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The Hemlock Papers An Undergraduate Journal of

University of Idaho Department of and Philosophy

Volume 17 Spring 2020

2 Letter from the Editors It is a great and privilege to present the 17th volume of The Hemlock Papers. Our team has worked diligently to revitalize our journal in the past two years following a significant hiatus, and we are delighted to share the following philosophical works with the greater academic community. The Hemlock strives to feature exemplary undergraduate scholarship and promote fruitful discourse, and we find this edition to be an outstanding realization of these goals. We chose to call for a wide range of philosophical subjects this year; the enclosed works, we hope, present with a richly diverse of perspectives, styles of argument, and academic engagement. I want to give special thanks to the members of the PST for engaging with and reviewing our submissions. I would also like to thank our chapter advisor, Dr. Graham Hubbs, and administrative assistant Omni Francetich for their unwavering support throughout this process.

Editors Emma French Trevor Woodward

The Team Michael Bivens Braden Farrar AJ Bruce Cameron Haylett Diana Cervantes Lauren Moon Sam Clements Landon Moulding

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Contents

The Benefits of Epistemological in Philosophical 4 Kyle Smith

Definitional Inconsistency and Conceptual Misrepresentation: A of Thomas Kelly’s 11 “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order ” Grace Forster

Philosophy and the Muslim Masses: A Discussion Surrounding Ibn Rushd’s Decisive Treatise 20 Fatima Najdi

Aristotle is a Rationalist: Necessity in ’s and 27 Nicholas M. Michieli

A Critique of Hume’s Skepticism of John H. Cooney 35

4 The Benefits of Epistemological Skepticism in Philosophical Inquiry

Kyle Smith Humboldt State University

ABSTRACT: The inductive skeptic argues that we can know no inductive inferences to be certain. Although the skeptic’s methodology is sound, it is impos- sible to carry out the skeptical system into one’s actions. In this paper, I ar- gue for a less than that held of the traditional inductive skeptic. I posit that we can make use of skepticism in philosophical discourse through use of a restricted domain of which allows us to aside the practical issues of a more complete skepticism.

Epistemological skepticism is throughout our philosophical investi- both sound and not a fruitless inquiry, gations. which many have contended in the The classical skeptical argument past. Skepticism is widely regarded as is that we have no proper grounds to an impractical viewpoint due to the assert any ’s . There consequential rejection of all positive are two methods of reasoning to deter- philosophical theories and the impos- mine the certainty of a statement: de- sibility of action. I argue that the re- duction and induction. Deduction in- stricted form of skepticism I describe, volves the logical and systematic as opposed to radical skepti- “elimination” of statements in order to cism which most are familiar with, is reach a truly verified conclusion (i.e. philosophically beneficial. I will be mathematical, logical, and definitional pulling primarily from the arguments ). Induction is the method of of Abraham Meiden and Peter Unger drawing a probabilistic conclusion to establish my position on different from some evidence. I will be con- forms of skepticism. I will conclude by cerned with inductive skepticism as offering an overview of more plausible deductive arguments are uninforma- and pragmatic uses of skepticism, re- tive by (e.g. “all teenagers are lying on domain of focus and degree of between the ages of 13 and 19” or probability, pulling from Brian “A=A”). An inductive skeptic cri- Skyrms’ “Grades of Inductive Skepti- tiques induction on the grounds of its cism”. All accounts of the refutation of . skepticism, while well intended, fall is widely regarded as the founder of short of the skeptical scope. Skepti- modern inductive (Humean) skepti- cism is sound in all accounts put forth cism. Hume claimed that “to try to jus- thus far and as epistemologists we tify (it) inductively is to beg the ques- must contend with this and at- tion: “It is impossible, therefore, that tempt to make use of skepticism any arguments from can 5 prove this resemblance of the past to conducted in , phi- the future, since all these arguments losophy as a whole, or any discipline are founded on the supposition of that for that is fruitless and contin- resemblance.”1 gent upon the weakly assumed reliabil- Philosopher Abraham Meiden ity of belief. A notable group lays out some popular formulations of which took on the challenge of skepti- the radically skeptical argument2 as cism are known as the justificationists. follows: The justificationists argue that “skep- tical arguments show just that state- (a.1.) To show that a statement is ments such as ‘The sun will rise to- in fact certain is to prove or jus- morrow' are not certain; but they do tify it. In order to do so, one must not show that such statements are not justify all assumptions within the justified, plausible or probable. There- statement and subsequently jus- fore, we may still claim that it is ra- tify all assumptions within those tional to believe that the sun will rise justification statements… Form- tomorrow and irrational to deny it.”4 ing an infinite regress of (doubt- The justificationists agree with the ful) justificatory statements. skeptics in their fundamental argu- (b.1.) Human (e.g. ment of uncertainty, but posit that we and ) is imper- ought to shift the focus of our episte- fect by nature. mological pursuit of to a (c.1.) It is logically possible that more pragmatic model concerned with some ‘ demon’ is controlling justification, plausibility, and proba- our beliefs and causes us to be bility rather than the former quest for mistaken.3 absolute and certainty. Despite the fact that the justifica- Arguments such as these lead the tionists agree with the skeptics on their skeptic to form the conclusion that we foundational claims, some strong- can know nothing at all to be certain. willed skeptics have still found a way Many have adopted in which to refute the justificationary the project of attempting to find a . The justificatory skeptic claims sound argument against skepticism, that a statement like ‘I have a body’ (or for highly rational . It seems as any statement supposing a belief to be though if we cannot know anything to true) is not only uncertain, but is also be certain, then much of the work no more justifiable than any other

1 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning 3Abraham Meiden, Arguments for Skepti- Human Understanding, (Oxford, Claren- cism, (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 don, 1896), 32. no. 2, 1986), 298. 2 These radically skeptical arguments are 4Abraham Meiden, Arguments for Skepti- applicable to both deductive and inductive cism, 299. reasoning, but once again I am concerned only with inductive skepticism here. 6 claim, including the claim that ‘I do diminishes quickly and tends to not have a body.’5 The justificatory be zero, or rather close to it.9 skeptic effectively applies modifica- tions of the classical skeptical argu- With this, I intend to have per- ment to disprove the probability, plau- suaded you to adopt the belief that the sibility, and justification of claims in skeptical thesis (in both the certain and order to assert their position against justificatory formulation) is sound. I the justificationists. Consider the fol- will further show how that plays out in lowing skeptical argument modifica- terms of human experience. tions which target justificationists: If one were to accept the radically skeptical position as more than a mere (a.2.) The justificationist argues conceptual philosophical outlook, that that statement p is not certain but is to incorporate the core thesis of is in fact justified. It follows then skepticism into their belief system and that the justification of p is not live according to its , said in- certain, but at most only justified. dividual would run quickly into some The justification of p is at most damning consequences. Suppose that only justified, which is at most you, the reader of this paper, was ut- only justified and so on, leading terly amazed by the arguments for to yet another infinite regress.6 skepticism laid out above and immedi- (b.2.) Consider an extremely sim- ately self-indoctrinated yourself into plistic and widely accepted scien- the skeptical . Following the tific theory7 such as: “All physi- guidelines of true skepticism, you cal objects on earth are affected would likely stop reading, as it is skep- by gravity.” This leads to the in- tical whether you were ever reading at finite conjunction of justificatory all and whether some evil scientist was claims that ‘ x on earth is not actually making you believe you affected by gravity.’ According were reading per usual when in fact to skeptical , this theory with each statement you read you are (‘all physical objects on earth are killing thousands of innocent sheep in affected by gravity’) is not cer- some pasture in Maryland. You tain, as proved formerly, leading quickly would become skeptical of the probability of the theory to be your need to perform essential human less than one.8 It follows that the functions, such as drinking, eating, probability of the infinite con- breathing, and so on. Although these junctive sentences (‘object x on examples may seem rather deranged, earth is affected by gravity’) the global skeptic, in staying con- sistent with their belief system can

5 Ibid., 299. 7 , used here, 6 Note the synonymy of the argument here simply a justified conclusion formed (a.2.) to the argument for radical skepti- through the observance of empirical data. cism (a.1.). 8 “One” being absolute certainty. 9 Ibid., 300. 7 accept no form of reasoning to be cer- know at best, hardly anything tain. put it best in at all. He does not argue in favor of the saying: (radical) “skepticism, while classical skeptical thesis, that nobody logically impeccable, is psychologi- knows anything to be certain, but ra- cally impossible, and there is an ele- ther takes a more restrained approach ment of frivolous insincerity in any to the topic.11 Unger’s argument pri- philosophy which pretends to accept marily utilizes two linguistic , it.”10 which he refers to as relative and ab- Although the form of global-rad- solute terms. A relative term is one ical skepticism laid out thus far is psy- which has degrees to it, such as the chologically impossible to carry out, I of roughness or coura- posit that this is no reason to throw geousness. A road may be a certain de- skepticism to the curb. I agree with gree n rough after three years of use, Russell in stating that skepticism is but after fifteen years it likely will logically impeccable, but I suggest a have a larger degree of ‘roughness.’ modification to the latter half of his Just as a child going on a roller coaster view on the . Skepticism can be may hold degree x of , most implemented as a useful tool in - would agree that a firefighter rushing sophical discourse when restricting its into a burning building surpasses the domain of focus. We have already child’s degree of courageousness. In done this in the preceding paragraphs contrast, an absolute term is one which (potentially unknowingly so) when has no degrees, such as flatness or speaking of inductive skepticism, ra- straightness.12 ther than the traditional global skepti- Unger argues that epistemologi- cism which attacks all claims. As we cal terms such as certainty or have seen, inductive skepticism still knowledge are absolute terms, while leaves the scope of arguments under “confident’, ‘uncertain’ or ‘doubtful’ consideration fairly broad. I will now are relative.13 One can assert a certain lay out some examples of philosophers degree of uncertainty, but in terms of who have utilized this tool of domain- our can assert no degree of specific skepticism and found fruitful certainty. For example, I am some de- results in doing so, without being gree x uncertain that it will rain tomor- forced to accept a holistic skeptical row. If I check the weather report and outlook on the . see that there is a 50 percent chance of Philosopher Peter Unger offers us rain, my degree of uncertainty may a domain-restricted example of skepti- likely level out to be somewhere cism in his article “A Defense of Skep- around 50 percent. If I were to check ticism.” Unger argues here that the weather and see a 100 percent

