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D Black's Law Dictionary D Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) , Page 1171 D. D.abbr.1.DISTRICT. 2.DEFENDANT. 3.DIGEST. D.A. D.A.abbr.1.DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 2. See deposit account under ACCOUNT. DACTYLOGRAPHY dactylography (dak-t<<schwa>>-log-r<<schwa>>-fee), n. The scientific study of fingerprints as a method of identification. — dactylographic (dak-til-<< schwa>>-graf-ik), adj. DAF DAF.abbr. DELIVERED AT FRONTIER. DAILIA dailia. See DALUS. DAILUS dailus. See DALUS. DAILY BALANCE daily balance.The final daily accounting for a day on which interest is to be accrued or paid. average daily balance.The average amount of money in an account (such as a bank account or credit-card account) during a given period. • This amount serves as the basis for computing interest or a finance charge for the period. DAILY NEWSPAPER daily newspaper.See NEWSPAPER. DAISY CHAIN daisy chain.A series of purchases and sales of the same stock by a small group of securities dealers attempting to drive up the stock's price to attract unsuspecting buyers' interest. • Once the buyers have invested (i.e., are caught up in the chain), the traders sell for a quick profit, leaving the buyers with overpriced stock. This practice is illegal. DALUS dalus (day-l<<schwa>>s), n.[Law Latin “a dale”] Hist. 1.A dale; a ditch. 2. A measure of land being a thin strip of pasture between two plowed furrows. — Also termed dailus; dailia. DAMAGE 1171 D Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) , Page 1172 damage,adj. Of or relating to monetary compensation for loss or injury to a person or property <a damage claim> <a damage award>. — Also termed damages <a damages claim>. Cf. DAMAGES. damage,n. Loss or injury to person or property <actionable damage resulting from negligence>. DAMAGE-CLEER damage-cleer (dam-ij kleer), n.[fr. Latin damna clericorum “clerk's compensation”] Hist. A set fee payable by a plaintiff to the Court of the Common Pleas, King's Bench, or Exchequer before execution on an award of damages. • The fee — later abolished by statute — was originally a gratuity to the court clerks for preparing special pleadings. It was later abolished by statute. — Also spelled damage cleere. — Also termed damna clericorum. “Damage cleere, damna clericorum, was assessed by the tenth part in the common pleas, and by the twentieth part in the king's bench and exchequer, of all damages, exceeding five marks, recovered either by verdict, confession, or judgment of the court, in all actions upon the case, covenant, trespass, battery, false imprisonment, dower, and all others, wherein the damages were uncertain, which the plaintiff was obliged to pay to the prothonotary, or chief officer of that court, wherein they were recovered before he could have execution for them. But this is taken away by 17 Car. 2, c. 6.” Termes de la Ley 141 (1st Am. ed. 1812). DAMAGE FEASANT damage feasant (dam-ij fez-<<schwa>>nt orfee-z<<schwa>>nt), n.[fr. French faisant dommage] Hist. Doing damage. • This phrase usu. refers to injury to a person's land caused by another person's animals' trespassing on the property and eating the crops or treading the grass. By law, the owner of the damaged property could distrain and impound the animals until compensated by the animals' owner. But the impounder had to feed the animals and could not sell or harm them. The term was introduced during the reign of Edward III. — Also spelled damage faisant. — Also termed damnum facientes. DAMAGE RULE damage rule.See LEGAL-INJURY RULE. DAMAGES damages,n. pl. Money claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury <the plaintiff seeks $8,000 in damages from the defendant>. — damage,adj. “Damages are the sum of money which a person wronged is entitled to receive from the wrongdoer as compensation for the wrong.” Frank Gahan, The Law of Damages 1 (1936). accumulative damages.Statutory damages allowed in addition to amounts available under the common law. — Also termed enhanced damages. actual damages.An amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or 1172 D Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) , Page 1173 loss; damages that repay actual losses. — Also termed compensatory damages; tangible damages; real damages. [Cases: Damages 15. C.J.S. Damages §§ 21–22.] added damages.See punitive damages. additional damages.Damages usu. provided by statute in addition to direct damages. • Additional damages can include expenses resulting from the injury, consequential damages, or punitive damages. benefit-of-the-bargain damages.Damages that a breaching party to a contract must pay to the aggrieved party, equal to the amounts that the aggrieved party would have received, including profits, if the contract had been fully performed. — Also termed loss-of-bargain damages. [Cases: Damages 117.] compensatory damages (k<<schwa>>m-pen-s<<schwa>>-tor-ee).1. Damages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered. — Often shortened to compensatories. 