--"''''

environmentalism. After all, a concrete parking lotlot is relatively stable. Of Leo­ pold II SS threethree criteria for noral rightnessrightness inin thethe envirorunent (beauty,(beauty, stability, and in­in­ tegrity),tegrity), only natural integrityintegrity seemsseems toto make sense. If we consider a forest that is ravaged by a fire caused by a bolt of light­ ning, we see a simplified system that results from a loss of stability. Moreover, it sus­ tains a major loss of sentient life. Yet, .all,all this is a result of natural processes, and so I see no real loss of value here. I think that this kind of case reflects the compromise criteria that Finsen is trying to develop. The key to understanding natural ANIMAL RIGHTS envirorunental value is not in stable environ­ ments that tend to produce K-selectors; the AND ECOHOLISM key to understanding environmental value lies in the idea of natural change. ARE NOt COMPATIBLE

Finally, let me say that both views, animal rights individualism and ecoholism, continue to have problems with seriously SIDNEY GamIN GE:IDIN endangered species. Proponents of the fonner EasternPastern Michigan University University cannot say why individual rare animals are nore important than plentiful ones, especial­ ly when they are ugly. Holists cannot say why non-functioning species (as nost rare In her admirable paper, Professor Finsen ones are) are important at all. I have, succeeds in clarifying the views of some of therefore, developed a theory (or an excuse) the leading ecoholists, and she also succeeds

based on the idea of reparations. Human in showing that their views are not terr~ly society owes canpensationcompensation to those survivors far from those of the animal rights people. of any extinction process begun by humans.

Nevertheless, there are important differences If this~. view is correct, then there would be between the philosophy of ecoholism and that no reason to "prevent'prevent naturally occurring of animal rights that cannot be minimized.' extinctions, i.e., extinctions that do not Professor Finsen is too ambitious in suppos­ result from human interference in the envi­ ing that she can supply a theoretical recon­ ronment. If the koala bear species eats all ciliation of the two positions. the leaves off the eucalyptus trees, thereby dooming both the tree species and itself, I take it that the essence of,of Professor then it is simply too bad for the koala bear. Fihsen I s paper is that those she calls eco­ They will be extinct, and humanity does not holists--for example, RodmatlRodman and Leopold-­ have to feel the least bit guilty. love not any old biotic environment but those that show "integrity, stability and beauty." In conclusion, let me repeat my claim These are precisely the environments that are that we are presented here with two different particularly kind to thethe organisms that ani­ methodologies of applied ethics. The nost mal rights proponents favor. As she put it, important issue thus facing us is which ap­ the ecoholist "values the very systems which proach we will take as we trytry to solve ethic­ give rise toto thetl:J.e sentient beings valued by al problems regarding animals and the envi­ ronment. I vote for examining the resolution of problems in the concrete situation and for postponing metaphysical speculations, however interesting they may be, because they rarely lead to pragmatic solutions. DISCUSSIONDISCUSSION

