Localism and the Design of Political Systems

This book examines localism as a political idea and policy approach and explains what localism is about, why it is growing in importance and how it relates to other themes in politics. Illustrated with case studies from the United Kingdom, mainland Europe and the Indian sub-continent, the book analyses localism in conceptual and theoretical terms and locates it within the overall landscape of political thought. Key themes covered in the book include place, space and scale; decentralization and devolution; multi-level governance; public value; democracy and empowerment; and political design. With the focus on the bottom-up, constructivist aspects of localism, the book argues that localism is most likely to work successfully in a political order where sovereignty is ‘distributed’ across various social spheres and levels of government. It offers a comprehensive view of localism by synthesizing its various strands and creating a distinctive framework for design and evaluation. This book will be of particular interest to scholars, students and practitioners of localism, particularly within local and regional government, public administration and policy, human and political geography, and urban studies.

Rick Harmes is a former teacher and local government officer. He is currently Associate Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Exeter, UK. Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy

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Localism and the Design of Political Systems Rick Harmes

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Rick Harmes First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Rick Harmes The right of Rick Harmes to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. With the exception of Chapter 8, no part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Chapter 8 of this book is available for free in PDF format as Open Access from the individual product page at www.routledge.com. It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Harmes, Rick, author. Title: Localism and the design of political systems / Rick Harmes. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge studies in governance and public policy | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020037814 (print) | LCCN 2020037815 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367406011 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367810054 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Local government—Cross-cultural studies. | Political planning—Cross-cultural studies. Classification: LCC JS78 .H266 2021 (print) | LCC JS78 (ebook) | DDC 320.8—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037814 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037815 ISBN: 978-0-367-40601-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-81005-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC For Sue

Contents

List of figures ix Foreword and acknowledgements x List of key abbreviations xii

1 Introducing localism 1 Localism: a political doctrine for our times? 1 Questions and aims 1 Key themes and paradigms covered in this book 2 Structure of the book 3 Organizing perspectives 4

2 Analysing localism 6 The polycentric world order 6 In search of localism: mapping the intellectual and conceptual landscape 6 Conceptual analysis of localism 11 The localist turn: geography, environmentalism, politics 12 Analysing social and political organization 14 Three dynamics of localism 16

3 Localism in context 22 Place, space and scale: core dimensions of social and political organization 22 Communities of place and their governance 24 The nation state and the limits of government 25 The international relations system and the size of states 27 The global and the local 29 Multi-level governance, empires and political orders 31 Political community, public goods and sovereignty 35 Localism and sovereignty in conflict: the case of Catalonia and Spain 37 viii Contents 4 Varieties of localism 54 ‘Old localism’: established local governance 54 Neighbourhood governance 56 Governance at the micro level: pathologies and challenges 58 Governing locally in a polycentric world: towards a ‘new’ localism? 62 Trans-localism and the upward-shaping potential of the local 64 Localism in flux: Cornwall, England, UK 66

5 Localism and public value 96 On public goods and public value 96 Core domains of public value 98 Localism and democracy 100 Localism and human wellbeing 103 Localism and environmental sustainability 108 Joining up the domains of public value 113 Territorial cohesion within political systems: the case of the European Union 115

6 Designing for localism and multi-level governance 128 Institutions, political systems and their design 128 Principles for institutional and system design 132 Design trends in national, regional and local governance 135 Visionary localism: the case of India and Kerala 137

7 Local outcomes 163 Policy evaluation and achieving public value 163 Towards a local outcomes framework 164 Evaluating local outcomes in Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly 166 Evaluating localism: Area Assessment in the UK and Cornwall, 2009–2010 169

8 Localism and political systems in the twenty-first century 173 The argument so far 173 The twenty-first-century design context 177 Designing political systems 179 In conclusion: ten propositions 184

Index 188 Figures

3.1 Political map of Spain, showing the location of Catalonia and the other autonomous communities 38 4.1 Outline map of Great Britain, with Cornwall highlighted 67 4.2 Map of Cornwall showing Cornwall Council’s 19 Community Network Areas and the county’s main towns 69 6.1 Political map of India, showing the location of Kerala 143 6.2 Administrative map of Kerala, showing the state’s 14 districts 145 Foreword and acknowledgements

Localism and the Design of Political Systems is my first published book, and it represents nearly 50 years of work experience and academic research. My interest in localism was kindled by a professional career in public services in the UK and Europe, including more than 25 years in English local government. As a teacher, and then as a council manager, I was routinely expected to carry out whatever government policy for my sector happened to be at the time. This was challenging and sometimes frustrating, especially as government policy changed frequently between 1980 and 2008. However, I often had the satisfaction of helping to devise a local or community response to a pressing service issue, or of helping to shape a policy which all the main political parties locally had discussed and were fully agreed on. More recently, as an academic researcher, I have become particularly interested in the mechanisms by which public policy may be created and driven from the bottom-up, as well as from the top-down. Whatever the source of a particular policy initiative, its implementation has to take place at the individual, community or local level. So it is with that level that my commitment as a researcher continues to lie. The recent turn to localism speaks to a range of contemporary concerns around governance, policy and theory. As a foundational concept within politics, localism can be approached in a variety of ways. I hope that some of that diversity will be reflected in the account set out in this book. At the outset, I would like to acknowledge some of the key people and organizations who have supported me with this research project over the past decade. Firstly, the many academic staff, visiting presenters and students I have come into contact with at the University of Exeter since 2008, and the intellectual stimu- lation I have received on a wide variety of academic topics during the course of my research. In particular, I want to acknowledge the academic colleagues with whom I have worked most closely during the gestation of this project, including Stephen Wilks, Michael Winter, Dario Castiglione and members of Exeter’s Political Theory Reading Group, Oli James, and my two PhD supervisors Andrew Massey and Duncan Russel. Secondly, I want to record my thanks to the councillors, officers and staff at Cornwall Council for the help they have given me over more than a decade of Foreword and acknowledgements xi carrying out longitudinal research on their organization. I have received nothing but total support from everyone I have dealt with at the council. My particular thanks go to Rob Andrew and to all his colleagues, past and present, working in Cornwall’s localism services. My admiration for their professionalism and their commitment to public service during a period of great challenge for English local government is boundless. Thirdly, my thanks also go to Andrew Taylor and Sophie Iddamalgoda and all their colleagues at Taylor & Francis, who have helped me with the publication of this book. It has been a great pleasure working with them, and I would be happy to do so again. In this connection, I must also acknowledge the organizations that have given me copyright permission to print the maps they have created, including Cornwall Council (Figures 4.1 and 4.2), infoandopinion.com (Figure 6.2) and ontheworldmap.com (Figures 3.1 and 6.1). Finally, I want to thank my close family and friends for the unfailing interest they have shown in this project, and for the encouragement they have given me at various points along the way. Most especially, my gratitude goes to my partner Sue, to whom this book is dedicated, for her editing suggestions and for the close interest she has taken at every stage of my academic journey. Rick Harmes Lympstone, Devon 2020 Key abbreviations

ANC Assemblea Nacional Catalana (civil society umbrella organization in Catalonia) ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian political party) BL British Library BPT British Political Tradition (expression used to denote a top-down style of governing that has been characteristic of UK governments for a long time) CA Combined Authority (designation given to consortia of English local authorities with formally devolved powers) CAA Citizenship Amendment Act (controversial new act passed by the Indian legislature in December 2019. Regulates the allocation of citizenship rights in India) CAA Comprehensive Area Assessment (a system for assessing the effec - tiveness of local public services in England. Used for one year only before being discontinued in 2010) CCTV Closed-Circuit Television CEC Commission of the European Communities (official title of the Euro - pean Commission) CIC Community Interest Company (special form of non-profit-making com - pany established under UK law to pursue a particular social purpose) CIOS Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly CNA Community Network Area (formed by a cluster of town and parish councils in Cornwall) CNP Community Network Panel (local governance body established by Cornwall Council to represent key interests within a Community Network Area) CoR (EU) Committee of the Regions CP Caste Panchayat (traditional body responsible for regulating social relations, particularly in rural India) CUC Combined Universities Cornwall (a partnership of four universities and colleges aimed at promoting the development of higher education in Cornwall) Key abbreviations xiii DAI Development Alternatives Incorporated (international development company founded in the United States in 1970) DC District Collector (chief official responsible for public administration and law and order within an Indian district) DCLG Department for Communities and Local Government (UK central government department, 2006–2018) DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change (UK central government department, 2008–2016) DETR Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (UK central government department, 1997–2001) DiEM25 Democracy in Europe Movement DTLR Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (UK central government department, 2001–2002) EEC European Economic Community (forerunner institution of the Euro- pean Union) EGTC European Grouping on Territorial Cooperation (European legal instrument designed to facilitate cross-border co-operation between regions) EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product (internationally recognized measure for assessing the overall economic performance of states) GVA Gross Value Added (a widely used measure of the value of goods and services produced in a specific area, industry or sector of the economy) HDI Human Development Index (internationally recognized measure of human wellbeing based on indicators of health, education and prosperity) HM Her Majesty’s (as in ‘Her Majesty’s Government’) IAS Indian Administrative Service IBSS International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (leading online resource for social science and interdisciplinary research) IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (international body responsible for assessing the science related to climate change) IR International Relations ISI Institute for Scientific Information (organization offering -biblio graphic database services, especially citation indexing and analysis) KILA Kerala Institute of Local Administration LDF Left Democratic Front (electoral alliance of left-wing political parties in Kerala) LEP Local Enterprise Partnership (type of locally based partnership body in England, with responsibility for economic development) LGA Local Government Association MEA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (major assessment of human impact on the environment carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. Published in 2005) MEP Member of the European Parliament xiv Key abbreviations MHCLG Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (UK central government department since 2018) MK Mebyon Kernow (Cornwall’s main ‘nationalist’ political party) MLG Multi-level Governance NGO Non-governmental Organization NLGN New Local Government Network (group of some 50 organizations working to promote the local government sector in England). The network has recently changed its name to New Local. NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (hierarchical system for dividing up the territory of the EU) ONS Office for National Statistics (the UK’s official statistical agency) PP Partido Popular (Spanish Conservative political party) PRI Panchayati Raj Institution (type of local government body found in rural parts of India) PV Public Value SABEF St Austell Bay Economic Forum (place-shaping group and Commu - nity Interest Company for the St Austell Bay area in Cornwall, UK) ScS Scalar Structuration (sociological process whereby organizations and institutions are created at various territorial scales) SDG Sustainable Development Goal TC Territorial Cohesion (policy principle which aims to ensure that all regions and sub-regions of the EU enjoy similar opportunities and a comparable quality of life) TPC Town and Parish Councils (the most local tier of governance in England) UBS Universal Basic Services UDF United Democratic Front (alliance of centre-left political parties which regularly contests state-level elections in Kerala) UNDP United Nations Development Programme (global development network of the United Nations Organization) UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change VCS Voluntary and Community Sector (UK collective term referring to the whole range of not-for-profit charitable organizations) VTC Voluntary Technical Corps (cadre of retired public servant volunteers recruited to support Kerala’s local government reforms from 1996 onwards) WEF World Economic Forum (elite gathering of politicians, business leaders and influencers, which meets in January of each year at the ski resort of Davos in Switzerland) 1 Introducing localism

Localism: a political doctrine for our times? Localism is about the micro aspects of social organization and politics. It is a fast-growing theme in social science, as well as within politics and government. Localism’s profile has been especially high in the United States (US) andthe United Kingdom (UK), but its influence is now being felt in many other parts of the world as well. One of localism’s strengths is that it is not associated with any particular partisan position. For that reason, perhaps, it is now being widely embraced across the political spectrum. Some argue that the contemporary ferment around localism represents something of a localist ‘turn’ NLGN,( 2012). Others say that there is nothing new about localism at all (Evans et al., 2013). While the term ‘localism’ may have been coined fairly recently, it has in fact been the dominant socio-political paradigm throughout most of history. It was only in the nineteenth century that there was any real shift of emphasis away from the local scale of organization. Before then, the ‘local’ was so ubiquitous that people simply took it for granted. It didn’t need a label of its own. Although the local dimension remains critical for a range of public functions, it is the ‘national’ and, much more recently, the ‘global’ scales of activity which have come to dominate our thinking in recent times. However, the surge in globalization since the 1990s and the concerns it has evoked in many quarters have also raised the profile of ‘the local’ in the political imaginary (Massey and Jess, 1995). No doubt, it is for this reason that a new term – ‘localism’ – has been coined to describe it.

Questions and aims The two core questions this book seeks to address are ‘What is localism about?’ and ‘What does it involve?’ These issues are examined in conceptual and analytical terms in the early part of the book. As a subsidiary to this core enquiry, this book also addresses the question ‘How useful and important a concept is localism?’ Two specific aspects are of interest here: firstly, from an analytical point of view, how can one apply the 2 Introducing localism term ‘localism’ convincingly to other political settings beyond Europe and North America? These issues are explored in several ways and in particular through one of the principal case studies presented in this book. Secondly, the book also examines whether, in the current state of world affairs, localism has any normative purchase. Assuming this is so, what would the basis of its normative purchase be? This issue is explored in some detail in Chapter 5 of this book, particularly from the perspective of public value (PV). As a further extension to the book’s main enquiries, we explore the question ‘How can localism make a meaningful contribution to the task of institutional and system design?’ This issue is addressed most directly in the later part of the book. It is also a theme which runs through several of the case studies. Some of these, for example the local self-governance reforms in India and Kerala and the cohesion policies of the European Union (EU), have been selected as exemplars of effective institutional and system design, inspired to a significant extentby place-based thinking. In addressing the topic of localism, the book has two overriding aims. The first is to help establish localism as a coherent political doctrine in its own right. The main concern here is to ensure that localism sheds any residual associations it may still have with parochialism, or with ‘low politics’ (Bulpitt, 1983). The time has come for localism to ‘walk tall’ and to begin to draw comparison with other ‘high-end’ political concepts such as globalism, human development and democracy. The second aim is to point towards a more effective way of designing political systems: one which has public value principles at its heart. In this connection, it is worth noting that Stoker (2013: 174–181) argues for a political science that is oriented towards solutions rather than problems. This implies a shift towards design thinking and a focus on how change can be achieved in the political sphere. It involves a willingness to grapple with normative questions as well as with analytical ones.

Key themes and paradigms covered in this book Most previous academic writing about localism addresses it from the point of view of current policy debates, rather than as a substantive political idea in its own right. By contrast, this book presents two extended explorations of the term ‘localism’: one from a conceptual point of view and the other from the perspective of social and political theory. The aim of these explorations is to ‘raise the bar’ as far as academic discussion of localism is concerned and to raise its profile as a political doctrine. The book presents a variety of perspectives on localism, including the conceptual, theoretical and empirical. The intention is to allow a thorough understanding of localism to emerge, including an idea of how it relates to, and potentially enhances, other significant themes in politics. The book is designed to be comprehensive in its coverage and cumulative in its impact. Introducing localism 3 The first cluster of ideas to feature in this book is that which revolves around the notions of place, space, scale and territory. Many of these are core concerns of political geography and of urban and locality studies. Secondly, the book draws on a range of ideas concerning decentralization, devolution and subsidiarity. These terms relate particularly to the delivery of public policy and governmental functions on a territorial basis. A third major set of ideas addressed in the book is that relating to governance, and especially to multi-level governance (MLG). MLG plays a fundamental part in the analysis presented here. It underpins the argument at every point. A fourth set of ideas to feature prominently in the book are those relating to public value. However, the analysis of PV presented here assumes a much more expansive understanding of that concept than is generally current in the literature (Moore, 1995; Benington and Moore, 2011). In this study, the rather managerial notion of PV is broadened to include major political themes such as environmental sustainability, human wellbeing, and democracy and accountability. It is also used to encompass ‘system-based’ political qualities, such as territorial cohesion (TC) and intergovernmental mutuality. Public value is advanced as a core principle of political design, and it plays a fundamentally important role in the scheme of this book. The fifth set of ideas featured within the book is that relating to democracy and empowerment. These are presented as a major theme within the broader paradigm of public value. The book argues that democracy and accountability for individual citizens are often substantively enhanced when they are aligned with collective- level democracy for localities and communities. The final set of ideas which is relevant for this book is that concerning the design of political institutions and systems. As already stated, one of the book’s main questions is to explore the contribution that localism can make to the task of political design.

Structure of the book The exploratory approach outlined previously is reflected in the way in which the book is structured. In Chapter 2, the assumptions about localism’s place in the overall landscape of political ideas are set out. The chapter also outlines the key lines of analysis for studying localism policy and practice. In Chapter 3, the concepts of place, space, scale and community are analysed with specific reference to governance and government. The account covers the development of the nation state, the international relations (IR) system and globalization. It also addresses the tensions created in the international sphere by questions of political community and sovereignty. The chapter illustrates this with a case study of the fraught political relationship between Catalonia and Spain, and the lack of response so far from the EU. Chapter 4 considers various aspects of scalar governance, including the developing role of governments at the regional, local and neighbourhood levels. It also 4 Introducing localism discusses some positive and negative aspects of the localist paradigm, as well as the emergence of a new, more emancipated localism. The chapter concludes with a case study of the shifting multi-level relationship between Cornwall, England and the UK. Chapter 5 argues that the main purpose of governance and government is to produce ‘public value’. PV outcomes encompass a very wide spectrum of public goods. These can be achieved within localities, regions, sovereign states and multi-level political systems. As an example of this, the chapter concludes with a case study of territorial cohesion policy within the EU. Chapter 6 considers the question of institutional design and its wider application to large-scale political systems. It also discusses previous and current attempts to design political jurisdictions on the basis of localist principles, and most particularly in India and its south-western state of Kerala. The localism framework presented in Chapter 7 is the core of the book’s academic contribution. The framework contains seven ‘institutional design indicators’. These specify the public value outcomes that public policy should aim to achieve within localities. The chapter presents a case report to show how this approach was piloted some years ago in England. Chapter 8 restates the main arguments in the book and directly addresses the book’s overall theme of how the design of political systems could be transformed through a focus on place-based policy and localism reform. The book will show that bottom-up governance is establishing a firm foothold in world affairs. This is mainly through the work of social movements and federations, assisted by the growth of mass media and the recent revolution in digital technologies. The latter are helping to emancipate local communities from the centuries-old constraints of scale and parochialism. This in turn indicates a step change in the capacity of communities to participate in, and to influence, national and global events. However, the state of the world is also increasingly characterized by concerns about ecosystem sustainability, inequalities in human development and a range of political pressures on rules-based, democratic orders, as well as the need for greater political cohesion within and across states. The book will argue that all of these global transformations point to the need for an enhanced science of political design based on systems and applied on a broad scale, rather than just to individual institutions. The aim should be to align the micro, meso and macro levels appropriately with each other. With this in mind, it is important for design proposals to be underpinned by a broad set of political principles. These should be accompanied by a framework of indicators which specifies the public value outcomes to be achieved in local settings.

