship’s organic chains platform and the successful engagement air plan, if we fouled the flight deck it would and straps the battalion provided to- se of a land-based target at the range of 70 have thrown off the timing and events of cure the axles. The use of the ship’s organic kilometers. Both were achieved. This suc- the exercise. Both the software and blast chains proved the HIMARS could be se- cessful demonstration of S-BEF identified a pad acted as advertised. The software ran cured to any ship that has similar tie-down cross-domain capability that can be utilized without error and the blast pad preserved points to an LPD-17. Next, the ship traveled by a task force to precisely strike enemy tar- the deck. Only a small amount of residue to the predetermined coordinates as the gets from the sea. remained on the flight deck after the live amphibious force and range control cleared The scenario for the S-BEF demon- fire. We were constrained by the WSESRB the surface and airspace of the entire sur- stration required an enemy island-based to only fire one rocket, but since we had a face danger zone (SDZ). The WSESRB pro- coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) site nominal firing event, we could have used hibited any personnel or equipment from to be neutralized. This would allow the the blast pad for additional rounds. being within the SDZ. Due to the demon- amphibious task force (ATF) to maneuver Getting the HIMARS and blast pad into stration’s nature, the SDZ was quite large into position to attack additional targets on position required training and multiple and clearing it required the use of multiple the island and establish expeditionary ad- rehearsals to ensure we were prepared to Navy and Coast Guard air and watercraft. vanced bases to support the ATF’s future execute once the ship was in position and Range control identified a five-mile course operations. As the enemy force was identi- we had permission from the range control along which the Anchorage could trav- fied on the southern portion of the island, authorities to fire. The HIMARS and rock- el and the HIMARS could fire. The ship the ATF determined all available assets et pod were embarked via Landing Craft reached it and maintained the appropriate would be required to destroy the defend- Air Cushioned through in-stream on load. speed, roll and pitch parameters required ing enemy force. Intelligence, surveillance While the blast pad could have been stored by the updated fire control software. The and reconnaissance identified the targets in the bed of a resupply vehicle (RSV), it fire mission was pre-scripted to observe the for the S-BEF, as Naval Surface Fires Sup- was stored in the hangar bay to increase administrative constraints, but an F-35 Joint port from Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, a setup response time, and the HIMARS was Strike Fighter from the USS Essex (LHD-2) rotary-wing attack aircraft, as well as Joint stowed in the upper vehicle stowage area was present and spotted the rocket’s impact Strike Fighters from amphibious ships. The of the well deck alongside other Marine and could have easily been incorporated S-BEF was sequenced to fire first in order vehicles that would later be disembarked. as the fire mission’s observer. Further, the to neutralize the CDCM and allow for oth- The rehearsals identified that the HIMARS administrative constraints required the bat- er ATF assets to position themselves and could be stowed on any of the ship’s stow- tery fire direction center to verbally send attack the remaining enemy forces. Upon age decks, but the upper vehicle stowage the fire mission to the HIMARS section, but identification, S-BEF destroyed the- CD area, had the easiest and quickest access to multiple rehearsals proved the battery’s CM’s radar, with the newfound freedom to the flight deck. ability to digitally control the S-BEF Fires. maneuver, the ATF’s ships repositioned as The rocket pod was stored in the ship’s The GMLRS-U was fired at a replicated ra- required. magazine. We used the ship’s organic ma- dar site on land at a range of 70 kilometers. Prior to demonstrating this capability, terial handling equipment to transport the The rocket destroyed the 10 foot by 10 foot approval to stow, transport and live-fire rocket pod from and to the launcher and fiberglass dome. Our assessment showed it

36 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club struck within the munition’s circle error of probability. Marines from 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment fire an M142 High Mobility Upon completion of the fire mission, the Artillery Rocket System while aboard the USS Anchorage. (Mass Communication flight deck was inspected for damage and Specialist 2nd Class Matthew Dickinson/U.S. Navy) foreign objects were mapped and docu- mented. With the minimum amount of de- bris from the launch, the officer in charge of the flight deck was satisfied that the deck was safe for flight operations. The HIMARS and blast pad were recovered to the upper vehicle stowage area and hangar bay and flight operations resumed within 30 minutes of the live fire. The purpose of the S-BEF demonstration was “to allow the fleet to assess HIMARS as a potential future candidate for integration as a sea-based Fires alternative.” We linked our purpose to the Marine Corps Operating Concept published in September 2016 and the Navy’s Littoral Operations in a Contest- ed Environment. After the successful S-BEF demonstration, it is fair to ask “What’s next?” And “Is this a capability we want to further develop?” There were a series of administrative constraints, which should be removed for future training. The removal of these constraints will allow for the rehearsal of S-BEF as the delivery function of a digital kill could just as easily have been organic to a niques and procedures would need to be chain. It would also allow the HIMARS sec- multi-domain task force and general sup- developed to ensure the flight deck was not tion and ship’s crew to work at a rapid pace port to a geographic or functional com- fouled in case an UH-1 needed to recover to and the after action review would shape mander. S-BEF could also have been direct a flight deck. Perhaps another ship’s deck future S-BEF capability developments and support to any of the task force’s subordi- would be used if the HIMARS were still tactics, techniques and procedures. Future nate warfare commanders or the battalion top-side, or it could land near the HIMARS evolutions could look at the possibility of landing team. between fire missions and be recovered into firing other munitions from the MLRS fam- Accounting for its mission, the Marine the hangar bay. These procedures require ily of munitions (MFOM), particularly the Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Ready development, and flight deck management Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Group commanders would have to survey would require multiple staff elements to The range and explosive power of the the missions and decide if the stowage re- work through contingencies, especially if ATACMS would provide the amphibious quirements, and area of operations (AO) is the HIMARS were required to fire multiple force a tremendous long range sea-based right for adding S-BEF to the MEU’s table missions. S-BEF provides the amphibious Fires alternative. If the MFOM were ex- of organization. Necessary redundancy commander the first rocket system that is panded to include an anti-ship missile, the would be required if S-BEF were deployed, reloadable while underway, a capability addition of that capability to S-BEF would likely two HIMARS. As previously stated, that should not be discounted. provide the amphibious commander with a the blast pad(s) could be stowed in the RSVs, The S-BEF demonstration during Dawn complement to the AGM-84 Harpoon Mis- but ammunition must be stored in a mag- Blitz 2017 proved that HIMARS can be safe- sile. The anti-ship capability would also in- azine. The rocket pod’s size could quickly ly and effectively fired from the flight deck vite experimentation with the kill chain. If a overcome a magazine. How much room is of an LPD-17 Class amphibious ship as an sensor identified an enemy surface combat- reserved for the rocket pods depends on alternative sea-based Fires capability. With ant, S-BEF could serve in an anti-ship role what else is embarked aboard that ship, further development, it could be incorpo- as the primary or alternate shooter. Or, a but it is a serious consideration that must rated as organic Fires for a task force that time on target could be chosen for multiple be taken into account. Further, command- requires a capability to provide fire support platforms to mass on the surface target. ers must decide if the AO requires precision from the sea while retaining the option to The type of headquarters S-BEF could Fires from the sea. Traditionally, those Fires send the asset ashore where it could contin- support opens the discussion to one of re- would be provided by the embarked UH-1 ue to provide deep Fires. quirements and embarked trade-offs. The detachment, but if the air defense threat Maj. Adam Ropelewski is an Army field ar- command structure of Dawn Blitz 2017, prohibited their use, S-BEF could be a pos- tillery officer serving in I Marine Expeditionary combined the 1st MEB and ESG-3 staffs sible answer to unilaterally destroy that Force as an exchange officer. He also serves as into Amphibious Force 3. S-BEF was or- threat or as part of sequenced Fires with the lead planner for Sea-Based Expeditionary ganic and general support to AF-3, but it the UH-1’s against the threat. Tactics, tech- Fires.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 37 Big sky, little bullet Tackling the Army’s airspace and joint Fires integration problem By Maj. Daniel Threlkeld On March 24, 2001, Major League Base- During an average Major League Baseball ver commanders, at various echelons, an ball pitcher, Randy Johnson, threw a fast- game, pitchers throw approximately 150 AO that encompasses a geographic region, ball that hit and killed a dove during a times, catchers throw the ball back to the to include the three-dimensional block of spring training game. The poor bird hap- mound, and batters can rocket a ball into airspace when delegated that responsi- pened to fly between home plate and the the air off of a good pitch. This small 60- bility from the airspace control authority. pitcher’s mound at the exact moment in plus foot patch of airspace, during a game, Current joint and service doctrine uses ma- time and space for it to collide with a ball could be classified as a high probability of neuver control measures, airspace coordi- roughly three inches in diameter. Video of collision zone (i.e., high collision zone). If nating measures (ACMs), and fire support the collision between bird and ball can be the bird flies into this high collision zone, it coordination measures (FSCMs) to plan for seen on the internet today, and if social me- increases the risk of being struck by a base- and manage joint Fires and airspace. Gen- dia and viral videos existed then, as they do ball. Those collision zones define a specific erally speaking, Fires and airspace planners now, it would have been internet gold. volume of airspace as it pertains to the odds design unit airspace plans using ACMs and Airspace ‘collision zones’ What does Randy Johnson’s infamous of being struck by a baseball. FSCMs to define specific three-dimension- pitch have to do with joint Fires integration Airspace planning, use of al blocks of airspace for aircraft (fixed and you might ask? It is certainly an example of collision zones on the battlefield rotary wing) to safely operate. This is done how the concept of “big sky, little bullet” Now that we are clear on the baseball through the use of airspace coordination can go terribly wrong. What if our military analogy, let’s translate it into a military areas, restricted operations zones and air had the right procedural controls and situ- area of operation (AO). We assign maneu- corridors. ational awareness to execute this concept of Figure 1. A comparison of the playing area on a baseball field and the collision airspace zones. joint Fires integration? This article analyzes (Courtesy illustration) the pitching incident to illustrate the utility of using collision zones to orchestrate joint Fires processes to be more efficient and clearer. Low Collision Airspace Zone (Outside Baseball Diamond) Let’s examine the pitching incident for a moment (see Figure 1). The odds of a bird being hit and killed by a baseball in most places on planet earth is close to zero. So, we could consider the airspace outside of a baseball diamond as having a low prob- Medium Collision Airspace Zone (Inside Baseball Diamond) ability of midair collisions with a baseball (i.e., low collision zone). If the bird dives into the confines of a baseball diamond (during a game or practice), the odds of col- liding with a baseball somewhat increase as there are more chances the bird could be struck by either a hit or thrown ball. We could classify the general airspace within the baseball diamond (during a game or High Collision Airspace Zone (Pitcher to Catcher) practice) as a medium probability of collision zone (i.e., medium collision zone). Although the bird now has an increased risk of being struck by a baseball, the odds are still in the bird’s favor. However, if the bird flies in between the pitcher’s mound and home plate during a game, the odds of a midair collision increase exponentially.