10 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its 11 Peter Unger, A Defense of Skepticism, Scope and Limits, (New York, Simon and (Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Schuster, 1948), 9. Epistemology, n.d, 2000), 324. 12 Ibid.,327. 13 Ibid.,331. 8 chance of rain my degree of uncer- epistemologists are familiar with is not tainty would diminish, but I would still the only reasonable method of skepti- not be correct in saying that I am cer- cism.14 Further, Skyrms claims that “it tain it will rain tomorrow. If I claimed is possible, and sometimes quite rea- that I was ‘very certain’ or ‘fairly cer- sonable, to be skeptical about some tain’ that it will rain tomorrow, I am, things but not others.”15 according to Unger, truly asserting that Skyrms asserts his position by I have a low degree of uncertainty that citing the works of various philoso- it will rain tomorrow. It is never the phers of who made use of case that I am x degrees certain, but it the of probability. For our pur- is always the case that I am y degrees poses, I will cover a simplified reitera- uncertain. In short, certainty must be tion of Skyrms’ explanation of the an “all-in matter” and as the skeptics work of . Bayes was have shown, this is not the case for concerned with establishing a way to matters of . calculate the exact probability of all in- Although this is a simplified ver- ductive conclusions.16 I do not believe sion of Unger’s entire argument, I pre- he was capable of achieving this task, sent it to show the applicability of but his work offers us some interesting skepticism upon a specific domain of into the mechanics of induc- inquiry. Unger is not arguing that we tion. Bayes argues that chance must be cannot know anything, but rather fo- a random variable17 and that there cusing in on the semantic issues of our must be varying possible ‘chances’ speech when discussing knowledge when reaching a conclusion through and certainty to show that we ought to induction. Bayes recognizes what are be skeptical (to a degree) of the beliefs known as ‘priors,’ which are “the be- we discuss as certain. I found his argu- liefs an agent holds regarding a fact, ment compelling and psychologically hypothesis or consequence, before be- compatible with a rational being’s - ing presented with evidence.”18 Bayes . presumed the ‘uniform prior’ for his Epistemologist Brian Skyrms of- work in which equivalent intervals are fers us a defense of skepticism similar given the same probability of truth. to mine in his article “Grades of Induc- One can imagine a uniform prior as tive Skepticism”. Skyrms argues that analogous to drawing names randomly there are grades or degrees of induc- from a hat. Each name within the hat tive skepticism which vary in what the presumably has an equal chance of be- skeptic’s concerns may be and what ing drawn, assuming all conditions are they choose to accept. The Humean equal. In short, Bayes sees a quantifia- global skepticism most ble probability of a certain outcome t,

14 Brian Skyrms, Grades of Inductive 17 A random is defined as: “a vari- Skepticism, (Philosophy of 81, no. able whose values depend on outcomes of 3, 2014), 304. a random .” 15 Ibid., 304. 18 Priors, (Lesswrongwiki, n.d.). 16 Ibid., 306. 9 when all conditions are equal and all usually align with the way things func- data has been assumed correctly.19 tion in world. Bayes further shows that when Bayes shows that we can, when one assumes the uniform prior, the assuming the uniform prior, determine probability of a certain outcome t in- approximate chances a posteriori, but creases and grows more resistant to an there is a notable ‘ignorance prior’ abnormality by the amount of data re- which must be addressed in the discus- ceived verifying outcome t.20 Suppose sion of induction. An ignorance prior I was testing the probability of a cer- is a prior which assumes no knowledge tain light switch turning on a light in and is the foundation of most skeptical my new home. If I were to test it once arguments. An ignorance prior, ac- and the outcome was that the light did cording to Skyrms, can have some pos- in fact turn on the probability would be itive probability between 0 and 1.21 I close to 1 based upon my experience, might know nearly all the variables of but if I were to try it again and it turned a given situation s (giving me an igno- on a different light the probability rance prior of nearly 0), no variables of would diminish quickly, especially if I s (giving me an ignorance prior of 1), were to receive the negative result of or likely somewhere in between the the other light turning on multiple two. It is this of grades of ig- thereafter. I would likely assume norance priors which allow us to con- that it was either a strange electrical duct skeptical reasoning in a more lo- fluke that the light switch initially calized manner. I may hold a certain turned on the incorrect light or that ignorance prior p of my knowledge of some wires had been temporarily the sun rising tomorrow, but it is likely crossed. However, if I were to turn the rather low, considering the priors light on hundreds of times without fail which contribute to my belief that the and went to flip the switch once and it sun will in fact rise tomorrow. That is turned on another light, despite the not to say I cannot examine such igno- oddity of such a scenario, the probabil- rance prior if it pertains to an inquiry ity of the light switch (in a Bayesian about the sun rising tomorrow, but ra- style analysis) not turning on the as- ther that I can set it aside while consid- sumed light in the future is more re- ering another more relevant matter sistant to this deviant sample of data without compromising my belief sys- than if it had occurred after fewer tri- tem. als. I find Bayes to be useful in his To summarize, a global skeptic analysis of the components of proba- focuses in on human’s ignorance pri- bility in induction, but his work resides ors and uses them as the basis of their primarily in the mathematical and log- argument for uncertainty. While it may ical domain in which the uniform prior be the case that we cannot in fact be is assumed. The uniform prior does not certain of our knowledge, we can rely on the principles of probability to

19 Skyrms, Grades of Inductive Skepticism, 20 Ibid., 307. 306. 21 Ibid., 307. 10 determine an outcome which is most ignorance priors in said domain which likely to occur. This does not equate to can lead to fruitful philosophical re- the rejection of skepticism as a useful sults. tool in inquiry because the principles of probability allow us to conduct skeptical inquiry on specific relevant matters. Bayes’ probability theory al- lows us to set aside concerns of skep- ticism and focus in on a specific do- main of inquiry and acknowledge our

Bibliography

Hume, David. “An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.” A Trea- tise of , Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon. (1896): 32. Meiden, Abraham. "Arguments for Skepticism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1986): 298-300. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.humboldt.edu/sta- ble/40231470. “Priors.” Priors – Lesswrongwiki, Accessed November 30, 2019. https://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Priors. Russell, Bertrand. “Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits.” New York: Simon and Schuster, (1948): 9. Skyrms, Brian. "Grades of Inductive Skepticism." 81, no. 3 (2014): 303-312. doi:10.1086/676637. Unger, Peter. “A Defense of Skepticism.” Knowledge: Readings in Contempo- rary Epistemology, n.d. (2000): 324–31. isbn: 978-0-19-875261-5.

11 Definitional Inconsistency and Conceptual Misrepresentation: A Critique of Thomas Kelly’s “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”

Grace Forster University of Lethbridge

ABSTRACT: Peer disagreement occurs when epistemic peers come to contrary conclusions despite having been exposed to the same body of evidence and the same arguments that bear on the acceptability of a . The relevant ques- tion concerns how each peer should revise their original views based only on the knowledge that an epistemic peer disagrees. The commonly suggested equal weight view holds that peers should split the between their contrary po- sitions. However, Thomas Kelly offers an alternative in his total evidence view that does not prescribe the adoption of a median perspective by dissenting peers. This will seek to explain the shortcomings of Kelly’s of the equal weight view and his defense of the total evidence view, including his use of an inconsistent definition of a “reasonable response” to peer disagreement and his re- liance on an improperly understood characterization of the claims of the equal weight view

After several hours of delibera- comes to assessing a relevant kind of tion, a diligent and fair-minded jury re- proposition, as well as the relevant mains split on the guilt of the accused. background information needed to Two equally qualified meteorologists make such an assessment. In addition, utilizing the same meteorological data no peer is aware of any defeaters, or report different opinions on the chances pieces of evidence that suggest that of rain tomorrow. These are real-life their peer’s assessment abilities are examples of peer disagreement pre- currently compromised.2 When epis- sented by Thomas Kelly in his article temic peers are exposed to the same “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order body of evidence and the same argu- Evidence.”1 But what, precisely, is peer ments that bear on the acceptability of disagreement? As defined by Kelly, ep- a relevant proposition X, and neverthe- istemic peers are whose avail- less come to contrary conclusions able evidence indicates that they each about said proposition, they experience have an equal track record when it peer disagreement.

1. Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and (New York: , Higher Order Evidence,” in Social Epis- 2011), 183. temology: Essential Readings, eds. Al- 2. Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher vin I. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb Order Evidence,” 183. 12 The main philosophical question Second, Kelly criticizes the equal concerns how, if at all, each peer weight view using a conception of the should revise their original views under relationship between evidence and the these circumstances, based only on the belief formation process of the in- knowledge that an epistemic peer disa- volved peers that is fundamentally dif- grees.3 One suggested response, termed ferent from the conception of this rela- the equal weight view, holds that in tionship adopted by proponents of the such cases, peers are “rationally re- equal weight view. Therefore, his cri- quired to split then difference” between tiques of the equal weight view rely on their beliefs.4 Accepting this view en- an improperly understood characteriza- tails adopting a middle position be- tion of the claims of the equal weight tween each peer’s belief. To do other- view without recognizing it as such. wise would involve unreasonably priv- ileging one’s own opinion over that of Kelly’s Total Evidence View one’s epistemic peer.5 Kelly’s total evidence view states Thomas Kelly disagrees with this that the reasonable response to a peer view and offers his total evidence view disagreement is to treat each peer’s be- as an alternative in “Peer Disagreement liefs about the disputed proposition X and Higher Order Evidence.” The total as pieces of evidence. This view uti- evidence view advocates for revising lizes a between what Kelly one’s position on a proposition X based calls first and higher order evidence. on an assessment of the initial evidence Higher order evidence comprises of the in combination with the evidence cre- beliefs formulated by peers on the truth ated by a peer’s contrary belief. How- or falsity of proposition X. All the other ever, this revision will not necessarily pieces of available evidence used by require one to split the difference be- the peers to form their initial beliefs tween one’s view and that of a - about the truth or falsity of proposition ing peer. X constitute first order evidence.6 The This essay will argue that Kelly’s higher order evidence is weighed in argument against the equal weight view combination with the first order evi- and for his total evidence view suffers dence by each peer to render their final from two major shortcomings. First, decision about the proposition.7 As Kelly relies on an inconsistent defini- such, the total evidence view considers tion of a “reasonable response” to peer the disagreement of a peer as some disagreement that is too idealized to form of evidence against an individ- in real-world scenarios. ual’s belief in proposition X. However,

3. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb Order Evidence,” 184. (New York: Oxford University Press, 4. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher 2011), 168. Order Evidence,” 184. 6. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher 5. Adam Elga, “Peer Disagreement and Order Evidence,” 200. Higher Order Evidence,” in Social Epis- 7. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher temology: Essential Readings, eds. Order Evidence,” 202. 13 this higher order evidence does not typ- Kelly’s first identifiable argumen- ically outweigh all the first order evi- tative shortcoming is that, even though dence used to formulate each peer’s in- his argument aims at defending a itial position.8 Thus, peer disagreement stance on what should constitute a rea- should generally result in each peer sonable reaction to peer disagreement, having less confidence in their belief, he fails to rely on a single, clear, and but they are not reasonably required to consistent conception of what it means split the difference between the dissent- to be reasonable. Within the history of ing views. Given the introduction of , philosophical un- more peers, there may be a point when derstandings and uses of the concepts the amount of higher order evidence of reason and reasonableness have var- outweighs the first order evidence, re- ied considerably. In his streamlined ac- quiring the peer with the widely op- count of western philosophical devel- posed view to change their position. opment, Schaffer identifies four differ- However, for a revision in position to ent philosophical conceptions of reason occur, the total evidence view requires and reasonableness.10 The first early a much larger batch of evidence than is western conception of reason identified necessitated by the equal weight view.9 by Schaffer defined reason as a mental Under the equal weight view, the disa- capacity or faculty to draw conclusions greement of a single peer necessitates from premises.11 There was significant adopting a median position, while un- debate as to whether this faculty ex- der the total evidence view, the opin- isted to discover knowledge of substan- ions of peers as higher order evidence tive truths or merely to formulate con- is considered a much weaker form of nections among acquired sensory data, evidence. As such, higher order evi- and whether the faculty of reason itself dence must meet a comparatively high can speak normatively for a specific threshold to outweigh first order evi- course of action.12 Within this context, dence and cause a change in the widely “to call something ‘reasonable’ [was] disagreed-with peer’s position. to say that it is in accordance with a properly functioning faculty of reason (however this [was] understood).13 This early conception of reason The First Shortcoming: Defining relied on the that reasonable be- Reasonableness liefs were based on demonstrably

8. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher of : Reason, Reasonableness, Order Evidence,” 200. Rationality, and Reasons," Manuscrito 9. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher 41, no. 4 (October – December, 2018) Order Evidence,” 199-200. 11. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- 10. Karl Schaffer's account is by no means ity,” 505. exhaustive of all the philosophical uses 12. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- of “reason” and “reasonableness”; it is ity,” 505-506. merely a broad summary of general 13. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- trends. Karl Schaffer, "A Brief History ity,” 507. 14 certain linkages; however, with the ad- properly responsive to one’s (pos- vent of probability theory, a reasonable sessed) reasons.”18 belief could be based on merely proba- Schaffer’s account provides a bly grounds rather than “demonstrably small sampling of how the definition of certain grounds.”14 Thus, reasonable- reason can and has varied widely de- ness became a “matter of responding pending on the philosophical persua- correctly to uncertainty in the face of sion of the using it and the his- less than fully conclusive evidence.”15 torical and cultural context one exists This definition creates a layer of sepa- within. Given the wide variety of defi- ration between reasonableness and ob- nitional , it is essential for a phi- jective truth, allowing for the possibil- losopher to clearly define the concept ity of a reasonable response that never- of reason and use it consistently within theless leads an individual to an incor- the parameters of their argument. Un- rect conclusion. fortunately, Kelly does not achieve this Both classical and probabilistic goal in “Peer Disagreement and Higher conceptions of reason rely on norma- Evidence,” when he utilizes an ambig- tive justifications of reason’s . A uous and internally inconsistent defini- third, “rationalist,” conception of rea- tion of reason. son abjured justifications for As indicated above, Kelly begins the value of reason in favor of instru- his paper by providing real-world ex- mental or rules-based considerations. amples of peer disagreement.19 These Reasonable actions could be justified examples suggest that Kelly by either their ability to achieve certain prescribes as a reasonable response to ends or for their compliance with a pri- peer disagreement must be something ori rules of logical thought.16 The ra- an individual can achieve in the real tionalist conception was met by a back- world. In real-world scenarios, it is not lash by “reason fundamentalists,” who possible to know with absolute cer- wished to restore the normative para- tainty that one has formed a belief in mountcy of reason. They created a response to available evidence in a way fourth conception of reason that sought that corresponds with objective truth. to reassert “reasons,” abstract objects Thus, in such a case, a reasonable ap- which individuals utilize to justify ac- proach might align with the probability tions, as the dominant concept in terms theorists’ definition of reasonableness of which all other philosophical con- identified by Schaffer above. On this cepts should be defined.17 This branch account, “being reasonable [is] funda- of philosophers would define reasona- mentally a matter of responding cor- bleness as “being (disposed to be) rectly to uncertainty in the face of less

14. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- 17. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- ity,” 509. ity,” 519. 15. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- 18. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- ity,” 510. ity,” 519. 16. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- 19. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher ity,” 514. Order Evidence,” 183. 15 than fully conclusive evidence.”20 An possibility of uncertainty around the individual with a reasonable belief is, correctness of one’s response to a prop- therefore, excused from knowing one osition. However, other parts of has a correct response to a proposition, Kelly’s argument suggest that he aligns assuming it is based on an appropriate partially with Richard Feldman’s con- probabilistic evaluation of uncertain ception of reasonableness. For Feld- evidence. The requirement of having man, a reasonable individual is some- secure knowledge of the objective de- one with identifiable and objectively fensibility of one’s response to a prop- defensible reasons for thinking they osition could never be a practical re- have evaluated some evidence about a sponse to peer disagreement, as it proposition correctly in a specific case would require secure knowledge of the and who has actually done so, from an objective truth. However, this kind of objective point of view.22 knowledge is lacking in the context of Kelly seems to align with the first peer disagreement since peers would prong of Feldman’s approach when he not be evaluating evidence in the first argues that “typically when one re- place if they possessed definitive sponds to the evidence, one is not ut- knowledge of the objective truth. terly blind to the fact that one has done Kelly initially seems to align with so.”23 This quote suggests that accord- a probabilistic conception of belief and ing to Kelly, as for Feldman, one has an reasonable response, as in many of his ability to possess and be aware of pos- arguments, he uses a standard Bayesian sessing objectively defensible reasons convention. Rather than thinking of be- to believe that their evaluation of the liefs in a dichotomous way as either evidence is correct. However, he does true or false, Bayesians conceptualize not adopt the second prong of Feld- beliefs as numerical confidence levels man’s definition, that one must have on a 0 to 1 scale, from absolute confi- actually evaluated a proposition in an dence in a proposition’s falsehood to objectively correct way to be reasona- absolute confidence in a proposition’s ble. For Kelly, a peer can weigh all the truth, with the value 0.5 representing first order evidence in favor of their in- in the mid- itial opinion much more strongly than dle.21 Kelly’s use of Bayesian conven- the contrary evidence represented by a tions suggests he accords with the type peer’s disagreement, based only on the of probabilistic version of reasonable- requirement that they have defensible ness outlined above, which at a mini- reasons to believe that they evaluated mum, indicates that there is a the first order evidence correctly. Thus,

20. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- a version of the equal weight view in ity,” 510. cases of peer disagreement in “Respect- 21. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher ing the Evidence,” Philosophical Per- Order Evidence,” 183. spectives 19 (December 2005): 116. 22. Interestingly, despite arguing for this 23. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher level of self-awareness of one's reasona- Order Evidence,” 200. bleness, Feldman advocates for adopting 16 Kelly’s approach allows one to weigh either peer can have secure knowledge one’s beliefs more strongly than would of how well they responded to the ini- be the case on the probabilistic view, tial evidence for some proposition (and based on the first prong of Feldman’s be aware that they know), allowing definition of reasonableness, but it them to maintain most of their confi- lacks the assurance of Feldman’s sec- dence in their initial belief. However, ond prong, namely that one has objec- in real-life scenarios, peers can have no tively evaluated a proposition cor- such knowledge. Indeed, the evidence rectly. By going beyond the probabilis- they do have access to, the dissent of a tic view without the guarantee of objec- peer, suggests there is a not-insignifi- tive certainty of the truth, impossible as chance that they responded to the that is to attain in real situations, initial evidence incorrectly. Kelly’s use Kelly’s total evidence view allows for of “reasonable” in his work is, there- a strange form of overconfidence in the fore, internally inconsistent. It both ad- correctness of one’s beliefs. mits of the formation of an opinion Because Kelly seems to partially based on an adequate response to the accord with Feldman’s definition of available evidence as a sufficient con- reasonableness, he criticizes the equal dition for reasonableness, while seem- weight view as unreasonable, as its pre- ingly implying a stronger requirement scription to split the difference between that one can and must have knowledge conflicting beliefs seemingly ignores that one has responded correctly to the how well one supposedly responded to available evidence to be reasonable. the initial evidence. If one is in a peer Given that, according to the Bayesian disagreement and possesses objec- view of how one forms beliefs, the tively defensible reasons for thinking strength of one’s belief should corre- they have evaluated the evidence about spond to the strength of the available a proposition more correctly than their evidence (even when it is incomplete), peer, but then adopts the equal weight it also implicitly requires that one’s for- view, they may move substantially fur- mulated opinion (e.g., that X is true at ther away from the most defensible po- a certainty value of 0.7) is also objec- sition on proposition X than their initial tively true. position. Kelly sees this as unaccepta- ble since each peer’s final position on proposition X will not be causally re- A Second Shortcoming: Belief lated to their respective evaluation abil- Formation ities, which is one of Feldman’s re- quirements to achieve reasonable- The second major shortcoming in 24 ness. Kelly’s argument concerns how he The problem with Kelly’s (at conceptualizes the relationship be- least) partial reliance on Feldman’s tween evidence and belief formation in definition is that it seems to require that

24. Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence,” 191-192. 17 peer disagreement. Kelly’s total evi- Elga in his defense of the equal weight dence view treats the evidence used to view. He presents a scenario involving formulate beliefs about a disputed two individuals who are equally com- proposition and the formulated beliefs petent at judging horse races being of others as different forms of evi- asked to judge an extremely tight dence. In contrast, proponents of the race.25 Both individuals evaluate the equal weight view do not conceive of race individually and come to different the beliefs formed by a peer about a opinions on the winner based on the proposition as a form of evidence. In- available optical evidence. They each stead, what Kelly calls first order evi- possess a belief about the outcome, but dence is considered an input that is the “first order evidence” is no longer used to formulate each peer’s belief accessible as the race is over. Given about a proposition. Those beliefs then that they come to contrary conclusions, serve as a summation of the available and that the mere fact that they have evidence arrived at by an individual, ra- done so does not constitute any evi- ther than as a new of evidence in dence that one peer is a better judge of themselves. The value of this summa- horse races than the other,26 they split tion is determined by each peer with the the difference between their views. identification of epistemic peer status. This is based on the idea that, lacking If an individual that another any evidence that suggests otherwise, person possesses the relevant back- both peers are “equally likely to be cor- ground information and intellectual rect.”27 ability to assess proposition X, has For proponents of the equal been exposed to all of the same evi- weight view, this idea holds true even dence as they have about the truth or if the first order evidence is still acces- falsity of X, and is not compromised in sible but unchanged. If both peers have their ability to assess X, then they are evaluated all the same evidence and considered an epistemic peer. The sum- used it to form contrary on mation of the first order evidence by a the truth of some proposition, the fact peer should, therefore, be equally valu- that the first order evidence remains able as one’s own. In peer disagree- available and unchanged offers no ad- ment, this leads to a deadlock as to ditional value in determining the truth which belief is correct. Thus, the equal of that proposition. The equal weight weight view advocates for splitting the view does not merely dispatch with the difference between the dissenting first order evidence in this scenario, but views. instead it recognizes that the first order This principle is best demon- evidence no longer offers any . strated by the example used by Adam There is no way to be certain about

25. Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagree- 26. Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” ment,” in : Essential 166. Readings, eds. Alvin I. Goldman and 27. Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Dennis Whitcomb (New York: Oxford 167. University Press, 2011), 166. 18 which peer has correctly evaluated the the total evidence view seems to evidence, even if each peer is confident amount to a recommendation that each that they have done so, which, as Kelly person unduly privilege their own suggests, is often the case. Due to the opinion in cases of peer disagreement, uncertainty posed by peer disagree- a recommendation at odds with the new ment, the fact that each peer believes evidence presented by that disagree- equally strongly in the defensibility of ment itself. their beliefs, and the lack of access to the objective truth surrounding the ap- Conclusion propriateness of their responses to the evidence, the reasonable response is Given Kelly’s failures to ade- the one prescribed by the equal weight quately dispute the equal weight view, view. Each peer should temper, signif- and the identified shortcomings with icantly, their confidence in their origi- Kelly’s total evidence view, the equal nal belief. This action will cause their weight view is a more reasonable re- perspectives to meet in the middle. sponse to the problem of peer disagree- Because Kelly conceives of the re- ment. It is more reasonable based on a lationship between opinions and initial probabilistic theory of reason that rec- evidence in a way that is fundamentally ognizes it is not possible to determine different from those who promote the the correctness of a peer’s belief who is equal weight view, he unduly criticizes “responding … to uncertainty in the the equal weight view for privileging face of less than fully conclusive evi- higher order evidence over first order dence.”28 In contrast, Kelly’s total evi- evidence. However, the equal weight dence view takes the position that it is view recognizes that a belief in how reasonable to mostly maintain one’s in- well one evaluated the original evi- itial belief simply because one believes dence cannot be used as evidence in - they have correctly evaluated the initial vor of one’s position, as each peer will evidence. To do so implies having an hold equally strong (and justified) objective, secure knowledge that one views. That is why it seemingly ignores has evaluated the evidence better than the first order evidence in prescribing their peer, something that is not achiev- that the peers split the difference be- able by epistemic agents. Kelly implies tween their beliefs. In contrast, the total the need for a reasonable response to evidence view privileges an individ- peer disagreement to be operational in ual’s initial opinion, the objective truth real-life; thus, the total evidence view of which cannot be accessed in peer is internally inconsistent based on disagreement, based on their certainty Kelly’s parameters. Kelly also defends that they have evaluated the evidence the total evidence view and criticizes correctly over that of their peer. Given the equal weight view based on a that both peers will likely be justified in flawed understanding of the relation- privileging their opinion in this way, ship between initial evidence and belief

28. Schaffer, "A Brief History of Rational- ity,” 510. 19 formation and the implications of the equal weight view based on this rela- tionship. As such, Kelly’s total evi- dence view is a problematic response to peer disagreement.

Bibliography

Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement.” In Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb, 158-182. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreement.” In Social Epistemol- ogy: Essential Readings, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whit- comb, 137-157. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. ——. “Respecting the Evidence.” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (December 2005): 95-117. Kelly, Thomas. “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.” In Social Epis- temology: Essential Readings, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whit- comb, 183-217. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Schaffer, Karl. “A Brief History of Rationality: Reason Reasonableness, Rationality, and Reasons.” Manuscrito 41, no. 4 (2018): 501-529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.ks

20 Philosophy and the Muslim Masses: A Discussion Surrounding Ibn Rushd’s Decisive Treatise

Fatima Najdi University of Michigan-Dearborn

ABSTRACT: The debate between and reason has not gone to sleep, certainly not in the mass Muslim community. This essay aims to bring awareness to the importance of philosophy and reason in light of Ibn Rushd’s Decisive Treatise. Ibn Rushd argues philosophy is obligatory on Muslims and this essay expounds on this main premise with examples from scripture, historical accounts, and Muslim thought. Reasons Muslims give for their apprehension to philosophy is namely twofold: it is seen as devoid of purpose and a cause of doubt in faith, and it is sometimes believed to be forbidden. These two main points of their discourse is addressed throughout this essay. As it is, the Muslim community is growing in an age of learning, questioning, and . All things, which can bring about a refined form of gaining faith if we follow logical prescriptions and practice philosophy.

The practice of philosophy may there is a less aggressive tone today, sometimes threaten theists and this ap- but the point is made: philosophy is un- prehension is cause for a lack of appre- welcome. Contrary to this point, Mus- ciation for reasoning. Argumentation lim masses should not eschew philo- and debate surrounding faith often take sophical discussion; philosophy, inso- place, but with little appreciation for much as it is a practice of reflection and reasoning, conclusions stand to be in- consideration, is well advised to build- accurate or unsupported. This is com- ing a foundation for genuine and valid mon practice in Muslim discussion and belief to be possible. communities. It can be easy to sympa- The philosopher Ibn Rushd1’s De- thize with the Muslim who is hesitant cisive Treatise argues that philosophy to promote philosophy for the mass and are not only , but ob- Muslim public, because they usually ligatory by (Divine). He argues, feel the mass public is incapable and “If the activity of philosophy is nothing uninterested. However, there are many more than reflection upon existing cases when even a capable and inter- things and consideration of them inso- ested Muslim is ridiculed for practicing far as they are an indication of the Ar- philosophy. Examples are scattered tisan ⎯ I mean insofar as they are arti- throughout history, when for instance , for existing things indicate the Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi was exe- Artisan only through cognizance of the cuted for cultivating philosophical in them, and the more complete cog- teachings. Similar events and threats of nizance of the art in them is, the more execution were not rare, and perhaps complete is the cognizance of the 21 Artisan.”1 In other words, knowledge if the Law (or ’s word) makes it ob- of creation leads to knowledge of the ligatory for Muslims to reflect and con- Creator. There is clear support for this sider existing things, then “it is obliga- in Islamic scripture, the Qur’an, which that we go about reflecting upon is said to be the word of God and from the existing things by means of intel- which the Law is derived. Consider, lectual syllogistic reasoning7.”8 One “Have they not reflected upon the king- cannot reflect properly without consid- doms of the heavens and the earth and eration, because the work would only what things God has created?”2 as well be half-done. Reflection and consider- as numerous other instances where the ation differ in that by reflecting, one text urges readers to “Look”3 or simi- notices features of the known and by larly, “Reflect”4. Ibn Rushd highlights consideration, one makes the effort to the importance of the Qur’an’s urging conclude things about the unknown, continuing, “⎯ and if the Law has rec- i.e. God or the “Artisan”. Considera- ommended and urged consideration of tion of existing things is primarily dif- existing things, then it is evident that ferent from reflection, because it fo- what this name indicates is either oblig- cuses on the relationship between the atory or recommended by the Law. artifacts and the Artisan. It is an activ- That the Law calls for consideration of ity that aids in answering questions existing things by means of the intellect such as: what does this artifact and its and for pursuing cognizance of them by defined features tell about the kind of means of it is evident from various Artisan Who made it? verses in the Book of God.”5 He then It must be made evident to anyone goes on to cite various verses from the who doubts permitting syllogistic rea- “Book of God” including the one cited soning or philosophy in the Muslim above. community that not only is it permitted, The education of proper reasoning but obligatory. There is no merit in fol- must be endorsed by Muslim faith lowing one’s own presumptions or ac- communities. Since reflection is a nat- cepting anything as true without mak- ural inclination and activity, reasoning ing the proper sufficient investigation. may not be required for reflection as To cite a verse from the Qur’an, “Do much as it is for consideration. How- not pursue anything that has not come ever, these activities go hand-in-hand. to your knowledge. Indeed, hearing, Ibn Rushd defines consideration as syl- eyesight, and the heart-all these are ac- logistic reasoning which is “nothing countable.”9 The philosopher Allamah more than inferring and drawing out the unknown from the known…”6 and

1 Decisive Treatise, p.1 7 This essay refers to intellectual syllogistic 2 Qur’an, Chapter 7 Verse 185 [7:185] reasoning as syllogistic reasoning for brev- 3 Qur’an [10:55], [80:24], [86:5], … etc. ity 4 Qur’an [56:62], [16:44], [6:50],… etc. 8 Decisive Treatise, p.2 5 Decisive Treatise, p.1 9 Qur’an Chapter 17, verse 36 6 Decisive Treatise, p.2 22 Tabatabai10 in his commentary on this obligates its adherents to logically dic- verse says the following, “The verse tate its validity. forbids one from following what one It is commonly believed among does not know. Given the uncondi- Muslims that God does not create a tional form of the verse, it includes thing without a designated purpose. His every form of following whether in be- creation of humanity and their distinct liefs or practice.”11 And later says, intellect gives grounds for speculation “Sometimes one assumes things that of its purpose. Ibn Rushd makes his ar- satisfy his and pacify his heart to gument clear; human can gain be knowledge, even though they are de- knowledge of the Creator through syl- void of the certainty that is called logistic reasoning of creation13. The knowledge as in the technique of purpose of human intellect can vary, demonstration in logic.” 12 We may be but perhaps its ultimate purpose is to comfortable with our faith and harbor know the Creator. Muslims are not no doubts, but this cannot be a reason asked to believe because their parents to abandon logic or reflection. or some notable figure believe, which It can be easy to empathize with was precisely the cultural of the the apprehension some have to delve pre-Islamic era before called for into philosophical discussion espe- reform. The Qur’an explicitly brings cially when faith is concerned. Closely attention to this when it says, “When examining beliefs that shape and culti- they are told, ‘Follow what God has vate the way to live one’s life is an in- sent down,’ they say, ‘No, we will fol- timidating task. What if our belief of low what we have found our fathers the truth is different than the truth in re- following.’ What, even if their fathers ality? The fear may scare us into being neither exercised their reason nor were complacent with our ignorance and guided?”14 Immediately following this stick to our habits. Perhaps sometimes, verse, the Qur’an describes said people it is a question of instead of fear. as “deaf, dumb, and blind, they do not Many of us are not naturally interested exercise their reason”15 Belief must be in researching the faith we adhere to, based on one’s own conviction and be- such as Islam. Other times, the affinity lief in what is true. In many cases, how- for our beliefs may cloud our judge- ever, communities promote a different ment as well. Past spiritual or religious path for belief. One that is based on can also aid in our compla- maybe fear, habit, , or a blend of cency to not pursue a logical course of all three. The problems are innumera- action. These are all areas where people ble to mention for a Muslim who does who believe in Islam sometimes fall not have their belief founded on reason, short, but it is the same Islam that but perhaps the most unfortunate is the