Organizing perspectives It is important to underline that the aim of the book is to present localism as a major policy and design principle in its own right. Although written principally from a UK and European perspective, the study is keen to give due weight to evidence from the Global South as well as from the Global North, hence the inclusion Introducing localism 5 of the case study of India and Kerala. In this part of the world, localist thinking is not necessarily thought of as ‘localism’ at all by those most directly involved.1 In terms of the insights they provide, the case studies presented in this book should be seen very much as on a par with the book’s theoretical elements. Their function is neither to prove nor to disprove any proposition but to provide their own distinct perspective on localism and MLG. That said, each of the case studies is presented as an MLG ‘cluster’ in its own right, and the impact on governance at two or more scalar levels is consistently highlighted. A further point to make about the book is that it seeks to present both analytical and normative perspectives on the topic of localism. Wherever possible, though, the book will seek to draw a clear distinction between these two main modes of argumentation. Generally speaking, the earlier chapters are predominantly analytical in their focus, whereas from Chapter 5 onwards the book has a stronger normative thrust.

Note 1 Particularly, for example, in India, where the term ‘localism’ has been used in the past with distinctly pejorative connotations (see Chapter 4).

References Benington J and M Moore (eds.) (2011): Public Value: Theory & Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Bulpitt J (1983): Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation. Manches- ter: Manchester University Press Evans M, D Marsh and G Stoker (2013): ‘Understanding Localism’, in Policy Studies, Vol. 34(4), 401–407 Massey D and P Jess (eds.) (1995): A Place in the World: Places, Cultures and Globalisa- tion. Oxford: Oxford University Press Moore M (1995): Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press New Local Government Network (NLGN) (2012):The Localist Manifesto: The Report of the Commission on Next Localism. London: NLGN Stoker G (2013): ‘Designing Politics: A Neglected Justification for Political Science’, in Political Studies Review, Vol. 11(2), 174–181 2 Analysing localism

The polycentric world order In this chapter we look at what localism means in conceptual and analytical terms. The book starts from the assumption that social and institutional facts exist and can always be traced back to ‘brute facts’ in the physical world (Searle, 1996). It is also accepted that the physical and social/institutional worlds are infinitely complex and that both oscillate between relative stability and chaos. Within the physical world, we know that the particles which compose life and matter are constantly organizing and reorganizing themselves, and that the thrust for this ferment typically comes from the bottom-up, rather than the top-down (Waldrop, 1992). Similarly, in the social and institutional worlds, the flow of events is often structured and patterned, but also liable to moments of sudden change – in the same way that a river might flood its banks or alter its course after extreme weather (Kingdon, 2003: 222). This suggests a view of politics as multiple flows of events taking place within certain social and institutional boundaries. These flows are driven to a large extent by human agency. At any moment, such flows are likely to extend across different geographical scales (Brenner, 2001). Thus, the core assumption behind this book is that we live in a ‘polycentric world order’, where organizational structure and political scale are constantly being constructed, eroded and reconstituted in different ways, and over differing – sometimes very lengthy – periods of time.

In search of localism: mapping the intellectual and conceptual landscape Building from this ontological base, the material presented in this book is shaped by a particular combination of discourses. These are encapsulated in a range of concepts and ideas which, taken together, constitute a kind of intellectual field or landscape (Bourdieu, 1971). The following paragraphs sketch out some of the key concepts which populate this landscape. Some of their relevant defining features are outlined, ones which I shall mostly take for granted as the argument unfolds. I also present the concepts in an order which reflects the overall argument of the Analysing localism 7 book. However, I avoid entering into substantive discussion of them at this stage. The purpose is to map out a broad conceptual terrain and to establish where localism fits within it. ‘Locating’ localism is a task I will turn to in the next section. This book makes considerable use of geographical notions such as place, locality, space and territory (Massey and Jess, 1995; Massey, 2005; Keating, 2008) to frame the ideas and policies that it is most directly concerned with. Spatial approaches are an effective way of anchoring institutional and political events to ‘brute facts’ in the physical world. Places and territories provide the locus for all forms of social and institutional life. John Searle (Searle, 2000) argues that social and institutional facts are part of a continuum of socially constructed realities – organizational and ideational – which human beings create through their use of language. However, institutional facts lie further along the continuum of abstrac- tion than social ones; they make greater use of symbolism and tend to be more heavily rule-bound in the way they operate. Another powerful concept influencing this study is scale. The concern here is with how social and institutional scale is constructed, and with how particular forms of ‘scalar political fix’ – most notably the sovereign state – have become established over the course of historySmith, ( 1995; Brenner, 1999). Scalar transformations and rescaling lie at the heart of the contemporary turn to localism, and the ways in which communities of place are being reimagined. Two essentially political factors which drive the evolution of scalar organization are social conflict and power; so a focus on scale is a useful way of tracing their impact. In all communities of place, at whatever territorial level they are constituted, there are certain fundamental modes of co-ordinating social and institutional life. These correspond to the three main organizational realms of ‘government’, ‘the economy’ and ‘civil society’. Each of these realms has its own distinctive mode of co-ordination. While government and the economy are public and institutional in nature, and are typically rule-bound in the way they achieve co-ordination, civil society operates much more on the basis of free association, as well as private and personal acquaintance (Young, 2000: 159). It is important to note that social co- ordination may take place from the top-down or the bottom-up. Civil society tends to favour a bottom-up approach to co-ordination, whereas government typically operates in a more top-down way. This book makes substantial use of the terms ‘government’ and ‘governance’. Broadly speaking, I adhere to the standard distinction that political scientists draw between these two concepts: ‘government’ indicating the actions and decisions of an institutionalized and formally constituted jurisdiction, and political ‘governance’ indicating the broader and more informal co-ordination of public purposes within a territory or jurisdiction. Governance is generally regarded as the more complex and amorphous of the two concepts, and it clearly has a strong social dimension as well as an institutional one. It entails a prominent role both for civil society and for the economic sector in the co-ordination of public decision- making. However, one difficulty with the terms ‘government’ and ‘governance’ is that the semantic boundary between them is very fluid. As a result, they often end 8 Analysing localism up being used interchangeably. With this in mind, I will try to avoid such confu- sion in this book, sometimes by using both terms alongside each other where the sense demands it. Also fundamental to this study is the notion of the state. The modern sovereign state is a specific kind of governmental institution, with a distinct set ofsub- systems (Dunleavy, 2014: 49). According to Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009: 18–32), modern states have five core functions in respect of the territories they govern, namely providing external security, maintaining internal order, raising revenue, promoting economic growth, and providing income security and social support. Across the world, states now provide the main organizational framework for ensuring that political decision-making is seen as legitimate and that fundamental human freedoms and rights are respected (Eckersley, 2004). They are the main locus for political sovereignty. However, a curious point about the world’s 195 internationally recognized states1 is that statehood seems to bear little relationship to population size or geographical scale. Almost a fifth of the world’s states currently have populations of less than half a million peopleUN ( Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 2017). This should give us pause for thought when considering how the possibilities of localism might play out in the future. Chapter 3 in particular looks at this issue in more detail. One of the most distinctive functions of government as a form of social and political co-ordination is to serve as the main locus for democracy. Democracy can be understood as the most highly evolved method so far devised for constituting the state and conducting the business of government. It is considered normatively superior to other forms of governing because as a matter of principle it relies on the primacy of rational debate over physical force, as well as on the participation and involvement of all the members of a political community. As a form of governmental co-ordination, democratic practice is based on clear expecta- tions of inclusion, transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs. However, while democracy is critical to the way in which modern government functions, it is often thought to be less relevant to governance. Indeed, some commentators have even questioned whether democracy and governance networks are compatible with each other at all ( Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). Democratic rights are also generally understood as applying to individuals rather than to collective entities. This is a theme I return to later in the book, especially in Chapters 5 and 8. Under the transforming influence of democracy, the scope of modern govern - ment has become increasingly complex. As this complexity has grown, so the sheer amount of public policy activity undertaken by governments has burgeoned too. In the past 70 years, there has been a considerable ‘thickening’ of government worldwide (Light, 1995). Once implemented, public policies are essentially government intentions transformed into institutional and social fact. Gary Marks and his colleagues (Marks et al., 2008: 177) argue that in most Western democracies there has been a huge diversification of public policy since 1950. This has been mainly in the fields of welfare, education, environment, infrastructure and economic development. Unlike military conflict, these policy areas do not drive Analysing localism 9 authority in the direction of a centralized state. Instead, they have resulted in a huge expansion of public services and an increasing impact of state decision- making on people’s daily lives (Hirst, 1994). This raises questions about the optimum scale at which government and governance activity should be organized, and how elected governments should go about conducting their ‘relationships’ with citizens (Cooke and Muir, 2012). The proliferation of public policy activity has had a number of consequences for the governments of sovereign states. In many cases, this has led towards greater decentralization or devolution of states’ increasing powers and responsibilities. As Marks et al. (2008) conclusively demonstrate, devolution of state powers is typically directed towards regional or local tiers of government. But in some states, most notably in the UK, devolution of powers has often been to the advantage of semi-autonomous public bodies (James, 2003) and increasingly of corporate enterprises operating on a multinational scale. Meanwhile, in some cases the central state has retreated into a more remote form of ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop, 2004) or ‘system stewardship’ (Hallsworth, 2011). This is where the notion of strategy comes to the fore. Strategy offers governments the means of getting a grip on an increasingly overcrowded and contested policy landscape (Mulgan, 2009). Government strategies may reflect various ideologies, and some are the subject of deep political contention. For example, using the notion of the ‘competition state’, Cerny (1995) has highlighted the strategic priority that certain governments have given to creating a suitable investment climate for global capital. This has led to a general dismantling of many welfare and employment protections in the states concerned, thus reinforcing the impression that the machinery of state is being ‘hollowed out’ (Harmes, 2006). In broad terms this is often regarded as government ceding some of its ‘rightful’ functions in order to further the interests of the economic realm, with potentially harmful consequences for civil society and ordinary citizens. Another strategic priority that governments have been urged to adopt in recent decades is sustainable development (WCED, 1987). This in turn brings into play two other concepts that will feature prominently in this book. These are sustainability and resilience. ‘Sustainability’ is an extremely broad term with many institutional applications (Cox and Béland, 2013). As indicated earlier, these include the wide-ranging notion of sustainable development which embraces economic prosperity, social inclusion, environmental stewardship and good governance (Sachs, 2015: 11–13). For reasons of space and analytical focus, the emphasis in this study is specifically on sustainability in its environmental sense. The most salient feature of environmental sustainability is its overriding concern with the ecosystems that support human life. A further feature of sustainability more broadly is the emphasis it places on decision-making for the longer term. As for resilience, it is quite closely related in meaning to sustainability. It denotes the ability of social systems and institutions to ‘retain function’ in the face of an environmental or other ‘external’ shock (Shaw and Theobald, 2010: 6). It also implies 10 Analysing localism thinking about institutions and systems from a long-term perspective, as well as improving the connectivity between their constituent parts Owen,( 2009). A systems-based, holistic approach to policy making leads us to consider how political institutions should be designed and how strategic factors such as sustainability and resilience should guide the design process. Indeed, it is hard to overestimate the power of institutional and system design as a means for achieving desirable political ends such as greater legitimacy and/or effectiveness in government. In essence, ‘design’ is an Enlightenment concept that emphasizes the importance of rational thinking concerning ends and means (Goodin, 1996). Thus, during the past 200 years, it has become increasingly common for new states to be established through a conscious process of design. This is the case with many existing states, including the United States, Canada, Australia, India, modern Germany and South Africa, all of which have been designed according to some understanding of constitutional and democratic principles. A feature of the states listed here is the way in which the design of their institutions is based on federal lines, with governmental powers being shared constitutionally between a central (or ‘federal’) government and a number of constituent territorial units such as states or provinces. Federalism is a particularly useful mechanism when it comes to designing government for a geographically extensive territory, or for one which is very heavily or densely populated. Much more will be said about institutional and system design, and also about federalism, in Chapter 6. Two other territorial concepts which have come to prominence relatively recently in connection with institutional design are subsidiarity and territorial cohesion. There will be more discussion of these two concepts in Chapter 5 of this book. Briefly, subsidiarity emphasizes the importance of government decisions being taken as close to the individual citizen as possible ( Vara Arribas and Bour- din, 2012: 13). Essentially, subsidiarity is a rather top-down notion and very much presupposes the existence of a federal or decentralized political system. As for cohesion, it is an idea which potentially has significant implications for localism. Like subsidiarity, it is being developed principally within the European Union (EU). It is aimed at promoting the ‘balanced and harmonious development’ of all the diverse territories that form part of the EU. Because of its territorial focus, cohesion automatically cuts across traditional functional policy areas. It brings to the fore the importance of making public policy fit the needs of individual places and of thinking about them in a holistic way. It can thus help to promote policy integration and a sharper focus on public service outcomes within the constituent parts of a larger jurisdiction (Commission of the European Communities [CEC], 2008: 4). Finally, a key integrative concept that some consider essential for the way in which government is carried out, and for the design of political systems in general, is public value (PV). As Benington (2011) points out, PV may be thought of in one of two ways: firstly, not only as that which is valued by the public, but also as that which adds value to the public sphere. PV may be generated within a number of different policy realms: social, cultural, economic, environmental Analysing localism 11 or political. It will normally be assessed in relation to specific ‘outcomes’ that are achieved through the policy realm in question. Usually, PV outcomes will be either medium- or longer-term in nature (Benington, op. cit.: 42–49). Two core features of public value as a concept are, firstly, that from a normative point of view its connotations are inherently positive and, secondly, that its semantic content is highly flexible and open-ended. It is therefore a concept which invites reflection, deliberation and analysis. It also implies a clear sense of collective impact. To this end, Alford (2011) makes the point that PV is ‘public’ not because it is produced by public organizations but because it is ‘consumed’ collectively by citizens. In fact, PV may be produced by many different stakeholders, including private companies, community organizations and individual citizens Alford,( 2011: 144). The issue of public value in relation to localism is discussed in much greater depth in Chapter 5.

Conceptual analysis of localism How does localism fit in to the intellectual and conceptual landscape sketched out here? The suffix ‘ism’ implies that localism attaches a special value to the local dimension of social organization and politics. So, its most obvious association is with the notion of scale or level. In political terms, the ‘local’ can be used to refer to almost any spatial entity below that of the nation state. However, much depends on the characteristics of the state in question. For most states above a certain size and population, it is normal to distinguish between a ‘regional’ and a ‘local’ tier of political organization at the sub-national levelEU ( Committee of the Regions, 2009). In this context, the ‘local’ tier will typically include spatial and population clusters such as ‘areas’, ‘districts’, ‘towns’, ‘villages’, ‘wards’ and ‘neighbourhoods’. Mention of local geographical entities such as these points up localism’s strong association with the idea of place or locality. In this connection, localism conveys a strong attachment to the particularity of individual places. Again, the scale of organization encompassed by a ‘place-based’ or ‘locality’ approach can be fairly flexible. As far as the term ‘place’ is concerned, it may be used to indicate any spatial entity ranging from an individual neighbourhood at the ‘micro’ level right up to the level of a city or sub-national region. As for the term ‘locality’, in British English it tends to indicate a more limited geographical area than the word ‘place’ does (Jones and Woods, 2013). Thus, ‘locality’ generally excludes the ‘meso’ level of the city or the sub-national region. The term ‘localism’ also has strong associations with all three major forms of social, economic and political co-ordination highlighted in the previous section. Indeed, ‘government’, ‘the economy’ and ‘civil society’ all have significant local dimensions of their own. Together with place, they often become fused within the broader notion of community (Young, 2000: 160). However, as an idea, community is by no means completely synonymous with the local. Communities are often ‘national’ or ‘sub-continental’ in their geographical reach, or they may be 12 Analysing localism widely dispersed across physical space, or else they may be virtual. Nevertheless, as Delanty (2003) recognizes, there are also many points at which the ideas of localism and community do overlap. Localism often manifests itself as a reaction to political centralization or to the impact on local communities of economic and political globalization. In this respect, localism has clear associations with the notions of governance and government, and how these are performed. A number of scholars have seen the local as being the ultimate testing ground for public policy. On this account, the local is the site where policy choices made further up the chain of command actually work themselves out in practice, and where any shortcomings in design have to be addressed (Bailey and Pill, 2015: 291). As the previous section notes, many states have sought to address the challenge of ensuring effective policy outcomes, both for citizens and for local communi - ties, by devolving powers to regional and local governments ( Goldsmith, 2004). With this in mind, localism can be seen as having a degree of conceptual linkage with terms like ‘decentralization’, ‘devolution’ and ‘subsidiarity’. However, quite how far this linkage goes will depend on the way in which the divestment of state powers takes place in each case. Generally speaking, localism conveys a preference for bottom-up or collaborative approaches to governmental and economic co-ordination, rather than top-down ones Pratchett,( 2004). In summary, the term ‘localism’ denotes a clear valorization of the local dimension in politics, often in opposition to the power of the state and/or to the impact of globalization. With this in mind, the main strands in the academic literature on localism to date are set out briefly in the next section.