38 • Fires, July-August 2018, RedDate Photo Taken: 25AUG17 / Location: Cashman Field, Las Vegas, NV (LV 51’s Game) + blue fight club Action: Example of Airspace “Collision Zones” during a baseball game Photo taken and edited by: Daniel S. Threlkeld Additionally, a coordination level and ater Battle Management Core System. One the BCT’s AO and above a particular alti- coordinating altitude is established to sepa- reason that the ROZ SSM / SUA SSMS is tude (the coordinating altitude) could be rate and delineate entire blocks of airspace. addressed here is that its implementation defined as a low collision airspace zone be- Coordination level is used to separate fixed requires coordination between the Fires cell cause we determine that the majority of our and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an and the airspace element. Army airspace surface Fires will not travel outside of the altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft users need to identify the most appropri- BCT’s AO (baseball diamond). Therefore, normally will not fly.1 Coordinating alti- ate ACMs that closely correlates to their limiting the risk to transiting aircraft. Our tude is an ACM that uses altitude to sep- airspace requirement and integrate those medium collision zone (inside the baseball arate users, and defines the transition be- measures into a clear, concise, and under- diamond) could be defined as everything tween different airspace control elements.2 standable unit airspace plan. Now on to below the coordinating altitude and inside Airspace coordination areas are defined as airspace collision zones and why under- the BCT’s surface boundary. The medium “a three-dimensional block of airspace in standing levels of collision risk could facil- collision airspace zone is crucial because it a target area, established by the appropri- itate a better airspace plan. In planning, an requires detailed planning and synchroni- ate commander, in which friendly aircraft airspace collision zone could be designated zation of airspace in order to expedite joint are reasonably safe from friendly surface by the calculated probability of an aircraft Fires. Our high collision airspace zones Fires.”3 A restricted operations zone (ROZ), being struck by surface Fires (high, medi- would equate to three-dimensional air cor- is defined as “airspace reserved for specific um or low) after analysis of all variables. ridors (ROZ SSM/SUA SSMS) between fir- activities in which the operations of one, or This probability would be linked to defined ing unit locations and enemy targets. This 4 more, airspace users is restricted.” Lastly, levels of risk underwritten by a commander would expedite Fires through airspace that an air corridor is “a restricted air route of for specific blocks of airspace during specif- we have planned for a high volume of fire. travel specified for use by friendly aircraft ic time periods. The level of collision risk In order for this concept and methodology and established for the purpose of prevent- for a particular block of airspace would be to work, a staff must understand where sur- ing friendly aircraft from being fired on by inversely proportional with the level of re- face Fires will shoot from (i.e., the pitcher 5 friendly forces.” strictions placed on artillery and/or other and/or pitcher’s mound), where the majori- What about surface fired projectiles? indirect fire units assigned to an AO. ty of enemy targets will be (i.e., the catcher Joint Fires planners often forget that artil- For instance, low collision airspace and/or home plate), and a pretty good es- lery projectiles are airspace users just like zones would be most restrictive to surface timate of the types and number of aircraft aircraft, although the flight path (ballis- Fires, while high collision airspace zones that will be operating in the AO. tic solution) cannot be controlled like an would be least restrictive. In keeping with Firing unit restrictions (further aircraft once fired. One could argue this the baseball analogy, we will use a brigade mitigating risk while expediting makes planning airspace for Fires easier combat team’s (BCT’s) AO as our baseball Fires) than aircraft. With the exception of preci- diamond (see Figure 2). Anything outside Back to baseball for a moment. What if sion-guided munitions, conventional cannon and rocket artillery generally follow a Figure 2. An example of an airspace collision zone in a brigade combat team area of operation. very predictable flight path and/or trajecto- (Courtesy illustration) ry. There is a relatively unknown doctrinal ROZ called a surface-to-surface munition Low Collision Airspace Zone (Outside BCT AO and Above CA) (SSM) ROZ which is “airspace of defined dimensions established specifically for surface-to-surface munitions route of flight and launch and impact point.”6 A variant used in United States Message Text Format (USMTF) 2004, and compatible with our digital systems, is a special use airspace (SUA) ROZ called a Surface-to-Surface Mis- Medium Collision Airspace Zone (Inside BCT AO and Below CA) sile System (SSMS). The SUA/SSMS ROZ is used to identi- FSCL JTF 3 fy airspace requirements for firing guided 08 0600 Z JAN 14 multiple launch rocket system munitions, CFL (38ID) Army tactical missile system munitions 08 0600 Z JAN 14 and cannon artillery. Only the SUA/SSMS ROZ is compatible with USMTF 2004 used 82 X to communicate between Army mission X High Collision Airspace Zone (SSM ROZ) command systems and the Air Force’s The-

