Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause

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Leo Groarke University of Windsor

Graham Solomon

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Recommended Citation Groarke, Leo and Solomon, Graham. (1991). Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause. Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (4), 645-663. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub/30

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Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause Author(s): Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1991), pp. 645-663 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709970 . Accessed: 27/11/2012 13:49

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Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon

The historyof ideas encompassesmany questions that extend beyond theinterpretation ofthe views of particular thinkers. 1 Among other things, theyinclude questions about the relationship between the views and ideas of differenttimes and questionsabout the intellectualmilieu in which thinkersdevelop their perspectives. Hume addressesthe former concerns in The Natural Historyof Religion and, in a more implicitway, the latterin a letterin which he tells his friendMichael Ramsay that the metaphysicalparts of the Treatisewill be understandableif one reads Malebranche'sRecherche, Berkeley's Principles, Bayle's Dictionary,and Descartes'sMeditations.2 In the presentpaper, we address such questionsas they relate to Hume's account of cause, discussingthe extentto whichhis views are anticipatedby ancientthinkers (in particularthe ancient skeptics) and the extentto whichavailable accountsof theirviews may have contributed to thedevelopment of Hume's own thinking.There is, we argue,a clearer anticipationof Hume in ancientthinking than usually imagined-one whichprobably contributes, in at leastan indirectway, to Hume'sthinking on the subject. We beginwith an outlineof Hume's generalargument,3 leaving until

'An earlierversion of this paper was presentedat a November1990 workshopon "David Hume and His Background"at the Universityof WesternOntario. We are especiallyindebted to JohnWright, Tom Lennon,William Harper, and David Fate Norton fortheir comments; to Brian Hillyardand Mike Barfootfor information on the holdings of Edinburghlibraries; and to RogerEmerson for information about Charles Mackie. Leo Groarkewould like to thankthe CalgaryInstitute for the Humanitiesfor a fellowship supportingthe workon the presentpaper. 2 See RichardPopkin, "So, Hume did readBerkeley," Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1954) (the letteris dated 31 August,1737). 3A verydetailed account of Hume's argument,like the one presentedin J.L. Mackie's The Cementof the Universe(Oxford, 1974), esp. p.10, is unnecessaryand problematic, requiringas it does a greatdeal of speculationabout finepoints of argumentwhich are notaddressed by Hume. In elaboratingour account we referto A Treatiseof Human Nature (2nd ed.; Oxford,1978) as Tr. and to theEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding,ed. E. Steinberg(Indianapolis, 1977) as Enquiry.

645

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 646 Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon later differencesthat mightbe thoughtto separate Hume and earlier thinkers(viz., his appeal to the notionof power and his discussionof probability).For the moment,the importantpoint is that the crux of Hume's critiqueof cause is his claim that the groundsof our beliefin cause and effect-theconstant conjunction of particular kinds of events- cannot,via reason,justify a beliefin causes and effects(though Hume clearlythinks that there is a morepractical sense in whichsuch a belief is justified). We rememberto havehad frequentinstances of the existence of one speciesof objects;and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have alwaysattended them, and have existedin a regularorder of contiguityand successionwith regard to them.Thus we rememberto haveseen that species of objectwe callflame, and to havefelt that species of sensation we call heat.We likewisecall to mindtheir constant conjunction in all pastinstances. Without anyfarther ceremony, we call theone cause and theother effect, and inferthe existenceof the one from that of the other. (Tr, 87)

Yet reasoncannot justify the conclusion that there are causal laws. There is nothingcontradictory about the supposition that nature will not proceed uniformlyand we can easilyimagine that particular causes are not followed by theirregular effects. Thereis no object,which implies the existence of any other if we considerthese objectsin themselves,and never look beyond the ideas which we formof them. Suchan inferencewou'd amount to knowledge,and wou'dimply the absolute contradictionand impossibilityof conceivingany thingdifferent. But as all distinctideas are separable, 'tis evident there can be noimpossibility ofthat kind. (Tr,86-87, cf. 139)

Nor can probabilityestablish "that instances,of whichwe have no experience,must resemble those, of whichwe have had experience,and that the course of naturecontinues always uniformlythe same" (Tr, 88-89); forit is foundedon the question-beggingprinciple that there "is a resemblancebetwixt those objects,of whichwe have had experience, and those,of whichwe have had none" (Tr, 90). It followsthat we cannotjustify our beliefin cause:

Thus not onlyour reasonfails us in the discoveryof the ultimateconnection of cause and effects,but evenafter experience has inform'dus of theirconstant conjunction, 'tis impossiblefor us to satisfyourselves by our reason,why we shou'dextend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallenunder our observation. We suppose,but are never able to prove,that there mustbe a resemblancebetwixt those objects, of which we havehad experience, and thosewhich lie beyondthe reach of our discovery. (Tr, 91-92)

In theend, it is habitand custom,not reason, that are thebases of all our causal inferences.This does not mean,however, that we should give up

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hume's Accountof Cause 647 ourbelief in causesand effects.Rather, we needonly recognize that it is the constantassociation of particularobjects that makes the mind anticipate conjunctionsof events and itis thispsychological process, not any rational justification,that explains our faithin causal reasoning(cf. Tr, 167-69). Giventhe length of Hume's discussionthere are, of course, many other aspectsof his analysis(some of themcontroversial). For our purposes,it is enoughto note the followingfour ideas thatare centralto it: 1. the claim that the basis of our beliefin cause and effectis the constantconjunction of the objectswe designatecause and effect; 2. theclaim thatwe cannotdemonstrate the necessity of causal rela- tionshipsbecause we can withoutcontradiction imagine that causes are not alwaysfollowed by theirclaimed effects; 3. theclaim that it begsthe question to attemptto provethe probability of causal connections(for probabilityassumes that unobservedin- stancesof particularevents will be conjoinedwith the same eventsas observedones); and 4. the suggestionthat we should,for practical reasons, accept a day to day beliefin cause even thoughit cannotbe justifiedby reason. It is these four ideas that we shall investigatein the works of earlier thinkers,arguing, in particular,that they are foundin ancientskepticism. If one judges by the lack of referencesto earlierthinkers in most discussionsof Hume's account of cause, one mightexpect few possible sourcesfor Hume's thinkingand, in consequence,many difficulties when one triesto prove an ancientsource. In some ways the situationis the reverse.For thoughit is difficultto provean ancientsource of Hume's argument,this is in partbecause there are too many,not too few,possibilit- ies. It is also difficultto decideon thelikelihood of a particularsource of Hume's argumentsjust because the psychologicalprocesses that precipi- tatean argumentare inherentlyindefinite and unpredictable.It is difficult to know how Hume mighthave interpretedparticular ancient thinkers. In the case of Hume's critiqueof cause, we can illustratethe questions thatthis raises by turningfirst to Lucian and his relationshipto Hume.

