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Home , Amor Prohibido, Arcady Boytler, Better than Us, Breaking down the script, Censorship in Brazil, Censorship in Mexico

Mexican and the Creation of Regime Legitimacy, 1913-1945

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Reyna Marie Esquivel-King, M.A.

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2019

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Stephanie Smith, Advisor

Dr. Laura Podalsky

Dr. Stanley Blake

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Copyrighted by

Reyna Marie Esquivel-King

2019

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Abstract

My dissertation, entitled, “Mexican and the Creation of Regime

Legitimacy, 1913-1945,” argues that Mexican government officials used cinema censorship to disseminate a positive image of and as modern and prosperous, and attempted to create an appearance of stability and control. Utilizing archival sources, newspapers, journals, and film , I examine how regimes use film censorship as a tool to legitimize their power through images. Specifically, I focus on representations of women, the indigenous, and Mexicans in U.S. cinema. The officials realized the significant persuasive and influential power that visual media had over its vast and far-reaching audiences, especially the increasingly popular form of film. They saw censorship as an efficient and effective tool they could use to create and/or change the course of any given tide of public sentiment or opinion. They implemented film censorship and the use of positive imagery to serve two purposes. One reason being to convince international audiences of Mexico’s status as a modern, powerful, and independent nation. The second was to persuade domestic audiences of the Mexican government’s legitimacy to rule and restore a sense of national pride in order to breed a common desire for national unity. While other scholars have discussed censorship, none have looked at the broader, transnational aspects and consequences that my dissertation analyzes.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Trudy Washburn (Grandmother), Felipe Esquivel I

(Father) and Ingrid Bradford (Aunt). May they rest in peace.

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Acknowledgments

This project is combination of interests that I have had going back to my undergraduate years at the University of Michigan-Dearborn. The variety of different classes I took provided me with the opportunity to explore the idea of difference by studying issues of race, ethnicity, and identity, including their historical importance. Consequently, I took an avid interest in classes that addressed the history of those subjects. These classes, along with additional courses in women and gender studies, helped me contextualize concepts of race and gender. For me, history provided a way to understand the social construction of race and gender, and, in turn, assisted in understanding myself. I chose to study Mexican cinema and how Mexican directors and producers represent masculinity because of a documentary entitled Tough Guise that I watched in an introductory course to women and gender studies. In 2012, I completed my master’s thesis entitled, “Vampires,

Monsters, and Santa Clause: Sociopolitical Representations of Gender, Class, and the in Three Mexican Horror , 1954- 1959,” that examined the image of masculinity in Mexican horror films of the 1950s. I became fascinated with how I could use cinema to understand the construction of identity and nationality. It was during my readings in my doctoral graduated classes that I read about the story of how Vámonos con (1936) initially had an alternative conclusion that ended with Villa killing the main character and his family; however, the Mexican censorship board rejected this script and stated a new one needed to be created that was less critical of the . I was intrigued by this and wondered what other films were altered and why. I decided to analyze, over a 30-year period, how government officials could create a

iv concept of national identity using censorship. It is through this work that I share the fascinating connection between censorship and the building of national identity in postrevolutionary Mexico.

I owe my thanks and gratitude to my Ph.D. advisor, Dr. Stephanie Smith, first and foremost.

Her knowledge and guidance have shaped who I am as an intellectual and scholar. has read this dissertation too many times to count and her feedback and advice have been invaluable to my dissertation. Her own scholarship provided an outstanding example for me to follow and learn from. I am greatly indebted to her. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee from the Ohio State University, Dr. Podalsky and Dr. Stanley Blake, for reading and commenting on my work. Dr. Podlasky’s suggestions and observations about Latin American film studies were incredibly helpful and opened my mind to new methodologies and ways of looking at cinema. Dr. Blake’s own recommendations at examining popular culture in Brazil helped me shape a more transnational viewpoint of Latin American film and identity.

This research would not have been possible without the numerous awards and prizes from

Ohio State University. In 2014, I received the Tinker Field Research Grant from the Center for

Latin American Studies that allowed me to conduct preliminary research in which led to the creation of this project. The Ohio State University History Department generously provided funding for me to conduct four summers of research in various parts of Mexico and the

United States.

While completing this dissertation I have the pleasure of meeting and working with amazing archivists and colleagues both in the United States and in Mexico. I would like to thank all the archivists at the Archivo General de la Nacíon in Mexico City for their patience with me, especially when locating the Secretary of Public Education records, which took much longer than

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I originally thought. These files were a huge resource for my dissertation, and I am so appreciative for their kindness, hard work, and professionalism towards me each of the four summers I visited there. The archivists at Cineteca Nacional were wonderful as well, and very excited about my project. At the Biblioteca Pública del Estado de “Juan José Arreola” in , the archivists led me to priceless documents about the lives of women in the Mexican .

My numerous friends and colleagues in the history department at Ohio State have read my work numerous times and gave me helpful and insightful feedback that shaped my dissertation. I am grateful for our long conversations about academia and our work and for their constant support.

Last, but not at all least, I would like to thank my family. My mother, Lorri Esquivel, has always supported me in whatever dream I had, ever since I was a child. She let me be who I wanted and unconditionally supported my endeavors. My grandmother, Trudy Washburn, who was called

Omi, was my second mother and my rock. She passed away before I completed this dissertation, but her love and words of encouragement are seen within the pages of this work. My grandfather

Donald Washburn, my brother, Felipe Esquivel II, my uncle Donald Washburn Jr., and my aunt

Debra Reske, have provided me with tremendous support and encouragement, always calling to check up on my mental and emotional health, as well as my academic journey. I am so happy to have my entire family in my corner. Finally, I give my biggest thanks to my loving husband, Paul

King, who has moved from city to city and school to school as I perused my dream of receiving a history Ph.D. He has happily edited my papers, chapters, etc. and been there to encourage me through all the difficult and emotional times and our long talks and conversations have helped shape my research in many ways. I am so glad that he was a part of this journey and my academic growth.

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Vita

May 2005 …………………………………………. Henry Ford II High School

May 2010 …………………………………………. B.A. History and Social Studies,

University of Michigan-Dearborn

May 2012 …………………………………………. M.A. History, New York University

August 2012- Present……………………………… Graduate Associate, Department of

History, The Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Dedication ...... iii Acknowledgments ...... iv Vita ...... vii Introduction ...... 1 Chapter One: How is Censorship Legal and what is the purpose? Conversations about Censorship ...... 24 Chapter Two: Consolidating the Cultural Revolution- The History of Bureaucracies ..... 74 Chapter Three: Mexican Film and the International Audience- Reconstructing Race Transnationally ...... 126 Chapter Four: Unions- Foundation of the Film Industry ...... 174 Chapter Five: Women in the Mexican Film Industry ...... 216 Conclusion ...... 258

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………267

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Film stills from Amor Prohibido...... 255

Figure 2: Film stills from El Signo de la Muerte...... 256

Figure 3: Film stills from Flor Silvestre ...... 257

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Introduction

In the final scene of Vamanos con Pancho Villa (1936), one of Pancho Villa’s soldiers, named Don Tiburcio Maya, deserts Villa’s army. Tiburcio and his friends originally joined Villa to fight for the Revolution in hopes of creating a better life for themselves and their families.

However, at the end, the rival armies killed all of Tiburcio’s friends and he was left with crushing sadness and disappointment. He decides to go back home and take care of his family, and the credits roll. However, the original ending was quite different. Instead of concluding with Tiburcio heading home, the scene fades into another where Tiburcio and Villa run into each other a few years later. Villa encourages Tiburcio to rejoin Villa’s army. Tiburcio refuses and, in retribution,

Villa kills Tiburcio’s wife and daughter. Villa then has Tiburcio murdered. This alternative ending did not make it into the final edit of the movie. The script went through the Mexican state censorship board and officials decided the original ending had to be cut and replaced with a less gruesome one.1 According to the Mexican administrators, the idea of Villa being a ruthless killer would taint the perception of the revolutionary hero and was critical of the postrevolutionary government. Therefore, the movie needed to be revised to showcase Villa and the Revolution in a more positive

1 John Mraz, “Chapter 5: How Real is Reel? ’s Revolutionary Trilogy,” in Framing : Contemporary Critical Perspectives, ed. Ann Marie Stock (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 94-95.

1 light. This is just one example of the many films that were altered by the Mexican censorship board to protect government officials from criticism.

Following the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican government attempted to consolidate and establish itself as the ruling authority by creating and proliferating a national identity that unified the competing ideologies of the Mexican Revolution and healed longstanding wounds. Officials in the Mexican government used films to create a positive image of Mexicans and more broadly,

Latin Americans. The officials believed that the way to reverse the negative and undignified portrayal of Mexican people and culture that was so pervasive in foreign films was by increasing both domestic distribution and international export of Mexican-made films that were replete with positive imagery characterizing the Mexican people/culture as intelligent, civil and productive.

These images, in turn, depicted the Mexican government as skillful and adept. The officials realized the significant persuasive and influential power that visual media had over its vast and far-reaching audiences, especially the increasingly popular form of film. Mexican administrators saw it as an efficient and effective tool they could use to create and/or change the course of any given tide of public sentiment or opinion. Officials implemented film censorship and the use of positive imagery to serve two purposes. One reason was to convince international audiences of

Mexico’s status as a modern, powerful, and independent nation. The second was to persuade domestic audiences of the Mexican government’s legitimacy to rule and restore a sense of national pride in order to breed a common desire for national unity.

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My dissertation, entitled “Mexican Film Censorship and the Creation of Regime

Legitimacy, 1913-1945,” argues that Mexican government officials used cinema censorship to disseminate a positive image of Mexico and Mexicans as modern and prosperous, and attempted to create an appearance of stability and control. Utilizing archival sources, newspapers, journals, and film propaganda, I examine how regimes use film censorship as a tool to legitimize their power through images. Specifically, I focus on representations of women, the indigenous, and Mexicans in U.S. cinema. My work is one of the few English-language historical studies of Mexican state- sponsored film censorship.2 My study explores how the state uses media to disseminate images that legitimize authority as ideas about citizenship and identity changed over time through the cultural process of state formation.3 Popular culture is a crucial part of state formation, in which the state imposes certain ideals that justify and legitimize its power over the people through cultural means, such as education, media, legal system, etc. Through an analysis of Mexican state censorship laws and practices, I will examine how regimes use film censorship as a tool to certify their power.

Historians and cultural studies scholars have not produced a clear historical examination of how cinema cultures change over time and why they do so. I bridge this gap within this literature

2 A few examples of censorship and film literature include: Daniel Biltereyst and Roel Vande Winkel, eds., Silencing Cinema: Film Censorship Around the World (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), Jennifer Fronc, Monitoring the Movies: The Fight over Film Censorship in Early Twentieth-Century Urban America (Austin: University of Austin Press, 2017), Martín Luis Guzmán, El Águila y la Serpiente (Mexico City: Compañia General de Ediciones, 1941), Virgilio Anduiza V., Legislación Cinematográfica Mexicana (Mexico City: Filmoteca UNAM, 1984), Julia Tuñón, Historia de un Sueño: El Hollywood Tapatio (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1986), Eduardo de la Vega Alfaro, La Revolución Traicionada: Dos Ensayos sobre literatura, cine, y censura (Mexico City, UNAM, 2012). 3 Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 13.

3 by assessing, over a thirty-year period, how different regimes in Mexico have used state censorship in film to cultivate legitimacy and power.4 My research employs an interdisciplinary approach, using history, cultural studies, and cinema studies to explore how images shift over time and the effect of sociopolitical events on state formation. Mexico provides an ideal research opportunity because it had a large and successful film industry, a diverse society, and relative stability.

However, my work is relevant to the larger field of Latin American history, as several countries in

Latin America share the dilemma of creating a legit regime with a very diverse populous, such as

Brazil and . In both these countries, leaders attempted to cultivate a national identity that could unite people despite the diversity and problems within their nations.

I analyze the creation of a national identity of post-revolutionary Mexico, arguing that government officials were not the sole creators of Mexican national identity, but were in dialogue with local and state . Urban Mexican audiences influenced the process of censorship by paying to see these films and writing reviews in journals, magazines, newspapers, etc. Mexican citizens also wrote to their representatives about international films that denigrated the image of

Mexico and Mexicans, demanding the government take action. I chose to study film because it plays a crucial role in regime and state formation. In Mexico City, where literacy rates were low

(20% in 1910 and 37% by 1940)5, visual culture was a suitable medium to cultivate and disseminate ideas about the ruling establishment. Film was relatively cheap and accessible to the

4 This includes studies like Sergio de la Mora, Cinemachismo: Masculinities and Sexuality in Mexican Film, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), which provide a very informative book on queer studies and Mexican film, but do not look at the historical connections and changes over time. 5 David R. Olson and Nancy Torrance, eds. “Chapter 8: The Making of Literate Societies,” Education for All Global Monitoring Report, 2006 (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006): 192.

4 lower classes in growing urban areas like Mexico City (where the population increased from

471,000 in 1910 to 2.9 million in 1940).6

My analysis of national identity through film in Mexico also is a transnational examination of the construction of race through derogatory and negative stereotypical racial images projected by U.S. cinema and Mexico’s attempt to combat them. It is important to understand the implications of this transnational conversation. In contemporary U.S. cinema, Hispanics still tend to play the villains and bandits.7 Unfortunately, this type of representation is not new. As part of this marginalized group, I have an avid interest in understanding the origin of these stereotypes.

My research gets to the very root of these images, examining Hollywood’s construction of Latin

Americans and the subsequent response of the Mexican government. I see my work as speaking to a larger audience beyond historians of Mexico. My research will appeal to those in Latin

American film studies, cultural studies, Latino/a studies, and gender studies. My methodology incorporates a historical study of the construction of race and gender troupes. My research also examines the construction and use of regime rule, which will interest those scholars who work on the creation and use of power.

6 Priscilla Connolly “UN Global Slums Report: The Case of Mexico City, Mexico,” accessed February 14, 2014, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/Mexico.pdf. 7 Including the greaser image in: West Side Story (1961) and Zoot Suit (1981), as gang members and involvement in the drug trade, Blood in, Blood out (1993) and the series (2015-present), and sexualized Latinas with Sofía Vergara’s character Gloria Delgado in the Modern Family series (2009-present) and Mi Vida Loca (1993).

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National Identity in Post-Revolutionary Mexico: The Cultural Revolution

The concept of national identity, “. . . sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, [and] a mass, public culture. . .” is complicated and often contradictory.8 This was the case in postrevolutionary Mexico. One aspect of postrevolutionary Mexican national identity stressed the image of the rural and urban poor as noble, family-orientated, honest, and hardworking: the poor were the people who made up the heart of Mexico.9 However, Mexican authorities sought to control the lower classes by prescribing certain actions and attributes to the ideas of Mexican identity, such as acceptance of their position in society. The poor should embrace their role and take pride in their work and lifestyle.10

Another aspect of the national identity dealt with the incorporation of the indigenous population. However, postrevolutionary elites had a contentious relationship with indigenous people that lived in modern-day Mexico. While certain aspects of indigenismo were praised,

Mexican elites considered modern-day indigenous people as uneducated and poor. Examining the statements and writings of artists and politicians illustrates this view. Dr. Atl (aka Gerardo

Murrillo), a Mexican painter and influential political activist, took an avid interest in the creation of a Mexican identity built out of the Revolution. He worked closely with the muralist Diego

Rivera and the Secretary of Education, José Vasconcelos, in the production of a postrevolutionary

Mexican nationality through popular culture images. One of his most important ideas was the promotion of indigenous culture within Mexico. For Dr. Atl, the mestizo culture of Mexico

8 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14. 9 Anne T. Doremus, “Authenticity, the Pelado and the Mexican National Identity: Essay Versus Film during the 1930s and 1940s,” Confluencia 16, no.1 (2000): 41. 10 Ibid. 42.

6 presented a difficult problem: it was a mix between European and indigenous peoples. While officials could stress the European side, Dr. Atl understood that this would simply not work for

Mexico, and instead felt that the promotion of indigenous culture was necessary.11 Historian Rick

López argues that “[i]ndigenous cultural influences provided the shared traits and collective distinctiveness that constituted a ‘true national culture’.”12 However, embracing Indianness was not without its problems, as many in Mexico could not agree on what aspects to endorse. The encouragement to embrace Indigenous culture is seen with the India Bonita Contest of 1921, a beauty contest for indigenous women that was broadcasted as a spectacle for Mexican citizens.

Yet, Mexican officials who were not of indigenous descent, set the beauty standards. For example, one contestant was disqualified because she had green eyes instead of brown.13 Historian Michael

Gonzales asserts that the elites decided and prescribed ideas of indigenous beauty and this was informed by their own racial and prejudicial stereotypes.14 The upper-class only upheld certain features that they prescribed to Indigenous people and the poor in order to control any opposition in the attempt to unify the country. 15

11 Rick López, Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State After the Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 89. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 58 14 Michael J. Gonzales, “Imagining Mexico in 1921: Visions of the Revolutionary State and Society in the Centennial Celebration in Mexico City,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 25, no. 2 (2009): 266. 15 Mary Kay Vaughan states, “The multiethnic elements of popular culture- indigenous, mestizo, folkloric- were celebrated and packaged as national culture, to serve as the point of departure for modernization.” Mexican national identity stressed a connection to the powerful indigenous pre-colonial past of the Aztecs and Mayans. The indigenous were illustrated as strong, beautiful, and commanding and were often romanticized in the national culture in direct confrontation to how the indigenous were actually treated in the modern day. This contradiction was directly related to modernization and industrialization allowing for some of the population to excel while leaving behind a large majority. Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics of Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 5.

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Mexican officials saw national culture as a tool for unification and a way to legitimize the postrevolutionary government. Mexican historians Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen Lewis refer to the process of propagating a national identity in the post-revolutionary period as the “cultural revolution.” Popular culture forms, such as education, art, and film, provided a way to produce a national identity and promote nationalism.16 The projects of the state were part of a larger cultural revolution taking place in Mexico during 1920-1940 and these developments were crucial in establishing the ideology of the Mexican Revolution and, in turn, the new government that emerged from the Revolution. Mexican officials used national identity to unify its diverse population in order to strengthen its power. With art and film, the Mexican government pushed for artists, directors, and producers to highlight the positive aspects of Mexico. However, citizens were not passive in this process. They also participated in this project as union members, , directors, producers, etc.

I examine how the ruling regime in Mexico constructed the postrevolutionary images and characteristics and used the medium of film to both censor negative images and propagate positive illustrations of Mexico and its people. These depictions, in turn, helped to validate the power of the ruling regime. State formation is a cultural process.17 The state officials use cultural tools, such as art, film, media, education, etc. to enforce a hegemonic ideal of the state and its citizens.

However, the people also enter into dialogue with the state and can use culture production to their own advantage. My own works examines how Mexicans in the film industry and citizens

16 Stephen E. Lewis and Mary Kay Vaughan, “Introduction,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, ed. by Stephen E. Lewis and Mary Kay Vaughan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 2. 17 Joseph and Nugent, “Popular Culture and State Formation,” 13.

8 influenced the production and censorship of Mexican and international films, developing and policing ideas of Mexican national identity. For example, union workers in the 1930s would call for a strike or of theaters that showed denigrating movies. These same workers also pushed for protectionist reforms for Mexicans in the film industry.

Like the institutionalizing process of national art, cinema became a tool for “truth telling” or the process of reconstructing Mexico’s past through a revolutionary lens.18 Film was mobile, cheap, and accessible to most of the population, unlike artwork that was found only in the government buildings. Particular works in film studies provide useful examinations on the relationship between culture and the state. One of the first texts in English on Mexican cinema history is Carl J. Mora’s Mexican Cinema: Reflections of a Society 1896-1980. While this text does not provide an analysis of the films, it was the first and only scholarly text (at the time) in

English that provided a basic outline of Mexican movies and cinema beginning with the Silent Era up to the 1970s. Mora addresses how Mexican officials used film as a political tool. He argues that

Russian filmmakers who worked in Mexico, such as Lev Kuleshov and , influenced and implemented film as a way to celebrate ideas of the revolution such as giving back land, workers’ , and nationalism.19 Eisenstein began production on one of the first Mexican sound films in 1932, ¡Que Viva México!:- although he never fully finished the movie.20 Eisenstein

18 For more on this analysis see Mary K. Coffey How a Revolutionary Art Became Official Culture: Murals, Museums, and the Mexican State (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012.) 19 Mora does not suggest that Mexico lacked the idea of using film for political purposes (Pancho Villa had been doing so since 1910). Rather, Mora uses a transnational discussion of film as a political tool to further contextualize the Mexican cinema industry. See Carl. J. Mora, Mexican Cinema: Reflections of a Society, 1896-2004, (Jefferson, McFarland & Co., 2005). 20 Soviet director and friend of Eisenstein, Grigori Alexandrov constructed the film and it premiered in 1979. See Barnaby Haran, Watching the Red Dawn: The American Avant-Garde and the (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 118.

9 intended this movie to illustrate the , from the indigenous beginnings to the modern day using and folk music. Eisenstein was influenced by indigenous culture and pre-Colombian art, much like muralist Diego Rivera. These artists and cinematographers wanted to create a revolutionary Mexican art through an expression of Mexican identity, and they wanted it grounded in the ideology of indigenismo.21 The themes were carried over into film and many Mexican producers used sections of Eisenstein's film within their own. I argue that officials utilized these images of postrevolutionary Mexico to illustrate that the government was fulfilling the promises, like labor reform and land redistribution.

The government officials saw education as a way to promote and install postrevolutionary ideas of citizenship and found film as a valuable medium to use in the classroom. In her historical monograph, Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930-

1940, Mary Kay Vaughan argues that the real cultural revolution occurred within the dialogue between the state and society.22 She examines the role of state-sponsored education in four rural areas of Mexico and the politics of culture, meaning the definitions of culture and how it was articulated and disputed. Teachers attempted to understand their students in the rural areas in order to facilitate state policy in a language the people could relate to. In this way, education was shaped and influenced by the locals. I use Vaughan’s work to examine the types of films that the state allowed for use in the educational campaign. Cinema was particularly useful because of the high illiteracy rates in the countryside. The Secretary of Public Education began to utilize movies

21 Joanna Hershfield, “Race and Ethnicity in Classical Cinema,” in Mexico’s Cinema: A Century of Film and Filmmakers, ed. Joanne Hershfield and David R. Maciel (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 86. 22 Vaughan, Cultural Politics of Revolution, 2.

10 through the Directorate of Cultural Aesthetic and the Department of Fine Arts and Libraries by commissioning film screenings at libraries to circumvent the problem of illiteracy.23 Due to the success of these events, screenings moved beyond libraries to open air festivals in several rural

Mexican cities to allow access for all of the people within that region.

With the coming of sound in the 1930s, Mexican administrators like Eugene Gaudry, an administrator in the Mexican Department of Fine Arts, became concerned over “Americanization” and petitioned that the government provide money to commission a series of movies made by

Mexicans for Mexicans to educate them.24 However, because of the lack of domestic educational films, Mexican officials had to import movies that would provide examples; however, they needed approval of from the Secretary of Education. The movies the state department approved for use to educate the indigenous and rural population illustrates the images of Mexican society and characteristics of good, productive citizens that the government propagated, such as hygiene, science, and agricultural business education. Mexican officials provided incentives for Mexican directors and producers to create films about the positive aspects of Mexican life and culture.

President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) created the Financiadora de Películas (Movie Financing), that was a state institution responsible for finding private financing for films.25 Mexican officials emphasized that educational films in Mexico should promote ideas of collectivism and working to aid their neighbors and, this in turn, would produce active, contributing citizens in Mexico. These

23 Aurelio de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad en México 1896-1930: Vivir de Sueños (1896-1920), vol. 1 of Cine y Sociedad en México 1896-1930 (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1983), 137. 24 Eugene Gaudry, “Project to avoid Americanization via the English-language films; and promotion of ,” AGN, Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP), Box 33638, Exp. 2, 1931-1937, entire file. 25 Joanne Hershfield, “Screening the Nation,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Stephen E. Lewis and Mary Kay Vaughan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 264. This institution was responsible for facilitating financing private films.

11 concepts related to revolutionary ideals and promises, such as land redistribution and the nationalization of oil. Showing the success and fulfillment of revolutionary promises, in turn, legitimized the postrevolutionary government.

Censorship

The literature on film censorship in is limited.26 Most works focus on U.S. and European cinema, with edited collections providing few articles that discuss Latin America, specifically. Those texts on Latin American censorship present a very basic overview of the subject, providing certain laws and examples of films that were censored.27 My work examines the extensive censorship process within Mexico from cutting scripts to providing money and for movies that fit in with the ideas of the postrevolutionary government. I illustrate that censorship was not simply banning films or making edits, but I also provide incentives and protectionist measures for the Mexican cinema industry and its workers. Movies that promoted and uplifted revolutionary ideals and how officials where enacting the promises of the Revolution were funded and recommended for exportation abroad.

This type of positive censorship (incentives) did not end with monetary compensation. In the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, Hollywood dominated the Latin American market.

26 A few texts on censorship include: Daniel Biltereyst and Roel Vande Winkel, eds., Silencing Cinema: Film Censorship Around the World (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) and Jennifer Fronc, Monitoring the Movies: The Fight over Film Censorship in Early Twentieth-Century Urban America (Austin: University of Austin Press, 2017). 27 In “Cinema ,” Ian Bruce argues that censorship is not simply the cutting of films at the end of the procedure; it is active in every step of the process, from giving money to producers and film companies to distribution and advertisement. Ian Bruce, “Cinema Censorship in Brazil,” in Film and Censorship ed. Ruth Petrie (London: Cassell, 1997).

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However, the invention of sound opened up the industry. Hollywood failed at making successfully dubbed Spanish films because the Spanish was often incorrect and did not accurately reflect the

English dialogue. Therefore, Mexican cinema workers stepped in to fill this gap. However, many theaters in Mexico continued to give preference to Hollywood films and U.S. theater companies often treated Mexican workers poorly. To combat this conduct, Mexican cinema laborers, through the Mexican cinema union, demanded that the Mexican government put in place protectionist measures to ensure that Mexican films and workers were the priority in these theaters and movie houses.28 In one example, Mexican government officials grounded a plane with actors bound for the U.S to do dubbing work.29 Mexican administrators and audiences found dubbing to be so awful that they did not want to contribute to or aid this practice, especially using Mexican talent. In these ways, the Mexican government used censorship to elevate the Mexican film business.

The study of cultural production and mediums have opened sources (not just papers from the archive) to explore from a cultural studies perspective such as the regulation of art, education, media, etc. This includes the documents from the Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (The General Directorate of Political and Social Investigations, DGIPS), which are the equivalent to the Mexican secret police and investigated people, groups, activities, etc. that were seen to be a threat to the state.30 Film was a target of the DGIPS because U.S. movies in the 1920s

28 “Solución Parcial del Conflicto-Un Boletín de la Asociación de Productores,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 1, Num. 8, 9 Sept. 1938. 29 Article author unknown, “Mex. Union Stops Actors from Coming Here to Dub Pictures,” The Hollywood Reporter, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Pictures and World War II Files, Folder 164: Foreign Film Industries- Mexico, 8 June 1944. 30 Please see Tanalís Padilla, “Espionage and Education: Reporting on Student in Mexico’s Normales , 1960-1980,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) 19, No. 1 (2013): 20-29 and Alexander Aviña, “An Archive of Counterinsurgency: State Anxieties and Peasant Guerrillas in Cold War Mexico,” JILAR 19, no. 1 (2013): 41-51.

13 often portrayed Latin Americans, in particular, Mexicans, as uncivilized criminals. I use these reports to demonstrate how this agency worked to eradicate negative stereotypes of Mexico and

Latin America in film by watching and reporting on U.S. movies that were found vilifying to the nation. Mexican political elites saw these types of movies as a way for the U.S. to undermine the authority of the Mexican government; therefore, the movies needed to be banned to keep public order.

Mexican officials also controlled aspects of the media through the Dirección General de

Información (General Information Division) created by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) in 1937. The DGI contained sub-departments including the General Press and Office which encompassed the Department of Supervision. The main purpose of this department was to gather information on managing materials within media outlets, like movies.

The DGI was responsible for editing information within educational and commercial films, enforcing cinematic laws, the authorization for the commercial display of films throughout

Mexico, and making sure that domestically produced movies were exported properly in accordance with the appropriate regulations.31 They also handed out fines and approved final edits of movies before they were screened in theaters. These documents illustrate how censorship was enforced.

For example, each movie had a specific rating that included whether or not it was suited for children. The DGI fined any theaters that had children in the audience of a film deemed for adults.

However, many theaters disputed these charges, like when one child was a worker and only

31 “Unidad de Descripción Documental,” Guía General de los Fondos-AGN, http://www.agn.gob.mx/guiageneral/ last accessed Oct. 18, 2015.

14 cleaned the theater in between the showings.32 Other examples of these disagreements show that citizens did not simple accept these laws but were active in the processes.

Transnationality

In 1922, President Álvaro Obregón (1920-1924) censored and banned films originating from the United States that contained derogatory images of Mexicans and, more broadly, Latin

Americans. Although the ban was officially lifted in 1923 with an agreement from the MPPDA

(Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America) to stop producing films with denigrating images, U.S. producers and directors continued to exploit these negative stereotypes. While scholars have examined the racial depictions of Hispanics in U.S. films during the 1920s-1930s, none analyze the role of state-sponsored and its transnational causes.33 The

Dirección General de Gobierno (Directorate General of the Interior, DGG) enforced the ban. By examining these articles, I illustrate what films were targeted and why, showing a conversation between Mexican officials on what depictions were offensive and what ones could be used to portray Mexicans in a better light. This transferred over to the U.S. as film companies saw Mexico as a profitable market and needed to make films that conformed to the censorship regulations that largely dealt with the representation of Latin Americans.

32 Letter from Angel Tejera to head of supervision of cinematography, AGN, Dirección General de Información (DGI), Box 94, Exp. 40, March 1945, 1. 33 Some of these scholarly works include: Juan J. Alonzo, Badmen, Bandits, and Folk Heroes: The Ambivalence of Mexican American Identity in Literature and Film (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009); Melissa A. Johnson, “Pre-Television Stereotypes: Mexicans in U.S. Newsreels, 1919-1932,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 16 (1999): 417-435; Colin Gunckel, Mexico on the Main Street: Transnational Film Culture in before World War II (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015); William Anthony Nericcio, Tex{t}-Mex: Seductive Hallucinations of the “Mexican” in America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); and Myra Mendible, ed., From Bananas to Buttocks: The Latina Body in Popular Film and Culture (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).

15

Mexican censorship was part of a larger transnational conversation about the image of

Hispanics and Latin Americans in international cinema. Mexican officials promoted the idea that

Mexican nationality was a way to connect all Mexicans, no matter where they lived. It also included a Pan-American notion, with themes that could be understood by most Latin Americans.

Ana López argues that while Mexican cinema was culturally insular and portrayed Mexican nationalism, it appealed to audiences throughout Latin America. She discusses how Mexican film became an international industry, with movies being shown all over Latin America. This was not only due to the language, but also because the themes of colonialism, independence, and nationalism appealed to Latin American audiences.34 I build on López ‘s work by illustrating how

Mexico became a fierce participant in the Latin American cinema industry and how Hollywood responded to this competition and influenced how Latin American were to be portrayed on the screen.

In 1936, Mexican officials created the Popular Credit Union division of the Mexican

National Bank to finance the Mexican cinema industry.35 One the motivating factors behind this bankrolling was for producers and directors to export Mexican nationality transnationally through movies and images. Mexican administrators argued that Mexicans regardless of place, class, race, and, sometimes, language, were still Mexicans and could relate to the postrevolutionary imagery.

Along with uniquely Mexican themes, the movies also incorporated a uniting agent across Latin

American audiences. For example, while Allá en el Rancho Grande (1936), a “comedia ”,

34 Ana M. López, “A Cinema for the Continent,” in The Mexican Cinema Project, ed. Chon A. Noriega and Steven Ricci (Los Angeles: UCLA Film and Television Archive, 1994), 7-12. 35 Manuel Gutierrez Rendon of the Mexican Bank to Jose Munoz Cota, head of the Departamento de Bellas Artes (DBA), AGN, SEP, Box 33640, Exp. 35, 23 Jan. 1936, 1.

16 portrayed the folkloric countryside of Mexico, the history and theme of the rural countryside and haciendas was common among Latin American countries. In contrast to the Hollywood movies that used negative and derogatory stereotypes of Latin Americans, Mexican movies stressed the positive aspects of Mexico and Latin America using official censorship (regulations, monetary incentives, etc.)

Gender

Mexican officials used censorship to both negate and create a more positive image of Latin

Americans, including women. However, while combating certain stereotypes like the fiery, sexual

Latina, Mexican movies were grounded in patriarchal ideas of gender roles that kept women below men and in the roles of wife, mother, and caretaker. With the Asamblea de Ciudades (Assembly of Cities) project, Mexican cinema companies exported films and film still to U.S. cities that had a large Spanish-speaking population. While this promoted the idea of Pan-Americanism and a transnational Mexican identity, it also illustrated the image of Mexican women. I use three films from this collection to show how these movies perpetuated gender norms. These movies often upheld traditional gender troupes with “good” women as homemakers and faithful wives and “bad” women as prostitutes who often died at the end of the movie as punishment for their lifestyle choices.36 There also was concern over Mexican women acquiring “an intimate knowledge of the modern” that was associated with the growing consumer culture.37 Modern ideas could threaten

36 The three films I chose were: , Amor Prohibido (1944, Mexico); Chano Urueta, El Signo de la Muerte (1939, Mexico); and Emilio Fernández, Flor Silvestre (1943, Mexico: Films Mundiales). 37 Jacqueline Ávila, “Arcady Boytler: La Mujer del Puerto (1933),” in Clásicos del cine Mexicano: 31 películas emblemáticas desde la Época de Oro hasta el presente, ed. Christian Wehr (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2016), 60.

17 the established gender hierarchy; therefore, Mexican movies often linked the prostitute with the modern, night life of larger cities, like Vera Cruz. For example, in Amor Prohibido (Forbidden

Love, 1944), a movie part of the Asamblea de Ciudades project, illustrated the unfaithful wife,

Lucia, run off with her lover but they both die in a car crash. Her husband, Mario, ends up with his former patient and gentle woman, Isabel. This film, which was sent to audiences outside of

Mexico, reinforced gender norms by celebrating Isabel and punishing Lucia for her bad behavior.

Looking at the lives of Mexican female directors and actress demonstrates the inequalities they faced and how they were forced into certain roles because of the gender hierarchy. For example, the first woman director Adela Sequeyro, had a difficult time obtaining money to finance her films because she was a woman. Although she produced a successful movie from her original , La mujer de nadie (Nobody’s Woman), it took her two years to fund, most of which came out her own pocket. Her second movie, Diablillos de Arrabal (Devils of the Suburbs, 1937), was a failure, again due to lack of funds, and this caused union members to not hire her as a director, stating she could be an assistant, but nothing more.38 In the end, she went bankrupt and sold her ; this left her virtually out of Mexican cinematography history until very recently. My work sheds light onto the lives of these women to showcase their stories and demonstrate how Mexican film, from the screen to behind the scenes, promoted a certain national identity that regulated women to traditional roles.

38 Marcela Fernández Violante, “Mi encuentro con Adela Sequeyro, ‘Perlita’ Pionera del Cine Mexicano,” 1994, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 1994, 22.

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Sources and Organization

I conducted historical archival research in Mexico and the United States. Much of my research took place at the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) and the Cineteca Nacional, in

Mexico City. I also worked at the Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola” in

Guadalajara and the Margaret Herrick Library at the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences in Beverly Hills. At the AGN I collected a series of censorship laws from El Diario Oficial, the official newspaper of the Mexican government bureaucrats that discussed the latest laws and decrees enacted during the months. I also utilized documents from the Instruccíon Publica y Bellas

Artes (Secretary of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, IPBA), which was renamed the Departamento de Bellas Artes (Department of Fine Arts, DBA) in 1917 under the direction of the Secretaría de

Educacíon Pública (Secretary of Public Education, SEP). These departments provide examples of how Mexican officials offered incentives for producers and directors to create films that were positive propaganda for Mexico and its citizens. In addition, these papers illustrate how administrators used movies to educate the public, embedded with postrevolutionary ideology. The

DGIPS and DGI reports show the enforcement side to censorship, describing what films were banned and why, as well as handing out fines to those theaters that disobeyed censorship laws.

Documents from the Margaret Herrick Library shed light on the Mexico’s relationship with

U.S. film companies and Hollywood, especially in the 1930s and 1940s. During this time, U.S. officials needed to create allies in Latin American to help fight the fascists governments in Europe.

However, it was evident that citizens in the U.S. knew very little about their neighbors to the south.

What information U.S. audiences did have was based on negative stereotypes. Therefore, the U.S. government created a department to better relationships with Latin American through film by

19 working with Latin American directors and producers. Mexico became a large market target for the U.S. and many in the Mexican cinema industry benefitted from this relationship. However,

Mexican film began to compete with U.S. movies because Mexican pictures where more culturally sensitive and showcased a brown hero Latin Americans could relate to.

Documents from the Departamento de Trabajo (Department of Labor) at the AGN and the library at Cineteca Nacional () provide an interesting and different perceptive into the Mexican cinema industry. These units contain papers and articles relating to the formation of film and cinema unions within Mexico illustrating how the working people interpreted and enforced censorship laws. These sources allow for historians to see how everyday people interacted with the formation of popular culture in the film industry. The battle within the cinema worker’s union between technical laborers and actors greatly affected the industry. Workers went on strike, practically freezing the Mexican cinema industry for months. Workers argued that there was corruption within the union leadership, causing a call for an entire restructuring of the union.

Laborers also called into question the government’s right to censor their work and demanded protectionist legislation against foreign companies in Hollywood.

In my first chapter, I will discuss, chronologically, the different censorship decrees and laws. In addition, I use newspapers and film magazines to illustrate the debate in the film industry over the idea of mandatory state censorship. The major discussions include examining the legality, benefits, and costs of state-sponsored censorship. However, I argue that the key reason to defend censorship was to protect Mexican audiences from negative images of their government, culture, and language to keep public order. For the government officials to enact censorship, they needed bureaucracies to enforce the laws. My second chapter focuses on the role of government-created

20 departments in the distribution of postrevolutionary Mexican identity through the medium of film.

By highlighting instances of censorship and regulation of movies, this chapter demonstrates the contested nature of Mexican identity in postrevolutionary Mexico in both domestic and foreign settings. While all the agencies functioned in different ways, I argue that they ultimately worked together to further the goal of the Mexican government officials: to legitimize and consolidate their power using film censorship as a tool.

In the 1930s, Mexican cinema increasingly grew in popularity because of the invention of sound. Native Spanish-speaking audiences preferred the Spanish of Mexicans more than the dubbed Hollywood productions. Around the same time, U.S. officials were attempting to create a more positive relationship with Latin America, including Mexico, because of the Good Neighbor

Policy and one way to do so was through films. My third chapter explores the Mexican domestic cinema industry and its relationship to the international film community in the United States and other countries, such as Cuba and Argentina, within Latin America. I argue that the Mexican film industry became a strong, competitive rival to Hollywood films because Mexican pictures were more appealing to Latin American audiences. This caused Hollywood directors and producers to reconsider the portrayal of Hispanics in film. The construction of race is at the heart of this argument: the depiction of Hispanic characters in Hollywood was deplorable, whereas the portrayal of Hispanics in Mexican films demonstrated positive images of all Latin Americans, and further, took into consideration the cultural differences throughout Latin America. Through

Mexican films, Hispanics could reconstruct the depiction of race transnationally.

The fourth chapter examines the relationship between the government, international film companies, and unions. I provide a brief history of the contentious construction of cinema unions,

21 highlighting the major differences between technical workers and actors, which created a volatile point of disagreement culminating in standoff and the use of federal troops to stop the strikes and . While the government had an image it wanted to produce, it did not always go as planned due to union disruptions. Unions also influenced the creation and dissemination of a national identity in film through strikes and contract negotiations. I then look at how the government worked with the unions providing benefits and other favorable working conditions, asserting that unions influenced the film industry and censorship through debates and compromises with government officials.

In the last chapter, I discuss the National Council for Culture and Arts project called the

Assembly of Cities in the 1940s and the image of Mexican women in film. This project consisted of Mexican film companies creating satellite offices in the U.S. and using film stills and images to advertise Mexican movies to audiences where Spanish was the most prevalent language. On the surface, the point is simple: to propagate Mexican film. However, under further investigation, I argue that these films exported a certain portrayal of women within the Mexican national identity.

This chapter provides an example of the construction of Mexican identity, specifically, in regards to gender and how this idea was distributed abroad. I argue that the Mexican government constructed a certain representation of Mexican women to both counter the negative depiction of

Hispanic women in the United States and dictate the roles of women in postrevolutionary Mexico.

However, the problem that officials had was to create a portrayal of women that mutually fit revolutionary ideals and traditional concepts of gender.

This dissertation illustrates how cultural mediums, such as film, are critical and useful sources to understand the contested history of national identity in postrevolutionary Mexico. The

22

Mexican government used censorship as a way to manufacture and control images that the public saw to combat any criticisms. However, political actors were not the only ones involved in this process. Citizens also used government censorship to demand that Mexican officials take action against offensive foreign films. In the end, both Mexican officials and the people challenged the negative stereotypes of Latin Americans through this transnational dialogue.

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Chapter One: How is Censorship Legal and what is the purpose? Conversations about Censorship

Introduction

Victoriano Huerta enacted the first cinema censorship law when he seized power during the Mexican Revolution in March 1913. According to the statute, films could not contain scenes that illustrated “attacks on authorities, other people, morality, good manners, peace and public order, or any depiction of unpunished crimes or misconduct.”39 Huerta enacted the decree with the purpose of suppressing any dissidence during his forced rule.40 The law received backlash from entrepreneurs and business owners who argued that the act violated the as well as protection of the press guaranteed in the Mexican Constitution. An illustration of their frustration took place in July 1913, just a few months after the law was enacted. Officials prohibited a movie at Varledades Theatre (owned by Dr. Ernesto Espinosa Bravo) from being screened because it presumably showed a criminal committing crime with no retribution. In

Puebla, a major town south of Mexico City, several people in the local film industry, including theater owners, businessmen, and producers, gathered at the city council to protest what they considered to be a breach of the Mexican Constitution. They argued that censorship regulations

39 Misha MacLaird, Aesthetics and Politics in the Mexican Film Industry (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 45. 40 Virgilio Anduiza V., Legislación Cinematográfica Mexicana (Mexico City: Filmoteca UNAM, 1984), 16.

24 violated freedom of speech and expression. 41 This dispute in the Puebla City Council sparked a debate on the constitutionality of censorship that eventually made its way to the federal level.

The assertion that state-sponsored film censorship was anti-constitutional began with the creation of the law itself in 1913 by opponents of censorship and continued throughout the 1920s, even as the laws changed. The debate illustrated the negotiation of censorship between the government and the people. Those who challenged censorship cited Articles six and seven of the

Mexican Constitution that guaranteed the and speech. Specifically, Article

Six, “the expression of ideas shall not be subjected to any judicial or administrative investigation,” and Article Seven “Freedom of writing and publishing writing on any subject is inviolable. No authority may establish censorship.”42 Using these two articles as a basis for their reasoning, entrepreneurs and other adversaries claimed that the government violated constitutional rights by enacting censorship on films because the act infringed on the freedom of speech and the press.

Business owners understood that cinema was a different medium from books and newspapers; however, the scripts were conceived and published in writing and should be protected by the

Constitution. Yet, government officials argued the Constitution allowed censorship, citing the second half of Article Six, that stated the expression of thoughts should not be censored unless they “offend good morals, infringe on the rights of others, incite crime, or disturb public order.” 43

The same stipulations also applied to Article 7 and the freedom of published ideas. Administrators

41 “Los empresarios de cinematógrafos protestan contra la previa censura que se ha establecido,” El Imparcial, World Newspaper Archive, 27 July 1913, 1. 42 The Mexican Constitution, 3, Accessed 9 March 2018, https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text- const.pdf. 43 Ibid.

25 contended that films were categorized as thoughts and ideas and they stressed that it was their job to protect the public from scenes and images that could potentially harm them and/or society.

This chapter examines how Mexican authorities defended and implemented film censorship. Even though there was a written law about censorship, administrators needed the support of bureaucracies and the film community to enforce it. Therefore, censorship became a negotiation between the state and the people, specifically with those in the cinema industry.

Primarily, the key discussions include not only the legality of state-sponsored censorship, but also its cultural and financial costs and benefits. I argue that Mexican authorities justified censorship by asserting their duty was to protect Mexican audiences from negative images of their government, culture, and language. I begin this chapter with an assessment of different forms of self-motivated censorship that preceded actual legislation. I explain how self-censorship reflected the political and economic situation in Mexico. Producers and directors from 1900-1910 practiced self-censorship to protect themselves from any backlash from Porfirio Díaz. For example, extensively covered the worker’ strikes in Cananea (1906) and Rio Blanco factory

(1907), no filmmakers documented the strikes. In both strikes, workers’ challenged U.S-owned businesses; however, the strikes were violently put down by U.S. businessmen and Díaz did nothing to help Mexican workers, upholding U.S. interests over Mexico. Producers and directors seemed to purposely avoid events like this that challenged the ruling regime as to not receive negative repercussions from the government. Filmmakers also were cautious of the portrayal of

U.S. businesses and other interferences with Mexican affairs because they relied on raw materials from the U.S. to make movies. The also played a large role in censorship by

26 pressuring citizens to complain about immoral films to the city councils and urged people to boycott any theater that played such movies.

The second section analyzes the deliberations that took place in the Mexican government over the creation of the Office of Censorship. Politicians, business owners, union members, etc., voiced their opinions about the legality of such an office. Opponents claimed the office violated the constitutional right to free speech, while supporters maintained that the government had to censor movies to keep out any negative and false images of Mexico, its culture, people, economy, and political foundations. Because foreign movies posed the greatest threat to Mexican nationalism, from 1913-1930 the government focused on censorings international films (especially those coming from the United States) that contained negative stereotypes of Mexico and of Latin

America more broadly. Mexican movies also were subjected to censorship, but the Mexican film industry was small in the 1920s; therefore, domestic movies were not the major focus of censorship administrators.44 However, officials provided incentives for producers and directors who agreed to conform to the regulations. For example, Mexican films would receive state financing if they showcased positive aspects of Mexico to counteract the negative images. In 1923, the Mexican government reached an agreement with the Mexican Association of Film Producers sponsoring a full-length movie that would illustrate the beauty of Mexico. The film would be divided into three parts: “official Mexico, colonial Mexico, and modern and commercial and industrial Mexico.”45

Official Mexico included the political structure with images of the Palacio Nacional (National

44 Joanna Hershfield, The Invention of Dolores Del Río (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 4. 45 Aurelio de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad en México 1896-1930: Bajo el Cielo de México, vol. 2 of Cine y Sociedad en México 1896-1930 (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1993), 206.

27

Palace), Castle of Chapultepec, and other municipal buildings that served the public. The second section of the film highlighted innovations of the Spanish colonial period like sewage services and parks and showcased the architecture of older hotels and private homes. The movie concluded with modern Mexico and its growing industries, to garner outside investment.46 Mexican cinematographers produced movies that uplifted Mexican culture and heritage.

The final part of this chapter explores the censorship laws created during the growth of the

Mexican film industry in the 1930s-1940s including censorship decrees, tax-breaks, and other acts related to cinematography. With the invention of sound in 1930, Mexican cinema grew tremendously because of the production of Spanish-language films. While Hollywood made

Spanish-language movies, they were not well-received because the Spanish was often misunderstood since the films were created by people who had little knowledge of the Spanish language or Mexican culture. Mexican movies became more popular with Mexican and Latin

American audiences because the quality of Spanish was better than U.S. movies and Mexican were more aware of the difference in Latin America. I assert that the number one priority of administrators was to keep audiences, both domestic and international, from seeing any unfavorable images of Mexico that potentially could harm the work and reputations of politicians and officials. However, unlike the 1920s, officials focused most of their efforts on Mexican movies and its film industry. Bureaucrats used incentives like protectionist legislation and the creation of national prizes to encourage those in the movie business to produce positive propaganda for

Mexico to show to Mexican viewers as well as those abroad. The major objectives of government

46 Ibid.

28 censorship, to officials, were to keep out negative images about the regime to maintain law and order in Mexico, as well as provide a modern illustration for international powers to recognize

Mexico as a growing country and business interest. Administrators could do this by creating censorship alliances with Spain and other Latin American countries, along with building a stronger

Department of Censorship with specific laws and regulations. Mexican officials also policed the way certain historical events, like the Mexican Revolution and the Cristero Rebellion, could be portrayed in movies, making sure the negative aspects were kept to a minimum. Overall, I argue that the purpose of Mexican government censorship was to push Mexican filmmakers to create a positive, idealistic image of Mexico, inviting very little critique. Censorship also forced international producers in the United States to reevaluate how Latino/as were portrayed because of the bans placed on certain movies described as denigrating.

Brief History of Mexican Film Censorship up to 1913

There is evidence that, before official censorship, cinematographers in Mexico practiced a kind of self-censorship. Mexican historian Aurelio de los Reyes used both the Cananea strike of

June 1906 and the Rio Blanco textile conflict from December 1906 to January 1907 to illustrate how those filming edited for a particular audience.47 In the first event, Mexican workers went on strike at the copper mines in of Cananea by “sabotaging” mine production and challenging “some of the most powerful capitalist in the world” who were from the United States.48

47 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:58. 48 John M. Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War (Berkley: University of Press, 2002), 148.

29

However, Americans crossed the border into Mexico and violently put down the strike. This enraged Mexican journalists and citizens because Porfirio Díaz did little to help the Mexican people; therefore, upholding U.S. intervention and providing no protection for Mexican workers.49

While editors and commentators covered this story extensively in Mexican newspapers, cameramen and producers did not document the strike to the same extent. Other occurrences at the time were filmed, like the “Guanajunto flood or the Metlac rail accident” but not the strike at

Cananea. De los Reyes argues that the lack of cameras here was because it took place so close to

United States’ territory and it effected U.S. companies. Many of those in the film industry within

Mexico relied on the U.S. for materials and most likely feared that a negative portrayal of the U.S. may cause a reduction in those resources.50

The second event was the textile factory strikes in the city of Rio de Blanco. In December of 1906, workers went on strike virtually paralyzing the textile business in Rio de Blanco.51 The strike came to a violent ending in June of 1907 causing the deaths of many Mexican workers.

Again, the press covered this event; however, filmmakers “ignored the tragedy,” mostly likely because both incidents demonstrated the problems with the Díaz regime supporting U.S. businesses over Mexican citizens and the movie producers could possibly face major consequences for documenting these events.52 The strikes were covered in newspapers; yet, only the literate were able to receive and understand this information, leaving a large portion of Mexicans in the dark about these issues. A film could reach a much larger audience and more people would know about

49 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:58. 50 Ibid. 51 Francie R. Chassen de López, From Liberal to Revolutionary Oaxaca: The View from the South- Mexico, 1867- 1991 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 272. 52 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:58.

30 the strikes and, possibly, could turn against the government headed by Díaz. De los Reyes reasons that cameramen and producers used a form of self-censorship deciding not to cover any events that clashed with state economic and political policies.53

The Catholic Church also was, unofficially, involved in film censorship at the same time.

Catholic citizens and the clergy came together in Mexico and called on officials to censor any movies that contained immoral images. For example, in 1903 Catholic residents in were upset over the film La vie et la passion de Jésus Christ (The Life and Passion of Jesus Christ,

1903) because of an appearance of Jesus in his underwear.54 Many people, including civil authorities, encouraged a boycott of any theater that showed these types of movies. Occasionally, officials would close halls that displayed any such picture, unofficially practicing censorship.