1 Joint Publication 3-52, Joint Airspace Control (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 13 November 2014) C-6. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., C-7. 4 Ibid., C-4. 5 Ibid., C-2. 6 Ibid., C-5.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 39 we helped manage and/or mitigate the risk is allowed to throw a ball, there must be a users adequate time to ensure they are not of a pitcher hitting a bird with a baseball by thumbs up from the spotters that the pitch- in the wrong place at the wrong time. The implementing some pitching restrictions as ing lane is clear from the pitcher’s mound point is to keep it long enough for a quick well? We could do this by using a simple to home plate. Then and only then can they check, but short enough not to stifle the fire green, amber and red pitching status (red release a pitch. This would significantly mission timeline. We must be confident in being the most restrictive). If we gave the slow down play, but would ensure that no our unit airspace plan, but to be confident, pitcher a green pitching status, because birds get hit by a baseball. we must have personnel who understand we observe that no birds are flying around This same concept could be applied to how to construct that plan. This would take the ball field (or we predicted this during firing units to help mitigate risk (see Figure a balanced approach to the airspace when planning), it would allow him or her to 3). A green fire status could be defined as: talking permissive versus restrictive. pitch freely. This would expedite pitching procedurally clear airspace; notify all users Lastly, a red fire status could be defined efforts and the risk would be relatively low on a common net and fire immediately un- as: additional airspace clearance required; because we do not see any birds in the me- less someone calls check fire. This would notify all airspace users on a common net dium or high collision airspace zones (or produce the most responsive Fires and and fire only when given clearance of air by we have a way of keeping birds out of the could be paired with a high collision air- the appropriate airspace control element. medium or high collision zones through co- space zone that has been built as an SUA/ This is the most restrictive firing status for ordination and control measures). SSMS ROZ (high volume of surface Fires). a unit and could (by default) be paired with If we see some birds fly into the ball This would make the airspace permissive a low collision airspace zone. This would field’s airspace, we may tell the pitcher that for surface Fires, but restrictive for aircraft. make the airspace permissive for aircraft they are now in an amber pitching status, An amber fire status could be defined but restrictive for surface Fires. The firing which means they must look around be- as: procedurally clear airspace; notify all status is fluid and could always be adjust- fore making a pitch to ensure no birds are airspace users on a common net and fire ed if the unit has a clear picture of its air- heading towards their location. This would one minute after notification unless some- space. The air defense artillery community slow up the play a bit, but would mitigate one calls check fire. This would slow Fires already employs a similar form of firing the risk of any pitches hitting a bird. Now, slightly and could be paired with a medium unit control via a weapons control status, let’s look at the red pitching status. In this collision airspace zone as long as it is com- though it is designed around the enemy scenario, we will say that there are a lot of plemented with the appropriate coordina- and not airspace. Their weapons control birds flying around the baseball field, espe- tion and control measures. Note, the time statuses are free: fire at any target not posi- cially near the pitching mound and home of one minute is an estimate and could be tively identified as friendly; tight: fire only plate. To help mitigate risk, we employ bird adjusted in accordance with a command’s when targets identified as hostile; and hold: “spotters” who we could equate to as the risk tolerance (shorter or longer). Theoret- fire only when ordered or in self-defense.7 airspace control element. Before the pitcher ically, one minute would give all airspace The good thing about aircraft is that

7 JP 3-01 , Countering Air and Missile Threats (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 21 April 2017), V-24—V-25.

Figure 3. Examples of firing statuses and airspace collision zones. (Courtesy illustration)

Airspace Firing Collision Status Details Zone • Firing Status: Procedurally clear airspace; notify all airspace High users on common net and fire immediately unless someone Green calls “check fire” Collision Fire Airspace • Airspace: Permissive for Surface Fires; Restrictive for Aircraft Zone • Firing Status: Procedurally clear airspace; notify all airspace Medium Amber users on common net and fire 1 minute after notification Collision unless someone calls “check fire” Fire Airspace • Airspace: Balanced Zone • Firing Status: Additional Airspace clearance required; notify all Low Red airspace users on common net and fire only when given Collision clearance of air by appropriate airspace control element Fire Airspace • Airspace: Permissive for Aircraft; Restrictive for Surface Fires Zone

40 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club they are much more predictable than a bird. develop a coherent airspace plan, but man- by the Air Force and distribute these tools That is, if we published the collision zones age that airspace after the plan is in place. and/or systems to the lowest echelon possi- and unit firing statuses to all pilots and/or Even with current doctrine, we hardly have ble. Additionally, BCTs need organic radar operators, then they would do their best enough trained personnel who understand systems like the Sentinel Radar, or another to avoid certain airspace collision zones how to make it all work. There are very few comparable system, to provide a real-time at certain times. New guidance would staff officers (and commanders) across the air picture. We have counter-fire radar sys- also need to be developed for aircraft op- Army who fully understand airspace plan- tems at all BCTs and radar systems to fa- erations within airspace collision zones. ning and management. We have maneuver cilitate airspace are just as important today. For instance, avoid high collision airspace planners who only think about the ground This is an uphill battle due to equipment zones as they correlate to a high volume of fight, field artillery personnel who only procurement, cost and personnel training, surface fire, and adhere to published ACMs think about surface Fires, air liaison officers but it would be worth the effort in the long and FSCMs inside medium-risk zones to and joint terminal attack controllers who run. Our airspace is only getting more con- reduce the risk of midair collision with a only think about fixed-wing aircraft, and gested. We can no longer rely on antiquat- surface projectile. The good news is that we air defense officers and brigade aviation ed technology and procedures from a time already have several venues to publish this officers who only think about their pieces when there was no such thing as an un- information to include the airspace control of the puzzle. We have gotten better at col- manned aircraft system or remotely piloted order, special instructions, notice to Air- laborating over the years, but we still have a aircraft. Getting Link 16, radars and other man and operations orders. tendency to conduct stove-piped planning mission command systems down to the Simplifying airspace plans, in our area of expertise. Additionally, staff brigade combat team to facilitate airspace management officers still have a hard time understand- control may be a pipe dream at this point Could this perspective of airspace be ing their own digital mission command but it is something that needs serious con- used in joint Fires planning to identify risk systems let alone how those systems inte- sideration. In the interim, we need to ful- zones and help expedite clearance of Fires, grate with others on the network. ly leverage the capabilities of the systems and/or could it be integrated into current Proposed solutions that are sitting in all of our command posts. joint Fires and airspace planning proce- I propose two solutions to help expe- The latest versions of the Advanced Field dures to simplify the overall plan? In this dite safe and responsive surface Fires, both Artillery Tactical Data System, the Tactical complex and ever-changing battlefield we of which could complement current pro- Airspace Integration System, and the Air must be bold yet cognizant of risk. Let me cedures. The first solution is to adopt the and Missile Defense Workstation provide pose a simple question: Do we really need aforementioned airspace collision zones powerful tools, but we often fall short of to go beyond a quick procedural clearance and unit firing statuses into doctrine and leveraging their true capability due to lack in a “high collision” airspace zone that is train personnel on their use. The meth- of training and understanding of how they clearly defined and articulated to all- air odology is still in a conceptual stage and complement each other. Additionally, our space users? I have witnessed, firsthand, must be discussed among Fires and air- operators and leaders need comprehensive units painfully try to clear airspace in an space professionals and proofed and tested training on these systems to include de- area that we knew, with a high level of in real-world scenarios. Additionally, we tailed instruction on interoperability. confidence, that there were no aircraft pres- must do a better job at training personnel It is time to get out of the old airspace ent. During my time at the Joint Readiness on current joint Fires and airspace doctrine. mindset and generate new ideas. The con- Training Center as a Fires support observ- Our 13A field artillery officers and 13F fire cepts and methodologies discussed in this er, coach, trainer, clearance of Fires was the supporters must be trained on airspace article may not be the right solution, but thorn in everyone’s side. Maneuver com- planning and management early on in their the hope is that it generates discussion that manders complained that it took too long careers. The buzzwords are integrate and eventually turns into action to make clear- so they eventually reduced their use of sur- synchronize “multi-domain” Fires, but in ance of Fires and airspace planning and face Fires. We, the military, have published order to do this we must have well-round- management that much better in the future. tactics, techniques and procedures, stan- ed officers and noncommissioned officers Maj. Daniel Threlkeld is an Army Joint Sup- dard operating procedures, and doctrinal who understand airspace planning and port Team–Nellis joint air ground operations manuals to address the problem to no avail. management. It must be learned early in instructor/writer at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. We have created the Joint Air Ground In- the training pipeline and practiced often to He holds a Bachelor of General Studies from tegration Center concept with some recent create true experts. We must also start look- Ball State University and Master of Science success, but it is far from perfect and locat- ing at artillery as an airspace user and plan Administration from Central Michigan Uni- ed at the division level. appropriate airspace measures (i.e., SUA/ versity. His assignments include four combat If airspace collision zones were de- SSMS ROZs) for surface-to-surface Fires. deployments supporting Operation Iraqi Free- veloped and published properly, aircraft These blocks of airspace can work concur- could avoid high collision zones (i.e., SUA/ rently with other coordination and control dom, Operation Spartan Shield and Operation SSMS ROZs), therefore reducing the time measures. Inherent Resolve. Additionally, Threlkeld spent to shoot surface-delivered munitions. The The second solution involves mission two and a half years as a Joint Readiness Train- crux of the problem has to do with plan- command systems. The Army must sub- ing Center Fires observer/coach trainer at Fort ning and the ability not only to accurately scribe to the Link 16 architecture employed Polk, La.