It is difficultto establishthe extentof Hume's acquaintancewith Lucian's worksbefore he wrotethe Treatise,though we know that he studiedunder William Scot, Professorof Greek at Edinburgh,and that he thoughtvery highly of Lucian's work later in his life.He refersto Lucian ninetimes in his moral,political, and literaryessays, often in the mostlaudatory way. When he arguesthat ancient attitudes to womendid not allow ancientwriters to leave us "one piece of pleasantrythat is excellent,"Hume qualifieshis judgment, noting that "one mayexcept the Banquetof Xenophon, and theDialogues of Lucian."4 In a letterto David

4 "The Rise of Artsand Science,"David Hume: EssaysMoral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller(Indianapolis, 1987), 134.

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Hume the Younger,he recommendsa course of summerreading that includesLucian' and Abbe Morelletbegins a letterto Hume with the remarkthat "As Lucian is yourfavourite author...."6 Finally,we note thatit is Lucian's Dialogues of theDead Hume turnsto in preparingfor death.7 Given Hume's respectfor Lucian, it is interestingto note that the latter'sdialogue, "Zeus Rants" containsremarks which anticipate some of the centralnotions in Hume's critiqueof cause-notions thatcan in principlebe derivedfrom Epicurean thought. They occurin a passage in whichthe Epicurean Damis ("thatsly rogue") rejectsthe Stoic Timocles' appeal to theargument from design as a basis fora beliefin theprovidence of the gods. Timoclesanswers by explaininghow he has come to believe thatthe gods exerciseprovidence: In thefirst place the order of natureconvinced me, the sun alwaysgoing the sameroad and the moon likewise and the seasons changing and plants growing andliving creatures being born, and these latter so cleverlydevised that they can supportlife and move and think and walk and build houses and cobble shoes- and all therest of it; these seem to me to be worksof providence.8 Damis repliesthat it begs thequestion to assumethat the order we see in the worldmust be a reflectionof divineprovidence. WhileI myselfwould say the recurrent phenomena are as youdescribe them, I neednot, however, at onceadmit a convictionthat they recur by somesort of providence.It's possiblethat they began at randomand nowtake place with uniformityand regularity. But you call [this] necessity "order" and then, forsooth, get angryif anyonedoes not followyou whenyou catalogueand extolthe characteristicsof these phenomena and thinkit a proofthat each of themis orderedby providence.9 Thoughthere seems no wayto be surethat these comments influenced Hume, Damis clearlyanticipates him whenhe suggeststhat events that occurwith a regularand uniformpattern of behavior (i.e., eventsthat are constantlyconjoined) may have come about at randomand may not be, therefore,necessarily conjoined. Regularity does not,in short,guarantee necessaryconnection. In makingsuch claims,Damis invokesa standardtenet of Epicurean

I Cited fromDavid Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton,"New Light on the Hume Library,"an unpublishedpaper presentedto the BibliographicalSocieties of Edinburgh and Oxford. 6 JohnYoung ThomsonGrieg (ed.), Lettersof David Hume (2 vols.; Oxford,1932), II, 158, n. 1. I See ErnestC. Mossner,The Life of David Hume (2nd ed.; Oxford,1980), 600-601. 8 "Zeus Rants," The Worksof Lucian, tr.A. M. Harmon(Cambridge, Mass., 1960), II, 38. 9Ibid., 39.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hume's Accountof Cause 649 theory,maintaining that the presentorder of thingsone findsin the worldis not necessary(though it is regular)and is the resultof chance interactionsof the atoms (cf. Lucretius,De Rerum Natura, 1.1024-35; Hume's discussionof such possibilitiesin theDialogues Concerning Natu- ral Religion,Part 8; and theseventeenth-century discussion of Epicurean- ism in Thomas Stanley'sHistory of Philosophy).10More generally,the Epicureansclaim that it is therandom (in thesense of unpredictableand undetermined)swerve of atomsthat produces the worldwe know.Such views obviouslyraise questionsabout the extentto which our beliefin cause and effectreflects necessary connections in the worldand may in thisway provokethe critiqueof necessaryconnection that one findsin Hume. The Epicureanprinciples defended in Lucian show thatwe can imagine(as the Epicureansdo) that the presentorder of natureis not necessary.Hume himselfscathingly rejects Epicurean principles,11 but thisitself shows that he knewand consideredthem. Ultimately, he must findthe Epicurean claim that the present order of eventsis notnecessary too radical,preferring the weakerclaim that it cannotbe knownto be necessary(and perhapsaccepting a beliefin necessaryconnection nonethe- less).12 But thisdoes not mean thatEpicurean ideas did not motivate(or at least contribute)to the accountof cause thatHume propounds. Anotherpossible antecedent of Hume's critiqueof cause is, as Ken Dorterhas suggested,13 themyth of the cave in Plato's Republic(Bk. VII, 5156). Here it is suggestedthat the cave's prisonersare mistakenwhen theyinterpret the shadowson the wall in frontof themas the cause of soundsthey hear. Theirinterpretation of eventsin thisway is the result of the conjunctionof the shadowsand the sounds and thisimplies that an observedconjunction of eventsprovides no proofof a cause and effect relationship-a principlethat plays a centralrole in Hume's reasoning. It mightbe thoughtthat this readingof the mythof the cave is an unnaturalone whichis possibleonly because we are alreadyfamiliar with Hume's accountof cause. One shouldnote, however, that Plato's doubts about our ordinaryview of cause and effectare a clear and obvious consequenceof his rejectionof the realityof the ordinaryworld in favor of a world of forms.This being said, it mustbe grantedthat it seems unlikelythat Plato playeda substantiverole in thedevelopment of Hume's