However, by 1913 censorship became formal under . Huerta enacted the first censorship decree in 1913 targeting the image of criminals and consequences of crime. This law banned scenes portraying “insults to buenas [moral conventions], peace, and public order,” which meant that lawbreakers and delinquents had to be punished justly, showing that law and order ruled.55 The censorship act also prohibited films which “insulted any religion”, illustrating the Catholic Church’s influence on censorship in Mexico.56 The censorship act itself reflected aspects of self-censorship. Producers and directors in Mexico purposely avoided subjects that may be taboo or clash with the ruling regime. Huerta’s law echoed this concern by making it

53 Ibid., 59. 54 Francisco Peredo Castro, “Catholicism and Mexican Cinema: A Secular State, a Deeply Conservative Society, and a Powerful Catholic Hierarchy,” in Moralizing Cinema: Film, Catholicism, and Power, ed. Daniel Biltereyst and Daniela Treveri Gennari (New York: Routledge, 2015), 66. 55 Laura Isabel Serna, Making Cinelandia: American Films and Mexican Film Culture Before the Golden Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 163. 56 Peredo Castro, “Catholicism and Mexican Cinema,” 68.

31 illegal to show criminals getting away with their crimes. Characters in the movies had to be punished for any transgressions and this included any infractions against Huerta. In addition, the decree also stated that subtitles needed to be written in “correct Spanish’” and any film that did not have a translation would be banned, making sure that all movies entering Mexico could be understood by the audiences.57

While the legality of censorship was in question under Huerta, the process of censoring a movie also was a problem because it was long and costly for theaters, as shown in an article from

El Imparcial, a popular Mexico City newspaper. The owners were “forced” to attend hearings where they would show the pictures to an inspector.58 The inspector would then decide, of his own volitions, as to whether the movies where “immoral or inconvenient,” using the decree by Huerta.

However, there was a problem: the terms within the law were not clearly defined, and it would be left to the inspector to determine. Huerta’s decree did not include a formal process of how censorship was to be enacted. Therefore, many owners argued that this law was unfair because there were no clear guidelines as to what should be censored. More broadly, they argued that the law was unconstitutional for violating the guaranteed freedom of speech for published works. Yet,

Mexican officials claimed that the Constitution did not directly discuss film as an art form because cinema was not invented when the document was written, leaving movies open to censorship.59

Because the Constitution lacked clarity over the censorship of cinema, it led for advocates of both sides - for and against censorship - to discuss the merits of state-sanctioned censorship. In this next

57 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 16. 58 “No Quieren la Previa Censura,” El Imparcial, World Newspaper Archive, 27 July 1913, 4. 59 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:16.

32 section, I examine the conversations about censorship that producers and directors had with one another in major newspapers and film magazine articles illustrating the opinions of people directly affected by state intervention and their views and tactics to deal with it. I also discuss how officials justified censorship using examples of foreign movies that denigrated Mexico.

Prominent Debates within the Cinematic Community: 1913-1930

During 1913-1917, Mexican filmmakers capitalized on the Mexican Revolution by documenting and recreating battles for the public to see on the movie screen. However, from

March 1913-July 1914 (when Huerta was forced out) the pictures had to abide by Huerta’s censorship law. One of the first movies subjected to censorship was Sangre Hermana (Blood

Brothers, 1914), illustrating the violent battles in Morelos under Zapata. Because the producers needed to please the censors, the film was described as a spectacle where “the public could see the horrors of Zapatismo.”60 Zapata vehemently opposed Huerta and actively fought against Huerta.

Therefore, Zapata was an enemy of the government and had to be portrayed that way for the censors to pass the film. Yet the movie was quite sympathetic to Zapata’s revolutionary cause.61

Despite the censorship laws, films advocating for the overthrow of Huerta and support of Zapata and Villa were made because Mexico was in a state of chaos and it became difficult for Huerta or any of the other officials to fully enforce the law. From 1914-1917, the Mexican nation went into the most violent phase of the Revolution and censorship of film was a low priority of government

60 Ibid., 17. 61 Ibid.

33 officials. Nevertheless, with the end of the war in 1917, officials began to implement censorship regulations, triggering the older debate over the legality of state-sanctioned censorship.

By 1918, administrators in the federal legislator as well as local bureaucrats attempted to re-instate censorship regulations; however, the debate over the legality of the law resurfaced .In a

1918 interview, a Mexican lawyer argued that it was illegal to censor movies because films were

“thoughts” and could not be policed by the state.62 The lawyer used Article 6 of the Mexican

Constitution to affirm his argument. He described that the article stated, “the manifestation of ideas shall not be subjected to any judicial or administrative and movies are the author’s ideas that compose or arrange an argument.”63 Basically, the lawyer argued that movies were protected under Article 6 because they were considered thoughts of the writer, director, producer, etc. The lawyer then used Article 7 of the Constitution which directly stated that the press could not be censored. The lawyer asserted that cinema should be consider part of the press, explaining how pictures were ultimately the thoughts of writers just as articles in the newspaper. Along with the constitutional argument, the lawyer also discussed the senselessness within the 1913

Censorship Decree. In the law, films could not show villains and thieves succeeding; however, the lawyer claimed that he had, personally, never seen a film where the “bad guy triumphs” or “where the crime or offense committed has gone unpunished.”64 The lawyer reasoned that this type of censorship was unwarranted as no film portrayed villains as heroes. For these objections, censorship was unnecessary and unconstitutional. Therefore, the law should be abolished.

62 “La Censura Previa para películas: Se Juzga anticonstitucional porque las ‘films’ son una manifestación del pensamiento,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 24 July 1918, 1 and 4. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., 4.

34

Despite the anti-constitutional accusations by those in the cinema industry, in 1919

President created a new censorship act (like Huerta’s 1913 decree) stating: scenes were forbidden which showed criminals getting away with crimes and any other images that violated public moral and decency.65 Unlike Huerta, Carranza created the Council of

Censorship to facilitate the enactment of this law. The Council included a president, vice president, and secretary that worked collectively as the Office of Censorship and reported to the Ministry of the Interior.66 The Office had two major responsibilities. In the first capacity, the office would act as a censorship agent for all films imported into Mexico and those exported abroad.67 The second task consisted of the office being a “laboratory” for filmmakers. This included registering the rights of original films and providing permission for “institutions” to exhibit movies in Mexico City.

This was done with the intent of “. . . showing the state of culture of Mexico, its natural resources, and the procedures of using them by promoting the development of wealth, culture and morality.”68

The purpose of the laboratory was to endorse movies which contained a positive message of

Mexico and restrict any that did not. The censors in this office used nationalism and morality “as a lens through which to supervise the films,” focusing on images of the Mexican government and symbols of the Revolution.69 The censors worked and were paid for a minimum of two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, but could have up to eight hours, if needed.70 Anything

65 Anduiza V., Legislación cinematográfica, 17. 66 Ibid. 67 “Poder Ejecutivo, Secretaria de Gobernacion,” Diario Oficial, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Diario Oficial Sept.-Oct. 1919, 2 Oct. 1919, 471. Diario Oficial or the Official Gazette of the Federation is the official publication of laws, agreements, circulars, and any other acts issued by the Federation of Mexico. http://dof.gob.mx/historia.php 68 Ibid. 69 Peredo Castro, “Catholicism and Mexican Cinema,” 69. 70 Ibid.

35 over this limit would be an additional cost to the movie houses. Once the censors granted clearance for a film, the movie acquired a stamp of approval and the institution paid whatever costs were due and they would be provided with a receipt as proof of payment. Both the stamp and receipt were needed to verify that the movie was legal to show in theaters.

The Office of Censorship would be an additional expense to the federal government, and officials in the legislator argued over whether the federal government legally could fund it. In

December of 1919, two months after Carranza’s decree, there was an important debate within the budget committee over the cost of the Office of Censorship. The committee began to finalize the federal spending plan for next year which included the office; however, some officials asserted that because censorship was unconstitutional the federal government could not, legally, fund such an office.71 Secretary of the Interior, Aguirre Berlanga, a proponent of censorship, argued that censorship was legal, stating the Executive Branch used a special law to create the Office of

Censorship and this was all in accordance with the Constitution. Therefore, the budget committee had no standing to “suppress” the Office of Censorship.72

Dr. Siurob, a member of the budget committee, argued tenaciously that censorship was unconstitutional and contended that the office should not be funded. Under Article 14, the

Secretary of State must approve an Executive Order and this was not done for the Office of

Censorship. Dr. Siurob cited, like many others previously, Article 6 and 7 of the Mexican

Constitution, asserting that that these articles prohibited censorship of “the press and ideas”, which

71 “La Comisión de Presupuestos se opone a la censura cinematográfica y a los gastos secretos de la Secretaría de Gobernación,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 6 Dec. 1919, 10. 72 Ibid.

36

Siurob argued, should include films.73 Dr. Siurob threatened to use his power in the budget committee to suppress the Office of Censorship by not providing funds. Berlanga countered Dr.

Siuro’s argument by stating that Article 7 only pertained to the written word, such as press and literary works, not films. And article 6 did allow for censorship to keep order and defend the country’s image for the benefit of the citizens. Berlanga provided proof for his claim by reporting that the Mexican Office of Foreign Relations obtained several feet of film from the United States about Mexico, and in these movies, U.S. directors portrayed Mexico as “the country where trees do not bear fruit, where flowers have no perfume, where women have no virtue, and where men have no honor.”74 He stressed that Mexico needed censorship to protect Mexican citizens and the government from being defamed by the U.S. cinema industry. In the end, the budget committee and Ministry of Finance found the argument for censorship to be much more compelling. Officials stated that the Office of Censorship served to eradicate slander against the Mexican government and maintain peace and order, which was essential. This important debate illustrates the varying opinions of state-sponsored censorship and its connection to the image of Mexico. Ultimately censorship won out because it was vital for the Mexican government to safe guard its own image than the freedom of expression and speech in film.

With the Office of Censorship firmly in place by 1920, the next problem that opponents of state-sponsored censorship challenged was the costs to film house owners and cinematographers.

According to the law, Mexican business owners who presented domestic films for review had to pay a tax of 1.75 pesos per three hundred meters, while those submitted for export out of Mexico

73 Ibid. 74 Ibid.

37 paid 2 pesos for every three hundred meters.75 These taxes upset many business owners who vocalized that it was unfair to make them pay for a service that they did ask for in the first place.

The Union of Renters, a union for cinematographers who rented films to theaters, salons, etc., decided to boycott the censorship costs by making a pact to not rent out any movie that was being inspected by the censorship board. Union leaders stated that anyone in the union who violated this agreement would be fined up to 10,000 pesos. This protest disrupted the cinema industry in

Mexico, so officials wanted to settle the matter and asked the union for their demands. The Union sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior maintaining that the renters would oblige state-sponsored censorship if it did not cost the renters any money.76 The Union would agree to lift the ban and work with the government if there was no cost to them. However, Aguirre Berlanga, the Secretary of the Interior, responded negatively to this demand. Berlanga argued that it was the government’s obligation to prohibit the showing of immoral and/or denigrating films because the pictures

“brought evil to our country and the government has the duty to prevent this at all cost.”77

Enrique Orozco, a leader within the renter’s union, disagreed vehemently with Berlanga and the censorship of film, in general. Orozco reasoned that while there were rules and regulations for moving people and products, they could not extend to ideas.78 Orozco sent a letter to Berlanga outlining his explanations for why the censorship of film was illegal. Orozco first stated that movies were a product of thought and could not be censored. Again, Article 6 and Article 7 of the

Constitution were cited, with Orozco asserting films were expression of ideas and deserved the

75 “Poder Ejecutivo: Secretaria de Gobernacion,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: April 1920, 8 April 1920, 1. 76 Ibid., 4. 77 Ibid. 78 “Es Inconstitucional la Censura Cinematográfica,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 31 Jan. 1920, 4.

38 same protection as the press and other print works. He contended that the only difference between literature and cinema was the medium of expression, but that did not make movies vulnerable to censorship.79 Second, the Executive Branch had no power to enforce censorship as cited in Article

89. The Congress of the Union needed to approve such laws and departments; however, in the case of the Office of Censorship, the executive branch did not receive approval before the creation of the office. Third, Orozco analyzed that censorship could not be enacted because under Article 60, stating, “. . . censorship regulations of works of intelligence in the literary artistic dramatic order

– which includes all cinematography- cannot be censored.”80 Orozco emphasized that if officials could circumvent this part of the Constitution by enforcing illegal censorship on film then the government could not guarantee any Constitutional protection.

Not only were film owners upset over the cost of censorship, they also were frustrated with the entire process, claiming it was very slow. For example, a group of salon owners, all men, gathered in Mexico City to see the governor to complain that the women in charge of viewing the films at the Office of Censorship left their positions early but reported to their supervisor that they were indeed working the hours assigned to them.81 The fact that women oversaw this censorship is remarkable to note. While the source does not state why women were chosen, in examining scholarly works about women’s morality one can suggest that the Mexican officials selected women because women would make ethical and honest decisions on what parts of film should be cut to save the public from viewing anything depraved or corrupt.82 The theater owners asserted

79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 “La Censura de Películas,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 13 May 1920, 9. 82 While no one source has stated that middle and upper class women were chosen because of their morality, I have come to this conclusion reading the literature on women and gender in Latin America. Please see Susie S. Porter,

39 that these women were costing them money due to the delay. Each day the men had to wait for the women to censor the film was another day they could not show the movie. The owners protested to the governor that this type of censorship was useless, arguing that the women were ineffective and “interrupted” the process.83 Many owners also explained that women were incapable of properly censoring films, declaring that censorship was “in the hands of a few young ladies who neither understand movies and are unable to discern the topic of the tapes that might offend our country. . .” and that “we believe ladies are not the most appropriate judges because it is just too demanding.”84 Owners argued the women were unqualified to work at the Office of Censorship because they made mistakes and did not understand what needed to be censored. They provided an example with the U.S.-made film El Ojo del Toro (The Eye of the Bull, 1918). This movie portrayed Mexican bandits crossing the border, taking a woman hostage, and then forcing a

Catholic priest to marry the woman to one of her captives.85 It was degrading to the Mexican nation, the men asserted, and certain parts of the movie were cut before Mexican audiences could view it. However, two owners received copies of the film and one was completely uncensored.

That owner was fined for it even though he was not responsible for the censoring. Business owners were forced to pay for the mistakes of a government office, and they demanded that this be fixed.

In addition to paying once for the censorship, if the films needed to be re-done or revisited for any

Working Women in Mexico City: Public Discourses and Material Conditions, 1879-1931. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003, which examines women’s morality in working-class Mexico. Sueann Caufield, Sarah C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam eds., Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, which analyzes gender and cultural influence on legal issues, discussing the morality of women, and Sueann Caufield, In defense of honor: sexual morality, modernity, and nation in early-twentieth century Brazil. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000 also examines morality and women. 83 “La Censura de Películas,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 13 May 1920, 9. 84 “Fueron Aprehendidos varios dueños de cinematógrafo,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 5 July 1920, 6. 85 Ibid.

40 reason, the business owner had to pay a second fee. In 1926, the cost was 5 pesos per 300-meter roll and the second revision cost about 1 peso per 300-meter roll.86 The owner/renter had to pay the dues in full whether the censors cut scenes or not.

The complaints over the costs of censorship illustrated the difficult and unnecessary expenses of the process for entrepreneurs interested in the movie industry. Due to these financial problems, those working in Mexican cinema feared that business owners would refuse to participate, leaving the Mexican movie production to decline. The Business Cinemas Municipality, a group that represented the needs and interests of Mexican several film houses and theaters, claimed that “Municipal Censorship Would be Fatal for the Cinema.”87 The main issue was the cost per meter of film for censorship that renters and salon owners had to pay. In a newspaper interview, a film renter asserted that theaters soon would not be able to show movies because the cost was too burdensome, at least 3 to 4 times the original price. The Municipality explained that

“Sixteen rolls of film are needed to form a program for the theater and it should cost around 40 pesos, yet the Censorship Council charged 540 pesos per roll, over ten times more than the producers have to pay for the same program.”88 The charge for censorship was outrageous to the renters and they pushed for a resolution. In fact, the Municipality reasoned that state- sponsored censorship was unnecessary because the renter/business owner/producers knew the tastes of the audience and would be able to censor accordingly.

86 “Poder Ejecutivo Federal,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Enero 1929, 29 Jan. 1929, 1. 87 “La Censura Municipal Sería Fatal Para el Cinematófo,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 26, Sept. 1922, 5. 88 Ibid.

41

While film owners argued that they could censor their own films and criticized that the government should protect the freedom of expression for cinematographers, officials like Berlanga asserted that the government’s role in shielding Mexican audiences from immoral movies was of higher priority than protecting freedom of expression. A member of the Board of Education

(unnamed) wrote an editorial stressing why censorship was necessary, especially to protect women and children. The author engaged with the idea of freedom of the press; however, the they argued that “. . . visual images are more powerful than any other form of media and it has despotic power over youthful imaginations. Nothing I read in books comes to worry me to such a degree.”89

Movies were more influential on a child’s mind, the author emphasized, and children were unable to understand and tell the difference between truth and fiction. In the 1920s, movies were silent and accompanied by subtitles; however, not all children could read and only saw the images, which could be dangerous if children picked up immoral ideas from these illustrations alone. The author also declared that films could have a detrimental effect on women as well. In the movies, women saw actresses leading full lives, dancing proactively, falling for “don Juans,” etc., leaving women to seek out this type of immoral life.90 Therefore, the state needed to intervene and censor the films for the sake of the women and children.

Besides removing negative depictions, officials also utilized censorship in the 1920s to showcase the “social progress” of Mexico after the Revolution. Producers and filmmakers did this by creating movies about Mexico’s social elite. Two examples were Hasta después de la muerte

(Till death do us part, 1920) and El escándalo (The Scandal, 1920). The first film followed the

89 “Nueva York Múltiple,” Excelsior, World Newspaper Archive, 28 Oct. 1921, 3. 90 Ibid.

42 adventures of Clara, a young woman who was heir to a great fortune. She fell in love with Ramón, who was a free-spirited Bohemian, but another man, Federico, attempted to steal Clara to get to the inheritance. The movie was rife with drama, including Ramón finding out he was illegitimate.

The movie ended with Federico going to prison and Clara marrying Ramón. One of the highlights of the picture which illustrated “social progress” were the lavish parties held at Clara’s mansion in one of Mexico City’s wealthier area of Colonial Roma. The plot of El escándalo was similar with a socialite woman having a scandalous relationship with an artist while engaged to a wealthy young man, also named Federico.91 Both pictures “show the world that in Mexico there were not only broken and broad-brimmed men who shot bullets.”92 Elites and Mexican officials argued that, because of the Revolution and violent figures like Pancho Villa, audiences abroad saw all

Mexicans as violent and poor. Illustrating stories of the elite and their beautiful lifestyle, would show that Mexico had an elegant and distinguished culture. However, some Mexican officials, filmmakers, and producers condemned this view, claiming that these movies were an attempt to

“Europeanize” and “Americanize” Mexican culture. One critic claimed about El escándalo, “We sincerely regret that this film, because of the environment in which it takes place, does not have anything Mexican, except the streets of the post office. We need to Mexicanize.”93 These types of movies praised the elite, which, according to the author, was not a part of Mexican nationalism.

91 José María Sánchez García, “Historia del cine Mexicano,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter Collection, 24 Jan. 1953, 111. 92 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:226. 93 “Atavismo,” Revista de Revistas, World Newspaper Archives, 13 Jan. 1924.

43

Filmmakers needed to embrace post-Revolutionary culture which praised the working-class and the .94

Mexican screen writers used the backdrop of the Mexican Revolution to create Western pictures, spotlighting the “charro.” A charro was/is a Mexican rancher, typically dressed in traditional attire a broad-brimmed hat, and “is a rough, noble, and exotic male who pridefully commands the animals and men around him.”95 In the Western films of the United States, Mexican were the bad guys, portrayed as bandits who kidnapped women and stole from innocent civilians.

However, in the Mexican versions, were shown as heroes defending their land and country.

In 1921, Guillermo Calles and Miguel Conteras Torres produced De raza Azteca (Of Aztec Race), and Epifanio Soto Jr., Mexican film critic and , cited it as great example of a western/charro movie by.96 Calles, known as Mexico’s first indigenous filmmaker, was a nationalist who vocally criticized Hollywood for the “racist images of Mexicans and Native

Americans.”97 His movie illustrated the adventures of a man who was a descendent of Aztec warriors and Calles described it as a nationalist movie. However, one critic exclaimed that the only few images that made the movie “Mexican” were the charro hat the hero wore and that the hero fought of a band of thieves “dressed as Texan cowboys”, making the hero the only “decent” person in the entire picture.98 Despite Calles’ attempt to produce a pro-Mexican western, it was difficult

94 Sergio de la Mora, Cinemachismo: Masculinities and Sexuality in Mexican Film (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 83. 95 Christopher Conway, “Charros: A Critical Introduction,” in Modern Mexico Culture: Critical Foundations, edited by Stuart A. Day (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2017), 68. 96 Epifanio Soto Jr., “Cronica de Mejico,” Cine Mundial, World Newspaper Archive, April 1922, 204. 97 Jan-Christopher Horak, “Guillermo Calles, Mexico’s First Indigenous Filmmaker,” UCLA Film & Television Archive, 7 July 2017, https://www.cinema.ucla.edu/blogs/archival-spaces/2017/07/07/guillermo-calles-mexicos- first-indigenous-filmmaker, accessed 11 Nov. 2017. 98 Rogelio Agrasánchez, Guillermo Calles: A Biography of the and Cinema Pioneer (Jefferson: McFarland and Co., 2010), 36.

44 among the reality that thieves and bandits were present in Mexico and along the border. Aurelio de Reyes argues, “This aspect of reality, painful as it was and bothered Mexicans to see it in the mirror of American cinema, filtered through the movies.”99 Unfortunately, this violence was a real problem that the Mexican officials needed to solve.

The Mexican government pushed for the creation of pro-Mexican films with monetary incentives to eradicate negative images and promote economic and social growth,. Movies that provided a positive view of Mexico would be financed by the federal treasury. Mexicans abroad, especially in the United States, sought out ways to participate in the pro-Mexican propaganda as well. Mexican artist and sculptor, Francisco Cornejo, who lived in San Francisco, was a major figure in bringing Mexican culture to the United States. He specialized in Aztec and Mayan themes and created a “social center” not just for Mexicans in the U.S. but also other intellectuals from

U.S. and European universities.100 Because of the success of Cornejo’s endeavors, in 1922 a group of Mexican artists and actors, led by actor Romualdo Tirado, raised enough funds to build a small movie production studio to film a picture entitled From Mexico to Los Angeles. The movie documented Mexican culture, including archeology, art, and traditions from different regions in

Mexico and the effects of Mexican culture on Mexicans in Los Angeles.

Producers and directors used the idea of propagating Mexican nationalism as a form of self-censorship and to increase their chances of funding from the government. However, many intellectual and religious groups, like the Unión de Damas Católicas (Union of Catholic Ladies), lobbied for more censorship regulations besides the federal Office of Censorship. These

99 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad en México, 2:237. 100 Ibid., 207.

45 organizations argued that movies continued to be produced and shown that upset “public” morale and they called for the creation of more rigid censorship procedures.101 Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, head of the Sección de diversiones públicas (Section of Public Diversions), sent a proposal to

Miguel Alonzo Romero, municipal City, detailing a different censorship process including a department made up of inspectors and projectionists who would be paid from the revenue that the state charged film companies to have to their movies revised. Lerdo de Tejada explained “only films that, in the opinion of the supervisors, are suitable for public morals and for the nation, will be shown,” which would weed out any negative press.102 Filmmakers, producers, and even editors at popular newspapers like Excelsior and El Universal, protested vehemently against Alonzo Romero’s agreement with Lerdo de Tejada to escalate censorship measures.

Alonzo Romero was surprised with the backlash asserting that other countries like the U.S. had enacted similar censorship measures to ensure morale and public order.

Administrators intended to secure national confidence by censoring destructive images from foreign films, specifically from Hollywood. These movies often showed Mexico and

Mexicans in a negative light. Because of U.S. movies continued to vilify Mexicans, officials declared a ban of all U.S.-made movies in early 1922. Even though Obregón lifted the film boycott in July of 1922, several complaints came in from both the Mexican press and public over denigrating films. In 1923, the Mexican consul in New York received a detailed grievance from a

Mexican viewer, most likely a diplomat, about Harold Lloyd’s film Why Worry? (1923). The movie depicted Lloyd as a wealthy aristocrat who took a “rest cure” in a country within Latin

101 Ibid., 221. 102 Ibid.

46

America.103 While the location of the movie was set in the Republic of Paradise (fictional country), the audience member asserted that the movie clearly referenced Mexico with “the ubiquitous presence of a tricolor flag (complete with the national symbol of an eagle devouring a serpent), adobe buildings, and the sombrero, headwear associated worldwide with Mexico.”104 In the letter, the viewer alleged that “the film portrayed Mexico. . . as a country ‘composed exclusively of poor peons of the lowest order.’”105 The consulate used this as evidence to counteract the claim of Lloyd and his lawyers that this movie was set in an imagined placed. The film caused controversy throughout the Mexican consuls in the United States and finally reached Manuel Téllez, the

Mexican ambassador to the United States. Téllez discussed this issue with Lloyd’s lawyers, asking that the movie be withdrawn from the market. The lawyers refused, stating that it was a comedy movie being taken too seriously. This culminated with Téllez reiterating the U.S.’s history of displaying negative imagery of Latino/as, describing that he had “a list of hundreds of pictures produced during the past twelve years in which the Mexican people [had] been so unjustly or maliciously depicted,” and he was happy to send this along.106 This was one of many examples that the Mexican government used to justify bans on U.S. movies that were vilifying.

Another instance was the film La Paloma (The Dove, 1927) illustrated in a telegram to

Genaro Estrada (Mexican statesman and writer), Alfonso Reyes (Mexican diplomat and writer).

Reyes described the film as “denigrating film propaganda” as it displayed Mexicans as backward

103 John Bengston and Kevin Brownlow, Silent Visions: Discovering Early Hollywood and New York Through the Films of Harry Lloyd (Chicago: Santa Monica Press, 2011), 61. 104 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 155. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.

47 and barbaric, discrediting Mexico.107 The Mexico City newspaper El Universal also discussed this film, claiming it was made as an attack against Mexico by the U.S. oil companies as tensions between Mexico and the U.S. were high due to the conflicts over oil production within Mexico.108

However, the Mexican government had no response to this film and did nothing to stop it from being shown throughout the country. Despite the lack of response from the central government,

“some consuls abroad and municipalities of Mexico managed by their own prohibition of several films in their respective jurisdictions, or they complained to the Secretary of Foreign Relations without obtaining answer.” 109 This illustrated that people outside the federal authorities in Mexico were vital to the censorship process and saw it as their responsibilities to rid the film market of movies that were denigrating to Mexicans and Latin Americans abroad. In reaction to this problem in the United States, the Mexican central government rearranged the structure of the censorship process. The city council of each municipality would be responsible for the “moral and political in relation to the problems of the country.”110 Their decisions would be passed onto the Ministry of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, where administrators would then deal with the films judged demeaning to the country and take the necessary actions to rid Mexico of these types of movies.

Finally, the central government, through the Office of Censorship, would enact and enforce the bans.

The City Council in Mexico City capitalized on the intensified censorship process with the ban of U.S. films in 1922-23 and demanded that all movies in Mexico, including those reviewed

107 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 3:370. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid.

48 by the federal Office of Censorship, be reevaluated by the regional offices. For example, the silent film Santa had to go through several inspections even though the author of the novel, Federico

Gamboa, was the head of the Consejo Cultural y Artístico de la Ciudad de México (Cultural and

Artistic Council of Mexico City).111 Despite backlash from the cinema industry, President Obregón praised the City Council’s efforts to keep negative images of Mexico out of theaters. During 1923 and 1924, the City Council developed the main criteria for censorship using ideas of “nationalism and moralism.”112 However, the Council was not only concerned about Mexico’s reputation, but also with the safety and control of the Mexican population. For instances, the Council banned a movie “because in one of its scenes, the blasting of a house by the dynamite was seen" and censors did not want the audience to have knowledge of using dynamite in fear this could lead to destruction of property within the city.113 While censors and officials worked on the domestic cinema industry, they continually focused on foreign movies intensely because there were few

Mexican films made until the innovation of sound.

1930-1945: Emergence and Growth of the Domestic Film Industry and Changes in

Censorship

The film industry transformed in Mexico with the invention of sound largely due to

Mexican filmmakers producing movies in Spanish for both domestic and international Spanish- speaking audiences. With the growth of the cinema industry came new ideas about censorship and

111 los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:224. 112 Ibid., 225. 113 Ibid., 224.

49 how to implement it among the changes taking place. Mexican director Juan J. Moreno asserted in his article “Cinelandicas” that censorship was constantly evolving with reconstruction of social norms. He stated,

. . . censorship rules change over time and what ten or twenty years earlier had made a woman blush, today, for, many adults of both sexes, and adolescents of this age, seems to have no important baring. They add that our grandparents would twist their necks to glimpse a modeling good ankle in the era of long skirts and dresses, but modern youth barely bother to give an indifferent glance at the bare forms on the beaches that are displayed in bulk, or the contours of the female costumes shown today with a clarity that leaves no doubt.114

Moreno reasoned that because social norms were constantly fluctuating, censorship became difficult to enforce. What may have seemed indecent in the 1910s and 1920s, like women showing their ankles, was no longer as shocking and immoral. This section explores how censorship laws were transformed in response to the social changes and the growing industry. Here I argue that due to a lack of positive representations of Latin America in Hollywood sound films and the opportunity to make money, the Mexican state decided to sponsor the production of movies.

However, officials used censorship by limiting what topics producers could discuss and how. To receive funding, movies had to fit into a certain idealized image of Mexico and its people.

The introduction of sound revolutionized how audiences experienced movies. Instead of hearing only music accompanied by words on the screen to read, viewers could see and hear the actors talking to one another allowing for those who were illiterate to enjoy the film in its entirety.

Most of the first talking films in the Americas were produced in English, which Mexican audiences could not understand because of the language barrier. Hollywood also made films in Spanish;

114 Juan J. Moreno, “Cinelandics,” Cinelandia, World Newspaper Archives, 1 Nov. 1931, 7.

50 however, they were inadequate because the actors spoke a variety of Spanish dialects and it did not sound natural to people whose first language was Spanish.115 In order to appeal to both

Mexican viewers and help increase the consumption of Mexican films, the Mexican Department of Finance and Credit modified the existing tax law on movies to state that all imported films needed to be in Spanish, whether subtitled or dubbed.116 If the movies arrived in any language other than Spanish, the company was charged an extra 5 pesos per roll of film to have the laboratory at the Office of Censorship provide a translation, usually in subtitles. If the movie was submitted in Spanish, the company or individual needed a certificate from their own country as well as one from the Mexican Consul certifying that it was in Spanish.117 This measure insured that only Spanish movies would be shown to Mexican audiences, thus allowing for Mexican filmmakers and producers to have an advantage.

Other Spanish-speaking countries were also dissatisfied with Hollywood films, both for the lack of sensitivity to Latin American cultures and disappointing Spanish translations and sought an alternative. With the production of Santa (Saint, 1932, the first Mexican sound movie),

Mexican cinema started to become popular among other Spanish-speaking nations and, together, these nations wanted to provide protection for one another against Hollywood’s misrepresentations of Latin America. In 1932, the Hispanic-American Cinematography Council met in Madrid, Spain to discuss the protection of Hispanic culture. The Council decided to create the Cinematography

Teaching Institute in Mexico City, where people in Spanish-speaking countries who were part of

115 Eduardo de la Vega Alfaro, “Origins, Development and Crisis of the Sound Cinema (1929-64),” in Mexican Cinema ed. Paulo Antonio Paranagua, trans. Ana M. López (London: British Film Institute, 1995), 79. 116 “Poder Ejecutivo: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Público,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Abril 1932, 21 April 1932, 1. 117 Ibid.

51 the film industry could learn techniques and other parts of filmmaking to compete with Hollywood and European movies.118 In addition, the Council stated it would use various censorship measures on foreign films, such as those coming from Hollywood to protect the Spanish-speaking cinema industry. Mexican representatives joined the Council to promote Spanish-language cinema. The

Council also encouraged the countries to work together to keep the language alive and portray a variety of cultural aspects within Latin America and Spain to counter the images that Hispanics were one homogenous group. The Council worked to provide Spanish-speaking audiences with culturally sensitive and relevant material to enjoy.119

To further this goal, in 1933, Mexico entered an agreement with Spain to ban any films that: “. . .attack, slander, defame, offend, or disfigure, directly or indirectly, the customs, institutions, habits, characteristics, or peculiarities of Mexico or Spain.”120 The purpose of this pact was to defend the Mexican film industry’s interests and audiences from negative images of

Latino/as. Another part of the enforced a limit on foreign filmmakers and producers entering the countries. To make a movie in Mexico and/or Spain, foreigners would need to request permission from the Foreign Affairs Department. This would prevent international companies from using/filming physical locales of Spain and Mexico to depict negative stereotypes of

Hispanics and Hispanic cultures. The two governments also agreed to inform each other when denigrating films arrived in either country and maintained communications when movies entered illegally. The objective of this system was to unite other Spanish-speaking nations together to

118 “En Pro de la cultura e idioma,” Hispano-America, World Newspaper Archive, April 23, 1932, 3. 119 Ibid. 120 “México y España contra las películas denigrantes,” Mundo Cinematográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Mundo Cinematográfico Jan.-Dec. 1933, Vol. 4, Num. 38, Oct. 1930.

52 censor all films that vilified Spanish-speaking people around the globe. Because of the rise in popularity of Mexican cinema, Spain asserted they would be a good ally to have in combating the undesirable images, while also opening new markets for consumption.121

The emergence of sound in cinema generated a resurgence of interest in films about the

Mexican Revolution, that began with Fernando de Fuente’s trilogy: El Compadre Mendoza

(Compadre Mendoza, 1933), El Prisioner Trece (Prisoner Number Thirteen, 1933), and ¡Vámnos con Pancho Villa! (Let’s go with Pancho Villa!, 1936).122 The image of the Mexican Revolution was important to both Mexican officials and citizens; therefore, administrators scrutinized and edited these films to provide a positive illustration of this monumental event. Using these movies,

I will examine how state-sponsored censorship worked to guard the representation of the

Revolution. The Mexican government prided itself on revolutionary values and utilized the

Revolution when enacting policies like land and labor reform, especially during the Presidency of

Lázaro Cárdenas (1936-1940). The first of de Fuente’s films, El Prisioner Trece, told the story of the friendship between a landowner (Mendoza) and a Zapatista to whom Mendoza owed his life.

However, in the end, Mendoza betrayed his friend to Carranza’s army (who was fighting against

Zapata at that time) to save his family from being murdered on their hacienda, showing the horrors of war. The second movie centered on Colonel Carrasco, a corrupt general. Carrasco “. . . is forced, through a series of complex circumstances to order the death of his own son,” but woke to find out that the entire situation was a dream.123 Both were a harsh critique of the Revolution and censors

121 Ibid. 122 Andrea Noble, Mexican National Cinema (Routledge: London, 2005), 54. 123 Ibid., 45.

53 imposed the dream ending in the second film to soften the account.124 While de Fuentes highlighted some of the victories of the Revolution, these first two movies heavily questioned the motives and actions of the Revolutionaries, especially Carranza. This went against the Revolutionary government’s goal of legitimacy and power because the officials like Cárdenas based their policies around revolutionary promises. In fact, one of the censors of the time, Felipe Gregorio Castillo, stated (in the 1940s) the following regarding De Fuentes’ pictures (as cited in Noble’s work):

“[F]ilms like El Compadre Mendoza should no longer be made, for they showed ‘shameful aspect of the revolution’ and if it had been up to me ten years ago, De Fuentes’ film would never have been made.”125 De Fuentes’ challenged the idealized version of the Mexican revolution; therefore, threatening the current government with his movies.

De Fuentes’ final film in the series, ¡Vámnos con Pancho Villa! chronicled the journey of six men who joined Pancho Villa’s army. Mexican film scholar Carl J. Mora argued that because this film was government-funded it illustrated the political openness at the time. However, I assert that this movie was the least contentious of all three De Fuentes’ films because censors gutted the movie of “offensive images”, exemplifying that the government was not open to criticism. During the movie, five out of the six men died. The surviving member returned home because he recognized that Pancho Villa was indifferent to the soldiers’ plights and this member became disheartened with Villa and the Revolution.126 Again, De Fuentes criticized the Revolution; however, in this movie he chose to concentrate on Villa, a less likeable hero than Zapata or

124 Ibid., 56. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid.

54

Carranza since Villa was known to be vicious. Interestingly, this film was produced by CLASA films, a large national Mexican cinema company (Cinematográfica Latino Americana, Latin

American Cinematography). The Mexican government subsidized a large portion of the cost to construct the studio, as well as provided equipment specifically for the movie.127¡Vámnos con

Pancho Villa! did question the Revolution and showed a realistic version. Yet, De Fuentes’ focused on the shortcomings of Pancho Villa, a character in the Mexican Revolution seen as ill- tempered and controversial, one who wasn’t associated with the current government, as Zapata and Carranza (Cárdenas was referred to as the successor of Carranza and Zapata because of his land promises and policies). Therefore, it was easier for the government to financially back this movie.

Further evidence of my argument that the Mexican government was censoring De Fuentes’ films, is the alternative finale that censors cut out of the first production of ¡Vámnos con Pancho

Villa! In the original ending, the surviving member returned home to take care of his wife and child while Villa continually suffered defeat after defeat by the Constitutionalists. Villa went to the man’s house to get the solider back on the battle field; however, it was clear that the man needed to stay at home. To force the soldier, Villa killed the soldier’s wife and daughter. Then the solider, who tried to defend himself, was shot in the back by another one of Villa’s men.128 The censors asserted that this ending was too controversial because of Villa killing a woman and child.

Instead, the film concluded with the soldier returning to his family with no confrontation, but still

127 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 43. 128 Zuzana M. Pick, Constructing the Image of the Mexican Revolution: Cinema and the Archive (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 224-225. In footnote 15.

55 disappointed with Villa and the Revolution. The picture did discuss the horrors of the war and showed how everyday people were affected, teaching Mexicans of the sacrifices that were made for the country they lived in presently. But it did so by not offending the Mexican government.

As seen with Cinematográfica Latino Americana (Latin American Films, CLASA) Films, the Mexican government became heavily involved in film production. Under President Cárdenas, the state took more of an innovative and active approach to provide funds and protection for the

Mexican cinema industry. The Mexican Congress approved a new draft of Constitutional Article

73, Section X, which allowed Congress to legislate matters within the film industry and the

Executive Branch could enact protectionist laws and censor movies.129 Censorship became more secular under Cárdenas as well. He implemented an amendment to the censorship regulations that stated films could not show “apology of any religion” or “promotion of fanaticism through the

‘exaltation of religious motives’ in movies.”130 Cárdenas’ administration was not worried about immorality based on religion within movies, but mostly concerned with the image of Mexico and its government, especially focusing on the reforms Cárdenas’ put in place. An article in Mundo

Cinematográfico illustrated Cárdenas’ commitment to the Mexican movie business by recounting his visit to the CLASA headquarters. During his tour of the studio, Cárdenas “. . .made meticulous observations, flattering with promises that the national cinematography will receive ‘all the support it needs and all the support that can be imparted within the law so that it can become a real source

129 “Se legislará en por de la Cinematografía Nacional,” Mundo Cinematográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Mundo Cinematográfico Jan.-Dec. 1934, Vol. 5, Num. 30, Oct. 1934. 130 Peredo Castro, “Catholicism and Mexican Cinema,” 72.

56 of work and wealth’. . .”131 With backing from the President, the author argued that the industry could have access to the best technology and artists to produce high quality pictures.

The article also emphasized that Cárdenas put in place a more advanced system (censorship) that would ensure Mexican films “will bring to foreigners a correct vision of what our social evolution means.”132 The Office of Censorship attempted to make certain that only positive images of the Mexican government and population would be exported. For example, in

1936 the Federal government issued a new circular reiterating that all films going out of Mexico needed a seal of approval from the Office of Censorship, which complied with the decree of

1919.133 The author stressed that this government intervention would be constructive, allowing other nations to see all that Mexico had accomplished because of the revolutionary reforms.

Ultimately, supporters of the censorship act assured that the national cinematographic industry could be successful for everyone involved “. . . workers, artists, exhibitors and the State that receives its duplicate taxes. . .”134 The government would facilitate censorship in the best interest of those in the movie business.

An example of a state-financed film showcasing the censorship decree was Judas bankrolled by the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (Revolutionary National Party, PNR, ruling party) in 1936.135 Judas depicted the story of poor peasants in the countryside forced into hard

131 “El Gobierno y la Cinematografía Nacional,” Mundo Cinematográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Mundo Cinematográfico: March, Sep., Dec. 1936, Jan., March, July, Aug. 1937, and Jan. June, Dec. 1938, Vol. 7, Num. 67 and 68, April 1936, 1. 132 Ibid. 133 “Circular Oficial Número 301-147725,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Oct. 1936, 22 Oct. 1936, 2. 134 Ibid. 135 Agrasánchez, Guillermo Calles, 113.

57 labor for the landowners causing the peasants to live a life of poverty and hardship.136 They befriended middle-class men and women sent to educate them by the Mexican government and together they fought the landowners for control of the haciendas and won. The PNR used this movie as political propaganda for Cárdenas’ education and land reforms. It depicted revolutionary ideas and how both the Revolution and the modifications made by Cárdenas freed peasants from greedy landowners, and received a right to education, land, and labor unions.137 Officials were willing to sponsor films that uplifted and illustrated the ruling party as generous to its citizens.

Because President Cárdenas expressed an interest in promoting and aiding the growth of national cinema, several people in the film business wrote to Cárdenas requesting money and other forms of assistance to create Mexican movies. In the spring of 1938, the Sociedad Cooperative de

Producción Cinematográfica (Cooperative Society of Cinematographic Production) petitioned for

“financial aid to boost the production of national films” from the Office of the President.138 In the letter, the Society described two movies that they obtained the rights to produce: Los Cristeros

(The Cristeros, 1937), based on the novel by Jose Guadalupe de Anda and La Montaña Virgen

(The Virgen Mountain, 1936) written by Enrique Othón Díaz.139 Los Cristeros was a fictional story taking place during the Criteros rebellion that became popular with Mexican readers because of de Anda’s narrative writing style.140 The Virgen Mountain also chronicled a major event in

136 Ibid. 137 “Film and Political Propaganda: A Production Still of Judas,” Agrasánchez Film Archive, accessed 15 March 2017, http://www.mexfilmarchive.com/documents/film_and_political_propaganda_a_still_of_judas_1.html. 138 Memo from Agustín Arroyo, Head of the Department of Press and publicity to Godofredo F. Beltrán, Private Secretary to the President, containing the request from the Cooperative Society of Cinematographic Production, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 653, Exp. 5238/37, 18 April 1938, 1. 139 Letter to Rolando Aguilar, President of the Cooperative Society of Cinematographic Production, to the President of Mexico, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 653, Exp. 5238/37, 30 March 1938, 3. 140 Walter M. Langford, The Mexican Novel Comes of Age (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 44.

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Mexican history: The Mexican Revolution. The novel told the story of Juan Pablo, a man who lived in a poverty-stricken Indigenous area of Oaxaca where he struggled to bring himself out of this life during the Revolution. While the Revolution promised to bring change, the novel questioned whether this change would reach the Virgen Mountain region of Oaxaca.141 Both illustrated important historical happenings which helped shape modern Mexico and its government; therefore, the Society figured they would be perfect films for educating the Mexican public on their history and culture. President Cárdenas provided help by offering a venue and equipment for the Society to play the movies.142

Cárdenas also expressed his own positive, personal opinions about Mexican films, which emphasized his willingness to provide support. For example, in a letter to Señora Esperanza Iris of Iris Films Production Company, Cárdenas stated he watched Noches de Gloria (Nights of Glory,

1938) at his home and received it “with the best impression.”143 This movie depicted the story of a young woman who was framed for her husband’s murder and spent 15 years in prison. When released, she started her life over by working at an amusement park and dreamed of reuniting with her daughter. Both mother and daughter wanted to work in the theater, and, in the end, they reunited and finally obtained jobs performing as singers.144 The overall film depicted life for the poor in Mexico but uplifted the strength of the woman and her determined spirit. Critics and

Cárdenas praised the movie for being uniquely Mexican, providing audiences with a positive view

141 Joseph G. Fucilla, “Review: La Montaña Virgen,” Books Abroad 12, no. 2 (Spring, 1938): 231. 142 Letter to Rolando Aguilar, President of the Cooperative Society of Cinematographic Production, to the President of Mexico, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 653, Exp. 5238/37, 30 March 1938, 3. 143 Letter from Cárdenas to Señora Esperanza Iris, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 653, Exp. 5238/37, 18 Feb. 1938, 6. 144 Edward Bernard G and Charles L. J. Turner, “Noches de Gloria (Film),” Modern Language Journal 24, no. 6 (March 1940): 425.

59 of Mexico and its culture.145 Cárdenas also liked the message of the movie commending its

“spiritual disciplines” and promotion of “noble causes.”146 With this optimistic feedback, business members at Iris Films asked Cárdenas for help with the installation of Iris Films’ new endeavor into object development cinematographic art, which he did by providing some money.147 Here

Cárdenas’ own view was projected, illustrating his approval of Mexican films which offered a bright image of Mexican life. This also showed his bias for certain types of films which would receive funding from the government.

While officials stressed the positive aspects of censorship, many consumers of film and those in the cinema industry asserted that the Office of Censorship cut and distorted movies by removing sections that were important to the plot and aesthetics of the picture. In August of 1936,

Jaime Luna, a Mexican screenwriter and actor, wrote an article for Filmográfica entitled “How does supervision work in Mexico,” to investigate the process behind censorship and provide this information to the larger public. Luna began by discussing the “Official Unit,” asserting that the censorship department did not work independently, as most thought. Instead, the department had to answer to the Ministry of the Interior.148 Here Luna explained that the Office of Censorship was not solely responsible for the edits, as all the films ultimately had to be run through the Central

Department of the Ministry of the Interior before being allowed into theaters. Luna then added that the Censorship Board must adhere to the ideas of the Ministry of the Interior, which was directly

145 Letter from Cárdenas to Señora Esperanza Iris, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 653, Exp. 5238/37, 18 Feb. 1938, 6. 146 Ibid. 147 Letter from Lorenzo V. Gutierrez of Iris Films to Cárdenas, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 653, Exp. 5238/37, 3 March 1938, 8. 148 Jaime Luna, “Como trabaja supervisión en México,” Filmográfica, Cineteca Nacional, Filmográfica: Agosto 1936, Aug. 1936.

60 related to the “sociological programs that the rulers now hold in the representations of our people,” like reforms for education and land.149 This meant there were certain notions and concepts of citizenship tied to Mexicanidad (discussed in the introduction) that the government held and wanted to project to the domestic audiences. The censors had an official duty to take out any scenes that were in “conflict with the ideologies proclaimed in the government platform. (This was the case of Nobility Baturra in which the divinity of miracles openly clashed with the positivism of national secular education.)”150 was obviously the major job of the censorship board; however, officials reasoned that they were doing this to protect the public from images defaming the official government and, more broadly, Mexican culture and citizenship. The purpose of state-censorship was to protect and propagate films that provided an alternative, constructive view of Mexicans.

To further achieve this goal, the Office of Censorship argued that, because many imported films projected Mexico as “barbaric,” the government needed to step in and rectify this problem by censoring what foreign producers could film within Mexico. Therefore, in 1937 the

Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (Autonomous Press and Advertising

Department) issued a circular stating that, for the good of the country, there needed to be censorship of movies which contained shots of Mexico and its surroundings.151 The department officials stressed that they wanted pictures to show “real” Mexico with its improvements and accomplishments, not its “shortcomings.”152 The officials did acknowledge that there was

149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 “Circular Oficial Número 301-147725,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Oct. 1936, 22 Oct. 1936, 2. 152 “Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Julio-Aug. 1937, 10 July 1937, 3.

61 resistance to state-censorship; however, they countered this resentment by stating “it is evident that no nation exists, however civilized it may be, which can be conceived without censorship.”153

Officials argued that censorship was needed, in this case, to make sure foreigners did not further propagate negative stereotypes for profit. Instead, the Mexican government pressed to work with international directors and producers to showcase Mexico as a great place to visit and encouraged tourism.154 The censorship process, for foreigners, included the director/producers meeting at the consulate and discussing where and when they would like to take photographs, stills, and frames.

This request would go to the Mexican military for authorization. All foreigners required a seal of approval before taking their material out of the country.155 The officials claimed that this procedure would protect Mexico from unnecessary bad press.

This circular came out in response to the persisting projection of negative stereotypes of

Mexicans in Hollywood movies. Inspector V-92 discussed the problems with a film titled El

Cuatro del Espionaje in his report to the Office of Political and Social investigations in Mexico

City. El Cuatro del Espionaje, translated to Secret Agent, was an Alfred Hitchcock film produced in 1936 about a British spy sent to assassinate a German general during World War I. While the inspector stated that he confiscated several rolls of this film from Cine Eden, they did not state the reason for the removal of this film.156 However, after examining several of the censorship records from previous years, it seemed this movie was most likely banned because of the part “the hairless

Mexican.” This character, played by Peter Lorre, (who was Caucasian) was the sidekick to the

153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Letter from Inspector V-92 to Head of the Office for the Departamento de Investigaciones Políticas y Solacias, AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Solacias (IPS), Box 74 Exp. 4 (1936-37), 29 Nov. 1936, 3.

62 main character, John Gielgud. Lorre was dressed in minstrel-style blackface to appear “Mexican.”

Because of movies like these, the Mexican government continued to monitor any films coming into the country.

Along with censoring foreign movies, the Mexican government administrators also put in place protectionist laws to promote Mexican cinema. In 1939, Cárdenas amended Article 91 of the

Constitution dealing with the Regulation of Public Shows in the Federal District by stating that all film houses and theaters in the capital must show Mexican productions at least once a month.157

Theaters had to choose Mexican movies of “acceptable” quality that illustrated national art and history of Mexico. This decree affirmed that Mexican movies were showcased in Mexico City and

Mexican audiences would have a chance to see the beauty of their country. In addition to the protectionist laws, the Secretary of Public Education passed a regulation that created the National

Prizes for Literature, Cinema, Science, and other areas. An award of 10,000 pesos would be given annually for each category (literature, science, etc.). To win, the artist or scientist needed to be

Mexican either by birth or naturalization for at least one year before their work was published.158

The budget for this prize was to be 100,000 pesos, 10,000 for the prize and the rest to be used for publication domestically and abroad to showcase Mexican works internationally.

As well as passing the censorship and protectionist laws, the government, through the

Department of Credit and Finance, also worked with theaters and movie houses by reducing the taxes that they had to pay for the rights of each film if these businesses complied with certain stipulations. Cinematographers who also included programs about Mexico within their movies and

157 “Departamento de DF,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Sep.-Oct. 1939, 16 Oct. 1939, 11. 158 “Secretario de Educación Pública,” AGN, Diario Oficial: Marzo 1940, 11 March 1940, 11.