23 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES individualists." And she makes this case out sion analogously to Dworkin's use of the word entirely persuasively. The problem, hOl¥'ever, when he explains what it means to take rights is that there are ecoholistseooholists and ecoholists. seriously. And what it means is that in the Whatever the stature of Rodman, Leopold, nomalnormal course of events, "rights trump utili­ Partridge, and sagoff, they do not have a ties." In short, I mean that strong ecohol­ rronopoly on ecoholism and, in my opinion, do ism is itself a rights based view. It takes not appear, at least on the basis of Finsen's species and environments seriously. I empha­ account, to present the boldest version of size "and environments" because there are at that pulosophy. least two other sorts of things ecoholists seem to hold dear besides species that puts them at odds with animal rights proponents. Consider, for example, what Finsen tells us about Leopold. Leopold made the claim Even if animal rights people made some that a thing is good if it contributes to the grudging concessions concerning the value of integrity, stability, and beauty of the bio­ species, it would nevertheless only be animal tic ccmnunity, but Susan Finsen rightly species that they could take seriously. But points out that he did not say and in any ecoholists appear to value plant species to case should not have said that a thing is about the same extent as they value animal good only if it makes such a contribution. species. I take it that the r-selection arrl In this way we can value things for reasons k-selection principles that Finsen appeal to other than their role in the envirorunent. apply to plant species too, and that one can Obviously she is right, and if Leopold under­ as well point to stable, beautiful plant stood this, then that is to his credit. On enviromnents with integrity as one can to the other hand, there are rrore unbending animal environments. But must these k-selec­ ecoholists, such as Robert Loftin, who expli­ ted environments contain the sentient beings citly claims that "it is wasteful to focus so valued by animal rights individualists? concern on animals rather than on ecosys­ They need not. And certainly one can imagine tems. "[1) In Loftin's view, no value at all a flourishing k-selected environment becaning attaches, for example, to trying to give threatened by an intruding human. Suppose medical assistance to wild animals. And Robinson Crusoe came along to a certain very Loftin goes so far as to claim that it is small island knOlNing that he would be rescued only holistic entities such as species and in three or four rronths but only if he used entire ecosystems that are the locus of val­ up the otherwise self-sustaining k-selecting ue. Consequently, the "only if" provision plants. This is the sort of conflict that that Finsen says is lacking in Leopold is Regan may have envisioned, and nothing in present in Loftin. Nothing in Finsen's paper Finsen's analysis shOlNS us hOI¥' the ecoholist will reconcile a view such as Loftin's with a can be on the side of poor Mr. Crusoe. view such as Regan's. In his review of Tom Regan's The case Professor Finsen makes sensible observa­ for Animal Rights, [2) J. Baird callicott tions about hOI¥' little disagreement there oonfesses that Regan's liking for furry crea­ need be between echolists and animal right­ tures "irritates" him. callioott makes quite ists over hunting and trapping, the treatment clear that he is not only as concerned about of domestic animals and the alleged paradoxes plants as he is with animals but also as of predation, but she falters, I believe, ooncerned with species of plants as for spe­ with respect to the issue of endangered spe­ cies of animals. His view, though, is the cies, which is one of the i.creconcilable very paradigm of the arcanum. He certainly issues separating the two camps. doesn't grant rights to plants, since he doesn't grant them to animals; rrore exactly, strong ecoholism (perhaps not preached he denies that it is sensible to attribute by Leopold despite his near guru status in rights to wild animals, since that would be the rrovement), takes envirorunents and species in effect to domesticate them (presumably a seriously and is not merely proposing that a bad thing). Although he seems to think do­ rrore sensitive approach than is usual to the mesticated animals have some rights and wild enviromnent is for the greater good. By my animals do not, one must not be misled into saying ecoholists take envirorunents "serious­ thinking that he thinks that domesticated ly," I mean, of course, to use this expres­expres- animals are rrore entitled to our concern. BElWEEN THE SPECIES 24