10 See Thomas Stanley,A Historyof Philosophy,1687 (New York, 1978), 874 (Ch. II) & 875 (Ch. V). 11In Part VIII of Hume's Dialogues, Philo asks "what if I should revivethe old Epicureanhypothesis?" It is, he remarks,"commonly, and I believe,justly, esteemed the most absurdsystem, that has yetbeen proposed."However, "with a fewalterations, it might... be broughtto beara faintappearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter infinite,as Epicureansdid, let us supposeit finite...." 12 For a recentaccount see Galen Strawson,The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume (Oxford,1989). 13 Personalcommunication.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 650 Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon thinking.His letterscontain scattered references to Plato and he refersto theRepublic twice in hisEnquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and twicein his moral,political, and literaryessays, but he takesa verydim view of Plato's outlook,comparing "the visionarysystems or ravingsof Plato" to "the solid sense of Plutarch."14

Though theyanticipate some elementsof Hume's account of cause, theanticipations of Hume we findin Lucian and Plato do not encompass detailed analogues of the fourpoints we noted in our account of his discussion.In contrast,the analogue of Hume one findsin ancientskepti- cismprovides a muchmore detailed anticipation of Hume's reasoning.It is in thisregard worth noting that Epicurean and Platonicprinciples must contributeto the intellectualmilieu that produced this aspect of ancient skepticism.Plato's mythof the cave is particularlysignificant given that it anticipateslater skepticism, which might be summarizedas the claim thatwe cannotknow that the worldreally is as it appears(that we may, forall we know,be in theposition of the prisoners in Plato's cave). Unlike Plato, however,the skepticsdeny that we can findour way out of the cave and establishthe truenature of the world,maintaining that we can onlysay how thingsappear relativeto our subjectivecircumstances (the mode of relativityis, accordingto Sextus,the basic Pyrrhoneanmode- PH, 1.29). The skeptics'view of cause and effectis discussedin detail in the extantworks of Sextus Empiricus,which provideour most complete account of ancientskepticism (Sextus himselfis a Pyrrhonean,but his argumentsand discussionare also influencedby academicskepticism). In the presentcontext they are especiallyrelevant, for theywere readily available to Hume. Accordingto A. P. Cavendish,his "knowledgeof Greekwas inadequatefor the purpose" of reading Sextus, but "theedition of J. A. Fabricius(Leipzig, 1718) includedthe Latin versionof H. Ste- phens,which Hume was probablycapable of reading."Cavendish none- thelessrejects any significantinfluence, remarking that "The onlyrefer- ence to Sextusin Hume's philosophicalwritings occurs at Essay on the Natural Historyof Religion,IV (1757). There can be no question of plagiarism.Hume's analysis is farmore subtle and thoroughthan anything attemptedby Sextus."'5 In answer to Cavendish'sremarks, it should be said that Hume's analysisis a variantof Sextus's,that there is a secondreference to himin SectionXII of The NaturalHistory of Religion,and thatthere is a third referencein Hume's essay"On thePopulousness of Ancient Nations" 16 a referencewhich refers to one of the books of Sextus (the Outlinesof

14 "Of the Populousnessof AncientNations," Essays, 377-464. 15A. P. Cavendish,David Hume (New York, 1968), 175. 16 Essays,399.

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Pyrrhonism,Book 3) that containsan analogue of Hume's critiqueof cause. More importantly,Cavendish overlooks the much more accessible versionof Sextus available to Hume in the translationof the Outlines containedin Thomas Stanley'sHistory of Philosophy.Stanley (1625-78) was knownprincipally as a poet but turnedto classical scholarshipin 1651.The firstvolume of his Historyof Philosophy was publishedin 1655, and othervolumes followed in 1656, 1660, and 1662. In 1661 he was elected a CharterMember of the Royal Society.Charles Mackie used the Historyas a sourcebookfor undergraduates during Hume's timeat Edinburgh,and both theUniversity library and the libraryof the Advo- cates(which functioned as a libraryfor polite Edinburgh) contained Stan- ley's work.17 JonathanBarnes has claimedthat Sextus does not anticipateHume, but thisis because Barnes has not consideredall the relevanttexts and because thereare problemswith his analysisof some of those he does discuss(see below)."8The mostnatural place to look foran analogueof Hume is in Sextus'spresentation of Aenesidemus'seight tropes against thedogmatists' accounts of cause (their"aetiologies"). They encompass a varietyof considerations that are notdirectly relevant to Hume'sconcerns, thoughmodes one and fourcan be interpretedin a way thatmakes them analoguesof Hume's reasoning. The First[mode holds that Aetiology cannot be established],for ... thekind of Aetiology,which is conversantinthings not apparent, hath not an acknowledged prooffrom apparent things.... TheFourth, for ... takingPhaenomena's as theyare, they think they comprehend thingsnot apparent, as theyare likewise;for things not apparent are perhaps effectedthe same way as Phaenomenas,perhaps some other peculiar way.19 The crux of these modes is the Pyrrhoneandistinction between those thingswhich appear (appearances or phainomena) and thosethings which actuallyexist. Modes one and fourare thus foundedon the claim that aetiologistsattempt to establishwhat are, in reality,causes and effectson thebasis ofwhat appears to be thecase. Whatappears to be thecase (and whatappear to be causes and effects)may, however, be distinctfrom what is actuallythe case (fromwhat are actualcauses and effects)and it follows thatone cannotuse theformer as a basis forconclusions about the latter. Accordingto Barnes,20there is no reason to accept the skeptic'spoint

17 Bothlibraries had the 1687second edition; the University library had thefirst edition as well. In discussingSextus's anticipationof Hume, we relyon Stanley'stranslation, whichremains very readable today. 18 JonathanBarnes, "Ancient Skepticism and Causation,"Myles Burnyeat (ed.), The SkepticalTradition (Berkeley, 1983). 19 Stanley,787; Outlinesof Pyrrhonism,1.17.181-82 (in referencesto the Outlines outsideStanley, we listbook, chapterand line numbers). 20 The SkepticalTradition, 164-66.