63 were shown more than ten days had a reduction of 8% for the price of the film.159 Also, any type of educational films, either domestic or international, were exempt from any tax or censorship charges, to encourage theaters to play these before the main movie in an effort to educate the public.160 The Secretary of Public Education (SEP) would decide which films could be considered

“educational” and then provide a published list in Diario Oficial. The SEP was particular when choosing films, as the lists usually contained 2-20 films out of 100s that came in for submission.161

Movies produced in Spanish were given preference over English titles, as seen in June of 1934, when 7 out of 8 films chosen to be duty-free were in Spanish, with only one being in English.162

In April of 1935, only one film, Maquinas para la manufactura de camisas, ropa interior, sweters y cerrar sacos llenos (Machines for the manufacture of shirts, underwear, sweaters and full clothes bags), produced by Maquinaria Textil in Mexico, was selected.163 The government protected

Spanish-language pictures while promoting development in the sciences and businesses in Mexico.

In September of 1941, President Manual Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) created a revised regulation for cinema supervision to provide a more detailed process. Camacho argued that because of the growth of the Mexican film industry, extension of control was necessary.164 The new film supervision rules included eighteen different articles. The first article dealt with the legalization of censorship, stating that the Law of Secretaries and Departments of States granted

159 “Decreto por el que se modifica la Ley del Impuesto del Distrito Federal,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Enereo 1937, 19 Jan. 1937, 2. 160 “Poder Ejecutivo: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Público,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Abril 1932, 21 April 1932, 1. 161 “Secretario de Educación Pública,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Mayo-Junio 1932, 28 June 1932, 2 and “Secretario de Educación Pública,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Junio 1934, 28 June 1934, 2. 162 “Secretario de Educación Pública,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Junio 1934, 28 June 1934, 2. 163 “Secretario de Educación Pública,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial Marzo-Abril 1935, 13 April 1935, 675. 164 Anduiza V., Legislación Cinematográfica, 261.

64 the Department of Cinematographic Supervision, under the Autonomous Department of Press and

Publicity, power to legislate film law. Another provision put in place a rating system that every theater within Mexico had to enforce: films for children, adolescents and adults, adults only, and adults in specially authorized exhibitions. Any theater that did not follow this regulation would be fined 100 pesos.165 If any owner wanted to show a movie, they would have to bring the film to the

Censorship Board at least six days before the movie would be shown. The censors would have three business days to review the film in a designated room chosen by the Censorship Department’s director. The theater received a report twenty-four hours after the censurers viewed the movie. If a patron requested to challenge the decision, they could do so with a written report explaining why they were soliciting further review. One of the key points of this revision was that the theater or renter would not have to pay the extra cost for further analysis.166 The film would then go to the

Ministry of the Interior for reassessment. The rest of the articles discussed provisions for international cinema companies requesting to film in Mexico, assuring that the producers and directors would respect Mexico and its customs. The conclusion of the regulations stated, “The

Department will not authorize the exhibition of films belonging to persons or companies that produce or distribute films abroad that are offensive to our country.”167 The new decree enforced the main point of the past regulations: to keep negative images of Mexicans out of Mexico.

However, the articles allowed for domestic cinematographers to take a more active role by allowing them a chance to question the censors’ decisions.

165 Ibid., 262. 166 Ibid., 263. 167 Ibid., 264.

65

Included in this statute was the “Rules of Film Supervision” that laid out the criteria for censoring both foreign and domestic movies. First, authorization would not be provided if the movie contradicted or impaired “the technical, moral or economic interests of the Mexican nation, the criterion of social justice enshrined in our laws, or the imperatives of decency and good customs or public order provisions.”168 Basically, films could not degrade Mexico, as the decree before; however, the government provided more specifics stating that the movies could not denigrate any Mexican laws or customs, essentially nothing that would go against the Mexican government. While the rules were strict, people in the film business could dispute the censorship reports by filing a complaint with the DGI and a new reviewer would be assigned and come up with a solution that works. Once the movie was approved, the Department gave it an authorization that allowed the picture to be shown anywhere in Mexico without any need for further documentation.169 Local authorities could not show movies that did not have a seal of approval. If a non-sanctioned film was played in a theater, both the theater owner and the person who allowed the display of the movie would be fined. All exported films required this seal as well or they could not leave the country.170 In September of 1941, more rules were added to the decree including that movies not spoken in Spanish needed to contain an “explanatory text” in Spanish that would be enough for the audience to understand.171 If they did not, then the movie would be rejected.

168 “Poder Ejecutivo: Secretario del Interior,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Marzo-Abril 1941, 1 March 1941, 3. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 “Poder Ejecutivo: Secretario del Interior,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Septiembre 1941, 19 Sept. 1941, 1.

66

Felipe Gregorio Castillo became head of the Cinema Censorship Department on April 1,

1941. Because of misunderstanding and miscommunication with producers and directors with the censorship department, Castillo wrote an article in Mexican Cine July of 1942 entitled “What is

Censorship?” to answer some of the questions posed by those in the film industry. He stated that film was a great resource to educate the public; however, if left unsupervised, cinema “can be a deeply disturbing element that the State is in the obligation to suppress severely.”172 He explained that department watched the films first before they went on display to the public and administrators would cut any scene(s) that were:

detrimental to morality and good manners; Or those who incur in historical falsehoods that are offensive to our country; Or those that by ignorance or bad faith present the physical and moral aspects of our people in a negative and degrading way; Or, finally, those narrated or dialogued in languages other than Spanish, do not have sufficient explanatory texts for the understanding of the spectators.173

The government was responsible for making sure the movies presented to the Mexican public did not have any plots or images that provided negative, incorrect information about Mexico or its citizens. Movies also needed to be in Spanish so the audience could understand the film. These rules emphasized the Mexican nationalism that the government disseminated.

Along with being the head of the censorship department, Castillo was interestingly, and perhaps not coincidentally, also a filmmaker. In 1942, he produced and directed the film María

Eugenia. This movie illustrated Castillo’s own ideas of morality and aesthetics which he used in censoring other films.174 María Eugenia presented a melodrama following the plights of Maria

172 Emilio García Riera, Historia documental del cine Mexicano: Época Sonora Tomo II, 1940-1944 (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1970), 54. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid., 103.

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Eugenia, a poverty-stricken woman who sought love and support. However, she was tricked into giving her virginity to a man that promised to marry her but did not. In the end, a benevolent land- owner took her as his wife to keep her from being disgraced. The landowner being the hero commented on Castillo as a man of the middle-upper classes, “a landowner who demonstrates his good condition by giving presents to his peons (surely, to desist from any revolutionary vehemence.)”175 Other Mexican films used the troupe of the poor man and peasant as the hero. A reviewer of the movie asserted that, through this film and Castillo’s own decisions on censorship, one could see how Castillo was concerned with keeping the Mexican viewers “protected” from their own “bad instincts.”176 Castillo had a narrow view of what Mexican cinema should portray and demeaning or questioning the government was not allowed. For example, in 1944 Castillo wrote a piece in Mexican Cinema, outraged that the film of Las Abandonadas (The Abandoned,

1944), was shown without the necessary cuts made from the Department of Censorship. Castillo claimed that the movie displayed the Mexican military in a negative way, stating that “senior heads of the Secretary of National Defense” saw the film and prohibited it from being exhibited in the barracks because the picture “damages the prestige of the armed institutions.”177 This, along with

Castillo’s remarks on El Compadre Mendoza, illustrated his bias of censorship.

In 1941, the government added more regulations to the censorship laws revising the and artistic property procedure for turning scripts into films, which included guidelines on what images and/or places in Mexico the director could use. For those who produced their own

175 Ibid., 104. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid., 208.

68 work and sought to shoot a movie in Mexico, they needed to visit the Secretary of Education and receive a certificate stating they received the right to film.178 The overall process, according to the decree, was to insure that all works entered for certification would improve “the intellectual and artistic property” of Mexican culture.179 In order to be registered, the scripts had to contain a detailed outline of every scene, including the dialogue, camera movements, and any other technical developments used within the movie. Everyone working on the film, including authors, actors, as well as the technical workers, had to be put on the script and informed of the decision, making sure all involved could receive credit. The SEP officials would then discuss with a military representative the location of the movie to guarantee the director had permission to film the areas.180 Along with the settings, officials would look at the dialogue to see how the setting would be portrayed, which played a large role in the decision to leave or cut the scene. Officials wanted to “purify” the image of Mexico and did not want any domestic films to degrade any part of Mexico or its culture.

On December 23, 1941 President Camacho created the Banco Cinematográfico

(Cinematography Bank), a state institution responsible for providing money for cinema production and distribution in Mexico.181 There were stipulations on which production companies would get bankrolled, enforcing censorship indirectly. The institution functioned as a financer to production companies so they did not have to sell assets, usually land, to offset the cost of production and

178 “Secretario de Educación Pública,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: July 1943, 17 July 1943, 7. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 Noble, Mexican National Cinema, 16.

69 distribution, allowing for movies to be made faster and of better quality. As Emilio O. Rabasa, member of the Bank, stated in 1970:

Since its birth, the film industry in Mexico has had an abrupt run, with ups and downs, culminations and crisis. The economic conditions of its development have been of the most varied and for being an activity of social interest, it required the intervention of the State in permanent form.182

The Cinematography Bank became the intervention that the film industry needed. In 1934 producers made only 282 films; however, by 1947, five years after the Bank was created, 1,726 movies were produced.183 In the first year of its operations in 1942 the Bank loaned out 5 million pesos to nine production companies (out of 30 which competed) and the following year, 1943, was fruitful and productive, making Mexico a strong competitor in the business.184 The two most successful movies of this period were Emilio Fernández’s Flor Silvestre (Wild Flower,

1943) and María Candelaria (1944), which illustrated the innocence and simplicity of Indigenous and peasant life. The films showcased the Mexican countryside and falsely beautified the rural areas and Indigenous villages, not presenting the many problems.185 But it was this representation that both audiences and officials paid to see, so the Bank provided more money to producers who made these types of films, where Mexico and its culture were uplifted and celebrated.

With the Bank and protectionists laws, Mexican filmmakers were less likely to challenge censorship as they were rewarded financially for cooperating with the government’s project to provide a purified image of Mexico. Luis Gabriel Torres, a Mexican cinematographer who

182 Emilio O. Rabasa, La Realidad del Cine en México: Problemática y Soliciones (Mexico City: Banco Nacional Cinematográfic, 1970), 5. 183 Ibid. 184 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 59. 185 Ibid., 62-66 full description of films.

70 benefitted from this, wrote an article for Cinema Reporter supporting state-sponsored censorship.

He asserted that the Constitution guaranteed Mexicans had the freedom of press and speech which included films; yet, Torres explained, in the United States when this same debate took place, the courts ruled that cinema was a business that “carried out a commercial purpose and should not be seen as part of the press.”186 Film censorship allowed for a protection of Mexican history and culture, which was often misrepresented by other cinema industries like the United States.187

Torres concluded his article reasoning that most human beings have some sort of moral standard, most likely religious-backed, and did not want to be introduced to immoral acts on the screen.

Therefore, censorship made perfect sense to shield the audience, especially children, from vile scenes of violence and sex.188 Again, the priority of state-sponsored censorship was to protect the public from immoral and offensive images. Officials amended the film censorship regulations in

1944 to include a clause stating the government had an obligation to support and elevate Mexican cinema because movies were a way to diffuse national culture “both inside and outside the country and it [Federal government] is obliged to contribute to the protection and enhancement of said culture,” emphasizing the idea of safeguarding Mexican civilization.189

186 Luis Gabriel Torres, “La Necesidad de la censura cinematográfica,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 1944, July 1944, 32. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 “Secretaría de Gobernación,” Diario Oficial, AGN, Diario Oficial: Marzo 1944, 23 March 1944, 1.

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Conclusion

Cinematographers in Mexico had been practicing self-censorship before any official censorship laws were created. They did so in an effort to protect themselves from the repercussions of the Díaz regime. The censorship decree of 1913, enacted under Huerta, reflected the fears that cinematographers had, in that if any films showed opponents of law and order getting away free, the movies would be banned. The purpose of state-sponsored censorship was to protect the ruling party. However, in the early years of official censorship, Mexican cinematographers and entrepreneurs argued that censorship was illegal because it violated basic rights of freedom of speech, ideas, and the press. Using the Mexican Constitution, these people challenged official censorship, illustrating that the citizens did not passively accept the laws, but actively participated in the larger debate over the legality of censorship and at what costs. Clearly the government won out as censorship continued, but it did so working with the film industry. For instance, a major complaint was that there were no guidelines set up in the decree of 1913. Therefore, the censorship law of 1919 created the Office of Censorship, which would help alleviate the confusion over what images could and could not be shown to audiences. Officials justified censorship by asserting the need to protect the citizens from negative images of Mexico and its customs.

When the Mexican cinema industry began to grow in the 1930s, officials used positive censorship like prizes and protectionists laws to reward those who cooperated with the government’s project of uplifting Mexican revolutionary ideals and culture which, in turn, legitimized the government itself. By focusing on the positives, audience members saw only the good the government was doing, for example providing land, education, and labor rights. While critiques of Mexican history in film existed, like De Fuentes’ trilogy projecting a more pessimistic

72 view of the Revolution, the censorship office made sure to take out any scenes that were deemed too harsh and provided a filtered version for the audience to see. Censorship provided a way for the official government to keep any negative critiques out and use film to propagate its own ideas of citizenship and Mexicanidad.

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Chapter Two: Consolidating the Cultural Revolution- The History of Bureaucracies

Introduction

In 1917, the victorious Constitutionalists, headed by President Venustiano Carranza (1917-

1920), created a new constitution for Mexico. It was rife with populist language promising

Mexicans priority over Mexico’s resources. Only Mexican citizens would have access to Mexico’s land and assets. These new policies would dismantle the system of preferential treatment of foreign companies seen under President Porfirio Díaz, (1876-1911).190 Although the Constitution of 1917 contained radical proposals, like land redistribution and protection for workers’ rights, Carranza took little action in implementing and enforcing these reforms. Mexican citizens who battled for these changes were upset with the slow pace to improve conditions in Mexico.191 Carranza’s political reputation deteriorated as some Mexican officials and military personnel who fought in the revolution, such as General Álvaro Obregón, accused Carranza and his administration of corruption and nepotism. Citizens and officials heavily criticized Carranza’s administration; so,

Carranza needed a way to regain the public’s confidence in the bureaucrats and his executive committees to consolidate the revolutionary government and restore order. To accomplish this

190 Patricia Haesly Worthington, El Paso and the Mexican Revolution (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2010), 46. 191 Steven M. Bell and Peter Standish Culture and Customs of Mexico (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), 18.

74 goal, political officials, as Carranza and General Obregón, used Mexican nationalism as the core of post-revolutionary politics to unite citizens, using the cinema industry to circulate these ideas.192

The Revolution left Mexico in shambles. People lost their lives, homes, jobs, etc. Morale was low for the Mexican population. Carranza utilized the Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes

(Secretary of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, IPBA, the bureaucracy in charge of education) to help create confidence in Mexico, its culture, and government. The IPBA disseminated positive illustrations of Mexico and other characteristics of Mexican culture and to ban any negative imagery against Mexico in foreign films. Yet, the Revolution did not completely end in 1917, making it difficult for the government to enforce the restrictions. Fighting continued and in 1920, the government’s inner circles began to bicker because Carranza chose Ignacio Bonillas for his predecessor instead of General Álvaro Obregón, who was promised by Carranza to be the next president.193 In May of 1920 Obregón and a group of generals rebelled and assassinated Carranza and put Obregón in the position of president. As president, Obregón faced the same obstacle as

Carranza: the task of rebuilding the country after the devastating Revolution. Obregón needed the support of the Mexican people and officials to carry the constitutional reforms.194 To reconstruct the government and economy Obregón and other leaders, like Plutarco Elías Calles (president

1924-1928) and, especially Lázaro Cárdenas (president 1934-1940) had to inspire hope and unite citizens.195 They did this by attempting to express positive ideas of the revolution and its

192 Tania Carreño King, “El Charro”: La Construcción de un estreotipo nacional (1920-1940) (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana Federación Mexicana de Charrería A.C.,2000), 11. 193 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 21-22. 194 Pick, Constructing the Image of the Mexican Revolution, 178-179. 195 Bob Herzberg, Revolutionary Mexico on Film: A Critical History, 1914-2014 (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2015), 25-27.

75 connection to nationalism through popular culture, using film as a tool to do so both as a form of education and entertainment. Cinema censorship became essential to accomplishing this goal.

Although the Mexican cinema industry in the early 20th century was minimal at best,

Mexican officials used movie censorship to promote revolutionary ideals. Bureaucrats like

Obregón targeted foreign films, usually from the U.S., that depicted Mexicans in a negative light.

Mexican scholar Tania Carreño King states that, “In the first two decades of the century, American cinema exploited the figure of the ‘Mexican’ – ‘almost always dressed in a wide-brimmed hat, short jacket, exaggeratedly embroidered trousers and carved leather boots,’ and a nationalist movement took place ‘to dignify the image of the country abroad.’”196 Portrayals of Mexicans as barbaric and uncivilized clashed with the optimism and pride that Obregón and other officials attempted to cultivate among Mexican citizens. These destructive stereotypes also potentially hurt foreign investments and relations that bureaucrats were seeking to rebuild with other countries. As

Mexican film production grew in the 1930s, administrators turned their attention to censoring domestic films by both policing movies and providing incentives for directors and producers who reflected positive attributes of Mexico and its government in their films. To control the images of

Mexicans and Mexico through movie censorship, the government utilized bureaucracies to implement several programs and reforms.

In this chapter I analyze several of the main governmental departments, the history and evolution of each sector, as well as examine the specific action that each branch took regarding film from 1913-1945. Although the agencies functioned in different ways, I argue that ultimately

196 Carreño King, “El Charro,” 41.

76 they worked together to further the goal of the Mexican presidential administrators (who were the officials in the executive branch responsible for executing laws), to legitimize and consolidate their power using film censorship as a tool. The first unit I examine is the IPBA, which became the

Departamento de Bellas Artes (Department of Fine Arts, DBA) in 1917, which was a subdepartment of the Secretaría de Educacíon Pública (Secretary of Public Education, SEP). These two sectors were responsible for educating the public and used movies to showcase revolutionary ideas to citizens. They often used positive censorship, like monetary incentives, to entice cinematographers to create positive Mexican educational films. The other departments I analyze include the Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (General Directorate of

Political and Social, DGIPS), and the Dirección General de Información (General Information

Division, DGI). These two entities worked as censorship agents, enforcing laws and bans on foreign films. Each division had a separate and distinct position within the censorship process of the film industry. Some, like the SEP, worked to modify and educate the public about how

Mexicans should behave and the responsibilities of Mexican citizens. Others acted as censors, removing negative images in movies that clashed with the positive ideas of the Mexican

Revolution. Officials understood that cinema was an important component to the dissemination of

Mexican national identity and revolutionary ideals as films were cheap and accessible to many spectators, even those who could not read. Movies could be exported to showcase a modern, powerful, independent Mexico to both domestic and international audiences.

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1905-1920: Introduction of Film to Mexico and the Role of Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes

In 1905 Porfirio Díaz created the IPBA, which was responsible for public education at all levels. Education included community art as a form of instruction, incorporating photography, music, and the new media of cinema (first film shown in 1896). To exhibit different operas, plays, and artwork in theaters and museums around Mexico City the creators had to the IPBA for permission. Officials within the IPBA would then decide whether the work could be shown and they based their conclusions on if the piece was decent and lacked immoral messages (this of course, was left up to the interpretation of each official.)197 The administrators in the IPBA were both skeptical of and intrigued with the innovation of cinematography because of its potential to showcase and/or corrupt “true” life. Carlos J. Meneses, the director of the IPBA, stated that theaters would not be permitted to exhibit any type of cinematography because (he alleged) cinema and films were not real “art.”198 He claimed, “The cinema is an artifact, as the magic lantern, or other for that style, amusing but not moved, because the emotion of life is required and cinema does not imitate this.”199 Because film was silent during this era, Meneses maintained, it did not convey

“true emotion.” He meant that without speech and the use of voice inflection, film actors could not adequately express the feelings of their characters, making them one-dimensional and shallow.

Meneses asserted that theaters must not show movies. Instead, actors should to continue to perform live, as live performance was an art. However, despite Meneses’ dislike of cinema, film was wildly popular and the IPBA became involved in its handling.

197 I go into more detail, specifically about the censorship laws in chapter one. 198 Letter from Carlos Meneses, “Informe sobre no conceder los teatros para exhibición del cinematógrafo,” Archivo General de Nación (AGN), Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 121, Exp. 11 (20 Jan. 1906), 11 Jul. 1906, 1. 199 Ibid.

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Due to the growing prominence of movies, IPBA officials developed concern about the new medium and its influence over the population. Renowned Mexican film scholar Aurelio de los Reyes breaks early Mexican cinema into two periods: 1. 1896-1915: movies were more concerned with showcasing “reality, the country, the people, and the Revolution” and 2. 1915-

1930: “films focused more on the plot, creation of many more fiction films.”200 Therefore, the first movies produced bore resemblance to documentaries, showing the audiences “real life in real time” like trains arriving and departing in stations throughout Mexico.201 However, since pictures were supposed to represent “reality,” it troubled government officials that cinema was liable to distort the truth. The first Mexican movie, Un duelo a pistol en el Bosque Chapultepec (Pistol

Duel in the Forest of Chapultepec), provides an example. Directors Gabriel Veyre (Mexico) and

Lumière (France) introduced the film to Mexican audiences in 1896 and it depicted exactly what the title stated: a famous duel between two deputies in Chapultepec. While many of the Mexican people were excited and fascinated by the movie, journalists expressed a negative opinion because they, and other prominent figures of Mexico’s elite, were afraid international audiences would not know whether this was a true honor duel or just a barbaric happening in everyday-life within

Mexico.202 Francisco Peredo-Castro, historian at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

(National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM), stated that “the press was outraged and argued that cinema should not be used for ‘distortions’ and, especially, not be used to ‘trick’

200 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:5. 201 Ibid., 21-23. 202 Anna M. Lopez, “‘Train of Shadows’: Early Cinema and Modernity in Latin America,” in Multiculturalism, Postcoloniality, and Transnational Media, eds. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 109.

79 audiences.”203 This movie and the reaction to it was important to the development of the IPBA during this early period as IPBA officials saw that films could be manipulated in many ways, causing the stories to lose their “realness”, like the nobility of the duel. As shown previously,

Carlos Meneses had reservations like those of the journalists, mainly, that movies were not true art because they did not represent real life. This was a problem that would affect the government officials’ approach to cinema. However, movies were popular and Mexicans continued to visit the theaters, making cinema a major source of media that the government administrators would have to acknowledge and regulate.

While some were skeptical of film, President Porfirio Díaz used the new medium and the

IPBA to promote Mexican culture and achievements. Although Díaz mostly illustrated his own leadership.204 The first movies that came through the IPBA for investigation dealt with what film scholar Tom Gunning refers to as the “cinema of attraction.”205 Instead of a narrative, films presented to the audience new technologies and movements. For example, one of the earliest pictures portrayed a ride on a train where the camera was set up on top to give the viewers the experience of being on the train as it moved through several locations.206 Specifically in Mexico, filmmakers followed President Díaz on his many trips across the country, as well as his numerous celebrations and foreign visitors.207 Díaz used these Mexican films as propaganda for himself and his connection to modernization. For instance, in 1908, Díaz commissioned a production crew to

203 Francisco Peredo-Castro, “ Shadows: Politics, Religion, Diplomacy, and Ideology in Mexican Film Censorship,” in Silencing Cinema: Film Censorship Around the World, eds. Daniel Bilteryst and Roel Vande Winkel (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 63. 204 See chapter two “Llegando el Tren a Toluca,” in de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, vol. 1. 205 Ana M. López, “Early Cinema and Modernity in Latin America,” Cinema Journal 40, no. 1 (2000): 52. 206 Ibid., 53. 207 Ibid., 54.

80 follow him on his trip to Manzanillo for a celebration of the opening of a railroad that connected the port city to Mexico City. Under Díaz, the IPBA approved movies that were positive publicity for the regime and displayed Mexico as a prospering, modern country (the second theme will continue after Díaz).208

The outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 disrupted the cinema industry and few films were made and/or imported to Mexico between 1910-1913, leaving the IPBA relatively uninvolved because the government itself remained unstable.209 However, in 1913 Victoriano

Huerta, a Counter Revolutionary, came to power and enacted the first cinema censorship law to keep out opposition by the revolutionary forces. The decree stated films could not show scenes where guilty thieves and criminals went unpunished.210 This law placed censorship into the hands of the IPBA, providing them with a renewed role in cinema control. With the forced resignation of Huerta in 1914 the function of IPBA within the film industry changed. Instead of just policing films, the bureaucracy became proactive and sought to use this new media to promote a more positive image of Mexico amidst the bloody civil war. Aurelio de los Reyes suggested that cinematographers and directors understood that Mexican films documenting the Revolution were extremely important because the movies provided imagery that “no literature is able to reconstruct” and displayed the “real history” of Mexico.211 The IPBA sought out movies that presented the proud narrative of their country to bring people together amidst the war. Previously, President Díaz recognized the value of film and capitalized on it to produce propaganda for his own regime by

208 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:54-55. 209 Aurelio de los Reyes, “The Silent Cinema,” in Mexican Cinema, ed. Paulo Antionio Paranaguá, trans. Ana M. López (London: British Film Institute, 1995), 66. 210 Anduiza V., Legislación Cinematográfica, 16. 211 Ibid., 123.

81 filming his many exploits.212 The IPBA used cinema in the same way. After the overthrow of Díaz, focused instead on the leaders of the independence movement in the colonial period of the 1800s, especially Father Hidalgo. On April 25, 1914, the IPBA sponsored and advertised a rally that honored Hidalgo and his call for independence from Spain almost a century earlier. The secretary of the IPBA requested the use of a cinematic “apparatus” for the rally from a private film company.

Basically, the IPBA would use the apparatus, most likely some sort of camera, to show a film about Hidalgo, that the IPBA created. The company had reservations about loaning out the machine, as it was extremely expensive.213 However, the mayor of Mexico City stepped in and demanded that the company offer access to the appliance. This illustrated that some public figures in Mexican politics also held a special interest in advertising and promoting Mexican culture. The mayor stated he would provide employees who would oversee managing the apparatus to make sure it was returned safely in good condition. The secretary of the IPBA wrote back, assuring that he was very grateful for the favor and that the “apparatus views will liven the rally.”214 This letter shows the importance of the IPBA projects showcasing and celebrating national heroes. Private film companies were compelled to provide what was needed for these films to be viewed by the

Mexican population.

From 1914-1919, the IPBA continued to promote Mexican culture and used film to present the picturesque landscapes, natural resources, and customs of Mexico to audiences abroad.215 A film company named Alvarez, Arrende, and Company (Mexican producers) worked to produce a

212 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:62. 213 “Memo,” AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 328, Exp. 72 (1915), 1915, 1-2. The company was never named in the document. 214 Ibid., 4. 215 López, “Early Cinema,” she mentions this several times throughout her article.

82 movie series that promoted Mexico and its culture to Latin America. Alvarez and his company requested that the IPBA provide a list of places in Mexico to film to circulate these images overseas to “showcase the great beauty of the country.”216 The company discussed how they sought to send a series of photographs and films to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to promote Mexico and build cultural relationships with other Latin American countries. The A, A and Film Company called the movie series Mexico in the Movies and it illustrated the progress of Mexico’s “ . . . national, commercial, industrial, political, and social development.”217 On December 11, 1916, the president of the IPBA sent a list to the company and he asserted that it contained “ . . . the most important monuments, natural beauty, and buildings of the Republic, as well as cities, historic sites, and artistic places . . .”218 These sites were the most gorgeous and impressive places throughout the country so they were perfect examples to illustrate the exquisiteness of Mexico. Some of these locations included Chichen-Itzá, Teotihuacán, many cathedrals in different Mexican states, and several lakes. The movie used these spots to show the natural resources of Mexico and what the country was doing with these assets to improve the quality of life and the economy. Convinced of the importance of this movie series, the director of the IPBA wished the film producers luck and expressed his interest in seeing the series once it was completed so it could be exported abroad, mostly to the United States. The hope was that Mexico in the Movies would educate others in Latin

America about the positive aspects of Mexico and improvements the government made to the economy and society.

216 “Direccion General de las Bellas Artes,” AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 119, Exp. 77 (1916), 1916. 217 “México, a 16 de noviembre de 1916,” AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 119, Exp. 77 (1916), 1916, 3. 218 “22 de noviembre 1916,” AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 119, Exp. 77 (1916), 1916, 5.

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The IPBA used film as an instrument to educate audience about Mexican culture and ideals.

Film historian Federico Dávalos Orozco sums up the attitude of the Mexican government of film from 1917-1920s: “At best, the state conceived of the cinema as a useful pedagogical tool for mass education.”219 Mexico geared its first movies towards instruction and illustrating new ideas of

Mexican citizenship and culture. Cinema was a practical form because illiterate as well as literate people could access the material. An example of an educational movie was the silent film called

Chapultepec (1917), created by the Rosas Derba Company, a film company founded by prominent

Mexican producers Mimí Derba and Enrique Rosas.220 Chapultepec told the story of “Los Niños

Héroes,” or boy heroes who defended the Chapultepec Castle during the war of North American

Aggression (The Mexican-American War, 1846-1848). They were six children from the military academy who occupied Chapultepec Castle during the attack by the United States on September

13, 1847.221 According to legend, these boys were part of a larger group that decided to stay and defend the castle despite being ordered to evacuate. The Boy Heroes were a symbol of Mexican dedication to defeating U.S. intervention and imperialism. The film was timely and appealed to the call for the end of U.S. interference since the invasion of Vera Cruz happened only three years prior in 1914.222 To portray the heroes to the best of their ability, the film company requested the

219 Federico Dávalos Orozco, “The Birth of the Film Industry and the Emergence of Sound,” in Mexico’s Cinema: A Century of Film and Filmmakers, ed. Joanne Hershfield and David R. Maciel (Wilmington: SR Books, 1999), 18. 220 Agrasánchez, Jr., Guillermo Calles, 33. For more on the Rosas Derba Company see, Irene García, “Mimí Derba and Azteca: The Rise of Nationalism and the First Mexican Woman Film-Maker,” in Women, Ethnicity, and Nationalism in Latin America, ed. Natividad Gutiérrez Chong (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1988), 99-112. 221 Ernesto Aceves Fritsche, “Los Niños Héroes or Forgetfulness,” Nexos: Society, Science, Literature 24, no. 285 (2001). Accessed 12 March 2019. https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=10104. 222 Ibid. Although many more than these six defended the castle with their lives, these six boys were the ones attached to Chapultepec: Andrés Mellado, Hilario Pérez de León, Agustin Romero, Lorenzo Pérez Castro, and Agustin Camarena.

84 use of historical artifacts from the Museo Nacional de Antropologia (National Archeological

Museum); however, the museum denied this request.

The Rosas Derba Company was upset over the denial and turned to the IPBA to work on the Company’s behalf in bargaining with the National Archeological Museum. The Company expected that the IPBA, being a state organization with the backing of politicians, would be more persuasive.223 The film company’s producers requested certain historical objects, such as rifles and uniforms from the period, to accurately recreate this momentous historical event.224 However, the

National Archeological Museum was reluctant to lend out these items because they were several decades old and the museum did not want them to get ruined during the filming. After a month and a half with no response, the film company composed another letter, this time with endorsement of the IPBA. Both the film company and the IPBA argued that this movie provided a strong educational value for the Mexican public and it promoted domestic film companies. The Rosa

Derba Company was a “distinctly Mexican company working on the development of the artistic culture and extolling patriotism.”225 The film company argued that it helped in the dissemination of Mexican culture and educated the Mexican public about heroes who gave their lives for

Mexico’s freedom and, most importantly, the company had support from President Carranza. They declared that President Carranza granted them permission to use the artifacts and that he would provide free assistance in the making of this film.226 President Carranza also appointed guards to

223 Letter from Rosas Derba Film Company to the Department of Bellas Artes, AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 107, Exp. 43, 1917, 1. 224 Ibid., 2. At this point the IPBA was absorbed into the SEP; however, some of the records remained in the IPBA file. 225 Ibid. 226 “Señor director de las Bellas Arts,” AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 107, Exp. 43 (1917), 1917, 8.

85 watch over the collection of items to persevere their “historical character” and the president stated that he and the government would supply the film company with any equipment, including historical artifacts needed to produce this movie.227 This example shows the importance of using

Mexican history as propaganda for revolutionary ideals with the endorsement of the president.

Carranza appointed Dr. Manuel de la Bandera as head of the IPBA in 1918.228 Dr. de la

Bandera, professor of theater, was one of the producers who worked on Chapultepec. Along with being an academic, de la Bandera was also an actor who founded Méxican-Lux Productions. He sought to train actors for movies and attempted to set up a school in 1916; however, the school was never built.229 In his position as head of the IPBA, he could put his plans into action. One of de la Bandera’s first programs was to offer free classes for students who wanted to learn about acting in and producing films. Manuel de la Bandera was one of the first actors to encourage the growth of a national cinema industry and he tried to do so through teaching and trying to build his own academy (although this never happened.)230 He sought to create an industry in Mexico “to make known the natural beauties of our country, the customs of our country, the civilization of our country.”231 After a year as department head, de la Bandera finished his first popular full-length feature film Cuauhtémoc in 1919.232 This movie, like Chapultepec and the Hidalgo film of 1915, was an historical drama; but, the setting was the pre-Colombian era rather than the 19th century.233

227 Ibid., 9-10. 228 “Minutas,” AGN, Instruccíon Publica y Bellas Artes, Box 74, Exp.11 (1918-1920), 1-2. 229 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 19. 230 García, “Mimí Derba and Azteca films,” 102. 231 Article from El Universal found in Carreño King, “El Charro,” 45. 232 I mean first as in the film was directed and produced by him with no co-producers or editors like his previous two films. 233 Hershfield, “Screening the Nation,” 261.

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Historically, filmmakers like de la Bandera used the populist nationalism of the Revolution and celebrated the indigenous past, Mexico’s history, and nationwide customs.234 Cuauhtémoc focused on all three. Cuauhtémoc was the last Aztec emperor before the Spanish defeated the Aztecs. The cultural revolution in post-revolutionary Mexico glorified and took pride in the indigenous people of the past. De la Bandera created Cuauhtémoc as a “unifying agent” for Mexican citizens to celebrate indigenous history while condemning European colonialism.235 In de la Bandera’s film, the indigenous people came together to fight off the Spaniards. Even though the Aztecs lost, de la

Bandera illustrated the importance of the indigenous leaders and his movie fit perfectly into the new ideas of post-revolutionary Mexico, especially the uplifting of the indigenous past.236

In 1917, the Rosas Derba Company became Azteca Films. They produced one of Mexico’s most famous silent films, El Automóvil Gris (The Grey Automobile, 1919), which provides an excellent example of the enforcement of unofficial censorship through political affiliations. The movie was about a series of robberies that took place in 1915 Mexico City, during the chaos of the

Revolution. The crimes were interesting because the thieves dressed up as soldiers and used warrants to force citizens to open their home. At that point, the thieves would rob and kill the people, taking advantage of the disordered state.237 Individuals in Mexico City believed that the robbers were connected to higher officials. First, Zapata who controlled the area, then Carranza,

234Ibid. 235 Christopher Fulton, “Cuauhtémoc Regained,” Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México 36 (2008): 8. 236 According to Aurelio de los Reyes, “Mimi Derba and Enrique Rosas went to New York in late 1917 to try to sell their production and suffered such a setback that they returned to Mexico immediately disappointed and dissolved their film company and Mimi Derba be retreat film production.” de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:230. 237 Charles Ramírez Berg, “El Automóvil gris and the Advent of Mexican Classicism,” in Visible Nations: Latin American Cinema and Video, ed. Chon A. Noriega (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 3.

87 when General Pablo González took the city for Carranza.238 Enrique Rosas was the director and producer of the film and had political connections through a friendship with General González; therefore, Rosas discreetly manipulated the film to show the crimes occurring under Zapata. Rosas also did not discuss the military abuses of Carranza and made General González the hero.239 While, officially censorship was not enforced, Rosas used discretion in his movie to make sure it appealed to the ruling regime. This type of indirect political censorship became more direct with the creation of the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) in the latter year of 1917. The SEP was responsible for education and used movies and film to propagate certain ideals of the revolution that coincided with the ruling party.

Creation of the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)

The Constitution of 1917 commissioned the creation of a new bureaucracy in 1919: the

Secretary of Public Education (SEP) and the IPBA was integrated into this new administration.240

The SEP was Mexico’s most powerful agent of creating good Mexican citizens because, like the

IPBA, it was responsible for public education at all levels.241 One of the most important aspects of the SEP was to teach Mexicans how to become productive citizens in the “new” post-revolutionary society. The SEP launched several projects, such as the establishment of public schools in rural areas and the commissioning of art to institutionalize and/or establish post-revolutionary culture

238 Charles Ramírez Berg, The Classical Mexican Cinema: Poetics of the Exceptional Golden Age Films (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015), 37. 239 Ibid., 38-39. 240 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 1. 241 Stephen E. Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico, 1920-1940,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, eds. by Stephen E. Lewis and Mary Kay Vaughan, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 176.

88 that emphasized indigenismo and modernity as the norm within Mexico.242 The agency created a national history and complex notion of citizenship for the Mexican public to emulate. This included the praising of the mestizo as the “cosmic race.” The cosmic race, as defined by José

Vasconcelos (Secretary of Education, 1920), was a mix of both indigenous and European blood that, Vasconcelos asserted, provided Mexicans with the best traits of both races. 243 Vasconcelos used the cosmic race to counter the argument made by Anglo scientists that Mexico and other

Latin American nations were barbaric and violent due to their blood. Instead, Vasconcelos argued that the environment was to blame for the difficulties in Mexico. By fixing social and economic problems Mexico could join other developed nations like the United States.244

Cinema particularly was convenient in education because illiteracy rates were high in the rural regions of Mexico and film was a medium that could be understood without the knowledge of reading. In 1922, the Secretary of Public Education began to utilize movies through the

Directorate of Cultural Aesthetic and the Department of Fine Arts and Libraries by commissioning film screenings at libraries to circumvent the problem of illiteracy.245 The SEP was enterprising with film production by working with other social groups like unions, student organizations, feminist factions, etc. Collaborating with both private companies and community agencies, the

SEP buildt a series of educational short films. The SEP also organized cultural festivals where movies were the major attraction. The first festival was held in February of 1922 in partnership

242 Ibid. Concept of indigenismo is in the introduction. 243 For more on the theory of the cosmic race see Marilyn Grace Miller, Rise and Fall of the Cosmic Race: The Cult of Mestizaje in Latin America (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004) and Ilan Stavans, José Vasconcelos: The Prophet of Race (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011). 244 Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem,’” 179-180. 245 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:137. This was a sub department of the SEP that housed films and books used for educational purposes in the state school system and federal organizations.

89 with Rialto Film where pictures about Aztecs and other parts of Mexican history were shown. The event was so successful that the SEP created more events at several other cinemas and theater houses across Mexico City, involving many organizations including children dancing troupes and singing groups. At these festivals, SEP officials also showed movies that illustrated the nationalist aesthetic cultural innovations of Vasconcelos. By June of 1922, these celebrations spread throughout Mexico City and into the less populated regions like Xochimilco. The movies shown at these events included information on other countries, outside of Mexico, to help educate the

Mexican people about the world, as well as animals, art, and agriculture.246 The topics were very broad to teach citizens about numerous subjects, but they always included Mexican culture.

The state continued to support cinematic education through the SEP and other departments.

As the Bulletin for the SEP asserted, the knowledge “acquired” through film was effective, helping

Mexico create educated and cultured citizens.247 At the beginning of 1923, administrators within the SEP hoped to expand cinema exhibits by providing “open air theaters.” These events took place outside in the evening for workers to keep them from spending their money at saloons and bars.248

SEP bureaucrats also talked of making it mandatory to show an informative short clip, about ten minutes, before movies at theaters to continue the educational campaign. While the officials seemed to have good intentions, one anonymous commentator in El Informante (The Informant), a newspaper based in Guadalajara, argued that the SEP cinematic education did not change people’s habits, stating that “while the festival unfolded inside theaters, outside ‘two peasants are

246 Ibid., 139. 247 Boletín de la SEP, tomo 1, num. 3, Jan. 1, 1923, 409. de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:143. 248 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:143.

90 killed with slashes’; The thieves robbed a jeweler, the drunkards scandalized in the canteens. . .”249

The author asserted that, while the films taught morality and education, the workers and peasants continued lives of violence and crime, doing little to change their ways.

The educational campaign intensified as the Ministry of Public Education ambitiously followed a plan to wipe out illiteracy in all of Mexico and spread the cultural ideas of the

Revolution. However, there were several problems with this: one, there was much more ground to cover than administrators originally thought, and two, some groups within rural and indigenous communities did not accept the educators and pushed to retain their own culture and customs.250

It also did not help that the teachers had little to no knowledge of the indigenous languages or lifestyles and were often met with distrust by the locals. Officials attempted to incorporate cinema in the indigenous educational plan. In May of 1923, the Department of Indigenous Culture announced a contest for creating a way to teach writing and reading with films and the winner would receive 500 pesos as the prize.251 Mexican officials likened the educational campaign to that of “religious evangelization,” or spreading a message that would likely better the lives of the poor and indigenous, “civilizing” them through education and personal hygiene and they were called cultural missions. Cameramen and others in the film business went with the groups of teachers and doctors to these small towns to document, as well as teach people about cinema and film.252 Unfortunately, the use of educational films by the SEP was cut by 1924 due to a lack of

249 Ibid. 250 Ibid., 144. For more on the educational campaign see Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution. 251 Ibid., 145. 252 Ibid.

91 budget and the culture missions of 1924 did not include any movies. The SEP would not become involved in the cinema industry till the expansion of Mexican films in the 1930s.

1923-1930: Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS) Counters Racist Images

The Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (The General Directorate of

Political and Social Investigations, DGIPS) was and continues to be an equivalent to the Mexican

“secret police,” or intelligence services. They investigated matters relating to national security and other similar activities. Basically, they collected intelligence information from a variety of sources, and inspected issues that threatened political power of the ruling party. This bureaucracy was founded in 1918 under the name Servicios Confidenciales (Confidential Services, SC) and it would take on several titles throughout its existence: in 1924 the name changed to Departamento

Confidencial (Confidencial Department, DC), in 1925 the Oficina de Investigaciones Políticas y

Sociales (Office of Political and Social Investigations, OIPS), 1938 Departamento de

Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (Department of Political and Social Investigations, IPS), and late 1940s DGIPS.253 Carranza created the SC and used it to exert political control by gathering information on friends and enemies.254 Carranza saw film, especially movies from Hollywood, as undermining his authority as the pictures characterized Mexicans in a derogatory way. Essentially,

Hollywood framed Mexico as uncivilized and barbaric, a country with nothing to offer. These images could potentially hurt Carranza’s administration by effecting relationships with other

253 Aaron W. Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954 (University Park, Pennsylvania University Press, 2010), 152. 254 Ibid., 153. (From now on I will use DGIPS for simplicity)

92 countries and Mexican citizens questioning Carranza’s ability as a leader. Therefore, Carranza decided to resolve this problem using the SC.255

The records of the DGIPS provide a unique perspective into the Ministry of the Interior because these reports were from agents out in the field, watching and reporting on the films. They offer a first-hand account, allowing historians to analyze how government representatives interpreted different threats to national security.256 These internal security accounts contain information collected by agents from different backgrounds, both paid and voluntary.257 While the representatives did not analyze or evaluate the information in the reports, historians find the documents useful for three reasons: construction of the historical past, understanding the historical formation of intelligence agencies and the extension of the one party state, and exploring how accurate the reports were and how this can affect the broader historical issues.258 Scholars utilize these documents to discern how the DGIPS agents interrogated and reported on mobilization activities. These reports also illustrate the anxiety of the state during times of uprising and their need to reassert authority.259 I employ these statements to demonstrate how this agency worked to eradicate negative stereotypes of Mexico and Latin America in film by watching and reporting on

U.S. movies that were found vilifying to the nation.

255 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:232. 256 Tanalís Padilla and Louise E. Walker, “In the Archives: History and Politics,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) 19, no. 1 (2013): 2 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid., 5-6. 259 Please see Tanalís Padilla, “Espionage and Education: Reporting on Student Protest in Mexico’s Normales Rurales, 1960-1980,” JILAR 19, No. 1 (2013): 20-29 and Alexander Aviña, “An Archive of Counterinsurgency: State Anxieties and Peasant Guerrillas in Cold War Mexico,” JILAR 19, no. 1 (2013): 41-51.

93

The DGIPS’ focus on cinema was unique to this period, from 1920-1930, because of the government’s major concentration on the censorship of imported movies. One of the key reasons the DGIPS became involved with film in the 1920s was directly related to the censorship law of

1919. After the creation of the Constitution of 1917, Carranza implemented a new cinema law named Film Censorship Regulations in 1919, aimed at censoring films within Mexico. Carranza stated that by having a board of regulators the authorities could avoid “arbitrary” decisions.260 The censorship law principally was meant for movies that were shot and/or filmed in Mexico containing scenes that “denigrated the country” and for the display of movies that "offend public morality in its content and its legends.”261 The censorship regulation dealt with images and/or films and production taking place in Mexico. The Board of Censors had to approve the images/films and provide a voucher that would be given to customs. These images/films could not leave the country if they were not accompanied by a voucher.262 Foreign films also needed approval documentation to enter Mexico. The government officials, under Carranza, stated that this law would be applied to all movies that entered Mexico in the past, going all the way back to 1896. However, theater owners threatened to go on strike, so the authorities then changed the law to apply to movies produced after the law took effect in 1919.

The Film Censorship Regulations decreased the importation of U.S. films to Mexico and influenced other countries, including Colombia, Cuba, Spain, and Argentina, to also censor and boycott Hollywood movies that denigrated Latin Americans because of the laws’ success in

260 Padilla and Walker, “In the Archives,” 17. 261 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:234. 262 Ibid., 260.

94

Mexico.263 An article in the 1922, entitled “Films Arouse Mexican’s Ire,” discussed how Spanish-languages correspondents in the United States praised the Mexican boycott and urged other countries in Latin America to do the same.264 Mr. Camprubi, President of La

Prensa Nueva York, a popular Spanish-language newspaper in , stated that these types of movies not only offended Mexico but the whole race of Hispanics across countries and

Latin America should come together to fight these stereotypes.265 Agents of the DGIPS provided the backbone for the censorship law, investigating theater and movie houses.

Another major motive for film to become a target of the DGIPS was directly related to the

U.S. recognition of Mexico in 1923 and the attempt to create a cordial relationship with the U.S.

While winning recognition by the United States was a triumph for the Obregón administration, political commentators expressed their deep concern over achieving the respect of the United

States and the image of Mexico in the U.S. media. In El Heraldo, a popular Mexico City newspaper, an editorial stated that cultural understanding was important to renewing political and economic relations.266 The author proclaimed that the two countries needed to create a collective intellectual atmosphere. Another editorial in El Excelsior declared that Mexican filmmakers “. . . make it seen and known that we can be a nation capable of living within a regime of civilized states and not a sanitarium for epileptics. Only in this way will recognition take root.”267 This author

263 Ibid., 234. 264 “Films Arouse Mexican’s Ire,” Los Angeles Times, Proquest Historical Newspapers, Los Angeles Times (1881- 1990), 16 July 1922, I13. 265 Ibid. 266 Article author unknown, “The Meaning of Recognition of Mexico,” El Heraldo, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 97, enclosure no. 8, 3 Sept. 1923, 8. 267 Article author unknown, “Following Recognition,” Excelsior, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 97, enclosure no. 9, 3 Sept. 1923, 1.

95 argued that U.S. citizens must see Mexicans as civilized and disciplined for the United States’ people to acknowledge Mexico as an independent, sophisticated country. This cultural degradation by U.S. media outlets caused problems, presenting Mexico as barbaric and undignified. Mexican officials attempted to eradicate and disprove negative stereotypes of Mexicans by depicting

Mexico as a reputable and prosperous country in Mexican films.

An account written in April of 1925 on the film Furia Desatada (Unleashed Fury) provides an inside overview into the DGIPS and film. This report from the DGIPS stated that the movie was demeaning to the country because Mexicans were portrayed as “. . . bandits. They drink large amounts of alcohol. They commit crimes, rob, and beat up other people.”268 The picture's plot was relatively simple: A servant and young boy lived in the U.S. countryside and the servant taught the child how to survive and take care of the ranch properly. In a tragic event, Mexicans killed the child’s parents across the border in Mexico. The servant instructed the child that he needed to avenge his parents’ death and the servant revealed the location of the murderers in Mexico. (In the memo by the DGIPS, the government agent underlined “across the border,” to emphasize that the villains were Mexican.) Because Mexican men killed this young boy’s family the audience was made to see Mexicans as the enemy. Therefore, the agent advocated banning this film because it vilified Mexicans.269

268 Agent 4 report to the Departamento de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, “‘Furia Desatada’,” AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, Box 6, Exp. 16 (1925), 1925, 4. 269 In October of 1925, the Mexican government investigated another American film, Triangle Kay See. In this investigation, agent 31 discovered that this production company had no representation in Mexico. Agent 31 reported that the film was a “denigrating” work. However, no description of the film or explanation of why this film was negative was provided in the file. In the next memo agent 31 stated he witnessed the destruction of this film. Agent 31 report to the Departamento de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, “Bájata, José. Agente Confidencial,” AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, Box 48, Exp. 6 (1925), 1925, 1.

96

In October of 1925, the DGIPS launched another major investigation into U.S. cinema with the title of “Denigrating Films.” In this report, the DGIPS agents examined several films, providing an understanding of what images the DGIPS representatives found offensive and their reasons for placing a ban on such movies. The agents first targeted the film El Hogar (The Home, a U.S.-made

Spanish film) and, although no description was provided, the agent stated that broke out in the movie houses around Mexico City because of the portrayal of Mexicans. The agent suggested that the government needed to ban films like El Hogar to protect the country against anything that depicts Mexicans/Mexico as dangerous and to keep public order.270 Along with this report, the file contained a magazine (described as a magazine for families) with an article on El

Hogar entitled, “A Denigrating Troupe.” This article detailed several reasons for why the film El

Hogar was offensive to Mexicans. One of the main motives cited was that the movie illustrated the pueblas (neighborhoods) outside of Mexico City as simple and rudimentary. The picture depicted the mostly indigenous people in these neighborhoods as slow and less intelligent.

Therefore, the movie portrayed Mexicans along the border as stupid. The Spanish language was also abused within the movie because the subtitles were written differently than the way Mexicans used Spanish. It displayed U.S. ignorance and unwillingness to understand Mexican culture and language when attempting to make films for a Mexican audience. The article also stated that

Mexicans were upset because the actors were in brown-face, which was highly distasteful.271

Overall, officials contended that the movie was offensive to the Mexican country and its people

270 Agent 17 report to the Departamento de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, “Peliculas Denigrantes,” AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, Box 7 (1935), 1935, 3. 271 Ibid., 12.

97 and took the article in this magazine seriously. The mayor of Mexico City stated he received this article and understood the concerns of this film being demeaning to the country. He assured that he had taken care of the problem by banning the picture within Mexico City.

