Animal Rights and Ecoholism Are Not Compatible
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--"'''' environmentalism. After all, a concrete parking lotlot is relatively stable. Of Leo pold II SS threethree criteria for noral rightnessrightness inin thethe envirorunent (beauty,(beauty, stability, and inin tegrity),tegrity), only natural integrityintegrity seemsseems toto make sense. If we consider a forest that is ravaged by a fire caused by a bolt of light ning, we see a simplified system that results from a loss of stability. Moreover, it sus tains a major loss of sentient life. Yet, .all,all this is a result of natural processes, and so I see no real loss of value here. I think that this kind of case reflects the compromise criteria that Finsen is trying to develop. The key to understanding natural ANIMAL RIGHTS envirorunental value is not in stable environ ments that tend to produce K-selectors; the AND ECOHOLISM key to understanding environmental value lies in the idea of natural change. ARE NOt COMPATIBLE Finally, let me say that both views, animal rights individualism and ecoholism, continue to have problems with seriously SIDNEY GamIN GE:IDIN endangered species. Proponents of the fonner EasternPastern Michigan University University cannot say why individual rare animals are nore important than plentiful ones, especial ly when they are ugly. Holists cannot say why non-functioning species (as nost rare In her admirable paper, Professor Finsen ones are) are important at all. I have, succeeds in clarifying the views of some of therefore, developed a theory (or an excuse) the leading ecoholists, and she also succeeds based on the idea of reparations. Human in showing that their views are not terr~ly society owes compensationcanpensation to those survivors far from those of the animal rights people. of any extinction process begun by humans. Nevertheless, there are important differences If this~. view is correct, then there would be between the philosophy of ecoholism and that no reason to "prevent'prevent naturally occurring of animal rights that cannot be minimized.' extinctions, i.e., extinctions that do not Professor Finsen is too ambitious in suppos result from human interference in the envi ing that she can supply a theoretical recon ronment. If the koala bear species eats all ciliation of the two positions. the leaves off the eucalyptus trees, thereby dooming both the tree species and itself, I take it that the essence of,of Professor then it is simply too bad for the koala bear. Fihsen I s paper is that those she calls eco They will be extinct, and humanity does not holists--for example, RodmatlRodman and Leopold- have to feel the least bit guilty. love not any old biotic environment but those that show "integrity, stability and beauty." In conclusion, let me repeat my claim These are precisely the environments that are that we are presented here with two different particularly kind to thethe organisms that ani methodologies of applied ethics. The nost mal rights proponents favor. As she put it, important issue thus facing us is which ap the ecoholist "values the very systems which proach we will take as we trytry to solve ethic give rise toto thetl:J.e sentient beings valued by al problems regarding animals and the envi ronment. I vote for examining the resolution of problems in the concrete situation and for postponing metaphysical speculations, however interesting they may be, because they rarely lead to pragmatic solutions. DISCUSSIONDISCUSSION 23 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES individualists." And she makes this case out sion analogously to Dworkin's use of the word entirely persuasively. The problem, hOl¥'ever, when he explains what it means to take rights is that there are eooholistsecoholists and ecoholists. seriously. And what it means is that in the Whatever the stature of Rodman, Leopold, nomalnormal course of events, "rights trump utili Partridge, and sagoff, they do not have a ties." In short, I mean that strong ecohol rronopoly on ecoholism and, in my opinion, do ism is itself a rights based view. It takes not appear, at least on the basis of Finsen's species and environments seriously. I empha account, to present the boldest version of size "and environments" because there are at that pulosophy. least two other sorts of things ecoholists seem to hold dear besides species that puts them at odds with animal rights proponents. Consider, for example, what Finsen tells us about Leopold. Leopold made the claim Even if animal rights people made some that a thing is good if it contributes to the grudging concessions concerning the value of integrity, stability, and beauty of the bio species, it would nevertheless only be animal tic ccmnunity, but Susan Finsen rightly species