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 41 Rethinking risk, airspace for

Bydecisive Lt. Col. Dave Pasquale action

United States Combat Training Centers management, with the corps headquarters off the guns” when rotary wing entered observe overreliance on positive control of decentralizing airspace control to subordi- the area of operations. We did not have to airspace by rotational training units (RTUs), nate elements within their respective area concern ourselves, in general, with the op- which diminishes the unit’s ability to em- of operations (AO) for the execution of posing force using large volume of Fires or ploy timely joint Fires from the North At- operations. Divisions with direct support fixed-wing (FW) aircraft due to the enemy lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against ASOCs allow the headquarters to form a capability. This created the opportunity to a near-peer. The result is unnecessary risk joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC). establish positive control over everything to force and mission. The ACA, mentioned in JP 3-52 and above, - to include requesting the maximum or- The joint airspace planners from the may delegate assigned airspace to the di- dinate (MAXORD), gun target line (GTL), brigade combat team (BCT) to corps need vision. This delegation, along with further and time of flight (TOF) for each mission to communicate collective airspace user responsibility of airspace to the BCT-level fired. In addition we stove-piped how we requirements, emplace associated employ- enables the clearance of Fires and control of communicated positive control of airspace. ment procedures, and properly commu- low altitude above ground airspace conges- We became over-reliant on Upper Tac- nicate the associated airspace user risk to tion given the threats posed by the enemy’s tical Internet (Upper-TI) and the satellite the commander. Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, integrated air defense system.3 communication systems that gave us the “Joint Airspace Control” states that, “The How did we get here? tools to establish this positive control. Up- airspace control authority (ACA) develops “We must be more per-TI provided really trapped us into a an airspace control plan (ACP) for joint sophisticated in our fire primary, alternate, contingency and emer- force commander (JFC) approval. The plan support approach. We must gency (PACE) plan that lacks the “ACE.” should take into consideration the likeli- help design a battlefield A PACE plan that relies, in its entirety, on hood of multinational operations, as well architecture that enables Upper-TI to be operational and in place is as the need to develop policies and proce- Maneuver commanders to not a true PACE plan. Combat training cen- dures that foster compatibility and interop- bring all elements of combat ters (CTCs) continue to see RTUs establish erability of support systems and methods power to bear simultaneously a PACE that is reminiscent of the communi- to accommodate potential civil aviation at the time and place of their cations capabilities we became accustomed activities.” Further, “The ACP should be choosing on the battlefield. to in the counter-insurgency (COIN) fight closely integrated with the JFC-approved Techniques that may have been with the assets available on the FOBs. A area air defense plan developed by the area effective in counterinsurgency PACE plan of: P. Advanced Field Artillery air defense commander. Collection of les- operations, such as Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to Tactical sons learned information throughout the establishing blanket low-level Airspace Integration System (TAIS) con- development of the ACP will assist ACP coordinating altitudes, result nection/A. Transverse Chat/C. Secure Voice development for future operations.”1 Field in unnecessary clearance of Over Internet Protocol/E. Command Post Manual (FM) 3-52, “Airspace Control,” in- Fires drills and ineffective of the Future Chat is actually only P: Up- corporates lessons learned as well as the indirect Fires when applied per-TI. There are some unique capabilities updates associated with the re-write of JP in a decisive action training specific to high frequency that we, asan 3-52. FM 3-52 states, “The alignment of air environment.” Army, lack training and equipment to take support operation centers (ASOC) with ac- -From the Commandant’s desk 2017 advantage of. Additionally, we tend to for- tive Army division headquarters allow for Year in Review, Looking Back at 2017 get the options that our Advanced System the greater responsiveness and flexibility & Looking Forward to 2018, Redleg Improvement Program radios provide. of responsive Fires and division assigned Update November/December 2017 Airspace control includes the airspace. The central idea of this publica- Through years of fighting adversar- capabilities and procedures tion reflects the Army’s role within a larger ies without significant peer-level airspace used to increase operational framework (unified action) and its focus on capabilities and decades of allied air su- effectiveness by promoting the maximum flexibility through a philosophy periority, we lost the ability to identify safe, efficient, and flexible use of mission command and an operations and mitigate risk with respect to airspace. of airspace. process approach.”2 While isolated on forward operating bases -Joint Publication 3-52, The newly published FM 3-0 “Oper- (FOBs) or combat outposts (COPs), we had Joint Airspace Control ations” gives maneuver commanders at the luxury, at times, to layer our response This type of integrated airspace control the BCT-level a framework for airspace to the adversary. We could afford to “turn system and ease of access to upper-TI fed

1 JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.Page I-2. 2 FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016. Page iv. 3 FM 3-0. Operations. October 2017. Pages 2-31 to 2-32.