10 Allamah Husayn Tabatabai, 12 Al-Mizan, An of the Qur’an, p. 1904-1981 123 11 Al-Mizan, An Exegesis of the Qur’an, p. 13 or what is known or apparent 122 14 Qur’an, Chapter 2 Verse 170 15 Qur’an, Chapter 2 Verse 171 23 eventual loss of faith. It is not difficult addresses this as a deficiency on their to imagine a Muslim in today’s western part and we cannot write-off the obli- world. Islamic belief is scrutinized in gation for reason simply because an ac- the world today. There is a constant cident occurred. He says, “For this pressure to answer questions as well. manner of harm coming about due to Most times, it happens inadvertently in them is something that attaches to them a university classroom. It is important by accident, not by . It is not ob- for Muslims to make the effort to know ligatory to renounce something useful what they are believing, because it not in its nature and essence because of only stands to benefit communities as a something harmful existing in it by ac- whole, but more importantly, it is of ut- cident.”17 Unfortunately, many Mus- most personal benefit for the Muslim lims promote and philosophy him/herself. as incompatible and even further re- Muslim parents should be aware nouncing it and believing it is forbid- that while it is encouraged to raise den. The reasons they might have are one’s children Muslim, their children countless and to list them all would be should have the opportunity to delve out of the scope of this essay. Gener- deeper and practice syllogistic reason- ally, Muslims who support this view ing whenever possible. If children are and understanding of philosophy fear uninterested in proving their own faith, that the of the Qur’an and the this is when a parent can encourage it wisdom it contains is being called into in the same way syllogistic reasoning is question and is made subversive to the imposed in schools. As children mature whims of human speculation, which is as well, an atmosphere of learning and often mistaken and misguided at the di- questioning surrounding belief will go rection of cultural biases. Thus, it can a long way in helping children keep an be seen as a reinforcement of human ar- . It is a process cultivated over rogance and indulgence of ego, things and one worth our while. Some Islam calls to minimize. fear that in quest of cogni- Here, it is important to state the zant of the Artisan, someone might fundamental rule of philosophizing or stumble and leave Islam or find that the questioning, and that is to be in a state evidence does not conform to the faith of . In any science, we must they were born into. They might stum- collectively and personally curtail bias ble for various reasons, which Ibn the best we can manage. Indulging in Rushd lists as “either a deficiency in his bias and ego is not necessary to conduct innate , poor ordering of his philosophy. In fact, indulging in one’s reflection, being overwhelmed by his ego in practicing philosophy would not passions, not finding a teacher to guide be conducive to results. Philoso- him to an understanding…”16 but it is phy, again, requires a state of neutrality an accidental case in that it is not the for logic to take its course validly. universal experience of all. Ibn Rushd Moreover, I would argue, as would Ibn

16 Decisive Treatise, p.5 17 Decisive Treatise, p.5 24 Rushd, if a person believes something must be included in books using to be true, philosophy or demonstration demonstration. He Abu Ha- should not intimidate them. Ibn Rushd mid al-Ghazali’s works as the sole affirms, “Since the Law is true and cause of a lot of demonstrative texts calls to the reflection leading to the moving into the public sphere causing cognizance of the truth, we, the Muslim people to be misled. Prior to al-Ghaz- community, know firmly that demon- ali’s work, most demonstration was strative reflection does not lead to dif- done and shared with capable people, fering with what is set down in the mostly scholars. Law. For truth does not oppose truth, it While Ibn Rushd had good reason agrees with and bears witness to it.”18 to make this point during his lifetime, I Reason is a means to know the truth believe the times now call for a differ- and to thereby validate it. ent approach; books of philosophy In order to make syllogistic rea- should be widely dispersed and ab- soning or philosophy more inviting to sorbed by the Muslim community. The the Muslim masses, it is important to last century or so has increasingly educate what is expected and what is caused doubt to be a natural state of be- not, because surely it is not necessary ing among any person of faith, let alone to know the nooks and crannies of phil- a Muslim who may consistently find osophical studies to be a Muslim cog- their faith taunted and ridiculed pub- nizant of Law. Philosophy in the clas- licly. It is important, now more than sical sense is not an on any- ever, to seek reasonable for one’s one, Muslim or not. Muslims are not beliefs. Muslims, individually, must obligated to know and discuss Ibn make an effort to seek the truth using Sina’s Metaphysics or ’s idea of their intellectual capacities, but only in- forms. This in fact can be helpful in somuch as they are capable. No one is many cases as it can be used to demon- asking for more. It not only serves to strate the valid or invalid use of logic in help prove one’s belief in God but fur- an argument that typically has little to ther used to guide how to carry out His no bearing on one’s personal belief. It Law. Just as a patient must completely is a “safe” method of practicing philos- understand a medication’s purpose and ophy and logical skill, which aid in how the prescription should be carried one’s reflection and consideration of out beforehand, the Muslim must be the world. Near the end of the Decisive well informed about their religious be- Treatise, Ibn Rushd discusses making liefs in their totality. We must try with demonstrative books less available to our best efforts to seek the truth, not the masses, because it can cause more what is comfortable. harm than good when the reader is a The historic Islamic figure, Imam Muslim who is incapable of under- Ali Ibn Abi Talib19, has famously said, standing. He further supports the idea “Learn your religion, do not inherit it.” that interpretations or commentary Is there another way to learn besides

18 Decisive Treatise, p.7 19 Cousin and successor to the Prophet Mu- hammad 25 reflection and consideration? Is it not similar groups. It is helpful to keep in learning through these activities of the that philosophy can be as simple intellect that allow us to reach true con- as reflecting on how day turns to night viction? Conviction in belief is stressed or how we eat our foods as in Ibn Tu- in religious atmospheres, because it fayl’s fictional tale Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. sets the foundation for a firm belief and In which, a man named Hayy is devoid practice to follow; however, a type of of language and was cut off from other learning is required to reach convic- human beings at birth. Throughout his tion. Intellectual conviction is not life, he reflects on the phenomena something a person is born with or nat- around him, such as the animals that in- urally has, it is worked for and until it habit the same island and how he is dif- is reached, a proper effort is made to ferent from them, or how the moon, learn and confirm things as true. How sun, and stars travel in the sky. He re- true is one’s belief if it has never been flects on such phenomena until he real- tested (through questioning)? Just as a izes there must be something in con- person’s character may be refined with trol… a Creator. He considers what he struggle, the same applies to a person’s has reflected and noticed in the world belief. How pleased would a God be if he experiences. Whether or not all hu- one believed out of habit, fear, or one’s man beings in would come to culture? Could we really rationalize it the same conclusion under the same to be true belief? More often than not, conditions is not for consideration here, in an age of questioning, most cannot but that philosophy can be as simple as defend their beliefs to themselves or to taking notice and appreciating what others. There is an urgency to reflect surrounds us in the most complete way- and consider. A contemporary Muslim reflecting and considering. scholar writes, “The Qur’an asks the in- Philosophy insomuch as it is a tellect not to hold onto anything which practice of reflection and consideration has not been proved with certainty and is required of every Muslim and the beyond doubt. It requires the intellect Muslim masses must cease their dis- not to accept anything until there is a dain for philosophical discussion given clear and decisive proof.”20 its possibilities for genuine belief to Most are aware that there are peo- take place. The Muslim community ple who claim to be Muslims who do should realize it is not only important not follow reason, that is people who and recommended, but obligatory to re- are followers of ISIS or the Taliban, flect and consider creation to maximize and the like. There is no precise way to knowledge of the Creator. We use log- validate belief without logic. If we ical deduction throughout our daily were, as a Muslim community, to argue and mundane tasks, so why not in against the use of logic or reason, then the faith to which we adhere? The Mus- we would have no way to prove we are lim community’s interest in rational different from followers of ISIS or thought is growing as time passes. We

20 Ethics and Spiritual Growth by Lari, p.57 26 should accept these times as opportuni- find the truth that all are capable of be- ties to grow intellectually and sin- lieving with an open mind and sincere cerely. Philosophy is not an excuse to questioning. attack one’s faith or another’s, but to

Works Cited

The Qur’an. Various Translators, https://quran.com/. , and Charles E. Butterworth. The Book of the Decisive Treatise: Deter- mining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom & the Epistle Dedica- tory = Kitāb faṣl Al-maqāl Wa-taqrīr mā Bain aš-šarīʻa Wa-l-ḥukūma Min Al-ittiṣāl. Brigham Young Univ. Press, 2001. Ibn Ṭufayl, Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Malik , and Lenn Evan Goodman. Ibn Tu- fayls Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān: a Philosophical Tale. The University of Chicago Press, 2009. Lārī Mujtabá Mūsavī, and Qarāʻī ʻAlī Qūlī. Ethics and Spiritual Growth. Founda- tion of Islamic C.P.W., 2010. Tabatabai, Allamah Muhammad Husayn. Al-Mizan, An Exegesis of the Qur’an. Vol. 25 Tawheed Institute Australia, 2015

27 Aristotle is a Rationalist: Necessity in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Ethics

Nicholas M. Michieli Lakehead University

ABSTRACT: Abstract. In discussions of modern epistemology, Aristotle is typically referred to as an empiricist rather than as a rationalist. However, this paper, in stride with the work of some modern commentators, argues that Ar- istotle is better classified as a rationalist. To accomplish this, a definition of is given, along with context of the and rationalism di- vision of the . The discussion of the early modern period culminates by exploring Kantian epistemology, outlining the foremost role of necessity in classifying rationalist thought. Then, necessity is highlighted in Aristotle’s system of philosophy by exploring Aristotle’s , Ni- comachean Ethics, and the secondary literature, with to the work of Jaroslaw Olesiak and some other recent commentators. Specifically, this paper demonstrates necessity in Aristotle’s metaphysics and in his ethics. If these claims hold, then it is most likely that Aristotle is more accurately classified as a rationalist than as an empiricist.