it. #iii u And the fact that he probably does not think snaildarter to the well-being of the biotic that plants have rights should not lead us to communityccxmnunity is minimal. They must know that suppose that he thereby thinks they are less the world can survive the loss of the snail­ entitled to our concern. In any case, for darter even IOClrerrore easily than it has survived reasons that are too hard for me to grasp, without the saber tooth tiger and the passen­ Callicott appears to think that some mysteri­ ger pigeon. Despite a lot of hocum reminis­ 0usous ecological considerations trump both cent of old Bela Lugosi IOClviesrrovies where someone rights and ordinary utilitarian factors. sooner or later would say, "There are things Callicott appears, for whatever reason, to be in nature man should not tamper with!," the IOClrerrore concerned about the good of, say, a fact is that this tampering with the snail­ weasel than he is about the good of a dachs­ darter and other insignificants cannot be hund. In any case, however he may feel about what bothers the ecoholist. It is, rather, this, Callicott does tell us that the key to that he has a deep cormnitmentcommitment to endangered reconciling environmental ethics with animal species for their own sake. He or she takes rights is to understand that wild animals their rights seriously. have no rights. This certainly has the air Professor Finsen proposes to reconcile of paradox, but it needn't really be a para­ Professor Finsen proposes to reconcile the survival issue--i.e., Regan's concern dox. Think of it, instead, as a quaint way over whether his life is rrore important than of telling the animal rights proponents that over whether his life is IOClre important than they are wrong. The reconciliation is a pure that of a wildflower--by appeal to what she one way street. It is effected by asking the calls "act holism" and "rule holism," but animal rights people to give-upgive' up their view. apart from the fact that she has the implica-implica­ (I must confess that I shall later make the tions of these two views reversed, she cannot same IOClverrove of asking ecoholists to give up bring about the desired reconciliation. Fin­ sen says that if there was some important their view.) dilemma in which one had to choose between killing a human and killing a wildflower, Let me be very brief with respect to the then rule holism (also called "indirect hol­ other matter that I said creates an unbridge­ ism" by her) gives us a way out. It is IOClreII'Ore able impasse between the ecoholists and the defensible than act-holism because it warns animal rights proponents. The other matter us not to deal with nature on a case-by-case is the fascination the ecoholists have with us not to deal with nature on a case-by-case basis. She thinks that the rule holist would non-living nature: a beautiful rock fonna­forma­ basis. She thinks that the rule holist would tion, the "unspoiled" wilderness, the Grand advise us to sacrifice the wildflower because Canyon, etc. R. Will Flowers says that deep rule holism recognizes and respects the inte­ ecologists would feel repugnance at the ex­ rests of sentient beings. However, Finsen seems to overlook the fact that an act holist termination of a species of beach IOClllserrol1se to seems to overlook the fact that an act holist can recognize the interests of sentient make room for condominiums. He likens this can recognize the interests of sentient to murdering an old man for his life insur­ beings if a rule holist can. After all, ance. [3] I do not doubt in the slightest their differences are methodological only and that Flowers (wonderful name! ) would not are not about fundamental values. But she countenance the destruction of the beach for characterizes the act holist as insisting the sake of those despised condominiums even that in each and.everyand, every instance, we must if we could relocate the poor mouse.rrouse. Ecohol­ preserve the integrity and stability of the ists who preach this sort of love for non­ biotic cormnunity In fact, it is only because living nature are preaching, I believe, an she recognizes the inherent preposterousness aesthetics of nature and not an ethics. Like of killing a human being for the sake of a ecoholists, many animal respectors have a wildflower that Professor Finsen is so eager

passionate love for nature'snature I s beauties, but to find a way out. That way is to postulate when push comes to shove, they believe ethics rule holism and to suppose that it would takes priority overolTer aesthetics. contain a rule that said something like this: whenever there is a straightforward . conflict I said I did not think that ecoholistsecoholists or interests such that we must choose between the survival of a human being and the survi are disguised consequenti,alists. In my view,view, the survival of a human being and the surviv­ their obsession with aesthetics confirmsconfirms al of a wildflower, then we choose that the that. Those who worry seriously about thethe human being should survive. What sort of ecoholism is this? fate of the snaildarter understand perfectlyperfectly ecoholism is this? well. I trust that the contribution of thethe

25 BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

'-, ~~,.,:g':""',t1).~';::t"t;:-';',"',:-;7C,:T"'''''''"';:'~;'''''·';';:'·~,;:;',.,,( ~',i't,;,·,...::,,::... ;;;f.;;c:;':i'·.::,';<:" 'C-'; ;:;O;'-:'ir,?,;i'i,.",i-f"'-ri';'{c" ,',' ;;"!"~~,;;;",,.,,,.; ;:::;;:-;;·,'·,,:i,·"·"" Any credible variety of ecoholism ITRlst making the p::>sition of the ecoholist more contain rules that are weighted in favor of palatable. I say the survival issue is a ecosystems and species. If there is such a red herring because when I looked casually thing as a rule holist, he or she does not through some of the writings of Leop::>ld I did prop::>se rules for resolving conflicts between not notice any discussion of what to do when ecosystems and people; rather, she/he holds a human life hung in the balance against that that once we discover the very best rules for of a wildflower. In truth, Leop::>ld and his maintaining the ecosystem, we should hold early supporters were not in the tradition of fast to them even when it 'seems that in a Anglo-American philosophy, thrust and coun­ ter-thrust, thesis and counter-example. This given cirClUllStance we would do better ----for the ecx:>system by violating the rule. He would is even more obvious in the works of Leo­ not, qua ecoholist, preach that when the pold's predecessors, people like Audubon and well-being of an ecosystem or species con­ John Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club. flicted with the well-being of a human being, Even today's environmental organizations rely we should put the well-being of the latter heavily for their membership up::>n "animal ahead of the former. As for an act holist, lovers." The rank and file membership of he/she would tell us only that if we truly groups like the Sierra Club, the National desire to protect the ecosystem, then it Wilderness Society, the Audubon Society, isn't good enough always to abide by rules. Whatever the internecine battles of two vari­vari- eties of ecoholism, none of this will help poor Tom Regan when his life is being threat­ ened.