Despite the efforts taken by the DGIPS, U.S. movies continued to violate the censorship regulations of 1919. On August 26th, 1927, both and Los Angeles Times contained articles stating that the Mexican government prohibited 19 U.S. film companies. The article did not provide a reason, but the author speculated that the companies’ pictures illustrated

Mexicans in an offensive way. An editorial in Excelsior on Ortiz Rubio’s visit to the White House in 1929 stated, “. . . “Millions of ignorant Americans believe that everything outside of their country is barbarous and that we Mexicans are a savage people of dark skin and of still darker ways.”272 There were still feelings that the United States’ officials had a negative view of Mexicans and the Department of Social and Political Investigations reported on these activities. The agency had a dual objective: one direct, which was to make reports that would allow for the censorship of imported films deemed offensive to Mexico, and one indirect that permitted upper administrators to use the DGIPS reports to justify the enforcement of banning the importation of films from U.S. companies causing the film corporations to lose money.

As seen from the reports, the DGIPS not only monitored films that they perceived as threatening, but the agents also advocated for the exportation of certain Mexican pictures overseas because they showed Mexico as a progressive and modern country.273 An example was a

272 Article author unknown, “Oritz Rubio at the White House,” Excelsior, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 96, 26 Dec. 1929, 1. Rubio was the presidential candidate for the National Revolutionary Party. 273 This advocacy for certain films seems to be part of the agents’ everyday practice, as seen from the entire file.

98 documentary produced by the Telephone and Telegraph Company of Mexico.274 The film depicted workers building train stations and laying tracks. In a report written on December 16, 1926, agent

7 asserted that the movie illustrated the “beautiful and graphic work” of the company and displayed

“comfortable and happy” workers so the film should be sent abroad as positive propaganda.275 In another report on December 29, 1926, a different agent, Agent 6 declared: “It illustrates the progress of our nation’s growth and should be exported.”276 According to declarations in these documents, the Mexican government officials pushed for distributors to advertise and circulate the movie to several countries because it presented Mexico and Mexican society in a positive light.

The officials hoped to refute some of the negative images of Mexico that films from the U.S. showed to both European and U.S. audiences.

After 1930 DGIPS officials turned their attention away from film and towards other political issues, such as the “surveillance and of political dissidence.”277 In 1930,

Delgado, an agent of the DGIPS resigned and all the other agents besides one left as well leaving the DGIPS open for new leadership and design.278 With new agents and supervisors, the purpose of the DGIPS shifted to surveillance of people, ideas, and groups seen threatening to the government and film no longer posed a political hazard. Another change in 1930 was the expansion of the Mexican cinema industry; therefore, allowing Mexican films to compete with U.S. pictures

274 Agent 7 report to the Departamento de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, “CIA. Telefonica y Telegrafica Mexicana,” AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Política y Sociales, Box 16, Exp. 43 (1926), 1926. 275 Ibid., 1. 276 Ibid., 3. 277 Navarro, Political Intelligence, 153. 278 Ibid., 160.

99 seen as denigrating. The growth of the domestic industry transferred censorship power to the SEP and DGI.

1930-1934: Mexican Film and SEP

Building and Protecting the Mexican Film Industry

In the 1930s, the SEP adopted a renewed interest in film because of the invention of sound.

At this point the officials made an ideological shift in their approach. As historian Mary Kay

Vaughan states in her book Cultural Politics in Revolution, in the 1920s the SEP officials were more conservative and they did not have a fully defined concept of national culture or a way to disseminate it to the public.279 However, in the 1930s the SEP became involved in the transmission of nationalist popular culture and “the processes of party-and state-building,” meaning that the

SEP took the lead in circulating ideas and images of Mexican national culture.280 The SEP broke up the Department of Fine Arts (DBA) into further sub-departments, including the Departamento de Cinematografía (Department of Cinematography) and Departamento de Fotografía,

(Department of Photography). The Department of Cinematography dealt with directors, producers, actors, etc. including evaluating the for funds and inquiry of showing movies in public areas.281

The introduction of sound created a unique opportunity for Mexican filmmakers because

Hollywood movies failed to successfully translate the English films into Spanish with both

279 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 29. 280 Ibid. 281 Found in the SEP files from the AGN.

100 dubbing and subtitles.282 This left a Spanish-speaking audience dissatisfied and wanting good

Spanish-language movies that they could relate to and understand. Antonio Moreno produced one of Mexico’s earliest sound films Santa (Saint) in 1931. This movie, a melodrama, told the story of a young prostitute named Santa who had a tough life and ended up dying due to a combination of syphilis, poverty, and alcoholism.283 As film scholar Emilio García Riera described the movie,

“Santa, the mold of dozens and dozens of similar heroines (and movies) for Mexican cinema, is the archetype of the prostitute who owes her condition to bad luck and who at no time belittles her good heart.” 284 (Several movies produced after Santa contained a relatively similar story about the prostitute with the heart of gold, with much success.) Santa became one of the most popular movies throughout Latin America. The SEP, realizing the potential use of film as tool for propaganda since it was commercially viable, became interested in cinema. The SEP claimed that movies were a way to publicize the idea of a national identity formed by the post-revolutionary government to the public masses.285

Eugene Gaudry, a Mexican producer, director, cinema critic, and member of the DBA, became a major advocate and voice of the DBA in 1931. His main mission within the DBA was to fight “Americanization” and negative images of Latin Americans. Gaudry proposed a “Project to avoid Americanization via the English-language films; and promotion of silent film,” from

282 Joanne Hershfield, Mexican Cinema/Mexican Woman: 1940-1950 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996), 13. 283 Ibid. 284 Emilio García Riera, Historia documental del cine Mexicano: Época Sonora Tomo I, 1926-1940 (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1969), 26. 285 Anne T. Doremus, “Authenticity, the Pelado and the Mexican National Identity: Essay Versus Film during the 1930s and 1940s,” Confluencia 16, no. 1 (2000): 36. Please see the beginning of this chapter for the definition of national identity, which includes the uplifting of the poor and indigenous, but through concepts imposed upon them by the elite.

101

1931-37.286 In a letter from Cesar Pellicer, an active member of the Union for Mexican Workers, to the DBA on Dec. 4, 1931, Pellicer argued that the Association of Film Distributors of Mexico was replete with people who either had ties to or were paid-off by U.S. film companies which enabled them to saturate the Mexican market with U.S. movies.287 In order to rectify this problem,

Pellicer called for a new law that would create formidable barriers to film contractors in the U.S. wanting to show movies in Mexico by forcing them to navigate their way through a plethora of bureaucratic formalities, including the DBA. Pellicer described U.S. film in the following manner:

These kinds of films, already the people have a lack of interest in them, are, as already noted, contrary to the true purpose of any education trends. Since they are not credible and maintain certain popular superstitions, as the efficiencies of amulets and other prejudices born of ignorance; distort historical facts and geographic data in the most blatant manner; they contribute through signs and legends that boast to promote the use of words, terms and expressions in Spanish, contrary to their sense and right expression; spread the bad taste in all its forms . 288

Following the reports from the Department of Political and Social investigations, Pellicer saw U.S. movies as ignorant of Latin American culture and geography, along with destroying the Spanish language. This called for improvements in the Mexican film industry by advancing and producing

Spanish pictures that were educational and culturally sensitive, according to Pellicer.

Gaudry wanted a Mexican cinema industry “for Mexicans by Mexicans” and stressed that the Mexican government should intervene and aid in its construction by setting up protectionist legislation. He addressed the Cámara Nacional de Comercio (Chamber of Commerce) in Mexico on June 14, 1929, arguing that the government should set up an office to support Mexican film and

286 Eugene Gaudry, “Project to avoid Americanization via the English-language films; and promotion of silent film,” AGN, Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP), Box 33638, Exp. 2, 1931-1937, entire file. 287 Letter from Pellicer to Department of Bellas Artes, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 1, 21 Jan. 1931, 2. 288 Ibid., 3.

102 theater so the Mexican public could view them at a reasonable price and he asserted that Mexican theater houses should show only Spanish-speaking films. 289 In a report sent on December 5, 1931,

Gaudry outlined the basic situation of the Mexican cinema industry and the pictures screened in

Mexico. Gaudry stated that there was an over-abundance of U.S. movies in Mexican society and he suggested a solution: creating an influx of Spanish-language educational and instructional movies for the Mexican public.290 However, Gaudry argued that the many barriers inherent to the

Mexican rule of government, itself, were the major obstacles producers and directors faced in their attempt to succeed at such an endeavor. To accelerate production of a film project, politicians needed to urgently advocate and campaign for funds through the Central Federal District. To

Gaudry, the bureaucracy was corrupt, and he was going to have to develop a project that would catch the Department’s eye (promote it as extraordinary) and cost very little (tout it as extremely inexpensive compared to its value).

Gaudry stressed that the role of the DBA should be to promote the Mexican film industry and not only focus on the movies themselves, but all parts of the industry, including film houses

(theater chains). As a producer and director, Gaudry experienced movie houses first-hand and he strongly disliked them. Gaudry discussed how the setting in theaters needed to be more comfortable by adding in new seating and better lighting. Also, pictures needed to be affordable so people would be able to see them, otherwise the film industry could not grow. Gaudry proposed several protectionist resolutions, including the prohibition of foreign movies from playing in

289 Víctor Cerdán Martínez and Elisa González Galán, “El acuerdo sobre películas ofensivas de 1933,” Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos 771 (Sept. 2014): 24. 290 Letter from Gaudry to Union for Mexican Workers, AGN, SEP, Box 33538, Exp. 2, 5 Dec. 1931, 1.

103 certain film houses and placing an equal limit on both U.S. and European movies shown in theaters.291 Gaudry attempted to diminish the cinema patron market that U.S. films had monopolized in Mexico.

Gaudry was not alone, as others in the SEP also took an interest in cinema. The SEP utilized socialist education as “a project of state integration.”292 Officials within the SEP asserted that a curriculum built with socialist principals would unite the many diverse states of Mexico and they found film to be a good medium to propagate this education. The first sound movie that the SEP

(through the DBA) endorsed was Redes (The Wave, 1936), a story about poor Indigenous fishermen revolting against their boss.293 While previous film scholarship notes the support from the SEP and President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) for Redes, they leave out its relationship to censorship. In this case, it was positive censorship, providing funding for a film which could showcase ideas of the Revolution. 294 Redes illustrated the powerful struggle of the indigenous population yet idealized their life and environment. The DBA supported films like this because they stood in opposition to the Hollywood-type cinema. Redes began production in 1934 with the help of U.S. photographer Paul Strand.295 The movie focused on Port Alvarado and proposed to show the life of these fishermen through a “social point of view.”296 This picture concentrated on

291 Ibid. 292 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 35. 293 Ibid., 267. 294 Positive censorship is “state support for the arts” and “privileges for certain cultural and artistic activities. . .” Monika Mokre, “Culture and Collective Identities,” in Culture and External Relations: Europe and Beyond, eds. Jozef Bátora and Monika Mokre (New York: Routledge, 2011), 76. 295 Letter from Paul Strand to the Ministry of Credit and Finance, “Presupuesto de las Cantidades indispensables para llevar a cabo los trabajos necesarios para la Filmacion de la Parte Silenciosa de la Pelicula Pescados,” AGN. SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 2, 3 May 1934, 20. Strand visited Mexico at the request of Carlos Chavez, who was a composer and conductor. Strand wanted to participate in the art and culture of post-revolutionary Mexico. For more information, see James Krippner, Paul Strand in Mexico (New York: Fundación Televisa/Aperture, 2011). 296 Presentation by Agustin Velazquez, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 2, 28 July 1934, 22.

104 the indigenous fishermen in Veracruz and their struggle to acquire ownership of their fishing cooperative and boats from businessmen who used and abused the indigenous population for several years to make a profit.297 The DBA considered this film a fine example of Mexican cinematography because of its aesthetic appeal and its focus on the working-man’s struggle, upholding values of the Revolution.298

Redes received excellent reviews, both in Mexico and the international film community.

The unfortunate shortcoming, however, was that the distributors only showed it in urban areas. In

1936, José Muñoz Cota of the DBA requested that National Film Distributors (the distributors of

Redes) display Redes at a discounted cost in rural areas so peasants with little money could see the film. Muñoz asserted that, “Redes is the first artistic endeavor to diffuse the social justice principles that inspired our great revolutionary creed” and that all Mexicans had the right to view this film.299

The DBA endorsed this intention as officials wanted to indoctrinate revolutionary ideals to the rural public as well, which were much harder to reach.

Transnational Influences

Mexican officials asserted that revolutionary values could be taught through socialist pedagogy in Mexican movies. However, in the early 1930s the Mexican cinema industry was just beginning to grow and needed examples of such films. Most movies coming from the U.S. did not contain these ideas so Mexican directors and producers had to look elsewhere. Paul Strand, a U.S.

297 Letter from Efren N. Mata to Secretary del Ramo, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 2, 23 Oct. 1934, 34. 298 Letter from Rafael Molina Betancourt to the Secretary of the Government, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 2, 16 June 1936, 41. 299 José Muñoz Cota of DBA letter to the Distributor of “Redes,” AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 37, 24 June 1936, 4.

105 photographer who previously worked on Redes, suggested Mexico use Soviet films. Strand praised

Mexico’s cinema industry for embracing socialist values and he placed himself within this movement. Carlos Chávez, director of the DBA, invited Strand to come work in Mexico in 1932.

Chávez and Strand met in New York and became friends in the 1920s, both interested in art and photography.300 They stayed in touch even after Chávez returned to Mexico. When Chávez took his position as director of the DBA, he felt Strand’s talent would be beneficial to Mexico’s film and photography industry. Strand stressed that he wanted to promote a revolutionary nationalism within Mexico.301 He had contempt for U.S. and Hollywood cinematic culture stating “Lenin said that religion was the opium of the people. When dealing with the United States, it is the film and not the religion to which these words should apply.”302 U.S. movies were corrupt, Strand argued, because U.S. producers and directors took direct advantage of the medium and distorted the truth to promote a materialistic-capitalist culture that was very hard to achieve for the working class.

Strand emphasized that Soviet films were a better example because the movies focused on social problems and illustrated the struggle of the common people striving for a better way of life, instead of Hollywood which portrayed an unattainable lifestyle for most working people. Strand argued that Mexicans should look to Soviet movies as a reference, and work on pictures that helped the

300 James Krippner, “Traces, Images, and Fictions: Paul Strand in Mexico, 1932-34,” The Americas 63, no. 3 (2007): 362. 301 Ibid. 361. Strand’s work after Redes focused on photographs that captures the essence of Mexico, including photos of the indigenous and the poor to garner support for the new national identity that the government attempted to create. He worked in Mexico from 1932-1934 and eventually became head of the Department of Photography under the Department of Fine Arts. Strand was forced out of Mexico in 1934 due to conflicts within the SEP. His friends Narissco Bassols (Head of the SEP) and Chávez (Head of the DBA) were replaced by other bureaucrats and soon Paul Strand followed, returning to New York at the end of 1934. For more information on Paul Strand in Mexico please see: Krippner, “Traces, Images, and Fictions,” 359-383. 302 Notes about film by Paul Strand, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 9, 10 July 1933, 1.

106 plight of the poor, like Redes.303 He asserted, “I feel that the only films worth funding from the

SEP are movies with a defined social perspective - clear dramatic films containing elements that can be understood by all.”304 Movies that discussed the everyday hardships and provided some sort of solution, again like Redes, were the only pictures worth funding and producing. The

Hollywood types, according to Strand and, to some extent, Gaudry, should not be shown. Strand emphasized that the DBA must solely center on a cinema that would help better society.

Mexico’s relationship with the Soviet Union was both politically and culturally complicated. In 1924, President Obregón officially recognized the Soviet Union; however, the affiliation broke apart under President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) because of the Soviet ambassador’s role in the Mexican communist party.305 Despite the break in relations, Soviet artists and filmmakers, like Sergei Eisenstein, influenced Mexican cinema. With the beginning of sound film production in the 1930s, Mexican filmmakers looked to other cinema industries as examples and Soviet movies provided a strong foundation. “It was cinematically lively, and its oppositional stance coincided with Mexico’s post-revolutionary pro-worker ethos,” meaning Soviet ideas of the state supporting workers and other nationalistic ideals were very similar to Mexico’s own, including giving land back to the indigenous population and supporting unions.306 Eisenstein’s unfinished film Que viva Mexíco! also inspired Mexican producers and directors with its

303 Ibid., 5. 304 Ibid., 7. 305 Daniela Spenser, The Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia, and the United States in the 1920s (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 3-4. 306 Ramírez Berg, The Classical Mexican Cinema, 55.

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“ and visual tropes that could be utilized to represent Mexico,” which

Mexican filmmakers implemented in their own movies.307

The Soviet government also used movies to educate and “promote the interests of the

Soviet state,” which Mexican officials found useful.308 Those in the Mexican film industry stressed the need to create socialist educational movies, like the Soviets. Mexican filmmaker I. Etapa’s essay, “Plan for the Filming of Education Films” discussed how there was a deep “need to create social awareness and an economic-social consciousness.”309 (Educational films were movies specifically created for the direct purpose of being used in educational institutions.) Etapa asserted that children must learn that working together, as a society, was the best way to ensure everyone had access to the natural resources of Mexico. U.S. films enforced capitalist ideals and individualism, where people competed against one another to be on top and often hurt each other.310 Educational films in Mexico should promote ideas of collectivism and working to aid their neighbors and, this in turn, would produce active, contributing citizens in Mexico. These concepts related to revolutionary ideals and promises, such as land redistribution and the nationalization of oil. However, Mexican filmmakers needed a model of these movies to generate their own. Therefore, Alberto Martin, a Mexican businessman who worked with foreign picture companies in Mexico, wrote to President Cárdenas about purchasing two Soviet-made films: Road to Life (1931) and Alone (1931). Soviet movies stressed a collective identity, like that of Mexican revolutionary ideals. Martin asserted that Soviet films could combat the lavish lifestyles and ideas

307 Ibid., 65. 308 Spenser, The Impossible Triangle, 100. 309 Plan for the Filming of Education Films by I. Etapa, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 9, July 1933, 20. 310 Ibid.

108 of Hollywood. Road to Life, directed by Nikolia Ekk, was one of the first Soviet sound films and it broke box office records in the U.S.S.R.311 The students in the film were educated in socialist instruction out of the roots of the Russia Revolution, about collectivization and helping the community. The plot of Alone, directed by Leonid Trauberg, as described by historian Denis J.

Youngblood “. . . concerns the attempts of a commissar (an official in the communist party who was responsible for education) to reform a gang of thieving orphans. The children gradually reform through work, and the tone of the film for the most part is jolly and optimistic.”312 These movies illustrated a more communicative lifestyle in which children become happier and part of a society that took care of them that Mexican officials wanted to emulate. Soviet films could, in turn, help

Mexican filmmakers create movies that furthered the nationalist project. (However, it is unclear from the documents whether these Soviet films were purchased.)

Despite the attempts to propagate a more communal message and constrain the lavish

Hollywood movies through bans and censorship laws, Hollywood continued to be the largest exporter of films to Mexico. Therefore, the Mexican government officials tried to limit the influence of Hollywood by working with U.S. companies to promote Mexican nationalism within the cinematic industry. One example of this was when the Mexican Consulate in Los Angeles proposed a censorship initiative to the SEP. The venture was not aimed at censoring movies as much as it encouraged U.S. film companies to incorporate Mexican advisors prior to making their films. The censorship project focused on pictures that contained images and/or themes involving

311 Cristina Vatulescu, Police Aesthetics Literature, Film, and the Secret Police in Soviet Times (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 135. 312 Denise J. Youngblood, Soviet Cinema in the Silent Era, 1918-1935 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 226.

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Mexico. Oscar Duplan, head of the Department of Advertising in Mexico, stressed the significance of this mission stating, “I think that this project has many advantages for Mexico and can create a favorable environment for the audiences of Mexico by the removal of scenes that our denigrating to the country.” 313 Duplan explained that the Consulate created a staff to view and censor films before they were exported to Mexico and Duplan asked that the DBA authorize Ernesto C. A

Romero as head of this operation.314 The censorship plan aimed at correcting the ignorance of U.S. producers and directors of Mexican culture in movies, which ended up depicting Mexicans and

Mexico in an unfavorable and unsavory manner.315 The DBA justified censorship through the use of education, attributing the ignorance to a lack of the directors and producers checking authoritative foundations. Hollywood simply did not have the resources on Mexican history, dress, and culture and it would be the job of the staff at the Mexican consulate to provide this guidance through education and censorship.316

While the DBA worked to censor films coming from Hollywood, the consulate in Corpus

Christi petitioned the DBA to export movies into Texas. The Consulate exclaimed that they were impressed with the Mexican film industry and every year it seemed to get better.317 There was an increasing demand for Mexican movies due to the large population of Mexican-Americans in the southern state of Texas. The consulate suggested that small Mexican production companies merge together to create a powerful business that could work with U.S. cinema firms as an equal and

313 Letter from Oscar Duplan Dept. de Publicidad to the SEP, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 4, 7 June 1932, 1. 314 Ibid. 315 Joaquin Terrazas of the Consul of Mexico in Los Angeles, “Censorship Project,” AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 4, 25 May 1932, 4. 316 Ibid., 4. 317 Memo from the Consul in Corpus Christi, “Business report for the month of July 1934, rendering Mexico consulate in Corpus Christi, Texas,” AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 17, 15 July 1934, 1.

110 produce Mexican films for those in Texas.318 DBA officials were in favor of this idea, arguing that exposing people around the world to Mexican culture was one obligation of the DBA. Another duty was to educate the people in Mexico so they could become civilized and productive citizens in an increasingly modern society. President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) further connected film with the nationalist project by creating the Financiadora de Películas (Movie Financing), that was a state institution responsible for finding private financing for films.319 The DBA worked with the

Movie Financing Agency, accepting and making decisions on the applicants for funds. Some filmmakers saw an opportunity to teach Mexican history through cinema and this, in turn, could help Mexican audiences understand their culture heritage.320

Educating the Mexican Public

Members of the SEP and DBA stated that one of their major obligations was to educate

Mexican citizens and they were interested in the importation of foreign films with an instructive purpose (this was seen with the Soviet films mentioned previously.) To join industrialized nations,

Mexican citizens needed to know basic hygiene and become knowledgeable in the sciences and math, along with the arts.321 Under Cárdenas in 1934 the DBA announced its plan to increase the production of educational films with a brochure titled: “General Ideas for Establishing Educational

Cinema in Mexico,” written by Agustín Aragón. Aragón was a strong proponent of elementary and secondary education for all Mexican children and worked alongside the DBA.322 He stressed

318 Ibid. 319 Hershfield, “Screening the Nation,” 264. This institution was responsible for facilitating financing private films. 320 Ibid., 270. 321 Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 26. 322 Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1884-1934 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), iii-iv.

111 that Mexico was a country that needed educational films the most, but lacked an industry to produce them. He agreed that Redes was a great movie with a modest budget of 100,000 pesos; however, U.S. producers, rather than Mexicans produced the film. Aragón stated that Mexicans needed to take more of a proactive stance in the creation of educational cinema. Aragón described the importance of educational cinema:

For everyone, cinema is an art, a way of fun. Few have realized that cinema is essentially a language for operating with pictures of reality, it is a universal language. For workers, the film is an exceptional medium of instruction because it is direct and does not require specialized mental effort and it creates a new concept of things. In the field, the value of that cinematography is invaluable and now feasible even in the most remote areas.323

Cinema could reach the illiterate masses and educate them in way that reading a text could not.

Aragón called upon the DBA to take up the creation of an educational cinematic industry. It would not cost much, as seen with Redes, and there were plenty of theaters around that could show these films. Aragón laid out a relatively simple budget proposal that would cost around the same,

100,000 pesos and stated the DBA could easily afford this and should begin working on the production of educational movies. Aragón’s plan provided reasons why education films needed to be produced and the justification for the budget and execution of these movies, hoping to kick start this project as soon as possible. As a follow up to this document, Aragón provided a list of educational films that schools currently showed children.

While Aragón pushed for educational cinema, Mexico had very little films within this genre. So to encourage the growth of the educational film sector, the Dirección General de

323 Agustín Aragón, “General Ideas for Establishing Educational Cinema in Mexico,” AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 19, 1 Dec. 1934, 1.

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Aduanas (General Directorate of Customs, the office in charge of the export and importation of films), gave the DBA the power to choose which foreign movies could be exempt from the import tax.324 The theater was a place that could serve as another form of education, outside the classroom and Mexican producers wanted to capitalize on this market and make sure that everyone, from children to soldiers, in the Mexican republic saw these pictures. 325 Miguel T. Gonzalez, Mexican

Secretary of Education, stressed that in order to propagate these movies, the government needed to subsidize the cost and a tax exemption would help. The executive branch did allow for the exemption and the DBA began to work on this project immediately.

To encourage foreign cinema companies to import educational films, in 1934, the

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Secretary of Foreign Relations) provided a tax-exempt status on foreign educational movies. Because of this tax break there was a new interest in educating the public and several groups throughout Mexico petitioned the DBA for access to these films for several different purposes.326 The Mexican elite and middle classes asserted that the lower-classes required “constant elevation” as citizens and consumers to uplift the image of Mexicans.327 The working-class needed to be educated with middle-class values for Mexico to become a modern nation. Therefore, Mexican officials used the medium of cinema as a tool of reform and to install

“middle-class” ethics. Mexican officials attempted to instill these principles in the working-class

324 Letter from Federico C. Valdes to the SEP, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 3, 20 May 1932, 2. Letter from Narciso Bassole the Secretary of the SEP to the head of the DBA, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 3, 26 April 1932, 1. 325 Miguel T Gonzlez to the President of the Republic, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 3, 26 July 1932, 5. For more on the theater as a classroom see Carlos Monsivás, “The Golden Age of Mexican Cinema: From the Screen like a Mirror to the Nation,” in Mexican Cinema, eds. British Film Institute and Mexican Film Institute (London: British Film Institute, 2006), 48. 326 See file “Cine Exhibits Requested by Groups, Societies, etc.,” AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 8, 1934. 327 Gunckel, Mexico on Main Street, 15.

113 by having them focus only on the film being played in the theater and not anything else around them. The idea was discipline.328 The poor were often characterized as “unruly” and barbaric. To improve their behavior, Mexican administrators and others in leadership positions used films to instill the idea of self-control. Cinema could also be used to instruct audience members on “thrift, sobriety” and morality, values that state officials wanted to see within the lower and working- class.329 The Mexican government administrators looked to industrialists and traders to finance these educational movies and asked unions and labor organizations to show them to people.330

The DBA previously stated that they wanted to create a Mexican cinema for Mexicans so it seemed contradictory to import films from Europe and the United States. However, this issue illustrates the problem that Aragón described with Mexico: a need for educational film, but no industry. To build this business, he suggested Mexican filmmakers needed to import movies from abroad. One of the apparent suppositions of the DBA was while wanting to stand on their own,

Mexico lacked access to the latest technology and academic theories in both science and the arts.

Therefore, the DBA needed to import films that would teach Mexican citizens, especially those in the university setting, the newest theories and how to use new technological apparatuses. A few examples included German pictures produced by Deutsche Lehrfilm that discussed proper sanitation and hygienic procedures, childcare techniques, manufacturing of food products, and other ways to properly industrialize the food industry.331 All of these subjects aimed at modernizing Mexican industry and its citizens, especially the urban poor. At the same time, the

328 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 73. 329 Ibid., 76. 330 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:113. 331 Letter Alfonso Guerra of the Foreign Affairs Office Berlin to the DBA, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 21, June 1932, 3-5.

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DBA also imported German education films produced by Universum Film Akt. Ges that were directed at educating college and university students in subjects like zoology, biology, chemistry, physics, and meteorology.332

While educational films became available to Mexican schools, educators voiced concern over what movies were shown. In 1934, Efrén N. Mata, Head of the Department of Primary and

Normal Education, wrote the DBA and asserted that specific rules and regulations needed to be put in place to police the films to make sure only educational pictures were presented.333 Emmanuel

Palacios, Head of the Secretary Administration of the DBA, stated to Mata that the DBA had the power to fine schools that did not have the authority to show certain films to the students. To carry out this action, Palacios created the Movie Censorship Commission for Elementary and Secondary

Schools and the Commission stated that only films which “fulfill the educational purpose” of the office could be displayed.334 The DBA allowed for filmmakers, both domestic and international, to request that their movies be shown in the schools by filling out a form with the title and purpose of their film. Then the members of the Commission would look over the form and decided on the status of the film.

As the DBA educated students on sciences and hygiene from foreign films, it turned inward when discussing Mexican culture. In 1934, the DBA showcased a series of films through an educational conference created to accurately describe the history of the Aztecs and the beginnings of . The DBA claimed that the movies were precise because they used actual artifacts

332 Ibid., 6. 333 Letter from Efrén N. Mata Head of the Department of Primary and Normal Education to the Inspectors and Director of the Official Primary Schools and Kindergartens, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 14, 5 Sep. 1934, 6. 334 Efrén N Mata Head of the Department of Primary and Normal Education to the Inspectors and Director of the Official Primary Schools and Kindergartens, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 14, 9 July 1934, 3.

115 from the Museum of Natural History, along with consulting Professor Don Ramon Mena, who was

“widely known in the world of science and considered one of the more prominent figures in historical and archaeological materials.”335 In his work, Professor Mena analyzed documents from the National Archive and researched decoding the “hieroglyphics” of the ancient Aztecs. The DBA discussed that each film in the series would focus on a historical issue/problem that would be solved and proven with information by “scientific” evidence from a “competent” staff of researchers and cinematographers.336 The DBA asserted that these movies were extremely important not only for Mexico, but for universities around the world as this series could teach students the “truth” about the history of the Mexican race and the beginnings of colonialism.337

The films would illustrate the Aztec leaders in beautiful colors, presenting them honorably and displaying the brutality of the Spanish who only conquered the Aztecs in an unequal battle due to disease and pillaged Mexico of all its natural resources. Yet, through all this suffering, the Mexican people prevailed and provided for themselves and continued to hold their traditions. The DBA stressed this film series would rectify any negative images the international audiences once held of Mexicans and hopefully change the minds of university students to see Mexico as a great country with a strong, resilient people.

Some international filmmakers contended that Mexico was understudied and petitioned the

DBA to create cultural films about Mexico for Mexicans, as well as Europeans and Americans who knew very little about Mexico and its people.338 Walter List, a filmmaker from Germany,

335 Memo from Palma Guillen of the SEP to Dept. of Bellas Artes, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 8, 25 April 1934, 2. 336 Ibid. 337 Ibid., 2-6. 338 Dept. of Migration Francisco Ramirez Villarreal to SEP, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 14, 11 Oct. 1934, 1.

116 wanted to make one of these films and asked permission from the DBA to begin production. List stated that his picture would be great “propaganda” for Mexico and likely increase tourism to

Mexico and illustrate the beauty of Mexican civilization and focus on its culture.339 Another filmmaker from the United States, Arthur Pillsbury, also petitioned to film in Mexico for similar reasons.340 Comparably, in 1935, Zorobabel and Oscar Galeno, U.S. producers, asked the SEP for funding to make a movie about Mexico to show at Mission High School in San Francisco. José

Castellot Jr., head of the Office of Cinematography (under the DBA), supported this project completely, stating that the film was, “. . . great propaganda for Mexico. Also, it would help make good relations with those of Latin American descent in the U.S.”341 The filmmakers wanted to educate their own citizens as well as enhance Mexico’s position in the international community by advertising Mexico’s growth and beauty, fitting into one of the major missions of the DBA, which was why the films received funding. The DBA helped enact censorship by providing funding for films that conformed to a certain, positive ideal of Mexico and its people. The administration also enhanced the educational film sector but did so by regulating what educational pictures could be exported without taxes. However, the DBA could not directly control the media and enforce legislation, so this was left up to the DGI formed in 1937 to help protect Mexican cinema.

339 Ibid. 340 Arthur Pillsbury Requesting Permission to Film in Mexico, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 10, July 1934, 1. 341 José Castellot Jr. head of the Office of Cinematography to the head of the DBA, AGN, SEP, Box 33640, Exp. 7, 6 May 1935, 1.

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1937-1940s: Controlling the Media- Dirección General de Información (DGI)

The Cárdenas administration created the Dirección General de Información (General

Information Division) in 1937 and the bureaucracy became part of the Interior Ministry. The department contained several branches including: the Department of Publicity and Propaganda

(1937), General Press and Publicity Office (1937, which encompassed the Department of

Cinematography Supervision), and Department of Information (1940).342 The basic function of this directorate was to supervise, manage, and censor media propaganda, including films, newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts, both domestic and international.343 Cárdenas formed this administration during the rise and threat of fascism and war within Europe. Several of the files from this office show concern over the ideas of fascism undermining concepts of the

Revolution that the administration was propagating. The DGI’s major priority was to maintain security inside Mexico, specifically broadcasting and film during World War II.344 The agents investigated several media outlets and other sources of information to stop any negative press, particularly to the current leading regime and the Mexican government more broadly, as well as any anti-ally, fascist, and anti-democratic propaganda. The main purpose of this department was to gather information on managing materials within media outlets, including radio, journals, periodicals, newspapers, and films. Explicitly relating to cinema, the DGI was responsible for editing information within educational and commercial films, enforcing cinematic laws, the

342 Like the DGG, there are no secondary sources on the history of the DGI. This analysis is my own created from the AGN series of the DGI. 343 “Adding Reform Act and Article 1 of the Law on Ministries and Departments of Estado,” AGN, Dirección General de Información (DGI), Box 7, Exp. 1. 344 For more information on the history of the Department of Social and Political Investigations, as well the larger security agencies see: Navarro, Political Intelligence.

118 authorization for the commercial display of films throughout Mexico, and making sure that domestically produced movies were exported properly in accordance with the appropriate regulations.345 In the process of cinema censorship, this department gave out and collected fines, as well as approved the final products of educational and documentary films for public viewing.

The branch did not help to produce films like the DBA or to specifically ban films as the IPS, instead the DGI was involved in the censorship of the actual movies and handing out fines and revisions to the company or individual producer of the film.

In 1938 Cárdenas changed the cinematic censorship law of 1919 that gave executive power to the DGI. This law replaced the Censorship Board with a new office, the Department of Cinema

Supervision (DCS) under the Department of Publicity and Propaganda and the DCS became responsible for the censorship and taxation of film. In 1941, the DCS developed “Film Supervision

Regulations,” which included assigning power of censorship to the DCS, officially stating that: no films could be shown that harmed the rights of others, disturbed the peace, or injured public moral to the Mexican people. There were several rules put in place, including that any foreign films entering Mexico had to be subtitled in Spanish because dubbing was completely inefficient, according to officials, and any foreigner who wanted to take photographs or film in Mexico needed permission from both civilian and military authorities.346 The DCS classified movies into three types: “adults, teenagers, and children.” These ratings indicated what audiences the movie was appropriate for viewing. The Ministry of the Interior put the head of the DCS in charge of finding

345 “Unidad de Descripción Documental,” Guía General de los Fondos-AGN, http://www.agn.gob.mx/guiageneral/ last accessed Oct. 18, 2015. 346 Anduiza V., Legislación Cinematográfica, 17-19.

119 those movie houses, theaters, and individuals, foreign or domestic, that violated any of these laws.

Therefore, the DCS became the police agents, both reporting on and punishing those who broke cinematic laws.347

The DGI was concerned with the image of Mexicans when Cárdenas nationalized oil in

1938. Many U.S. companies were affected by the nationalization because they lost their oil field holdings, meaning a loss of profit. Also, many U.S. workers left and had no jobs, leaving them unemployed. The United States waged large anti-Mexican campaigns, including in films.348 Again, the negative portrayal of Mexico and Mexicans in the media was an important matter for government officials; therefore, Cárdenas used the DGI to regulate all propaganda. In addition to censoring U.S. films, the DGI also endorsed nationalization as a positive aspect for Mexico.

During a promotional event in July 1938 headed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Promotion, the DGI loaned out films to the Secretariat including, The nationalization of oil and Mexico and its oil.349 In a memo from Jose Rivera P.C. of the General Secretary, Rivera requested to have the same producers of Mexicana Petroleos (Mexican Petroleum), a film which showcased the positive and industrial aspects of nationalization process, produce a similar one in English for the

Department of Tourism in 1939. The idea was to show the Mexican oil industry as modern and doing well without U.S. intervention.350 The Department of Cinematography Supervision gave

347 Ibid. 348 Julio Moreno, Yankee Don’t Go Home!: Mexican Nationalism, American Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950 (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 53. 349 Letter from Alfonso Pulida Islas Disclosure Office to the Secretary of Agriculture and Promotion, AGN, DGI, Box 80, Exp. 12, 29 July 1938, 4. 350 In 1940 the DGI created the Dirección de Supervisión Cinematográfica (Department of Cinematography Supervision, DSC). This department was responsible for investigating film companies, both foreign and domestic, and individuals that violated any of the cinematic laws and to approve or deny request to showcase films in film houses and public areas within Mexico. The department also analyzed what material could be broadcasted over news and radio programs. A request from a Mr. Xavier Frias, a Mexican director and producer, to show his films at the

120 these same short pictures to several film houses, ordering that they be shown before the movies so

Mexicans could understand the importance of the nationalization and take pride in this event.351

Most of the film houses complied and showed the short clips, if not they were fined.

The DCS (Department of Cinematic Censorship) became the enforcer of cinematic laws, not only with censorship but also on the age limits placed on film, citing that certain movies were inappropriate for children to see.352 There were several cases where the DCS penalized film companies, including Cine Rex, because they violated morality codes. Castillo fined Cine Alacron

100 pesos for advertising the film The Three-Cornered Hat for children and adults when it had been restricted to only adults.353 However, some of the owners contested the charges, which illustrated that the companies concluded that they had the right to dispute penalties they saw as unfair. Angel Tejera, a film house owner, explained that he did advertise for adults only. The audience members with tickets had to stop outside the ticket booth to prevent any minors from entering the theater. Yet, Tejara stated, “. . . keep in mind that, because it is unionized personnel, the orders of the Company do not have all the necessary effectiveness for full compliance.”354 The

National Film week in the summer of 1942 provides an example of the department’s work. The department agent wrote to the General of Extra School Education that they received a request from Mr. Frias to display his film (no title or description provide) during the National Cinema Week on June 17th 1942 at Bellas Artes The agents stated that he highly recommends the film and just wants final approval from the Department responsible for choosing the films. 350 In this case, it is the General Extra School Education Department. The film had to be approved before it could be shown to the Mexican public, making sure nothing negative or embarrassing was on the film. From the Department for the Supervision of Cinematographic to the General Director of Extra School Education, attention to the Theater Section. F. Gregorio Castillo, Head of the Department, AGN, DGI, Box 2, Exp. 16, 12 Sept. 1941, 2. 351 Department of Cinema Supervision telegraph to C. Luis Manjarrez, AGN, DGI, Box 128, Exp. 47, 3 Nov. 1942, 1. Files contain information on agents going into the theater and recording whether the oil films were shown. 352 At this point, I cannot find any information of the specifics of cinematic law. Only that children under 18 were not permitted into adult films. 353 Letter from Gregorio Castillo to Cine Alacron, AGN, DGI, Box 94, Exp. 23, 3 July 1944, 3. 354 Letter from Angel Tejera to head of supervision of cinematography, AGN, DGI, Box 94, Exp. 40, March 1945, 1.

121 employees could let in a minor without their knowledge. The government officers from DCS came around at intermission to check the theater and found a 16-year old minor. Tejara explained this boy was an employee at the movie house and was not watching the film but cleaning the theater during intermission.355 He then asked that the fine be forgiven and the DCS did waive the fee.

Another interesting case involved an educational film displayed at the Radio Cine Club entitled A Baby is Born, depicting childbirth. This film was shown to a group of medical students from a nearby university.356 The Club was surprised to receive a fine of 100 pesos for allowing a minor in as the group consisted of all medical students well above the age of 20. The case is important for two reasons. First, the SEP had imported educational films to be shown to all

Mexican citizens, yet childbirth was considered much too graphic for children. Second, the DCS fined them because they confused a short man for being a child. The head of the Radio Cine Club stated at the end of his letter, “No doubt that this clarification will enable you to exempt us from the fine. It's not fair because there was no real reason for it.”357 The language was blunt, showing that the film house felt comfortable asserting their own authority in these matters and that they were not simply passive objects of the DCS.

In addition to policing theaters, the DCS also received viewing requests from other government departments and private film companies. The Department of Tourism asked Castillo to review a documentary film on Mexico produced by Cinema Publicidad.358 Cinema Publicidad described the movie in a letter to the Department of Tourism on July 27, 1942 as an illustration of

355 Ibid. 356 Letter from the Supervisor of the Radio Cine Club to Head of Cinematography Supervision, AGN, DGI, Box 94, Exp. 47, 29 July 1942, 1. 357 Ibid. 358 Memo from Department of Tourism, AGN, DGI, Box 3, Exp. 15, 1942, 1.

122 the civil authority and military apparatuses of Civil Defense to boost the morale of the people during the time of war.359 This film would allow for current and perspective tourists to see how serious and committed Mexico was to protecting democracy in the face of the Axis powers.360

Castillo wrote back to the head of Cinema Publicidad stating that the department would examine the film to make sure it followed the cinematic laws, mainly that nothing denigrating about the military was displayed. However, Castillo seemed positive and assured them that if there were any problems, Castillo would write them down and Cinema Publicidad could correct these problems and resubmit again. This case shows, again, the working duties of the DGI as a protectorate of the government within the interior through media, by censoring what foreigners saw about Mexico.

One unique case of the DGI handling external agencies involved the city of Cincinnati. The

“Society of the American Friends of the Mexican People,” an organization in the United States set up to exchange cultural and intellectual material as part of the Good Neighbor Policy, wanted to highlight Mexico’s struggle for democracy and freedom, another segment of the World War II propaganda.361 As part of the cultural exchange, documentaries filmed in Tehuantepec,

Cuernavaca, Taxco, and Acapulco were shown to students in Norwood High School in Cincinnati,

Ohio in April of 1942.362 The Mexican consul in Detroit, G. Adolfo Dominguez, requested the films, with the permission of the DGI because as letter from Ernesto Hidalgo Directorate General of Foreign Trade and consular service protection section to Secretary of the Interior stated, “ . . . the aforementioned films provided a good impression for 1,500 students and faculty on campus”

359 Ibid. 360 Ibid. 361 Letter from Manuel Espejel y Alvarez of General Information General Correspondence Control to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate General, AGN, DGI, Box 77, Exp. 38, 21 May 1942, 5. 362 Ibid., 6.

123 in Cincinnati.363 The DGI aided in the effort, through film, to portray Mexicans as progressive and educated in the international realm.

Conclusion

While the role of each bureaucratic department was quite different, the administrations all worked together to propagate ideals of the post-revolutionary Mexican government within film and cinema. This included modernity, uplifting the indigenous population, creation of a national history, and new concepts of citizenship. The departments did this with both positive and negative censorship. Negative included the IPS and DGI making sure films that were derogatory and/or insulting to the government (and Mexico more broadly) were kept from public viewing. Positive censorship encompassed producing and advertising movies which showcased Mexico in a favorable light. The separate sectors functioned as arms of the central government, furthering the goal of legitimacy. However, within the department themselves there were conflicts over what type of censorship should be enforced. The examples I provided here illustrate the larger clashes and negotiations of what revolutionary ideas meant and how race should be perceived. While the central government did create a certain notion of “Mexican”, this idea went out of their hands and into individuals within the departments who had their own interpretations. The construction of a national identity, race, stability, and modernity became a negotiation between the government and the people.

363 Ibid.

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Due to the introduction of sound in 1930, the film industry in Mexico started to blossom.

By 1931, Santa, the first sound film in Mexico, was produced and became extremely popular. The

DBA decided to take advantage of this growth and both protected the Mexican film industry and attempted to garner an international Spanish-speaking audience. Mexican film grew and began to compete with Hollywood films in several other Latin American countries, showing some success for the government initiatives to protect Mexican national cinema from foreign films, especially

Hollywood, and solidify post-revolutionary ideal.

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Chapter Three: Mexican Film and the International Audience- Reconstructing Race Transnationally

Introduction

In January of 1936, the Comisión Administrativa (Administrative Commission) at the

Banco Nacional Mexicano (Mexican National Bank, MNB) announced the creation of the

Cooperativa de crédito popular (Popular Credit Union) division. This unit was built to provide funding for domestic film production companies to support the advancement of national cinema.

Manuel Gutierrez Rendón, a member of the commission stated, “It is not simply for financial reasons that we will help cinematic companies, but because cinema is a powerful means of social propaganda and the industry is ready to grow as organized groups have acquired the experience and means of production.”364 Rendón asserted that Mexico had the capital and talent to develop their own industry, especially after the success of Santa (1931), El Compadre Mendoza (1934), and La Mujer del Puerto (1934). As discussed in chapter 2, the SEP and DBA used films to educate the public as well as entertain; therefore, the state was inclined to invest in its own domestic industry not only to instruct its citizens, but also to compete with international films, especially from Hollywood. To facilitate the funding, the MNB chose to give administrators at the DBA power to decide which individuals/companies would receive money. The initiative of the bank

364 Manuel Gutierrez Rendon of the Mexican Bank to Jose Munoz Cota, head of the DBA, AGN, SEP, Box 33640, Exp. 35, 23 Jan. 1936, 1.

126 showed that both private and government officials were invested in the importance of film to propagate certain messages and ideas to the public.

Mexican government officials decided to subsidize the expansion of Mexican cinema for two reason. One, to export Mexican revolutionary ideas to a transnational audience in the United

States. Two, provide an alternative image of Hispanics and Latin Americans for a Latin American market. Mexican administrators attempted to unite the “heterogeneous [Mexican] population” that was divided by “region, class, race, and even language.”365 Mexican film allowed for the exportation of a transnational Mexicandad that Mexicans could relate to and take pride in, regardless of their location. Not only did Mexican pictures reach out to Mexicans across the globe, these films also created a uniting agent throughout Latin America. Mexican producers and directors wanted to capitalize on this Pan-Americanism within their own films in hopes of reaching international fame.

This chapter explores the Mexican domestic cinema industry and its relationship to the international film community in the United States and other countries, such as Cuba and Argentina, within Latin America. I argue that Mexican movies became a strong, competitive rival to

Hollywood films because Mexican pictures were more appealing to Latin American audiences.

The construction of race is at the heart of this discussion. In pandering to entertainment-hungry audiences with indiscriminate tastes, Hollywood filmmakers invariably did not broaden their limited, one-dimensional view of all Latin American cultures. Hollywood movies continued to offend Latin Americans in their use of recycled versions of the same worn, derogatory stereotypes

365 Gunckel, Mexico on the Main Street, 8.

127 to portray Hispanic characters. However, Mexican filmmakers were sensitive to the multi-national and multi-cultural landscape of Latin America. They brought a sense of dignity to Latin American audiences by including and accurately portraying a variety of native Latin American characters. In their films, Mexican cinematographers fostered a great sense of both national and personal pride in their audiences by providing a wide range of positive traits and qualities to their Latin American characters. The Mexican government also took an active role in the creation of the film industry that stressed the positive aspects of Mexico and Latin America using official censorship

(regulations, monetary incentives, etc.)

This chapter is broken-down into two distinct sections. The first part examines the 1920s and how Mexican government officials censored and banned films originating from the United

States that contained derogatory images of Mexicans and, more broadly, Latin Americans. I touched upon this in chapter two. However, I add to my analysis the transnational aspect of racial construction and Mexico’s part in shaping the image of Latin Americans in movies. I discuss the official ban of U.S. films declared by the Obregón administration in 1922 and the continual use of censorship of certain pictures deemed denigrating. Using newspaper articles and records from the

Mexican consulate in Los Angeles and the AGN in Mexico City, I investigate what films the

Mexican officials from several bureaucracies considered offensive and why. I also utilize records from the MPPDA, which was, “. . . the trade organization that represented the commercial and political interests of the eight major Hollywood film companies . . .”366 The MPPDA stepped in to deal with the ban because U.S cinema companies were losing money. However, the negative

366 Jindriska Blahova, “A Merry Twinkle in Stalin’s Eye: Eric Johnston, Hollywood, and Eastern Europe,” Film History 22, no. 3 (Sept. 2010): 347.

128 images did not stop, and the Mexican government officials continued to censor certain films deemed denigrating even after the ban was lifted. This section is important because it illustrates the conflict between Mexican authorities and Hollywood cinema in the construction of race and how Mexican officials decided that Mexican filmmakers could provide a better representation.

The second section of this chapter analyzes the creation of a more optimistic image of Latin

Americans in Mexican cinema, using censorship as a motive for the growth of the Mexican film industry in the 1930s. Mexican films used positive censorship to portray Mexicans and Hispanics as the heroes and showcase Mexico as a modern, industrial country ready to join the ranks of other world powers. Mexican movies not only provided Mexican citizens with characters they could relate to, but they also challenged Hollywood’s portrayal of Latin Americans and forced directors and producers in Hollywood to question their illustration of Hispanics, especially during the time of the Good Neighbor Policy. Heading into World War II, the U.S. attempted to establish a more productive and positive relationship with Latin American countries to gain their support for the

Ally cause. I start off this portion by investigating the creation of the Mexican cinema industry and its development during the 1930s. Then I explore the positive intercontinental reception to

Mexican cinema and how countries in Latin America began to choose Mexican films over those from Hollywood.367 I discuss several responses from the Latin American community about U.S. films and their negative depictions and how Mexican movies became a better alternative to

Hollywood. I end with a conversation examining Hollywood’s response to their own ignorance and the growing threat that Mexican film posed.

367 Based on information from the U.S. National Security Archives, series Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records.

129

The Mexican Ban on U.S. Film, 1922-1930

In February of 1922, President Obregón and his administration imposed a ban on all film producers and production companies in the United States because the they continually portrayed

Mexicans negatively. The stereotyping of Mexicans in Hollywood movies started before 1922; however, it was in the early 1920s that Mexican officials asserted U.S. movies “were rife with stereotypes that undermined the government’s desire to project an image of Mexico as a modern nation” and “the very symbols being mobilized to create a cohesive, postrevolutionary national identity- the charro and the revolution, for example, were being used in Hollywood’s racist depictions of Mexico.”368 Hollywood challenged the Mexican government by portraying negatively the exact images that Mexican officials placed at the foundation of Mexican culture and heritage,. For example, characterizing the Mexican Revolution as a senseless, violent war instead of one fought for freedom from oppression.369 Therefore, in June of 1922, Obregón declared that the Secretary of Foreign Relations would have the power to ban any films imported into Mexico that were considered degrading to the nation.370 By imposing this sanction, the Mexican government realized its power as a large consumer of U.S. films and used this to pressure

Hollywood to eradicate their negative stereotypes.371

The Dirección General de Gobierno (Directorate General of the Interior, DGG), created in

1918 as an administrative body, played a large role in this ban. The Ministry of the Interior founded the DGG in 1918 under the name Sección Primera de la Secretaría (First Section of the Secretariat),

368 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 156. 369 Ibid. 370 Letter from the Secretary of Foreign Relations to Secretary of the Government on June 14, 1922, AGN, DGG, Box C.2.00.5, Exp. 3, 10 June 1922 1. 371 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 165.

130

Departamento de Gobernación (Department of the Interior) in 1929, and finally Dirección General de Gobierno (DGG, I will refer to the department as DGG from now on) in 1938. The major function of this office was as an organizational unit and in the 1920s, it appointed officials in several areas including Congress and the Supreme Court, as well as working with the Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, which included cinema.372 Specifically, with film, the DGG oversaw registration and inspection and enforced censorship, including bans on imported films.373 Members of the DGG targeted U.S. pictures due to the films’ derogatory nature. The types of documentation in the DGG included presidential reports, decrees, laws, and regulations related to film. As seen in the papers, the DGG played a substantial role in facilitating the prohibitions of U.S. film by organizing and sending out messages between numerous bureaucratic administrative offices. I will provide several examples of this department’s functions and the importance of this administration to larger negotiations of how Mexicans and Latin Americans should be portrayed in popular media.