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withouta reasonfor believing that appearances and the nonapparentare distinct,but from the skeptic's standpoint this is a case ofmisplaced onus. It is the dogmatistswho claim to know causes and theirclaims can be justifiedonly if theycan justifythe assumptionsthey depend on. For ourpurposes the important point is thatthose things which appear to be causes and effectsare thosethings which are constantlyconjoined in our experience,and that modes one and fourthus suggestthat we cannotjustify the dogmatists' assumption that things which are constantly conjoinedare in realitycauses and effects(i.e., necessarilyconjoined). ReadingSextus in thisway, the modes against the aetiologists do contain an analogueof Hume's critiqueof cause. Indeed,such an interpretation suggeststhat Sextus anticipatesthe positiveand the negativeside of Hume's account,for his rejectionof the dogmatists'claims is coupled witha commitmentto "acquiese in Phaenomena[i.e., appearances]" and use themas a criteriawhich determines "in thecourse of lifewhat things are to be done, what not."'21 In the realm of causes and effectsthis obviouslyimplies an acceptanceof apparentcauses and effects.On the proposedreading, however, this implies an acceptanceof the apparent tie betweenobjects and eventswhich are constantlyconjoined-an acceptance whichis an analogueof Hume's acceptanceof causes and effectsin day to day affairs.

That thisis the correctinterpretation of modes one and fourof the Pyrrhoneans'tropes against cause is suggestedby Sextus's remarksin Book Two of the Outlines,which contain a moreexplicit version of such reasoningin the Pyrrhoneancritique of signs-a critiquewhich shows thatSextus considers apparent causes and effectsto be objectswhich are constantlyconjoined. The principleproblem with Barnes's account is his failureto notethat Sextus treats causes and effectsas signsof one another, a failurewhich allows him to overlookthe critiqueof cause which is impliedby Sextus's account of signs. The basis of this account is an account of (followingStanley) "hypomnestick" (or "admonitive")and "endictick"(or "indicative")signs. A Hypomnesticksign, they call thatwhich being observed to be togetherwith a significate,evident, as soon as everthe sign evidently incurreth to our sense, tho'the significate appear not, yet it causethus to rememberthat which was concomitantto it,tho' at presentnot evident, as smokeand fire.22 A hypomnestickor (followingBury)23 "suggestive" sign (literally, a sign whichreminds us) is,in otherwords, one whichwe haveobserved together withits significate (what it is a signof) to suchan extentthat its appearance

21 Stanley,777; Outlines,1.11.21. 22 Stanley,800; Outlines,2.10.100. 23 SextusEmpiricus, tr. R. G. Bury(Cambridge, 1933-49).

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hume's Accountof Cause 653 immediatelyreminds us of the significate.The constantassociation of smokeand fireleads us, forexample, to take smokeas a hypomnestick sign,in thiscase an effect,of fire. Sextus applies the same account"to the scar which followsthe wound, and to the punctureof the heart that precedesdeath; for on seeingthe scar we recallthe wound that preceded it,and on viewingthe puncture of theheart we foretellthe immanence of death" (AM, 8.151-53). From Hume's point of view, those thingswe ordinarilycall causes and effectsare suggestive(i.e., hypomnestick)signs, fortheir constant conjunction makes us associatethem with each other and it is this-not a necessaryconnection-which explains why we treat themas causes and effects. The positiveside of Hume's accountof cause is his suggestionthat we should believein causes and effectseven thoughwe cannotbuild a philosophicalfoundation for the claims that this implies.He himself contrastssuch an outlookwith the tenets of Pyrrhonism,remarking that "All discourse,all action would immediatelycease; and men remainin totallethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserableexistence" if Pyrrhonismwere to "universallyand steadily" prevail(Enquiry, 128). In fact,the Pyrrhoneansadopt a positionwhich is strictlyanalogous to Hume's, explicitlyrestricting their critique of signsto endicticksigns, suggesting that we relyon hypomnesticksigns in everydaylife. As Sextuswrites: Ofthese two kinds of signs [the hypomnestick and the endictick], we opposenot both,but onely the Endictick, as seemingto be forgedby the Dogmatists; the Hypomnestick[the suggestive] is creditable in thecourse of life; for whosoever seessmoke, knows that Fire is signified,and seeinga scarsaith, it had beena wound.So as wenot onely not contradict the common course of life, but maintain it,assenting inopinionatively [i.e., undogmatically] tothat in it which is creditable, butopposing what is particularlyforged by the Dogmatists.24 In keepingwith his general claim that the Pyrrhoneans accept appearances (and onlyreject claims about the world beyond them), Sextus thus suggests that the Pyrrhoneansaccept thingswhich are constantlyconjoined as apparentsigns and apparentcauses and effects,anticipating Hume's acceptanceof themin day to day affairs.25 The negativeside of Hume's critiqueof cause whichwe foundin the modesagainst aetiology finds an analoguein the Pyrrhoneanrejection of endicticksigns. Stanley's translation of thisaspect of Sextusis sometimes problematic,but it stillprovides a basis forHume's critique.In introduc-

24 Stanley,800; Outlines,2.10.102. 25 One mightdistinguish between the kinds of beliefin cause and effectthat are proposedby Hume and the Pyrrhoneansby delvinginto the detailsof the Pyrrhoneans "undogmatic"belief, but such mattersare beyondthe scope of the presentpaper; for an accountof Pyrrhoneanbelief, see Leo Groarke,Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in AncientThought (Kingston, Montreal, 1990), esp. 136-40and 144-46.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 654 Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon ing the Pyrrhoneancritique of signs,it notes(following the first remarks on hypomnesticksigns quoted above) that: An Endicticksign, (say they)is thatwhich is notobserved together with an evidentsignificate, but of its own nature and constitution signifieth that whereof it is a signe;thus the motions of the body are signes of the soul. Hereuponthey define [endictick] Signe thus, Signe is a demonstrative axiome,antecedent in a soundconnex, detective of that which followeth.6 This last sentenceneeds to be explained.A definitionof the terms that it contains,found on thesame page in Stanley,implies that a signis some provablething (axiom) whichis the antecedentof a trueconditional (a sound connex)and thusestablishes the existenceof the thingreferred to in the conditional'sconsequent. A woman'shaving milk is, forexample, alleged to be a sign of her havingconceived, for it is alleged to be the antecedentof the trueconditional, "If she has milk,she has conceived." The claim thatan endicticksign indicatesits significatein "its own natureand constitution"amounts to the claim thatthe signalways and necessarilyindicates its significate. The claimthat such a signmust render true the antecedentof a true conditionalthat has its significateas a consequenceimplies a necessaryconnection. In the case of signsthat are causes and effects,this means thatendictick causes and effectsmust be necessarilyconjoined, and thatthe Pyrrhonean rejection of endictick signs impliesthe rejectionof necessaryconnection. Sextus'ssuggestion that an endicticksign "is not observedtogether withan evidentsignificate"27 may seem problematic,for this might, on firstreading, be takento implythat causes and effectsare not treatedas endicticksigns (for they are observedtogether with their evident significates).28Such a readingwould destroythe symmetry between hypomnes- tickand endicticksigns, however, and anysuch exclusionis contradicted by thesuggestion that an endicticksign is one thatmakes the antecedent ofa trueconditional true, for this obviously can be so in thecase ofcauses and effects.Indeed, Sextushimself gives "she hath milk" as an alleged exampleof an endicticksign of "she hath conceived"because theyare said to be joined by the true conditional,"If she hath milk,she hath conceived."The suggestionthat an endicticksign is notobserved with an evidentsignificate can, therefore,be best understoodas the claim thatit is notunderstood as a signmerely because it is constantlyassociated with its significate(because it is psychologicallyassociated, as in the case of hypomnesticksigns), but because it is in some strongersense tied to its significate.