The localist turn: geography, environmentalism, politics As highlighted at the start of this book, localism has been a fast-growing theme in academic writing about politics and society. This is borne out by any high-level analysis of publications containing the word ‘localism’ in their title or abstract. For example, in May 2019, the British Library’s main catalogue, which includes reports and web pages as well as books and articles, showed that of the 1,924 individual titles shown on its localism list, all but eight of them (i.e. well over 99%) had been published since 1992. Indeed, nearly three in five of them (or just under 59% of the total) had been published since 2010 ( British Library, 2019). Accord- ing to the ISI Web of Science, the seven individual years which saw the highest number of new publications to date on localism, have been 2011–2017. Indeed, since 2015 this record rate of new publications has itself more than doubled. Looking at the whole of the literature on localism published to date, including a very large number of relevant titles which are not listed in the main academic databases, three particular disciplines stand out: geography, environmentalism and political science. Historically speaking, the first and second of these became inter - ested in locality and localism at a somewhat earlier stage than political science. However, the geographical and environmental literatures have often highlighted Analysing localism 13 questions of policy, political organization and collective decision-making. Thus, their concern has been with questions which are fundamentally political in nature. For geographers, the starting point for their discipline’s contribution to the literature on localism is its inherent focus on places. Indeed, as Clarke points out, ‘since the earliest forms of geographical enquiry, scholars have sought to identify and describe localities, places and regions’ (Clarke, 2013: 495). Clarke highlights three of the most recent approaches to locality studies within geography. First, he identifies the ‘natural localities’ literature based on regional and humanistic geography, and spatial science. This ‘National Geographic’ approach, which dominated the discipline for much of the twentieth century, tends to see localities as ‘naturalistic phenomena’ possessing an infinite range of variations (Clarke, op. cit.: 495). However, during the 1970s a more Marxist-inspired, political-economic geography came to the fore. This viewed localities as products of uneven economic development. The crucial contribution of this strand of the literature was to open up the notion of localities being ‘made and unmade over time’. Indeed, this is where geography and political science first made common cause with each other, particularly within the sub-discipline of urban studies (Clarke, op. cit.: 496– 497). Since the 1990s, a new form of ‘poststructuralist’ geography has emerged. This is more concerned with the idea of localities as open, permeable and dynamic places. One of the leading exponents of this approach is Doreen Massey, and this book will draw heavily on her ideas, particularly in the next chapter. The approach developed by Massey and others has significant implications for politics. This is because it sees the governance of localities as a ‘loose and negotiated set of political arrangements of central, regional and local institutions, along with private and third-sector agencies’ (Clarke, op. cit.: 499–500). This has distinct resonances with multi-level governance (MLG), a key analytical framework as far as this book is concerned. MLG will be introduced briefly in the next section and then analysed in greater depth in Chapter 3. Unlike geography, the literature on environmentalism has always had a marked political edge, ever since it first appeared in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. It has always contained a critique of developments such as industrialization, urbanization, population growth and unsustainable lifestyles. One of its foremost figures is the American economist Herman Daly, whose influ - ential titles Steady-State Economics (1991), with its four key principles of sustainability, and Beyond Growth (1996) set out the key operational principles for sustainable development. Within the UK, one of the first popular writers to capture the link between environmental critique, alternative economics and localism was the British-based economist E F Schumacher. Schumacher’s highly influential and best-selling book Small Is Beautiful (Schumacher, 1973) was almost certainly the earliest localism manifesto to appear in Western political and economic thought.2 Subsequently, his ideas have become a major element in Green political thinking (Dobson, 1990: Chapter 3), and they have also become the basis of the Transition Movement’s contemporary appeal in communities of all types and sizes across the world (Hopkins, 2011). A key bone of contention within the 14 Analysing localism environmental approach to localism is the extent to which it favours a ‘defensive’ withdrawal from the national and global economy, as opposed to a much more open, but self-sufficient, engagement with the world at large. The initial contributions of politics and political science to the academic literature on localism were associated with the idea of ‘new localism’, an expression which resonated in many urban neighbourhoods in the latter part of the twentieth century. It first appeared in the United States (Morris and Hess, 1975; Goetz and Clarke, 1993) and then later in Britain (Filkin et al., 2000; Corry and Stoker, 2002). In the United States especially, the new localism was seen as a kind of radical reawakening, with local communities urged to rise up and challenge the regulatory state. After its introduction in Britain in 2000, new localism was almost instantly adopted as official policy by the then Labour government ( DTLR, 2001). However, under New Labour, new localism quickly morphed into something quite different from the American original, to the extent that Lawrence Pratchett, writ - ing in 2004, was able to criticize Labour’s ‘new localism’ as a ‘sophisticated tool’ for ensuring that localities deliver even more effectively on government policy (Pratchett, 2004: 371). Pratchett’s critique highlights a key issue that localism raises for political science. To what extent can, or does, a commitment to localism enable governance from the bottom-up, from the top-down, or of a genuinely collaborative character between the different levels of government, to develop? This raises much more fundamental questions about the locus of sovereignty and the ultimate ends of politics itself. Certainly, there is scope for a more coherent theory of localism to be developed, perhaps as part of a broader examination of what political sovereignty should mean in the twenty-first century. This book should be seen as a contribution to that broader intellectual project (see especially Chapters 3 and 8).

Analysing social and political organization As suggested earlier in the chapter, it can be useful to think of geographical scale in terms of standard levels of social and political organization. In this connection, a banding approach using the categories ‘micro’, ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ can help to frame the analysis of complex phenomena and orientate the academic discussion of them. Clearly, opinions are likely to differ as to which spatial concepts should be allocated to conceptual bands as broadly conceived as these, especially when dealing at the margins. However, a classification of this kind is essential for situat- ing the ‘local’ and its family of related spatial concepts more precisely within the overall scalar landscape. At the micro-end of the spectrum, it would not be too controversial to place the concepts of ‘neighbourhood’, ‘ward’, ‘village’, ‘town’, ‘district’ and ‘area’. Broadly speaking, this classification would encompass a total population of up to 250,000 at the most. At the meso level, most would regard it as reasonable to include ‘city’, ‘sub-region’, ‘region’ and (in many cases) ‘state’ as well. This would encompass a broad swathe of spatial entities containing populations of anything between 250,000 and 50 million. Finally, the concepts of Analysing localism 15 ‘sub-continent’, ‘continent’ and ‘world’ should clearly be seen as belonging to the ‘macro’ category, that is any territorial entity with a resident population of 50 million or more. Looking at how the term ‘localism’ fits into this broad categorization, it quite obviously takes its place within the micro level of social and political organization. One might say that this is ‘real localism’ or localism in its core sense. How- ever, Massey and Jess (1995: 227) argue the ‘local’ can also be understood in a much broader sense. For them, it can refer to any scale of operation which is not itself ‘global’ and vice versa. Based on this, there is a case for arguing that localism can also apply to the meso scale of operation, and particularly to sub-regions and regions which lie below the level of the sovereign state. This is a much more relative, or secondary, use of the term ‘localism’. However, including some meso- level phenomena within the definition of localism opens the way to a much richer analysis potentially, and it is also fully consistent with an MLG approach. In the rest of this book, both the core and the secondary variants of localism will therefore feature prominently in the analysis, particularly in the case-study examples presented later. Given this dual focus on the core and secondary aspects of localism, the analysis in this book will focus on organizations across the three main realms of social and political co-ordination (i.e. government, economy and civil society) referred to earlier in the chapter. The organizations concerned will include local governments at the neighbourhood, district, town, area and sub-national levels, as well as civil society organizations at the micro and meso scales. This reflects a methodo - logical commitment to combining institutional and social factors alongside each other as part of the same analysis. Given that civil society involvement is such a key factor in political governance (Young, 2000), it makes sound methodological sense to treat government and governance as a continuum in this way. A further point to make about the analysis in this book is that it will focus on collectivities and organizations, rather than on individuals. However, it is also assumed that there is an underlying continuity of interests between individuals, collectivities and organizations. Seen from this perspective, a key justification for localism is its ability to function as a kind of ‘intermediate support’ to individuals, groups and neighbourhoods, enabling them to survive, prosper and flourish more effectively within the context of a polycentric world order and of economic globalization (University of Birmingham Policy Commission, 2011). With all these different analytical dimensions in play, the main framework that will be used to analyse localism in this book is that provided by multi-level governance (MLG). Of course, MLG conceives of governance not just as multi-level but as multi-centred and multi-actor as well (Piattoni, 2010). As an essentially polycentric notion, MLG opens the way for a much more sophisticated analysis of how political power is wielded across different territorial levels and also by -dif ferent types of political actor. In this connection, one of the most striking features of MLG is the extent to which it assumes absolutely equal status between jurisdictions and organizations of all types and at all levels, at least from a theoretical 16 Analysing localism point of view (Piattoni, 2009: 164). Under MLG, sovereignty is essentially shared across many different levels of governance. This ‘equalizing’ aspect of MLG is a fundamental analytical assumption of this study. Not only is MLG a useful framework for policy analysis, it also carries increasing weight as a normative idea. Having reviewed a number of different schol - arly literatures across a range of sub-disciplines, Hooghe and Marks (2003: 235) conclude that all the literatures have one basic assumption in common: that the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is more flexible than concentrating it just within one jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, MLG allows more scope for the design of institutions and political systems to reflect heterogeneity, complexity and the wider social and economic environment inherent in the idea of a polycentric world order.

Three dynamics of localism Within an MLG framework, a key axis for understanding and analysing localism is to address it from the point of view of the power relationships that exist between different spatial levels of organization and government. In this connection, one can identify three basic power dynamics: top-down, bottom-up and collaborative. These are reflected in Hildreth’s influential typology (Hildreth, 2011: 704), in which three main variants of political localism are identified:

• Conditional localism – that is, a commitment by central government to decentralize powers to a local tier of government, conditional on the latter’s agreement to support national policy objectives or to accept certain performance standards • Representative localism – that is, devolution to local, democratically elected bodies in accordance with broadly accepted principles of local self-government, for example the European Charter of Local Self-Government, based on the principle of subsidiarity • Community localism – that is, devolution to citizens and to local communities with the explicit aim of engaging and empowering them.

The first of Hildreth’s three ‘ideal types’ set out here represents a top-down localism dynamic. The second reflects a collaborative dynamic, while the third type suggests a more bottom-up approach to localism. However, although these three ideal types offer useful tools for analysis, when one examines how governments have gone about implementing devolution and/or localism, one often finds that two or more of these dynamics are present in different combinations at the same time. For the purposes of analysis, it is really the mix between them that matters (Evans et al., 2013: 614). For each of the three dynamics just outlined, there are some characteristic themes and tropes to be found in the political science literature. Top-down approaches to localism are often accompanied by terms such as ‘strategy’, ‘value for money’, ‘customer service’, ‘delegation’ and ‘earned autonomy’ Stoker,( 2004). In recent Analysing localism 17 years, some scholars have developed a trenchant critique of top-down localism and what they see as its hollow use of terms such as ‘big society’ or ‘community empowerment’. Localism on this account is typically seen as a tool of ‘neoliberal governmentality’ (Davoudi and Madanipour, 2013) or ‘depoliticisation’ (Newman, 2014: 117–118). As far as bottom-up approaches to localism are concerned, these are typically associated with the themes of community and neighbourhood empowerment (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 64–65). However, bottom-up approaches to localism tend to emphasize the importance of empowerment as ‘an open-ended process’ which takes place in ‘governance spaces’, which have been ‘claimed and created’ by communities and neighbourhoods themselves Bailey( and Pill, 2015: 292). Bottom-up approaches to localism also tend to be linked with concepts such as community ownership (Bunt and Harris, 2010) and resilience (Shaw, 2012). In the particular sub-strand inspired by Green political theory, a distinctive theme is that of communities taking back not so much political as economic control of certain fundamental activities that support everyday life, such as food production and energy generation. Rob Hopkins, founder of the Transition Movement, has used the term ‘localization’, rather than ‘localism’, to describe Transition’s distinctive approach to these issues (Felicetti, 2013: 565). Finally, an intriguing strand of the bottom-up literature on localism is that which sees places and localities as political, economic or cultural ‘players’ in their own rightCox ( and Mair, 1991; Barber, 2013; Katz and Nowak, 2017). If followed through systematically, the ideas raised in this final sub-strand of the literature have the potential to radically transform the design of political institutions and systems. With regard to collaborative approaches to localism, these are most typically found in the academic literature on federalism. One of the most eloquent expressions of this approach is set out by Landy and Teles (2001: 413–426). Based on their analysis, this book suggests ‘mutuality’ as a key principle for the design of political systems (see Chapter 6 of this book). A strong element of intergovernmental mutuality is implicit in the EU’s recent papers on cohesion policy (CEC, 2008). For a UK perspective on this issue, some of the reports from the now-defunct Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons are particularly relevant. In 2013, for example, the Select Committee argued – unsuccessfully – for a systematic codification of the relationship between central and local governments in Britain (House of Commons, 2013). This chapter has addressed the first pair of questions outlined inChapter 1. An analysis of what is at stake as far as ‘localism’ is concerned has been set out. The following chapters examine how the ideas inherent in localism can be traced and applied within the areas of governance, public value and political design.

Notes 1 That is, those which either are members of or have observer status at the United Nations General Assembly. For more discussion of the world’s sovereign states, see Chapter 3. 18 Analysing localism 2 It is worth noting, though, that Mahatma Gandhi had written in somewhat similar terms for an Indian audience in the early part of the twentieth century (see Chapter 6).

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This chapter presents the broader theoretical context of the recent turn to localism. In particular, it draws on the poststructuralist literature on place and scale, as well as from social theory. Seen from these perspectives, places and localities are essentially open, dynamic and pluralistic (Clarke, 2013). A dynamic approach to place is in tune with the assumption of a ‘polycentric world order’ which underpins this study at the deepest level. It also chimes in well with the notion of multi- level governance (MLG), which is the overarching analytical framework adopted in this book. In the past 20 years, an understanding of the full implications of MLG has begun to take root within academic thinking. An MLG perspective opens up possibilities for a bottom-up political localism to emerge, as the argument in this chapter and the next will show. The chapter concludes with an extended MLG case study of the fraught political relationship currently playing out between Cata- lonia, Spain and the EU.

Place, space and scale: core dimensions of social and political organization The starting point for this account is place. According to Doreen Massey (1995), places are ‘meeting points’ and constellations of social relations. Through the activity patterns of their residents and users, places may have stronger or weaker links with the world around them. This has always been the case, but what is specific about the current period of ‘late modernity’ is the intensification in both the volume and the type of links that places are forging. This is a consequence of the growing compression of time and space that is now taking place (Giddens, 1984). The boundaries of most places are now far more porous than they have ever been. Massey and Jess (1995) argue that, while physical environment is an important element in the idea of place, its most significant features are nearly always socially constructed. All places are unique in the sense that each is characterized by a specific combination of images, which interacts in different ways with the wider social and political environment. Also, each place has a unique historical profile which has contributed to the way in which it is seen and thought about today. Localism in context 23 In her book For Space Doreen Massey (2005) argues that places are located within a wider geographical space. Both place and space are essentially public in character. Social relations within them always have to be negotiated in some way, and this in turn brings into play questions of politics. In defiance of a long tradition in Western thought, Massey makes a strong case for the revalorization of space/place as a dynamic entity in its own right, particularly given the present conjuncture of global and international flows. This is based on what Massey describes as the ‘thrown-together’ quality of space and its ability to contain the many ‘intertwined trajectories’ of individuals, groups and organizations. As part of being socially and geographically connected with each other, places are also organized into groupings and hierarchies extending across territorial space and time. Thus, according to Massey (1995: 69), places are not just inter- connected but interdependent as well. They are bound together by ‘geographies of power’. Despite their unique features, places are also unequal because they are differentially located within these wider power geographies. The inequality here is not just about variations in income or prosperity between different places but also shaped by their social and cultural positioning in relation to each other. This is where the politics of scale and theories of ‘scalar structuration’ play a defining role. According to Paasi (2004), scale is complex because it can refer to both horizontal and vertical organization. Thus, Howitt (2002, 2003) analyses scale along three different dimensions: as an ‘areal’ concept (i.e. scale as size), as a hierarchical one (scale as level) and also as a ‘relational’ one. The latter is especially concerned with the boundaries of scale. It sees them as interfaces at which different ‘scale entities’ or ‘levels’ interact with each other. This approach effectively views scale as a ‘technology of bounding’, which serves to make the division of space around conventional political markers (e.g. the different levels of government) possible. With this in mind, it has been suggested that scale is best regarded as an epistemological framing device, rather than as an ontological category in its own right (Jones, 1998: 28). With regard to Howitt’s ‘horizontal’ notion of ‘scale as size’ (see earlier), it is relevant to bear in mind the way in which social and political co-ordination across physical space has developed over the course of history. Anthony Giddens notes how the limitations of physical ‘presence’ are increasingly being transcended through the ‘stretching’ of social relations across time and spaceGiddens, ( 1984: 35). He draws attention to a whole set of cultural and technological innovations, such as the invention of writing and money, and modern developments in education, travel and communications. In recent decades these have led to an exponen- tial increase in the intensity of co-ordination across social, economic and political systems worldwide. For the first time in history, agents have been able to achieve such a high degree of ‘time–space distanciation’ that physical absence no longer poses an obstacle to system co-ordination (Giddens, op. cit.: 185). As for Howitt’s ‘vertical’ notion of ‘scale as level’ (see earlier), Neil Bren - ner draws an important distinction between the ‘contexts’ of scale and the actual 24 Localism in context processes by which scaling and rescaling occur. According to Brenner, it is the latter which should be really understood as embodying a ‘politics of scale’. On this basis, he sets out a number of propositions which may serve as a starting point for a theory of ‘scalar structuration’ (ScS). These include the following:

• Processes of ScS are constituted and continually reworked through everyday routines and struggles • Processes of ScS generate contextually specific causal effects • Processes of ScS constitute geographies and choreographies of power • Processes of ScS may crystallize into ‘scalar fixes’, and such fixes may serve to constrain the evolution of further scalar processes (Brenner, 2001: 604–609).

Neil Smith (1995: 228) argues that geographical scales should be seen as mutable constructs. They are the product of particular economic, political and social relationships, and they represent the ‘spatial resolution of contradictory social forces’. So while place and space are important, it is ultimately scale which decides. Sca- lar processes are fundamental to ensuring the temporal fixing of power relationships, and any reconfiguration of scale is likely to challenge existing political settlements and fixes Swyngedouw,( 1997: 145).

Communities of place and their governance Doreen Massey’s generic view of place, set out earlier, should not divert attention from the fact that real places are of many different types and scales. So what features should one be looking for in order to identify somewhere as a ‘place’? First, the term ‘place’ implies a specific geographical location, usually with some kind of built component – this may often be a very significant feature of the place in question. Secondly, it implies a recognizable community of residents and regular users. Thirdly, as Massey herself argues, a place needs to have a unique ‘identity’ comprising at least a name and incorporating a set of meanings and images associated with that name and with the place’s physical location. In addition, one would expect most places to have a social structure and a number of informal groupings, associations, organizations and institutions specifically identified with the location in question. Finally, depending on circumstances, a place may also possess some site-specific element of formal political leadership and/or governance. These five markers can be seen as constituting the core elements of any community of place. Given the huge variation that exists between different types of places, it is useful to establish some sort of typology for the purposes of effective description and analysis. Broadly speaking, one can identify the following principal categories of place:

• Single places: by which is meant a simple, identifiable, bounded community such as a neighbourhood, ward or village. This type nearly always Localism in context 25 corresponds with the micro scale of social and political organization (see the previous chapter). In formulaic terms, it will be designated in this book as P1 • Aggregated places: such as towns or cities, which are made up of a number of individually identifiable, but geographically contiguous, neighbourhood- type (or P1) communities. Depending on geographical size and population, places which come into this category may equate with either the micro or meso scales of organization as defined in the previous chapter. This type will be designated in the book as P2. • Extended places: such as districts or regions which are made up of a number of separate, bounded P1- and P2-type communities, often of varying size, spread across a wider bounded territory. Communities of place corresponding to this type can vary widely in geographical size and population and include districts, areas, regions or even states. But they will generally fit within the micro and meso scales of organization, as defined previously. In this book, this type of place will be designated formulaically as P3.