Mexico was the largest consumer of Hollywood movies and; therefore, crucial to the U.S. film industry (despite the destructive imagery). Obregón decided to use this power of purchase that Mexican audiences had with Hollywood in an attempt to stop the dissemination of negative images of Mexicans. In February of 1922 he threatened to place a ban on any company that supported denigrating movies and in March Obregón pushed to produce positive propaganda films through the SEP and other departments, as discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.374

Official censorship was enforced under Carranza for most of his presidency; however, the

372 This information is found in the Manual de Organización del Gobierno Federal, Presidencia de la República, Coordinación general de Estudios Administrativos, 1982. 373 This is based on the information I analyzed from the DGG at the AGN. 374 Ibid., 178.

131 administration suspended the Office of Censorship in the last few months of Carranza’s presidency due to instability and lack of funds. In 1922, the Obregón administration renewed funds for the

Office of Censorship to reopen because officials received “reports of offensive films sent by the consuls of several countries, who were acting on their own account; and, Mexicans who wrote angrily to the Secretary of Foreign Relations for Mexico to defend their dignity.”375 Mexicans, both in Mexico and abroad, petitioned the Mexican government officials to stop the production of offensive films. For example, a Mexican citizen who lived in Los Angeles in 1921 named José

Rojas wrote to José Vasconcelos, Secretary of Public Education in Mexico, asserting that the

Mexican government needed to intervene with denigrating films because these movies were:

a source of embarrassment for our compatriots who contemplate them, surrounded by hundreds of people, and who can do nothing, absolutely nothing, to rectify. . . The premeditated and vicious errors that are committed against our country and our people, exhibiting the worst of one and of others.376

In his letter, Rojas discussed how the movies impacted Mexicans, both in Mexico and abroad, arguing that the pictures distorted the truth of Mexico and its people causing non-Mexicans to have a harmful image of Mexicans, which led to disrespect and prejudice towards Mexicans in the

United States. Rojas cautioned that if nothing was done to stop these films, Mexico would never be recognized as modern country and receive investment from international businesses.377

Under Obregón, the Mexican government reacted to the offensive films using abrupt action. Obregón threatened Will H. Hayes, head of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), with a ban of all U.S. cinema companies that produced such negative

375 Ibid. 376 “Propaganda cinegrafica”, Ideam, World Newspaper Archive, 10 Feb. 1921, 7. 377 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:179.

132 movies. Mexican administrators argued that this ban was the sole way to stop Hollywood from producing these types of pictures: “Closing the market was the only measure that had a weak country in front of a heavily organized country.”378 Mexico was a country with limited resources at this point, ravaged after the Revolution, and could not possibly take on the United States with force; however, the Mexican government could use their purchasing power to make a firm claim that denigrating movies would not be tolerated.

In June of 1922, the Mexican Secretary of the Interior circulated information on the first ban placed on all films produced by the Aywon-Film Corporation, a U.S. company. The Aywon-

Film Corp. released, what officials referred to as, a denigrating film called The Man of Courage

(1922). One Mexican viewer described this silent western as “humiliating to our country” because

Mexicans were the bandits terrorizing U.S. civilians along the border.379 The Mexican Foreign

Secretary asked that all officials and offices comply with the Presidential directive for the embargo and take necessary security measures to complete this order. Another presidential decree, related to the first, prohibited all Harry Carey films because of the movie The Heart of Texas Ryan (1917).

This movie was one of the many borderland pictures that pitted Anglo-American cowboys or policemen against Mexican bandits.380 Basically, white U.S. citizens were the heroes and anyone with brown skin was the villain. The chain of letters to and from state officials, such as the governor of the state of Durango and the Secretary of the Interior, illustrated the main purpose of the DGG: to inform different agencies about the bans to make sure they were executed. This was how

378 Ibid. 379 Letter to the Secretary of the Interior from the Foreign Secretary, AGN, DGG, Box 532 2/000/27/1- 2/000/28/26161, 7 June 1922, 1. 380 Dominique Brégent-Heald, Borderland Films: American Cinema, Mexico, and Canada during the Progressive Era (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 201.

133 officials in other areas were notified of prohibitions and sanctions placed on movies and film companies so they could enforce this cultural policing.

North of the Rio Grande (1922), was another example of the films targeted in the 1922 ban illustrating the concern over the borderland genre. In this picture, a gang of Mexican bandits captured a young woman and took her over the border to Mexico. The white hero, Bob, rescued her. (North of the Rio Grande came out shortly after the attack on Columbus, New Mexico by

Pancho Villa in 1916, which was significant as audiences in U.S. saw Mexicans as barbarous murders.381) In North of the Rio Grande the Mexicans continued to be thieves who captured innocent U.S. citizens. Mexican viewers wildly protested the film and, in one incident, they caused a theater owner to be arrested.382 The Mexican-American audience in the United States also reacted negatively to this movie, showing the transnational connection and conversation about race. Jose

Camprubi, editor of La Prensa Nueva York, a Spanish-language newspaper, supported the film’s ban stating in his letter to other Spanish language journalists in the United States, “. . . restriction, not alone on films offending Mexicans, but on those which belittle ‘the race as bandits, murders, etc.’”383 He asked that government officials in all Latin American countries forbid importing movies depicting Latin Americans in any negative way.

The Dictator (1922), a silent film comedy, was banned as well; however, it was different from the borderland westerns. In The Dictator, two characters from the U.S., Brooke Travers and

381 Pancho Villa felt betrayed by the United States’ because, during the Mexican Revolution, U.S. officials put their support behind the constitutionalist army headed by Venustiano Carranza and Álvaro Obregón. Pancho Villa then attacked the small town of Columbus, NM killing 18 U.S. citizens. 382 Article Author unknown, “Films Arouse Mexican’s Ire,” Los Angeles Times, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 97, enclosure No. 3, 16 July 1922, 113. 383 Ibid.

134 his friend Biff Dooley, followed a young woman, Juanita Rivas, to the fictional South American town of San Manana.384 San Manana was in the middle of a revolution and Travers helped Rivas and her father in this fight, eventually leading to Rivas’ father coming to power. It was a comedy satire, seemingly mocking the revolution that took place in Mexico. The actors who played Juanita and her father were of European ancestry, not Hispanic, and they employed exaggerated stereotypes to be believed as Latin American characters. Again, Mexican officials were dismayed with the depiction of Latin Americans and, moreover, U.S. obliviousness to Latin American cultures. Leandro Garza Leal, Mexican consul in Los Angeles (1922) stated in an interview to the

Los Angeles Times, “‘The Dictator.’ They say it is not Mexican but might apply to Latin America anywhere. I mention this to explain the producer’s ignorance as to types and resulting inaccuracy.

In ‘The Dictator’, the hats, the jackets and trousers that are worn are Mexican…”385 Garza Leal asserted that producers in the United States did not understand the differences within Latin

America, assuming all of them dressed like Mexicans. The Dictator was offensive to Mexicans; however, it also managed to insult other Latin American countries (considering U.S. producers' and directors' parochial views regarding the cultural diversity of Latin America).

To solve the problem of offensive films made in Hollywood, Garza Leal propositioned that he would create a company in the U.S. to produce cinema specifically aimed at the Latin American market. In the same Los Angeles Times article, Garza Leal stated that this company would work with Hollywood businesses to make sure denigrating images of Latin America were kept out.386

384 Ibid. While this movie does not depict Mexico, officials were upset over the image of Hispanics more broadly. 385 Article, author unknown, “Hispanic Film Firm forming,” Los Angeles Times, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 97, enclosure No. 16, 3 Aug. 1922, II1. 386 Ibid.

135

This way movies could pass the various censorship regulations. Leal claimed that his company could assist in making pictures with actors who were native speakers of Spanish and themes relevant to Latin American countries. Garza Leal reasoned that producing movies with a historical context, like the dramatic conquest of Mexico, with actors who spoke Spanish as a first language would be more appealing to Latin American audiences than U.S-made movies.387 Unfortunately, there is no more material on the company and the idea died off rather quickly, leaving Hollywood to continually make films with poor depictions of Hispanics.

Some U.S. producers tried to understand their neighbors to the South. From Humble Race

(1922), a short film produced by U.S. filmmakers documenting the lives of Mexicans, was an attempt to display Mexican culture in a positive light. However, the film became extremely controversial. Governors from several cities in Mexico, like Colima and Puebla, wrote to the

Mexican Secretary of the Government and the Ministry of the Interior stating they saw From

Humble Race and were shocked and offended by its plot and portrayal of Mexicans. They then demanded this film be prohibited from being imported and shown in Mexican film houses.388 The

Supervisors of Films (Supervisores de Películas), members of the censorship board, described the movie as purposely using negative stereotypes of Mexicans as “ragged Indians, hungry and fearful, living in squalor.”389 The film not only hurt Mexicans, it also denigrated all Latin America. The officials proclaimed that foreigners trying to record the life of Mexicans failed miserably and

387 Ibid. 388 Letter from Governor of Colima and Puebla to the Secretary of the Government, AGN, DGG, Box 17, Exp. 1 (D.2.03.28 UI 0054), 16-23 April 1922. 389 Statement from the Supervisors of Film, AGN, DGG, Box 17, Exp. 6 (D.2.03.28 UI 0054), 17 April 1923, 1.

136 asserted that this film be taken off the global market so these false images wouldn’t continue to circulate. The good faith endeavor ultimately flopped.

The ban on U.S. films by the Mexican officials hurt the United States’ cinema industry and the MPPDA quickly responded. Mexico was a primary source of profit for Hollywood and the

MPPDA was afraid of a “ripple” effect throughout Latin America.390 If other countries decided to ban U.S. films, it could be even more detrimental to Hollywood; therefore, the MPPDA wanted to negotiate a solution with Mexico. In July of 1922, the MPPDA set up a resolution that stated that to continue “cordial relations” with Mexico the carelessness of portraying Mexicans negatively must stop. The end of the resolution stated, “Resolved: that this Association shall do everything possible to prevent the production of any new motion pictures which present the Mexican character in a derogatory or objectionable manner.”391 Woodrow Wilson even declared that he would establish a censorship department in the U.S. that would screen films before exportation.392

(However, U.S. films continued to use demeaning images.) The official resolution came just a few months before President Obregón renewed relations with the United States on September 1st, 1923.

Many in Mexico were worried that the United States could never truly respect Mexico and its people because of the poor images of Hispanics in film. One editorial article from Excelsior stated,

“Someone has said that the ‘recognition’ of the White House is useless for Mexico without

‘recognition’ of the American people; and that is true.”393 The author asserted that the everyday

390 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 166. 391 Resolution by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPPDA) Committee, Resolution, MPPDA Digital Archive, Resolutions, reel 1, record 204, frame 1-2379, 25 July 1922, accessed 22 Dec. 2017, http://mppda.flinders.edu.au/records/204 392 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 1:233. 393 Editorial author unknown, “Editorial,” Excelsior, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 97, enclosure No. 5, 1 Sept. 1923, 3.

137 individuals in the United States needed to respect Mexico and its culture for Mexico and the United

States to have a positive, constructive relationship. The agreement between the MPPDA and the

Mexican Ministry of the Interior lifted the ban in the same month and year, undoubtedly as a show of the resumption of the normalized diplomatic situation. This ban illustrated how Mexican audiences viewed U.S. movies threw a “visual vocabulary of Mexico’s emerging post- revolutionary nationalism.”394 Mexico’s national identity was not only restricted to Mexicans in

Mexico, it was exported into the United States as well. This imagery of post-revolutionary nationalism would become the center of Mexico’s own film industry.

Although Obregón officially lifted the ban on U.S. films in 1923, administrators continued to report on and censor denigrating pictures. For example, Miguel Castillo, who was a Mexican living in Chicago, wrote to the office of Foreign Affairs in Mexico about the film One Week of

Love.395 Castillo stated that the two characters in the movie representing Mexicans were “illiterate people of dirty and vicious appearance” who attempted to kidnap a “beautiful” American girl; however, they were killed by U.S. ranchers.396 The film displayed Mexicans as the barbaric villains and Manuel Tellez, Mexican ambassador to the United States, confronted the Hollywood director of the movie, Bernon Woodle. Woodle exclaimed that David Selznick of Selznick movies and

Paramount films would take out any “offensive images.” 397 Tellez threatened that all movies by the company would be banned yet again. The debates continued and Paramount was very

394 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 179. 395 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:189. 396 Ibid. 397 Ibid., 190.

138 accommodating to the Mexican Foreign Affairs Office so they would not lose any profits because of the ban.

Hollywood directors and producers asked Tellez: what was denigrating or offensive to

Mexico? From the examples previously given, it seemed, at least to U.S. producers, that the mistakes were simply cultural misunderstandings and not purposely malicious. In response to this,

Tellez brought to Hollywood’s attention the film His Majesty, the American, a Douglas Fairbanks movie commenting on the landscape along the Rio Grande in Texas. The movie followed a man

(played by Douglas Fairbanks) traveling by train throughout the border towns of Texas. In one scene a gunshot woke Fairbanks and he asked “‘Is This Murdero Mexico?’ No. It was not. It was

Peace Vale, Texas.”398 Here, the audience made the connection to murder in Mexico and peace in

Texas, part of the United States. Then, when the train arrived on the Mexican side of the border

Fairbanks read a sign that stated: “Murdero Mexico: Bullets, Bandits, Featuring Francisco Villa,” confirming that Mexico was dangerous.399 The stereotyping continued when Fairbanks asked a town person why the area was so desolate and the man replied that Villa came once a year to kill people. Fairbanks’ visit coincided with Villa’s yearly appearance. The two fought in a duel, ending with Fairbanks drowning Villa and saving the town, displaying that Americans had to save

Mexicans from themselves.400 Reviews of the movie asserted that “Fairbank's behavior is outrageous” and “boasts of arrogance, hence the title of the movie His Majesty, the American,” and directly offended Mexico and its people.401

398 Ibid., 199. 399 Ibid., 200. 400 Ibid. 401 Ibid., 201.

139

One of the most fascinating aspects of these bans and Mexican censorship regulations was their effect on international racial politics. Through censorship, Mexican administrators controlled what images could be viewed by Mexican audiences in both national and international movies.

Officials not only suppressed certain films; they also offered money and materials to national cinema companies and corporations that produced films which created a positive and modern image of Mexico. The officials then pressed for the exportation of the progressive movies so audiences in both Europe and the United States could view an optimistic depiction of Mexico as a modernizing country. Even after Obregón abolished the ban in 1923, discriminatory Hollywood motion pictures continued to be targeted by Mexican officials. For example, in 1925, the Mexican government banned all the films of because of the movie Fighting Fury

(1924).402 In this film, a Spanish-born boy orphaned at a young age due to Mexicans killing his

Spanish parents, was raised by his Mexican servant and then grows up to seek revenge. While the

Ministry of the Interior in Mexico stated that the Mexican bandits were offensive, Universal argued that the Spanish-born man was also Mexican, as he lived and worked in the country, and the servant was a kind mentor. After negotiations, the ban was lifted in a day or two.403 What this example shows; however, is that the Mexican government still used its position as a powerful economic market for Hollywood to influence ideas about race.

402 Article, author unknown, “Mexican Film Ban Quiz Begun,” Los Angeles Times, Records of the Department of the State Relating to Mexico, microfilm roll 97, enclosure No. 5, 4 June 1925, 3. 403 Ibid.

140

Building up a Domestic Film Industry 1934-1945

The introduction of sound to movies changed the industry and aided the growth of Mexican cinema by allowing films to be produced in Spanish. An article from the Mexican film magazine

Filmográfico entitled “A que ha llegado el Cine?” (“What is the place of Cinema?”) discussed the huge impact that the technology of sound had on film production: “Before sound, Hollywood had a virtual monopoly on film. But, after 1928 and the invention of sound, politics of film began to change.”404 At first, movies in Hollywood were produced only in English and “nationalists in

Mexico and Latin America” were worried that these films would force the audiences to learn

English. They saw this as a passive “invasion” of their countries.405 The Mexico City newspaper

El Universal went as far as trying to convince Mexico and other Latin American countries to boycott all English-language movies. By 1929, protests broke out in several major cities across the globe, demanding films be made in a variety of languages.406 In response to this need, Hollywood producers eventually began producing films in other languages, including Spanish. However, the

U.S.-made Spanish movies were not successful. The films were often low-quality and unable to provide a “valid cultural” model.407 These movies illustrated that Hollywood knew very little about

Latin American countries, especially with their use of Spanish. The pictures often had actors of many nationalities and ethnicities, mixing different Spanish accents together, causing the film to sound awkward to Spanish-speaking audiences. One major problem was that U.S. producers assumed that the Castilian Spanish of Spain would be acceptable to all audiences; yet, this was

404 “A que ha llegado el Cine?” Filmográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Filmográfico April 1934-Dec. 1935, Vol. 1, Num. 2, 5 May 1934, 1. 405 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 30. 406 de la Vega Alfaro, “Origins, Development and Crisis of the Sound Cinema, 78. 407 Ibid., 79.

141 untrue as Spanish varied by areas and localities.408 By 1932, it was clear that U.S. foreign language films were failing. The poor reception of Spanish-language movies made by Hollywood left this market open for Mexican cinema. In 1933, Mexican production companies produced 21 films and were at the “forefront of Spanish-language moviemaking.”409 The industry only continued to grow, especially after the success of the Mexican film Santa (1932), that was well-known throughout the

Americas and opened international markets for Mexican films.410 Mexican cinema production enjoyed an increased popularity.

Producers and directors in Mexico jumped on the opportunity to create Spanish-language films as quickly as possible. Nacional Productora de Películas (National ) was one of the companies to start producing Spanish-language movies. It was founded in June of 1931 by a group of popular cinematographers including: Rafael Angel Frías, Juan B. Castelazo, Manuel M.

White, Gustavo Sainz, José Castellot Jr., Eduardo L. Bar, Carlos Noriega, and Alberto Caso.411

These men came together and invested over 100,000 pesos in the company to deliver Spanish- language films to the public. It was a monumental moment in Mexican cinema as Mexican producers hoped to replace the films of “Yanquiland” and provide movies that could be understood in their own “tongue” (Spanish).412 By June of 1932, one year after its founding, National Film

Studio seemed to be doing quite well. An article in Filmográfico stated that the Studio had its share of obstacles in entering the Spanish market; however, by the end of June the Studio reached the

408 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 32. 409 Ibid., 37. 410 “Editoriales Breves,” Filmográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Filmográfico Abril 1934 -Dec. 1935, 5 April 1934, Vol. 3, Num. 25. 411 “a Cia. Nacional Productora de Películas,” Filmográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Filmográfico: April 1934-Dec. 1935, Vol. 1, Num. 6, 5 April 1932, 4. 412 Ibid.

142 conclusion of stage one, consolidation.413 National Film Studio debuted their first film, Revolución

(Revolution), in the summer of 1932. The movie depicted recreations of famous battles from the

Mexican Revolution. While not as successful as Santa, film critics praised Revolución: “For those who lived through the pages of our Revolution, this film will bring memories in droves, and the plains that were silent witnesses to the fratricidal struggle, go through the mind of the beholder, with all the sadness of something that was great.”414 This film, like the silent historical movies mentioned in chapter two, illustrated the history of Mexico to Mexicans by Mexicans. The picture showed how important the Revolution and its principles were to the larger idea of national identity.415 The Mexican government became further involved by subsidizing the creation of

CLASA (Cinematográfica Latino Americana, S.A.) under Lázaro Cárdenas. The studio was given top of the line equipment to make movies and the first film produced was the successful Vámanos con Pancho Villa. The government also provided funds for CLASA Films to bail them out when the company declared bankruptcy.416 This shows that the government was an active participant in the growth of Mexican cinema and the image of Mexico to audiences.

Mexican cinema continued to grow with the development of several production companies.

On July 27th, 1934, the Mexican Movie Association announced its official creation to Narisco

Bassols, head of the SEP.417 This association was important to the Mexican cinema industry

413 “Primer Aniversario de la Cia. Nacional Productora de Películas S.A.,” Filmográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Filmográfico April 1932-March 1934, Vol. 1, Num. 3, 5 June 1932, 3. 414 “‘Revolución’: Un Triunfo de la Cinematografía Nacional,” Filmográfico, Cineteca Nacional, Filmográfico April 1932-March 1934, Vol. 1, Num. 6, 5 Sept. 1932, 6. 415 Ibid. 416 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 43. 417 Letter to Jorge Pezet Secretary of the Association to Narisco Bassols of the SEP, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 11, 3 Aug. 1934, 1.

143 because it brought seventeen production companies together to better represent their interests, like the MPPDA in the U.S. The Association claimed that film production was at the center of making positive propaganda for Mexico and they asked the SEP to provide money to help the Association get started on creating films to portray Mexico and Mexicans as civilized and modern. The SEP forwarded these messages on to the DBA. One of the first requests on behalf of the Association to the DBA was from director Fernando Alpuche and producer Federico Brito of “Filmica Nacional

(National Film).”418 They wanted to shoot footage around Mexico City and create a documentary including monuments, natural wonders, customs, festivals, growing industries (agricultural, mining, medical), etc. that could be shown to the international community. In addition to monetary funding, the producer and director also inquired if the DBA would be able to help move workers and people, if needed for a shoot. The members of the DBA were happy to oblige. The DBA and the SEP, already involved in educational cinema, became interested in domestic film companies that would produce entertainment films for an international audience. These movies would showcase Mexico in a positive light and work towards the goal of consolidating the revolutionary government and legitimizing their rule through the making of a stable, modern Mexico.

In addition to the SEP, other Mexican departments also contributed to film production. The

Mexican Movie Association received monetary support from the Mexican National Bank in 1936.

As stated in the introduction, the bank administrators asserted the need to invest in a domestic cinema industry to compete with Hollywood and to also portray Mexico in a constructive way.

One of the motivators for this monetary financing was a letter from the director of Chapultepec

418 Letter to Director Fernando Alpuche and Producer Federico Brito from “Filmica Nacional” to Antonio Castro Leal DBA of the SEP, AGN, SEP, Box 33639 Exp. 15, 16 Oct. 1934, 1.

144

Production Company to the Mexican National Economic Secretary requesting that the government finance Mexican films. The director wrote, “Assuming that the Federal Government is determined to protect and ensure development of the film industry in our country, it is not difficult to agree that the government itself should take an active and effective participation as soon as its facilities permit.”419 The director argued that the government needed to put safety nets in place, along with providing some sort of funding for the film industry to grow. To defend the claim, the director stressed that international audiences assumed Mexicans to be barbaric and uncivilized, “notorious” for their backwardness, even those of the upper class, and Mexico was seen to be delayed in every way, “social, moral, historical, and in hygiene.”420 The director emphasized that production companies should make films to educate the public on how to behave and the history of Mexico, itself. Through film, Mexicans could learn about their own cultural heritage and the rich resources within their country. Movies could also illustrate the “wonderful” changes brought by the

Revolution and how the economy was growing with renewal of industry and the good work of revolutionary cultural projects.421 Essentially, the director reasoned, a film company with help from the federal government could produce movies that united all Mexicans using symbols of the

Revolution as part of coalescing national identity. In turn, this would help project the legitimacy of the Revolution and the post-Revolutionary government.

The SEP began to receive several requests for funding from both individuals and companies. In 1936, Chano Urueta, famous Mexican director and producer, put forth a proposal

419 Letter from the Chapultepec Production Company to the National Economic Secretary, AGN, SEP, Box 33640, Exp. 39, 25 Sept. 1935, 1. 420 Ibid. 421 Ibid., 3.

145 for his film production company, Cine Revolucionario (Revolutionary Cinema) to the Mexican

National Bank, through the SEP.422 Urueta referenced the last film Cine Revoluvionario produced on the irrigation systems in Mexico. He stated that this movie was highly successful in showing the accomplishments of the revolutionary government for putting irrigation systems in rural areas.

Irrigation opened new routes for small farmers and helped women working in the fields for long periods of time.423 The film was a propaganda piece for the success of the Revolution by showing how the government made irrigation more accessible to farmers. Urueta stated that he desired to expand the activities of his company and use film “. . .as a vehicle of a comprehensive vital pedagogical socialization, to the consciousness of the proletarian child of the city and countryside and adult industrial and agricultural worker.”424 Movies could reach the illiterate poor masses in both urban and rural areas to help educate them in conjunction with revolutionary teachings. Films provided a different pedagogical source that for the government. Urueta sought to work with the government, specifically through the SEP, to educate Mexican citizens with revolutionary teaching, such as socialization, collectivization, industrialization, and, in general, academic education. 425 Since Cine Revolucionario would be helping the government, Urueta asked that the

SEP pay to produce the film: half to help with the production and the other half given to the

422 For more information on Chano Urueta, please see Paulo Antonio Paranagúa ed. and translated by Ana M. López, Mexican Cinema (London: British Film Institute, 1995), Joanne Hershfield and David Maciel, eds., Mexico’s Cinema: A Century of Films and Filmmakers (Wilmington: SR Books, 1999), and Robert Michael “Bobb” Cotter, The Mexican Masked Wrestler and Monster (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2005). 423 Proposal submitted by Chano Urueta and to the DBA, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 40, 30 Dec. 1936, 1. 424 Ibid., 2. 425 Ibid., 3.

146 company after the presentation of the movie to the SEP and its acceptance by officials of the

Ministry of Education.

While, domestically, Mexican movies did well in the 1930s, in the U.S. it was more difficult. Some Mexicans within the film production industry felt Hollywood put up unnecessary barriers for Mexican pictures to stop any potential competition within the U.S. The U.S. censored films imported from Mexico, despite the fact there were very few, and Mexican-Americans claimed that this censorship was unfair. Ramon Ruis, the director of Consolidated Information

Service who resided in New York, wrote directly to President Cárdenas about the censorship process and discussed a solution. In the U.S., Mexican movies were subjected to harsh criticism.

Mexican movies were “the target of ignorant censorship that unfairly and arbitrarily mutilates and prohibits films and scenes” that were crucial to the films’ plot.426 Ruis asserted that the U.S. restricted Mexican movies to stop them from potentially competing with Hollywood. Ruis stressed that Mexican pictures were of the highest moral regard and it was U.S. films that were corrupt, ending in what Ruis referred to as “crowning the triumph of adultery or murder.”427

Ruis wrote the SEP as well about the discriminatory censorship practices in the United

States. Mexican films like Redes that were favorably regarded by the international film community, became labeled by U.S. officials as “communist” and prohibited from entering the

U.S..428 Ruis alleged that Teatro Cervantes, the only theater in New York City dedicated to playing solely Spanish language movies, took bribes from U.S. companies as the film house also showed

426 Letter from Ramon Ruis to President Cárdenas, AGN, SEP, Box 33640, Exp.19, 14 Sept. 1936, 1. 427 Ibid. 428 Letter from Ramon Ruis to the SEP, AGN, SEP, Box 33640, Exp. 19, 5 Oct. 1936, 3.

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English-language films. Ruis then stressed that this issue not only effects Mexicans, but the entire

“Hispanic” race. He ended his letter with this warning, “interpreting the ideals of the illustrious son of America, Simón Bolívar, ‘who offends one of our people, offends all Hispanoamerica.’”429

U.S. producers where not just harming Mexico, but all Latin Americans by cutting off the viewing of Mexican film and, more broadly, Spanish language movies.

Many Mexican producers were worried that without protectionist legislation and international growth, Mexican movies could be overpowered by Hollywood. Therefore, with the progression of the cinematic industry, Mexican production companies looked beyond a domestic audience and yearned to reach intercontinental success by to other Spanish-language areas, mostly in Latin America. The introduction of sound greatly increased the demand for

Mexican films in other regions like Cuba and El Salvador, which did not have large domestic cinema industries. The Mexican film industry continued to grow throughout the 1930s, reaching its highest peak in 1938 with 57 movies.430 Mexican cinema was popular with Latin American audiences and this caused conflict between Mexico and Hollywood, as Mexico became a serious competitor on the world market.

Latin American Reception to Mexican Films and Competition with Hollywood

In 1935, Chico Nabarak, a prospective Mexican director and producer, wrote to President

Cárdenas about the troubling perception of Mexicans in Latin America abroad. Nabarak traveled to several countries and he stated in his letter, “I have been interested to know the opinion of people

429 Ibid., 2. 430 Noble, Mexican National Cinema, 14 and 31.

148 who come from other lands and I have been convinced that we are the most discredited of Latin

America.”431 Other Latin Americans believed, according to Nabarak, Mexicans were drunken revolutionaries and that the Revolution was not honorable, but a senseless, violent war and that

Mexico continued to remain in a state of chaos. Nabarak wanted to provide an alternative, accurate image of Mexico abroad. Nabarak asked Cárdenas, as a “Mexican, loyal to his country”, for financing for Mexican films that would showcase the great strides made within Mexico because of the revolutionary government. Nabarak assured Cárdenas that the movies would not only change the world view of Mexico, but also bring in money to the treasury. Nabarak’s vision was right, because by 1940 the Mexican cinema industry was doing quite well internationally.

In 1937, Mexican director José Luis Nueno provided an interview with Filmográfico about his tour in the United States and Cuba and their audience’s reception to Mexican films. Nueno stated that he was well-received and asserted that viewers would continue to watch Mexican films.432 J. Calero Paz, a Peruvian distributor, declared that he believed in a resurgence of Mexican cinema in Perú because the movies provided common themes in Spanish and respected the many differences of Latin American countries.433 Mexico had the most developed cinema industry at the time and became the second exporter of films to Latin America (with United States being the first).434 Latin American countries preferred Mexican movies because they were in Spanish and

431 Letter from Chico Nabarak to President Cárdenas, AGN, SEP, Box 33639, Exp. 34, 22 Sept. 1935, 1. 432 “Caso y Cosas de Cine Nacional,” Filmográfica, Cineteca Nacional, Continental y Filmográfica Oct. 1936-May 1937, Vol. 3, Num. 5, 5 Feb. 1937, 49. 433 “Perú Cree en el Resurgimiento del Cine Mexicano,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 4, Num. 48, 16 June 1939, 1. 434 Noble, Mexican National Cinema, 15.

149 the themes and characters were more relatable than those coming from Hollywood. Mexican films more accurately portrayed the life and people of Latin America.

In the “Review of the Motion Picture Industry and Trade of Cuba During 1941,” written by John P. Hoover, the American Vice Consul, Hoover stated, “Spanish language films are becoming more popular.”435 While many films shown in Cuba were from the United States,

Mexico ranked second. In a memo from March 1944, an unnamed U.S. diplomat wrote to a Mr.

White that the Spanish talking films were “making great strides in the motion picture business.”436

Hollywood films were more popular in Cuba and other Latin American countries simply because these films were of better quality, meaning the cameras and other forms of technology used in

Hollywood were more advanced, making a softer and more appealing picture. However, the quality did not make up for the poor representations of Latin Americans. Therefore, movie houses and theaters in Cuba began to show Spanish-language films more frequently in the 1940s. By 1943,

8% of the imported films were from Mexico and increased to 20% in 1944. Some of the small town theaters actually canceled contracts with studios in order to make room for Spanish language movies from Mexico.437 In another memo entitled, “Review of the Present Trends in the

Motion Picture Industry in Cuba,” dated March 29, 1944, diplomat J.N.C. reported that the three most popular films in Cuba were Tres Mosqueteros (Three Musketeers) 1942, El Circo (The

435 Report written by John P. Hoover, “Review of the Motion Picture Industry and Trade of Cuba During 1941,” U.S. National Archives, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, , Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Embassy, Havana, Internal Affairs of State, Cuba Part 2, Folder 1: Cuba Social Matters, Baseball, and Motion Pictures, Cuba-1942, RG 84, 23 March 1944, 17. 436 Memo from unnamed U.S. diplomat to Mr. White, “Memo,” U.S. National Archives, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, Cuba-1942, Internal Affairs of State, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Embassy, Havana, Cuba Part 2, Folder 2: Cuba Social Matters, Baseball, and Motion Pictures, RG 84, 23 March 1944, 2. 437 Ibid.

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Circus) 1943, and Doña Bárbara 1943, all produced in Mexico.438 J.N.C. suggested that U.S. businessmen buy up Mexican production companies and/or find a way to work with them so

Mexican producers and directors would not turn production companies and movies into anti-

American propaganda.439 This illustrated that J.N.C. saw Mexican cinematographic businesses as a potential threat the U.S. within Latin America.

Argentina was the third largest competitor in Cuba for motion pictures, close behind

Mexico. However, due to Argentina’s stance of neutrality during World War II, the United States imposed a ban on “virgin film”, the unexposed film negatives used to make the actual movie, exported to Argentina.440 This hurt Argentine cinema, but it opened the door for Mexico to take a lead in the Latin American film market.441 Yet, in an interview from an article from El Pais in

Havana dated September 19th, 1945, famous Argentine director Luis César Amadori argued that

Mexico and Argentina have reached a state of “cordial understanding.”442 Both Mexican and

Argentine audiences disliked the Spanish “dubbing” (which was the placing of Spanish-voice over translations paired with the English actors’ voices) of Hollywood films disseminated to Latin

America and would rather have films from other Latin American nations where Spanish was spoken. When asked about dubbing in this interview, Amadori replied that it failed because the

438 Report by diplomat J.N.C., “Review of the Present Trends in the Motion Picture Industry in Cuba,” National Archives, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Embassy, Havana, Cuba-1942, Internal Affairs of State, Cuba Part 2, Folder 2: Cuba Social Matters, Baseball, and Motion Pictures, RG 84, March 1944, 2. 439 Ibid., 6 440 David Scheinin, “Argentina: The Closet Ally,” in Latin America During World War II, eds. Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), 192. 441 Liam White, Mitchum, Mexico, and the Good Neighbours Era (Gosport: Chaplin Books, 2014), 24. 442 Article author unknown, “Translation of Newspaper Article from El Pais,” National Archives, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Embassy, Havana, Cuba-1942, Internal Affairs of State Cuba Part 2, Folder 1: Cuba Social Matters, Motion Pictures, about Sports, State Show Requirements for Cinemas, RG 84, 20 Sept. 1945, 49.

151 audience did not want to hear “Humphrey Bogart talking like an Andalusian urchin.”443 Amadori asserted that Mexico was a solid rival to Hollywood and he sought to forge a substantial bond with the Mexican cinema industry to help Argentine film and the growth of Spanish-language movies in general. In the “Informal Comment on Reports and Dispatches,” the Telecommunications

Division in the United States confirmed this fear of Mexican film industry growth. The Division stated that this report on the Motion Picture Industry in Cuba would be helpful to U.S. businessmen in gauging both “the appeal of dubbing” and the “increased competition of Mexican and Argentine film.”444 While the report suggested that films from Hollywood would become more successful with dubbing, Latin American audiences continued to voice their dislike of Spanish dubbing and that they preferred subtitles or Spanish-language films.

An article in Cinema Reporter stated that the dubbing within Hollywood movies was, in one word, “disastrous.” 445 Yet, U.S. film companies continued to produce dubbed films instead of working with Latin American countries. Therefore, Mexico producers had an opportunity to step in and create Spanish-language films as a better alternative to dubbed movies. This can be seen, for example, in the “World Survey of Foreign Motion Picture Conditions- El Salvador 1939.”

American Vice Consul Overton G. Ellis, Jr. stated that dubbed Spanish films failed to gain a large audience.446 He then went on to declare that Mexico was the largest competitor next to U.S. films

443 Ibid. 444 Report by the U.S. Telecommunications Division, “Informal Comment on Reports and Dispatches,” National Archives, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Embassy Havana Cuba-1942, Internal Affairs of State Cuba Part 2, Folder 1: Cuba Social Matters, Motion Pictures, about Sports, State Show Requirements for Cinemas, RG 84, 1940, 16. 445 “Fracaso del Doblaje en el Centro,” Cineteca Nacional, Censura 1933-1940, Vol. 9, Num. 367, 28 July 1945, 1. 446 Survey by Overton G. Ellis, “World Survey of Foreign Motion Picture Conditions- El Salvador,” National Archives, series Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, 1930-45, El Salvador, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files Legation: San Salvador (Embassy, San Salvador after 1943) – 1936, Internal Affairs, Folder 1: El Salvador Motion Picture Industry, RG 84, 23 Dec. 1939, 5. This is also found in a

152 because Mexican movies were produced in spoken Spanish. In another report written by Ellis in

1941, he asserted that Mexican movies were the only rivals to Hollywood.447 Again, Ellis emphasized the attractiveness of Mexican films in El Salvador, especially the ranchera musical genre. Nicaraguan audiences also enjoyed Mexican movies. Edward B. Lawsor, American

Commercial Atteché in reporter that Mexican and Argentine pictures were the fiercest contenders to U.S. cinema companies.448 Even though Mexican films remained quite far behind

U.S. films (from 1938-1942 only 15% of the films shown in Nicaragua were Mexican), they illustrated their importance on the international market.449 In a report about cinema in Honduras by Fred K. Salter, American Vice Consul, Mexican films were the second largest exporter of films.

Mexican movies often drew a larger crowd and were played for much longer in the theaters than

U.S. movies because Mexican films were in spoken Spanish and contained themes common among other Latin American countries.450 In a survey conducted in Colombia by Allen Rivikin of the

report from Honduras by Antonio Certosimo, National Archives, Internal Affairs of State , Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files Legation, Tegucigalpa (Embassy, Tegucigalpa after 1943)- 1936, Honduras Social Matters, Sports, Entertainment, and Motion Pictures, Folder 1,RG 84, 13 July 1935, 8. 447 Survey by Overton G. Ellis, “Survey of Motion Picture Conditions- El Salvador,”, National Archives, Internal Affairs of State, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America 1930-45, El Salvador, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files Legation: San Salvador (Embassy, San Salvador after 1943) – 1936, Folder 2: El Salvador Motion Picture Industry, RG 84, 10 May 1941, 28. 448 Edward Lawsor, “Motion Pictures in Nicaragua,”, National Archives, Internal Affairs of State, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, 1930-45, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Legation-Embassy, Managua, Nicaragua- 1936, Nicaragua, Folder 1: Nicaragua Sports, Entertainment, and Motion Pictures, RG 84, 29 July 1943, 2. 449 Ibid., 4. 450 Fred Salter, “Motion Picture Conditions in Honduras,” National Archives, Internal Affairs of State, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America, 1930-45, Honduras, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Legation, Tegucigalpa (Embassy, Tegucigalpa after 1943)- 1936, Folder 2: Honduras Social Matters, Sports, Entertainment, and Motion Pictures, RG 84, 12 Sept. 1938, 4.

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Coordinator’s Office of Film Preferences in January of 1943, Mexican films were second only to

U.S. movies in Barranquilla.451

Because Mexican movies were so successful in other Latin American countries,

Hollywood producers and directors discussed the problem of competition from the Mexican cinema industry in several major film newspapers and magazines including The Hollywood

Reporter, Variety, and Motion Picture Herald. An article entitled “U.S. Report Cites Growing

Competition in Mexico,” from Motion Picture Herald August of 1942, detailed how and why the

Mexican film industry became so strong. The article used the U.S. Department of Commerce report stating that Mexican film companies declared Argentina as their biggest competitor “because Latin

American audiences preferred ‘poorly made’” Spanish films to English films coming from

Hollywood.452 The tax levied on foreign movies (Mexico) in languages other than Spanish also helped both the Mexican and Argentine film industries within Mexico.453 The Commerce Report specified that “. . . scenes, songs, or situations which disparage Mexican traditions or customs. . .

Or the presentation of the country’s history in an unfavorable light, may cause a film to be rejected.”454 As shown earlier, these types of movies were often from the U.S. and banned in

Mexican theaters. In an article from The Hollywood Reporter in September of 1942, it was noted that small towns in Mexico prefer Mexican/Argentine films as opposed to big blockbusters from

451 Allen Rivkin, “Survey in Colombia,” Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations-Films and Records, 25 Jan. 1943. 452 Report from the U.S. Department of Congress, “U.S. Report Cites Growing Competition in Mexico,” in Motion Picture Herald, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Pictures and World War II Files, Folder 164: Foreign Film Industries-Mexico, Aug. 1942. 453 Ibid. 454 Ibid.

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Hollywood. Rural villages and less populated areas of Mexico frequently chose Mexican and then

Argentine movies over any dubbed pictures.455

The popularity of Mexican film abroad caused the Mexican government to take a major role in its promotion. An article from The Hollywood Reporter from September of 1943 used a survey created by Herbert T. Silvberg, a lawyer who specialized in film, to examine the idea of

“nationalism” in the Mexican film industry and its effect on Hollywood. Silvberg stated that

“Mexico has embarked on an ‘all out’ program of building its own film industry, even to the extent of partially ‘freezing out’ the American film business and turning a cold shoulder to projected

American enterprise . . .”456 While not entirely deterring U.S. film producers and directors, the

Mexican government provided incentives for Mexicans participating in their own film industry and punishments for those Mexicans who chose to work with foreign countries. For example, any

Mexican actor or actress who worked with Hollywood was not considered a “Mexican star” and earnings on their films decreased.457 The Mexican government officials censored their own laborers (actors, in this case) to build the Mexican cinema industry. In 1944, the Mexican union the Screen Artists Syndicate, went one step further by completely banning any of its members from dubbing Hollywood films in Spanish.458 An article from June 8, 1944 in The Hollywood

Reported detailed that Mexican government officials grounded a plane with actors bound for the

455 Article author unknown, “H’Wood Pix Losing Out to Latins in Mexican Stix,” The Hollywood Reporter, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Pictures and World War II Files, Folder 164: Foreign Film Industries- Mexico, 23 Sept. 1942. 456 Article by Herbert T. Silvberg, “Spirit of Nationalism is Keynote of Mex. Industry,” The Hollywood Reporter, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Pictures and World War II Files, Folder 164: Foreign Film Industries-Mexico, 15 Sept. 1943. 457 Ibid. 458 Article author unknown, “Mex. Union Stops Actors from Coming Here to Dub Pictures,” The Hollywood Reporter, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Pictures and World War II Files, Folder 164: Foreign Film Industries- Mexico, 8 June 1944.

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U.S to do dubbing work.459 The union in Mexico declared that any Mexican union member who participated in helping foreign competition would not be able to work in Mexican film productions.

Not only did the Mexican unions want to help cripple Hollywood, many Mexican officials, along with audience members disliked U.S. dubbing because of its poor use of the Spanish language and they did not want to further encourage this.460

Other Latin American politicians and producers/directors echoed Mexican officials in their criticism of U.S. movies and sought an alternative. In an editorial entitled, “Lack of Scruple and

Education of the Film Production Houses,” from the newspaper El Cronista in Honduras, an anonymous author criticized U.S. films for their ignorance of Latin American culture. The author asserted that U.S. movies were “disastrous” for Mexico.461 The author then went on to describe the situation in Mexico where U.S. movies had terribly portrayed their country and Mexicans. He declared that if people only had knowledge of Mexico through U.S. films, Mexico would be:

. . . a desert full of cacti; the inhabitants lodge in miserable huts and the mule is the only means of locomotion; its women are Indians with long braided hair and filthy skirts and the men tawdry ragged, full of dirt and with a harrowing face capable of causing fear in the most brave. In sum, Mexico, according to the interpretation of the Yankee directors, would be nothing more than a nest of bandits.462

U.S. pictures did not depict Mexico in a flattering light, leaving out all the strides towards modernity that Mexican officials made.

459 Ibid. 460 Ibid. 461 Article author unknown, “Lack of Scruple and Education of the Film Production Houses,” in El Cronista, National Archives, Internal Affairs of State, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America 1930-45, Honduras, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Legation, Tegucigalpa (Embassy, Tegucigalpa, 1943)-1936, Folder 1: Honduras Social Matters, Sports, Entertainment, and Motion Pictures, RG 84, 8 Feb. 1935, 4. 462 Ibid.

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The author argued how uplifting the Mexican race was not a popular “theme” for U.S. audiences because they would rather see the stereotypical caricatures of Mexicans and Mexican-

Americans. Therefore, U.S. directors chose to highlight the negative aspects of Mexican culture instead of making a movie that illustrated the positive work the government was doing to rebuild itself and the Mexican cultural projects.463 The directors and producers did not care about the negative portrayal of race so much as they were able to make a profit from the film. At the end of the article, the author called for the people of Latin America to stand up against this degrading representation, asserting, “How would you like it, Sirs, if we, guided by your pictures, believed that you were nothing more than enormous band of gangsters, where justice is sold to the brewer, politicians are agents of Al Capone, and machine guns are as common as cigars? Indeed that would be monstrously illogical?”464

April 4, 1944 Miguel Izaguerri wrote a report for the Mexican ambassador to Honduras,

José Muñoz Cota, detailing the positive impact of Mexican films on the Honduran audience.

Izaguerri stated that Argentine and U.S. films provided only a “bourgeois” view of life.465 Mexican movies were different by appealing to the working class. Mexican films showed “. . . the struggle of the charro, of the country man against the capitalist, against the rich farmer, against the young gentleman and the boss who wants to steal his idolized sweetheart, his beloved land. But fortunately, in most cases the underdog comes out on top.”466 The hero of the Mexican movie was

463 Ibid. 464 Ibid., 5. 465 Article by Miguel Izaguirre, “The Mexican Movies,” in El Heraldo, National Archives, Internal Affairs of State, Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records, Central America 1930-45, Honduras, Records of the Department of State Diplomatic Post Files: Legation, Tegucigalpa (Embassy, Tegucigalpa after 1943)- 1936, Folder 3: Honduras Social Matters, Sports, Entertainment, and Motion Pictures, RG 84, 19 April 1944, 12. 466 Ibid.

157 from a humble background, a worker or small farmer, who had to overcome the obstacles of either an overbearing boss or greedy hacienda owner. The elite and white-collar workers were the enemies and the hero was a strong, macho man able to defeat them and keep his land and/or family.

Mexican film appealed to the lower and working classes because the “little guy” won out.

Mexican films contained themes more appealing to Latin American audiences, that countered the negative attitude and illustration of Hispanics in Hollywood and the U.S. The

National Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples in the U.S., a committee formed by Latina activist

Luisa Moreno in 1938, warned that the treatment of Hispanics in U.S. film alienated a large portion of United States’ population and, internationally, hurt the war effort in Mexico.467 In a letter to

David Hopkins, Coordinator’s Representative for the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs from

Josefina Fierro de Bright, General Secretary of the National Spanish Speaking People’s Congress on June 6, 1942, Fierro stated that there were large problems within the Spanish-speaking community.468 She asserted that U.S. companies took advantage of the Mexican population by paying them less. Jobs were tough for Mexicans to obtain because of prejudice and difficulty attaining work visas. Fierro suggested that government agencies exempt Mexican nationals from the paperwork needed to approve their status.469 Although, on June 5, 1942, Mexican President

Manuel Ávila Camacho declared war on the Axis powers, joining the United States in the fight

467 The Congress “aimed to improve the economic, social, moral, and cultural, conditions of Hispanics.” From Mario T. García, Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity, 1930-1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 147. 468 Josefina Fierro de Bright letter to David Hopkins, Margret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 130: Mexican Tourist Bureau Films-Correspondence, 30 June 1942, 1. 469 Ibid. 2

158 against fascism, not all Mexicans and Mexican-Americans supported the war effort.470 She insinuated that many immigrants could not speak English, so they were more prone to reading fascist newspapers and other forms of anti-democratic media. Additionally, Mexicans saw the war as another “phase of Yankee Imperialism” and were not concerned.471 Her figures included: 20% neutral, showing a lack of integration of the Spanish speaking population, a large minority group,

50% not supporting the war, with 30% actively opposing.472 She argued that this was a huge problem and the cause was the lack of effort on the part of U.S. in reaching the Spanish-speaking community both domestically and abroad. She suggested that more be done to produce media and propaganda within films to help foster ties with Mexicans and the Spanish-speaking community at large. These complaints also reflected a growing discontentment internationally, especially towards U.S. films that portrayed Latin American cultures as monolithic and insulting.

The Motion Picture Society of the Americas (MPSA) put together a press summary in May of 1941 called “Specific Criticisms” to discuss this problem of negative reception. In the summary, the MPSA agents acquired several articles from both Mexican and U.S. newspapers illustrating the opinion of Mexican and Latin Americans both domestically and internationally on “Hispanic”

Hollywood films. Argentine Nights (1940) was the first movie critiqued. It was about three managers in the entertainment business who left the U.S to escape . They stowed away on a ship to and ended up in Buenos Aires. The all-girl band they managed came with them as well and performed most of the musical numbers within the film.473 The movie caused

470 Camacho’s Declaration of War, Margret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 141: Mexico-research, 1. 471 Ibid., 3. 472 Ibid., 3. 473 John Sforza, Swing It! The Andrews Sisters Story (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 207.

159 an outrage with Argentine audiences because of the misrepresentation of Argentines. For example, the three managers impersonated the all-girl band in one scene by dressing up like the Bahia costume of Carmen Miranda, insinuating that Brazilian dress was representative of Argentine women. The Argentines that the managers met acted barbaric and ignorant.474 Argentines reacted badly to this film and an author of an editorial in the Miami Herald stated, “Who can blame them?”

The United States producers and directors portrayed Latin Americans as “gangsters” and “hillbilly degenerates.”475

In an article from the Kentucky Times in Louisville entitled, “Hollywood Attacks

Neighbors,” an anonymous author argued that films like Argentine Nights brought about anti-

American feelings.476 These types of movies hurt relations with the U.S. and that threatened the

Ally alliance with Latin America. The author called attention to an article from a Buenos Aires newspaper, La Nacion, in which the Argentine author stated, “No amount of good-will traveling will foster Pan-American understanding.”477 The author for the Kentucky Times agreed with the

Argentine, stating the solution to this problem was to stop the ignorance of U.S. producers and directors. An editorial from the Evening Courier from Camden, NJ, asserted that because

Hollywood did not know what was offensive to South American audiences, they should hire someone familiar with the customs to collaborate with in writing and producing movies.478 There

474 Jean-Louis Ginibre, Ladies or Gentlemen: A Pictorial History of Male Cross-Dressing in the Movies (New York: Filipacci Publishing, 2005), 140. 475 Article author unknown, “Argentine Nights,” Miami Herald, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 7 May 1941, 166. 476 Article author unknown, “Hollywood Attacks Neighbors,” Times Louisville, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 5 May 1941,166. 477 Ibid. 478 Article author unknown, “A Mickey Finn,” Evening Courier, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 6 May 1941, 168.

160 needed to be someone who could act as a liaison between Latin America and Hollywood to help cultivate positive images of Hispanics. There was an effort by United States’ officials to censor

U.S. films going to South America. However, the censorship was not applied to movies that might be offensive. Lucy Neville, who wrote an editorial in Knickerbocker News, detailed that the censors in the U.S. focused more on movies like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) and The

Grapes of Wrath (1940) because they portrayed the U.S. government in a negative light.479

Hollywood and U.S. government agents were more concerned about the image of the United States and corruption in the U.S. administration in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, rather than the racial issues of the films that blatantly insulted the people of Latin America with unfair representations.

Another movie that upset Latin American audiences and showed the ignorance of

Hollywood was Miss Central America. This film depicted the “Miss Central America” competition; however, the winner was announced as a woman from El Salvador “an island in the

Bahamas.”480 Obviously, the producers made an error in geography and Latin America audiences, especially those in El Salvador, were upset. The article ended with the remark that the U.S. film industry invest in an atlas.481 The author was mocking the filmmakers for making such a foolish mistake. It clearly showed the ignorance and carelessness of U.S. directors and producers. This lack of knowledge significantly hurt Hollywood’s market in Latin America and opened it up for

Mexico.