Aristotelian epistemology is provides a more broad account of ne- foundational to modern discussions of cessity in various aspects of Aristo- epistemology, in part because of its in- tle’s system of philosophy. First, the fluence on early modern debates be- conclusion that there is necessity in the tween empiricism and rationalism. To metaphysics and physics of Aristotle, typify the two sides of the rational- is explored and then accepted. Next, ist/empiricist debate, Aristotle is nor- Aristotle’s teleological ethics, as mally defined as an empiricist and described in the Physics and Ni- Plato as a rationalist. This paper ar- comachean ethics, implies what can be gues that Aristotle’s system of philos- called necessity in accordance with a ophy is more accurately classified as thing’s natural tendency. Before con- rationalism than as empiricism, and cluding, I consider the objection that this claim is not without support in the Aristotle’s is not derived greater philosophical community.1 from necessary claims but rather from However, while Hoshyar (2019) contingent experience. In conclusion, mainly focuses on rationalist elements necessity as found in Aristotle’s - in Aristotle’s epistemology, this paper physics and his ethics is antithetical to

1 Cf. Hoshyar (2019) and Frede (1996) to as a rationalist than as an empiricist. find the claim that Aristotle is better classi- fied 28 classical conceptions of empiricism. preestablished . Other ration- Thus, Aristotle’s system of philosophy alists from the early modern period in- is more accurately classified as ration- clude the Cartesians Nicolas Male- alism than as empiricism. branche and Antoine Arnauld, as well Rationalism is the historical as scientist Christian Huygens. A school of epistemology which main- modern example of a thinker with ra- tains that the world can be known tionalist elements in their philosophy through thought or “pure concepts” is , whose concepts are alone, sometimes entailing belief in in- said to belong to a “third realm” of nate . In this paper, the working thought. definition of what classifies a thinker Aristotle is typically classified as as a rationalist, as set out in Priest an empiricist rather than as a rational- (2007), is that rationalist epistemology ist. To be sure, in a survey of rational- adheres to at least one synthetic a pri- ist and empiricism throughout the his- ori metaphysical claim. For the pur- tory of philosophy, Stephen Priest says pose of this article, Priest’s definition that “Plato’s pupil, Aristotle, is an em- of rationalism is accepted as accurate. piricist.”2 According to Priest’s chap- Further, the claim that anything syn- ter “What Is Empiricism?”, empiri- thetic a priori must be necessary is ex- cism is “the thesis that there is no a pri- plored below. Again, according to Ste- ori [prior to experience] metaphysical phen Priest, rationalism, which op- knowledge and [that] all concepts are poses empiricism, entails at least one derived from experience.”3 Aristotle’s synthetic a priori metaphysical philosophy has been classified as em- knowledge claim. For example, Plato piricism because he is a nominalist; was a rationalist because his theory of that is, for Aristotle, all things in the ‘the Forms,’ or of the realm of world are individuals.4 This claim - pure thought, was a synthetic a priori damentally opposes Plato’s theory of metaphysical knowledge claim. Typi- the Forms, because for Plato things in cal examples of the rationalists of the the world are instances which partici- early modern period are Descartes pate in the idea of that thing. However, (whose famous “cogito ergo sum” is for Aristotle, a thing is that thing and known a priori and for whom the idea what you see is what you get. On the of God is innate) and the Cartesian Aristotelian epistemological account, Spinoza, for whom the obeys then, all sources of knowledge are de- strict and necessary which deter- rived from the senses, and this is a mine all things in nature, including the classic tenet of empiricism typified in human will. Gottfried Leibniz is an- British empiricist ’s Essay other rationalist, for whom God is a Concerning Human Understanding necessary a priori being from whom (1689). This typical classification of the universe is necessitated in a Aristotle’s epistemology as empiricist

2 Stephen Priest, The British Empiricists, 4 Ibid., 17. (New York: , 2007), 16. 3 Ibid., 5. 29 is accurate as regards knowledge de- of the understanding are “synthetic”. rived from the senses. However, there Kant’s theory requires three important are other aspects of Aristotle’s thought distinctions to be understood, which which have more rationalist tenden- are the distinction between a priori and cies, as discussed further below. a posteriori, between synthetic and an- The furthest extreme of empiri- alytic knowledge claims (which mean cism is David Hume’s position, which expansive of knowledge and explica- can be called arch- empiricism or rad- tive of knowledge, respectively), and ical empiricism. For Hume, every- between necessity and .6 thing in nature is contingent and noth- First, necessity describes universal in- ing is necessary: “there are no ideas, terconnectedness (that something must which occur in metaphysics more ob- be a certain way and cannot be any scure and uncertain, than those of nec- other way). For example, Kant de- essary connection.”5 Specifically, any scribes the form of the human under- necessary connection between a cause standing as necessary; “all rules ac- and its effect is untenable. That is, at cording to which the understanding least, knowledge of causes and effects proceeds are either necessary or con- cannot be connected inferentially by tingent.”7 The contingent rules accord- using reason alone. Rather, any idea of ing to which the understanding oper- a necessary connection or a cause and ates are when the understanding is em- an effect is merely a psychological ex- ployed as a contingent and dependent pectation which arises from “constant type of cognition; “the contingent conjunction”. Thus, the only neces- rules which depend on a certain object sary thing in Hume’s philosophy is of cognition are as variegated as these that everything is contingent, and objects themselves.”8 Next, a priori re- therefore any knowledge claim must fers to things which can be known be considered with the utmost skepti- prior to experience, such as God or cism. Kant’s categories, and a posteriori re- , in a direct re- fers to things known empirically and sponse to Hume, argues that there are from experience. To be sure, necessity necessary rules (the form or canon) of can only be known a priori. An exam- the human understanding that can only ple which demonstrates the relation- be known a priori, and that these rules ship between necessity and the a priori

7 5 David Hume, An Enquiry Con- Immanuel Kant, Logic in The Norton cerning Human Understanding, Anthology of Western Philosophy After Kant: The Analytic Tradition, (New York: (New York: Anchor Books, Norton, 2017), 64. 1974), 350. 8 6 Ibid., 64. These contingent and de- Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any pendent types of cognition can be Future Metaphysics in The Norton An- mathematical cognitions, metaphysi- thology of Western Philosophy After cal cognitions, musical cognitions, Kant: The Analytic Tradition, (New York: etc. They are derived from empirical Norton, 2017), 59 experience (which is a posteriori). 30 is mathematics, when Kant says that empiricist. As will be demonstrated, “we must observe that all strictly Aristotle is better classified as a ration- mathematical judgments are a priori, alist than as an empiricist because and not empirical, because they carry there is necessity in his system of phi- with them necessity, which cannot be losophy, specifically in his metaphys- obtained from experience.”9 Kant here ics and in his ethics. Again, according is referring to the fact that mathemati- to Kant, anything necessary can only cal judgments (which are both neces- be known a priori. So, Aristotle cannot sary and universal and therefore a pri- be a true empiricist with merely a con- ori) are synthetic (expansive of tingent understanding of the world, be- knowledge). cause there is necessity in the afore- Mathematical knowledge, then, mentioned aspects of his philosophy. must be synthetic and necessary, and The claim that there is necessity in Ar- necessary things are fundamentally a istotle’s philosophy, which would priori. Thus (according to Kant alt- constitute rationalist elements in his hough seriously debated afterward) philosophy, is not necessarily a radical Hume was incorrect in his claim that claim. For example, the Medieval all knowledge is contingent, because Scholastics spent centuries attempting synthetic a priori knowledge claims to reconcile God (a synthetic a priori carry with them necessity.10 and therefore necessary being) with Again, according to Kant, Aristotelian empiricism. knowledge of necessity can only be Again, there are several elements obtained a priori, not through experi- of necessity in Aristotle’s philosophy. ence alone. So, if there is necessity in These necessary elements are in his a system of philosophy, then that ne- metaphysics and his ethics. First, there cessity is known a priori. Recall that is necessity at work in Aristotle’s met- according to Stephen Priest, a ration- aphysics. According to Olesiak alist is classified by synthetic a priori (2015), there are in Aristotle’s works metaphysics in their system of philos- four different kinds of necessity, alt- ophy. Any source of a priori hough three of these kinds are deriva- knowledge, which if Kant’s thesis is tive of one, which is absolute necessity accepted is therefore necessary, then (that which is eternal and exists neces- justifies the classification of a thinker sarily).11 The types derivative from ab- as a rationalist and not as an solute necessity are simple necessity,

9 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any expansive, and could be known adequately Future Metaphysics in The Norton An- through experience. Opposing this claim, thology of Western Philosophy After Kant considers these of ideas to Kant: The Analytic Tradition, (New York: be synthetic a priori knowledge claims. Norton, 2017), 60. 11 Jaroslaw Olesiak, “Nature and Ne- 10 Hume claimed that mathematical judg- cessity in Aristotle’s Physics,” Studia ments are analytic a priori knowledge Philosophiae Christianae UKSW 51.1 claims (or relations of ideas). That is, they (2015): 64. were descriptive judgments only, not 31 hypothetical necessity (those basic thing which classify it as that thing. things necessary for subsistence), and For Aristotle, that a thing is classified necessity in accordance with a thing’s as it is because of the properties it natural tendency. In Physics, Aristotle bears is a matter of necessity, and describes how things in nature occur therefore there is necessity in the clas- or act with necessity: “we must ex- sification of a thing in Aristotle’s met- plain then (1) that nature belongs to aphysics. Again, simple necessity is a the class of causes which act for the metaphysical concept in Aristotle, sake of something; (2) about the nec- which refers to the of a thing essary and its place in physical prob- as a thing as necessary. In turn, neces- lems.”12 The first class mentioned, of sity in a system of philosophy is an ad- causes which act for a certain sake, is equate characteristic to classify a what Olesiak calls necessity in accord- thinker as a rationalist. This is dis- ance with a thing’s natural tendency. cussed in more detail below. This refers to Aristotelian teleology, Teleological necessity is another commonly known as the “final cause” type of necessity, and this is present in or end purpose of a thing. As final Aristotle’s ethics. First, regarding causes in Aristotle are more appropri- physical cause and effect, Aristotle ately discussed in a physical or an eth- proposed that there are four answers to ical framework, details are given be- ‘why?’ questions. One of these four low. causes, the ‘final cause,’ is “the sense The second class which Aristotle of end or 'that for the sake of which' a refers to is simple necessity, and thing is done.”13 The idea that there is herein is the necessity within Aristo- necessity in Aristotle’s teleology is tle’s system of metaphysics. Simple supported in the recent literature. For necessity refers to the necessary exist- example, Abbate (2012) gives the dis- ence of an existing substance (that is, tinction between hypothetical neces- if a thing exists then it must have ex- sity and absolute necessity in Aristo- istence), and the necessary classifica- tle, demonstrated through the logical tion of a substance according to the implication.14 Again, in Aristotle’s properties of which it is possessed. words, the final cause refers to the ten- The metaphysical concept substance is dency of “those things which, by a that which is ‘standing under’. The continuous movement originated from substance bears the properties of a an internal principle, arrive at some