26 Sextusin Stanley,800; Outlines,2. 10. 101. 27 Cf. Bury:"is not clearlyassociated with...." 28 His example(of bodilymotions as signsof thesoul) mightbe takenas a case where signsare notobserved with their significates, for mental states are notdirectly observable.

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In the veryact of rejectingendictick signs in favorof hypomnestick signs,Sextus's critique anticipates Hume's claim thatour beliefin causes and effectsmust be foundedon observedconjunctions of eventswhich cannotestablish their necessary connection. The Pyrrhoneansuggestion that we should accept (and rely on) hypomnesticksigns anticipates Hume's suggestionthat we acceptour day to day beliefin cause without a philosophicalfoundation. It might,however, still be asked whetherthe Pyrrhoneansgive the same groundsfor rejecting the claim thatconstant conjunctionimplies necessary connection-i.e., the untenabilityof a de- fenseof this implication in termsof logical necessity or probability(points 2 and 3 in our summaryof Hume's reasoning).Leaving till later Hume's claims about the impossibilityof defendingthis inference on thebasis of probability,we may note thatthe Pyrrhoneansprovide a clear analogue of Hume's suggestionthat causal necessitycannot be reducedto logical necessity. This aspect of Sextus's critiqueof endicticksigns depends on the notionof a "relative,"a conceptthe Pyrrhoneansuse to referto things whichcannot be separatelyconceived. Among the examplesSextus uses to illustratehis variousdiscussions of relativesare the conceptswhiter and blacker,sweet and bitter,left and right,and wholeand part(see AM, 8.154, 161-62,9.340). In generalit maybe said thatX and Y are relatives if and only if any claim about X logicallyentails a claim about Y (if somethingis sweetit is not bitter,if it is a whole,its partsare subsumed by it, and so on). Signs which are necessarilytied to theirsignificates (endicticksigns) must be relativeto theirsignificates, for it must be impossibleto imaginesuch signsoccurring without their significates. It is onlythis that allows one to deduce the existenceof the latterfrom the former(cf. AM, 9.340). The problemis thatthis implies that such signs and theirsignificates are not logicallydistinct and cannot,therefore, functionas signsand significates. ... ifit [thesign] be relativeto thesignificate, it must necessarily be comprehendedtogether with the significate, as right with left, upwards with downwards and thelike: But if it be detectiveof thesignificate, it is necessarythat it be comprehendedbefore it, that, being first known, it may bring to us thenotion of thething which is knownby it.... Thereforeitis impossibleto understandany thingwhich is notonly relative to, but detective also of, that to which it is relative: Buta [endictick]sign, say they, is bothrelative to, and detective of the significate, thereforeit is impossibleto understandthe sign.29 It is importantto see that the temporalconsiderations this argument invokesare notessential to it.Thus thecrux of the Pyrrhoneans' reasoning is the claim that signs and significates(e.g., smoke and fire)must be distinctentities and that this cannotbe the case if theyare necessarily

29 Stanley,801; Outlines,2.11.119-20.

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(i.e.,logically) conjoined. The latterimplies that they cannot be temporally distinct,but this is a consequenceof the more basic pointthat they cannot be separatelyconceived. As Sextus notes, "the sign is relativeto the significate,and relativesare comprehendedtogether with one another," and an endicticksign cannot, therefore, be apparentwithout its significate and is useless as a sign. "For as rightand leftincurring to us together, rightis not said to be moreapparent than left, or leftthan right; in like mannerthe sign and thesignificate being comprehended together, it cannot be said thatthe signis moreapparent than the significate:But ifthe significatebe apparent,it is nota significate,as notneeding any to signifie and detectit."30 Applyingthis reasoning to endicticksigns which are said to be causes and effectsof one another,it can be said thatthey must be relativesand thus logicallyinseparable. But this impliesthat they are not logically distinctobjects and not,therefore, genuine causes and effects.As Hume putsit at one point,"There is nothingin any object,consider'd in itself, whichcan affordus a reason fordrawing a conclusionbeyond it" (Tr, 139). Hume's argumentagainst cause employsthe same logical considerations,though it goes the otherway around,assuming that causes and effectsare distinctand concludingthat they are notnecessarily conjoined. As he putsit, "There is no object,which implies the existence of any other [distinctobject] if we considerthese objects in themselves,and neverlook beyondthe ideas whichwe formof them. Such an inferencewou'd amount to knowledge,and wou'd implythe absolute contradiction and impossibilityof conceiving any thing different. But as all distinctideas are separable, 'tis evidentthere can be no impossibilityof thatkind" (Tr, 87). Sextus explicitlyapplies the temporalversion of such reasoningto causes and effectsin Book III of theOutlines, in a sectionone of thefirst reviewersof the Treatisesuggests as similarto Hume's argumentagainst cause.31According to therelevant part of Sextus's discussion (a partwhich Barnesdoes not discuss),there is no way to establishthat there are any causes, forcauses mustprecede their effects and thisis impossiblegiven thatcauses and effectsare supposedto be relatives,i.e., necessarilyconjoined and thuslogically inseparable.