479 Lucie Neville, “Fighting Regulations,” Knickerbocker News, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 27 May 1941, 197. 480 Article author unknown, “Miss Central America,” Record, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 8 May 1941, 172. 481 Ibid.

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In June of 1943, Ted Fithian, a writer on staff at the Council of Inter-American affairs, was instructed by Joseph Breen, President of the MPSA, to conduct research on Latin American reception of U.S. films.482 On July 27, Fithian submitted one report on the Mexican audience reactions to the film Yankee Doodle Dandy (1942). This was a patriotic musical showcasing the life of entertainer George M. Cohan. It was made right after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and used as piece of propaganda to gain popularity for the war effort throughout the Americas.483 In the letter Fithian stated that, “Our films portray too much of the shoddy and repugnant.”484 The audience complained about the music because U.S. director did not understand customs of Latin

America. For example, they would play Cuban music for a scene in Mexico or claim the music to be from Mexico when it was Brazilian. Mexican viewers stated they would rather Hollywood not use their music at all. Finally, Fithian analyzed, Mexican and Argentine movies were growing in popularity because Latin Americans “liked to see a brown-skinned hero.”485 U.S. movies never showed Mexicans or any Latin Americans as true heroes, especially in Yankee Doodle Dandy, which did not have one cast member of Latin American descent. To go back to the editorial by

Izaguerri, Latin Americans wanted a hero they could relate to. Many critics of the film business in the United States believed Hollywood should focus on making films that were “authentic.” An author of an editorial from the Oregonian stated that if Hollywood sought to create movies about

482 Joseph Breen to Ted Fithian, telegram, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 429: Fithian, Ted, 15 June 1943. 483 “Filmsite Movie Review: Yankee Doodle Dandy (1942),” 26 March 2015, http://www.filmsite.org/yank.html. 484 Telegram from Joseph Breen to Ted Fithian, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 429: Fithian, Ted, 15 June 1943. 485 Ibid., 2.

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Latin America to foster good relations then producers had to “stick to authenticity.”486 To remedy this, filmmakers needed to be accurate by employing people who had knowledge of life in Latin

America. “It is time, we suggest, that the motion picture industry consider seriously a substantial

Western Hemisphere policy designed to heal and not to hurt; to be sympathetic with rather than to give offense to . . .”487

U.S. Directors and Producers Respond to Hollywood’s Ignorance

Directors and producers in Hollywood realized that there was a problem with the poor representation of Hispanics in U.S. film. To keep their dominance in the Latin American cinema market, the Office for the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), using the Motion

Picture Society for the Americas (MPSA), decided to help producers and directors create films that portrayed Latin Americans, especially Mexicans, in a more positive light. The OCIAA was a government agency built to foster “hemispheric solidarity” against the Axis powers.488 The

OCIAA used cultural diplomacy and the MPSA, founded in 1941, was the motion picture wing of the OCIAA that collaborated with the U.S. film industry. The main duty of the MPSA was to work with the primary movie companies so that their films fit in with the major objectives of the OCIAA.

However, according to the first issue of Reel News in June 1942, the MPSA’s personal newspaper, the job of the MPSA expanded to include the making and overseeing of short movies that would

486 Article author unknown, “Sound Advice,” Oregonian, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 21 May 1941, 194. 487 Article author unknown, “Industry Needs a Policy,” NY Press, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 390: Cultural Relations- Films and Records, 10 May 1941, 178. 488 Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), 2.

163 bridge the cultural gap within the Americas.489 Most members of the MPSA accepted the fact that

U.S. audiences knew very little about the “neighbors down South.” Walter Wagner, president of the MPSA in 1942, stated in his address to Variety,

Most North Americans are quite out of touch with the conditions which exist in the countries which share the Western Hemisphere; and, what is worse, they accept certain caricatures as representative of Latin American people . . . an immediate effort should be made to transform mutual ignorance and suspicion into mutual understanding and sympathy. No more urgent objective faces the educators of America; no more essential duty faces every citizen who ‘can read and comprehend.’490

The MPSA and film were crucial to this mission of educating the Americas.

The OCIAA and MPSA both asserted that film was extremely important in the transfer of information and culture. In the same issue of Reel News the MPSA stated that, through movies, the MPSA could help construct a friendly relationship with countries in Latin America that would work towards the larger objectives of the MPSA.491 In this case, the joint goal was to defeat the

Axis powers and restore democracy. However, to unite the Americas, the countries needed common understanding and mutual respect. In an article by Mary C. McCal Jr. in Reel News entitled “200,000 Eyes Upon Us”, she warned, “ . . . when we produce pictures which are laid in

Latin America, or which Latin American characters appear, we must remember the power we are unleashing, the power to bind our hemisphere together, the power to alienate out neighbors, and

489 Article author unknown, “Freeman, Wagner continue as Society Heads,” in Reel News, Information Control and Propaganda- Records of the Office of War Information Part I, The Director’s Central Files, 1942-45, Folder 1: Motion Pictures, Information Control, and Propaganda Files, June 1942, 3. 490 Ibid. 491 MPSA article, “Orson Welles Proves that ‘It’s All True,’” in Reel News, Information Control and Propaganda- Records of the Office of War Information Part I, The Director’s Central Files, 1942-45, Folder 1: Motion Pictures, Information Control, and Propaganda Files, June 1942, 5.

164 to destroy what we must have, Pan-American solidarity.”492 Film industries in the United States needed to portray Latin Americans in a positive light if the U.S. sought them as allies against the

Axis powers.

The Coordination Committee for Mexico, a commission of the MPSA, chaired by F.W.

Ellis, was responsible for reporting on what types of films should/should not be considered for consumption by Mexican and Mexican-American audiences. In a letter to Rockefeller, head of the

OICAA, Ellis developed a list of “do’s and don’ts” for movies exported to Mexico. First, Ellis cautioned that Mexico was not so much pro-Axis as it was anti-American and anti-imperialistic.493

He suggested that U.S. movies should include the faults within the United States in a “good humored way” because many Mexicans asserted that the U.S. flaunted itself as superior.494 Ellis declared that U.S. filmmakers had to show the critiques and problems in U.S. life with comedy and jokes that were all-around good-natured. This would allow the U.S. to depict themselves as equals, not superior. Ellis recommended that a film about the day in the life of a Mexican diplomat would be useful so Mexican audiences could see, first-hand, the positive relationship being built between the two countries.

The committee was also concerned with how Mexicans were portrayed to U.S. viewers.

For example, Ellis stated, “Many Americans think of Mexico as a place where hygiene and

492 Mary C. McCall Jr., “200,000 Eyes Upon Us,” in Reel News, Information Control and Propaganda- Records of the Office of War Information Part I, The Director’s Central Files, 1942-45, Folder 1: Motion Pictures, Information Control, and Propaganda Files, June 1942, 2. 493 Letter from F.W. Ellis to MPSA, “Letter: No. CCM-65,” Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 488: Mexico-Films, 2 Feb.1942, 1. For more on Rockefeller’s involvement with OCIAA and cultural diplomacy within Latin America see Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012) 494 Ibid., 2.

165 cleanliness do not exist.”495 While Mexico may not be up to the same health and sanitary conditions as the United States, Ellis continued, many good strides were made towards modernity and there should be a short film produced to showcase up and coming cities such as Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Puebla. This movie would allow for U.S. audiences to see that Mexico was not as primitive and barbaric as they once thought. Ellis was not alone as Orson Welles also created a film that was never finished, entitled It’s All True, showcasing different areas of Latin America. Walt Disney produced a few cartoons like Saludos Amigos (We are Friends, 1942) attempting to depict a cordial, friendly relationship.496 However, these films were still ripe with negative stereotypes.

In 1943, John C Higgins, a U.S. screenwriter who worked with the MPSA, wrote a script entitled Mexico. Higgins created this film to show the history of Mexico from the time of the

Aztecs to the present-day. In a series of letters, Higgins corresponded with Jack Chertok () and Allen Rivkin, founder of the Writer’s Guild of America. These letters illustrated the conflicts that both writers and producers had with the creation of a movie that depicted Mexico and Mexicans as progressive and modern. The letters also revealed the thoughts of U.S. filmmakers about Mexicans and how to rectify their ignorance to keep their dominance in this market.

The correspondence began with a letter from Higgins to Chertok and Rivkin entitled

“Mexico: Suggestions for Attack.” In this communication, Higgins warned that Mexico was a diverse country, unlike Chile, (which was settled by “mostly whites”). Producers and directors needed to understand that Mexico contained a very diverse population and a variety of cultural

495 Ibid., 4. 496 White, Mitchum, Mexico and the Good Neighbours Era, 51-52. For more details on Orson Wells’ film see Catherine Benamou, It’s All True: Welles’s Pan-American Odyssey (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007).

166 differences throughout its many states. 497 Higgins then went on to say, “Mexicans are a new race”

(underlined in the script), a mix between Spaniards and Indians. Mexicans needed to work out a way of life to balance this cultural blend and were trying to build a state based on equality, like the

U.S. model.498 Higgins argued that Mexicans were attempting to create a government and lifestyle based on the American model. U.S. citizens should support them in this endeavor and uplift the image of Mexicans. Higgins expressed his intentions of the film:

The purpose of this picture is to show our people that Mexicans are not ‘greaser’ and ‘spigs’ [who spend half their time asleep under trees and the other half violent and perpetuating revolution.] It is to show the truth, they are human beings like ourselves, with many of our own customs and beliefs, yet with beliefs and culture and customs that also are vastly different from ours, and yet are valid and vital to them, picturesque and interesting to us . . . The second purpose is inherent in the first- - - by introducing the Mexicans to ourselves, their pride is touched . . .499

Higgins wanted to use the film to provide the U.S. public with an alternative, positive view of

Mexicans. He sought a cultural exchange that would breed a productive and cooperative relationship with Mexico and its people.

To ensure that the film would be well-received by Mexicans, Higgins stated that these subjects should be avoided: 1. U.S./Mexican War (1846-1848), 2. annexation of Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico, 3. Pancho Villa’s confrontation in Columbus, NM, 4. Vera Cruz Invasion

(1916), 5. Nationalization of oil, and 6. the Mexican navy.500 There was to be no mention of the rocky relationship and imperialism of the United States in the late 1800s or of the offenses

497 Letter from John C. Higgins to Jack Chertok and Allen Rivkin, “Mexico: Suggestions for Attack,” Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 131: Mexico- Script, 1 Feb. 1943, 1-2. 498 Ibid., 2. 499 Ibid., 3. 500 Letter from John C. Higgins to Jack Chertok and Allen Rivkin, “Mexico: Suggested Outline,” Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 13: Mexico-Script, 1 Feb.1943, 8.

167 committed during the Revolution. Enrique de Lozada, Rockefeller’s top adviser for the Office of

Inter-American Affairs, also provided advice for the film. Lozado insisted that the movie negate the idea that Mexico was full of bandits and unstable revolutionaries, like Pancho Villa. Also, he demanded that Higgins portray Mexico as a democratic country and an example for others in

Central and South America to look up.501 Lozado anticipated to create a new image of Mexicans that was easily relatable to a U.S. audience and Father Morelos, the prominent figure in the fight for independence from Spain in Mexico, provided a great hero that Americans could equate with their own like George Washington: both fighting for freedom from an oppressive colonial power.

In April of 1943, Higgins created a temporary complete script for Mexico. Higgins made sure to emphasize that Mexico was a modern and industrial country. Images in the movie included an airplane flying over Mexico City, a new military hospital, the monument of the Revolution, hotels and boulevards, La Nacional Building, and Monterey and its factories.502 While showing these images, the narrator stated, “Mexico is modern . . . But besides buildings and factories and hospitals, Mexico is modern in another way! She has taken her place among those nations that stand united against injustice and slavery.”503 The second part referred to Mexico declaring war on the Axis powers. Again, Higgins illustrated that Mexico was not backwards both physically and with ideals of freedom and justice.

This script went to the OCIAA for inspection and critics revised it further. The OCIAA took out content that related to World War II and President Roosevelt, which was the most

501 Ibid., 10. 502 Ibid. 503 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the American narrator referred to Mexico as “she.” I will explain this concept of gender further in chapter five.

168 significant omission.504 Higgins protested this change. In a letter to Jack Chertok, Higgins insisted that the shot of Roosevelt and Camacho (president of Mexico 1940-46) shaking hands be put back in the film because it emphasized the fact that Mexico was part of the Allies. Higgins claimed that

Mexico’s war effort needed to be illustrated to solidify their alliance and Mexico’s contribution should be recognized. In the same memo with Chertok’s answers included, Chertok, again, stated that there would be no mention of Mexico and the war. However, Chertok provided no reason as to why the war could not be discussed. The final script contained several other changes such as the correction of dates and names. Bruno Newman, a member of the OCIAA commented that Higgins not give credit to de la Huerta, Calles, or Obregón (earlier presidents of Mexico) because “the position of these men in history has not been completely weighed” and this may cause controversy with Mexican audiences.505

The MPSA and OICAA worked together to generate other ideas for films that could strengthen ties between Latin America, specifically Mexico, and the United States.

Correspondence messages and letters from 1943 discussed several potential screenplays.

Analyzing this communication, one can assess the attitudes of the MPSA and OICAA towards

Latin America and what officials considered “proper” to show Latin American audiences. For example, in a memo from Kenneth McGowan, a U.S. film producer who worked with Fox Films, to Gerald Smith, assistant director of the Motion Picture Division of the OICAA, stated the studio did not want to make a film about the Monroe Doctrine because the topic was too controversial.

504 John C. Higgins, Mexico, edited script from OICAA, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 136: Mexico- Script, 6 May 1943, 1. 505 John C. Higgins, Mexico, edited script from OICAA, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 140: Mexico- Script, 1.

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McGowan returned the script to the MPSA and Fox Films declared that they would happily give up the rights to this film if any other company wanted to take this project on. However, no one wanted this script because of the potentially provocative material. 506

Taking a more positive direction, conversation by letters between Joseph Breen, President of the MPSA, and U.S. producer E. Lawrence, discussed the creation of a movie entitled The

Americas. This film would illustrate the United States’ optimistic attitude towards Mexico.

Lawrence asserted that the movie needed to end with modern Mexico including: the Manuel

Camacho presidency (1940-1946) and Mexico’s declaration of war on the Axis powers to show that United States and Mexico had friendly and cooperative relations.507 Lawrence suggested that the studio could make the movie using pieces of cinema from Mexico that they already collected and images from Mexican newsreels. Lawrence asserted that only “factual” material be used in the making of the film, meaning information based on newspapers and other sources. He then suggested using José Guadalupe Posada for commentary on the Porfirio Díaz regime and Diego

Rivera and José Clemente Orozco for the Mexican Revolution.508

Illustrating the Mexican Revolution in U.S. movies posed a problem for Hollywood.

Because of their political ignorance in the past, MPSA officials were most concerned with the portrayal of Mexican leaders of the Mexican Revolution. In 1942, an idea for a film based off

Zapata, the Unconquerable by Edgecumb Pinchon came to the MPSA for review and acceptance.

(Pinchon was a historical writer who authored the book and screenplay Viva Villa! in 1933.) The

506 Kenneth MacGowan, memo to Gerald Smith, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 228: Correspondence, 17 June 1943. 507 E. Lawrence handwritten letter to Joseph Breen, Margaret Herrick Library-Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 228: Correspondence, 24 Sept. 1943, 1. 508 Ibid., 2.

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MPSA had difficulties deciding how to portray Zapata. They claimed some Mexicans saw Zapata as a hero, while others remembered him as more of a ruthless , like Villa. Tammy Cotter,

MPSA script reader and writer, put together a short summary and analysis of the film for the officials at the MPSA. After reading Pinchon’s script, Cotter concluded Zapata was one of the

“incorruptible revolutionists” who really did want social revolution.509 It was his soldiers and methods that were cruel and controversial. Too many people remember these soldiers as ruthless and don’t want to adopt Zapata as a national hero. Cotter argued that Pinchon refuted any claims that Zapata was a bloodthirsty caudillo.510

Cotter attached a synopsis of the script for the MPSA officials. In short, the movie embellished and romanticized Zapata. As a child, he is seen defending the milpa when a hacienda owner threw him a peso and he refused to pick it up. The owner stated, “A peso is a peso” and young Zapata replied, “Sí, Señor, and a milpa is a milpa.”511 As a young adult, he stood up to the

Rurales (the private police force of Porfirio Díaz) and in one scene, he jumped over the wall with his horse, narrowly escaping the rurales, who continued to shoot after him. As an adult, Zapata became a leader within in his own town. While Zapata was wealthier than others, he realized that many of his people were struggling so he went to Díaz to address the grievances of Morelos.

However, he was denied entry to see Díaz. Along with being a champion of peoples’ rights, he was also a romantic who had several affairs, yet always provided for his children, like him being a father to the people of Morelos, his home state. At the end of the film, Helena, one of Zapata’s

509 Tammy Cotter summary of Zapata, The Unconquerable, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 315: Zapata, the Unconquerable, 7 Jan. 1942, 1. 510 Ibid. 511 Ibid. A milpa is the land that the indigenous cultivate. However, the milpa was taken away by the Díaz regime.

171 lovers, warned him that Carranza was tricking Zapata into meeting up; however, Zapata still went to the meeting and Carranza had Zapata killed.512 In the film, the spirit of Zapata lived on in Lázaro

Cárdenas, who was the President/leader who finally solidified the promises of the Revolution.

Because of the more positive message in Zapata the MPSA accepted the script. In several reports to the MPSA, other movie ideas were discussed and rejected for numerous reasons. These details shed light on what U.S. producers and directors considered appropriate for Latin America audiences. For example, Breen suspended the production of a film on the life of Sam Zemurray because it contained provocative material.513 Zemurray was the president of United Fruit Company in 1934. UFCO was extremely controversial because the company had exploited workers in several

Central American countries, especially Guatemala. Breen declared that a biography of Zemurray’s life would cause protests and boycotts because of UFCO perceived interference in Guatemalan politics. Overall, Breen and the rest of the officials of the MPSA professed their success in creating a respectable and workable relationship with Mexico using films.

Conclusion

The MPSA dissolved in 1946, at the end of the World War II. The goodwill effort put forth by directors and producers in the U.S. was no longer needed once the Allies won. Unfortunately for Latin Americans, Hollywood and United States officials were only concerned with the image of Hispanics during the war so that Central and South America would continue to be allies with

512 Ibid., 8. 513 Joseph Breen, letter to Maurice Reis, Margaret Herrick Library, Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Folder 228: Correspondence, 6 Dec. 1943.

172 the U.S. and help provide raw materials needed to continue the fighting in Europe and the South

Pacific. The end of the war ushered in a new period of U.S.-Latin American relations that turned away from the Good Neighbor Policy and towards containment and anti-communist intervention.

The Mexican film industry continued to grow tremendously despite the efforts of

Hollywood to create more “friendly” films for Latin America. Mexican movie producers and officials used the racial problems of Hollywood to their advantage by creating a “brown hero” for

Latin Americans and providing stories that related to themes and lives of those in Latin America.

Mexican films were also sensitive and aware of cultural differences throughout Latin America, unlike Hollywood. However, the Mexican film industry could only grow so far without the help of the United States. Producers and directors in Mexico needed to import materials such as cameras and equipment, along with the most important asset: raw film.514 This made it difficult for Mexican officials to completely boycott Hollywood films and competition. For Mexican film companies to receive goods, U.S. officials bartered with the Mexican government to slash taxes on foreign films and allow the import of Hollywood films. Unfortunately, without the help and cooperation of the

United States, the Mexican film industry was stuck in limbo and would begin to decline after the end of World War II in 1945, when the U.S. stopped providing its much-needed financial and material assistance.

514 Article by W.R. Wilkerson, “Tradeviews,” in The Hollywood Reporter, Information Control and Propaganda- Records of the Office of War Information Part I, The Director’s Central Files, 1942-45, Folder 2: Motion Pictures, Information Control, and Propaganda Files, 1 April 1943, 49.

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Chapter Four: Unions- Foundation of the Film Industry

Introduction

The growth of Mexican cinema in the 1930’s and 1940’s created many new career and job opportunities, not only for producers and directors, but also actors, stage hands, electricians, cameramen and a slew of other technical jobs. To ensure their fair pay and safe working conditions, these industry employees began to form unions. This proved difficult however, due to a lack of cohesion among workers. Several different unions emerged that generated tension between actors who performed in front of the camera and technical workers who worked behind the scenes. The technical laborers, including set builders, asserted that actors saw themselves as more entitled and the “real” stars, worthy of different representation. Yet, these movies would not be made without the hard work in the background and the technical workers pushed for equality amongst all involved in production. Unions also clashed with the Mexican government and Hollywood film studios by demanding better working conditions and salaries for Mexicans both in the domestic setting and those who worked for Hollywood companies (as actors, translators, consultants, etc.).

Laborers, both in front of the camera and behind the scenes, challenged Mexican censorship laws and pushed for protectionist legislation for Mexican films, making workers and unions active participants in the censorship process.

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This chapter focuses on the impact that the unions had on the Mexican film industry and censorship. I argue that the numerous cinema unions fought back against Hollywood’s racially and culturally degrading movies of Hispanics by staging boycotts and strikes against any film companies and theaters that produced and supported such pictures. Unions also shaped the structure of the movie industry by negotiating with the Mexican national government and, again, using strikes and boycotts as ways to gain more bargaining power, as well as challenge and change cinema laws. The first section discusses the history and development of cinema unions from the

1910s-1944, when the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industria Cinematográfica (Union of Film

Industry Workers, STIC) came to represent all the film workers.515 From the start, union leaders had a difficult time unifying cinema laborers because there were many differences between them.

For example, some theaters in small towns only had a few employees who worked weekends, while large complexes in Mexico City dealt with hundreds of workers, making the needs of each very different. There was also a wide range of work, including technical, acting, ticket taking, concessions, etc., creating tension between the laborers themselves.

Hostility increased when officials of the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana

(Regional Workers' Confederation of Mexico, CROM) decided to merge all Mexican unions under one larger organization, which would be CROM. President Obregón (1920-1924) backed CROM and appointed CROM union leaders in political positions.516 However, not all cinema unions aligned with CROM as several supported the Confederación General de Trabajadores (General

Confederation of Workers, CGT, which leaned more to the left) and Confederación Católica del

515 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 69. 516 Jorge Mejía Prieto, El Poder tras de las gafas (Mexico City: Editorial Diana, 1980), 21.

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Trabajo (Catholic Labor Confederation, CNTC). Eventually CROM unified all cinema employees by the end of the 1920s. However, CROM lost power with the rise of President Cárdenas (1934-

1940) and ultimately the cinema workers created the Unión de Trabajadores e Estudios

Cinematográficos de Mexico (Union of Workers of Cinematographic Studios of Mexico, UTEC) under STIC. Despite the many changes within the structure of the unions, the basic job remained the same: to protect Mexican workers.517 In the 1910-1920s, when Mexico’s movie production was rather small, the main objective was to work with U.S. companies in providing fair pay and working conditions. In the 1930s, with the growth of domestic industry, leaders called for protectionist legislation to keep Mexican workers in Mexico and stimulate the growth of Mexican cinema. This went along with the SEP’s efforts to also promote Mexican movies.

The second section of this chapter examines ANDA’s struggle to separate from UTEC.

The formation of STIC and UTEC created infighting between the technical workers and actors.

Actors designed the informal Asociación Nacional de Actores (Association of Actors, ANDA) and they asserted that UTEC could not accurately represent them because they had different needs.

Actors also envisioned themselves as the money-makers so they fought to break off and create their own unit within STIC. ANDA became its own sector (referred to as section 7) in March 1940, which led to a five-year struggle between ANDA and UTEC, and caused strikes and boycotts that virtually shut down the cinema industry in Mexico. The hostilities climaxed with union workers fighting the federal police in the streets. Therefore, union leaders called in the help of President

Camacho, who provided a resolution allowing ANDA to be separate. However, this agreement

517 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 42.

176 diminished the power of both groups so another upheaval, like the ones from 1940-45, could not happen again. These events between ANDA and STIC are important to examine because they show the power of unions. They paralyzed the industry when demands were not met. In this case, the fighting was so bad that the federal government had to intervene to keep the film industry from completely shutting down.

The third and final part of this chapter describes the demands of workers and the accomplishments of the unions. Despite the difficulty unifying cinema workers and the fighting between ANDA and UTEC, the film unions successfully managed to raise standards for workers and improve Mexican cinema, overall. While government bureaucracies supported and provided funds to promote Mexican movies, it was the workers that ultimately made the production of the films possible. Therefore, the unions were an important element in the construction a successful movie business. Union leaders pressed for the government to require that Mexican companies reached the standards of other international businesses so workers would not have incentive to leave. They also demanded funding, which led to the creation of the Banco Cinematográfico

(Cinematography Bank) in 1941. STIC also created an efficient payment system that ensured workers’ checks and compensation, along with guaranteeing a safe environment, asserting that all of this was done to advance the quality of Mexican movies. The union critiqued Mexican films and offered up suggestions for improvement. Unions actively participated in the dissemination of post-revolutionary culture by advocating for protectionist legislation (which contained provisions, like what would be shown) and staging strikes and boycotts against companies that portrayed negative images of Mexicans and treated Mexican workers poorly. These actions, in turn,

177 legitimized the PRI’s regime’s policies and progress. This ties into the larger idea of censorship as workers also asserted the need to be protected and portrayed in a positive light.

Cinema Unions: Brief History

By 1944, STIC represented all film workers within Mexico, both actors and behind the scenes laborers, as well as those Mexicans working abroad.518 However, this unification took collaboration and negotiation, not all of it pleasant. STIC had its roots in the very first union for cinema workers: the Unión de Empleados Confederados del Industria Cinematográfico

(Confederated Union of Cinema Workers) created in 1919.519 However, U.S. companies that worked in Mexico often placed Mexican employees in lower position of both power and pay.520

The inequalities within the theaters caused tension and, though the Confederated Union of Cinema

Workers was small, it was quite powerful. In November of 1921, film workers came together to protest the removal of Mexican mangers for U.S. employees. One hundred and sixty-five workers signed the petition, including two women (Maria Esperanza Cadena and Rosa Corona), with most the laborers being from Circuito Olimpia, a U.S.-owned theater chain.521 Circuito Olimpia had little choice to reinstate the Mexicans as the workers threatened to strike and it would cost more money to train new people than give into the demands. Another example took place again at

Circuito Olimpia in 1922, was when management laid off several Mexican workers due to the slow business caused by President Obregón’s ban of U.S. films. In response, the employees went on

518 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 69. 519 Ibid. 520 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 42-43. 521 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:352.

178 strike, with the support of the union.522 Eventually the union came to an agreement with Circuito

Olimpia, who agreed to rehire the workers let go. However, because cinema unions were able to put pressure on U.S. companies and distributors, these U.S. businesses came to resent the unions.523 The union could challenge U.S. businessmen by using the practice of an “embargo” where workers would go to distributors and ask them not to give movies to those theaters which refused to give into union demands and these embargos were quite successful.524 Overall, unions made production difficult for American companies, like Universal Pictures, Famous Lasky-

Players, and Goldwyn Pictures, who went to Mexico in hopes of seeking out cheaper labor and production costs.525

Due to the growing presence of U.S. film companies in Mexico, the head of the

Departamento de Productos Manufacturados (Department of Manufactured Products), part of the

Secretaria de Industria, Comercio, y Trabajo (Secertary of Industry, Commerce, and Labor) conducted a survey of the cinema industry in December of 1924. Specifically, the survey illustrated the vast differences in the work force between theaters in Mexico City and more rural areas. There were larger theaters that played movies all week, along with smaller ones connected to other places of businesses and social clubs, and even some that were set up over the weekend to show films and then taken down.526 For example, a small place in Michoacan employed about 25 people who worked six-hour shift for three pesos; however, this was not their only means of support because,

522 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 43. 523 Ibid, 44. 524 Ibid. 525 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 3:177. 526 Serna, Making Cinelandia, 55.

179 they often were “artisans government office employees. . .”527 In contrast, Cine Olimpia, a major theater in Mexico City, employed 150 people who worked 7-8 hours a day with one day off a week..528 Employees at the larger theater complexes were usually members of the Sindicato de

Empleados Cinematografistas (Union of Cinema Employees), affiliated with Confederación

Regional Obrera Mexicana (Regional Workers' Confederation of Mexico, CROM.) The disparities seen within the cinema labor force shows why the larger workers’ unions had trouble uniting all cinema laborers into one cohesive group; they tended to have different needs. Despite the disparities; however, laborers attempted to create one cohesive group.

In 1924, leaders of CROM announced their decision to bring together all Mexican workers and unions under CROM.529 CROM had strong ties to the Mexican government because union leaders pledged their support for General Obregón and, in turn, Obregón promised political seats to CROM members.530 CROM was founded in May of 1918 in the city of Saltillo when Mexican workers held a conference to create a union that could represent them all nationally.531 CROM workers broke themselves into different sections, including electricians, miners, graphic art designers, etc. However, with cinema it became difficult as set builders and those behind the scenes technically could, fall into a few different categories; however, the sections did not speak directly to the cinema industry. CROM also openly supported President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928).

Calles extended favoritism and he strongly promoted CROM’s decision to unify.532 Calles also

527 Ibid., 56. 528 Ibid., 59. 529 Ibid., 44. 530 Mejía Prieto, El Poder, 21. 531 Ibid., 20. 532 Jeffrey M. Pilcher, and the Chaos of Mexican Modernity (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 17.

180 appointed Luis Napoleon Morones, a CROM union boss, as the Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor and other CROM leaders became members of Congress.533 However, despite the executive backing, it would prove difficult for CROM to unite the cinema industry.

In January of 1925 the integration process began, and regional differences were major obstacles regarding the film unions. For example, in the Tampico area, cinematographers who formed a union often fought with the stage artists for control over labor contracts.534 There was another large divide between cinematographers and philharmonics, which were the musicians accompanying the silent films in theater houses. These two factions held competing unions and fought with management over wages and working conditions without getting results.535 This was not the best strategy because with the divided union, it was easier for management to take advantage of one group over another. In Tampico, the workers caused rifts between cinema and theater laborers within the first official “branch” of the cinematographers’ union, which included the “union of stagehands, stage designers, electricians, projectionists and props and allied theater.”

Cinematographers wanted to weaken the power of theaters and stage workers (not in movies) because the theater alliance favored the Confederación General de Trabajadores (General

Confederation of Workers, CGT), which was more radical than CROM.536 Conflict immediately arose in Tampico when the merger under CROM occurred because leaders made an agreement with the larger theater companies only to hire union members. This left those who supported the

CGT with little job prospects, and they were forced to join the Cinematographers Employee Union

533 Mejía Prieto, El Poder, 22. 534 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 327. 535 Ibid., 328. 536 Ibid.

181 under CROM. This struggle caused workers to call for boycotts and strikes, stalling film production and decreasing revenues. Therefore, CROM held a meeting on December 22, 1924, with theater and cinematographer representatives in hopes of finding a solution. CROM leaders wanted to unite the workers “to form trade unions by branches, that one group will not be subordinate over another” to keep peace between cinema and theater workers.537 However, those in the theater faction felt CROM clearly favored the cinema workers and, on Dec. 29th, they called for a boycott of cinema houses in Tampico, ultimately, leading sixteen theaters to close. In response, business owners and theater workers had their own meeting without cinematographers and came up with a pact to hire theater labor to get cinema houses running. The cinematographers received word of this secret agreement and “threatened to boycott the distributors for renting films to the filmmakers in Tampico.”538

The battle between the two unions seemed to have no solution. Finally, on March 23, 1925, the theater workers accepted a proposal by the governor of Tampico, Emilio Portes Gil, which provided funding from the liquidation of theater groups and joined together both sections under the Union of General Manipulators and Cinematographers. This was a branch of the

Cinematographers Employee Union controlled by CROM.539 While the union problems were being debated, theater companies hired what they referred to as “free” workers, those not in the union, causing another boycott of Tampico distributors and cinema houses until November of

1926, when they reached an agreement with CROM. The entire situation in Tampico highlights

537 Ibid., 329. 538 Ibid. 539 Ibid., 340.

182 the struggle to unify cinema workers, showing the differences and competition during this time between the mediums of film and theater. Tampico served as a micro-example of what was taking place nationally: a transition from live theater as the major form of entertainment to film and movies. Cinema became more popular because it was cheaper, accessible, and new. With the rise in the creation of movie houses came a larger workforce which CROM wanted to harness as the theater workers became less powerful.

Although there were fights, the Confederated Cinematographic Employees Union (under

CROM) was the strongest cinema union in Mexico, signing its first collective agreement in

1925.540 With the bickering solved for the moment, union leaders took to bargaining with businesses. The Confederated Cinematographic Employees Union came together and threatened to strike because a few companies and entrepreneurs refused to hire an “intermediary between workers and the manager of each cinema.”541 This person would mediate contracts between laborers and management to make sure the process went smoothly and that each side would hold up their part of the deal. The union argued to Mexican officials at the Department of Labor that a mediator was necessary. The administrators sided with the laborers and companies had to reconcile with the power of the cinema union. In general, CROM was more successful than other unions at the time, achieving higher wages and workers’ compensation for on-site accidents.542 Despite the strength of the Confederated Cinematographic Employees Union and CROM; moreover, there

540 Alexander Pineda and Paulo Antonio Paranaguá, “Mexico and its Cinema,” in Mexican Cinema, ed. Paulo Antonio Paranaguá, trans. Ana M. López (London: British Film Institute, 1995), 26. 541 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 340. 542 Mejía Prieto, El Poder, 25.

183 were still some areas in Mexico where workers were not completely organized, and union leaders had to deal with another powerful influential institution: the Catholic Church.

The formation and consolidation of Mexican unions under CROM increasingly clashed with the Catholic Church. Previously, the Church engaged in the workers’ struggle, helping to mediate between workers and their employers.543 However, after the Mexican Revolution ended,

President Obregón and his administration, along with the leaders of CROM, sought to unify all workers and link them directly with the state. Mexican Chamber of Deputies members Jose

Castillo Torres, Alejandro Cerisola, and Arturo Campillo Seyde, put forth an idea to create an

“economic parliament” in which meetings with union leaders would take place to facilitate the process of connecting unions with the state and federal government.544 The representatives would come from local chapters of unions established in the states’ capitals and, at the meetings, leaders would discuss the various situations within their districts and make recommendations for laws and other regulations. This initiative forced the Catholic Church out of union politics by connecting the unions directly with the state. Neither the Church nor any other organization could create unions or be a part union politics.545 What this meant was the Mexican government would be the sole arbitrator of workers’ contracts and rights.

Jose Castillo Torres turned the “economic parliament” idea into a draft of a bill on

December 28, 1924, which stated that scabs were illegal, and workers had a right to strike, as well as made it clear that no other institution was to interfere with the unions. The Catholic Church

543 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 67. 544 Ibid. 545 Ibid.

184 objected, arguing that Catholic unions were “professional unions of workers,” the largest being the

Confederación Católica del Trabajo (Catholic Labor Confederation, CNTC).546 The Church sought to protect the laborers, just as all the other secular unions. However, the Mexican Ministry of

Industry, Commerce, and Labor saw these groups as “religious associations, subject more to the postulates of conscience than to the laws on labor,” meaning that Church was tied to morals and laws of the Bible, which were not part of the state and could potentially clash. 547 To further this goal of ridding unions of the Catholic Church, the Mexican Social Secretariat declared that priests could no longer take part in social politics, such as labor.548 This caused fighting between Catholics and those who favored state-run unions. Eventually the President ruled in favor of CROM, which established a campaign to unify all the workers in Mexico under the state only.549

This battle effected cinema unions. While CROM attempted to unify all workers in 1924-

25, laborers who supported the Church continued to fight against the leaders of CROM. The different ideologies ripped the workers apart and caused violent fighting to occur in the work places and the streets, leaving CROM in a very difficult position in attempting to both stop the hostile encounter while also merging all the different sects. This conflict between Catholics and the state stimulated cinema business as movies became a “distraction” and form of “escapism” for people who wanted to get away from the fighting.550 Mexican film and cultural critic of the time,

546 Mejía Prieto, El Poder, 26. 547 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 68. 548 The Mexican Social Secretariat (Secretariado Social Mexicano) is the collection of Catholic social action organizations. The purpose of the organization was “to research social problems and to promote action that would restore” peace. Roy Palmer Domenico and Mark Y. Hanley, eds., Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Politics: L-Z (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), 375. 549 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 68. 550 Ibid., 100.

185

Margarita Santín de Fontoura, praised the invention of cinema in her article for the Mexican magazine Revista de Revistas. She stated that movies were a “useful, pleasant, economical distraction available to all tastes and understandings,” and despite the many misgivings, especially for women, films contained messages of moral and hope while also “exposing” the many dangers of the world, allowing for young women and men to learn how to avoid trouble.551 CNTC slowly disintegrated due to religious conflicts and the growing Cristeros War.552 CROM also had internal problems leading many in CROM to leave and join the large union affiliation, the Confederacíon

Sindical Unitaria de México (Unitary Trade Union Confederation of Mexico, under communist influence). The actors’ section was one group that left CROM.553

The clash between the Church and state government continued into cinema culture in the

1930s. However, the Church regained influence in censorship through the Acción Catolica

(Catholic Actions, AC). In 1934, they created a subgroup called the Legión Mexicana de la

Decencia (Mexican Legion of Decency, LMD), also known as the “Commission of Censors” and they produced a newspaper every week advising which films compromised Catholic values.554

The scene changed in the 1930s as Mexico began developing a successful and growing cinema business, causing Mexican unions to grow in power and increasingly worked more closely with Mexican government. As previously discussed, there were cinema unions in the 1920s, but

551 Margarita Santín de Fontoura, “Correo. De las Damas. Cinematofilia,” Revista de Revistas, World Newspapers Archives, 28 Sept. 1924, 31. 552 Mejía Prieto, El Poder, 26. 553 Pineda and Paranaguá, “Mexico and its Cinema,” 26. 554 MacLaird, Aesthetics and Politics, 79-80. While not officially a state institution, the LMD did assert some control over film censorship in the more conservative administration of Presidents Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) and Adolofo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) by exerting “pressure” and “directly” denouncing “a film’s exhibition before the State Department of Film Censorship,” specifically focusing on morality rather than the image of the state.

186 they had trouble coalescing with the larger groups like CROM. In March of 1933 representatives from several sections of the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria Cinematográfica

(National Federation of Workers of the Cinematographic Industry, a branch of the

Cinematographers Employee Union), the major film union at the time, discussed creating a more cohesive collection to encompass all in the cinema business.555 The union expected to negotiate better salaries and collaborate with distribution houses and renters to “obtain the greatest advantages for all workers.”556 The election of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934 helped make this a reality.

Cárdenas encouraged the growth of unions by assuring to fulfill promises of the revolution, including “agrarian reforms and union radicalism.”557 Despite his positive stance on unions,

Cárdenas faced strikes by several industries in his first-year, including cinema. Due to this friction, workers created the Unión de Trabajadores e Estudios Cinematográficos de Mexico (Union of

Workers of Cinematographic Studios of Mexico, UTEC) with Enrique Solís (Mexican cinematographer) as the General Secretary.558 UTEC united cinematographers and other technicians in the film industry and UTEC maintained control all elements of film production, including art, manual, and technical work. 559 Along with UTEC were two other unions:

Asociación de Producotres y Distribuidores de Películas (Association of Mexican Film Producers

555 Newspaper article (name of newspaper is not given), “Trabajadores de la industria cinematográfica: En la República, formaron una Federación Nacional, disolviendo a los otros grupos,” Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Departamento de Trabajo, Box 165, Exp. 9 1934, 15 Oct. 1933. 556 Ibid. 557 Pilcher, Cantinflas, 50. 558 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 42. 559 Letter from UTECM to Manuel R. Palacios, Sub-Secretary of Labor and Social Prevention, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-1939), 18 April 1944, 32.

187 and Distributors) represented managers while the Asociación Nacional de Actores (Association of

Actors, ANDA) consisted of the actors.560

There was friction between UTEC and ANDA. UTEC leaders aligned themselves with the larger Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM) founded by Vicente Lombardo Toledano in 1936; whereas ANDA maintained connections to

CROM. Toledano broke with CROM in the 1933 and CROM was no longer the major union representing workers, being replaced by CTM. 561 CTM supported the rising power of President

Cárdenas instead of Plutarco Calles (known as the “jefe máximo” from 1928-1936), whom CROM backed. Cárdenas exiled Calles in April of 1936, creating problems for ANDA because, under the rules of the CTM, “ANDA actors and UTEC cinematographers could not work in the same film studio.”562 Obviously, this was almost impossible as many of the film industry workers belonged to one of the two unions and both actors and technical workers were needed to produce a movie.

ANDA leader Angel Sala worked out an agreement with UTEC boss Solís in which ANDA became a part of UTEC, with the technical workers. However, several actors voiced their disliked for the decision because the actors claimed they had different needs from the others.563 The actors received temporary relief with the formation of Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria

Cinematográfica (STIC) section 7 in 1939, making them somewhat autonomous. However, CTM leaders blocked this movement by delegating actors and technical workers all in one group, section

560 Pilcher, Cantinflas,100. 561 Mejía Prieto, El Poder, 27. 562 Pilcher, Cantinflas, 100. 563 Letter from UTECM to Manuel R. Palacios, Sub-Secretary of Labor and Social Prevention, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-1939), 18 April 1944, 32.

188

2 of STIC.564 (This disagreement would eventually lead to a large conflict between actors and the leader of the UTEC, Solís, which will be discussed later in this chapter.)

Despite the in-fighting between the different sections, the Mexican film industry thrived and by 1938 sixty films were produced, inciting the addition of 18 new directors which “prompted the film workers’ union (UTEC) to establish a separate category of professionals” and, thus, the

Directors Guild was born.565 While the Guild helped protect the directors, by 1944, it seemed the

Guild made it extremely difficult for new and upcoming directors to join. For example, in 1944

“fourteen new directors made their appearance, but only one director was admitted into the organization in each of the following two years.”566 The Directors Guild closed itself off, allowing only a selective few to join which constricted the types of films being made. Yet, the Guild reasoned that it was protecting itself by only accepting the best to represent Mexican film.567

The main objective of all the unions was to represent the laborers and obtain the best wages and working conditions for them. However, the unions also strived to defend domestic interests and pushed for protectionists measures to save Mexican film industry jobs from being taken advantage of by Hollywood companies working in Mexico. In an article from Cinema Reporter

1938, the Association of Mexican Film Producers and Distributors declared that, along with

UTEC, all workers should stay within the Mexican film industry and that both groups “support the patriotic attitude of fighting for the improvement and progress of Mexican Cinema.”568 The unions

564 Pilcher, Cantinflas, 101. 565Agransánchez Jr., Guillermo Calles, 119. 566 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 69. 567 Ibid., 70. 568 “Solución Parcial del Conflicto-Un Boletín de la Asociación de Productores,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 1, Num. 8, 9 Sept. 1938.

189 agreed that workers must remain loyal to Mexican businesses to help increase the production of movies and; therefore, the revenue and influence of Mexico. The Association of Mexican Film

Producers and Distributors became an active participant and took measures to ensure the growth of cinema. The Association brought together three of the most well-known cinematographers:

Enrique Solís, Roberto Gallardo, and Alberto Calderon Monro, to form a movie corporation dedicated to producing at least 20 films within the year. The federal government finance committee provided the company an advanced of 3 million pesos towards distribution in Central and South

America, as well as the United States.569 The goals of this project were two-fold: create jobs for both actors, technical workers, and to help the Mexican cinema industry grow.

Despite the efforts made by the association, a year later, in 1939, workers were still upset over the “exodus of Mexican materials” and Mexican laborers to Hollywood and demanded protectionist measures.570 While the union representatives understood that Mexican film companies could not equally compete with those from Hollywood, they requested that the U.S.- based companies provide a livable wage to keep workers thriving within Mexico. The unions, together, declared that all the elements of film production had to stay within Mexico to keep resources from being exported abroad. Union leaders pushed for the government to step in and provide laws and sanctions to protect the national industry. The unions agreed to work with any company or individual that immigrated to Mexico to boost Mexican cinema and influence.571 In addition to protectionist laws, unions also participated in the giving of awards as an incentive for

569 “Se Organiza Nueva y Poderosa Empresa Productora y Distribuidora Mexicana,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 1, Num. 16, 25 Nov. 1938. 570 “La Unión de Trabajadores se Preocupa por el Exodo de Nuestros Elementos a Hollywood,” Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 1, Num. 25, 6 Jan. 1939, 4. 571 Ibid.

190 all in the film industry to do their best job when making films. The government, with the help of others in the movie business, created the National Film Industry Committee “to promote the development of good cinema in Mexico” by providing prizes and awards to the best films in

1939.572 Not only would the committee give an award for the best film, but also for the best components of the film: “the best argument, the best dialogue, best photography, best sound, the best musical adaptation” and for the actors as well as the film technicians.573 The main objective of the prizes was to “enrich the cinema in all its aspects” by making sure that all involved in the production of a film strived to do the very best job they could to make a fabulous presentation for the audience.

This Committee not only showcased the best Mexican movies, but it also attempted to correct major problems within the films. By viewing all the films from 1939, the judges saw that sound was still the main obstacle for Mexican movies. It was not up to the Hollywood standard and the committee recommended that new technology be added to the process of production.574

Additionally, the committee remarked that the new, younger actors had raw talent, but needed to be trained in the art of theater acting to gain the same level of emotion. Directors and writers also had to be more precise and work together to perfect the storyline’s transformation to the screen.

While the author stated that the task of critiquing film was daunting and, at times negative, it was a necessary job if the quality of Mexican film was to improve.

572 Xavier Villaurrutia, “Hacia Rumbos Mejores,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 3, Num. 76, 29 Dec. 1939, 77. 573 Ibid. 574 Ibid.

191

In 1940, the unions organized a joint commission called the Promotion of the Mexican

Film Industry, which would do just that: promote Mexican films.575 By 1940, the Mexican industry grew rapidly. While the progress was good for business, it caused numerous problems for the cinema industry. The unions declared that there never had been a presidential decree or anything of the like to protect domestic film. Union leaders pushed for government officials to take an active role and help film workers. They argued that foreign management companies often did not approve of increasing wages or improving the studio environment, leaving many, especially technical workers, to fend for themselves, take lower pay, and work in unsafe conditions. The union officials stated that they did not want to take extreme measures but would do so if pushed because their main job was to protect Mexican cinematographers and other laborers in the industry. In March of

1940, UTEC wrote a letter to the president (which was printed in Cinema Reporter) discussing the need for “industry protection.”576 The union spoke with President Cárdenas in Durango during his last year; however, with President Camacho’s presidency in 1940, none of the promises to workers were fulfilled. One major issue was finances and the union asked the financial committee to provide some sort of monetary base for Mexican film.577 Since the government was so successful with nationalizing the oil industry in 1938, those in the movie business urged the government also to support their production. However, officials failed to protect the cinematography workers, leading to the aggravation and tension that would eventually culminate into an industry wide feud.

575 “Derecho Proteccionista la Ampara Precisa la Acción Conjunta,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 2, Num. 87, 15 March 1940. 576 “La UTECM no pide dinero; pide protección a la Inudstria,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 2, Num. 96, 17 May 1940. 577 Ibid.

192

In-Fighting and Strikes: Actors, Technical Workers, and Enrique Solís

Since the creation of Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Cinematográfica (STIC), the situation between UTEC and ANDA was rocky.578 Under UTEC, all cinema workers were grouped together in section two of the Union of Film Industry Workers. Actors, according to

STIC, were not seen as separate from technical workers, like carpenters and set-builders. Actors argued they were put on same level of lesser skilled employees.579 The actors, led by “Cantinflas”

(Mario Moreno) and , saw themselves in a privileged position as “ticket magnets” and argued that that the union could not meet their specific needs through UTEC, and therefore, pushed to create a separate section for themselves.580 Cantinflas was an extremely popular comedian who rose to national and international fame in the 1930s and 1940s, and who especially was known for the way he spoke Spanish, “cantinflear meaning ‘to speak nonsense’.”581 Negrete also was a popular Mexican actor of the 1940s due to his talented singing in films.582 Enrique Solís, head of UTEC, vehemently rejected the idea of splitting the actors into a separate group. Solís’ position as a powerful union leader dictated his own personal reasoning for keeping the actors subordinate: he was a movie producer so he needed to control all aspects of the cinema unions to have the union work for him and his business.583 The actors viewed Solís as selfish and corrupt, using the workers as personal pawns to accelerate his own influence over the cinema industry.

This, of course, created tension between the actors and Solís. The actors also faced another

578 García Riera, Historia documental del cine Mexicano, 2:207. 579 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 69. 580 García Riera, Historia documental, 2:207. 581 Andrea Noble, Mexican National Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2. 582 Joanne Hershfield, “Race and Ethnicity in the Classical Cinema,” in Mexico’s Cinema: A Century of Film and Filmmakers, eds. Joanne Hershfield and David. R. Maciel (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 90. 583 Pilcher, Cantinflas, 101.

193 obstacle, though. Although the state officials pressed for labor unity and discipline; a separate section just for actors would disrupt the ideal of a strong worker alliance.584

In 1938 Enrique Solís founded the Compañía Productor y Distribuidor de Cinema

Mexicana (Producers and Distributors of Mexican Film Company) to compete with the National

Film Production Company. Solís’ company received an advance of $3,000,000 pesos to create 20 films to be distributed in Central and South America, as well as in the United States.585 This led to

Solís having an interest in his own company that was above that of the Union’s needs. Mexican director and union supporter, Chano Urueta, wrote an opinion piece about Enrique Solís which explained the negative feelings that most in the film industry had towards Solís, entitled “I do not believe it!” He began the article by stating that public reactions showed for “the umpteenth time” that Solís was only concerned with himself, using the cinema workers and producers to make a profit for his own film business.586 Urueta then praised the efforts made within the Union and by the laborers. He asserted that the industry was improving “year after year.” He explained that, during the infancy of Mexican film production most of the people were amateurs, but “amateurs willing to learn,” and these “amateurs” became pioneers in their fields, eager to absorb and learn more information and techniques about the business.587 However, Urueta stressed that there was one barrier despite the success of Mexican cinema: Enrique Solís. Urueta credited Solís for creating a pathway for the union of film workers, yet Solís moved away from protecting laborers

584 Ibid. 585 “Nuevos productores y distribuidores mexicanos organizados poderosos,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 25 Nov. 1938. 586 Chano Urueta, “Yo no lo Creo!” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, Vol. 3, Num. 128, 27 Dec. 1940. 587 Ibid.

194 to only looking out for Solís’ self-interests. While union members should be grateful to Solís, they also needed to move beyond him and go back to the roots of wanting to represent the workers, all of them from actors to carpenters. Other union members echoed this sentiment. In a telegram from the Labor and Social Prevision Department of the Federal government, the Executive Committee of the union stated that section 17 of cinematographers in Durango condemned Solís labeled him a “traitor to the country and a national labor movement.”588 Section 23 of union workers in

Michoacán called Solís’ actions “an act of treason to our organization.”589 The general attitude was that Solís was a huge obstacle to the union of all film workers and a solution had to be found.

The actors’ section of the union, ANDA, continued to fight for separation within UTEC and looked for allies outside of UTEC. While unions garnered support from Cárdenas, laborers’ rights suffered under Manuel Ávila Camacho when he became president in 1940. Camacho joined together with the leadership of the CTM to “extend government control over the entire Mexican workforce” and “union democracy, the rights of workers to negotiate their own contracts and to strike if dissatisfied with those , suffered serious reverses” under Camacho.590

However, with the help of Camacho’s brother, General Maximino Ávila Camacho, ANDA finally was able to create an autonomous section for themselves within STIC. General Camacho was the former governor of Pueblo and acted as the Secretary of Public Works under his brother’s presidency. General Camacho also had connections to the cinema world through William O.