42 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club our ability to establish positive control of Further, in the contested environment engaging each target displayed airspace users. the RTU operates, we do not see the RTU on the scheduling worksheet. “There are decisive points in time and properly set the conditions in time and This has improved connection space where positive control is warrant- space to execute a coordinated attack. De- capabilities, namely the Link16 ed, such as [forward arming and refuel- pending on where in the operation the co- protocol. It allows AFATDS to ing points] or [helicopter landing zones], ordinated attack takes place, to integrate connect to any devise/platform/ but those specific areas of positive control air-to-surface Fires (FW and RW) against sensor that uses the JREAP should be part of an overall plan based on a HPT with surface-to-surface Fires, the messaging service. These items procedural control.”4 RTU needs to layer detection and delivery include the airspace defense We do not need consistent positive con- assets to achieve local air superiority and system integrator (ADSI), trol nor can we afford to establish positive reduce the adversaries’ ability to counter or JWACS, JSTAR, Sentinel Radar control of all the airspace users. We can system as well as organic disrupt the coordinated attack. RTUs will no longer afford the risk associated with FF radar systems (Q-53 and “turning off Fires” and still achieve the ef- spend significant time clearing the air for a Q-50). The units as well as FF fects we need from the joint force against a counterfire mission to ensure that a UAV is radars can be managed for near-peer. not shot down by chance. movement from the AFATDS Current trends Improvements in detailed planning and for movement and range fan RTUs are overly reliant on the tools synchronization begin with understand- manipulation. Connections to used in COIN, the tools that trend towards ing the tools listed in JP and FM 3-52. It is Theater Battle Management positive versus procedural control. As clear this understanding does not exist as Core Systems (TBMCS), ADSI, mentioned, in the past, units had time to evidenced by the improper proper titling Air and Missile Defense establish positive control of airspace users of airspace coordination areas (ACA) as air- Workstations (AMDWS), given the threat faced or were that when space coordination measures (ACMs) ver- Airspace information service fired upon, counterfire missions were clear sus what they are, fire support coordination (ASIS) are now capable. due to that isolated location. The culture of measures (FSCM). The result is the plan- -Redleg Update, September/October COIN remains with RTUs over-clearing air- ning of these FSCMs, if staff-planned, by ro- 2016, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical space, requesting MAXORD, GTL and TOF tary wing or fixed wing representatives on Data System gets dramatic upgrade — even when the RTU knows there are the brigade staff and not synchronized and When the RTU uses ACAs there are is- no friendly airspace users. The RTU never sues that can negate the effort taken in plan- integrated with the planning and targeting wins the counterfire fight when taking this ning the FSCMs. For example, ACAs that effort required to support the command- route. do not expire and are active when visibility er’s maneuver and Fires plans. This further When we shape the battle to provide us prevents rotary wing aircraft from flying translates into positive instead of procedur- the opportunities to synchronize the pow- or AFATDS not loaded with digital terrain al control of airspace, resulting in counter- er of joint assets through coordinated at- elevation data resulting in all fire missions tacks against the maneuver commander’s fire missions beyond the time required to violating ACAs. The new version of AF- high-payoff targets (HPT) we can defeat have effects against a near-peer. Exempli- ATDS, 6.8.1.1, gives the future operations our adversaries. As the recently released fied best by the RTU spending three to five (FUOPs) and current operations (CUOPs) FM 3-0 states, “The use of aviation assets minutes trying to identify where the Raven staff “… increased capabilities allowing it requires additional detailed planning and or Shadow is during a counterfire mission. to dramatically improve integration of or- synchronization using specific airspace AFATDS 6.8.1.1 gives the ganic and joint targeting sensors and effec- control processes to maximize results.” commander the ability to tive data sharing of Army and Joint Mission This does not happen at CTCs with the incorporate several JADOCS Command systems.”5 regularity that is required to defeat a near- target managers (e.g. Joint Further stated in the 2016 Redleg up- peer. An Aviation battalion commander Time Sensitive Target date, this software update provides a visu- recently stated, “I will fly where I want to manager, Fires manager, al 3-D display of all friendly units, enemy fly,” versus communicating through staffs Inter-AOC Manager). It will situational template, geometries, FSCMs, and working with the fire support coordi- also give the commander the ACMs, range fans and munitions flight nator (FSCOORD) to determine what air- capability of conducting a Fire path for surface-to-surface Fires. The en- space they truly need to accomplish their Support Planning Course of hanced mapping allows commanders to specified and implied mission tasks. visualize the operational environment with Action (COA) Analysis with Additionally, we cannot afford to hear, proper altitudes and elevations providing “Turn off the guns. We have rotary wing in his assigned shooters. The FS near-real display of the modified com- the air,” when fighting a near-peer. To ex- COA displays tube strength, bined obstacle overlay. CTC’s observe that ploit the advantages of the alliance’s joint munitions required for mission rarely does the RTU take full advantage of assets and get to the detailed planning success and system, by type, what this update provides the FUOPS and mentioned in FM 3-0, staffs must develop a utilization. Attack Analysis CUOPS staff. better understanding of the tools available will allow a by-type, by target Completely acknowledging that main- to the joint force. of when each tube will be taining a common operational picture is

4 T. C. Hawn, personal communication, November 27, 2017 5 CW4 Trevor Meier and CW5 Robert D. Wilson, Redleg update September/October 2016, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System gets dramatic upgrade

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 43 Soldiers in the M-Stinger course practice target engagement with a Stinger Missile weapon system. Instructors from the Air Defense Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Okla., taught maneuver Soldiers how to conduct short-range air defense operations at the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, from July 31 to Sept. 1, 2017. (Staff Sgt. Kathleen Polanco/U.S. Army) challenging across a formation operating in and ultimately will achieve the command- operational environment, there are also the complexities of a decisive action trainer’s intent at a higher rate of success. those that we never gave consideration. ing environment (DATE); understanding The fastest counterfire mission at the Surface-to-surface Fires, unmanned aircraft the tools (doctrinal, digital or analog) is im- Joint Multinational Readiness Center is systems6, rotary wing and fixed wing are portant. Whether the AFATDS is used to the two minutes and 41 seconds, from rounds users that we executed positive control over full capabilities provided by version 6.8.1.1 sensed to rounds impacting. The RTU for the last decade and a half. When fight- or the BCT develops the standard operat- achieved this by adapting and learning ing a near-peer, we must take into account ing procedure that facilitates analog under- what they truly had to do with respect to the airspace users that we did not employ standing of the COP and the airspace plan airspace, establishing a quick-fire net that or the enemy did not employ against us – through an understood and executable flattened the counterfire process, - andex their own fixed and rotary wing aircraft, PACE plan in a contested electromagnetic ecuting numerous rehearsals during win- unmanned aerial vehicles and potential spectrum – identifying how the team will dows their analysis informed them would overmatch in surface-to-surface Fires. build this picture and maintain it is critical be a low-counterfire threat. Surface-to-air capabilities are returning to mission success. Rehearsing this prior to Who are the airspace users? to the BCTs in the hands of non-14-series arrival at CTC gets the RTU the repetitions There are airspace users that remain who attend a 40-hour Maneuver Stinger required to identify and mitigate friction unchanged from COIN. Given the COIN Course (either mobile training team or res-

6 Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is used for adversary aircraft—to include opposing force (OPFOR) platforms. When unmanned aircraft are used by the US, allied, and friendly forces, they are referred to as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). UA is used in two ways: to denote a system used by a country that is neither friend/ally nor adversary of the US; and as an overarching term that includes any unmanned aircraft, regardless of country. (From Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Classification and Trends Article; authored by Nicole Bier (DAC) and Patrick Madden (BMA Ctr), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration)