... a Cause ... mustfirst exist, and be a Cause, and thenproduce the Effect, whichis said to be theEffect thereof, The Cause alreadyexisting. But Cause

30Ibid. 31 In the Bibliothequeraisonee for April-May-June1740. The reviewernotes that Hume's discussionof cause "is prettyclose to the mannerin whichSextus Empiricus formerlyreasoned in his Hypotyposes,Book III, Chap. III." This remarkis noted in Mossner,The Life of David Hume, 129. A. P. Cavendishwas puzzled by the sectionof Sextusreferred to, but we will arguethat it containsan analogueof Hume's critique.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hume's Accountof Cause 657 beingrelative to theEffect, it is manifestthat, as Cause,it cannotexist before it.32(Cf. AM, 2.168,9.234-36) If we wantto put thesame argumentin wordsthat are closerto Hume's, we mightbegin with his alreadyquoted claim that "There is nothingin any object,consider'd in itself,which can affordus a reasonfor drawing a conclusionbeyond it" (Tr, 139). This suggeststhat we can establishthe existenceof an effectfrom the existenceof a cause onlyif its effectis not logicallydistinct. But thenthe one cannotoccur beforethe other,as is requiredby the concept of a cause and itseffect. Here again,the important pointis that distinctcauses and effectscan be conceivedwithout each otherand need not,therefore, be necessarilyconjoined.

Of thefour aspects of Hume's accountof cause we notedat theoutset, theonly one we have notyet found in Sextusis thesuggestion that a belief in cause and effectcannot be defendedby an appeal to probability.Given no clear distinctionbetween objective and subjectiveprobability (Car- neades' pithanonis betterunderstood as a notionof plausibility),33the Pyrrhoneansdo not discussit in a directway, but theircritique of induc- tive inferenceencompasses the crux of Hume's analysisin this regard. Indeed,there is a sensein whichit is morecomprehensive than Hume's reasoning,for it rejectsall inductiveinferences (and is not restrictedto an attackon causal claims),questioning the assumption that the regulari- tieswe have observedin naturewill continue in thefuture. As Sextusputs it, an inductioncannot be knownto be correctas long as we have not observedall instancesof the phenomenain question,"it beingpossible, thatsome of the omitted Particulars may be foundcontrary to theUniver- sal Proposition"34(cf. Hume's complaintthat probability "is foundedon thepresumption of a resemblancebetwixt those objects, of which we have had experience,and those,of which we havehad none,"Tr, 90). As Sextus notes elsewhere,such reasoningshows that generalizationslike "Every manis a livingcreature" and "No manis fourfooted" cannot be justified.35 Exactlythe same reasoningis applicableto causal inductions(for they are also based on the question-beggingassumption that future observa- tionswill confirm past ones) and it would,therefore, be a mistaketo think

32 Stanley,815; Outlines,3.5.26-28. Cf. the remarksthat "Relatives,as Relatives, coexist,and are understoodtogether; but ... it is necessary,that a Cause firstbe a Cause beforeit producethe Effect" (ibid.) and that"if we cannotunderstand a Cause (forasmuch as it is relative,)before its Effect;and, to understandit as Cause of the Effect,it be necessaryto understandit, as beingbefore the Effect ... thenit is impossibleto understand thatthere is Cause" (ibid.). 33 It is a measureof the forceof the impressionwe experienceand not as clearlytied to the enumerationof particularcases as thenotion of probabilityHume adopts.On this point,see Myles Burnyeat,"Carneades Was No Probabilist,"forthcoming. 34 Stanley,807; Outlines,2.15.204. 35 Ibid.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 658 Leo Groarkeand GrahamSolomon that Sextus's discussioncontains no antecedentof Hume's arguments againstthe probabilityof inductiveinferences.

It shouldby now be clearthat Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism contains an extensiveanalogue of Hume's critiqueof cause. The questionwhether thisanalogue influenced Hume remains.In favorof directinfluence, one mightnote that Stanley's translation made Sextusvery readily accessible and thatit would at least be odd to findthat someone preoccupied with skepticismas a problemwould not consultthe mostaccessible text that representsthe viewsof real skeptics.In answerto such suggestions,one mightpoint to modernand contemporaryepistemology, which is equally caughtup withthe problemof skepticism,but forthe mostpart ignores the detailsof the ancientskeptics' views (even when it makes reference to the ancientschools).36 Given such considerationsand Hume's own caricatureof the Pyrrhoneanposition,37 it seems unlikelythat Hume was familiarwith the detailsof Sextus'sOutlines when he composedthe Treatise. In contrast,it is much more difficultto dismissthe possibilityof indirectinfluence on Hume's thinking.Given Stanley'stranslation, the appropriatesections of Sextuswere available, not just to Hume,but to all of his contemporaries.Most notablyperhaps, Hume's teachersdid know Stanley.That therelevant sections of Sextuswere disseminated to at least some extentis shown by the referenceto Sextus in the reviewof the Treatisecited above (assumingHume saw the review,it is difficultto believethat he would not have looked it up). Given thatwe can neverknow what passed in conversationbetween Hume, his fellowstudents, his professorsand acquaintances,an exact accountof the development of his ideas on cause seemsimpossible, though it seemscertain that ancient philosophy provided a contextfor much of thisdiscussion. Indeed, Hume's readingof Bayle establishesthis in a very generalway. Sextus's anticipation of Hume's argumentsagainst cause and the moregeneral anticipations one findsin Lucian and even Plato (and in Sextus'svery general tropes, from which one can derivethe critique of cause), are not, therefore,compatible with the usual assumptionthat ancientdiscussion had no effecton Hume's thoughtsabout the problems ofcauses and effects.To reinforcethis conclusion, we finishour discussion with an account of otherthinkers who influencedHume's account of cause.

Giventhe possibility that Sextus influenced Hume's accountof cause,

36 See Groarke,Greek Scepticism. 3 On thispoint, cf. David Fate Norton'sremark that "It is difficultto reconcile. . . Pyrrhonismwith Hume's views on the topic" (David Hume: Common-SenseMoralist, ScepticalMetaphysician [Princeton, 1982], 266).