Generally speaking, the terms ‘place’ and ‘community of place’ are not applied to large sovereign states or to wider groupings of states such as the EU. Just how the affairs and relationships of the vast number of different communities of place that exist across the world come to be co-ordinated horizontally and vertically is determined by the processes of scalar structuration outlined in the previous section; and as Neil Smith (1995) and Neil Brenner (2001) point out, what these processes usually result in is some kind of ‘scalar fix’. Such fixes allow the affairs and relationships of geographic communities and collectivities of all types to proceed in an orderly and predictable fashion. Generally speaking, scalar fixes require some institutional mechanism, for example a government and/or a system of law and order, to help maintain them. However, much useful co-ordination can often also be achieved through individuals’ and communities’ own self-directed efforts. The concept that best captures this multi-directional co- ordination of public affairs, both within communities and across territorial space, is governance. Governance can be conceived of either as a process whereby actors collaborate to achieve common objectives or as the collective process through which order and goals emerge (Harris, 2011: 639). On this account, political governance is about much more than just the actions and decisions of the formal institutions of government. It is about how governments and other interests in society – markets, civil society and the public sphere and communities of place and individual citizens – work together in order to achieve public purposes.

The nation state and the limits of government A useful way of distinguishing ‘governance’ from ‘government’ is to think of the former as something relatively fluid and processual, and the latter as something that is essentially institutionalized and fixed. Due to its institutional nature, government has to operate at fairly standard and predictable scales: national, regional, 26 Localism in context city and local (Hooghe and Marks, 2016: 12). However, beyond the national and local scales, institutional government becomes less clearly defined in nature. At the extreme macro and micro levels, the co-ordination of public purposes tends to rely on the more fluid and amorphous processes of governance. For its part, institutional government is perhaps best seen as the archetypal embodiment of Neil Brenner’s idea of the ‘scalar fix’. This in turn is most clearly exemplified in the form of the modern, liberal-democratic nation (or sovereign) state. According to Neil Smith (1995), nation states emerged in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the geographical means for co-ordinating economic competition between different territories and cities. Although deeply ingrained in our current thinking about politics and society, the nation state is only one, historically contingent, way of organizing space, people and resources. Michael Keating (2008: 60) claims that throughout much of the twentieth century the dominant paradigm for understanding territory and politics was provided by theories of national integration and assimilation. During this period, the state became the default unit of analysis so far as social and political change was concerned. Territorial resistance to the state was seen as something problematic, whereas sustaining national unity was regarded as self-evidently a good thing. For instance, Karl Deutsch (1972: 80) saw national states as being formed around centres which gradually extended their reach into peripheries, absorbing them economically, culturally and politically. Strong states run by a central government were to be seen as ‘modern’ institutions and as ‘having history on their side’. The ultimate goal was to create sovereign governments which had ‘no critical or community cleavages’. By contrast, Keating highlights the importance of ‘bringing territory back in’ to debates about national politics and public policyKeating, ( 2013). John Loughlin (2007: 390–392) traces the ‘multiple crises of the welfare state’ during the latter part of the twentieth century. These pathologies became apparent in a number of ways, for example the severe limitations that had to be imposed on state spending during the 1970s; the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979; and the economic pressures felt by Western industrial capitalism with its ageing production methods. According to Loughlin, Western capitalism responded to these challenges by moving much of its heavy industrial production over to the Far East and concentrating its efforts on developing service industries instead. The aforementioned developments have had a significant impact on the internal organization of nation states and on the international order generally. Neil Brenner, for example ( 1999: 41), argues that ‘the state-centric form of capitalist territorial organization that prevailed throughout most of the twentieth century’ is now being eroded. What we are witnessing instead is the creation of new modes of territoriality at both the sub- and supranational levels. Typically, these take the form either of megacities and city regions, or of transnational economic and political blocks such as the EU or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Brenner even goes so far as to argue that urbanized regions are now fast replacing national economies as the basic building blocks of world capitalism. This is a view that has Localism in context 27 also been advanced in different ways by other scholars too, for example by Jane Jacobs (1984) and also, more recently, by Benjamin Barber (2013). Another indication of the scalar pressure being experienced by sovereign states is the steady trend towards decentralization that is evident in many countries across the world. Gary Marks and his colleaguesMarks ( et al., 2008), reporting on their comprehensive, longitudinal study of 42 countries going back over nearly 60 years, find that in more than two-thirds of their sample (i.e. in 29 out of 42 states) the extent of regional authority and powers has increased over the period of the study. In most of the remaining cases (11 out of 42 states), the ‘index of regional authority’ has stayed broadly the same. Most states with a population of more than 2.5 million have shifted significantly in the direction of regionalization over the period in question. The authors also note (Marks et al., op. cit.: 177) that in the century preceding the Second World War, the trend within the same group of states had overwhelmingly been towards centralization. More recently, Anjali Bohlken has argued that since 1950 a similar trend towards decentralization can also be observed in most parts of the developing world (Bohlken, 2016). In her analysis of 68 developing countries, Bohlken notes that only four countries have had no decentralization reforms at all during the past 60 years. By contrast, over the same period, many of the nations she surveyed, most notably China and the Philippines, have experienced several successive rounds of decentralization. Interestingly, Bohlken presents convincing evidence to show that such reforms have taken place not only in states with democratic regimes but in those ruled by autocratic governments as well. For Benjamin Barber, sovereign states were once the perfect political recipe for liberty and for the independence of autonomous peoples and nations. Today, however, ‘states are parochial and limited’ in their outlook, and they are too small either to regulate or to contain global centres of power (Barber, 2013: 77). Barber argues that states are defined by their nationality and their sovereignty, and this makes them incapable of co-operating across national borders. States are also built on the idea of a sovereign people. In former times this was an effective way of persuading disparate tribes, clans, cities, regions, counties and duchies – often previously in conflict with each other – to form a larger, more integrated society. In recent times, some larger states (e.g. the United States, Canada, India, Brazil) have been built on the basis of multi-cultural, rather than mono-cultural, identities. Even so, states have always found it hard to surrender their vital interests except in times of military conflict. According to Barber, it is cities that now speak for the cosmopolitan perspective, whereas nations speak for parochialism and for special interests.

The international relations system and the size of states Notwithstanding Barber’s view on the limitations of nation states, there has been a significant increase in the level of international co-operation between states over the past 75 years. Following the Second World War, in particular, a large number of 28 Localism in context international organizations were created. These include the United Nations (UN) organization and its various agencies, the World Bank and the International Mon- etary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community (EEC).1 These and many similar organizations founded over the same period can be described as institutionalized forms of ‘governance’, rather than as ‘government’ in the strict sense. Typically, these international bodies will meet and agree to measures as a group of sovereign states, but in formal terms they have only limited jurisdiction over their members. The main exception to this pattern is the EU, which has over time developed some of the features of a sovereign government. This is evident in the powers which the EU now wields through its legal, regulatory, banking and financial systems (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003; Varoufakis, 2017). There will be more discussion of the EU as a unique form of polity later in this chapter and also in Chapter 5. Given the recent turn to localism, there are some pertinent comments to be made about the current international relations system, particularly with regard to the size of states. Since the end of the Second World War, the total number of countries recognized as sovereign states has risen significantly. In 1945, there were 74 independent countries, but by 2003 that number had risen to 193 (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). At the time of writing, the UN still lists 193 member states on its website, with two other ‘non-member’ states (Palestine and the Holy See) having the status of Permanent ObserversUnited ( Nations, 2019). As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the most salient points about the world’s 195 states is their huge diversity, particularly in terms of population, land mass and economic power. With regard specifically to population, it is notable how many of the world’s states are actually quite small in size. As of mid-2018,2 some 75 of the world’s nation states (i.e. nearly two-fifths of the total) had populations of less than five million. Indeed, just over half of these states had populations of less than a million. According to the definitions set out inChapter 2, all 75 of these states can be considered as meso- or even micro-scale entities in some cases. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, just 28 of the world’s states had populations of more than 50 million inhabitants in 2018. Effectively, this is the minimum level of population needed to qualify for inclusion in the macro scale of political organization.3 The increase in the number of micro-level and other small states during the past 70 years has been one of the main factors accounting for the overall rise in the number of states during this period. According to Alesina and Spolaore (2003: 175–176), the rise in the number of small states in particular is due to the increasing level of integration in the world’s economy and to the relative absence of international threats. Two other factors which have also contributed to the increase in number are the decolonization of the developing world and the collapse of the former Soviet Union (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003: 197). The creation of small and micro states can also be linked to the global trend towards decentralization within nation states, a trend which has already been highlighted earlier (Bohlken, 2016 ; Localism in context 29 Hooghe and Marks, 2016). In this context, it is likely that many sub-national regions may have been able to extract favourable treatment from nation states in order to persuade them not to pursue the path of independence for themselves (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003: 199). In respect of small states, some argue that political science as a whole and international relations (IR) specifically suffer from an unconscious bias towards ‘gigantism’. This effectively blinds them to the position of small and micro-sized states (Sharman, 2017; Corbett and Veenendaal, 2019a). Certainly, the proliferation of such states during the latter part of the twentieth century is a significant development that IR has done relatively little to explain until recently. In their comprehensive study of the 39 smallest states in the world, Corbett and Veenendaal note that a key feature of the political culture in such states is that it is hyper-personalized. However, small states are also much more likely to be democratic in terms of the widely accepted Freedom House criteriaCor- ( bett and Veenendaal, 2019b: 6). Small and microstates are also some of the most developed countries in the world, with the highest levels of overall government effectiveness. The 77 smallest states4 account for more than 1.5% of the world’s population and for some 3% of global wealth (Corbett and Veenendaal, op. cit.: 7). Generally speaking, the close connections that exist between citizens and politicians in these states act as an obstacle to executive domination. They tend to discourage politicians from resorting to full-blown oppression and dominance (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2019a: 8). Taking the case of four of the smallest sovereign states, that is Nauru (population 11,000), Liechtenstein (pop. 35,000), St Kitts and Nevis (pop. 43,000) and the Seychelles (pop. 86,000), Sharman notes that while all four territories have been conquered repeatedly in the past, none of them has been attacked since it gained independence, despite their relative vulnerability as a group. Neither Liechtenstein nor Nauru has any armed forces at all, while the other two only have token armed forces numbering just a few hundred (Sharman, 2017: 567). These micro cases suggest that the international system now allows small states to enjoy ‘a world of possibilities: to have armies or allies, or not; and to retain, delegate or profit from a wide range of sovereign prerogatives’. This state of affairs suggests that the international system may be evolving from a relatively hostile ‘Hobbesian’ environment into a more benign ‘Kantian’ one.

The global and the local The developments outlined in the previous sections are symptomatic of the increasing impact of economic globalization on states of all sizes. According to Held and McGrew (2002: 7–8), globalization is principally about power and how it is organized and exercised. Globalization is also about how the territorial principle which lies behind the conventional notion of the state is being transformed. Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009: Ch.14) argue that globalization is 30 Localism in context primarily a financial and economic phenomenon but also impacts on many other forms of activity, including culture, communications and mobility. How- ever, the one realm of activity that seems to have been less affected than others by the impact of globalization so far is politics itself, thus fuelling the perception that globalization has broken free from the control of national governments (Dryzek and Dunleavy, op. cit.: 313). Of course, those states which are fully integrated into the global financial system do enjoy a relative degree of security, but this is partly at the expense of their autonomy in the social and economic fields. In this context, the world’s leading states now have to take increasing account of the reaction of international markets to their economic policies and performance. Many of the scholars who have written about globalization have commented on its impact on local communities. Massey and Jess (1995: 227) have argued pro- vocatively that the global and the local are mutually constitutive. A similar idea is expressed by James Rosenau in his book Distant Proximities (2003). Rosenau’s central argument is that human affairs are currently passing through a period of ‘fragmegration’. This oxymoron is intended to capture the tension of ‘localizing, decentralizing or fragmenting dynamics that are interactively and causally linked to globalizing, centralizing, and integrating dynamics’ (Rosenau, op. cit.: 11). This in turn leads to the notion, encapsulated in the title of the book itself, of ‘distant proximities’ – that is of events and decisions in one part of the world impacting directly on individuals and localities in continents many thousands of miles away. For Rosenau, this is the feature which more than any other defines our ‘emergent epoch’. Rosenau’s thesis is based on a theory of change that focuses on the link between the micro and macro dimensions of social and political life. Rosenau argues for the merits of complexity theory as a way of understanding the transformations taking place in our world. For him, complexity theory ‘lies somewhere between order and disorder, predictability and surprise’, and for that very reason it is compelling. It is also useful for analysing questions of stability and change, and the extent to which change is seen as acceptable at the micro level of local communities (Rosenau, 2003: 219–230). Ann Cvetkovic and Douglas Kellner note that the globalizing effects of trade and capitalism were recognized long ago by thinkers as different in their outlooks as Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Culture has become a major area of conflict and an important dimension of the struggle between the local and the global (Cvetkovic and Kellner, 1997: 9). There has also been a significant erup - tion of sub-cultures of resistance that have attempted to preserve specific forms of life and social relations in the face of globalization and the homogenization that is perceived by some to be part of it. Nevertheless, although global forces can be oppressive and can erode cultural traditions and identities, they can also provide new material to rework one’s identity and they can empower people to revolt against traditional forms and styles to create new, more emancipatory ones. Localism in context 31 With regard to politics and democracy, Cvetkovic and Kellner argue that changed ways of thinking are needed to respond to new configurations of the global and the local (Cvetkovic and Kellner, op. cit.: 13). In order to capture the relationship between the two, the authors advance the concept of ‘articulation’. At an intuitive level, this concept appears to be a very promising one from the point of view of system design, but it is not fully analysed or developed within the book itself. It does, however, carry a distinct relevance for the argument we are developing here, and it will be picked up again later in the book, particularly in Chapter 8. In seeking to understand and theorize the relationship between the global and the local, one needs to guard against favouring either one or the other of these two poles. Each may act as the starting point for analysis, depending on what the exact purpose of the analysis is. This means that in theoretical terms no geographical scale should necessarily have priority over any other Swyngedouw,( 1997: 144). In terms of political governance, the perspective which captures the essence of this approach most directly is multi-level governance. One of MLG’s main advantages over rival theories is that it is well suited to analysing the articulation of whole systems of governance, as opposed to single institutions and regimes; and it can be applied at any level the analyst chooses to focus on.

Multi-level governance, empires and political orders Simona Piattoni (2009) suggests that MLG is a powerful way of conceptual - izing some of the contemporary challenges to our view of the nation state. Not only are states under external pressure to cede powers to supranational jurisdictions, but they are also under pressure internally. This is partly due to the blurring of the public and private realms, and partly through the rising assertiveness of their constituent territories, particularly of regional governments (Keating, 2008). A number of criteria may be invoked in order to assess whether a particular policy initiative or reform is a genuine instance of MLG. As a minimum, an MLG initiative/reform needs to involve more than two geographical levels of government. Secondly, it needs to show evidence of non- governmental actors being involved across different scalar levels in the making of policy. Finally, one needs to be able to see these actors working together in non-hierarchical networks in order to pursue the policy initiative/reform in question (Piattoni, 2010). Piattoni’s outline of the key analytical dimensions of MLG suggests that governing across different geographical levels has become an increasingly complex business. The main steps through which this state of affairs has evolved over the past 100 years may be set out as a series of phases as follows:

• Firstly, there was the ‘law and politics’ phase. This coincided with the creation of central state institutions, with the centre mainly being concerned with ‘high politics’ and the localities with ‘low politics’ (Bulpitt, 1983) 32 Localism in context • Secondly, there was the ‘welfare state interdependency’ phase. During this period, the state used local governments to help implement the expansion of social welfare programmes and entitlements • Thirdly, there was the ‘government/NGO partnership’ phase. This was characterized by an increasing use of New Public Management approaches, such as contracting-out in the public sector, leading to a gradual hollowing out of the state • Currently, there is the networked governance phase. This is characterized by ‘multiple organizational involvements across levels and sectors’. It is hap- pening at a time when global and local concerns are coming more strongly to the fore (Agranoff, 2011: 73).

