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Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor Philosophy Publications Department of Philosophy 1991 Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause Leo Groarke University of Windsor Graham Solomon Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Groarke, Leo and Solomon, Graham. (1991). Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause. Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (4), 645-663. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub/30 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause Author(s): Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1991), pp. 645-663 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709970 . Accessed: 27/11/2012 13:49 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon The historyof ideas encompassesmany questions that extend beyond theinterpretation ofthe views of particular thinkers. 1 Among other things, theyinclude questions about the relationship between the views and ideas of differenttimes and questionsabout the intellectualmilieu in which thinkersdevelop their perspectives. Hume addressesthe former concerns in The Natural Historyof Religion and, in a more implicitway, the latterin a letterin which he tells his friendMichael Ramsay that the metaphysicalparts of the Treatisewill be understandableif one reads Malebranche'sRecherche, Berkeley's Principles, Bayle's Dictionary,and Descartes'sMeditations.2 In the presentpaper, we address such questionsas they relate to Hume's account of cause, discussingthe extentto whichhis views are anticipatedby ancientthinkers (in particularthe ancient skeptics) and the extentto whichavailable accountsof theirviews may have contributed to thedevelopment of Hume's own thinking.There is, we argue,a clearer anticipationof Hume in ancientthinking than usually imagined-one whichprobably contributes, in at leastan indirectway, to Hume'sthinking on the subject. We beginwith an outlineof Hume's generalargument,3 leaving until 'An earlierversion of this paper was presentedat a November1990 workshopon "David Hume and His Background"at the Universityof WesternOntario. We are especiallyindebted to JohnWright, Tom Lennon,William Harper, and David Fate Norton fortheir comments; to Brian Hillyardand Mike Barfootfor information on the holdings of Edinburghlibraries; and to RogerEmerson for information about Charles Mackie. Leo Groarkewould like to thankthe CalgaryInstitute for the Humanitiesfor a fellowship supportingthe workon the presentpaper. 2 See RichardPopkin, "So, Hume did readBerkeley," Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1954) (the letteris dated 31 August,1737). 3A verydetailed account of Hume's argument,like the one presentedin J.L. Mackie's The Cementof the Universe(Oxford, 1974), esp. p.10, is unnecessaryand problematic, requiringas it does a greatdeal of speculationabout finepoints of argumentwhich are notaddressed by Hume. In elaboratingour account we referto A Treatiseof Human Nature (2nd ed.; Oxford,1978) as Tr. and to theEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding,ed. E. Steinberg(Indianapolis, 1977) as Enquiry. 645 Copyright 1991 by JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 646 Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon later differencesthat mightbe thoughtto separate Hume and earlier thinkers(viz., his appeal to the notionof power and his discussionof probability).For the moment,the importantpoint is that the crux of Hume's critiqueof cause is his claim that the groundsof our beliefin cause and effect-theconstant conjunction of particular kinds of events- cannot,via reason,justify a beliefin causes and effects(though Hume clearlythinks that there is a morepractical sense in whichsuch a belief is justified). We rememberto havehad frequentinstances of the existence of one speciesof objects;and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have alwaysattended them, and have existedin a regularorder of contiguityand successionwith regard to them.Thus we rememberto haveseen that species of objectwe callflame, and to havefelt that species of sensation we call heat.We likewisecall to mindtheir constant conjunction in all pastinstances. Without anyfarther ceremony, we call theone cause and theother effect, and inferthe existenceof the one from that of the other. (Tr, 87) Yet reasoncannot justify the conclusion that there are causal laws. There is nothingcontradictory about the supposition that nature will not proceed uniformlyand we can easilyimagine that particular causes are not fol- lowed by theirregular effects. Thereis no object,which implies the existence of any other if we considerthese objectsin themselves,and never look beyond the ideas which we formof them. Suchan inferencewou'd amount to knowledge,and wou'dimply the absolute contradictionand impossibilityof conceivingany thingdifferent. But as all distinctideas are separable, 'tis evident there can be noimpossibility ofthat kind. (Tr,86-87, cf. 139) Nor can probabilityestablish "that instances,of whichwe have no experience,must resemble those, of whichwe have had experience,and that the course of naturecontinues always uniformlythe same" (Tr, 88-89); forit is foundedon the question-beggingprinciple that there "is a resemblancebetwixt those objects,of whichwe have had experience, and those,of whichwe have had none" (Tr, 90). It followsthat we cannotjustify our beliefin cause: Thus not onlyour reasonfails us in the discoveryof the ultimateconnection of cause and effects,but evenafter experience has inform'dus of theirconstant conjunction, 'tis impossiblefor us to satisfyourselves by our reason,why we shou'dextend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallenunder our observation. We suppose,but are never able to prove,that there mustbe a resemblancebetwixt those objects, of which we havehad experience, and thosewhich lie beyondthe reach of our discovery. (Tr, 91-92) In theend, it is habitand custom,not reason, that are thebases of all our causal inferences.This does not mean,however, that we should give up This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hume's Accountof Cause 647 ourbelief in causesand effects.Rather, we needonly recognize that it is the constantassociation of particularobjects that makes the mindanticipate conjunctionsof events and it is thispsychological process, not any rational justification,that explains our faithin causal reasoning(cf. Tr, 167-69). Giventhe length of Hume's discussionthere are, of course, many other aspectsof his analysis(some of themcontroversial). For our purposes,it is enoughto note the followingfour ideas thatare centralto it: 1. the claim that the basis of our beliefin cause and effectis the constantconjunction of the objectswe designatecause and effect; 2. the claim thatwe cannotdemonstrate the necessity of causal rela- tionshipsbecause we can withoutcontradiction imagine that causes are not alwaysfollowed by theirclaimed effects; 3. theclaim that it begsthe question to attemptto provethe probabil- ity of causal connections(for probabilityassumes that unobservedin- stancesof particularevents will be conjoinedwith the same eventsas observedones); and 4. the suggestionthat we should,for practical reasons, accept a day to day beliefin cause even thoughit cannotbe justifiedby reason. It is these four ideas that we shall investigatein the works of earlier thinkers,arguing, in particular,that they are foundin ancientskepticism. If one judges by the lack of referencesto earlierthinkers in most discussionsof Hume's account of cause, one mightexpect few possible sourcesfor Hume's thinkingand, in consequence,many difficulties when one triesto prove an ancientsource. In some ways the situationis the reverse.For thoughit is difficultto provean ancientsource of Hume's argument,this is in partbecause there are too many,not too few,possibilit- ies. It is also difficultto decideon thelikelihood of a particularsource of Hume's argumentsjust because the psychologicalprocesses that precipi- tatean argumentare inherentlyindefinite and unpredictable.It is difficult to know how Hume mighthave interpretedparticular ancient thinkers. In the case of Hume's critiqueof cause,
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