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it is naturalto ask how such influencefits with other accounts of the genesisof Hume's ideas in thisregard. Malebranche is themost important figurein thisregard, for Charles McCracken has shownthat "There can be no questionthat Hume, whencomposing the accountof causalityin the Treatise,had Malebranche'streatment of that topic in histhoughts."38 Indeed,the parallel passages McCracken notes convincingly establish that "Hume not only keptthe Search [The Searchfor Truth]in mindas he wroteon causality,but thathe even had it open forconsultation while writing."39 Two thingsshould be said about the implicationsof such considera- tionsin the presentcontext. Firstly, and mostobviously, it mustbe said thata varietyof influences probably manifest themselves in Hume's views, and thatMalebranche's influence does not,therefore, exclude the possibility of otherinfluences. Secondly, it should be noted that Malebranche himselfis to some extenta vehiclefor ancient skeptical doubts, and his influenceon Hume thussupports rather than diminishes the probability of the generalclaim thatHume's viewsare tied to ancientskepticism. Ancientdoubts about causation were available to Malebranchein the same way theywere available to Hume-via Stanley'stranslation of Sextus-but his preoccupationwith occasionalism (the doctrine that God is the onlyefficient cause) suggestsa morecircuitous route from ancient skepticism.To understandthis route,we must firstturn to medieval anticipationsof Hume's views. Though thereis no reasonto thinkthat the argumentsthey employ are exclusivelytheirs, two figuresmentioned as medievalprecursors of Hume on cause are thefourteenth-century French philosopher, Nicholas ofAutrecourt (dubbed "the medievalHume)"40 and theeleventh-century Islamic thinker,al-Ghazali. For our purposes,the apparentlack of any plausiblelink betweenNicholas and Hume makes Nicholas interesting onlybecause his viewsmay be yetanother manifestation of ancient skeptical concerns.41

38 CharlesJ. McCracken,Malebranche and BritishPhilosophy (Oxford, 1983), 257. 39 Ibid.,258. 40Cf. the introductionto the selectionsfrom Nicholas in A. Hymanand J. J. Walsh (eds.), Philosophyin theMiddle Ages (Indianapolis,1973), 654. 41 In Nicholasof Autrecourt (Princeton, 1948), JuliusWeinberg questions Nicholas's knowledgeof earlierskeptics, but thereare many referencesthat suggestthat he was familiarwith theirwork. At one point,he refersto the academic skeptics,suggesting that Bernard'sposition entails "the absurditiesof the Academics." His familiaritywith Pyrrhoneanskepticism seems reflected in his use of Rome as an exampleof what is not immediatelyevident (cf. his UniversalTreatise 228 and PH 2.98;AM 8.145);in hisextended discussionof the standard Pyrrhonean antithesis between the tastes of things which appear sweet to the healthyand bitterto the sick (ibid., 228 and passim.); in his appeal to appearancesas a basis forbelief; and in the generalstructure of his basic argumentsfor skepticism.Above and beyondthis circumstantialevidence, there may be an explicit referenceto thePyrrhoneans in Nicholas'ssecond letter to Bernard,where he arguesthat

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Ghazali's viewsare moreimportant because theyhave been linkedto Malebranche'soccasionalism. His critiqueof cause is includedin The Incoherenceof thePhilosophers (the Tahafutal Falasifa), whichattacks Aristotleand his Islamicfollowers on twentypoints which contradict the tenetsof orthodoxIslam. He findsa beliefin strictnatural necessity unacceptablebecause it makes God an amorphousfirst cause, remote fromday to day realityand unable to intervenein the naturalorder of events.In orderto reestablishGod's omnipotenceand the possibilityof miracles,Ghazali defendsoccasionalism, the view that God is theimmedi- ate cause of all events.Unlike Sextus,Ghazali thereforeintroduces the notionof God intohis analysis.Theological considerations thus motivate his argumentsthough they do notplay a crucialrole in logicallyestablish- ing his conclusions(the notionthat God is the basic efficientcause is alreadyfound in Anaxagorasand in Stoicism,and is mentionedin Sextus at AM, 9.6; elsewhereSextus remarks that the majority have declaredthat God is a mostefficient Cause and thereforebegins an accountof efficient principles"by inquiringabout God .. ."-PH, 3.2).42 In defendinghis occasionalism, Ghazali rejectsnatural necessity, hold- ing thatour beliefthat objects and eventsare causes and effectsis based on God's decision to ". . . create them in a successive order, though not because thisconnection is necessaryin itselfand cannotbe disjoined.On the contrary,it is in God's power to createsatiety without eating and decapitationwithout death, and so on withrespect to all connections."43 Like Hume,Nicholas, and thePyrrhoneans, Ghazali bases his critiqueof

the externalworld is not knownintuitively, for if it were,"rustics" (rustici) would know thatit exists.Weinberg (39) takesthis literally, as a referenceto peasants,but they do not, in anystraightforward way, deny the existence of the external world. Rather than peasants, it seemsthat it is Pyrrhoneansthat Nicholas has in mind,using a Latin equivalentof a termwe findin Galen, when he calls the more radical skeptics"rustic Pyrrhoneans" (agroikopyrroneious,8.711.1-3). Obviously, they clearly deny our knowledgeof external objectsand Nicholas can, therefore,legitimately invoke them to show thatit cannotbe assumed. 42 Accordingto Weinberg,Nicholas of Autrecourt'scritique of cause is moreradical thanany propoundedby predecessorslike Ghazali because it is less dependenton God's abilityto intervenein the naturalorder of events.It is, however,hard to see whythis would makeit stronger(unless one assumes,in an ad hoc way,that one can disprovethe existenceof God) and the claim thatGod can performmiracles does not play a crucial role in Pyrrhoneanarguments or in al-Ghazali. In the lattercase it is a conclusion,not a premise,in Ghazali's reasoning.Ghazali is motivatedby religiouscommitments, but this is anothermatter and Nicholas invokesa similarappeal when (in his fifthletter) he suggeststhat God maybe theonly efficient cause. UnlikeGhazali, he does not personally endorsesuch a view (ibid., 259), but stillholds that it is a possibilitywhich cannot be disproven,and whichentails that natural causes may not exist (or mayeven be impossible). 43 Tahafutal Falasifa, in Averroes'sTahafut al Tahafut("The Incoherenceof the Incoherence,"a responseto Ghazali which includeshis entiretext), Simon Van Den Bergh,ed. and tr. (2 vols.; London, 1954), I, 517.

