Issue Paper ALGERIA POLITICAL and HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE November 1996
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Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Page 1 of 32 Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Home Issue Paper ALGERIA POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE November 1996 Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This document is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate. Table of Contents MAP GLOSSARY 1. INTRODUCTION 2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 3. MAIN ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS 3.1 Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) 3.2 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 3.2.1 Internal Rivalries 3.3 Relationships Among Islamist Groups 3.3.1 FIS-AIS 3.3.2 FIS-GIA 3.3.3 AIS-GIA http://www2.irb -cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=115&cid=0& ... 28.05.2009 Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Page 2 of 32 4. INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST VIOLENCE 4.1 Car Bombings 4.2 Attacks Against Educational Institutions 5. GROUPS AT RISK OF ARMED ISLAMIST ATTACKS 5.1 Security Forces Personnel and Their Families 5.2 Media Personnel 5.3 Government Officials 5.4 Foreigners 5.5 Women 5.6 Other Groups at Risk 6. STATE RESPONSE 6.1 Counter -militant Operations 6.2 Curfew 6.3 Legal Sanctions 6.3.1 Amnesty Law and Clemency 6.4 Military Service 6.5 Communal Guards and Self -Defence Groups 6.6 Human Rights Violations by Security Forces 6.7 Limitations on Freedom of Expression 7. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS APPENDIX: List of Main Cabinet Ministers REFERENCES MAP See original. Source: Labat, Séverine, October 1995. Les Islamistes algérien: entre les urnes et le maquis. Paris: Editions du Seuil. GLOSSARY AIS Islamic Salvation Army (Armée islamique du salut) http://www2.irb -cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=115&cid=0& ... 28.05.2009 Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Page 3 of 32 FFS Socialist Forces Front (Front des forces socialistes) FIS Islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du salut) FLN National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale) GIA Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armé) LADDH Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (Ligue algérienne de défense des droits de l'homme) MDA Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la démocratie d'Algérie) MEI Islamic State Movement (Mouvement pour l'État islamique) MRI-Ennahda Islamic Renaissance Movement-Ennahda (Mouvement de la renaissance islamique- Ennahda) MSI-Hamas Islamic Society Movement-Hamas (Mouvement de la société islamique-Hamas) ONDH National Observatory for Human Rights (Observatoire national des droits de l'homme) PRA Algerian Renewal Party (Parti pour le renouveau de l'Algérie) RCD Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie) *The names of these groups have been translated from the French. These are not official translations, however, as English has no official status in Algeria. 1. INTRODUCTION This paper is an account of the situation in Algeria between mid-March 1995 and May 1996. It updates the June 1995 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper entitled Algeria: Islamism, the State and Armed Conflict , which contains background information on the Islamist movement as well as information on events in Algeria between early 1992, when the conflict between the state and armed Islamists erupted, and March 1995. In this paper, references are made to specific Islamist groups wherever possible. However, most sources do not make such distinctions and refer only to "Islamist groups," "armed criminals" or "terrorists" when describing events. Human Rights Watch also mentions the possibility that some of the civilian killings "officially attributed" to armed Islamist groups may have been committed by "criminal or other groups whose links to the Islamist movement were tenuous at best" (HRW 1995, 263). Similarly, Amnesty International states that, while the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armé — GIA) (see section 3.2) claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against civilians in 1995, it was impossible to authenticate these claims (AI 1996, 73). Further, the killing of journalists by Islamist groups (see section 5.2) and government- http://www2.irb -cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=115&cid=0& ... 28.05.2009 Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Page 4 of 32 imposed media censorship (see section 6.6) "have all but stopped reliable reporting on Algeria's civil crisis," according to one source (IPS 2 June 1995). 