Jenkins (theater owner) and Rómulo O’Farrill (television producer), and Camacho often had affairs

588 Telegraph from the Executive Committee Ramon Escotto to Secretarty of Labor and Social Prevision, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), 22 July 1944. 589 Ibid. 590 Pilcher, Cantinflas, 103.

195 with famous Mexican actresses.591 Camacho became a powerful ally for ANDA and a way for them to form section 7 of STIC, solely for actors. Section 7 became official in early 1944 and culminated with a huge celebration on March 30, 1944. Solís was furious with this decision and he ordered section 2 of STIC, to strike and shut down the studios until the actors seceded their autonomy and recognize Solís as the true leader of the UTEC.592 Solís was not alone in his anger.

In a letter addressed to Manuel R. Palacios, Sub-Secretary of Labor and Social Prevision, some

UTEC bosses denounced the decision of CTM to allow ANDA to separate from UTEC and claimed that UTEC was “subjected to unfair, illegal, and arbitrary treatment; . . . that we defend a revolutionary syndicalist position not allowing us to be divided into guilds; that we defend collective agreements of work legally celebrated and in full force.”593 UTEC leaders asserted that separating the unions would make it easier for companies to take advantage of workers and they used ideas of the Revolution to address their concerns.

UTEC bosses continued to list complaints and justifications for the strikes and actions taken by UTEC. In a memo to Manuel R. Palacios, Sub-Secretary of Labor and Social Prevision, the leaders discussed the history of UTEC as a union formed to represent “all the manual, technical and artistic elements that contribute to the production of cinematographic films” which included the actors.594 UTEC asserted that its organization had “contributed to the development of the

Mexican film industry” as its patriotic duty to see Mexico exceed in movie production. The action

ANDA took to separate itself within STIC was unacceptable to UTEC leaders as UTEC had

591 Ibid. 592 Ibid., 103-104. 593 Letter from UTEC to Manuel R. Palacios Sub-Secretary of Labor and Social Prevision, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), 18 April 1944, 32. 594 Ibid.

196 represented all aspects of film development sufficiently and to split apart would cause inequalities between technical workers and actors.595 UTEC argued that the leaders of CTM resolved the conflicts already in March of 1940 providing three reasons as to why UTEC had ultimate power to denounce ANDA’s separation. First, UTEC maintained influence and the power to bargain in every aspect of the film industry, including all “specialties and activities.” Second, they controlled the labor contracts and provisions with cinematographic producers and directors. Third and finally, under CTM, UTEC’s purpose was to unify the different areas of the movie business, “a confirmation of its program of revolutionary struggle,” stressing the revolutionary ideology behind the unions of Mexican workers more broadly.596 UTEC ended their letter with the affirmation that

CTM put ANDA under UTEC and, legally, ANDA had to answer to UTEC. ANDA did not retain the right to break off and higher officials in the Department of Labor needed to side with UTEC as to “not to interrupt the cinematographic production by respecting its undisputed rights that it has exercised for more than ten years.”597 It was a subtle threat, as UTEC would go on strike to stop ANDA. This illustrates the control that unions possessed within the film business. They could use their power to forward their own interests.

Despite the legality of the claims written by Solís and others in UTEC who supported him, there were many local sections of UTEC who condemned the actions of Solís asserting his reaction and threats to strike as unnecessary and unpatriotic. UTEC officials in several cities, including

Durango and Michoacán, wrote to the Executive Committee of Labor and Social Revision

595 Ibid. 596 Ibid. 597 Ibid., 26.

197 accusing Solís of being a “traitor to the country and the national labor movement” because Solís was dividing the workers instead of uniting them.598 The opposing UTEC leaders continued to send letters and petitions to the Department of Labor, including a long memo to Francisco Trujillo

Gurria, Secretary of Labor, which discussed several problems with Solís. In this note, union leaders claimed that Solís was purposely “misleading” the workers and members of UTEC, as well as higher “authorities, producers, and public opinion in general.”599 One of the most important issues

UTEC took with Solís was not only that Solís fought with the actors, but also he worked with the censorship office and illegally bribed Felipe Gregorio Castillo, Head of the Cinematographic

Censorship Department.600 Castillo cut films in a way where the plot and message of the film were completely altered, causing directors and producers to assert that the film “failed” their artistic vision.601 The union asked the Department of Labor to restructure STIC and write a new contract law within the industry that would not be under the control of Solís to make the cinematic industry fair for all laborers (producers, actors, directors, management, etc.)

Union members were concerned that UTEC was going to leave STIC completely if the

Department of Labor did not act soon. If UTEC left, they feared that the Mexican cinema industry

598 Telegraph from the Executive Committee, Ramon Escotto, to Secretarty of Labor and Social Prevision, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), 22 July 1944, 4. 599 Memo presented to sr. Lic. Francisco Trujillo Gurria Secretary of Labor and Social Security, by the national committee of the union of workers of the similar and related film industry of the Mexican republic, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), July 1944, 10. 600 Felipe Gregorio Castillo became head of the Cinema Censorship Department on April 1, 1941. He was also a producer and director, which made members of STIC suspicious of the relationship between Castillo and Solís because they both had investments in the film industry. Castillo’s first film María Eugenia debuted in 1942. It did not do well. Riera, Historia documental, 103. 601 Memo presented to sr. Lic. Francisco Trujillo Gurria secretary of Labor and Social Security, by the national committee of the union of workers of the similar and related film industry of the Mexican republic, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), July 1944, 10. See examples in previous chapters.

198 would be damaged due to strikes and non-cooperation by technical workers.602 To gain support from government officials, union leaders referenced the Mexican Revolution at the end of their memo declaring that UTEC (previously, before Solís) had always supported the revolutionary government regimes and the workers raised that status of Mexico, as a nation; therefore, UTEC deserved “the attention and support of” the Department of Labor and, more broadly, the President of the Republic.603 This memo from and about UTEC brings to light several crucial issues. For example, censorship was a problem for workers, especially directors and producers. There was corruption between Solís and Castillo showing that officials were not always impartial, and this needed to be fixed if the Mexican film industry was to progress. The memo also illustrates that unions used the idea of supporting the revolutionary government, explaining that UTEC respected the authority of the ruling regime and requested that, as a government based on revolutionary ideals, they would negotiate with UTEC and keep the laborers as the number one priority.

By 1944, union members were increasingly concerned about the state of both UTEC and

STIC because strikes were causing a loss of business. They voiced their desire for a quick and easy compromise so the strike would end, and they could continue making films. The National

Committee of CTM came together and outlined their concerns over the conflict in STIC and asserted that, in accordance with President Camacho’s “wishes”, they would form another committee to find a solution to the problem between ANDA and Solís.604 The committee noted

Solís’s own complaints that ANDA was ruining the union by forming a separate section. However,

602 Ibid., 11. 603 Ibid. 604 Notes from the CTM national commission of honor and justice, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-1939), 20.

199 the committee members completely disagreed with Solís. Actors formed ANDA to better represent their needs and ANDA only controlled “the artistic elements”; therefore, not separating the union but making it stronger and able to help all workers.605 Nevertheless, while strikes and work stoppages continued, CTM and the Department of Labor continued to blame UTEC, and specifically Solís. In July of 1944, leaders of STIC wrote to the Department of Labor that they were not responsible for the “paralysis of the industry.” Instead, it was regional section leaders that encouraged employees not to turn in work to the film companies and failing to “comply with the contracts of the producers.”606 The representatives of STIC accused lower-level leaders who sided with ANDA for the strikes, removing blame from themselves. However, the higher officials realized there was a problem with ANDA and it needed to be quickly resolved. ANDA had some rights for complaint as STIC was supposed to represent all within the film industry; yet, Solís did not provide protection for actors, seemingly using the union for his own personal gain.607

The conflict came to head in August of 1944. Most upper-level UTEC members in Mexico

City stood behind Solís, while other laborers, like studio musicians, “denounced” corruption within their section and cried for autonomy, separate from STIC.608 Strikes, protests, and pickets continued outside the film studios, halting production. Finally, on Aug. 8, President Camacho ordered the police to dismantle the protests and federal agents went after Solís at the UTEC headquarters. He barricaded himself in the office and had a standoff with the agents for a few hours

605 Ibid., 23. 606 Memo from Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Estudios Cinematograficos de Mexico, Francisco Trujillo Gurria Secretary of Labor and Social Prevision, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-1939), 25 July 1944, 26. 607 Ibid. 608 Pilcher, Cantinflas, 105.

200 but eventually submitted and was arrested and removed from the head of UTEC.609 On Aug. 27,

1944, STIC sent a letter to Manuel R. Palacios, Sub-Secretary of Labor, discussing a written resolution between UTEC and ANDA. In the agreement, UTEC and ANDA became two separate entities within STIC representing the different needs and views of the laborers. A letter written by leaders of UTEC entitled “Basis of Arrangement” contained their response to the official agreement. While not entirely content, the union members realized that this fighting caused the

“paralysis” of the film industry and, for the good of the country, UTEC was willing to “sacrifice” the union by dividing themselves into separate sections among STIC.610 Despite the negotiations taking place, the conflict continued into 1945 leading to armed fighting between the union members and police in April of 1945.611

To stop the escalating violence and strikes, on July 20, 1945, President Camacho wrote to the CTM about the conflict, asserting that ANDA and UTEC were to be separate unions under

STIC, which answered to the CTM bosses.612 In his letter, Camacho called to “delimit the respective jurisdictions of each of these Unions,” having them understand that union leaders were to make sure that actives within the cinema industry, such as “exhibition and distribution,” continued without any interruptions, meaning that the unions should have less power and authority so another strike like the ones in 1944 could not happen.613 Camacho decided to create a commission that would be solely responsible for the needs of the film industry and it consisted of “Salvador Carrill,

609 Ibid., 105. 610 Letter from UTEC, “Basis of Arrangement,” AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), Aug. 1944, 25. 611 García Riera, Historia documental, 207. 612 C. Fidel Velázquez General Secretary of CTM from Manuel Avila Camacho, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), 20 July 1945, 55. 613 Ibid.

201 secretary general of STIC, producer Jesus Grovsa, and Felipe Gregorio Castillo, the head of the

Censorship Department.”614 With this committee in place, Camacho pushed for the film industry to solve their own problems more efficiently without having the federal government use force.

Despite the efforts to stop the fighting, the conflict continued, causing major problems for the Mexican cinema industry. In August of 1945, the Secretary General of the CTM called on

President Camacho to compose a decree to provide a resolution to the union clashes.615 The president did not want to interfere to preserve the “autonomy of workers' organizations” and hoped that the problems could be resolved relatively quickly.616 However, this was not the case. Many production and technical workers were preventing actors from entering certain theaters and stopping production companies from getting finances. Since this moved beyond a workers’ conflict and involved “third parties,” the president needed to step in to swiftly end the feud.617

On September 25, 1945, President Camacho wrote an official resolution outlining how the terms of the agreement were to be applied and executed to ensure that in-fighting would end.618 In this document, the General Secretary of CTM stated that he turned to the President because, as

General Secretary of the union, he lacked any constitutional power to resolve the problems.

Therefore, he needed the help of the President and the ministry of the interior because the problem effected Mexico, as nation, in many ways and was not simply a union problem. First and foremost, the conflict disrupted the lives of workers, leaving many without jobs and pay. Second, the entire

614 García Riera, Historia documental, 207. 615 “Intergenerational conflict of film workers,” AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-1939), 23 Aug. 1945, 48. 616 Ibid. 617 Ibid., 48. 618 “Resolutions,” AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-1939), 25 Sept. 1945, 45.

202 film industry was paralyzed as laborers decided to strike and boycott cinema houses, halting the production of Mexican films that potentially could lead to an increase in importation of foreign movies and therefore, hurt the domestic film industry. Third, and finally, “it damages the right to the leisure of the people,” meaning Mexican audiences could not enjoy Mexican movies while this battle was taking place.619 Due to these reasons, the Mexican federal government stepped in to provide a solution. A major part of the resolution was to delineate responsibilities among the different sections under STIC and limit their jurisdictions. For example, Union of Workers of the

Film Industry would be responsible for the distribution and exhibition of newsreels while the

Union of Workers of the Cinematographic Production would oversee the production of movies in cinematic studies.620 The logic behind this was to lay out exactly what the duties of each section were to keep them from fighting. It also limited the power of each section so one could not dominate the other and potentially cause problems in movie production. This document represented the final resolution of the union conflict.

Inner-workings and Demands of the Unions

After exploring the history of the unions and the major fight that took place between all the different organizations, it is necessary to look at the demands that the unions made and how the unions functioned within themselves and interacted with the national government. It is essential to examine how unions worked with production studios to achieve their goals of protecting Mexican workers. This section explores requests of the unions to the government and how they planned to

619 Ibid. 620 Ibid.

203 achieve their goals, as well as examining the problems inside the unions and how they were solved.

I also provide examples of union contract with film studios to illustrate how the unions operated with production companies.

As previously discussed, the Mexican government provided funding to companies and individuals to produce films about and for Mexicans. Unions members saw this and requested financing and other forms of payment to enhance their positions. In 1937 ANDA wrote to President

Cárdenas requesting that the sub-section of the union receive a piece of land to build their “House of the Actor,” a place for ANDA members to come together to show their works and collaborate on other adventures.621 They also asked that four Sundays of the year the President provide them a showroom at the Palace of Fine Arts to “hold functions and raise money” for the House of the

Actor. This letter is important because it illustrated that ANDA, as a sub-section of the union, sought outside help from the government, in this case the President, to have their needs met because ANDA did not see UTEC as representing them. In this case, ANDA wanted a space for actors to present their work to Mexican audiences and raise money for their individual projects, in hopes of enriching Mexican movies.

ANDA and others in the union worked to promote Mexican film; however, they worried about Mexicans going to the United States to work in Hollywood and New York. They urged the

Mexican government to have some sort of safety net to encourage Mexicans to stay within Mexico.

Union leaders stated that production companies needed to realize the competition outside of

621 Letter from ANDA to the President, AGN, Archivos Presidenciales- Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio, Box 3, 19 March 1937, 3.

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Mexico and therefore should offer comparable wages to that of international film companies.622

Leaders cited the writings of the Secretary General of the Union of Workers, which declared that to keep workers within Mexico, the Mexican government had the responsibility to step in and make sure Mexican companies had the same high standards as those abroad.623 In March of 1940,

“Mexican producers and distributors, as well as the managers of the 1st and 2nd Sections of the

Union,” came together to form the Joint Commission, which called for the promotion of Mexican film and to find an “understanding with employers” within the film industry.624 While there were managers who were on board with the idea to make Mexican movies more accessible and profitable, others were more concerned with money and exploited workers to make cheap films and then sell out to U.S. companies.625 Union leaders argued that this was only possible because

Mexico lacked a protectionist Presidential Decree. Mexican workers demanded a fair wage and safe working conditions and, if Mexican cinema was to continue to grow, the government needed to actively help these workers by condemning bad management techniques and practices.626

UTEC leaders continued to stress the need for protectionist legislation. In May of 1940,

UTEC wrote a letter to the President Ávila Camacho claiming that there was nothing done to help the industry during the last year, even though administration had promised to intervene. In 1939, the union leaders met with President Cárdenas in Durango where they discussed the situation of the film industry. Although in response Cárdenas promised to provide measures to ensure the

622 “Sindicato de Trabajadores está preocupado por el éxodo de nuestros elementos a Hollywood: Urge una medida preventive,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 6 Jan. 1939. 623 Ibid. 624 “Exigimos la Exposición Mexicana Material: Ley proteccionista la Acción Común Acta de Ampara,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 15 March 1940. 625 Ibid. 626 Ibid.

205 stability of the Mexican movie business, the president made no laws or decrees, which upset union leaders.627 They asserted that the President promised, with the help of the Ministry of National

Economy, to create a financial institution to help production companies and industry, which would, in turn, provide better salaries and working condition for union members. Camacho finally fulfilled the promise in December of 1941 with the Banco Cinematográfico (Cinematography Bank), but it was this demand from UTEC that ultimately pushed the Mexican president and government into providing this institution.628

UTEC also was concerned about the workers receiving their payment. There had been some trouble in 1938-39 with union members not getting a deposit for the work that they would be doing. The Directive for UTEC stated that workers were to be paid a certain number of pesos per week for work done. However, as easy as this seemed to be, leaders stressed that this often did not happen.629 For example, with the movie Viviendo soñando (Living Dream, 1938), the distributor had the “greatest of intentions” but when the time came, the studio did not have enough money to pay the artists and technicians who worked on the film.630 In March of 1939 UTEC took

Mr. Gonzalo Varela, head of an unnamed Mexican production company, to court over unpaid funds. Varela entered a contract with UTEC on December 19, 1938 in which he agreed to pay

627 “El UTECM no pide dinero; Llama a la protección de la industria: En la carta enviada al Sr. Presidente, Exposes, la urgencia de que alrededor del 25% de las ganancias anuales de las casas extranjeras, se inviertan para el mejoramiento nacional de la película,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 17 May 1940. 628 The Banco Cinematográfico provided funding to Mexican production companies to increase the creation of Mexican films. Nobel, Mexican National Cinema, 16. 629 “Proteger al trabajador: Se pone en práctica, a la producción estándar, el depósito de seguridad,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 22 Sept. 1939. 630 Ibid.

206

$3071 pesos; however, he never paid them so UTEC went to court to receive compensation.631

Because situations like this were common, UTEC demanded a new form of payment system to guarantee workers would be paid. To remedy this problem, leaders at UTEC suggested that producers provide a weekly check in the amount of the payroll for all the workers to UTEC. They could direct the payments to the union members in order to guarantee that everyone was paid.632

UTEC understood that management companies would be suspicious of this method and claim that the union was trying to control their business. In response, leaders stated “[We]. . . do not think that if UTEC takes the practice to that extent it means dictatorship or extortion industry, nothing like that, it means that it is defending the same industry.”633 The union assured that they did not want to control of the businesses. Instead, they simply wished to protect the workers, an action which would ultimately benefit the whole industry and guarantee cooperation among all the ranks of the movie industry.

In July of 1939, the union set out a memo with adjustments made by the Sindicato de

Trabajadores de Estudios Cinematográficos de México (Union of Workers of Film Studies

Mexico) and the Asociación Mexicana de Productores Cinematográficos (Mexican Association of

Film Producers) over the payments for laborers. Unlike the above proposition, the memo stated that producers needed to be free to make their own payments to staff. However, the union should appoint a delegate who would be present on pay days to make sure that all the workers were,

631 Documento de sentencia, AGN, Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal, Box 3189, Exp. 567987 (1939), 24 March 1939, 2. 632 Ibid. 633 Ibid.

207 indeed, paid the right amount.634 They also called for the removal of all plant and production managers to leave the producers free to work as they wished, which would provide for a better quality to movie. For this to happen and be successful, both the Association of Producers and the

Union of Cinema Workers needed to collaborate and work together by in form of how much time the movie would take to make and the minimum wages for each person.

They would settle on an amount before production began, allowing for all laborers to know their pay and the company to provide it in a timely manner.635 When bargaining between all parties finished, and a new contract was drawn up, the producer provided a copy to the Association of

Film Producers, who would ensure that the contract would be enforced. Union members anticipated that the changes would guarantee workers’ payments.

Not all distributors and producers were content with the payment system. In 1941, Mexican workers went on strike against U.S.-based films companies Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Company,

Columbia Pictures, and SA Distributors because these establishments failed to come to terms with

UTEC in previous talks of bargaining. According to an article in La Prensa, a Spanish-language newspaper based in , Texas, the union leaders’ demands were unrealistic, inevitably causing the strike.636 The article, written by a U.S. citizen, took the side of production companies and claimed that the unions were too strong in Mexico and caused a stagnation in the film industry.

However, the union leaders argued that the strike would not stop movies from being shown because

634 “Memorandum presentado por A.M. P. P.: Puntos a tratar en las reuniones celebrando los representantes del Sindicato de Trabajadores de Estudios de Cine México y la Asociación Mexicana de Productores de Cine,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 14 July 1939. 635 Ibid. 636 “Se culpa a las autoridades del trabajo de la huelga de los obreros cinematografistas,” La Prensa (San Antonio, Texas), World Newspaper Archive, 20 Sept. 1941, 1.

208 theaters could obtain Mexican-made films. This put pressure on the U.S. businesses to work with the union and listen to workers’ grievances.

Union members not only demanded protection for themselves against companies and corporations, but also turned inward and examined their members to make sure workers were providing the industry with their best efforts. Producers had to be able to create movies that could compete with Hollywood, which was not an easy task. In an article in Cinema Reporter union leaders described that movie making as an art form in which the creator must be an expert. They continued, “. . . it is logical to think that those who make movies, surround themselves with people suitable and recognized as authorities in the difficult art of writing and creating characters whose sincerity transpires through their movements.”637 The piece argued that the management companies should consult those who have education and experience in filmmaking. At this time, the union leaders argued, producers would buy any script or writing they thought could make money, and often improvised as they went along.638 The union called for “men of letters” to

“cooperate with business builders screenplays,” meaning academics should team up with those in the film industry and work together to provide fresh, artistic, and presentable films.639 While the union wanted Mexicans to do this work, they stated if there were no academics in Mexico able and willing, then the government should invest in the importation of academics from abroad because it was much more important to create decent Mexican films for national and international consumption.640

637 “Fundamentally unknown Film: Nuestros Productores no deben hacer buenas películas mientras que no Adapters,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 31 March 1939. 638 Ibid. 639 Ibid. 640 Ibid.

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Along with encouraging experts to work with producers, UTEC also actively critiqued

Mexican movies and provided reports for improvement. One sub-committee studied how movies were received by Mexican audiences and requested that films that seemed unpopular be “vetoed” or not approved for further production.641 Leaders also criticized the Association of Producers because it “hinders the free development of the industry,” meaning directors and others were limited to what they could do in their movies, causing their creativity to be cut. One way to fix this problem was to “reorganize” the technical staff and retrain them on the best equipment, making sure they understood exactly how to operate all the machinery and to make “concessions” to the producer for the benefit of all involved in the production.642 Union leaders provided movies that were profitable and popular in 1939 as good examples to strive to replicate: Casa del Ogro (House of the Ogre), La bestia negra (The Black Beast), and Noche de los mayas (Night of the Mayans).643

While leaders understood not every movie was going to be successful, they stressed that all involved try to reproduce movies like this in order to compete with Hollywood’s pictures.

While UTEC reviewed the industry, others who worked in the film business made their own comments about the union and what could be fixed to help the success of Mexican films. One problem was that resources were scarce, and critics pointed to the movie El cobarde (The Coward,

1938) as an example. El cobarde was a film directed by René Cardona that told the story of

Alberto, whose father died in battle. Alberto’s mother wanted him to be a soldier, so he entered the military college and became friends with the military director’s son, Fernando. Fernando and

641 “Canalización del trabajo de UTEC, AMPP y Federación,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 5 May 1939. No more detail on what types of movies were provided. 642 Ibid. 643 Ibid.

210 a friend both compete for the love of Elena. However, war broke out and instead of fighting,

Alberto decided to hide out at his mother’s house. However, to earn Elena’s love, he overcame his fear, joined the battle and was quite successful.644 This movie involved war and soldiers; yet, the costumes provided for the men were inappropriate and did not show the “nationality” and “pride” they were supposed to.645 According to directors and producers, Cardona had to make sacrifices due to lack of funds that caused the movie to suffer. They asked union leaders “is it possible to continue making films under those conditions of poverty, sacrificing works and artists for lack of money?”646 The solution, if producers could not cover the costs of the movie, was to have them use their position in the Association of Producers and UTEC and ask that the union provide additional funds be to make movies. The producers and directors did not want to sound negative and ended their demand with “Our desire, mind you, is not to hurt anyone personally,” meaning that not one person was called to blame, specifically, the entire union needed to be reformatted and understand the needs of producers and help meet these needs to “achieve a better film” which would help the overall industry.647

The Association of Mexican Producers continued to have problems with UTEC and decided to read their memorandum at a meeting celebrating UTEC and AMPP. Producers argued the union did not allow them enough independence within their movie production and they requested that they be “absolutely free to make their payments directly and equally to hire

644 García Riera, Historia documental, 218. 645 “RESUELVE que el A.M. P. P.? Sus miembros se han reunido para abordar los graves problemas de la película nacional? En caso afirmativo, ¿qué decisiones se han adoptado?” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 7 April 1939. 646 Ibid. 647 Ibid.

211 artists.”648 The current procedure was to have the union provide the salary to the workers.

However, producers declared that this practice was unfair. They wanted to control the money that was given to them. AMPP provided a compromise by stating that a delegate of UTEC could be present on payday and collect union fees, but it should be the producer that hands out the checks.

AMPP also demanded that plant and/or production members be “deleted altogether” as they get in the way of the producers creative and mismanage funds.649 To make these changes, AMPP stressed that they work together with UTEC by examining each script that comes through and design a timeline as well as calculate the cost of paying all the workers. This way the producer could have an exact budget and understanding of the overall cost for production and get the funds together as necessary to avoid the problems of Cardona’s film.650

Unfortunately, the battle between the AMPP and UTEC continued. UTEC took its time in replying to the demands of the AMPP, making many producers feel that the union did not fully represent its needs. Members of UTEC had negative comments to make about AMPP and suggested that the AMPP understand that most of their work was harmful to the industry and they clean out their own group, getting rid of poor producers and directors first before complaining the

UTEC about the failure of production.651 UTEC criticized the AMPP for slowing down the work within the film industry and suggested that AMPP reorganize completely to be able to work within

UTEC and make profitable films. The battle between the two groups raged on. Jesus Grovas,

648 “Memorandum presentado por A.M. P. P.: Puntos a tratar en las reuniones celebrando los representantes de la Unión de Trabajadores de Estudios de Cine México y la Asociación Mexicana de Productores Cinematográficos,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 14 July 1939. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid. 651 “Los investigadores han resuelto? Los nuevos manifiestos no tendrían necesidad de organizar el trabajo?” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 4 Aug. 1939.

212 president of the AMPP and CEO of Golden Films, discussed the matter by stating that producers were within their rights to contract and pay artists directly, without interference from UTEC, under the Labor Act and Grovas stressed that forcing a producer, “who will invest a large sum of money in the shooting of a film” to conform to the payment arrangements by UTEC was absurd.652 Grovas declared that as long as the agreement between the workers and producers went through UTEC, then the producer should be free to control what happens on the set and provide the payments for the workers. Under this system, workers would still be protected, and producers would have more artistic freedom.

Conclusion

Cinema unions were a powerful presence within the Mexican movie industry dating back to the very beginnings of film. Without a thoroughly developed cinema business in the 1910s and

1920s, unions like the Confederated Union of Cinema Workers (1919) and The Cinematographers

Employee Union (1925) functioned to ensure that U.S companies provided a fair wage and working conditions for Mexican laborers. Union leaders used strikes and boycotts against businesses that would not bargain with the unions and this was quite effective as shown in the previous examples. This helped further the larger goal of Mexican administration of keeping a positive image of Mexicans in film by ensuring that actual Mexican laborers were treated fairly.

Workers also would strike and/or refuse to play any movies which did depict Mexicans and

Hispanics negatively.

652 “El AMPP rechaza un proyecto de la UTECM: El Papel del Trabajo, encuentra simpatía,” Cinema Reporter, Cineteca Nacional, Cinema Reporter collection, 6 Dec. 1940.

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With the growing domestic cinema industry during the 1930s, the function and influence of the film unions grew. Because Cárdenas encouraged the growth of labor, this allowed for the creation of the most powerful cinema union at the time: UTEC under Enrique Solís. Due to complications with the CTM, ANDA, the actors’ union, ended up joining UTEC, which caused friction. Despite the infighting, UTEC was very successful in fighting for and obtaining several protectionist measures and laws which ensured work and growth for the Mexican cinema industry in the face of Hollywood competition. The union also secured payments for workers by providing mediators to work with management, setting up a system that guaranteed, up front, the amount that laborers were to obtain and the date of when they would be paid. UTEC worked with their members to improve the quality of Mexican film by educating laborers about the latest technological advances and making suggestions about what types of movies should be created for Mexican audiences.

Despite the many accomplishments of UTCE during the 1930s and 1940s, the major battle with ANDA impeded success. Because of this infighting, the film industry was slowed down due to strikes and boycotts. While the union tried to sort out the problems on their own, the conflict eventually became violent, involving the federal police. When a solution could not be met since

UTEC refused to recognize ANDA as a separate entity, the President of Mexico, Camacho became involved and write a decree forcing UTCE to comply with the decision to make ANDA independent. However, there were consequences to involving Camacho since he was not as friendly towards labor unions as Cárdenas. Camacho limited the power of both unions so they would not be able to hinder the film industry as they did with their large conflict. The fighting

214 caused a drastic decrease in Mexican film and Camacho did not want the unions to have this much influence and he put in place a committee in hopes of preventing another major battle.

While the unions bargained with private companies, they also worked with the federal government. When companies treated workers badly, they went on strike and then asked that he

Secretary of Labor be involved to punish those businesses and force them to work with the union.

When companies violated workers’ rights, they were faced with legal trouble that could cost them large sums of money. Government officials also set limits for productions companies and their workers by writing contracts that allow for only positive images and ideas about Mexico to be film and portrayed. Unions, sometimes working with federal officials and private companies, and sometimes against them, could influence and help protect the Mexican cinema industry.

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Chapter Five: Women in the Mexican Film Industry

Introduction

The definition of what constituted a “good woman” and the image and characteristics of a productive female citizen changed in 20th century Mexico, especially after the Mexican

Revolution. While the revolution promised equality for all, the reality was quite different. The experiences of revolutionary citizenship and the physical manifestations of the revolutionary government differed greatly for each citizen based on their gender, class, and ethnicity. While women participated in the Revolution as nurses, soldiers, etc., their roles were not radically redefined after the Revolution ended. Women entered the public sphere, but patriarchal constraints continued to restrict them. While Mexican officials and others propagating postrevolutionary ideology attempted to instill concepts of social equality on women in the workforce, they did so by “defining borders of patriarchy, which demanded the perpetuation of inequality and socially sanctioned forms of sexual subjugation.”653 The definition of women in this era had to be redefined so women could both work for the postrevolutionary government in its different industries and stay within their confined roles as subordinates to men. Officials incorporated the idea of the state

653 Joanne Hershfield, Mexican Cinema/Mexican Woman, 1940-1950 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996), 29.

216 as the benevolent, patriarch of its citizens into national rhetoric. Women worked outside the home to support their husband and family, this affiriming the man as head of household. In postrevolutionary Mexico, ideas of “femininity” were embedded with nationalism and mexicanidad, which redefined women’s role but did not change them.

The Mexican cinema industry played a large role in disseminating the expectations of female citizens, both on screen and within its workings behind the scenes. As discussed in chapter one, Mexican administrators defended film censorship by explaining that it was the job of the government to protect its people from negative images and anything that could damage national morale. This included shielding women from more scandalous depictions of femininity, such as the flapper in the 1920s. Movies influenced women by portraying a certain idea of what was pretty and desired. Because the audiences did not need to know how to read, films could “represent and transmit. . . new ideologies of family, nation, and sexual difference.”654 Women could modify themselves through suggestions seen in films; therefore, the government had a responsibility to guard what women saw to keep them from taking in immoral concepts and ideas.

In this chapter, I focus on the image and treatment women in the Mexican film industry, which included both fictional characters and those who worked behind the screen, such as directors. I argue that the Mexican government constructed a certain representation of Mexican women to both counter the negative depiction of Hispanic women in the United States and dictate the roles of women in postrevolutionary Mexico. However, the problem that officials had was to create a portrayal of women that mutually fit revolutionary ideals and traditional concepts of

654 Ibid., 4.

217 gender. The Revolution brought with it the promise of restructuring the social system, which included the gender hierarchy. Along with these social changes came new ways of cultural expression. However, these “often reasserted older hierarchies based on sexual difference” and thoughts on gender remained grounded in older patriarchal views.655 It was difficult to create a concept of women in postrevolutionary Mexico that upheld the larger, collective ideas of the

Revolution, including equality among citizens, and gender norms that put women in a position below men. This struggle and often contradictory process was documented in the Mexican cinema production, both through films and with the women who worked in the industry. Women were not passive in this dialogue and acted in conversation with officials to demand equal treatment, often using revolutionary language to defend their positions. Early cinematographers captured women’s strikes in the street fighting for workers’ and women’s rights, including better pay and social equality for both men and women. Movie theaters became a gathering place for women and here they often showed news reels and other types of propaganda to get out their message to others.

In the first section I provide examples of three individual women’s stories who worked in the Mexican film industry. Analyzing their experiences, I show how the cinema industry attempted to construct an image of women that was rewarded for remaining in their traditional roles and punished if she stepped outside of them. This is seen through both fictional characters that women played within Mexican movies and the comments made to the women who worked behind the scenes. I start with Mexico’s first female director, Adela Sequeyro, who got her start by acting in and working as a technical laborer in several silent films within Mexico. In 1930, with the

655 Ibid., 8.

218 beginning of sound production, Sequeyro became more involved in the industry by writing scripts as well as being an actress. She petitioned to direct and produce her original movie, La mujer de nadie (Nobody’s Woman, 1936) in 1934; however, she ran into several issues in being able to obtain the money and cooperation of the film company and unions because she was a woman.656 I use Mexican director Marcela Fernández Violante’s 1994 interview with Sequeyro, along with several newspaper and magazine articles to illustrate both the successes and struggles Sequeyro faced as a woman in a male-dominated industry.

Next, I examine the life of actress Lupe Vélez. She was from Mexico, but mostly worked in Hollywood. However, I chose to analyze her work because of her characterization as the

“Mexican spitfire,” which was used in both English and Spanish descriptions of her movies. She began working in 1927 and continued to act in forty-four (two were Mexican-made) movies until her tragic suicide in 1944. While several of the Hollywood movies Veléz starred in were criticized by Mexican newspapers and magazines for denigrating the image of Mexico, none specifically targeted the depiction of Veléz herself. She was often the feisty foreigner, dressed proactively.

Even her death was sensationalized, portraying her as unpredictable and passionate. The third and final woman I explore is actress Andrea Palma who played the leading female role in the movie

Mujer del Puerto (The Woman of the Port, 1934). As Rosario, the prostitute, she illustrated the dynamic of the prostitute and the saint/good mother. The film and Palmer’s role, specifically, address how women were to behave and the limited life choices that they had to choose from. Even

656 Eduardo de la Vega Alfaro and Patricia Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1997), 35.

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Palma’s life and her decisions to quit her self-supporting job in acting in 1948 and become a housewife, devoted to her children and husband, exemplify these larger issues.

In the second section I discuss three films sent out by the Asamblea de Ciudades (Assembly of Cities) project. This venture was an attempt made by Mexican production companies, like

Azteca Films, to advertise and show Mexican films in major U.S. cities including Los Angeles,

New York, Dallas, etc. from the 1940s-1970s. Mexican film companies often had satellite offices in areas where there was a large Spanish-speaking population. Not only were the films advertisements for Mexican companies to gain capital in the U.S., they also were used to spread revolutionary ideals to Mexicans in the U.S. in hopes to create a more positive image of Mexicans abroad. For example, “critics and cultural authorities responsible for formulating notion of transnational Mexicanidad” encouraged Mexican immigrants to the United States to avoid

Americanization and embrace a nationalism that transcended borders, like supporting Mexican movies. 657 The three films I chose to analyze illustrate how Mexican films attempted to construct a more positive image of Latin American women in contrast to the exoticized and negatively stereotyped Latinas in Hollywood. However, as I explain, these movies rooted their depictions in ideas of traditional norms, such as women being faithful wives and mothers. Unfortunately, the promises of the revolution were not made available to all Mexican citizens and certain cultural beliefs and stereotypes continued of women as subservient to men (wives, mothers, if workers, only to provide for the family) to be perpetuated in Mexican movies.

657 Gunckel, Mexico on the Main Street, 9.

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Individual Women’s Stories

Being a woman working in the cinema industry was difficult, as directing and producing were typically defined as men’s work. Actresses did not fare much better, as they had to conform to certain standards of beauty and often played roles where the woman ended up dead or with a man, rarely ever setting out on her own. In this section I discuss the stories of three separate women who worked in the Mexican cinema industry. I analyze their experiences within Mexican film as women, and argue that even though they made strides, women were placed in positions below men. This aligned with the regime’s ideas of morality and citizenship within Mexico that conformed to traditional gender roles. While Mexican films attempted to provide a better image of Hispanics, unfortunately, in regard to women, the appearance changed very little, keeping them as housewives, mothers, etc.

Adela Sequeyro: Director and actress

Adela Sequeyro was a female pioneer of Mexican cinema, being one of the few Latin

American women to become a director in the sound era of films during the 1930s.658 Sequeyro was aware that her gender made it difficult for her to excel in the Mexican cinema industry. In

1994, female Mexican director Marcela Fernández Violante published an interview with Adela

Sequeyro to highlight women pioneers in Mexican cinema. Violante asserted that, “The absence of other women in film direction, led to conjecture that I was the first filmmaker in Mexico.

Nothing was further from the truth. . .” 659 But the lack of press and literature on other woman led

658 de la Vega Alfaro and Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro, 7. 659 Marcela Fernández Violante, “Mi encuentro con Adela Sequeyro, ‘Perlita’ Pionera del Cine Mexicano,” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 1994, 12.

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Violante to believe there were few if any past female directors. Because of this void in Mexican film history, Violante decided to write about and discuss women in the field to recover their voices.

While Violante stated that she found some information on Sequeyro and other women, she asserted that she needed to “personally” connect with Sequeyro to understand the complexity of Sequeyro’s work and why Sequeyro decided to pursue a career that was not seen proper for woman at the time.

Interviewing Sequeyro provided insight and information that was previously left out of texts and other works.

Violante chose Sequeyro for several reasons. One, Sequeyro was one of the older female directors still alive and she had worked in silent cinema and was one of the few pioneers of sound.

Second, Sequeyro was relatively young, 34, when she directed her first full-length film. Three,

Sequeyro’s fast decline, which happened before she was 40 years old, was due to her being a woman in a man’s business.660 Violante lamented that because Sequeyro was, “Faced with a series of economic calamities, Adeltia [nickname] had been forced to sell the negatives of her two films, and as a result, she lost control of her material, as director and producer. . .” essentially leaving

Sequeyro out of Mexican cinema history. She was not given credit for her work.661 Therefore, the interview became even more important to provide proper recognition to Sequeyro. The actual interview took place on July 26, 1986, when Sequeyro was 85 years old. Despite Sequeyro’s age,

Violante stressed that Sequeyro was quite bright and had a very vivid memory. It is through

Sequeyro’s own words that one can begin to understand the difficulty and contribution of women in Mexican film.

660 Ibid., 10. 661 Ibid., 11

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Sequeyro got her start with an event advertised in May of 1923 in El Democrata (Mexico

City newspaper) where the Mexican company Olimpia Cinema and U.S. company Paramount

Pictures announced their search for Mexican actors to star in films.662 Organizers of the event went to Sequeyro because of her references and she signed up for the competition. The newspaper ran a short biography of Sequeyro, stating she had never been in front of the camera before; however,

Sequeyro told the paper that she had a passion for Mexican cinema and longed to participate within the industry.663 She explained in an interview with El Democrata on March 29, 1923, that the contest would give her a chance to take up film as a full time career. She also explained that she worked full time for the Departamento de Agua Potable (Department of Drinking Water) and could not afford to go to school and pursue acting and cinematography. However, winning the contest allowed for Sequeyro to pursue her dream of working in Mexican film. She asserted, “I have so much love for movies, that if I had enough money to not have to work to earn my bread, I would film movies; I would enter the cinematographer not only for sport, but also to do work in favor of

Mexico; a work that was in favor of our civilization and the prestige of our race.”664 To Sequeyro’s

Mexican film could bring about a change in how audiences viewed Mexicans abroad.

The contest was no small feat, as several in the cinema business, like Mexican journalists and , saw this as an opportunity to create a “Mexican” star among the white actresses from Hollywood.665 However, this contest, like many others in the 1920s, “pretended, then, to manufacture Mexican ‘stars’ in the heart of Hollywood,” meaning that, while the women were

662 German Martinez, “Adela Sequeyro, una mujer de Veracruz que luchó en un ambiente sin mujeres,” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 29 April 1997, 1. 663 de la Vega Alfaro and Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro, 13. 664 Ibid., 13-14. 665 Ibid., 15.

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Mexican, they would work in Hollywood and English-speaking movies.666 Although Sequeyro did not win, she attracted the attention of Mexican directors and producers and was able to create a good career for herself in the Mexican cinema industry starring in many Mexican silent films: El hijo de la loca (The Crazy Child, 1923), Atavismo (Atavism, 1923), No mataras (You will not kill,

1924), and Un drama de la aristocracia (A drama of the aristocracy, 1924).667 Sequeyro began working in the film industry with El hijo de la loca (The Crazy Child, 1923). She was a both a photographer and co-director with Jose Ortiz and she also played two roles in the film.668 Violante asked Sequeyro how the technicians and others responded to woman in charge. Remarkably,

Sequeyro said the men working with her on this film were cooperative and endearing. She stated,

“With the staff I worked with, they were so cute with me that I could not look in the pockets of my pants, to get the pack of cigarettes, because ten hands were offering me a pack.” This surprised

Violante, prompting a follow up question for Sequeyro: “Were you wearing pants? You were a very modern woman.”669 Sequeyro asserted that she was one of the few women to wear pants and smoke cigarettes, but Sequeyro explained that she was constantly walking around the set and working with others, so a skirt was impractical. This incident illustrates the different standard for men and women as Sequeyro, being one of the female pioneers of Mexican cinema, was judged by her dress, causing her to have a different set of struggles in the industry than men.

Sequeyro was also involved in movie reviews, authoring a film column in the popular

Mexico City newspaper El Democrata through the 1920s and into the 1930s that discussed the

666 Ibid., 20. 667 “Honors for the first Mexican filmmaker,” Siglo 2, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 12 March 1985, 4. 668 Ibid., 20. 669 Ibid., 20.

224 latest Mexican movies and compared them to Hollywood.670 It was during this period, 1923-1930, that Sequeyro participated in the Mexican government’s attempt to industrialize the cinema business to compete with Hollywood; however, as discussed early, this effort ultimately failed.

With the coming of sound movies in the 1930s, she continued her acting career but played smaller roles in El Prisionero Trece (, 1933), La Sangre manda (Blood Sends, 1933), and

Mujeres sin alma (Women without Souls, 1933).671

Sequeryo wrote the screenplay for La mujer de nadie in 1934 and it was set to be filmed in the same year with her as the director. The plot told the story of Ana Maria who became the muse of three men, a poet, musician, and painter. They all created works to please Ana Marie, but she chose only one of the men which caused drama and conflict so Ana Marie picked up her stuff and left, never to see any of the men again choosing to go her own way (it is interesting to note as most melodramas end with the woman dying or falling in love with a man and marrying, not remaining single).672 However, according to an article in the film magazine Revista de Revista by Hugo del

Mar, Producciones Monterrey suspended the filming due to a conflict with Sequeyro.673 Sequeyro filed a lawsuit against the company, claiming she never received her compensation of 100,000 pesos because of discrepancies with the editing of her screen play. She stated that she did not want to play the role of a “quinceañera girl. 674 She explained that the initial female lead was supposed to be strong and of a bohemian background. However, the Companies’ managers wanted a more

670 Ibid. 671 German Martinez, “Adela Sequeyro, una mujer de Veracruz que luchó en un ambiente sin mujeres,” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 29 April 1997, 2. 672 “Honors for the first Mexican filmmaker,” Siglo 21, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 12 March 1985. 673 de la Vega Alfaro and Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro, 35. 674 Ibid.

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“typical,” traditional woman. The issue was sent off to the Junta Central de Conciliación y

Arbitraje (Central Board of Conciliation and Arbitration).

In January of 1935, President Cárdenas signed a decree that promised to provide support to the Mexican film industry to help it grow successfully. This policy aided in the creation of

Cooperative Grupo Exito with funding from the Banco de Credito Popular and Sequeyro looked to the Group to produce her film La mujer de nadie. However, the Group’s managers decided to produce another screen play by Sequeyro instead called Mas Álla que la Muerte (Stronger than death). Sequeyro explained that there were problems with making this film as well because of her distrust for the bank’s officials. They questioned her judgement and refused to hand over the funds for the movie because, as Sequeyro stated, “the treasurer, said: ‘. . . we would work better with men.’”675 Sequeyro then went on to explain how the Cooperative chose a different movie to show to investors that Sequeyro described as having a “bad plot.” No one in the audience laughed and it was considered a failure. She was at the showing and said, “How nice it is to make movies well, right? I congratulate you, keep it up!”676 The bank eventually provided funds to the Cooperative to produce Mas Allá de la Muerte with Sequeyro as co-director. She had her directorial debut (as a co-director) at the end of 1934 with her movie entitled Más allá de la muerte and she also was the lead actress. This movie was a melodrama telling the story of a beautiful and educated woman named Yolanda married to a famous pianist who drank and abused her. While married, Yolanda met a famous bullfighter and took him as a lover. However, her husband discovered the affair and, at first, he wanted a divorce, but the couple reconciled. The bullfighter saw the two together and

675 Ibid. 676 Ibid.

226 left for Guadalajara to bullfight. Yolanda followed the bullfighter to the fight; yet, the bullfighter was gored and died, then Yolanda faints and died as well. The movie was different from other

Mexican films about extramarital affairs. Instead of condemning Yolanda, Sequeyro tried to illustrate and understand the motivation for Yolanda to seek out another man and provide a more sympathetic view.677 However, the ending stuck to the same ideals where the woman who stepped out of the marriage was punished.

On September 27, 1936, author Hugo del Mar announced in Revista de Revista, “For the

first time in the history of our cinematography, a woman - Adelita Sequeyro, actress, ,

scriptwriter - is going to direct a film. . . La mujer de nadie.”678 The movie was filmed during

1937 through the Producciones Carola company and was primarily financed privately by

Sequeyro and her friends and family.679 The film created an atmosphere of excitement and interest

from those in the cinematic community because it was going to be directed by a woman. Sequeyro

could show her variety of talents with this film because she wrote, acted, and directed it.680 The

movie was mildly successful, with Carlos del Paso stating in Revista de Revista,

this film may not be the best film ever made, but on the other hand some of its achievements are without precedent in national film culture: concise, well-placed dialogue, for example, which avoids bloated clichés. This film successfully navigates the jagged reefs of sentimental good-humored mischief and without posing the least offense to morality.681

677 Ibid., 43. 678 Ibid. She was co-director of Mas Allá de la Muerte. La mujer de nadie was the first time she was a solo director. 679 Ibid. 680 Ibid., 46. 681 Patricia Torres de San Martín, “Adela Sequeyro and Matilde Landeta: Two Pioneer Women Directors,” in Mexico’s Cinema: A Century of Film and Filmmakers, ed. Joanne Hershfield and David R. Maciel (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 43.

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Sequeyro’s movie told a humorous story but stayed inside the guidelines of the censorship law by making it fit into the traditional ideas of morality, even if the female character chose to go off on her own.

Despite her previous negative experiences, Sequeyro was successful with her film La mujer de nadie (Nobody’ Woman, 1937). Sequeyro spoke at length about this movie in her interview.

Violante asked how long it took to complete the script and Sequeyro replied, “You see, as I am a very ‘tough’ woman and when I want to do something I hit, I hit until I finish it. The argument I did in eight days and then, to do the script, it took me another fifteen days. I made the movie twenty thousand feet,” in film reels.682 Sequeyro stated that other directors in her previous cooperative did not believe Sequeyro could produce a movie on her own so she wrote this movie to prove she could write and direct a prosperous film. Sequeyro declared that Nobody’s Woman was well- received by Mexican audiences, citing a newspaper review where an anonymous author praised the movie and Sequeyro’s talents. Sequeyro recalled that a New York Times article argued that a

Mexican “woman taught the men how to do technique,” which upset many of her fellow directors and producers.683

The film was one of the first to focus on a female character who chose not to be with a man, hence the title being Nobody’s Women. In the movie, the female protagonist was kicked out of her house by her stepfather. Three men, a poet, musician, and painter, take her in. All of the men eventually fall in love with her and attempt to win her over by constructing poems, songs, and

682 Ibid., 17. 683 Ibid., 18

228 paintings about her.684 She eventually chose the poet; however, all three fought over her and eventually she leaves due to the conflict. She ventures out on her own, being nobody’s women.

Emilio Garcia Riera, Mexican film historian and critic, praised this movie for the beautiful camera angles and photography, and the wonderful attention to detail in every scene, showcasing

Sequeyro’s talent and eye for directing.685

Sequeyro’s second film, Diablillos de Arrabal (Devils of the Suburbs, 1937), was, unfortunately, a disappointment. She modeled the picture after the U.S. Little Rascals series and the movie followed the adventures of “naughty children”; however, it was an economic failure and virtually destroyed her directorial career.686 She continued to marginally work in cinema by writing screenplays that were never filmed and performing tours of her movies sets within Mexico. It was not until the 1980s that her work as a female in Mexican cinema was recognized.687 In the 1930s it was very difficult for her, as a woman, to earn the same recognition of other great Mexican directors such as Fernando de Fuentes.688 Patricia Torres San Martín, Mexican cinema academic, stated that Sequeyro had “intelligence developed at the wrong time,” meaning that the Sequeyro’s was knowledgeable and talented, but not as successful because she was a woman.689

Sequeyro argued in her interview that women provided a different set of techniques in which the men lacked. She stated, “Notice that the great works, the great films are made with

684 “La Mujer de Nadie,” information sheet, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 26. 685 Eduardo de la Vega and Patricia Torres, “Adela Sequeyro, pionera del cine nacional,” Siglo 21, Oct. 18, 1992, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 18 Oct. 1992, 28. 686 German Martinez, “Adela Sequeyro, una mujer de Veracruz que luchó en un ambiente sin mujeres,” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 29 April 1997, 2. 687 Torres de San Martín, “Adela Sequeyro and Matilde Landeta,” 44. 688 Patricia Torres San Martín, “Adela Sequeyro, primera mujer que dirige el cine de sonido,” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 12 March 1995, 10. 689 Ibid.

229 details and little places. Man is more of a set, to direct battles and scenes of action, but for a finer thing, more spiritual, more intimate, woman is more docile in those things.”690 Women, according to Sequeyro, were more connected with emotions and could assist actors and actresses in getting into character to make the films more entertaining and real. She explained this in more detail with her second movie, Diablillos del arrabal (Devils of the Suburbs, 1938) in which Sequeyro directs an actor to make a “malice” face. When the child asked how to do that, Sequeyro responded

“‘Touch the tip of the tooth with your tongue and you smile.’ He made a perfect face of malice,” and it was this type of detail that women could provide to make the characters within the movie come to life.691 However, despite her contributions and attempts to make a place for herself in

Mexican cinema, Sequeyro stressed that it was the male attitude that stopped her from blossoming.

She lamented, “The man, sometimes, adopts a paternal attitude with the woman, but it is bad. You should not cut off the wings of a person who wants to do something new.”692 The men she worked with did not let Sequeyro try different techniques and often claimed they knew more than she did because they were men.