12 Aristotle, Physics, (Kansas: 14 Giampaolo Abbate, “The Role of Digireads.com Publishing, 2006), 25. Necessity in Aristotle’s Teleology as Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics Explained by Logical Implication,” are interrelated in many ways. There- Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fore, a passage from Physics is still a für Antike und Mittelalter 15.1 relevant representation of his meta- (2012): 5. physics. 13 Aristotle, Physics, (Kansas: Digireads.com Publishing, 2006), 19. 32 completion; the tendency in each is to- that the specific end or completion of wards the same end, if there is no im- a thing is contingent, can be learned pediment.”15 from experience and , and Concerning ethics and necessity therefore the end is not necessary (be- in teleology, Aristotle maintains that cause then it would not be known a rational human action is necessary: in priori). However, the end itself, which the Nicomachean Ethics he says that can be any end, is necessitated by the “the rational principle of the continent very fact that there must be an end for man urges them aright and towards the the movement all the things in nature. best objects,”16 and that “intelligent In the case of humankind, this end is action is for the sake of an end; there- necessarily achieved through the em- fore the nature of things also is so.”17 ployment of rationality, not because Aristotle here gives a version of his rationality is necessarily determined, definition of the essence of the human but because rationality is the necessary as rational social animal. That is, eve- aspect of what defines humankind. In rything in nature acts with a purpose, sum, teleology, which for Aristotle as a means towards a given end. In the constitutes the metaphysical essence case of human action, rationality is the of a thing, could not be discovered a cause guiding action and decision- posteriori because, as has been demon- making. Further, rationality is a neces- strated, it defines a necessary meta- sary aspect of the essence of being hu- physical of a thing. man, because for Aristotle humans are Recall here Hume’s position of defined by their rationality. Again, ra- , in which tional human action necessarily works knowledge of cause and effect is as a means towards rationally deter- merely conditioned psychological ex- mined ends. This final cause, or the pectation. Contrarily, Aristotle’s tele- sake for which something is done, is ological ethics, which claims that hu- fulfilled necessarily when human ra- manity is necessarily typified by act- tional ability is used. In Olesiak’s ing rationally, must appeal not only to terms, this type of necessity is the cause and effect, but also to a given fourth kind, which he deems necessity purpose which connects these events. ‘in accordance with a thing’s natural To use the attainment of good health tendency’. as an example, health is the effect, ra- Rationality is not determined tionality is the cause, and the human as necessarily for Aristotle, but since it is a ‘rational social animal’ is the teleo- the natural human tendency, and these logical purpose which connects the final causes or teleological tendencies cause with its effect. Clearly, this eth- are necessary characteristics of what it ical teleology is incompatible with means to be human, final causes are Hume’s radical empiricism because fulfilled necessarily. One might object teleology requires some idea of

15 Aristotle, Physics, (Kansas: 16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, (Kitche- Digireads.com Publishing, 2006), 27. ner: Batoche Books, 1999), 19. 17 Ibid., 26. 33 necessary connection between cause whereas for the empiricist knowledge and effect, which is fundamentally in- is only attained through the senses. compatible with radical empiricism. In According to Hume, everything is relation to rationalism, the knowledge contingent and there are no necessary that employing rationality is a neces- connections, whereas Kant asserts that sary and distinctive characteristic of there are indeed necessary claims, and what it means to be human could only these necessitated claims can only be be known a priori. This teleological known a priori. Therefore, a rationalist necessity can only be known a priori obeys necessity in their thought, and because knowledge of necessity, ac- this fundamentally opposes empiricist cording to Kant, cannot be obtained epistemology. Aristotle is typically from experience. Thus, necessary ends classified as an empiricist. However, in the actions of rational creatures sup- this paper has argued there are several ports the rationalist opposition to radi- aspects of Aristotle’s system of philos- cal empiricism, and further supports ophy, namely in his metaphysics and the claim that Aristotle is better classi- in his ethics, which are classified as a fied as a rationalist than as an empiri- priori knowledge because they entail cist. necessity. Therefore, because of this a In summation, rationalism is the priori necessity, Aristotle’s philoso- epistemological thesis that one can phy is more accurately classified as ra- know necessary aspects of the world tionalism than as empiricism. through thinking or mentation alone,

Works Cited

Abbate, Giampaolo. “The Role of Necessity in Aristotle’s Teleology as Explained by Logical Implication.” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 15.1 (2012): 1–25. Aristotle, and Jonathan Barnes. The Complete Works of Aristotle. the Revised Oxford Translation. Oxford: Oxford, 1995. Aristotle. Categories, 259-265. New York: The Free Press, 1966. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1-19. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999. Aristotle. Physics, 1-31. Kansas: Digireads.com Publishing, 2006. Dudley, John. Aristotle’s Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and . New York: SUNY Press, 2013. Frede, Michael. “Rationality of Aristotle”. In Rationality in Greek Thought, edited by Michael Frede and Gisela Striker, 157-173. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

Hoshyar, Yassaman. “Aristotle’s Rationalism: A Reply to Barnes.” Sophia Peren- nis 35 (2019): 5-20. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 350-383. New 34 York: Anchor Books, 1974. Kant, Immanuel. , 204-210. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1998. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason in The Norton Anthology of Western Philosophy After Kant: The Analytic Tradition. (New York: Norton, 2017), 52-58. Kant, Immanuel. Logic in The Norton Anthology of Western Philosophy After Kant: The Analytic Tradition. (New York: Norton, 2017), 64-67. 12 Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in The Norton Anthol- ogy of Western Philosophy After Kant: The Analytic Tradition. (New York: Norton, 2017), 59-63. Olesiak, Jaroslaw. “Nature and Necessity in Aristotle’s Physics.” Studia Philoso- phiae Christianae UKSW 51.1 (2015): 55-73. Priest, Stephen. “What Is Empiricism?” in The British Empiricists, 1-31. New York: Routledge, 2007.

35 A Critique of Hume’s Skepticism of Reason

John H. Cooney Carroll College

ABSTRACT: As exposited in his A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume holds that reason is subservient to passions—innate which motivate action—and that is a prod- uct of these passions. In this paper, I argue, contra Hume, that reason both super- sedes and precedes passion and that it is reason, rather than passion, which informs moral distinction. I make this argument on the following grounds: (1) passions are not innate but arise from reason, (2) reason supersedes passions—even to the point of being able to mitigate them, and (3) only a rational ethic (as opposed to Hume’s ) can be prescriptive in nature. In proving these three points, I demon- strate that Hume’s skepticism can neither a meaningful ethic nor a sound moral philosophy.

From Aristotle onward, numerous as far removed as Hume posits nor is philosophers have affirmed humanity’s morality a alien to reason. Ra- biform nature: animality and rational- ther, reason informs our passions and is ity. We are indistinct from baser crea- the basis for morality. tures with the notable exception of our Before any critique of Hume’s gift of reason. Accordingly, it is com- model is made, his conceptions of both mon and justifiable to believe that our reason and passion ought to be expli- rationality influences most facets of our cated. Hume views the former as lives—our decision making, our moral- highly limited, ascribing it only the ity, our . This assumption, how- ability to judge veracity (“reason is the ever, is rejected by David Hume. In his discovery of truth or falsehood”1) and works, A Treatise of Human Nature to create associations between events and An Enquiry Concerning the Princi- (“reason is nothing but the discovery of ples of Morals, Hume so greatly mini- this connection”2). Yet, for Hume, rea- mizes human rationality that he deems son is incapable of producing passion reason unable to compel action, an op- or inciting action. Regarding passion, eration he assigns to the passions. He Hume maintains a broader view. He instead deigns morality to be a product defines it as, “an original existence, or, strictly of sentiment. This restrictive if you will, modification of existence, view of reason’s abilities, though, is in- and contains not any representative accurate. Reason and passion are not , which renders it a copy of any

1 David Hume. A Treatise of Human Na- and Peter Markie, 277-288 (New York, ture. In Ethics, 6th edition, ed. Steven Cahn NY: Oxford University Press), 281. 2 Ibid., 278. 36 other existence or modification.”3 That , fears chaos, and detests disor- is, passion is an innate impression or der. and that which motivates ac- The human experience is an inter- tion. Perhaps what is most telling section amongst numerous systems. about Hume’s view of both faculties, Every human being is embedded in however, is his presentation of their re- thousands of interpenetrating and com- lationship: “Reason is, and ought only peting structures: political bodies, to be, the slave of the passions, and can sports teams, religious organizations, never pretend to any other office than Toastmasters clubs, moral codes, traf- to serve and obey them.”4 In other fic laws, and the like. The products of words, rationality is subservient to pas- a person’s embeddedness (say nothing sion in the realm of action and moral- of her psychological archetypes and ity—almost to the point of impotence. tendencies) are narratives—some con- Hume’s perspective mistakenly scious, others subconscious—concern- demotes the defining feature of human- ing how the world ought to operate. ity to an ancillary role in moral decision These narratives may be social, moral, making to an emotive expression. In- practical, or aesthetic in nature. When deed, reason not only influences pas- life works in accord with these narra- sion—and thereby action—but is the tives, we consider things to be properly very basis for it. This is evidenced by ordered; conversely, when circum- a simple teleological analysis; after all, stances depart from our narratives, things receive their definition, at least things are disordered. Since order and in part, by their functionality. Admit- disorder are the objects of reason and tedly, reason’s end as maintained by passions arise upon rational stimula- Hume is accurate. “It regards the ab- tion, an emotional response occurs ap- stract relations of our ideas, or those re- propriate to the current state of affairs. lations of objects of which experience A positive emotional reaction to a only gives us information,”5 “directs , for instance, begins as a ra- our judgment concerning causes and tional appreciation for its symmetry effects,”6 and, “conveys the knowledge and color complementarity—even if of truth and falsehood.”7 More suc- these technical elements are not con- cinctly, the function of reason is the or- sciously analyzed. dering of data for the sake of drawing At the risk of belaboring this conclusions from it—hence, its utility point, permit me an example. If one in the world of math and science. What day I found myself the victim of theft, Hume fails to see is that passion shares I would no doubt become angry. Why the same end. Passion takes pleasure in does this arise? It is because I have a certain concept of how life