The networked approach to governing which characterizes MLG is indicative of a major transformation taking place in the nature of government. Many institutional settings are now taking on some of the characteristics of ‘governance’ as described earlier in this chapter. This phenomenon is analysed by Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe (2004) using the terms ‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ governance. Type I governance denotes general-purpose, institutional government for a defined ter - ritory at a particular scalar level, operating within a relatively permanent framework of laws and procedures. As for Type II, this denotes a more fluid type of governing in which official interventions are designed to address the requirements of a specific policy area or set of issues. Type II arrangements will often involve either single-purpose administrations or governmental and non-governmental actors working in partnership and across scalar levels. Many accept that these two broad approaches to governance often exist alongside each other in a kind of ‘negotiated order’ (Piattoni, 2009). Chris Skelcher argues that the ‘Type II’ or ‘polycentric’ style of governance is generally embedded within a more basic Type I governance framework upon which modern nation states and sub-national governments are typically constructed. According to Skelcher, polycentric governance tends to flourish in- situ ations where mainstream government is unable to deal with major, cross-cutting policy issues (Skelcher, 2005: 94). A common pattern is for Type I bodies within a polity to retain responsibility for traditional functions of government and for specially created Type II bodies to manage and deliver new cross-cutting policy initiatives. Type I and Type II bodies co-exist increasingly alongside each other but not necessarily in a uniform pattern. However, what is also clear for Skelcher is that the move towards network governance is gradually eroding the integrity and the legitimacy of sovereign polities. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders agree that the new institutional approaches identified here are also gradually changing the nature of democratic accountability. State power remains important, but the way in which it is being exercised is becoming increasingly complex. While this new, more flexible form of governance may add to the effectiveness of public policy making through its increased level of responsiveness, it may also end up reducing legitimacy in the form of Localism in context 33 public accountability – unless new means can be found to connect citizens to the shifting locations of power (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 204–205). With this paradox in mind, Gary Marks looks at what we might be able to learn from our historical knowledge of ‘empires’. These are macro-level polities which, almost by definition, are composed of multiple territories. The most effective empires of the past have responded to the conflicting demands of organizational scale on the one hand and the preferences of territorial communities on the other by deploying one of three main strategies:

• accommodation (i.e. allowing a dependent community to have a measure of self-rule in exchange for some share of its resources and power) • assimilation (i.e. incorporating the dependent community, or its leaders, by persuading them to identify with the empire overall) • elimination (i.e. destroying the community by dispersing, enslaving or killing its members)

Of the three strategies, Marks regards territorial accommodation as the archetypal engine of empire (Marks, 2012: 6). This opens the way for an intriguing parallel to be drawn between the present- day approach of the EU and the way in which the Roman Empire operated nearly 2,000 years ago. Rome practised accommodation to a very advanced degree. The integration of dependent communities into its empire was achieved by a range of methods. Several different designs were available for the all-important treaty which bound Rome’s dependent communities to the confederatio. The inhabitants of some cities were granted full Roman citizenship; others were offered the status of cives sine suffragio, that is to say they paid Roman taxes and served in the army, but they did not have the right to vote in elections for officials. Others were deemed allies (socii). They were exempt from taxes, but they had to provide the empire with troops to serve under the command of Roman generals Marks,( 2012: 7). When the Roman Empire broke up, the communities which were bound together through imperial networks were gradually cut adrift. With the collapse of the imperial financial system, there was a steep decline in commerce, and trading towns increasingly became fortresses. Eventually, the rupture became systemic. During the ‘Dark Ages’, communities of place became fragmented into thousands of individual city states, principalities, kingdoms, dukedoms and bishoprics, each seeking to maximize its own power and resources. However, no city state could repeat the Roman trick of incorporating new territories and populations into its existing structure, or of involving very large numbers of people in its political and cultural life. Eventually, economic recovery did return, but it would be almost a thousand years before the people of Europe reached a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed at the height of Roman rule ( Marks, 2012: 9). During the early Middle Ages, one path to scale was for independent cities to form themselves into leagues. One of the most prominent of these – the Hanseatic 34 Localism in context League – was created in the thirteenth century. However, beyond the boundaries of city states such as these, territorial identity in Europe remained fluid and emergent. Gradually, however, as royal councils, taxes and local government became more systematized, and more stable and rooted communities began to emerge in a number of countries, including England, France and Germany (Marks, op. cit.: 10). Yet the fragmentation that followed the break-up of the Roman Empire, and the diversity that it spawned, proved decisive in limiting the overall size of governments. Similarly, the subsequent emergence of effective nation states within Europe diminished the potential benefits of empire and raised the military costs of pursuing this as a political option. Border disputes and wars took place frequently, but until Napoleon’s and Hitler’s continental-level campaigns, no major European power succeeded in annexing another by force (Marks, op. cit.: 11). Indeed, the experience of these two short-lived campaigns showed that in a Europe consisting of nation states, victories on the battlefield were incapable of producing any long- standing subjugation of national communities. The EU today is a utopian project founded on the ruins of the Nazi ‘empire’. European integration has been developing according to its own logic and timeta- ble but without any clear conception of what its final destination might be (Marks, op. cit.: 17). Like the Roman Empire, the EU makes significant use of accommodation, and this helps to explain why it has expanded in the way it has. Within the EU, accommodation does not operate in a rigid, top-down manner but rather through a flexible combination of co-operation, competition and control. The EU relies on courts and on the rule of law to legitimate its decisions. It is multi-level, multilateral and multi-centred. If it is to be regarded as an empire, it is most definitely one of the pen, rather than the sword. Jan Zielonka (2006) puts forward a case for the EU to be seen as a ‘neo- medieval empire’, rather than as a ‘Westphalian super-state’. This is particularly true following the EU’s enlargement in 2004, which increased its membership at a stroke from 15 to 25 states. Zielonka argues that the EU’s accumulated body of laws and regulations has now become too complex for ordinary citizens to understand. This makes it increasingly difficult for the EU’s electors to exercise demo - cratic control over it (Zielonka, op. cit.: 5). However, with the recent enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, the EU can now claim to be a more fully European project than it has ever been in the past (Zielonka, op. cit.: 134). What seems to be clear is that enlargement has added further to the diversity of civic cultures within the EU, making it even more difficult to arrive at a homogeneous pattern across the EU as a whole. The EU is most definitely not a state in the -con ventional mould, so other ‘non-Westphalian’ criteria need to be found in order to evaluate its democratic performance (Zielonka, op. cit.: 137). Zielonka warns that further enlargement of the EU may lead to a rise of populism, as certain groups challenge what they regard as its lack of legitimacy. That said, the very diversity of the enlarged EU makes it less likely that a single, dominant European identity will emerge (Zielonka, op. cit.: 169). Similarly, within the realm of foreign affairs, the EU seems to have set its face against pursuing Localism in context 35 the sort of power politics that equates might with right. Instead, the EU relies on the spread of freedom, law, democracy and prosperity as its characteristic legitimating device. The EU is essentially a civilian power enlarging its territory through consent and diplomatic bargaining. The policy of enlargement is clearly about the EU extending its influence over its near neighbours. In this respect, the EU’s governance is already increasingly non-territorial, multi-level and multi- centred. It includes EU institutions, member states and sub-states (including cities and regions), public and private agents, transnational and supranational actors all interacting ‘in complex networks of varying horizontal and vertical density’ (Zielonka, op. cit.: 180). What is emerging through the EU is a distinct new form of macro-level political order: one based on inter-state solidarity, the rule of law, trade and economic integration, a broad cultural heritage and a set of shared rights and values. That said, the EU is still in many ways an emerging system. It is beset with many internal tensions and by a host of external threats which could still fatally undermine it. However, from the perspective of this book, one of the key features of the EU is that, despite its complex and rather impenetrable nature, it does seem capable of allowing the preferences of small nations, and even of regional and local communities, to emerge and to be fed into a set of deliberative and decision-making processes extending over a whole sub-continental land mass. As a new type of political order, the EU is worthy of serious academic attention (see Chapter 5).

Political community, public goods and sovereignty The main theoretical issue for contemporary political governance is: who constitutes the ‘people’ – that is to say, the political community in whose name collective decisions are made? Logically, this question comes before any others, including how decisions are reached, and what the content of those decisions might be (Hooghe and Marks, 2016: 5). For Plato and Aristotle, and for many other political thinkers since their time, governance and government are rooted in community. They are an expression of the affective bonds that link people together within a community. They are marked by common understandings, discourses and practices. By contrast, a more modern, functionalist perspective on governance emphasizes the provision of public goods and the policies of the institutions which produce them. On this account, governance assumes that people have a range of different preferences, and that satisfying individual preferences will depend on the mix of public goods that are available, as well as on the taxes that people have to pay in order for such public goods to be provided. This in effect puts citizens almost into the role of ‘customers’. However, providing individuals with the pub - lic policies and goods that they want is not the same as giving them the authority to determine those things for themselves (Hooghe and Marks, op. cit.: 16). So, it is likely that some communities will continue to demand self-rule, even if government is generally successful in meeting citizens’ preferences. 36 Localism in context As for political communities, they can be regarded as settings of ‘parochial altruism’. As the main beneficiaries of the public goods that they produce, communities may choose either to maximize or to constrain the distribution of such goods within the territory they control. Communities therefore tend to be somewhat double-edged in their effects. Not only do community members enjoy the advantages of shared understandings and dense social networks, but they are also liable to draw boundaries around the provision of the public goods that they produce, depending on how they define the entitlement to such goods and on whom they consider to be insiders and outsiders (Hooghe and Marks, op. cit.: 18). One well-established approach to recognizing distinct communities within a wider political whole is through federalism. A federal approach to state building recognizes the existence of equal and largely self-governing ‘confederates’ who not only come together freely within a common political settlement but also each retain a significant range of ‘local’ decision-making powers. This contrasts with the unitary approach to state building, which relies on the idea of a central ‘sovereign’ who exercises legitimate authority over the whole of the territory in question (Hooghe and Marks, op. cit.: 29). For Michael Keating (2013), political sovereignty can be understood as the ultimate right to legal and political authority. It is linked to a number of other key ideas: that is, that of a sovereign people in whose name decisions are made; a sovereign territory over which the people can claim exclusive control; and the executive capacity to exercise political control over the territory concerned (Keating, op. cit.: 264) In its purest form, sovereignty rejects any other claim to legitimate rule, whether it comes from a superior jurisdiction or from a polity’s own constituent territories. However, untrammelled sovereignty can often be a difficult goal to pursue in practice, as there are nearly always competing claims to sovereignty within a given territorial space. Applying it too rigorously can lead to a ‘zero-sum’ form of politics which is impervious to the compromises that are a normal part of political exchange (Keating, op. cit.: 165). Marks argues that MLG can be understood as the attempt to reap the benefits of organizational scale for the provision of public goods, while at the same time adapting government to the growing trend for local and regional self-rule. In this sense, MLG can help to resolve the paradox of modern governance and government highlighted earlier in this section (Marks, 2012: 5). However, MLG can only really be effective if it is able to operate in tandem with a new ‘post-Westphalian’ understanding of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this new sense needs to be seen as essentially divisible in nature, and as a claim which has a number of different sources of legitimacy (Keating, 2013: 171). Keating argues that the notion of sovereignty should now be superseded by the more ‘relational’ idea of autonomy. This could open the way for the ‘unbundling’ of territory and for its re-articulation in new and more complex ways. It opens the door for territorial communities – at whatever scale they are constituted – to become self-governing, interdependent polities (Keating, 2013: 175; Frug, 2014: 4). Localism in context 37 Localism and sovereignty in conflict: the case of Catalonia and Spain The arguments around sovereignty and autonomy open the way for the first of this book’s extended case studies. Further case studies will be presented over the course of the next three chapters. In both this and the other case studies to come, the two key questions to be addressed are: what are the underlying reasons for the state of affairs described, and what are the prospects for the future? With regard to Catalonia/Spain, this is a case study of ‘secondary’ or ‘meso- scale’ localism. It illuminates many of the wider themes outlined in this chapter. It focuses on Catalonia, a sub-national territory with a strong sense of its own identity and whose government wants it to be much more than just an ‘autonomous community’ of the Spanish state (Keating, 2001: vii). The case study explores how a territory’s aspiration for greater autonomy and self-determination may conflict with the national and the international framework in which it operates.

Introduction to Catalonia Catalonia in north-east Spain is one of 17 ‘autonomous communities’ formally recognized in the Spanish constitution of 1978 (seeFigure 3.1). At 32,100 km2, it is the sixth largest of Spain’s communities, and it is the second largest in terms of population. At the time of writing, Catalonia has 7.6 million inhabitants (Idescat, 2019), which means that its population is greater than that of about half of the world’s 195 sovereign states. As a community of place, it clearly falls within the P3 category identified earlier in this chapter. Although Catalonia has an extensive rural and mountain hinterland, some two- thirds of its population live along its coastal strip. In addition, nearly half of Cata- lonia’s residents (i.e. some 3.2 million) live within the urban area of Barcelona (Dowling, 2018: 136). As a large P2-type community, Barcelona can justifiably be described as a ‘global’ city in its own right, particularly given the high profile it enjoys in the realms of sport, culture, tourism, business and public affairsBam- ( bery and Kerevan, 2018: 31). It is also a member of the C40 group of the world’s major cities (C40 Cities, 2019). It is clearly a significant element in the Catalan mix. From an economic point of view, Catalonia had a gross domestic product (GDP) of just over 30,000 Euros per capita in 2017. This was the fourth largest in Spain, and it also stands well above the average levels for both Spain and the EU (Idescat, 2019). According to the European Social Progress Index, Catalonia was ranked 68th out of 272 regions in Europe in terms of its overall GDP (Dowling, 2018: 138). Under the 1978 constitution, Catalonia has its own elected regional parliament and government, known collectively as the Generalitat. The parliament has 135 deputies, and elections to it normally take place every four years. The most recent elections were held in December 2017. At the time of writing the government is 38 Localism in context

Asturias Cantabria Basque Spain Country Galicia Navarre La Rioja Catalonia Castile and León Aragon

Madrid

Castilla-La Valencia Extremadura Mancha Balearic Islands

Murcia

Andalusia

Canary Islands

Figure 3.1 Political map of Spain, showing the location of Catalonia and the other autonomous communities Source: Ontheworldmap.com a minority coalition formed by two locally based parties, both of which support Catalan independence. These are the liberal Junts per Catalunya and the left-wing Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. Administratively, Catalonia is divided into four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona). It also has 42 Comarques (or districts), as well as 947 municipalities. While the four provinces function as administrative sub- divisions of the Spanish state, the Comarques and the municipalities are genuine local government bodies, each with its own elected council and paid officials. There is also a High Court of Justice in Catalonia, which administers the laws and measures approved by the regional parliament. The High Court oversees the work of the provincial and local courts. However, in constitutional terms, the court forms part of the Spanish legal system. The Generalitat has no direct role, for example, in appointing its judges. Catalonia is one of several sub-national regions within Europe, which can credibly claim to be a nation in its own right. In this sense, it is often likened to Localism in context 39 Scotland, Flanders or the Basque Country (Keating, 2013; Elliott, 2018). Like these other ‘stateless nations’ within Europe, Catalonia has many of the cultural and symbolic markers associated with nationhood: for example, a distinctive language and a substantial community of native speakers; an indigenous literature and a set of distinct cultural traditions; and, not least, a historical identity as an independent polity dating back more than a thousand yearsBambery ( and Kerevan, 2018: 41). Whether as a medieval kingdom or as a sub-national region of Spain, Catalonia has always been a major location for trade and economic activity. In terms of its history, Catalonia emerged as an autonomous state during the ninth5 and tenth centuries of the Common Era. In 1137, it formed a dynastic union with the neighbouring kingdom of Aragón. However, Catalonia’s political autonomy was not curtailed by the union with Aragón. Over the next three centuries, its overseas involvements extended across the Mediterranean to Sicily, Sardinia and even as far as Greece (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.: 7). On the home front, the Generalitat of Catalonia was established in 1359, together with its own president, thus making Catalonia one of Europe’s earliest pioneers in the field of parliamentary governance. At the time of writing, Catalonia finds itself in an uncomfortable stand-off with the Spanish state. Nine of its former ministers and civil society leaders have recently been sentenced to long jail terms on charges of sedition and misuse of public funds, having been arrested and imprisoned by the Spanish authorities in the autumn of 2017. At the same time, its former president and some of the former ministers in his government are living in self-imposed exile in Belgium. They are refusing to return to Spain for fear of being arrested and charged if they do. This state of affairs stems from the previous Catalan government’s (2015–2017) decision to press ahead with an independence referendum in October 2017. The referendum’s purpose was to seek voters’ approval for Catalonia to become an independent republic and to secede from Spain. How has this state of affairs arisen, and what are the future prospects for localism and multi-level governance in Catalonia and Spain?