When we talk of p::>ssible conflicts be­ tween a biotic canmunity and humans, do we not usually misdescribe the nature of the conflicts? Sane years ago there was the celebrated snaildarter case in which the proposed dam would have put an end to snail­ darters once and for all. Note that was a real conflict. It is only philosophers who raise the issue of a snaildarter's life hang­ ing in the balance with a human life. Envi­ ronmentalists worry about strip mining and its effects on the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic corrmunity. They are countered with arguments concerning economic necessity or something of that sort. No one ever argues, "Either we strip mine tOllDrrow,

or we die tOllDrrow. It Environmentalists are usually doing battle with Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce or representatives of the oil, mining, timber, and other indus'­ tries. The conflict is not choosing between destruction of a valuable biotic system and the death of human beings. The notorious Secretary of the Interior, James Watts, did not hold the curious view that the lives of humans are being threatened by the principles Name of enviroronentalists. Nor do I think that most ecpholists want to put the well-being of Street the biotic community above that of the lives of the human community. That non-issue is City State __ Zip _ but a red. ,herring designed to make ecoholism The ANIMALS' AGENDA Subscriptions look foolish. Consider how Finsen' s attempt p.G. Box 6809. Syracuse. NY 13217 to reconcile survival dilermna depends on

BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 26

.4 u i¥, LXX & iii tUM even, II think,think, Ducks Unlimited fanciesfancies itselfitself inin favorfavor of animal rights. And perhaps thethe leadersleaders of thesethese organizations thinkthink of them­them­ selves thatthat way, too.too. What has happened isis this.this. There is or was so much bombast on thethe part of those who proclaimed a "land ethic" that it was alrrostal:rrost inevitable that there would be unrealized implications of precisely the sort that trained analytic philosophers with pro-animal sentiments were bound to take exception to. More sophisticated philoso­ phers with pro-land ethic sentiments, like Rodman, leaped into the fray and, so far as I can tell, have extended their commitment to ecoholism beyond the wildest dreams of their DOMBROWSKI ON original mentors. In any case, so I see it. INDIVIDUALS, SPECIES, It is Finsen I s merit that she has done her very best to salvage the views of people AND ECOSYSTEMS like Rodman by showing that they want much the same sorts of things that animal rights proponents do. Unhappily, the deck was stacked against her because--and I hope the reader won'twon 't find it outrageous that I put DAVID N. JAMES JAMES this so baldly--it is trivially true that IDngwood College College sentient life has value independent of its role in any ecosystem, and it is also true, although perhaps not trivially, that an eco­ system has no value that could ever supersede At the end of his excellent historical the value of the totality of sentient life. study, The Philosophy of Vegetarianism, (This is not to say that deep ecology is Daniel Dombrowski suggests that "perhaps the false. Ecosystems may have their own, but most sophisticated version" of "a world of lesser, value independent of the value of nature alive" "is found in the recent thought sentient beings.) Ecoholism, when not driven of Charles Hartshorne. [l]"[1)" The present paper to extravagant limits, has much in it to be develops such an Harshornian metaphysics and admired. When it conflicts with a concern applies it to the moral status of individuals for life, it is patently absurd. The best and species. reconciliation would be for the ecoholists to admit this. According to Dombrowski, animals, in­ cluding humans, are individuals made up of living cells. Lacking the integration of a nervous system, plants are individuals in a much weaker sense. A mere colony of cells, "each for the most part on their own," plants also lack the psychological individuality of animals, Sentiency 2, the ability to feel Notes pain. But lower-level feelings or experien­ ces, Sentiency 1, exist in plants, rocks, and 1. Robert IDftin, ':The':The Medical Treat­ throughout nature at the microscopic level. ment of Wild Animals," Environmental Ethics (Fall, 1985).

2. J. Baird Callicott, in Environmental Ethics (Winter, 1985).

3. R. Will Flowers, "Ethics and the DISCUSSION HypermodernHyperrrodern Species, " Environmental Ethics (Surrnner,(Surrnner, 1986).

27 BEl'WEENBETWEEN THE SPECIES