3 Ibid. 7 David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the 4 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 278. Principles of Morals. In Ethics, 6th edition, 5 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 277. ed. Steven Cahn and Peter Markie, 289-313 6 Ibid., 278. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 313. 37 ought to operate—how it ought to be a Humean vein, as any disconnect be- ordered—and it was broken. In the tween passion and beliefs about order context of our illustration, I believe that could be taken to show passion as an life should be ordered in such a way ‘original existence.’ Thus, I posit two that wealth is proportional to work and alternative explanations. First, some is respected. My in- instances of disorder may not be of furiation is a result of disregard for this enough consequence to elicit an emo- presumed system. Now, suppose that I tional response. If every instance of find my transgressor who, after several disorder did evoke such a response, we minutes of sorrowful apologizing, ex- would be very disgruntled people in- plains that he is recently unemployed deed! The second explanation is that in and has a family to feed. Certainly, my situations like this, there exists a corre- anger will not dissipate wholesale, but sponding affective , but it is it may be tempered by for the man. not strong enough to be considered an This is the case, for while one situation emotion. I present these options simply was thrown into disorder, I recognize to demonstrate that such an example the potential for the reordering of an- need not be interpreted in a Humean other chaotic situation (i.e., I expect manner, and I leave it to the psycholo- families to be ordered in such a way gist to sort out which proves to be a that parents provide for their children). more viable explanation. Therefore, passion is orientated toward In addition to the disorder-passion the preservation of order pro rata. argument, there is no such thing as a To further clarify, passions are de- passion that is unable to be rational- rived from reason rather than reason ized—specifically in terms of order. being a means to rationalize passion. Reason, then, must come before pas- This is proven by the fact that reason sion but does not necessitate it. Like- precedes and supersedes passion. Pre- wise, supersession is demonstrated in cession is demonstrated in instances instances where reason transfigures or where a person comes to a logical con- nullifies a passion. As Spinoza taught, clusion about how a thing should be or- “Emotion, which is passion, ceases to dered without becoming passionate be passion as soon as we form a clear when it is disordered. For example, I and definite idea of it.”8 Plainly put, may believe that grades should be we have the ability to rationalize-away earned (order), but I may also be indif- emotion. If I enter a haunted house ferent when I hear of a classmate who lacking foreknowledge of what is to cheated on a test (disorder). We must come, I will be terrified. If I enter tread carefully, for this example pos- knowing what to expect at specific sesses the potential to be interpreted in points, my fear will be curbed. If I

8 . Ethica Ordine Ge- simulatque eius claram et distinctam ometrico Demonstrata et in Quinque formamus ideam.” Partes Distincta. The Library. “Affec- tus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, 38 enter having helped construct the repulsion. Or else, reason may be props, I might even enjoy the experi- based on incomplete data perception. ence. Passion is wholly contingent on A man may be racist from a young age, reason. Consequently, reason precedes having been fed inaccurate information and supersedes passion, and passion is throughout his childhood. Logic in se derived from reason, rather than the in- will not be a sufficient counter to the verse. data he has perceived, but a positive ex- Here, another possible Humean perience with a minority—that is, addi- objection ought to be addressed: if pas- tional data—may be. Simply put, rea- sion is situated solely in reason, then son cannot always reconcile itself to reason would always be effective in form a coherent order. mitigating irrational emotion, which it Despite the relatedness of reason is not. How can it be that a woman may and passion, however, passion cannot be shown—even with the full force of be considered mere reason. We do not, propositional logic—that there is no after all, become emotional over every need to be afraid of a spider, yet she re- rational conclusion we draw (see the mains fearful? Why may volumes of above discussion on the relationship biological evidence be unsuccessful in between disorder and passion). I may changing a man’s racist biases, but a recognize disorder in the form of the positive interaction with a minority cat- world water crisis, but it rarely evokes alyzes an ideological about-face in a passionate response, let alone action. him? It would almost seem that Hume What, then, transforms reason into pas- is correct when he writes, “Nothing can sion? There are a variety of factors that oppose or retard the impulse of passion, lead to this metamorphosis, the most but a contrary impulse.”9 The proper notable of which are fecundity (will the response to this objection is a conces- object of my potential passion lead to sion: reason is fallible. Reason can eas- future negative/positive experiences, or ily come into conflict with itself. Two is it self-contained?), proximity10 (does lines of reasoning may be present in a the concern me? a loved one? a situation which are irreconcilable. compatriot? a stranger on the other side Logic may be at odds with pre-reflec- of the world?), and mutability (does a tive reason—reason inherent either as a passionate reaction have the potential result of millennia of evolutionary pro- to engender order?). These are the ele- cesses or by of our being made ments upon which the reason-passion in imago Dei—as in the spider scenario threshold is contingent. Note that the or any other instance of natural word ‘threshold’ is somewhat

9 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 278. a component of fecundity. It is the prag- 10 A note about proximity: Hume would matic consideration that fecundity is in- consider proximity’s role as a factor in the creased with propinquity. I will more eas- reason-passion equation as evidence of his ily be able to help my next-door neighbor principle of benevolence (c.f., An Enquiry than someone on the opposite side of the Concerning the Principles of Morals). I globe. counter that proximity is nothing other than 39 imprecise, for as stated above, intensity emotion is uncontrollable, so too is ac- of passion is variable. tion. Hume encourages us to make rea- One question remains: what bear- son slave to passion and, by , ing does Hume’s distinction have on morality slave to whim and preference. morality? Hume’s ethic is indelibly To be fair, Hume attempts to bound up with his skepticism of reason. maintain personal responsibility by ar- He claims that, “Moral distinctions, guing that while reason does not pro- therefore, are not the offspring of rea- duce morality, it does recognize it, and son. Reason is wholly inactive, and can it is this recognition that creates ac- never be the source of so active a prin- countability. “According to this sys- ciple as , or a sense of mor- tem, then, every animal. . . must be sus- als.”11 His assertion is as follows: rea- ceptible of all the same virtues and son exclusively determines truth and vices, for which we ascribe praise and falsehood in matters of fact; our actions blame to human creatures. All the dif- are outside the scope of fact and reality; ference is, that our superior reason may therefore, morality cannot be judged on serve to discover the vice or virtue, and the grounds of conformity or contrari- by that means may augment the blame ety to reason. Thus, he concludes that, or praise.”13 This, though, is little more “since vice and virtue are not discover- than equivocation. Awareness of a able merely by reason, or the compari- subjective standard does not constrain son of ideas, it must be by means of me to obey it. If two people experience some impression or sentiment they oc- different emotional reactions to the casion, that we are able to mark the dif- same event, then, by Hume’s standard, ference betwixt them. . . Morality, that event is both moral and immoral. therefore, is more properly felt than “It is the object of , not of rea- judged of.”12 Pleasure becomes the son. It in yourself, not in the ob- measure of virtue and of vice. ject. So that when you pronounce any There is danger, though, in action or character to be vicious, you grounding morality in sentiment. If, as mean nothing, but that from the consti- Hume proposes, morality stems from tution of your nature you have a feeling passion, an original existence, then a or sentiment of blame.”14 If I act con- divorce arises between action and ac- trary to my natural inclination, the countability. Surely the further moral- worst I can be accused of is cognitive ity is removed from rationality, the fur- dissonance and inconsistency. An ob- ther it is removed from . How jective and knowable standard is re- much merit is there in rectitude and cul- quired in the discernment of moral pability in depravity if they are simply value.15 the product of innate disposition? If

11 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 281. 15 This paragraph hints that Hume’s theory 12 Ibid., 286 may fall into a subjectivist trap. To fairly 13 Ibid., 285. address this idea, though, it is necessary to 14 Ibid. engage with his mechanisms of 40 Reason, however, presents a much our rationality and, as a result, more palatable moral alternative to pas- constructs an unstable ethic—an ethic sion and its lack of accountability. Un- lacking the possibility of moral respon- like passion, reason does not necessi- sibility. This gift of reason, however, tate a specific action (or inaction, for does not belong in a box. To underes- that matter). It rather presents the real- timate reason is to underestimate the ity of a circumstance and judges the defining feature of human nature and merits and disadvantages of particular morals. Our rationality is fecund. Our actions, upon which we subsequently rationality is potent. Our rationality is decide and act. Where passion impels subservient to nothing but the truth. action—and in the process, removes re- sponsibility—reason demands action based on the information it has pro- vided and, in so doing, preserves per- sonal responsibility. Moral accounta- bility requires free , something nonexistent in Hume’s system. Even if we grant Hume the idea that only pas- sion can motivate, reason must discern the disparate passions present in a situ- ation and decide which, if any, is worth giving one’s self over to, again preserv- ing accountability. When a man is cut- off in rush hour traffic, he must decide if he will give himself over to anger or and is responsible for the resulting actions of his choice. Whether we deny Hume’s distinction in part or in full, it is clear that only rea- son is able to make room for moral ac- claim or culpability. Truly, an ethic without accountability is an ethic to which it is not worth subscribing. Hume paints a unique illustration of the relationship between reason and passion, from which his ethic flows. Nevertheless, despite his , he fails to acknowledge that reason is the progenitor of passion and that morality is indelibly bound up with it. He limits

and benevolence, concepts too large for a paper of this size and scope. 41 Bibliography

Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In Ethics, 6th edition, edited by Steven Cahn and Peter Markie, 289-313. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. In Ethics, 6th edition, edited by Ste- ven Cahn and Peter Markie, 277-288. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Spinoza, Baruch. Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata et in Quinque Partes Distincta. The Latin Library. Accessed November 11, 2017. http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/spinoza.ethica5.html.