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cause on the claim thatthe distinctnessof cause and effectshows that it is not contradictoryto denycausal necessity. Accordingto us,the connection between what is usuallybelieved to be a cause and whatis believedto be an effectis nota necessaryconnection; each of two thingshas itsown individuality and is notthe other, and neither the affirmation northe negation, neither the existence nor the non-existence ofthe one is logically impliedin the affirmation,negation, existence and non-existenceof the other...."4

Accordingto Ghazali, our observationsof causes and effectsand the habitsthey produce only establish their past conjunction, and nota necessary connection.In attemptingto prove thatcontact with fire causes a piece of cottonto burn,for example,"the philosophershave no other proofthan the observationof the occurrenceof theburning, when there is contactwith fire,but observationproves only a simultaneity,not a causation,and, in reality,there is no othercause but God."45This does notmean that we shouldgive up relianceon causesand effectsin ordinary affairsbut only that we cannotjustify it and thatwe shouldinstead accept the regularityof God's actions. Ghazali is importantin the presentcontext because he influenced Malebranche,who adopteda similaroccasionalism which seems to have exerteda greatinfluence on Hume's thinking.According to Naify,Hume "simplytook overMalebranche's criticism of the traditionaltheories [of cause],and thenturned a partof Malebranche's critical apparatus against him,"arguing that God's role as cause is similarlyunprovable.46 Naify's suggestionthat Malebranche is indebtedto Ghazali is confirmedby Len- non, who notesthat Malebranche gives Suarez's discussionof the views of Averroes(and, implicitly,Ghazali) as the sourceof his occasionalist concerns.47 In lightof our concerns,the importantpoint is thatHume's ties,via Malebrancheand Suarez, to Ghazali bind him once again to ancient skepticism,for it exerteda greatinfluence on Ghazali and the Islamic traditionof which he is a part.48Van Den Bergh'sdiscussion of the debate betweenGhazali and Averroesthus contains forty-four references to Sex- tus Empiricus,and Ghazali's discussionrepeatedly employs the kinds of example one findsin ancientskeptical discussions of causation-in particular,burning, the possibility of an individualchanging into another species,and the differenteffects the sun and firehave on differentthings

44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 518, cf. 537. 46 JamesFrederick Naify, Arabic and EuropeanOccasionalism (Ph.D. diss.,San Diego, 1975), 181. 47 Thomas Lennnon," VeritasFilia Temporis:Hume on Time and Causation,"History of PhilosophyQuarterly, 2 (1985), 287. 48 See Van Den Bergh'sextensive notes.

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(see AM, 9.202-3,241, 247-49;PH, 3.18; cf.AM, 8.192-94,D.L. 9.104). Medical exampleslike thosethat Ghazali uses wereprobably a standard partof the repertoireof the ancientempirical school of medicine,which has ties to Pyrrhonismand denies the possibilityof establishingcauses and effects.Such ties are confirmedby Maimonides'remark that "One mustknow everything the moslems, Mu'tazilites as wellas Ash'arites[the lattersect beingal-Ghazali's], have professedconcerning these subjects, has been borrowedfrom the Greeksand Syrianswho appliedthemselves to the criticismof the philosophers[i.e., the skeptics]."49It is difficult (perhapsimpossible) to determinethe exact way in whichancient skeptical discussionsof cause influenceGhazali, but it can safelybe said thatsome such influenceconstitutes one way in whichthe Pyrrhoneancritique of cause did indirectlyinfluence Hume, in thiscase via Malebranche.

Rather than show that Sextus did not influenceHume, then, the hypothesisthat his accountof cause is ultimatelyderived from al-Gha- zali's occasionalismsupports an indirectconnection. Yet anotherpossibil- ity is indirectinfluence through some of Hume's contemporarieswho were familiarwith Sextus in the Greek or Latin, or throughThomas Stanley'sHistory. Joseph Glanvill is a case in point,though Popkin has arguedthat his influenceon Hume's accountof cause is minimal.50Some such possibilitymay be indicatedby Hume's use of thenotion of a "relative" whenhe discussesthe possibilityof justifying a beliefin poweras a basis fora beliefin cause, remarkingthat "the idea of poweris relativeas muchas thatof cause; and bothhave a referenceto an effect,or someother eventconstantly conjoined with the former.""5 A detailedexamination of all the possibilitiesof indirectinfluence are, however,beyond the scope of the presentpaper. We have been concernedto make the followingmain points:(1) An-

49Guideof thePerplexed, 1.71, Van den Bergh,II, 1. 50 H. G. Van Leeuwenremarks that "Ferris Greenslet, in his JosephGlanvill: A Study in EnglishThought and Lettersof theSeventeenth Century (New York, 1900),points out thatGlanvill's account of the causes ofhuman ignorance is derivedin largemeasure from SextusEmpiricus. Glanvill may have had directaccess to a copy of Sextus'swritings, or mayhave used Thomas Stanley's The History of Philosophy (London, 1655), which contains largeextracts from the skeptic's writings" (H. H. Van Leeuwen,The Problem of Certainty in EnglishThought, 1630-1690 [2nd ed.; The Hague, 1970]79). RichardPopkin discusses Glanvill'sskepticism about causationand his influenceon Hume in "JosephGlanvill: A Precursorto David Hume," JHI, 14 (1953), 292-303. Popkin remarksthat Glanvill "indicates... thatthe Humean theoryof causalityis latentin the Pyrrhoneanpoint of view." 51 EnquiryVII ii 77n. Cf. ft. 32, above. And we note,contra Barnes, that Hume's referenceto "power" does not clearlydistinguish him fromthe ancientskeptics (see Barnes, 178). Hume believedcause is the crucialnotion and an appeal to the notionof powerreduced to an appeal to thenotion of cause and effect.Having the power to produce something"is synonymousto causing"(Enquiry, VIII ii 74n).

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.71 on Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:49:25 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hume's Accountof Cause 663 cientskepticism does (contraBarnes) containa clear analogueof central aspectsof Hume's accountof cause. (2) This aspectof ancientskepticism was readily available to Hume and his contemporariesthrough the seventeenth-centuryStanley translation of Sextus'sOutlines of Pyrrhon- ism. (3) Otherpossible seventeenth-century sources for Hume's thoughts on cause (viz., Malebranche)also suggesta linkto ancientthought. The gap betweenancient and earlymodern philosophy may not be thechasm thatthe rhetoricof the earlymoderns would have us believe.

WilfridLaurier University.

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