44 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club ident). These Soldiers and systems are air- The adversary that we train against at not afford to stovepipe the planning effort, space users that staffs must account for and JMRC in the Skolkan scenario is a near-peer we cannot afford to educate only leaders the whole system will require repetition to in every aspect to the alliance.7 The scenar- who represent airspace users on staff. Do- engrain the techniques that make these sys- io employs significantly more artillery than ing so often relegates the planning and ex- tems effective. Threat and opposing force’s the Atropian scenario does, with the RTU ecution efforts to members of the staff not (OPFOR) dominance of tactical airspace at direct support artillery battalion contend- ultimately responsible for synchronizing CTCs defined this capability as an absolute ing with up to two self-propelled artillery operations. Ultimately, this can also reverse requirement. With that requirement comes battalions and a rocket battalion. Depend- the trend of maneuver planners looking to the necessity to understand how we must ing on the success of the RTU’s targeting fire supporters for the Fires plan after they design and communicate risk to airspace process and counterfire success, there is create the maneuver plan and develop truly users while creating the opportunity need- a possibility to face a 2 to 1 ratio, realistic integrate fire plans with maneuver. ed for permissive surface-to-air Fires and when facing a near-peer. Further, that near- JP and FM 3-52 provides the joint air- preventing fratricide across an alliance. peer has an air force, as well as significant space planner the tools to tackle several of The next airspace user that we have not surface-to-air capability. These scenarios the trends mentioned within as well as an- accounted for in the last 15 years is the en- that do not fit the framework of the last 15 ticipated issues as the Army integrates new emy. This is two-fold, from a pure volume years in both Iraq and Afghanistan. RTUs capabilities at the BCT level. If joint air- of surface-to-surface Fires and the fixed need to consider these capabilities as airspace planners synchronized underutilized and rotary-wing capability a true near-peer space users when designing their airspace. tools from FM 3-52 such as, short-range air brings to an already complicated airspace. Tools in doctrine defense engagement zones, weapons free Both present different problems that, in the “Our Fires force must enable zone, FEZs, high-density airspace control worst-case situations, occur simultaneous- all of airspace to synchronize, zone and minimum-risk route, staffs have ly. CTCs do an adequate job incorporat- plan and execute a cohesive the potential to communicate and mitigate ing the fire strike into rotational scenarios. air deconfliction resolution. risk to the associated airspace users. Plan- However, in order to maximize training To do so, we must design ning for and communicating our airspace opportunities for the RTU, CTCs do not our battlefield geometry to risk mitigation techniques through our dig- incorporate the fire strikes at the scale, fre- coordinate airspace integration ital systems such as the AFATDS as part of quency or the capability level of a near-peer to ensuring that conflicts the military decision-making process and — removing an entire maneuver battalion between ground Fires and air pushing them to our higher headquarter from a rotation is detrimental to readiness operations are minimized.” will allow for a greater understanding of gained at a CTC. However, staffs do not -From the Commandant’s desk 2017 risk as they are promulgated through the take into account the impact of a fire strike Year in Review, Looking Back at 2017 special instructions located in the airspace on airspace users. Using analysts to deter- & Looking Forward to 2018, Redleg control order. While this can increase the mine anticipated enemy firing positions Update November/December 2017 commander’s ability to leverage permissive and when the enemy obtained the RTU Army, joint and allied doctrine provide 3-D airspace tools, it is important to ensure commander’s essential elements of friendly tools not used in COIN and are, as RTUs the staff understands how to use and com- information gives the CUOPs staff the abil- demonstrate, largely unfamiliar to the municate via analog means. Across a multi- ity to identify potential fire strike opportu- force. Appendix C in JP 3-52 lists out ACMs, national formation, analog may be the only nities and additional airspace users. Doing FSCMs, maneuver control measures, air means through which a task force can share so has potential to determine risk to friend- reference measures, air defense measures, a common operational picture for airspace ly airspace users and the friendly ground maritime defense measures and air traffic control. units that are the targets of these strikes. control measures. These 21 pages are an un- Brig. Gen. Stephen Maranian, 52nd Field Additional consideration is also re- explored goldmine that gives all planners, Artillery School commandant, stated in the quired for enemy fixed wing employment. just not airspace users, the tools to ensure most recent Redleg Update that the “ … While we are obviously not going to clear that they design airspace that creates a per- Fires force must enable all users of airspace the air for enemy fixed wing aircraft, we missive environment for surface-to-surface to synchronize, plan and execute a cohesive need to take into account where the air-to- and surface-to-air Fires. air de-confliction resolution.” air fight will occur. This is arguably more Brigade combat teams need to incor- While much of this responsibility does important than the counterfire fight as we porate airspace control into their leader indeed reside within the FSCOORD and work to establish and maintain local air su- development program to ensure those re- fire support officer roles in the BCT staff, periority and remove a near-peer critical ca- sponsible for the planning and executing the solution does not sit within a single pability from the operational environment. operations are educated on the tools avail- warfighting function. The Army Joint Sup- JP 3-52 identifies the restricted operations able that mitigate risk to friendly airspace port Team-Nellis offers training opportu- airspace coordinating measure, combat air users while creating a permissive envi- nities below the BCT level and echelons patrol and the air defense measure, fight- ronment for Fires. This includes sending above brigade. Courses such as the Joint er engagement zone (FEZs) as zones that maneuver leaders to courses that expose Fire Power Course are historically under account for the airspace users required for members of the FUOPs planning team attended when offered through a mobile this fight. FM 3-52 expands the joint defini- and CUOPs floor to the tools available to training team (MTT). Reports of only 40-50 tions by adding in Army planning consid- them – regardless of the warfighting func- personnel attending versus the capacity the erations not mentioned in joint doctrine. tion (WfF) they represent. Just as we can- MTT of 120 is a missed opportunity to edu-

7 https://www.army.mil/article/176321/skolkan_scenario_introduced_at_jmrc

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 45 Battle Group Poland Romanian soldiers set up and test their Oerlikon GDF-203 35 mm twin cannon anti-aircraft weapon during the Saber Strike 2017, at Bemowo Piskie Training Area near Orzysz, Poland, June 13, 2017. Saber Strike 17 is a U.S. Army Europe-led multinational combined forces exercise conducted annually to enhance the NATO alliance throughout the Baltic region and Poland. This year's exercise includes integrated and synchronized deterrence-oriented training designed to improve the interoperability and readiness of the 20 participating nations' militaries. (Spc. Stefan English/U.S. Army) cate leaders cross WfFs that work in FUOPS environment defined by the level of risk RTU to create everything from scratch. CTC and CUOPS. Commanders often send only the commander deemed acceptable for the HICON orders need to create a framework fire supporters to these courses, limiting the airspace users. It is incumbent upon the for procedural control that rewards BCTs ability to increase the knowledge of their CTCs to ensure that the higher command for leveraging procedural control. When entire staff when it comes to the require- (HICON) operation order (OPORD) lays possible, the CTCs need to replicate the ments to properly plan, deliberately and the proper foundation for the RTU to build quantity of airspace users that we, along dynamically, the airspace that minimizes an order that communicates the appropri- with our allies, would see in decisive action. the conflicts for responsive joint Fires. ate level of risk for all airspace users. Addi- Currently, the RTU does not take full How can CTCs improve the tionally, CTCs need to create the ACMs and training environment? FSCMs in the HICON AFATDS database advantage of the capabilities in planning The above lays out the opportunities that allows the BCT to tie in to an opera- and execution allowed by the new version for brigades and divisions to identify the tional environment with established proce- of AFATDS and neither do CTCs. We need manner in which they will operate in the dural controls. It is unrealistic to require a to create the airspace and fire support plans