Spain and Catalonia: the historical and constitutional background Since 1978 Spain has been a quasi-federal state with a constitutional monarch and a national parliament, the Cortes Generales, based in Madrid. In 2019, Spain had a population of 46.9 million inhabitants (INE, 2019) and was on this measure the sixth largest country in Europe. Apart from Catalonia, Spain has two other prominent ‘national’ minority regions within its borders: the Basque Country and Galicia (Keating, 2001: 114). Traditionally, Spain has been one of Europe’s great powers. In its current territorial configuration, it dates back to 1469. This is the year in which the crowns of Castile and Aragón/Catalonia were united through the marriage of Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragón/Catalonia. Following this, Spain went on to 40 Localism in context end the Moorish occupation of its territory in 1492. This was a highly symbolic event and a particularly important one in terms of establishing Spain’s status as a sovereign nation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain went on to develop a vast overseas empire across South America, the Caribbean, and in parts of the Pacific and of Northern and Western Europe. Following its union with Castile in 1469, Catalonia retained the right to self-rule and to be governed by its own institutions and laws. However as time went by, its relations with the Spanish Crown became increasingly fraught. This was because the Crown demanded ever more military and financial support for the campaigns it was waging in France and Northern Europe. Between 1640 and 1652, much of Catalonia rose up in revolt against Spanish rule. For a brief period, the leaders of the revolt even declared Catalonia to be a republic, albeit under French protection (Bambery and Kerevan, 2018: 46). Spain fought a successful military campaign to oust the occupying French troops from Catalan territory. In the subsequent peace treaty of 1659, Spain handed a number of Catalonia’s northern territories over to its powerful northern neighbour, These territories have remained under French jurisdiction ever since. Catalonia’s absorption into the Spanish state was completed early in the eighteenth century. This followed the Spanish War of Succession, during which Cata- lonia took the fateful decision to form an alliance with Britain. Catalonia was hoping to take advantage of Spain’s dynastic weakness in order to reclaim some of its previous autonomy. However, when the war ended, Britain and Spain signed the peace treaty of Utrecht. Under the terms of the treaty, Spain granted Britain possession of Gibraltar, in return for which Britain agreed to drop its support for Catalan independence. This paved the way for the Spanish Crown to issue the decree of Nueva Planta in 1716. This abolished all of Catalonia’s independent legal, financial and political institutions. At this point, the recalcitrant territory finally fell under the full control of the Spanish Crown (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.: 47). Prior to its re-emergence as a democratic state in 1978, Spain was ruled by the military dictator General Francisco Franco. Franco’s rule lasted from 1939 until his death in 1975. Prior to his becoming head of state, Franco’s ‘nationalist’ forces had been victorious in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939. This bloody war, in which more than half a million combatants and civilians from both sides lost their lives, was the culmination of a long period of national decline, stretching over more than 200 years. During this time, Spain lost nearly all its overseas territories and fell steadily backwards in economic and geopolitical terms. One of the key events that triggered Spain’s civil war was a decision taken by the preceding Spanish Republic in 1932 to grant Catalonia a statute of autonomy. For this reason, Catalonia and its principal city Barcelona were two of the main centres of resistance to Franco’s nationalist forces. They were the last to fall to Franco in January 1939. Catalonia’s defeat by the nationalists was another bitter episode in its long struggle against the Spanish state. Localism in context 41 Catalonia and Spain: the modern background After Franco’s death, Spain made a reasonably successful transition to liberal democracy. A constitutional monarch (King Juan Carlos6) was installed in 1976, following which a new constitution and a decentralized political structure were approved in a nationwide referendum in 1978. In Catalonia, the abstention rate in this referendum was fairly high (32%), but of those Catalans who did vote, more than 90% backed the new Spanish constitution. In the following year, over 88% of those who voted also supported Catalonia’s first statute of autonomy. With its newly devolved government under President Jordi Pujol (1980–2003), Catalonia became an integral part of a democratic, decentralized and modernizing Spain (Elliott, 2018: 229). On 1 January 1986, Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy was sealed when it was formally admitted, alongside Portugal, to membership of the European Community. Despite every appearance of success, there were a number of deep-seated problems with the Spanish transition to modern statehood. Firstly, there was never any formal process of reconciliation involving Spain’s previously warring territorial interests. Its leaders simply drew a veil over the civil war, in what was a mutually agreed pacto del olvido (‘pact of forgetting’). Given the trau- matic events of the war and the subsequent repression which took place under Franco’s dictatorship, particularly in Catalonia, it is now clear with hindsight that an element of reconciliation should have formed part of the democratic transition. Secondly, the 1978 constitution was ambiguous about the status of the autonomous communities, referring to them both as ‘nationalities’ and as ‘regions’, but leaving it unclear how these terms applied to particular communities and whether they were able to lay claim to one or both statuses at the same time (Keating and Wilson, 2009; Bambery and Kerevan, 2018: 117). Finally, the constitution provided for individual Statutes of Autonomy to be negotiated separately with each of the 17 communities. This arrangement swiftly became known rather cynically in Spain as café para todos (‘coffee for all’). It also allowed the Spanish government to play the different autonomous communities off against each other. With the new constitution in place, a first wave of autonomy statutes was approved for every single one of Spain’s communities by 1992Keating ( and Wil- son, 2009). After the millennium, however, certain communities started pressing for discussions to take place on a second round of devolution statutes. The process began in earnest in 2004 with the election of a new socialist government under Prime Minister Rodriguez Zapatero. In the Cortes, Zapatero’s government relied on the parliamentary support of two left-wing Catalan parties to keep it in power (Keating and Wilson, 2009: 542). In these circumstances, it was not surprising that the devolution process should be led by Catalonia. However, it was soon also joined by Andalusia, Aragón, the Balearic Islands, Castile-Leon and Valencia, all of which began their own individual discussions with the government. Catalonia’s new statute, agreed with significant modifications by Zapatero’s administration in 42 Localism in context 2006, clearly emphasized Catalonia’s status as a ‘nation’ and granted it significant new fiscal powers, including control over 50% of all the taxes raised in Catalonia. In June 2006, the Estatut was approved by 73% of Catalan voters in a referendum. However, on this occasion the turnout, at just below 50%, was disappointingly low (Bambery and Kerevan, 2018: 161). At the national level, this second wave of autonomy statutes was vigorously contested by the main opposition party, the Conservative Partido Popular (PP), under its combative leader Mariano Rajoy. Rajoy made sure that Catalonia’s newly approved statute was immediately challenged in Spain’s constitutional court. In fact, several challenges were lodged against Catalonia’s statute, not only by the PP itself but also by five other autonomous communities, most of them governed locally by the PP (Elliott, 2018: 238). In June 2010, after an exceptionally long deliberation, the constitutional court announced its verdict on these challenges. It decided to strike out all references in the statute to Catalonia being a ‘nation’ and also to Catalan being the ‘preferred’ language of administration and public communications in the territory. This led to outrage in Catalonia and to a series of huge demonstrations. It also marked a significant turning point in Catalonia’s current campaign for greater political autonomy Bambery( and Kerevan, 2018: 173). In the meantime, following a general election in November 2011, a new PP government under Rajoy replaced Zapatero’s Socialists in power. The legal battle over Catalonia’s new statute was taking place just as Spain was experiencing two major financial crises in quick succession. The first was triggered by the global financial crash of 2008. This brought an end to Spain’s long construction boom and led to the collapse of a number of major property companies and the loss of more than a million jobs in the construction industry (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.: 175). This was rapidly followed by the impact of the euro crisis on Spain’s over-extended banks (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.; 177). The impact of the harsh cost-cutting measures imposed by Rajoy’s new government was quickly felt in the ‘nations and regions’ of SpainDowling, ( 2018: 139). In Catalonia’s case, the level of public debt rose from 7% of regional GDP in 2007 to 34% in 2015. This fuelled perceptions that Catalonia was paying far more to support central government spending across the rest of Spain than it received itself from the national exchequer. Meanwhile, unemployment in Catalonia rock- eted from 6% in 2006 to 23.9% in 2011, with a loss of some 600,000 jobs during this period (Dowling, 2018: 133–139). Spain’s financial crisis and the resulting austerity sparked the growth of several grassroots protest movements in the country. A key trigger event was the huge rally of so-called indignados, which took place in Madrid on 15 May 2011. This was very much an urban revolt against Spain’s post-civil war political elite, and at the national level it soon spawned a new ultra-left political party, Podemos,7 as well as a local variant with similar policies: the En Comú party in Catalonia and Barcelona. These anti-austerity parties have shown themselves to be primarily concerned with social justice issues such as the lack of affordable housing, as well as with environmental questions such as urban sprawl and the massification Localism in context 43 of tourism (Dowling, op. cit.: 150–151). In the Barcelona municipal elections of May 2015, the En Comú party topped the poll, and its leader Ada Colau subsequently became the city’s mayor.8 While the new anti-austerity parties in Spain and Barcelona argue for a plurinational state (Bambery and Kerevan, 2018: 242), they are much less committed to independence than the traditional parties of the left in Catalonia. They support the right of Catalonia’s citizens to be able to vote in a referendum on independence, but they tend to see independence as a diversion from their own radical vision for society (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.: 185). By contrast, what marks the current Catalan independence movement out most strongly is its readiness to contem- plate a complete break with the Spain’s 1978 regime. In this respect, its closest parallel in Spain is with the Basque separatist movement. However, unlike some elements of Basque separatism, the Catalan independence movement has always been intent on securing a peaceful, negotiated exit from the Spanish state, rather than one that is achieved through armed struggle or terrorism.

Catalonia challenges the Spanish state (2012–2017) Following the Spanish constitutional court’s decision to amend key elements of Catalonia’s second autonomy statute, the level of popular and civil society pressure for independence grew significantly within the region. On National Day in 2012, some 1.5 million citizens took to Barcelona’s streets, the city’s largest protest since the death of General Franco. The demonstration was organized by a new civil society movement called the Catalan National Assembly (ANC). It was the first of many street demonstrations and events organized by this movement (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.: 188). The popular pressure applied by the ANC and other civil society groups eventually forced the Catalan government to hold a ‘consultative referendum’ on independence in November 2014. This was held in defiance of the SpanishCortes and the country’s constitutional court. The referendum asked two questions: (1) ‘Do you want Catalonia to become a state?’ and (2) ‘Do you want this state to be inde - pendent?’ Fewer than 40% of eligible Catalans voted in the referendum ( Elliott, 2018: 248), but of those who did, just over 80% answered ‘yes’ to both questions. A further 10% answered ‘yes’ to the first question but ‘no’ to the second Bambery( and Kerevan, 2018: 189). In elections to the Generalitat in September 2015, Catalonia’s pro-independence parties won an outright majority for the first time since Spain’s current constitu - tion came into force in 1978. Following this, the newly installed president, Carles Puigdemont, announced that a ‘substantive’ referendum on independence would be held in 2017. As with the earlier consultative referendum, this poll would go ahead with or without the agreement of the national government and in defiance of Spain’s constitutional court (Elliott, 2018: 249–250). A law paving the way for this referendum was approved by the Generalitat in September 2017. However, despite the proposal not receiving the required two-thirds majority, it was none 44 Localism in context the less enacted by the Catalan government (Elliott, op. cit.: 251). Following this, the government in Madrid took steps to arrest a number of the Catalan officials responsible for organizing the referendum and to start seizing ballot papers. Addi- tionally, it deployed some 10,000 national civil guards across Catalonia to ensure that the poll did not take place. Despite these measures, the independence referendum did go ahead as planned on Sunday 1 October 2017. Although a number of polling stations were unable to open, the vast majority did so. This was made possible by the largely passive role adopted by the local Catalan police, the Mossos D’Esquadra (Bambery and Kere- van, 2018: 203). However, the Spanish civil guards did not hesitate to use their batons to prevent electors all over the region from casting their vote. Their brutal- ity drew much criticism from both inside Spain and beyond, and more than 800 civilian injuries were reported to have been inflicted by the civil guards. Given the atmosphere of hostility on the streets, it was not surprising that many voters opted to stay at home. However, this also reflected the fact that many Catalan citizens did not consider the referendum to be legitimate, and so refused to go out and vote. Despite the civil guards’ actions, the electoral authorities were able to ensure that some 2.2 million valid votes were cast (i.e. 43% of the total electorate). According to Bambery and Kerevan, the overall validity of the poll was endorsed by the International Election Research Team whose observers were deployed around Catalonia to monitor its conduct (Bambery and Kerevan, op. cit.: 206). Of those electors who did manage to cast their vote, a proportion of just over 90% voted in favour of independence, with just under 8% voting against. On 10 October, Puigdemont made a speech declaring Catalonia to be a republic. But he also offered to delay the implementation of this declaration in order to allow time for dialogue with the Spanish government to take place. In response, Prime Minister Rajoy announced that the Spanish government was preparing to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, authorizing the state to take over the running of Catalonia’s devolved government. On 16 October, two prominent civil society leaders in Catalonia, including Jordi Sanchez, president of the ANC, were arrested and imprisoned on charges of rebellion and sedition. During this period, a number of EU leaders either distanced themselves from the Catalan issue (France’s Emmanuel Macron) or expressed their support for the Spanish government’s stand on it (Germany’s Angela Merkel). For his part, the EU Commission President at the time, Jean-Claude Juncker, made it clear that an independent Catalonia would have to reapply to join the EU – an application that a Spanish state without Catalonia could quite clearly block Bambery( and Kerevan, 2018: 217). By contrast, the Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel proposed a process of ‘international and European mediation’, if dialogue between the Cata- lan and Spanish governments failed to find agreement. Given the Spanish government’s tough response, Puigdemont was initially minded to play for time and to call for further legislative elections. However, he was forced to abandon this idea by fellow separatist politicians, and also by the highly charged demonstrations taking place across Catalonia at the time. On 27 Localism in context 45 October, Catalonia’s parliament decided by secret ballot to issue a unilateral declaration of Catalonia’s independence as a republic (Elliott, 2018: 257–258). This finally forced Rajoy into invoking Article 155 and dissolving the Catalan government. At this point, a number of Catalan ministers were taken into custody, while Puigdemont and four of his colleagues fled across the Spanish border and made their way to Belgium. Puigdemont’s strategy seemed to be to base himself in a sympathetic European country and to try and persuade a reluctant EU to intervene in the dispute (Bambery and Kerevan, 2018: 226). Having dissolved the Catalan parliament and dismissed its government, Rajoy ordered fresh elections to take place in Catalonia on 21 December 2017. The campaign for this election showed just how divided Catalan voters still remained over independence. The heartland provinces of Lleida and Girona were mostly strongly in favour of it, but many voters in the city of Barcelona viewed Catalonia as an integral part of Spain. On a turnout of 82%, the secessionist parties won 47% of the votes cast in the election. However, this result gave them 52% of the seats in the new parliament. On the other side of the argument, 43.5% of voters supported unionist parties, with the liberal-leaning Ciudadanos (or Citizens) party winning 36 seats and becoming the largest single group in the new Generalitat. Both the two main national parties (the Socialists and the PP) did relatively badly in the election. These were not the results that Rajoy either wanted or expected, and they show how seriously he had underestimated the strength of nationalist sentiment in Catalonia (Elliott, 2018: 258–263). Since the time of these elections, there has largely been stalemate in the stand- off between Spain and Catalonia. Puigdemont and his four ex-ministerial colleagues are still in exile in Belgium. In May 2019, Puigdemont was elected from his party list to serve as a Member of the European Parliament (MEP), but he has not been willing to return to Spain to make the necessary declaration which would enable him to take up his seat. Despite this, he and two of his exiled colleagues were permitted by the parliament itself to take up their seats as MEPs in January 2020. However, Spain has objected formally to the parliament about this, and the parliament’s authorities and legal advisers are currently considering the matter. Meanwhile, Spain itself has spent much of the past five years in a state of political paralysis. During this time, no fewer than four general elections have taken place. Rajoy’s PP government has now been replaced by a Left-leaning coalition formed between the Spanish socialist party and Unidos Podemos. Talks between representatives of the new Spanish government and of the Catalan regional government to address the current political stalemate began late in February 2020 (Los Angeles Times, 2020).

Reflections on the governance of Spain and Catalonia, and the position of the EU This section explores some of the underlying reasons for the current state of play in Spain and Catalonia. It begins by reviewing some of the key structural factors involved, and then considers issues of individual agency. 46 Localism in context Spain became a major world power during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During this time, a previously autonomous Catalonia was gradually, and at times forcefully, absorbed into the Spanish state. Once Spain’s period of supremacy had passed, the country experienced a long period of ‘weak abso- lutism’ (Fukuyama, 2011: 425) and gradual decline. Government became more centralized and authoritarian, and there was a tendency to turn to military solutions whenever the integrity of the state was thought to be threatened. Despite some short-lived attempts at modernization, Spain’s political order became increasingly sclerotic. It was incapable of dealing with the forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, particularly as these swept through Catalonia in the early part of the twentieth century. During this period, worker radicalism erupted in Barcelona, and Catalan nationalism became resurgent. The resultant clash of political cultures culminated in a full-blown civil war Bambery( and Kerevan, 2018: 67–68). This was a massive failure of territorial governance on the part of the Spanish state. In the post-Franco period, Spain embarked on a long overdue process of federalization. However, the territorial design that Spain has ended up with today is something of a hybrid. It has many of the characteristics of a federal state, without being a full federation in constitutional termsDowling, ( 2018: 157). The creation of the 17 autonomous communities was an inevitable concession by the new Spanish state aimed at pacifying the historic nations of Spain – particularly Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country. However, it was achieved in such a way that it did not threaten the pre-eminence of the central state. After 1978, the process of devolution began in a reasonably consensual manner; but this approach became more difficult to maintain as nationalist sentiment resurfaced in Spain during the 1990s. Federations work best when their members feel that they are part of a genuine partnership which respects the diversity of all its members. The PP, which has never been particularly inclined to celebrate the cultural and linguistic diversity of Spain, now became determined to limit any further con- cessions to the regions. The mounting use of Spanish nationalist rhetoric by the PP was seen as provocative by many Catalans. However, from Spain’s point of view, Catalonia is simply too big and too integral a part of the state to be allowed to secede. Its loss would almost certainly signal a huge crisis of identity for the nation as a whole. Nevertheless, the emergence in 2017 of an overtly secessionist challenge is also a clear sign that Spain’s quasi-federal model has failed ( Dowl- ing, 2018: 157–159). Explanation of the Catalan crisis must also take account of factors relating to the micro-institutional design of the Spanish state. Micro-institutions are often invisible to the outsider, but they can have a major impact on political events. They provide the rules and cultural practices which determine how the macro- institutions of the state work in practice Dunleavy,( 2019: 39). Spain’s current procedures for devolving new powers to the autonomous communities are cum- bersome, and far too prone to being subverted by partisan political haggling. This is evident in the way in which the PP supported Andalusia’s autonomy statute Localism in context 47 in 2006 but fiercely opposed the one that was negotiated with Catalonia in the same year, despite the two containing many of the sameKeating provisions and ( Wilson, 2009: 555). The fact is that the Spanish state lacks a proper constitutional mechanism for dealing with intergovernmental matters. Earlier proposals to create a territorialized senate or upper chamber, similar to the Bundesrat in Germany, have never got off the ground in Spain due to differences between the political parties (Keating and Wilson, op. cit.: 555). As for Catalonia, it has been an outward-facing territory throughout the whole of its long history. Economically and culturally, it has played a prominent role in European affairs, and in Barcelona it possesses a world-leading city. In many ways, Catalonia is the jewel in the Spanish crown, and it can be seen as an exemplar of meso-scale localism in action. Within its territorial borders, it has all the economic and cultural heft needed to operate as an effective medium-sized sovereign state within the EU. For a while, during Spain’s post-civil war period, the region was content to develop as a semi-autonomous ‘nationality’ under the aegis of a democratizing Spanish state. But in the past ten years, it has reached a point where its leaders are now confident enough to demand Catalonia’s right to decide on its own political future, with no options excluded (Dowling, 2018: 164). How- ever, Catalonia, as it is presently constituted, is also a core part of the Spanish state. It could not easily secede without leaving Spain considerably diminished structurally, economically and diplomatically. In their pursuit of independence, its leaders and their supporters need to proceed with an eye to constitutional propri- ety and to the way in which the international community views the legitimacy of their project. Among other things, that means having due regard for all shades of opinion within Catalan society. Catalonia’s recent trajectory towards independence may have been facilitated by some of the factors highlighted earlier in this chapter, concerning the increase in the number of small states across the world since the Second World War (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003: 199). The absence of major military conflict in Northern and Western Europe during this period and the economic integration promoted by the EEC/EC/EU since its inception in 1957 have both encouraged certain sub-national regions to feel comfortable about pursuing their aspirations for political autonomy. As Michael Keating argues: ‘A crucial effect of the new European order is the way in which it throws into question the whole state-centred doctrine of sovereignty and opens up the possibility of new and pluralistic normative orders’ (Keating, 2001: 138). According to Keating, the EU has enabled this ‘loosening up’ of the conventional political order by introducing mechanisms which allow sub-state actors to participate directly in the governance of the union. These mechanisms include the EU’s Committee of the Regions created in 1994; the practice of allowing sub-state actors to represent their states within the Council of Ministers in certain circumstances; and the establishment of new arrangements for cross-border collaboration between states and regions (Keating, 2001: 152–155). With this in mind, Keating notes that Catalonia has been very active in pursuing its external relations activity 48 Localism in context at the EU level. In particular, it has been effective in promoting ‘its history as a medieval trading nation embedded in Spanish, European and Mediterranean networks’ (Keating, 2001: 155). On the other hand, the Catalan crisis has exposed the limits of what the EU can tolerate in terms of its commitment to multi-level governance. Despite the measures the EU has taken to involve sub-national regions in its internal governance, the Catalan crisis has shown that it still remains ultimately a union of sovereign states. This became clear when former President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker commented in the autumn of 2017 that he did not want to be confronted one day with a union of 95 mini states.9 There is no doubt that most of the EU’s large nations simply looked away when the Catalan crisis was at its height and that the EU has never had anything positive to offer Spain or Catalonia to help resolve the matter. This may be justified by the EU’s traditional stance of not interfering in the internal affairs of its member states. And yet in recent years, the EU’s institutions have shown themselves to be more than willing to intervene directly in member-state affairs, whether it be about the role of the -judi ciary in Poland or about public debt and the public finances in Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and, most notably, Greece Varoufakis,( 2017). The EU could certainly have offered to mediate in the 2017 crisis, as the Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel10 urged at the time. It might even have had a useful role to play in helping the protagonists find a way forward. In addition to being shaped by the above structural factors, the Catalan crisis has unfolded through a combination of individual judgements and misjudge- ments. Whether in opposition or in government, Spain’s PP has been consistently rigid and partisan in its dealings with Catalonia and the Basque Country. This has been particularly so under the leadership of Mariano Rajoy. At any point in his premiership (2011–2018), Rajoy could have chosen to dial down the temperature of the escalating crisis in Catalonia. He could have sought to widen the issue by exploring the options for constitutional and financial reform, or by involving other territorial and civil society interests in Spain and beyond, with a view to addressing the issues at stake. For its part, the current political leadership of Catalonia has tried hard to ride the tiger of popular sentiment regarding independence. However, it seems to have ended up being almost consumed by it. Up to the time of the consultative referendum in 2014, the independence movement effectively held the moral high ground through its leadership of a broadly based civic initiative intent on pursuing its aims in a peaceful manner. From 2014 onwards, however, the lack of an unequivocal electoral mandate to break with the Spanish state began to undermine the movement’s legitimacy (Dowling, 2018: 164). The fact is that, while independence does have widespread support within Catalonia, there are also many citizens and wider interests within the territory which are flatly opposed to it and who wish to remain aligned with Spain. This is clear from the results of all the recent polls that have taken place in the region. In these circumstances, it seems like recklessness for Catalonia’s leaders to try and impose a course of action with such momentous Localism in context 49 implications on such a divided electorate. Moreover, this is not the way to win legitimacy either within the rest of Spain or within the EU. To the credit of the independence movement, most of its leaders, notably the mild-mannered Puigdemont, have generally eschewed the use of populist rhetoric in their statements, and they have repeatedly emphasized their determination to achieve their aims through constitutional means. However, they seem far too fix- ated on delivering independence through the ballot box, rather than on campaigning more broadly to win over opponents, sceptics and potential allies to their way of thinking.