2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS [1] In early April 1995 President-in-transition Liamine Zeroual launched consultations with several opposition parties to discuss an agenda for future presidential elections ( Middle East Times 16-22 Apr. 1995, 3; ibid. 23-29 Apr. 1995, 3). The National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale — FLN), Socialist Forces Front (Front des forces socialistes — FFS), [2] Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la démocratie d'Algérie — MDA) , Islamic Renaissance Movement-Ennahda (Mouvement de la renaissance islamique — MRI- [3] Ennahda) and the communist Ettahadi party each expressed their opposition to holding presidential elections while the conflict between the state and armed Islamists continued (ibid.). [4] The first four parties, which had signed a government-rejected peace proposal with the Islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du Salut - FIS), also said that the government should include the FIS in the dialogue, but the government stated it would not negotiate with the FIS until the group had rejected violence (ibid.;Middle East Times ibid. 16-22 Apr. 1995, 3). However, reports of secret negotiations between the government and detained FIS leaders [5] Madani and Belhadj in June 1995 suggested that the government would perhaps allow the FIS to participate in future presidential elections ( Middle East International 23 June 1995, 11; The Ottawa Citizen 26 June 1995; The Christian Science Monitor 28 June 1995). These talks reportedly collapsed in July 1995 ( Middle East Times 16-22 July 1995, 4; Jeune Afrique 27 July-2 Aug. 1995, 51), with the government accusing the FIS of being unwilling to call for a ceasefire and the FIS accusing the government of being responsible for the assassination of a FIS founder [6] and imam, Abdelbaki Sahraoui , in Paris on 11 July 1995 ( Middle East Times 16-22 July 1995, 4). However, on 18 August 1995 Le Monde reported ongoing discussions between the two parties. In 1995 various Algerian democratic opposition parties remained divided over Algeria's political future (Touati 1995, 224; Le Monde 9 Dec. 1995). Amine Touati, in his 1995 study of Algeria states, [translation] "unable to emerge as an alternative to the state/FIS division or bi- polarization, the democrats have drifted toward one or the other of the conflicting parties" (Touati 1995, 223). Human Rights Watch notes that the government has impeded the democratic opposition's attempts to consolidate their forces (HRW 1995, 265). However, on 9 June 1995 in Algiers between 10,000 and 15,000 people attended the first public rally organized by those opposition parties which had signed the Rome platform ( Le Monde 12 June 1995; Middle East International 23 June 1995, 11; The Christian Science Monitor 28 June 1995). Many supporters of the FIS attended the rally, although the government did not allow the participation of FIS representatives ( Middle East International 23 June 1995, 11). Concerned with legitimizing its rule in Algeria, the government organized a presidential election for 16 November 1995 ( Arabies June 1996a, 13). It called on 100 foreign observers, half from member states of the Arab League and half from the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to monitor and follow up on the election (MENA 16 Oct. 1995; Keesing's Sept. 1995, 40753). On election day the government tightened security throughout the country ( Le Devoir 16 Nov. 1995, A6) to counter the armed Islamist threat to kill those who voted (IPS 16 Nov. 1995; Middle East International 1 Dec. 1995, 16). There was no violence during Algeria's first democratic presidential election, which http://www2.irb -cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=115&cid=0& ... 28.05.2009 Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Page 5 of 32 international observers considered to be largely free and fair ( Country Reports 1995 1996, 1119; Monde arabe Maghreb-Machrek Jan.-Mar. 1996, 107; APS 22 Jan. 1996; Arabies June 1996a, 13). The election was marked by a high voter turnout of 75 per cent ( Monde arabe Maghreb-Machrek Jan.-Mar. 1996, 107, 109; Le Nouveau Quotidien 23 Nov. 1995; Middle East International 1 Dec. 1995, 16), which has been interpreted as an expression of the Algerian people's desire for peace ( Journal de Genève et Gazette de Lausanne 17 Nov. 1995; Le Nouveau Quotidien 23 Nov. 1995; Middle East International 1 Dec. 1995, 16; Arabies June 1996a, 14). Approximately 65 per cent of eligible Algerian voters in France also cast their ballots (Algerian TV 16 Nov. 1995). Liamine Zeroual, who was backed by the military, won the election with 61.34 per cent of the vote ( Le Nouveau Quotidien 23 Nov. 1995; Middle East International 1 Dec. 1995, 16). Sheikh Mahfoud of the Islamic Society Movement-Hamas (Mouvement de la société islamique (MSI)-Hamas), a moderate Islamist party, obtained one-quarter of the votes, many coming from FIS sympathizers, making it the most significant legal opposition party ( Le Nouveau Quotidien 23 Nov. 1995; Libération 25-26 Nov. 1995, 9). Saïd Saadi of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie — RCD), representing the modernist, democratic camp, received 9.6 per cent of the vote ( Le Monde 9 Dec.