2. See actual damages. [Cases: Damages 15. C.J.S. Damages §§ 21–22.] consequential damages.Losses that do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious act but that result indirectly from the act. [Cases: Damages 15–25. C.J.S. Damages §§ 21–38, 42; Parent and Child § 344.] contemptuous damages.See nominal damages. continuing damages. 1. Damages arising from the same injury. 2. Damages arising from the repetition of similar acts within a definite period. cosmetic damages.The amount awarded to compensate for personal disfigurement. damages for lost expectations.See expectation damages. damages ultra (<<schwa>>l-tr<<schwa>>). Additional damages claimed by a plaintiff who is not satisfied with the amounts the defendant paid into court. direct damages.See general damages. discretionary damages.Damages (such as mental anguish or pain and suffering) that are not precisely measurable but are determined by the subjective judgment of a jury. — Also termed indeterminate damages. double damages.Damages that, by statute, are twice the amount that the fact-finder determines is owed or twice the amount of actual damages awarded. • In some cases, double damages are awarded in addition to actual damages, so the effect is the same as treble damages. [Cases: Damages 227. C.J.S. Damages §§ 218–219, 383.] enhanced damages. 1. See accumulative damages. 2.Patents. Damages for patent infringement in an amount up to three times that of compensatory damages, at the discretion of the court, based on the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, including the willfulness of the infringement. [Cases: Patents 319(3). C.J.S. Patents § 569.] 1173 D Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) , Page 1174 estimated damages.See liquidated damages. excess damages.Damages awarded to an insured — beyond the coverage provided by an insurance policy — because the insurer did not settle the claim within policy limits. • If the insurer acted in bad faith in not settling, the insured may have a claim to recover the excess damages from the insurer. — Also termed excess-liability damages. [Cases: Insurance 3350. C.J.S. Insurance §§ 1160–1163, 1342.] excessive damages.A jury award that grossly exceeds the amount warranted by law based on the facts and circumstances of the case; unreasonable or outrageous damages, which are subject to reduction by remittitur. See REMITTITUR. [Cases: Damages 127–140. C.J.S. Damages §§ 384–385, 387–394; Parent and Child § 344.] exemplary damages.See punitive damages. expectation damages.Compensation awarded for the loss of what a person reasonably anticipated from a transaction that was not completed. — Also termed expectancy damages; lost-expectation damages; damages for lost expectations. [Cases: Damages 23. C.J.S. Damages §§ 28–33.] fee damages.Damages awarded to the owner of abutting property for injury caused by the construction and operation of an elevated railroad. • The term is used because the damage is to the property owner's easements of light, air, and access, which are parts of the fee. foreseeable damages.Damages that a breaching party knew or should have known would result from a breach when the contract was made. [Cases: Damages 21. C.J.S. Damages §§ 30–33.] future damages.Money awarded to an injured party for an injury's residual or projected effects, such as those that reduce the person's ability to function. • Examples are expected pain and suffering, loss or impairment of earning capacity, and projected medical expenses. [Cases: Damages 25. C.J.S. Damages § 42.] general damages.Damages that the law presumes follow from the type of wrong complained of; specif., compensatory damages for harm that so frequently results from the tort for which a party has sued that the harm is reasonably expected and need not be alleged or proved. • General damages do not need to be specifically claimed. — Also termed direct damages; necessary damages. [Cases: Damages 5. C.J.S. Damages §§ 3–6.] gross damages.The total damages found before adjustments and offsets. hedonic damages (hi-don-ik). Damages that attempt to compensate for the loss of the pleasure of being alive. • Such damages are not allowed in most jurisdictions. — Also termed (erroneously) hedonistic damages. [Cases: Damages 48–56.20. C.J.S. Damages §§ 94–104; Parent and Child § 344; Torts §§ 66–83.] imaginary damages.See punitive damages. 1174 D Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) , Page 1175 inadequate damages.Damages insufficient to fully and fairly compensate the parties; damages bearing no reasonable relation to the plaintiff's injuries, indicating prejudice, mistake, or other fact to support setting aside a jury's verdict. [Cases: Damages 127–140. C.J.S. Damages §§ 384–385, 387–394; Parent and Child § 344.] incidental damages. 1. Losses reasonably associated with or related to actual damages.
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