What are the future prospects for Spain and Catalonia? It is no exaggeration to say that Spain, one of Europe’s oldest nation states, now has a serious territorial crisis on its hands. Prior to the crisis developing, many elements of the Spanish state already had lost much of their legitimacy in Catalo- nia. After the most recent events, Catalonia’s disenchantment now extends to the whole of the 1978 settlement. Resolution of the Catalan question will only come about when Spain is prepared to embrace its own cultural and linguistic diversity. The new narrative of Spain as a plurinational state promoted by Unidos Podemos indicates that a change of heart may be emerging, at least among some of Spain’s younger voters. However, that remains a minority position within the country. Most of Spain’s population still has a fairly traditional conception of the state and its territorial integrity (Dowling, 2018.: 164–165). Constitutionally speaking, the main options for reforming the 1978 settlement appear to be for Spain to become either a formal federation of 17 regions, each with its own equal status and representation at the centre, or a plurinational state where there is some distinction in powers and status between the three historic nationalities and the remaining regions. The first of these options would almost certainly fail to satisfy Catalonia and the Basque Country, and it might also entail the need for a number of difficult mergers between some of the smaller regions, in order to create viable territorial units. The second option would be extremely difficult to achieve, particularly if it meant some parts of Spain ending up with more extensive powers than others (Keating and Wilson, 2009). As Keating (2001: 132–133) reminds us, asymmetry can work well as an approach to devolution. Indeed, in the recent past, it has been introduced quite successfully in the UK, at least as far as Scotland and Wales are concerned (seeChapter 4). However, anomalies that already are long established are easier to live with than ones that are created afresh. For the moment, one thing seems certain: support for independence in Catalo- nia is unlikely to fall below its current level of around 40% of the population. So a ‘low-intensity impasse’ between Spain and Catalonia is likely to continue into the near future (Dowling, 2018: 165). However, this state of affairs could be shifted quickly if some of Spain’s regions were to start making common cause with each other and promoting their disaffection with the Spanish state more widely. 50 Localism in context Interestingly, this is something that has rarely occurred in Spain in the past. That is quite surprising when one considers that the Basque Country has been struggling for independence from Spain for as long as Catalonia has. Historically, it seems that the regions and nations of Spain have generally been content to plough their own furrows, thus making it easier for the Spanish state to pick them off individually. However, if Catalonia is to realize its own aspirations towards greater territorial autonomy, it may need to get even smarter about developing peer alliances within both Spain itself and beyond. The current impasse could be even more decisively affected by possible future developments in Scotland, following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, particularly if there were to be a second independence referendum in Scotland. This could force the EU into taking a much closer interest in member states’ territorial governance arrangements. This is where Puigdemont’s decision to base himself in Belgium may possibly help to move the Catalonian crisis forward at some point in the future. The final point to emphasize is that both sides in the Catalan crisis have so far chosen to deal with the matter largely through constitutional means, rather than by using military repression, or by deliberately stoking popular unrest. True, the Spanish state has imposed long prison sentences on nine of Catalonia’s political and civil society leaders, and it did deploy the civil guard to forcefully disrupt the 2017 independence referendum, but these actions have been met with a reasonably measured response from Catalan leaders. Despite the uncomfortable stand-off that exists at the moment, there is still reason to hope that this deep-seated territorial dispute can be resolved in a peaceful, constitutional and possibly groundbreaking way. Moreover, any future talks between the opposing sides could yet be facilitated from outside, possibly with some support from Charles Michel as the current President of the EU. From a localism point of view, this will be a compelling space to watch over the next few years.

Notes 1 The EEC was created as a key part of the European Community (EC) in 1957. The EC was renamed the European Union (EU) in 1993. 2 The most recent year for which population estimates were available at the time of writing. 3 These 28 large states include the two ‘mega-states’ of China and India. 4 That is, those with populations of five million or less in 2017. 5 On 11 September 878 CE, Count Wilfred of Barcelona united the territories of Ausona, Besalu, Cerdanya, Girona and Urgell under his rule. This date is now celebrated each year as La Diada Nacional de Catalunya – the anniversary of Catalonia’s foundation as an independent political entity (Bambery and Kerevan, 2018: 41). 6 Juan Carlos is the grandson of Alfonso XIII, king of Spain from 1886 to 1931. When the Second Republic was established, Alfonso fled Spain never to return. 7 After 2016, Podemos became known as Unidos Podemos after forming an electoral alliance with some other smaller radical left parties. Localism in context 51 8 After the latest elections in 2019, Colau retained the position of mayor even though her party narrowly lost the popular vote. 9 There is a certain irony in Juncker’s statement, although it is unlikely that he was ever aware of it. Juncker is a former prime minister of Luxembourg, a small sovereign state with a land area and population less than a tenth the size of Catalonia. 10 In December 2019, Michel was appointed as the new president of the European Coun- cil to replace Poland’s Donald Tusk.

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The polycentric world order provides a backdrop to this book’s focus on the local levels of place and governance. The rise of the liberal-democratic nation state over the past 200 years raises questions about the role of sub-national and local governance systems. What does it mean to govern locally within the context of state power and globalization? And what are the opportunities and constraints of governance at the local level?

‘Old localism’: established local governance With Britain in mind, Wilson and Game (2011: 391–394) draw a key distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ localism. For them, old localism is about elected councillors and councils, and about their democratic accountability. It is also about the balance of powers that exists between central and sub-national government. However, new localism is less concerned with the institutions of ‘government’ and much more with the ‘governance’ challenges posed by ‘wicked’ issues such as climate change, ecological breakdown and the power of cyber-systems. According to Anwar and Sana Shah, governance at the local, or micro, level clearly predates the emergence of nation states. In the ancient period, tribes and clans established local systems of governance in many parts of the world. Such systems included locally based codes of conduct and arrangements for raising revenue and delivering services to the tribe/clan (Shah and Shah, 2006: 26). India, for example, has one of the oldest and most deeply rooted traditions of local self- governance anywhere in the world. There, the Brahmin caste created a network of tightly knit corporate entities across the whole of society. These were autonomous and self-governing, and did not require any state power to sustain them. This unique social and political structure has lasted right up to the present, with caste and village organizations still forming the backbone of Indian society today (Fukuyama, 2011). Another part of the world which boasts a long-standing tradition of local governance is Western Europe, especially Switzerland and Britain. In Switzerland, it is worth noting that local government’s supremacy in political affairs still continues largely unchallenged. There, local cantons enjoy considerable autonomy in fiscal matters, as well as in substantive policy areas such as Varieties of localism 55 immigration, citizenship, language, the economy and internationalShah relations ( and Shah, 2006: 28). Shah and Shah note that in most parts of the world local government has continued to develop alongside the modern state. New local government structures are being established currently in many developing countries, including some with autocratic regimes (Bohlken, 2016). In recent times, the development of local governance has been actively promoted by international bodies such as the World Bank and the UN. The World Bank’s Local Governance and Services Improve- ment Programme, for instance, has recently supported initiatives aimed at establishing local governance in emerging states such as South Sudan, and the West Bank and Gaza (World Bank, 2016). The widespread development of local governance systems across the world has raised a raft of new issues about how intergovernmental relations are organized within sovereign states. These questions have become a major analytical theme in public administration and in political studies generally (Ongaro et al., 2011). Within established states, the debate on central–local relationships goes back to the earliest days of ‘old localism’. Essentially, the debate revolves around the themes of top-down, bottom-up and collaborative governance, which were highlighted towards the end of Chapter 2. In the UK context, James Chandler (2008) notes that since the time of Jeremy Bentham, the most prevalent justification for local governance within British political theory is that it exists primarily to serve purposes beyond itself. Bentham argued that because the national parliament is the institution which serves the happiness of the greatest number, so all other bodies within a polity should be subordinate to it (Bentham, 1973). On the other hand, John Stuart Mill (1975) advances the more pragmatic argument that local government provides the necessary stability for parliamentary democracy to flourish. According to Mill, local government should also be seen as a useful breeding ground for future national leaders. Chandler describes these arguments as ‘expediential’ justifications for the role of local governance. They rest upon a utilitarian view of what local governance is about and are closely bound up with the liberal tradition. In contrast to this, Chandler draws attention to an alternative, ‘ethical’ view of local governance. This was defended passionately by Joshua Toulmin Smith, a nineteenth-century contemporary of John Stuart Mill. The ethical view holds that the individual’s freedom from arbitrary state control is best secured through a strong and independent system of local community governance. However, mainly as a result of Mill’s influence, it was the expediential justification for local govern - ance that was eventually accepted in Britain. This outcome can be traced back to the prevailing orthodoxy of the time – widely supported on both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum – that the central state is the only effective guar- antor of liberty and of social assistance for those who lack the means to support themselves. Chandler (2010: 7) notes that the belief that local governance should be subordinate to central government belongs very much to a twentieth-century mindset. 56 Varieties of localism Against this, an ethical argument can be advanced which sees the main purpose of territorial governance below the level of the state, as that of reconciling the interests of all those living within a particular geographical area, but in a way which does not impinge adversely on the interests of those living beyond it. However, in most contemporary political contexts, there must clearly be limits on the extent to which any local jurisdiction can, or should, remain truly autonomous. Con- straints on local autonomy can be justified in terms of both administrative equity (e.g. the need to apply national taxation rules fairly) and democratic principle. Such constraints may be especially pertinent in cases where government at the national level is deliberately pursuing a policy of redistribution, or where local jurisdictions may be abusing their powers, and some form of outside intervention is needed in order to safeguard human rights. The idea of autonomy at the level of local governance has also been analysed by Lawrence Pratchett (2004). Pratchett looks at the idea of local autonomy from three perspectives. His ‘Freedom from’ perspective sees autonomy in terms of freedom from interference by a higher authority. Two themes that are often associated with this perspective are (1) the constitutional/legal powers that sub-national government has in relation to its national counterpart and (2) national govern - ment’s natural tendency to centralize the levers of power. An alternative way of looking at local autonomy is to examine it through the ‘Freedom’ to lens. In contrast with the previous one, this perspective emphasizes what local governments are able to achieve with the powers which they do have, including the extent to which they are able to shape the policies of central government. A third perspective (the ‘Reflection of Local Identity’ approach) sees local autonomy mainly as a bottom-up process through which localities can develop a sense of place and solidarity within the resident population. Seen from this viewpoint, local autonomy is not just about the extent of formal powers held by elected local governments but also about the wider social relations within a geographical community. It is about empowering communities to define their own sense of place through their political and democratic institutions. The Reflection of Local Identity approach brings the argument back close to Wilson and Game’s characterization of the ‘new’ localism (see start of this section). According to these authors, the unit of territorial governance most closely identified with the new localism is the neighbourhood. Over the past few years, this archetypally ‘micro’ form of governance has been a distinctive topic in academic and political debates about localism in the UK. For this reason it is explored briefly in the next section.

Neighbourhood governance Of all the varying levels at which governance operates, the neighbourhood (or P1) level is the one that is most often associated with the notion of place. The ‘single’, neighbourhood-level community can be regarded as the fundamental building block of place and governance. It is also the point at which many of the real-world effects of public policies reveal themselves in practice ( Bailey and Pill, 2015; 291). Varieties of localism 57 A key question arising from this is: how can the position of neighbourhoods best be characterized within the wider political context of which they are part and within the polycentric world order generally? What role do neighbourhoods play in contributing to social organization, human wellbeing, and democratic participation? With regard to social organization and human wellbeing, Kearns and Parkinson (2001: 2104) see the micro level as comprising three component sub-scales, each with its own distinctive purpose and function:

• ‘Home area’ (typically 5–10 minutes’ walk from one’s home) offers individuals psychosocial benefits such as identity and belonging • ‘Locality’ helps to define people’s social status and position • ‘Urban district/region’ marks the boundaries of many people’s social and economic activity.1

As for political participation, a number of scholars have examined the democratic case for small-scale governance. Traditionally, governance at the neighbourhood level tends to be associated with community participation and responsiveness, whereas larger-scale governance is usually linked with functional efficiency and equity (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). However, with the recent turn to ‘new -gov ernance’, Lowndes and Sullivan argue now may be the time to re-evaluate this widely held view. According to Lowndes and Sullivan (2008: 57–59), there are four mutually reinforcing rationales which can be advanced to support the case for neighbourhood governance. These are

• the civic rationale – based on the argument that neighbourhoods provide more opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making • the social rationale – based on two arguments: firstly, that the neighbourhood is the most appropriate arena for a citizen-focused approach to governance and, secondly, that neighbourhood governance offers the best prospect for ‘joining up’ local action, thus providing a more integrated basis for the delivery of public services • the political rationale – based on three main arguments: (a) that citizens can access neighbourhood governance more easily and are more knowledgeable about the issues at stake; (b) that leaders at the neighbourhood level are more likely to be responsive to citizens’ views and have more experience of the matters at hand; and (c) that citizens are in a better position to hold political leaders to account at this level2 • the economic rationale – based on the argument that neighbourhood govern - ance can make more efficient and effective use of resources.

In the UK, the increasing profile of neighbourhood governance has helped to bring about a number of significant developments in the devolution of govern - ment powers. One of the most important of these developments is the idea of 58 Varieties of localism ‘double devolution’. This entails both national and sub-national governments handing down more of their powers to the tiers of governance operating ‘below’ them. In local government’s case, this has meant principal councils devolving powers to thousands of towns and parishes across England, Wales and Scotland, and even down beyond the micro-tier of governance directly to neighbourhoods and to groups of active citizens (Miliband, 2006). While the ultimate beneficiaries of ‘double devolution’ have sometimes appeared to be rather open-ended, what stands out most about this new direction in localism policy is that, for the first time in many generations, governance at the micro scale finds itself at the forefront of local governance reform in the UK. Recently, for example, the UK government has simplified the procedures for the establishment of new parish and community councils, and it has bolstered the powers of the micro-tier as part of the Localism Act 2011. An official document entitledYou’ve Got the Power (DCLG, 2013) sets out a total of nine new rights and powers, which the UK government claims to have enacted since 2010 in support of councils and communities at the P1-level. These include rights for local groups to bid for the ownership of assets of recognized community value and to reclaim publicly owned land for community purposes; to draw up neighbourhood plans for the future development of local environment and infrastructure; and to sponsor specific building developments in accordance with an approved neighbourhood plan. A key contribution to the growing interest in the role of P1-type communities has come from Green political thought. According to Andrew Dobson, Green thinking tends to favour small, locally based communities. In many respects it sees them as being similar to the historical city states of Western Europe but built on ‘a much higher and more sophisticated technological base’ (Dobson, 1990: 101). Such communities not only should be resilient and self-reliant but should also remain connected with other communities. The ideal type for such a community is now actively being promoted within the Transition Network, a global social movement founded in Totnes, Devon, in 2006, with the aim of promoting sustainable development within localities. The Transition approach is based on a coherent and broadly based philosophy of community. Its main elements are citizen initiative and individuals working together within localities; face-to-face interaction between citizens, together with respectful communication; emphasis on practical skills; maximizing the local production of food, goods and services; working with local businesses and representative organizations; and sustaining cultural and learning networks within the locality and beyond. However, the core idea behind Transition is the need to adapt to climate change and to respond effectively both to peak oil and to excessive levels of resource use (Hopkins, 2011). More will be said about the Transition Network and its distinctive approach later on in this chapter.