Another problem that Sequeyro discussed was the lack of funding for new or lesser known directors and producers in Mexican cinema. As explained earlier, many directors made historical dramas, recounting the history of Mexico and these were quite expensive, according to

Sequeyro.693 It was another reason why she so abruptly left the cinema industry. After the failure of Diablillos del arrabal, no one within STIC asked her to direct, blaming the fact that she was a

690 Marcela Fernández Violante, “Mi encuentro con Adela Sequeyro, ‘Perlita’ Pionera del Cine Mexicano,” 1994, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Adela Sequeyro, 1994, 21. 691 Ibid., 21. 692 Ibid., 22. 693 Ibid.

230 woman as the reason the movie did not make back the money invested in it.694 Sequeyro stated that the union suggest she be a director’s assistant. However, Sequeyro did not want that, arguing that she deserved to be a full director. Violante asked why Sequeyro did not continue as a screenwriter, as Sequeyro did write the movies she directed, but Sequeyro said that her stories continued to be thrown out or altered in such a way that they no longer resembled what she originally wrote. In general, Sequeyro complained that she was unable to make a decent career for herself in cinema because it was a man’s business. She declared, “. . . in my time it was very hard because the man felt disappointed when a woman tried to do what he did. He felt bad, annoyed, invaded in his duties.”695 Men did not want women to enter their realm of business, so they made it extremely difficult for Sequeyro, so much so that she was unable to continue her career. Sequeyro ended her interview on a solemn note, stating, “The cinema is a world of hungry wolves, unjust people. . .”696

Lupe Vélez: Actress

Lupe Vélez remains one the most visual and important Mexican actresses to star in

Hollywood films during the 1930s-1940s. Vélez was born on July 18, 1908 in San Luis Potosi,

Mexico as Maria Guadalupe Velez de Villalobos. When she was younger, her parents sent her to boarding in school in San Antonio, Texas, where she learned English and that proved to be helpful later on for her career in U.S. cinema.697 While her life began privileged, her father died in 1922

694 Ibid. 695 Ibid. 696 Ibid. 697 Raul Rodriguez Cetina, “Lupe Vélez: la dinamita Mexicana,” El Universal, Nov. 25, 1996.

231 and her family relocated to Mexico City. She decided to go into the entertainment business, starting first with dance classes and landing a star role as a dancer for the live theater in Mexico in March of 1925.698 Vélez was discovered by U.S. director Hal Roach, who was known for producing the

Laurel and Hardy film series.699 She began her career in 1927 taking minor roles in silent movies produced in Hollywood. These included the Laurel and Hardy comedy Sailors, Beware and the

Douglas Fairbanks movie The Gaucho.700 Despite the variety of films she acted in, she only played one role: a caricature of, “an impulsive, passionate and not very intelligent character.”701 Vélez became type-casted as the fiery, emotional, sexualized Latina.

Her fame as the “Mexican spitfire” became solidified with the D.W. Griffith films Lady of

Pavements (1929) and Wolf Song (1929). On July 2, 1929, an unnamed author published an article in Sunday section of El Universal Gráfico detailing both the successes and failures of Wolf Song which starred Veléz. The author described the highlights of the film as Veléz’s songs because of her voice and it was “a pity that she does not sing in our language.”702 However, there were several problems with the movie, mainly the depiction of Mexicans by U.S. producers and directors.

Although the setting of the film was never stated, the author argued that it was identified with the negative stereotypical characteristics of the Mexican people with “classic white trousers” and

“straw hats” there were “unmistakable national types.”703 The characters also had offensive

698 Ibid. 699 “Más Lupe Vélez,” Diá Mes Año, Reforma- Primera File, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, Oct. 26, 2007, 7. 700 “Lupe Vélez, de femme fatale a dulce recuerdo,” Siglo 21, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, July 19, 1998. 701 “Los Curiosos paersonajes de Lupe Vélez,” Imagenes, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, no date provided, 20. 702 de la Vega Alfaro and Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro, 90. 703 Ibid.

232 dialogue commenting on food, like beans being gross, which, the author argued, should have been caught by the censorship supervisor and changed or been rejected. The author asserted that the supervisor should do his job, although he along with others in the government were known to take a “siesta” and this led to mistake like the one in Wolf Song to be made.

The invention of sound advanced her career because she could use her accent and broken

English to her advantage, playing up the part of a fiery Latina. Vélez was described as “ ‘the queen of vulgarity,’ well known in the 1920s for her ostentatious make-up in the expressionist style and shrill laughter for her fiery temperament.”704 She would use Spanish during “her outbursts of bad temper” on screen, the typical stereotype of a Hispanic woman.705 The Half-Naked Truth, a U.S. movie produced in 1932, was one of the most popular of Vélez’s U.S. sound movies. She played an exotic dancer brought to entertain people in New York. She dressed scandalously in a crop top and long skirt with a high slit. She made a strong presence in the movie, singing two songs and providing an unforgettable performance.706 From this film on, Vélez reprised her role as the

“Mexican Spitfire” in eight other U.S.-made movies, where she danced the “” and popularized the idea of Pan-Americanism that was “promoted and encouraged by the needs of war

(World War II).”707 As stated in chapter 3, U.S. producers and directors in Hollywood attempted to create a more respectful and sensitive environment of Hispanics and Latin Americans in media to win their support for World War II, especially Mexico. In one of her movies, Vélez adopted a

704 “Las reinas también se suicidan,” Siglo 21, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,”no date. 705 “Lupe Vélez, de femme fatale a dulce recuerdo,” Siglo 21, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, July 19, 1998. 706 Mordaunt Hall, New York Times, Dec. 31, 1932, accessed 12 Dec. 2018, http://unaserenataparalupe.blogspot.com/2017/12/la-verdad-desnuda-segun-el-new-york.html 707 “Los Curiosos paersonajes de Lupe Vélez,” Imagenes, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, no date provided, 21.

233 war orphan, emphasizing the connection between the U.S. and Latin American countries working together to stop fascism. Mexico joined the allied forces in May of 1942 after two Mexican oil ships were attacked by German submarines.708 To solidify this alliance, U.S. filmmakers used movies in an effort to generate a friendly relationship with Mexico and other Latin American countries in order to gain their loyalty against the Axis powers. Vélez, a Mexican woman, adopting a child who lost their parents during the war, helped to solidify this allegiance.

Although being a talented actress, Vélez continued to be portrayed as an exotic, sexualized

Latina. U.S. producers and directors repeatedly type-casted her as a “fiery” Latina, as this character entertained audiences and brought . However, Vélez was more than this shallow interpretation. An article in El Universal Gráfico in June of 1931 explained Vélez: “Who could have suspected that inside the restless little body, and inside the crazy head of the girl Vélez, there was the most admirable artistic temperament and the most subtle dramatic visions.”709 The

Mexican author, unnamed, gave credit to the actress but not without commenting on her physical appearance and mental state of being “crazy” and a hot-headed Latina. In 1931, Vélez starred in the Hollywood sound adaptation of Leon Tolstoy’s Resurrection (Another version of the movie was made in 1927 starring Dolores del Rio but was silent). Resurrection told the story of the rich

Prince Necklyudov who served on the jury of a woman, Moslova, accused of murder. The Prince realized he had seduced and tricked Moslova into a sexual relationship many years prior to this event. The seduction caused her downfall, leading her to a life of prostitution. Although Moslova

708 María Emilia Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (University Park: Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 119-120. 709 de la Vega Alfaro and Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro, 95.

234 was innocent, she was found guilty and sentenced to death. Necklyudov felt incredibly guilty and saw himself as the root cause for her misfortune so he decided to reform his life.710 In the

Hollywood film, Vélez played the role of Moslova with U.S. actor John Boles as Necklyudov. The same article described Vélez’s performance as spectacular and as this character her true talent was finally showcased. The author explained, “But the scene in which she appears before the jury to answer for a crime she did not commit, is undoubtedly the maximum opportunity she has had to date to fly her flag of triumph.” 711 Vélez, as Moslova, illustrated that she was a remarkable talent and not just a token, exotic, over-sexualized Latina. Lupe Vélez said of herself, “To what do I attribute my success? I think, simply, I am different. I’m not beautiful, but I have lovely eyes and

I know exactly what do to with them. Even though the public thinks I’m a pretty wild girl, I’m really not. I’m just me, Lupe Vélez, a simple and natural Lupe.”712

In her decade-long career, she starred in around forty-four films, only two of which were

Mexican movies: “La Zandunga (1938), by Fernando de Fuentes, with Arturo de Cordova and

Rafael Falcon, and Nana (1944), her last work, directed by Celestino Gorostiza.”713 In La

Zandunga, a romantic comedy, Vélez played the main character, a woman also named Lupe from the small town of Tehuantepec, Mexico. She fell in love with Juancho; however, he left town and promised to marry Lupe at a later date. He never returned so she accepted the marriage of another man. This was Vélez’s first Mexican movie and the premiere date coincided with President

710 Michelle Vogel, Lupe Vélez: The Life and Career of Hollywood’s “Mexican Spitfire” (Jefferson: McFarland, 2012), 186. 711 de la Vega Alfaro and Torres San Martín, Adela Sequeyro, 95. 712 Rogelio Agrasánchez Jr., Beauties of Mexican Cinema (Harlingen: Agrasánchez Film Archive, 2001), 26. 713 Mauricio Peña, “Hoy, hace cincuenta años, murió la trágica estrella mexicana Lupe Vélez: Trayectoria de prestigio y luego el ocaso que la orilló al suicidio,”El Heraldo de Mexico, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez ,12 Dec. 1999.

235

Cárdenas’ announcement to nationalize oil.714 This was a celebratory day for Mexico and people flocked to the theater to see Vélez’s movie. Nana was Vélez’s final movie, based off the Émile

Zola novel of the same name about a French prostitute named Nana.715 Though she was a gifted actress, she was known for her many lovers throughout her short spotlight in Hollywood. Author

Mauricio Peña detailed, “She changed her lover in a way as frequent as changing clothes every day. At the same time, she was always so devoted to each of the men in her life, that all those who marched in her life nevertheless retained a beautiful memory of their relationships.”716 Her former partners included: Gary Cooper (U.S. actor), Johnny "Tarzan" Weissmuller (U.S. actor known for playing Tarzan in the 1930s-1940s), and heavy-weight boxing champion .

She took her own life, tragically, on Dec. 14, 1944. Some of the reasons for her suicide included her disastrous private life, with one failed marriage and several unsuccessful attempts to find love. This included her last partner, actor Harold Raymond, who left her pregnant for another woman. The night before Vélez’s death, she attended the premiere of her Mexican movie Nana in

Hollywood and then organized a private dinner with two of her closest friends, Benita Oakie (wife of U.S. actor Jack Oakie) and Estelle Taylor, a Hollywood actress who Vélez worked with in the past.717 Vélez prepared a menu with food from her hometown of San Luis Potosi and spoke about her career and pregnancy, also stating that Raymond put up “impossible conditions” in order for them to get married, so he abandoned Vélez. Vélez and her friends stayed up late into the early morning of December 14, when Vélez ushered Oakie and Taylor out of her apartment. Vélez then

714 Vogel, Lupe Vélez, 200. 715 Ibid., 140-141. 716 Peña, “Hoy, hace cincuenta años,” Siglo 21, El Heraldo de Mexico, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, no date. 717 Ibid.

236 took an overdose of sleeping pills and went to bed. She left a suicide note to Harold: "To Harold:

May God forgive you and forgive me too, but I prefer to take my life and that of our baby before bringing it up with shame or killing it. How could you, Harold, pretend to love me and our baby, when at no time did you? I do not see any other way out of this, goodbye, good luck, Lupe."718

Vélez made it clear in her note that the failed relationship with Harold was to blame for her taking her own life because her baby would not have a father.

There were two descriptions of her death. One stated that Vélez’s housekeeper was the first to find Vélez and described Vélez as "asleep and small as an angel in her enormous bed."719 The other, most likely a fallacy, was detailed by Kenneth Anger’s (U.S. director, author, and actor)

“scandalous” book Hollywood Babylon (1959), that described the major indignities of famous

Hollywood actors and actresses, including Lupe Vélez. Anger described the source of Vélez death being the mixture of pills in her stomach with the spicy “Mexican dishes” that caused an explosion in her stomach and she died vomiting over the toilet, hitting her head. This was a final insult to

Vélez’s life of a caricature fiery Latina, forced into making a “series of comedies that, although popular, denigrated her as the representative of the Latin spirit in Hollywood.”720

Andrea Palma: Actress

One of the most important Mexican actresses of the 1930s-40s was Andrea Palma, who starred in the popular film La Mujer del Puerto (Woman of the Port, 1934) directed by Arcady

718 “Las reinas también se suicidan,” Siglo 21, El Heraldo de Mexico, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Lupe Vélez, no date. 719 Peña, “Hoy, hace cincuenta años.” 720 Ibid.

237

Boytler. Boytler was a Russian filmmaker who immigrated to Mexico in the late 1920s. Despite being a foreigner, Boytler expressed his interest in participating and adding to Mexican cinema by creating films with specific Mexican themes.721 While this movie strayed away from the traditional characters of charros, it showcased the beauty and culture of Veracruz. The success of Santa and

La Mujer del Puerto helped solidified the prostitute drama and the problems of urban night life in

Mexican cinema.722 Palma played the main character, Rosario. Rosario grew up in the small town of Cordoba City and her boyfriend had promised to marry her. However, when Rosario’s father became sick, this left Rosario with little money and no income since she wasn’t married yet. On top of her father’s illness, Rosario discovered that her boyfriend was cheating on her with another woman from the village. Rosario decided to leave Cordoba City for the port city of Veracruz.

There she became a cabaret dancer and “sold love” to the sailors that came in and out of the port.723

One night, a client of hers was very rough and started to beat Rosario but another man named

Alberto saved her and Rosario thanked him by servicing him. Afterwards, the two began to talk and discovered they were siblings. Rosario was so disgusted that she ran away and ended up throwing herself off the port and into the ocean.

Women in Mexican films at this time fell into only two categories: mother/family woman or prostitute. As Mexican film scholar Jorge Ayala Blanco explains, “the prostitute reestablishes the family equilibrium, bases the Mexican search for a loving archetype, compensates for male dissatisfactions, sublimates civil heroism and unleashes melodramatic passions.”724 The prostitute

721 Jacqueline Ávila, “Arcady Boytler: La Mujer del Puerto (1933),” in Clásicos del cine Mexicano: 31 películas emblemáticas desde la Época de Oro hasta el presente, ed. Christian Wehr (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2016), 57. 722 Ibid., 60. 723 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 192. 724 Jorge Ayala Blanco, Aventura del Cine Mexicano (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1968), 128.

238 was the negative counterpart for the moral woman and was needed to show what happens to women who stepped outside their traditional roles. Prostitution became a major issue for Mexican officials in the postrevolutionary period. While both the State and Church condemned prostitution, officials realized it was a “necessary evil” and sought to control prostitution with zones of tolerance and running campaigns for the working class to educate them about hygiene and morality.725 Along with prostitution, the other concern was the mass migration of women to urban regions to take jobs in factories and other areas outside the domestic sphere. Women also participated in the consumer culture and increasingly began to “acquire an intimate knowledge of the modern” that officials and other conservative saw as threatening to traditional Mexican gender roles.726 Rosario embodied both the modern woman and the prostitute. This was an inherently Mexican movie; the film exemplified the tension and conflicted setting of modernity in postrevolutionary Mexico and the difficulty in establishing a national identity among many competing factors such as gender and class.

The role of Rosario made Palma famous in Mexican cinema. As Emilio Garcia Rivera said of La Mujer del Puerto, “... but something keeps our interest throughout the film, the privileged presence of Andrea Palma, elegant, distant, painful. In the most auspicious debut that any actress has ever had in the national cinema. . .” and another review of the movie stated, “Andrea was the great woman of our cinema ... her presence in the film is beautiful and enduring La Palma has a strength, a style of expression that contrasts with the sweet and sultry.”727 Palma provided a stellar

725 Ávila, “Arcady Boytler,” 60. 726 Ibid. 727 “Mitos y Mitotes: Andrea Palma (1),” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Andrea Palma, no date or author provided, 2.

239 performance of a woman who was sweet and innocent, but at the same time appealing and alluring, which highlights the illustration of a woman as either a wife or prostitute, nothing in between. Film scholar Jorge Ayala Blanco discussed this idea, asserting that La Mujer del Puerto displayed the myth of the binary of women as prostitute or mother.728 Blanco then went on to say, “Andrea

Palma succeeds in embodying the vast potentiality of this myth: grave, contemptuous gestures, sleepy eyes, a cigarette hanging from her lips, an irresistible pearly gaze, sunken cheeks and black lace.”729 Palma was both beautiful and dark, personifying the depiction of the “prostitute with a heart of gold” similar to the character in Santa. Both women were only able to purify themselves by dying.

The Mexican cinematic press compared Andrea Palma to other famous actresses of the time, like Greta Garbo and Marlene Dietrich. Because of the roles she played, Palma had a mysterious allure about her; however, in an article in Mexican Cinema in 1943, the author decided to interview Andrea to help audiences get to know the real Andrea, stating, “But Andrea, fortunately, is a much more humanized and much more consistent than all the protagonists of the beautiful fables, the ideal stories or the fictional cinematic stories.”730 In this article, Angel

Garmendia sat down with Andrea Palma asking how she felt about the comparisons of her to both

Dietrich and Garbo. It was evident in the interview that Palma wanted to stand on her own as an actress in Mexico and not have to be compared to or measured by European and U.S. actresses. Of

728 Ibid. 729 Ibid. 730 Angel Garmendia, “Desaparece qe tendia un paralelo entre la Estrella Mexicana y Greta Garbo y Marlene Dietrich,” Mexico Cinema, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Andrea Palma, Dec. 1943, 4.

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Dietrich, Palma said she was a “beautiful woman,” but “I never liked her as an actress.” 731

Therefore, Palma felt no correlation with Dietrich. Palma was then asked her opinion on Greta

Garbo, which was more positive with Palma asserting that Garbo was a wonderful actress. But

Garbo did not connect with the public as much as Palma felt an actress should, using “inaccessible” to describe Garbo.732

The last part of the interview opened with a quote from Palma asserting, “I do not want to grow old in film, for any reason.”733 She then continued to explain that she planned on retiring from films in five years, which would be in 1948. Her reason for retiring early, explained

Garmendia, was because Palma “now feels the aspirations of a woman who manages to dedicate herself to the home, next to the man chosen for life.”734 Ironically, unlike the female characters

Palma played, Palma decided to become a housewife and stay out of the public. She announced that she was engaged to fellow actor Ernesto Alonso and she believed that if they both continued acting after the marriage, it could potentially hurt the relationship. Palma decided to quit so Alonso could focus on his career and she “will be a woman dedicated to her home, I am perfectly sure.”735

She remained in the traditional role of supportive wife.

Mexican Women in Mexican Film: Creating an image for abroad

In order promote Mexican cinema abroad, especially in the United States, the Mexican government worked with Mexican national film companies to set up satellite offices in various

731 Ibid. 732 Ibid. 733 Ibid. 734 Ibid. 735 Ibid.

241 parts of the United States, including Los Angeles, New York, and Dallas. The cinema corporations in the U.S. would provide film stills and other forms of advertisements for theaters to put up and attract audience members. This project was called the Asamblea de Ciudades (Assembly of Cities) and it included a variety of films from the 1940s to the 1970s.736 In this second section, I focus on three films from the 1940s, using image stills from the Asamblea de Ciudades collection (AGN) and documents from the Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arrealo” that includes articles written about the films as well as commentary from directors and actors. I analyze the image of women and how censorship from the Mexican government constructed a certain ideal of

Mexican women to both counter the negative depiction of Hispanic women in the United States as fiery and sexual and dictate the role of women in post-revolutionary Mexico.

The three films I chose to analyze contain different ideas and attributes of the postrevolutionary woman that were ultimately rooted in older patriarchal stereotypes of gender.

These movies illustrated that women were only successful, happy, and productive citizens if they remained in the domestic sphere as a faithful wife and mother. Amor Prohibido depicts the dichotomy of the angel/whore motif where Luisa, the adulteress, was punished with death and

Isabel, the good woman, was rewarded with the main male character, Mario (whose wife, Luisa, cheated on him.) El Signo de la Muerte includes indigenous men and women; however, the women were portrayed as sensualize damsels in distress who needed the hero, played by the famous actor

Cantinflas, to save them from the evil Aztec priest. Here women play a passive role, background players for the larger hero’s story. The final movie, Flor Silvestre, depicts the woman of the

736 Asamblea de Ciudades file, collection Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y Las Artes, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN).

242 revolution as the main character, played by Dolores del Rio. She was widow of a Mexican revolutionary general and she passed down the stories of his plights to their son. This film was a propaganda piece used to unite Mexicans and aid them in understanding that while the revolution was brutal it was necessary for Mexico to have a brighter future. Del Rio’s character told the history to her son so he could then embody the ideals of the revolution. She served as the transmitter of history, but not as an actor making history.

Amor Prohibido (Forbidden Love, 1944) directed by Arcady Boytler, is a film from the

Asamblea de Ciudades collection that, ultimately, constructed a narrow role for women in society.

Amor Prohibido, the fourth movie by Boytler, was a comedic melodrama that told the story of

Isabel and Mario, a psychiatrist. During his session with his patient, Isabel, Mario discussed his concerns over his wife, Lucia. Mario believed Lucia was cheating on him and lamented in the session with Isabel, who became deeply disturbed by the whole situation.737 Isabel was so upset she could not sleep and decided to go for a walk at night. However, the police confused her for a prostitute and arrested her. This scene was made into a comedic moment. Mario heard about Isabel and went to the police station to straighten out the situation. Mario’s wife, Lucia, spied on her husband and listened to the interview with Isabel. Lucia found out that Mario knew about the affair and she then decided to leave with her lover. However, the two lovers end up getting in a car crash and Lucia died from her injuries. After an undisclosed passage of time, Isabel and Mario see each other in Chapultepec Park and “declare their love for each other” which was accepted by Isabel’s

737 Emilio Garcia Riera, Historia Documental del Cine Mexicano, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Amor Prohibido, 4.

243 father and the rest of her family.738 In the movie the cheating wife, Lucia, died and that was her punishment for not being a faithful, obedient spouse. Isabel, the “good” woman, ended up with

Mario, a reward for her own empathy. Lucia was not a prostitute, but she did violate the marriage vows by taking another lover, leaving the woman, again, with very little choice besides being a wife.

Mexican film critics asserted that the movie was entertaining. Ramón Pérez Díaz wrote a review in El Cine Gráfico stating that while the story was simplistic, in general the movie was funny and Boytler had much “promise” as a cinematographer and director.739 José María Sánchez

García affirmed that the movie was directed well and the photography and sound were of good quality.740 However, García, provided a list of negatives. For example, some of the actors and actresses were cold and not entirely believable in their roles. He ended his article stating, “I will not use bombastic adjectives to describe Amor Prohibido but strictly speaking, with all its deficiencies it is a very tolerable film.”741 Overall, his review was favorable, despite some of the critiques.

The film reviews provide insight into how the movie was perceived, illustrating that there was no critique of the angel/whore dichotomy. This type of melodramatic movie was typical of the time period and reflects the larger societal views of women. Film stills provided by the

Asamblea de Ciudades project aid in reaffirming how traditional gender roles were reinforced

738 Ibid. 739 Ramon Perez Diaz, El Cine Gráfico, Oct. 24, 1944, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Amor Prohibido, 24 Oct. 1944, 5. 740 José María Sánchez García, Moderna, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Amor Prohibido, 21 Oct. 1944, 6. 741 Ibid.

244 within the Mexican movies. As discussed in the previous section of this chapter, women were to remain in the domestic realm of wife and mother, being faithful to their husbands and tending to the needs of their family. The mother is seen in contrast to the whore/prostitute. Amor Prohibido illustrates these two characters in the roles of Lucia and Isabel. Lucia was the unfaithful wife who chose her lover over her husband and family, making her the whore. While Isabel was the kind, gentle woman, who became upset by the situation. The movie even made a comedic point when the police mistake Isabel as a prostitute, like it was funny to even consider Isabel a woman of the night. Figure one and two show Lucia and her husband, Mario. She doesn’t seem as interested in her husband, facing away from him in both pictures. In figure three, Isabel is reunited with Mario and they share a passionate kiss. In the finale scene Mario and Isabel end up together and happy.742

Isabel was rewarded for being the “good” woman by obtaining the handsome and loyal Mario.

Another one of the movies from the Asambleas de Ciudades project was El Signo de la

Muerte (The Sign of Death, 1939), a Mexican comedy directed by Chano Urueta. The film not only provides an illustration of the view of women, but also the indigenous population. The plot of the picture focused on Cantinflas, who played a museum worker that happened to find out that an Aztec grand priest was attempting to restore human sacrifice to the modern world and committing a series of crimes.743 The Aztec high priest was the son of Quetzalcoatl, who was disguised as a professor of archeology, an intellectual, and he was killing young women across the city. There is a subplot with a woman who both Cantinflas and the villain both desired, sexualized

742 “El Amor Prohibido,” 1944, AGN-Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y Las Artes, Asamblea de Ciudades, Box 2, Exp. “El Amor Prohibido,” 2-4. 743 Carlos Monsiváis, Mexican Postcards, (Verso; New York, 1997), 101.

245 as an Indian beauty and the movie contained a dream scene of Cantinflas which included a transvestite. Emilio García Riera provided an interesting description of the plot, stating that “The

‘Aztecs’ of the film are sinister murderers who sacrifice maidens under the cover of night” and

“who will be finally defeated by the representatives of a progressive world,” meaning that the

Aztecs were stopped by the police and others in the modern era.744 As discussed earlier, part of the postrevolutionary identity included praising the indigenous past; however, criticizing the

Indigenous in the present because of their lifestyle and language, which was why the government pushed so hard for educational campaigns in the countryside.745 This view is reflected in the film.

The plot of human sacrifice may have seemed offensive to some, an article from 1939 in El

Rodendel, a film critic magazine, explained. However, the humor and comedy behind the movie make the film light-hearted and acceptable.746 Overall, the author praised the film, stating it was

“well made” and had great actors who made the audience laugh with them.

The plot of the film focused on the Aztecs and idea of indigenous beauty. Yet, it was an ideal constructed around elite perceptions of what was desirable. This is illustrated with the India

Bonita Contest that started in 1921 in Pueblo. It was essentially a beauty contest for indigenous women founded by Félix Palavicin to draw attention to his newspaper, El Universal.747 However, it grew into a national project to “create” the Mexican Indian and “ethnicize” the nation and was part of the unification process in the postrevolutionary period. While, on the surface, the contest

744 “Description by Emilio García Riera,” Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file El Signo de la Muerte, no date or author provided, 1. 745 de los Reyes, Cine y Sociedad, 2:143. 746 “El signo de la muerte,” El Rodendel, Año XI, num. 582, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file El Signo de la Muerte, 24 Dec. 1939, 2. 747 Rick A. López, “The India Bonita Contest of 1921 and the Ethnicization of Mexican National Culture,” Hispanic American Historical Review 82, no. 2: 297.

246 seemed to uplift the indigenous people, the elite men controlled the requirements for the contestants. The judges looked for a woman who was good-looking, humble, had a round face, darker skin, “heavy-eyelids and no formal education.”748 In referencing Indian beauty, the judges used words like “braids, pure race, passive attitudes, mispronounced Spanish, typical Indian clothes, innocence and awkwardness.”749 Basically, indigenous beauty was measure on a lower level than white or mestizo beauty. To add to this, the indigenous women had little agency within the contest as the contestant administrators asked employers to submit photos of workers they thought could compete and they petitioned photographers to go out into the rural areas and take photographs of the women. These ideas of indigenous beauty coupled with the sexualization of the Latina body are exemplified in El Signo de la Muerte. For instance, the main love interest of

Cantiflas and the Aztec priest was a passive actress in the film, with few lines. Her purpose was to serve as an appealing woman in distress for the hero, Cantinflas, to save her. This is seen in figure four, with the woman captured and tied up by the Aztec spirits aiding the priest. While the indigenous people were men, they were dressed in traditional tribal clothing, which was minimal, and look like a caricature stereotype of the indigenous. Figure five went a step further to have the woman naked, on an altar, with much lighter skin in contrast to the indigenous men. In both images, it is illustrated that the woman was a passive actor, sensualized for the audience.

Flor Silvestre (Wild Flower, 1943) directed by Emilio “El Indio” Fernández and starring

Dolores del Rio, was one of the most popular films of the Asamblea de Ciudades project. In Flor

Silvestre, del Rio played a widow, Esperanza, and she recounted to her son the life of his father as

748 Ibid., 302. 749 Ibid., 305.

247 a brave soldier during the Revolution. The tale was illustrated through a series of flashbacks from del Rio and the message was one that deemed the Revolution necessary for modernization, but also “clearly rejects class divisions.”750 Mexican film critics praised del Rio’s performance in this movie stating, “But Flor Silvestre is Dolores del Rio. Our attention is fixed on her. . . How many of our artists will learn from her!”751 Del Rio previously worked in Hollywood before returning to

Mexico and a critic in an article in El Universal attributed her success in Flor Silvestre to the training she received in the United States. The critic exclaimed that del Rio captured the essence of “Mexicanism” in her role as a modest “rancherita” (feminine of farmer on the land). In her facial expression and acting the audience saw her as “haggard, aged, tortured by life” and

“something we [Mexican audiences] rarely see, except in the strong and human achievements of

Russian cinema.752 In her role, del Rio personifies the female widow of a Revolutionary soldier, both praising and critiquing the Mexican Revolution. This great acting and illustration of emotion, the critic argued, was not what Hollywood movies produced. Very few pictures were able to convey the sorrow, making Flor Silvestre an exceptional piece of Mexican cinema and world cinema in the critic’s viewpoint. The critic stressed that Mexican cinema artists should strive to produce such great works.753

Flor Silvestre was an important picture for reproducing revolutionary values, such as equality among citizens and nationalism. In this movie the audience heard from a fictional eyewitness, Esperanza, about the Revolution, providing a firsthand account. Author of an article

750 Bell and Standish, Culture and Customs of Mexico, 135. 751 “Dolores del Rio ha Trazado Una Ruta, Florestan,” El Universal, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, 2 May 1943, 1. 752 Ibid., 2. 753 Ibid., 2.

248 on Flor Silvestre in the Mexico City publication El Redondel, explained that the setting of the movie in the countryside was very important. The focus of the Revolution, the author asserted, was usually the cities and never much in the rural areas where “hatred and passion were unleashed, staining everything with rancor and blood.”754 However, this movie provided Mexican audiences an illustration of the horror and violence that took place outside the cities. The ending of the movie allowed for the Mexican audience to connect with Esperanza and understand the pain and violence were awful but necessary for Mexico to become a modern and powerful country. Flor Silvestre provided “an authentic value that belongs to us [Mexicans] in body and soul.”755 The performance of del Rio and the larger message of the film, Flor Silvestre, was seen as a uniting agent of Mexican citizens.

Dolores del Rio reached peak success in Mexico with the début of Flor Silvestre. As stated previously, del Rio worked in Hollywood during the 1930s and returned to Mexican cinema with this movie. As shown in chapter 3, those who worked in Mexican film looked down on actors that chose Hollywood over their own national cinema industry. However, del Rio seemed to be welcomed back with open arms. An article in Novelas de la Pantalle called her the “prodigal son,” returning to her “homeland with familiar customs and race.”756 This relates to the idea that this film was, in its essence, “Mexican,” showcasing several postrevolutionary ideals of nationalism and modernity. The director, “El Indio” Fernández, was a child of a revolutionary general, and; therefore, knew and felt the pain and terror of having a loved one in the battlefield. Fernández also

754 “Flor Silvestre: Los Ultimos Estrenos,” El Redondel, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, 25 April 1943, 3. 755 Ibid. 756 “Los hijos prodigos del cine nacional,” Novelas de la Pantalle, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, 15 May 1943, 5.

249 joined the revolutionary army as well. Mexican film commentator Antonio de Salazar asserted that

“Fernández . . . lived the Mexican revolution and felt in his noble soul of the great revolutionary flame of freedom risking his own life to achieve an ideal.”757 Fernández fought in the revolution to build a better future for Mexico and Flor Silvestre reflects the sacrifices that were made by men and women who battled to end the dictatorship and imperialism in Mexico. De Salazar commented that “Flor Silvestre is a complete and round Mexican film. . .” with the music and surroundings of the countryside matched that of real life, “so that the spectator receives a dose of strong drama as life itself.”758 Therefore the audience had an experience that was uniquely Mexican, but still contained a universal message of hope for those fighting for freedom. Figure 6 displays del Rio with her son as an infant and her husband, the general, by her bedside after their son’s birth.

Many film critics described Flor Silvestre as a major success for Mexican cinema and a movie unlike any other at the time. One reviewer asserted:

Emilio has made himself a film: he has revived a tragedy and has presented it with such fidelity and freshness very few films of such Russian and French characteristics, especially, can resist the comparison with this vigorous manifestation of the Mexican cinema that for the first time does honor to our race.759

Fernández recounted beautifully and melancholy the Mexican Revolution in a way that illustrated integrity and strength which provided a more positive image of Mexicans and the Revolution.

While movies in the United States have portrayed Mexicans as bandits and violent because of the

757 Antonio de Salazar, “Desfile and Carteleras,” La Pantalla, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, 29 April 1943, 6. 758 Ibid. 759 “Flor Silvestre,” Novelos de la Pantalla, La Pantalla, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,”file Flor Silvestre, 8 May 1943, 7.

250

Revolution, Fernández showed, in his film, that this fight was one to achieve a better future for

Mexicans, necessary to free Mexican citizens.

While commentators praised Fernández, they also gave credit to del Rio for her part in making the movie so successful. Even though she worked in Hollywood, del Rio was Mexican and able to connect to the audience because she was “[s]peaking in their own language,” meaning in

Spanish.760 Del Rio was perfect for the part, Antonio de Salazar asserted in another article, “We doubt that another artist could have played this difficult role with the same vigor, with the affection and with the interpretative talent of this artist, the glory of Spanish-speaking cinematography.”761

Del Rio could successfully convey the emotions of the widow who lost her love fighting for a better cause. It was understood as a necessary tragedy and she wanted to pass this along to her own son who joined the so he could understand what he was protecting. Her performance helped promote Mexican cinema. Some reviewers went as far as to say that del Rio, in Flor

Silvestre, had “given a lesson to Hollywood” and she was “an eminent actress, equal to any universal celebrity.”762 When del Rio first returned to Mexico, those working for the cinema companies in Mexico were skeptical at her talent saying “that there had never been anything in

Hollywood outside a pretty woman,” but the critics changed their opinion with Flor Silvestre showcasing del Rio’s ability to provide an amazing performance.763 Flor Silvestre kick started her career in Mexico and producers wanted to cast her in upcoming movies.764 Figure six illustrated

760 Ibid. 761 Ibid., 8. 762 Novelas de la Pantalla, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, May 8 1943, 9. 763 Ibid. 764 “Fiebre por Dolores,” Cinema Reporter, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, 12 Feb. 1943, 10.

251 del Rio in bed with her son and her revolutionary general husband at her bedside. Figure seven shows del Rio in her kitchen with a stoic look, depicting her beauty and seriousness in this role.

In 1944, Diego Rivera, the muralist, discussed his opinion on Mexican cinema with

Alfredo Díaz Ruanova, Mexican writer, for an article in the Novelas de la Pantalle publication in

February of 1944. Rivera did not have a high opinion of the producers stating, “The producers are businessmen, bankers, rich people who get into the cinema environment to have love affairs with the young stars. They do not understand your business. They are culpable of so many stupid films.”765 Rivera believed that those in the management side of film business were just in it for money and to have affairs with actress; therefore, the quality of movies they produce were low.

But this was unlike “El Indio’s” picture Flor Silvestre. Rivera commended Fernández and del Rio.

He asserted that Mexican directors were very educated even though, Rivera explained, Fernández gave the appearance of a “brave and savage” man and the actors, like del Rio, were also intelligent.766 Rivera argued that Flor Silvestre was the “best of our films to date”, “our” here was meant as Mexican and this movie provided the best of Mexican cinema.767 Despite the success of

Flor Silvestre, Rivera asked why such good films were few and far between, in which he answered that it was the “don juan” producers who only want a quick pay day and beautiful women which led to terrible movies.768 His major critique was that it seemed that Mexican producers and directors attempted to copy European and United States’ cinema which then created an inferiority complex because the movies were not as good. Rivera argued that directors and producers should

765 Alfredo Díaz Ruanova, “Diego Rivera contra todos,” Novelas de la Pantalle, Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco “Juan José Arreola,” file Flor Silvestre, 19 Feb. 1944, 15. 766 Ibid. 767 Ibid. 768 Ibid.

252 focus on retelling and illustrating Mexican folklore and history, like Flor Silvestre.769 However, despite the praise for this film as authentically Mexican and a successful retelling of the

Revolution, it did not question traditional gender roles. The overall tone, with the woman passing down the history of the Revolution to her son, the next man to carry on these ideals, illustrates the subordinate position of women that the Mexican state pushed for women to take. Serve the family and state, for the greater good of Mexican citizens.

Conclusion

The contradiction of revolutionary values with patriarchal rule was a problem for Mexican officials in creating a space for women in postrevolutionary Mexico. They needed to justify the subordination of women in the same breath as praising ideals like worker and land rights for

Mexican citizens. This battle to construct postrevolutionary identity was seen in Mexican film and with the women who participated in the industry. Analyzing the lives of three Mexican women who worked in the movie business, I illustrate that although they could participate, they were not allowed to move forward out of the role of assistants and female characters that were either moral, upstanding wives and mothers, or prostitutes and adulteresses who had to pay for their crimes.

Adeala Sequeyro was basically forced out of Mexican cinema because of her gender. Lupe Vélez remained the “Mexican spitfire” (an over sexualized version of Latinas) her entire career and it even carried forward in her suicide. Andrea Palma, while successful, starred in a film that showed the contradictions of the postrevolutionary women; however, she ultimately kills herself because

769 Ibid., 16.

253 of her life of prostitution. Then Palma, in her personal life, quit acting so that her husband could focus on his own career. Each woman was stuck in their traditional role.

While the films of the Asamblea de Ciudades project attempted to provide an alternative version of Mexicans and Hispanics, more broadly, they did not redefine the roles of women. All three movies chose women who fit the beauty standards of the time. They also punished women who misbehaved and rewarded those who remained in their domestic roles. Flor Silvestre was and continues to be praised as a positive and realistic portrayal of the Revolution. Although, the movie did not actually challenge patriarchal standards. The woman, del Rio, served her family and the state by recounting the memories of her husband who fought in the Revolution for the life her son enjoyed. It was up to her son to then go forth and continue to implement the fruits of the

Revolution, leaving her solely as the mother. In Amor Prohibido, Isabel was rewarded with marrying the doctor, while his cheating wife died. El Signo de la Muerte depicted a hyper- sexualized version of the indigenous. Mexican officials and artists may have attempted to make a more positive image of Mexicans, but in the end, this was only for certain Mexican citizens who were men.

254

Figure 1: Film stills from Amor Prohibido

255

Figure 2: Film stills from El Signo de la Muerte

256

Figure 3: Film stills from Flor Silvestre

257

Conclusion

Conservative Shift in the 1940s and the Decline of the Film Industry

The end of the Good Neighbor Policy and shift to containment after 1945 directly affected

Mexican film production. The Good Neighbor Policy, enacted in 1934, led to the creation of films like The Three Caballeros (1946) and That Night in Rio (1941). These movies depicted Brazil,

Mexico, and the U.S. as friendly neighbors exchanging different cultural values and customs.

Filmmakers in the U.S. began to initiate collaboration with directors and producers in Mexico and

Brazil in order to encourage this growing friendship. With the coming of sound, U.S. producers realized Mexican filmmakers had an advantage in the market: Spanish-speaking actors and actresses. Therefore, these U.S. companies provided financing to the Mexican cinema industry, aiding them greatly. The U.S. attempted to create better relations with Latin America which included providing money to movie and film companies in Mexico to produce pro-war and pro- ally films for popular consumption.770 However, there was a deep level of irony that came with

U.S. funds as Mexican producers made movies that were inherently nationalistic and also asked the Mexican government for protectionist legislation for Mexican movies against U.S. competition, the country Mexicans had taken money from to make their own movies.771 Mexican officials enacted some protectionist measure, yet Mexico’s film economy was set up in a way that

770 Fein, “From Collaboration to Containment, 127. 771 Ibid.

258 was dependent on money from the U.S. When World War II ended with the ally victory, so did the funding. Communism became the biggest threat for the United States and policy and funding turned towards containment. Mexican officials strived to keep good relations with the U.S., therefore, the film industry developed into one that would not challenge Hollywood In turn, this led to a decrease in quality and, a general decline of the industry.772

While Hollywood did provide much funding, the Mexican film industry was also able to thrive because of the financial assistance from the the Mexican government. However, this help came with certain stipulations, such as creating movies that, in turn, supported the ideas of the postrevolutionary government. With the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1936) came a rise in the idea and promotion of Mexican nationalism, including the cinema industry. Under Cárdenas,

Mexico experienced one of the most radical political climates since the Revolution with the largest land redistribution and the growing communist influence on labor union and education reform.773

As discussed in chapter four, cinema unions were the backbone of the movie business. Laborers secured better working conditions and protectionist legislation for Mexican cinematographers, allowing for Mexican cinema production to drastically increased. This also included government- funded films that upheld certain revolutionary ideals, like Redes.774 While the industry was never

“nationalized,” the Mexican government continued greatly aid the industry by subsidizing money into the creation of Mexican studios such as CLASA (Cinematográfica Latino Americana, S.A.), which produced Vámanos con Pancho Villa (1936). The Mexican administration not only provided

772 Ibid., 155. 773 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 41. 774 Letter from Rafael Molina Betancourt to the Secretary of the Government, AGN, SEP, Box 33638, Exp. 2, 16 June 1936, 41.

259 the money, but also material like military equipment and even a train and when the studio declared bankruptcy after the movie was made, the Mexican government bailed CLASA out.775 These actions illustrate how the investment of the Mexican government greatly aided in the success of the Mexican film industry and how more socialist and leftist values of the Cárdenas administration were reflected in the movies produced.

The Cárdenas administration also saw film as a way to export positive representations of

Mexico abroad, specifically to the United States. A Mexican movie critic stated that “film they

[Mexicans] produce is destined not only for Mexico but for the entire world and that we are judged abroad through film,” and Mexican film distributor in the United States argued “ a group of daring men that through effort and sacrifice, and the quixotic nature of our race, have tried to show the world that their country is not behind others in terms of cinema.”776 Through movies, Mexican cinematographers were able to showcase the beauty of their country and civilizations to help negate the racists depictions of Mexicans in U.S. film. The Mexican government helped in this effort by provided positive incentives for those who created movies that illustrated Mexico in a positive way, whether in a fictional movie or one used to gain tourism.

Despite the state investment in cinema, the Mexican industry was small in comparison to

Hollywood. Actress Dolores del Rio described the state of Mexican cinema in the late 1930s as

“not as yet ‘of sufficient solidity.’”777 In Hollywood, producers and directors were shrewd businessmen and knew how to use their profits wisely and put them back into the cinema industry.

775 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 43. 776 Gunckel, Mexico on Main Street, 136. 777 Ibid., 49.

260

Whereas, in Mexico, cinematographers only wanted to make a profit and did not want to build a larger industry, making it difficult for Mexican cinema to grow to the same lengths as Hollywood.

This included filmmakers using the success of Allá en el Rancho Grande (1936), and “churning out more than twenty ‘Rancho Grandes’ in the following years.778 This led to the film industry creating more commercialized films than the social commentary and educational ones like Redes.

The Mexican government and the movie business as well, took a more conservative turn with the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946). The film industry and audience views seemed to reflect this trend towards conservativism as En tiempos de don Porfirio (In the Times of

Don Porfirio, 1939) was the most popular movie of the year.779 This film harkened back to the era of the dictator Porfirio when European and U.S. imperialism and a more rigid social code hiearchy.

Although Camacho’s presidency was more conservative, he maintained that the Mexican government should still participate in the cinema industry. For example, he intervened in the fighting between ANDA and UTEC, forcing UTEC to recognize ANDA, and, thus, making both unions less powerful overall.780

Despite cutting the powers of the unions, Camacho did attempt to provide boundaries for production companies and their workers through contract negotiations with film companies, censoring them in an indirect way. In 1943, the Ministry of the Interior of Mexico and España

Mexico Argentina Film Company negotiated a legal contract that would allow the corporation to produce films in Mexico. The representatives in the agreement were Miguel Alemán (who would

778 Ibid. 779 Ibid., 50. 780 Fidel Velázquez General Secretary of CTM from Manuel Avila Camacho, AGN, Departamento de Trabajo, Box 214, Exp. 4 (1938-39), 20 July 1945, 55.

261 become the president of Mexico in 1946), serving as Secretary of the Interior and Juan F. Azácarate of España Mexico Argentina Film Company. In this deal, Alemán stated that the film company had to create a documentary entitled, Do you know Mexico?781 Alemán insisted that the purpose of this film was to educate the Mexican public about Mexico’s history. In the section of the contract labeled “Background,” Alemán wrote, “The Ministry of the Interior wanted the Mexican population to objectively know both manifestations of Indian culture as well as various post- development stages,” meaning audiences should be educated about the indigenous past as well as the progress of modern Mexico.782 He insisted that all areas of Mexico’s infrastructure be included in the film: agriculture, industry, mining, education, transportation, banking, etc.783 Do you know

Mexico? needed to showcase the many advancements that Mexico and its officials made since the

Revolution and that the Mexican people should be proud of their country.

As for the logistics of the film, the company promised to have it completed within a year;

“However, being the moral obligation to do everything possible to finish it within six months.”784

Alemán and the Ministry of the Interior asserted that the film should be finished rapidly and, as part of the contract, the Ministry agreed to provide financial assistance to the company in the amount of $50,000 (American dollars) given to the company in a monthly sum of $10,000 for five months.785 After the completion of this documentary, Alemán would view the film and have total discretion over whether or not the movie fit within the Ministry’s expectations. Note that this was different from the movie going to a censorship board first and then to the Ministry of the Interior

781 Written contract, AGN, Dirección General de Asuntos Jurídicos, Box 16 Exp. 18 (1943), 12 March 1943, 3. 782 Ibid., 2. 783 Ibid. 784 Ibid., 3. 785 Ibid.

262 if there were any problems. This shift gave power directly to the Ministry through Alemán, illustrating the change to a more authoritarian approach. If the company failed to produce a satisfactory documentary, then they would have to pay for the entire cost of the film. Alemán warned that the Ministry would demand that the $50,000 be returned at once.786 Both parties signed the contract agreeing to the stipulations.

The film contracts were a major way that Mexican government officials could censor the

Mexican cinema industry. Censorship included the promotion of a positive image of Mexico and the Mexican government did just that with the contracts. However, in this instance there was a change to Alemán having control over the censorship process, taking power away from the censorship board, thus making it a less democratic procedure. This is just one example of how the government of Mexico was changing to one that was more conservative.

Even though there were certain protections, like the previous example, foreign competition from Hollywood increased in the early 1940s. To counteract this, President Camacho created the

Banco Cinematográfico (National Cinematography Bank) in 1942 to help finance Mexican movies.787 It was a private firm (nationalized in 1947); however, the government helped finance and find money to aid Mexican production companies. However, the films that came from this

Bank often took a conservative tone, like Río Escondido (Hidden River, 1947) that told the story of Rosaura Salazar as a teacher who was given an assignment to her, personally, by President

Alemán (1946-1952), illustrating his power and kindness as Mexico’s leader.788 This new era

786 Ibid., 4. 787 Mora, Mexican Cinema, 78. 788 Ibid., 79.

263 pushed out the socialist and communal films of the 1930s, and movies like Redes and Vámanos con Pancho Villa were no longer created as the attitude of the government and general public turned more traditional and towards upholding the ideas and legitimacy of the state.789 This is depicted in what official censor Felipe Gregorio Castillo stated in the 1940s: “Films like El

Compadre Mendoza should no longer be made, for they showed ‘shameful aspects of the revolution’ and if it had been up to him ten years ago, De Fuentes’ film would not have been made.”790 Censors decided to ban and prohibited a different set of images that reflected the more conservative Mexican government. In the later films of the Golden Age of Mexican Cinema

(1940s-1950s), particular plots developed that constructed an official history where “official histories emerged at the allegorical level within the popular melodramas of Mexican cinema, fusing notions of national identity with the dominant regime.”791 But these ideas of national identity included a strict adherence to state administrators and politicians. While Cárdenas’ administration included the peasants and workers, Camacho and Alemán strived to pacify their demands while maintain strict state power.792

Despite the changes taking place from the leftist Cárdenas’ administration to the more conservative period of Camacho and Alemán, the image of women remained the same. This is illustrated in one of the most popular Mexican films in the post-war era Nosotros los Pobres (We

789 Alex Saragoza with Graciela Berkovich, “Intimate Connections: Gender, the State, and National Identity,” in The Mexican Cinema Project, eds. Chon A. Noriega and Steven Ricci (Los Angeles: UCLA Film and Television Archive, 1994), 27. 790 Noble, Mexican National Cinema, 56. 791 Saragoza, “Intimate Connections,” 27. 792 Seth Fein, “From Collaboration to Containment: Hollywood and the International Political Economy of Mexican Cinema after the Second World War,” in Mexico’s Cinema: A Century of Film and Filmmakers, eds. Joanne Hershfield and David R. Maciel (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999), 126.

264 the Poor, 1947). Similar to the movies discussed in chapter five, the plot has its foundation around the whore/mother motif. La choreada (the grimy one) is the love interest of the main male character, Pepe el Toro. She is depicted as chase and modest. Then there is Katy Juarado, who is infactuated with Pedro and played as a sultry, sexy Latina. Pedro’s sister is a prostitute who is inflicted by a horrid disease. Pedro has an adopted child and during the course of the film, the audience finds out that mother of the child is actually Pedro’s sister.793 This makes Pedro a sympathetic character, as he cares for his sister’s child. In the end, his sister dies, as almost all prostitutes do in the melodrama. And Pedro chose to marry La choreada, the humble and “good” woman. The same archetype was followed with Salón Mexico (1948). These movies show that the image of women did not change going into the postwar period. Women were to remain in the domestic sphere as wives and mothers and those who stepped outside of these roles were punished.

Legacy of Censorship

This dissertation has shown how the Mexican administrators used censorship as a way to promote and propagate revolutionary ideals that were directly tied to the postrevolutionary government. Officials used both positive and negative censorship to create a Mexican film industry that both negated the stereotypical images of Hispanics and legitimized the postrevolutionary leaders like President Cárdenas. However, cinematographers and others in the movie industry also played a role in this by pushing and fighting for protectionist legislation so they could create

Mexican movies for Mexican by Mexicans.

793 Saragoza, “Intimate Connections,” 28.

265

While Mexican officials used film censorship as a form of propaganda, cinematographers used it to their advantage by catering to the government’s request. Therefore, the cinematographers were able to obtain money and other necessities to create movies that uplifted Mexicans and Latin

Americans. Mexican cinema provided audiences with a brown hero and had themes that were unique and recognizable to Latin Americans and viewers could find commonality and see people that resembled them in a positive light. Mexican cinema created a space to express Mexican national identity and a Pan-Americanism that all people within Latin America could participate in and enjoy. The transnational conversations about race in film forced U.S. directors and producers to confront the negative depictions of Hispanics, while the Mexican film industry simultaneously provided positive images and characters for Latin Americans. It is important to understand the implications of this transnational conversation. In contemporary U.S. cinema, Hispanics still tend to play the villains and bandits. My work shows that this type of representation is not new and has roots going back to the beginning of international cinema; however, by learning about and engaging with denigrating stereotypes, we can hope to understand one another to eradicate them.

266

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