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The Hemlock Papers an Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 1 The Hemlock Papers An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy University of Idaho Department of Politics and Philosophy Volume 17 Spring 2020 2 Letter from the Editors It is a great pleasure and privilege to present the 17th volume of The Hemlock Papers. Our team has worked diligently to revitalize our journal in the past two years following a significant hiatus, and we are delighted to share the following philosophical works with the greater academic community. The Hemlock strives to feature exemplary undergraduate scholarship and promote fruitful discourse, and we find this edition to be an outstanding realization of these goals. We chose to call for a wide range of philosophical subjects this year; the enclosed works, we hope, will present the reader with a richly diverse set of perspectives, styles of argument, and academic engagement. I want to give special thanks to the members of the PST society for engaging with and reviewing our submissions. I would also like to thank our chapter advisor, Dr. Graham Hubbs, and administrative assistant Omni Francetich for their unwavering support throughout this process. Editors Emma French Trevor Woodward The Team Michael Bivens Braden Farrar AJ Bruce Cameron Haylett Diana Cervantes Lauren Moon Sam Clements Landon Moulding 3 Contents The Benefits of Epistemological Skepticism in Philosophical Inquiry 4 Kyle Smith Definitional Inconsistency and Conceptual Misrepresentation: A Critique of Thomas Kelly’s 11 “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence” Grace Forster Philosophy and the Muslim Masses: A Discussion Surrounding Ibn Rushd’s Decisive Treatise 20 Fatima Najdi Aristotle is a Rationalist: Necessity in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Ethics 27 Nicholas M. Michieli A Critique of Hume’s Skepticism of Reason John H. Cooney 35 4 The Benefits of Epistemological Skepticism in Philosophical Inquiry Kyle Smith Humboldt State University ABSTRACT: The inductive skeptic argues that we can know no inductive inferences to be certain. Although the skeptic’s methodology is sound, it is impos- sible to carry out the skeptical belief system into one’s actions. In this paper, I ar- gue for a less radical skepticism than that held of the traditional inductive skeptic. I posit that we can make use of skepticism in philosophical discourse through use of a restricted domain of focus which allows us to aside the practical issues of a more complete skepticism. Epistemological skepticism is throughout our philosophical investi- both sound and not a fruitless inquiry, gations. which many have contended in the The classical skeptical argument past. Skepticism is widely regarded as is that we have no proper grounds to an impractical viewpoint due to the assert any statement’s certainty. There consequential rejection of all positive are two methods of reasoning to deter- philosophical theories and the impos- mine the certainty of a statement: de- sibility of action. I argue that the re- duction and induction. Deduction in- stricted form of skepticism I describe, volves the logical and systematic as opposed to radical universal skepti- “elimination” of statements in order to cism which most are familiar with, is reach a truly verified conclusion (i.e. philosophically beneficial. I will be mathematical, logical, and definitional pulling primarily from the arguments truths). Induction is the method of of Abraham Meiden and Peter Unger drawing a probabilistic conclusion to establish my position on different from some evidence. I will be con- forms of skepticism. I will conclude by cerned with inductive skepticism as offering an overview of more plausible deductive arguments are uninforma- and pragmatic uses of skepticism, re- tive by nature (e.g. “all teenagers are lying on domain of focus and degree of between the ages of 13 and 19” or probability, pulling from Brian “A=A”). An inductive skeptic cri- Skyrms’ “Grades of Inductive Skepti- tiques induction on the grounds of its cism”. All accounts of the refutation of uncertainty. Philosopher David Hume skepticism, while well intended, fall is widely regarded as the founder of short of the skeptical scope. Skepti- modern inductive (Humean) skepti- cism is sound in all accounts put forth cism. Hume claimed that “to try to jus- thus far and as epistemologists we tify (it) inductively is to beg the ques- must contend with this fact and at- tion: “It is impossible, therefore, that tempt to make use of skepticism any arguments from experience can 5 prove this resemblance of the past to being conducted in epistemology, phi- the future, since all these arguments losophy as a whole, or any discipline are founded on the supposition of that for that matter is fruitless and contin- resemblance.”1 gent upon the weakly assumed reliabil- Philosopher Abraham Meiden ity of human belief. A notable group lays out some popular formulations of which took on the challenge of skepti- the radically skeptical