46 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club Multinational Division-Northeast9 from El- assets rests with the Airborne Warning and blag, Poland (Allied Spirit VIII). This allows Control System or Control and Reporting JMRC to experiment with how a division Center, both forward extension of the Air exercises mission command for a BCT that Operations Center. Even if the CAB's ATS is “in the box” against a world-class OP- were resident in the JAGIC, the division FOR and the additional BCT in a construc- AO is too large to manage all helicopters tive environment, controlled by a live BCT in a positive control stance. The 10th MTN staff. Further, the operational environment staff assesses that, typically, an Army ATS is always multinational, with the BCT in unit can conduct positive control between the box having multiple allied or partnered five to 10 miles of an airfield and probably units attached. This allows for the use of has the technical means to control helicop- Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities ters out to approximately 20 miles. A BCT program to test all of the above in a multi- at a CTC may have a forward extension of national environment. an air traffic company capable of positively In October 2017, JMRC began taking running airspace over a landing zone, but it steps to improve the RTU experience with lacks the means to cover the entire BCT AO. the receipt of the FA commandant’s situa- When NATO applies these lessons learned tion report. This report mentioned the 10th across an alliance that does not have a holis- Mountain Warfighter Exercise 18-1 and the tic positive control capability, the require- use of the JAGIC and airspace control and ment to engrain procedural control is more management operations. JMRC contacted evident. Though this one warfighter exer- the 10th Mountain Division Artillery com- cise does not warrant labeling as a trend, it mander to understand the lessons learned is does show the evolution of thought at the from the warfighter as well as the use of division level and the positive outcome as- the JAGIC with respect to airspace man- sociated with linking warfighter results to agement. The resulting dialogue evaluated CTC HICON execution. how CTCs communicate airspace to a RTU We became over reliant on positive air- as well as the sharing of the 10th MTN Air- space control given the pace of COIN and space Appendix from the 18-1 Warfighter. CTCs see RTUs struggle to break this ha- Further discussion and the release of the bitual method. Tools exist, from doctrine to new FM 3-0, resulted in several changes to training opportunities for our divisions and Annex D and the Airspace Appendix for BCTs, to embrace procedural control. Prop- the JMRC HICON OPORD. Utilizing the erly communicating risk to airspace users 10th MTN Airspace Appendix as a base by conducting proper analysis and planning in the deliberate and dynamic fight is minimum risk routes and the incorporation critical to the success of this shift. Positive of position areas for artillery are included control of airspace can be achieved during in the unit airspace plan. Additionally, a decisive points when required in a DATE, dedicated portion of the appendix discuss- however we will have to accept that the bat- es variations in levels of acceptable risk and tlefield in a DATE is too complex and vast clear priorities for each airspace user. for positive control to work. We can fight Tenth MTN determined that a division and win with a joint and multinational is not manned or resourced to achieve pos- force, harnessing the fire power of our alli- itive control beyond finite points. Within Battle Group Poland Romanian soldiers set up and test their Oerlikon GDF-203 35 mm twin cannon anti-aircraft weapon during the Saber Strike 2017, at Bemowo Piskie Training Area near Orzysz, Poland, June 13, ances, by training our leaders in the CUOPS the division, the Air Traffic Services (ATS) 2017. Saber Strike 17 is a U.S. Army Europe-led multinational combined forces exercise conducted annually to enhance the NATO alliance throughout the Baltic region and Poland. This year's exercise includes inte- and FUOPS staffs to design battlefield ge- Company within the Combat Aviation grated and synchronized deterrence-oriented training designed to improve the interoperability and readiness of the 20 participating nations' militaries. (Spc. Stefan English/U.S. Army) ometry that enables airspace integration Brigade (CAB) can conduct small-scale and creates a permissive environment for that BCTs would use within a division plan positive control, typically associated with Fires, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and and include those in an AFATDS database. FARPs and the immediate airspace. Tenth air-to-air. As the only CTC that has a secondary MTN found that divisions could not posi- Lt Col. Dave Pasquale is the Joint Multi- training audience consisting of a divi- tively control the large volume of airspace national Readiness Training Center senior fire sion-level staff, JMRC is unique. Division associated with a division fight. Even in the staffs, from National Guard to allied, per- JAGIC, the U.S. Air Force personnel desig- support trainer in Hohenfels, Germany. Prior form the functions of a HICON at JMRC. nated as “procedural controllers” have the to his current assignment, he served in Grafen- In just the last two rotations, JMRC saw the authority to route aircraft using procedural wohr, Germany, as the 4th Battalion, 319th division HICON performed by the 40th In- means, but have no capability to conduct Airborne Field Artillery Regiment commander, fantry Division from the California Army positive control of fixed wing assets. The as a member of the 173rd (Airborne) Infantry National Guard (Allied Spirit VII)8 and capability for positive control of fixed wing Brigade Combat Team.

8 https://www.army.mil/article/197056/allied_spirit_vii_invaluable_training_for_all 9 https://jfcbs.nato.int/page5964943/2017/general-farina--witnessed-the-inauguration-ceremony-for-multinational-division-northeast

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 47 Going the extra 1,000 miles Preparing a field artillery brigade for a near-peer adversary By Maj. Rich Farnell and Capt. Brennan Deveraux

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment, 17th Field Artillery Brigade conduct a mock artillery raid at Orchard Combat Training Center, Idaho, Apr. 21, 2018. The artillery raid was in conjunction with 16th Combat Aviation Brigade to exercise communications between the AH-64 Apache helicopters and the M142 High Mobility Army Rocket System. (Sgt. Jacob Kohrs/U.S. Army)

The 17th Field Artillery Brigade drove from the battery evaluations in February, sonnel while maintaining vehicle operabil- over a combined 1,000 miles “total con- the brigade looked to conduct the battalion ity throughout the 1,100-mile convoy. This voying” to and from the Orchard Combat evaluations in an environment that would required an extensive analysis prior to exe- Training Center, Idaho, in an attempt to test Fires in support of large-scale combat cution. Brigade staff was required to have a go beyond their standard training regimen operations. common operating picture and robust com- and build the unit’s confidence in vehicles, The OCTC mission not only certified munication architecture. Blue Force track- equipment and Soldier readiness in prepa- the battalions, it offered unique challenges ing systems were preloaded with routes ration for large-scale combat operations. at all levels. The mission emphasized three and geometries that kept the convoys syn- The brigade participates annually with areas that supported real world High Mo- ched in time and space. Multiple rehearsals our allies and partners abroad in major bility Army Rocket System operations: long had to be conducted to keep the convoy on training events including Yama Sakura, distance convoy operations, force-on-force a manageable schedule while aligning key Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Talisman Sa- operations in unfamiliar terrain, and live- decision makers with the right tactical bat- ber. These exercises challenge the brigade fire integration with a combat aviation bri- tle systems. These are critical actions and staff and rely heavily on the mission exe- gade (CAB). events the brigade must master to be confi- cution of simulated firing battalions. From The convoy dent against a near-peer adversary. these exercises, key training objectives are The roundtrip to OCTC allowed the Coordination, synchronization and formed that allow firing elements at eche- brigade to train on the complexities of uti- planning of the road march forced leaders lon to execute missions that were identified lizing multiple tactical battle command to consider what it would be like to travel a as vital in the scenario. Taking the lessons systems to coordinate and synchronize long distance and face an opponent during learned from the exercises, and progressing movement of hundreds of vehicles and per- a contingency operation. If the brigade had