that they could take seriously. But points out that he did not say and in any ecoholists appear to value plant species to case should not have said that a thing is about the same extent as they value animal good only if it makes such a contribution. species. I take it that the r-selection arrl In this way we can value things for reasons k-selection principles that Finsen appeal to other than their role in the envirorunent. apply to plant species too, and that one can Obviously she is right, and if Leopold under as well point to stable, beautiful plant stood this, then that is to his credit. On enviromnents with integrity as one can to the other hand, there are rrore unbending animal environments. But must these k-selec ecoholists, such as Robert Loftin, who expli ted environments contain the sentient beings citly claims that "it is wasteful to focus so valued by animal rights individualists? concern on animals rather than on ecosys They need not. And certainly one can imagine tems. "[1) In Loftin's view, no value at all a flourishing k-selected environment becaning attaches, for example, to trying to give threatened by an intruding human. Suppose medical assistance to wild animals. And Robinson Crusoe came along to a certain very Loftin goes so far as to claim that it is small island knOlNing that he would be rescued only holistic entities such as species and in three or four rronths but only if he used entire ecosystems that are the locus of val up the otherwise self-sustaining k-selecting ue. Consequently, the "only if" provision plants. This is the sort of conflict that that Finsen says is lacking in Leopold is Regan may have envisioned, and nothing in present in Loftin. Nothing in Finsen's paper Finsen's analysis shOlNS us hOI¥' the ecoholist will reconcile a view such as Loftin's with a can be on the side of poor Mr. Crusoe. view such as Regan's. In his review of Tom Regan's The case Professor Finsen makes sensible observa for Animal Rights, [2) J. Baird callicott tions about hOI¥' little disagreement there oonfesses that Regan's liking for furry crea need be between echolists and animal right tures "irritates" him. callioott makes quite ists over hunting and trapping, the treatment clear that he is not only as concerned about of domestic animals and the alleged paradoxes plants as he is with animals but also as of predation, but she falters, I believe, ooncerned with species of plants as for spe with respect to the issue of endangered spe cies of animals. His view, though, is the cies, which is one of the i.creconcilable very paradigm of the arcanum. He certainly issues separating the two camps. doesn't grant rights to plants, since he doesn't grant them to animals; rrore exactly, strong ecoholism (perhaps not preached he denies that it is sensible to attribute by Leopold despite his near guru status in rights to wild animals, since that would be the rrovement), takes envirorunents and species in effect to domesticate them (presumably a seriously and is not merely proposing that a bad thing). Although he seems to think do rrore sensitive approach than is usual to the mesticated animals have some rights and wild enviromnent is for the greater good. By my animals do not, one must not be misled into saying ecoholists take envirorunents "serious thinking that he thinks that domesticated ly," I mean, of course, to use this expresexpres- animals are rrore entitled to our concern. BElWEEN THE SPECIES 24 it. #iii u And the fact that he probably does not think snaildarter to the well-being of the biotic that plants have rights should not lead us to communityccxmnunity is minimal. They must know that suppose that he thereby thinks they are less the world can survive the loss of the snail entitled to our concern. In any case, for darter even IOClrerrore easily than it has survived reasons that are too hard for me to grasp, without the saber tooth tiger and the passen Callicott appears to think that some mysteri ger pigeon. Despite a lot of hocum reminis 0usous ecological considerations trump both cent of old Bela Lugosi IOClviesrrovies where someone rights and ordinary utilitarian factors. sooner or later would say, "There are things Callicott appears, for whatever reason, to be in nature man should not tamper with!," the IOClrerrore concerned about the good of, say, a fact is that this tampering with the snail weasel than he is about the good of a dachs darter and other insignificants cannot be hund. In any case, however he may feel about what bothers the ecoholist. It is, rather, this, Callicott does tell us that the key to that he has a deep cormnitmentcommitment to endangered reconciling environmental ethics with animal species for their own sake. He or she takes rights is to understand that wild animals their rights seriously.