argument2 as cism are known as the justificationists. follows: The justificationists argue that “skep- tical arguments show just that state- (a.1.) To show that a statement is ments such as ‘The sun will rise to- in fact certain is to prove or jus- morrow' are not certain; but they do tify it. In order to do so, one must not show that such statements are not justify all assumptions within the justified, plausible or probable. There- statement and subsequently jus- fore, we may still claim that it is ra- tify all assumptions within those tional to believe that the sun will rise justification statements… Form- tomorrow and irrational to deny it.”4 ing an infinite regress of (doubt- The justificationists agree with the ful) justificatory statements. skeptics in their fundamental argu- (b.1.) Human information (e.g. ment of uncertainty, but posit that we perception and thought) is imper- ought to shift the focus of our episte- fect by nature. mological pursuit of knowledge to a (c.1.) It is logically possible that more pragmatic model concerned with some ‘evil demon’ is controlling justification, plausibility, and proba- our beliefs and causes us to be bility rather than the former quest for mistaken.3 absolute truth and certainty. Despite the fact that the justifica- Arguments such as these lead the tionists agree with the skeptics on their skeptic to form the conclusion that we foundational claims, some strong- can know nothing at all to be certain. willed skeptics have still found a way Many philosophers have adopted in which to refute the justificationary the project of attempting to find a thesis. The justificatory skeptic claims sound argument against skepticism, that a statement like ‘I have a body’ (or for highly rational reasons. It seems as any statement supposing a belief to be though if we cannot know anything to true) is not only uncertain, but is also be certain, then much of the work no more justifiable than any other 1 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning 3Abraham Meiden, Arguments for Skepti- Human Understanding, (Oxford, Claren- cism, (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 don, 1896), 32. no. 2, 1986), 298. 2 These radically skeptical arguments are 4Abraham Meiden, Arguments for Skepti- applicable to both deductive and inductive cism, 299. reasoning, but once again I am concerned only with inductive skepticism here. 6 claim, including the claim that ‘I do diminishes quickly and tends to not have a body.’5 The justificatory be zero, or rather close to it.9 skeptic effectively applies modifica- tions of the classical skeptical argu- With this, I intend to have per- ment to disprove the probability, plau- suaded you to adopt the belief that the sibility, and justification of claims in skeptical thesis (in both the certain and order to assert their position against justificatory formulation) is sound. I the justificationists. Consider the fol- will further show how that plays out in lowing skeptical argument modifica- terms of human experience. tions which target justificationists: If one were to accept the radically skeptical position as more than a mere (a.2.) The justificationist argues conceptual philosophical outlook, that that statement p is not certain but is to incorporate the core thesis of is in fact justified. It follows then skepticism into their belief system and that the justification of p is not live according to its principles, said in- certain, but at most only justified. dividual would run quickly into some The justification of p is at most damning consequences. Suppose that only justified, which is at most you, the reader of this paper, was ut- only justified and so on, leading terly amazed by the arguments for to yet another infinite regress.6 skepticism laid out above and immedi- (b.2.) Consider an extremely sim- ately self-indoctrinated yourself into plistic and widely accepted scien- the skeptical camp. Following the tific theory7 such as: “All physi- guidelines of true skepticism, you cal objects on earth are affected would likely stop reading, as it is skep- by gravity.” This leads to the in- tical whether you were ever reading at finite conjunction of justificatory all and whether some evil scientist was claims that ‘object x on earth is not actually making you believe you affected by gravity.’ According were reading per usual when in fact to skeptical tradition, this theory with each statement you read you are (‘all physical objects on earth are killing thousands of innocent sheep in affected by gravity’) is not cer- some pasture in Maryland. You tain, as proved formerly, leading quickly would become skeptical of the probability of the theory to be your need to perform essential human less than one.8 It follows that the functions, such as drinking, eating, probability of the infinite con- breathing, and so on. Although these junctive sentences (‘object x on examples may seem rather deranged, earth is affected by gravity’) the global skeptic, in staying con- sistent with their belief system can 5 Ibid., 299.
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