48 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club with a few hilltops made battery commanders adjust how they fought. For example, B Battery, 1-94th FAR shifted away from traditional hide/firing point doctrine to a more Paladin-based dispersion and over watch style. Every place a launcher stopped became a firing point, and every fire- mis sion required the launcher to displace at least 200 meters after shooting the mission. Within this strategy, the support platoon in B Battery secured key terrain on a hilltop, known as Badger Mountain, to provide security to the firing elements. The platoon had never taken on this type of mission and quickly learned a hard lesson in conventional warfare. The platoon leader, 2nd Lt. Spencer Ni- etan, explained, “We didn’t have a good grasp on defilade and we were exposed on the hilltop.” Their element was hit with a simulated indirect fire chemical attack. The support platoon was out of the fight for hours, spent the day in Mission Oriented Protective Pos- tures Level 4, and had to assess casualties. It was a hard lesson that is not often emphasized in the artillery community, but one every Soldier in the platoon learned. This was apparent during the reoccupation of Badger Mountain four days later that was noted by the evaluators as a drastic improvement in defensive posture. As the battle progressed, all the firing elements needed to advance to stay in range and remain effective. At 3 a.m. on Day Four, a “prepare to march order” came over the to deploy to the Pacific theater, there may take time during routine preventive main- net requiring all elements move to a new be a need to travel across hundreds of miles tenance and take personal responsibility area nearly 50 kilometers away. Covering of terrain to be best postured to support the for the care of the equipment. After 17th such a distance through unknown and re- maneuver fight. FAB reached their destination, the units be- stricted terrain, with a required in position Maj. Sean Whelan, 1st Battalion, 94th gan building combat power to transition to ready to fire (IPRTF) no later than time, Field Artillery Regiment executive officer, force-on-force operations. provided a training opportunity for a pla- participated in the event and said, “Sol- The fight toon leader that cannot be simulated. diers of the brigade would need to have Rocket artillery Soldiers at Joint Base First Lt. Sean Skelly, 1st Fires Platoon confidence in their own equipment and be Lewis-McChord, Wash., spend ample time leader of B Battery, was the first to execute prepared to deploy into an immature the- at the Yakima Training Center. It is not the mission. “It was a challenge. We had to ater with limited sustainment capabilities.” only where section qualifications occur, but rely heavily on our map recon because of The exercise encouraged Soldiers to most of the field training in the brigade as the time constraints with IPRTF. I set the cross-train on equipment. Most vehicles well. When it comes to fighting an opposing priorities of work and was impressed how did not have mechanics as passengers, but force at YTC, the 17th FAB has a home field well my team executed,” he said. if a vehicle broke down the passengers advantage. This was taken into account The platoon was able to emplace, set up would need a level of knowledge to quickly when deciding to convoy to Idaho; OCTC security, establish a quartering party for the troubleshoot the problem. These moments was unfamiliar terrain. No section chief in rest of the battery and receive fire missions forced Soldiers to understand typical me- a firing battery could reference firing points - both voice and digitally - with 10 minutes chanical issues. A vehicle breakdown could from the last field training exercise and no to spare. The fight continued for six total be the difference in the momentum of the leaders could look to a combat training cen- days until force-on-force operations culmi- brigade, and how well the entire formation ter rotation in a previous unit. The training nated with a field artillery raid in support is able to successfully execute a road march audience was in enemy territory. of 16th Combat Aviation Brigade. into enemy territory. When Soldiers expe- The terrain was a challenge at the bat- The live fire rience these moments, it inspires them to tery level. Open, desert-like terrain coupled While serving as the force field artil-

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 49 Soldiers from 17th Field Artillery Brigade convoy over 150 vehicles on a 550 mile trek from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., to Orchard Combat Training Center, Idaho, from April 3-9, 2018. This convoy was to test the abilities of the vehicles and to give the Soldiers confidence in their equipment. (Sgt. Jacob Kohrs/U.S. Army) lery headquarters for I Corps, the brigade of the overall mission depended on them 30 days they gained confidence in their worked directly with 16th CAB. Rocket and there was no way they were going to equipment, their leadership and, most im- artillery has the range to conduct a sup- let the unit down.” portantly, themselves. pression of enemy air defense (SEAD) in The live fire focused only on the ingress Maj. Rich Farnell is the 1st Battalion, 94th support of deep shaping operations. This is and egress SEAD missions. It was shot at Field Artillery Regiment operations planner. done regularly during simulation exercis- the battalion level. B Battery executed the He has also served as the 17th Field Artillery es; the Soldiers in 1-94th FAR had not gone ingress and A Battery executed the egress. through this training. Upon completion of the mission with 16th Brigade’s fire support planner for key exercises The first integration with 16th CAB was CAB, 16 launchers were qualified, and the in the Pacific such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian done without live munitions utilizing the brigade was able to shift focus back to the and Yama Sakura. Previous assignments in- Brain/Training Pod. Firing batteries con- 550-mile drive home. clude 2nd Infantry Division fire support plan- ducted a raid, pushing past the forward The exercise prepared the 17th Field Ar- ner; National Training Center observer coach/ line of troops to get in range for the oper- tillery Brigade to provide Fires in support trainer, and multiple battery commands. -Far ation. Rehearsals created partnerships all of large-scale combat. In total, the OCTC nell is a graduate of the Command and General the way down to pilots talking directly to mission tested Soldiers and their equip- battery commanders. Sixteenth CAB put a ment, pushing some vehicles to the limit. Staff College, and holds a bachelor’s degree from liaison officer in the 1-94th FAR operations The brigade convoyed over 1,000 miles, the University of Tampa in Business Manage- center and helped shape the scenario to conducted a brutal six day force-on-force ment, master’s degree from the University of meet real-world mission requirements. in unfamiliar terrain, qualified 16 HIMARS, Oklahoma in Organizational Leadership, and The scenario focused the artillery on and conducted a live-fire SEAD mission is pursuing a doctoral degree in Organizational three things - ingress SEAD, targets of with a combat aviation brigade. Lt. Col. Leadership from Northeastern University. opportunity identified by aviation assets, Joe D. Hansen, 1-94th FAR battalion com- Capt. Brennan Deveraux is the B Battery, and egress SEAD. Each battery executed mander, said, “This field problem was an 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment the Brain/Training Pod iteration which re- investment to ensure the battalion is on the quired 32 rockets shot over the course of 45 right side of ready. With the mission pro- commander. He also previously served as the minutes. As the scenario shifted to live fire, files we executed during the exercise, our Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 17th the SEAD missions were incorporated into Soldiers have confidence in themselves and Field Artillery Brigade commander, where he the HIMARS qualification tables. The addi- their systems, to get the job, any job, done. participated in Warfighter 18-02 in Korea and tion of the real-world mission put the qual- This includes integrating with maneuver as a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System liai- ification in perspective and brought out the and aviation units that need complete con- son officer forward in Iraq in support of Opera- best in the Soldiers. fidence that our rounds are hitting targets tion Inherent Resolve. Deveraux is a graduate of Staff Sgt. Evan Fowler, B Battery fire when they are needed.” direction chief, said “I have done a lot of If you ask the troopers across the bri- the Marine Expeditionary Warfare School and qualifications, but this wasn’t routine. Sol- gade if the training was worth it, they are holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of diers were focused, they knew the success quick to say that at a minimum in the last Washington in Political Science.

50 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 51

2018 FIRES CON Program 8.5x11_COA2.indd 15 4/18/18 10:21 AM In the next issue of Fires

September-October 2018, Competitive convergence. The Army wants to be ready to defend against formidable enemies including Russia, North Korea and China. How is the force preparing? This issue will also discuss the multi-domain battle and how Fires is moving to fight in this way, the Fires Battle Lab’s Fires Convergence Experiment, the Army Targeting Center’s expanded mission and Field artillery and air defense artillery branch transformation. The deadline for submissions is Aug. 1, 2018. For more information call (580)442-5121 or send submissions to [email protected]. A Soldier from the 256th Signal Company, 308th Brigade Support Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Brigade pulls security on a retransmission site at Orchard Combat Training Center, Idaho, April 14, 2018. A retrains site helps to boost the signal of communications over a long distance. (Sgt. Jacob Kohrs/U.S. Army)

52 • Fires, July-August 2018, Red + blue fight club