Governance at the micro level: pathologies and challenges Transition’s focus on the role of local communities is indicative of the current level of interest being shown in the idea of the ‘local’. As suggested on the opening Varieties of localism 59 page of this book, the heightened level of interest shown in this concept seems to be linked with our growing awareness of the impacts of globalization. Certainly, globalization has provided additional layers to our previous thinking about what the local entails. So, for the first time, it has become possible to talk in terms of ‘old’ and ‘new’ perspectives on localism (Wilson and Game, 2011). However, a more potent way of looking at the new politics of the local is to draw an analytical distinction between the concepts of narrowness and parochialism on the one hand and those of openness and cosmopolitanism on the other. This distinction will guide much of the analysis in the rest of this chapter. It is also important to clarify that the focus here is on micro and ‘small-scale meso’ communities of types P1, P2 and P3. The points made apply equally to urban and rural settings. The distinction being highlighted is essentially the one made familiar by Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887 between the concepts of Gemein- schaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). This section addresses two sets of issues: firstly, those which relate to the growth of the modern nation state and, secondly, those which reflect the contemporary impacts of globalization. As far as arguments about the modern state are concerned, the classic distinction is between local communities seen as the embodiment of parochialism and narrow horizons, and the modern state viewed as the archetypal beacon of enlightenment and progress. The clash of these two perspectives is vividly captured in the fierce debate which took place in 1946–1949 in the newly independent state of India, between the supporters of Mahatma Gandhi, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, B R Ambedkar, and his supporters, on the other. Following Indian independence in 1947, Gandhi had wanted to see a revitalized version of the traditional Indian village established as the basic building block of the new Indian state. But for Ambedkar, the village was ‘the black hole of Indian civilization’. Speaking in India’s Constituent Assembly, he lambasted the traditional Indian village council (or panchayat) in the following terms:

It is said that . . . instead of incorporating Western theories, the new Con- stitution should have been . . . built upon village panchayats. . . . They just want India to contain so many village governments!. . . . I hold that these village republics have been the ruination of India. I am therefore surprised that those who condemn provincialism and communalism should come forward as champions of the village. What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad that the Draft Constitution has discarded the village and adopted the individual as its unit.3

Ambedkar’s view of the Indian village echoes the dominant view of most thinkers and political leaders since the European Enlightenment, namely that the local is largely synonymous with patrimonialism, corruption and narrow-mindedness, and is good for nothing more than ‘low politics’ (Bulpitt, 1983). An example of the sort of theorizing that this view of the local has generated can also be found in the Indian context. Subrata Mitra (2001) suggests that the 60 Varieties of localism quality of local governance depends crucially on the quality of political leadership at the local level. This in turn depends on two further factors: (1) local leaders’ awareness of ‘modern’ democratic values and (2) the extent of social and political closure within the community concerned. On that basis, Mitra presents a fourfold typology of local leadership Mitra,( 2001: 107). Type 1 (feudal leadership) exists where there is low democratic awareness among local elites and high social closure within the local population. Type 2 (fragmented anomie) is to be found in communities where there is low democratic awareness among local elites but quite a reasonable level of democratic awareness within the local population. Type 3 (paternalistic or managerial leadership) exists where there is high democratic awareness among local leaders, combined with high levels of social closure within the local population. Finally, type 4 (democratic leadership) can be found where high levels of democratic awareness are aligned with open social systems and low levels of social closure. As Mitra demonstrates in his chapter, this typology works reasonably well as a framework for analysis in the Indian context, and it could be applied without too much difficulty to other parts of the world as well. However, it is based on a particular view of the dichotomy between parochial and cosmopolitan values. In contrast to the prevailing view of the local outlined earlier, John Tomaney (2012) presents a number of cogent arguments in defence of parochialism. Tomaney’s aim is to rescue the idea of local attachment from the condescension of those who hold a more cosmopolitan outlook. He argues that local identi - ties need not necessarily be reactionary. Indeed, they may provide the platform for a progressive and broadly based view of the world. Tomaney notes that a parochial outlook can often take the ‘thick’ cultural solidarities of local community attachment, and use them as a moral starting point, and as a launchpad for wider ecological concern. A parochial outlook values the local as a site for the development of important virtues such as commitment, fidelity and civil- ity (Tomaney, op. cit.: 659). By contrast, the cosmopolitan literature values a universal outlook as something which is inherently liberating, while at the same time decrying local place attachments as being exclusionary in their effects. Tomaney notes that poets, novelists and artists have typically shown a deep interest in questions of local belonging and place attachment. For example, the composer Ralph Vaughan Williams declared it ‘better to be vitally parochial than to be an emasculated cosmopolitan’. Tomaney also argues that poets are able ‘to test the ground between the local and the universal, the particular and the cosmopolitan, in ways that social scientists often struggle to achieve’ (Tomaney, op. cit.: 668). Turning to globalization and the impact it has had on local communities, there have been many case studies of places left behind and made more vulnerable by the ravages of globalization and of neo-liberal policy making. A typical case is reported by Jonathan Davies and Madeleine Pill in their study of recent neighbourhood governance initiatives in the United States and BritainDavies ( and Pill, 2012). In Baltimore, for example, the city’s neighbourhood investment strategy is based not on community need but on asset values alone. This approach classifies Varieties of localism 61 different areas of the city in accordance with their potential attractiveness to private investors. However, this ‘triage’ approach presents difficulties for those pre- cincts where property values are much lower. Rather than being a magnet for private investment, the latter are often forced to rely on the economic support of ‘anchor institutions’ in the public sector, such as a local university or a hospital trust. Where institutions of this kind do not exist, Davies and Pill find that distressed areas in Baltimore are simply being written off and left to function as ‘ungoverned spaces’ (Davies and Pill, 2012: 196). As for the UK, Davies and Pill and others have shown how localism policies have developed in the past 20 years. One of the most comprehensive initiatives was the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal developed by Labour governments from 1997 onwards Social( Exclusion Unit, 2001). This essentially top-down programme applied a rigorous focus on tackling poverty and social exclusion within urban neighbourhoods in EnglandWallace, ( 2001). It was based on the recognition that over time, hundreds of poor neighbourhoods had seen their quality of life and services deteriorate in relation to other parts of the country and that there was a particular concentration of vulnerable residents in such communities. The aim of the strategy was to identify those left-behind neighbourhoods and target them for special attention. This was with the intention of improving outcomes in the five core policy areas of jobs, crime, health, schooling and housing. The improvements sought were to be achieved through a combination of additional public investment and the implementation of new policy ideas based on economic renewal and community empowerment. The intention was to improve mainstream public services but at the same time to develop joined-up solutions that could be tailored to the needs of each neighbourhood. Another important element was to ensure that the strategy was followed through systematically over a period of 10 to 20 years. Notwithstanding Labour’s strategy, it seems that the problem of left-behind areas in the UK has only become more acute in recent years. This is despite subsequent government rhetoric extolling the benefits of localism and the ‘Big Society’. Since 2010, policy implementation has been undermined by deep public spending cuts imposed year on year at the local level. Lowndes and Pratchett draw attention to what they describe as the ‘sink or swim’ approach shown towards local communities by the Conservative-led coalition (2010–2015). They warn that, as the impact of financial cuts deepens further, this could result in many local communities and their councils eventually ‘drowning’ rather than being able to stay afloat (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 38). As for the Big Society, Catney et al. note that the government has effectively set a ‘localism trap’ for small communities. This has made it more likely that those which are affluent and well-organized will flourish and prosper, while the rest will end up losing out (Catney et al., 2014: 23). While some areas do have residents who are able and willing to play an active part in community life, this is far from being the case in every locality. The fear is that localism policy will further exacerbate the uneven distribution of social and civic capacity in England and will lead to the reinforcement of existing spatial divides (Wills, 2016: 81 and 168). 62 Varieties of localism Governing locally in a polycentric world: towards a ‘new’ localism? It is interesting to trace the emergence of the term ‘localism’ since the millennium, particularly within the UK, where it has become so prominent as a political idea and as a policy approach. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the origins of the term ‘localism’ lie in the United States. For example, Morris and Hess (1975) link localism firmly to the idea of neighbourhood governance, whereasGoetz and Clarke (1993) address it much more in the context of globalization. One of the first occasions on which the term ‘localism’ was used in the UK was in a paper entitled Towards a New Localism: A Discussion Paper published by the New Local Gov- ernment Network (NLGN) think tank (Filkin et al., 2000). In a subsequent NLGN publication, Corry and Stoker (2002) define localism as ‘a strategy for devolving power and resources away from central control and towards front-line managers, local democratic structures and local consumers and communities’, but also ‘within an agreed framework of national minimum standards and policy priorities’. This very much reflects a top-down view of what localism is about. What has lent critical weight to the case for an enhanced local dimension in politics and governance is the growth of instant electronic communications and their almost universal use in government, commerce and civil society. For many individuals, electronic interactions now loom larger in their lives than embodied ones, and an increasing number of the interactions that citizens have with state agencies are becoming virtual. This can have many benefits, including the possibility of governments being able to reach out to those living in remote locations or else to those with limited mobility. Electronic communication also enables people on the move, whether citizens or public sector workers, to remain in instant touch with their affairs. On a broader level, such communication leads to changes in the geographical reach and accountability of government institutions and it enables collaborative relations to be established more easily with other relevant organizations (Pollitt, 2012). As for technological change and its relation to place and space, one of its main impacts has been to shrink time and space and to make the constraints which they impose much less relevant (Giddens, 1984). John Benington (2011) argues that we are living through a period of radical change which is truly ‘Copernican’ in its impact and for which a new paradigm of government is urgently needed. This will need to treat government as part of a ‘complex adaptive system’ in which each part interacts closely with all the others. This in turn raises questions of decentralization and whether government and governance at the local level should continue to be seen as the same thing as their national counterparts, but simply on a smaller scale. Benington argues that we are moving into an era in which public services are increasingly being ‘co- created’ with citizens and for which new approaches to public leadership need to be developed. In a similar vein, Alan Finlayson and James Martin argue that the real challenge is to break fundamentally with the idea that sovereignty should reside in any one place or that it should be the monopoly of any specific locality or identity Varieties of localism 63 (Finlayson and Martin, 2006: 30). As for local governance, it is just one nodal point in a complex network of interrelating spatial elements, each moving at different speeds. Local communities are constantly shifting and interacting with other locales of varying scales. They are never purely ‘local’ in character and a single template for local government structure is no longer compatible with the nature of contemporary life. This is indicative of a broader distinction that is now emerging between the ‘formal persona’ of incorporated organizations and the ‘assemblages’ that are being constituted increasingly through networks, platforms and ‘territorial insertions’ (Sassen, 2006: 377). That said, Finlayson and Martin argue that locally focused organizations are still necessary to act as ‘nodes’ around which specific alliances can form so as to address emergent problems and oppor - tunities. This is the challenge for local place shaping in an age of globalization. Places are now constantly shifting, and new conceptions of collective action and public responsibility are needed to deal with this new reality. Heather Voisey and Tim O’Riordan (2001: 3) draw a distinction between ‘globalization/localization’ on the one hand and ‘globalism/localism’ on the other. Whereas the first pair of terms highlights the fundamental processes of change currently taking place around the world, the second expresses contrasting orien- tations towards these change processes. However, the two sets of terms are not necessarily contradictory. Localism can be insular, reactionary and exclusive, but it also can be open to the wider world (see Tomaney [2012] earlier in this chapter). O’Riordan argues that the expanding reach of globalization can be knitted together through local identities, provided it is accepted that the ultimate goal is to achieve connectedness and security, rather than to create wealth or power (O’Riordan, 2001: 240). With this in mind Voisey and O’Riordan highlight sustainability as an ‘organizing idea’ and as a basis for system design. Sustainability can potentially affect a very wide range of policy areas, including business and commerce, democracy and civic empowerment, and constitutional reform. Building on this argument, Gurney et al. (2017) argue that it is possible to apply Tomaney’s notion of local place attachment more broadly so that it becomes a ‘cosmopolitan’ form of attachment based on environmental protection and on the conservation of key landscapes’. The example that Gurney and her colleagues highlight is that of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. Interest in its conservation has mobilized many citizens around the world, and not just those living close to the reef itself. This kind of mobilization offers opportunities to combine both local and global approaches to stewardship, something which is critical to advancing global sustainability in an increasingly connected world (Gurney et al., op. cit.: 10081). According to Lowndes and Sullivan (2008: 56), most commentators now accept Doreen Massey’s view (see Chapter 3) that neighbourhoods are socially constructed. Depending on their economic and social characteristics, neighbourhoods will elicit positive or negative valuations from those living within and beyond their boundaries. Lowndes and Sullivan argue that in the context of the ‘new governance’, local and neighbourhood-level institutions have gained significant room for manoeuvre. They are increasingly finding the ability to act as agents 64 Varieties of localism in their own right (Cox and Mair, 1991), either in ‘invited spaces’ offered by governments from the top-down or in ‘popular spaces’, where individual citizens and local organizations can come together on their own initiative.

Trans-localism and the upward-shaping potential of the local Looking at current developments from a power perspective, Saskia Sassen argues that digital technology has brought about a significant transformation in the position of local communities vis-à-vis elites and established power geometries. Digital technology allows localities the possibility of forming global networks that can bypass central authority (Sassen, 2006: 366). This in effect makes two main types of ‘multi-scalar interaction’ possible: either local to local or else local to global. Local neighbourhoods need no longer be defined by their territorial boundedness nor by closure. Digital technologies allow local knowledge to reach a potentially global audience. This in turn enables knowledge of specific local conditions to influence wider policy debates. Such knowledge no longer has to move through ‘a set of nested scales from the local to the national to the international’ but can directly reach other local actors whether located within the same country or across international borders (Sassen, 2006: 371). With regard to the impact of digital technologies generally, Sassen notes that their most significant feature is their ability to bring about both ‘expanded decentralization’ and ‘simultaneous integration’. To the extent that they allow new types of cross-border interactions between large numbers of non-state actors to develop, they facilitate the emergence of a global civil societySassen, ( 2006: 376). Returning to the example of the Transition Network mentioned earlier in this chapter, a critical point to emphasize is its success in creating both a ‘brand’ and a ‘trans-local’ network of similar, citizen-led initiatives in many places across the world. In 2016, the Transition website listed some 1,260 registered initiatives in nearly 40 countries and the number of initiatives was still growing (Transition Network, 2016). One of the most interesting things about the localities listed on the Transition website is that they comprise communities of all types and scales, many of them ‘aggregated’ and ‘extended’ communities of types P2 and P3. In fact, these two types probably form the vast majority of the places listed on the website, although there also appear to be a number of ‘single’, P1-type communities in the list as well. All in all, Transition is a prime example of a social movement where the systematic cultivation of horizontal links with other similar communities across the globe, using the power of electronic communications, is seen as a more effective way of gaining influence and producing successful outcomes, rather than attempting to work ‘vertically’ through hierarchical and ‘unsympathetic’ state systems. The Transition case is just one example of how individual communities and local territorial governments can form effective federations across territorial Varieties of localism 65 space. While this type of trans-local organizing is long established in the field of politics, there is a case for arguing that its significance and impact have advanced considerably in recent years. A federation is an arrangement which enables different entities to work together to pursue common aims, or to achieve specific objectives together. Formal federations of territorial communities or governments may be of several different types and intensities. They may be concentrated within one particular territory, for example associations of town and parish councils within a defined geographical area; or they may bring together disparate communities united by a common interest across a wider national or sub-continental space. A good example of the latter are the transnational groupings of local areas and institutions brought together by recent EU funding programmes such as Grundt- vig and Erasmus+. For many years these programmes have involved private and voluntary-sector partners, as well as those in the public sector. In addition, there are now increasingly powerful federations of municipal governments in existence. Examples include the EU Covenant of Mayors, which at the time of writing comprised some 9,850 local authority signatories (including P1-, P2- and P3-type communities) from across the whole of Europe (EU Covenant of Mayors, 2019), and the C40 group of the world’s 94 largest and most powerful cities. Both of these latter groupings are similar to the Transition Movement in the sense that their main rationale is the perceived need for urgent action across communities to address the effects of climate change and to promote sustainable energy production. The advantages of greater localist influence in world politics are set out- strik ingly by Benjamin Barber in his book entitled If Mayors Ruled the World (Barber, 2013). In the book, Barber argues that cities (or large, P2-type communities, to use the typology developed in the previous chapter) are much more suited to governing collectively in today’s interdependent world than ‘dysfunctional’ nation states. In recent years, states have become increasingly bogged down by the very fact of their sovereignty. This makes it hard for many leading states to co-operate with each other and to accept limitations on their scope for independent action. On the other hand, modern cities are much more multi-cultural, cosmopolitan and networked than most sovereign states. Thus, when they meet together in networks such as the C40 Cities, the Climate Alliance or Mayors against Illegal Guns, city mayors are able to work together much more effectively because issues of sovereignty and independence do not form a barrier between them (Barber, 2013: 165). Barber argues that it is but a short step from their meeting in these existing forums to city leaders coming together to establish a fully fledged, global parliament of mayors.4 What Barber’s argument illustrates is the increasing power and influence that local communities and polities can potentially wield in contemporary politics: firstly, by being able to network much more effectively with each otherthan ever before on a trans-local basis and, secondly, by having the political space to form influential trans-local alliances around issues of common concern. What this amounts to is the effective emancipation of local communities from the 66 Varieties of localism centuries-old constraints of scale and parochialism. It also signals a potential step change in their capacity to both participate in and influence national and global agendas.

Localism in flux: Cornwall, England, UK These arguments bring us to the second of the book’s featured case studies. This is the multi-level cluster comprising Cornwall, England and the UK. As in the previous case study on Spain/Catalonia, the focus here is on how the different- lev els of governance interact across the three territorial communities featured in the case study, particularly given the fact that they all form part of the same sovereign state. The primary focus will be on Cornwall, the smallest and most local of the three territories featured. For more than a decade, localism has been an explicit policy priority for local governance in Cornwall. It has had a decisive effect on the design of local institutions and processes. The account here focuses on the work of Cornwall Council, which was established in its current form in April 2009. The analysis is informed by data gathered as part of a long-term research project focusing on the development of Cornwall’s local governance. This project has been monitoring all relevant events that have taken place in Cornwall in the decade since the council was created. In addition, the case study assesses developments in localism and devolution policy in England and the UK since the millennium. As with the previous case study on Spain/Catalonia, the two key questions addressed here are: what are the underlying reasons for the state of affairs described, and what are the prospects for this cluster of territories in the future? This study of multi-level governance in Cornwall/England/UK illustrates aspects of both the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ forms of localism as identified in Chapter 2. It shows how these two aspects interact with each other, and how they can be combined within a single political design. In particular, the study reveals a sub-national governance system in England that is currently in a state of flux, and where different pathways and outcomes are still possible. The study also shows the positive impact of well-planned institutional design at the most local level, as well as the benefits of regular review of the relevant institutional design features. Finally, the study has some intriguing overlaps with macro-level governance at the EU level. EU governance and its impacts on member states and regions will be presented as a case study in Chapter 5.

Introduction to Cornwall and England The English territory of Cornwall is a P3-type community of place located at the south-western tip of Britain’s mainland (see Figure 4.1). It has a land area of 3,562 km 2 and a population density of 158 inhabitants per km2. On this basis, it is classified by the UK’s Office of National Statistics (ONS) as an area which is mainly rural in character. Its total population in 2018 was estimated at 566,000 (ONS, 2019a). On this measure, Cornwall was larger than 32 of the world’s 195 sovereign states in that year. It has no big cities, but it does have several population centres of Varieties of localism 67

Figure 4.1 Outline map of Great Britain, with Cornwall highlighted Source: Cornwall Council 68 Varieties of localism more than 20,000 inhabitants. These settlements are fairly evenly spread across Cornwall’s land area (see Figure 4.2). Given its geographical location, Cornwall is very much defined by its relationship with the sea. At nearly 700 km in length, Cornwall’s coastline accounts for nearly 10% of England’s seaboard. The geology of Cornwall is characterized by the granite spine which runs through the length of its interior. The rocks which form this feature are rich in minerals. Cornwall’s landscape is also decisively shaped by the impact of the prevailing Atlantic weather on its rugged topology. The result is a spectacular and varied coastline. As a territory, Cornwall has a very distinctive identity and culture. Much of this derives from its history of resistance to successive waves of invasion from other parts of the British mainland over the last two millennia. Throughout this period, the native Kernewek language of Cornwall’s early Celtic inhabitants continued to be spoken in isolated pockets. However, it died out in the eighteenth century when the use of English became fully established. The eighteenth century was also a period when Cornwall’s economy began to boom, particularly on the back of its copper and tin mining industries. This was when Cornwall briefly played a leading part in Britain’s Industrial Revolution, especially in the fields of science and engineering. However, after the local mining industry collapsed in the late nineteenth century, Cornwall experienced a long period of economic decline from which it is still only emerging gradually today. Since the early part of the twentieth century, it has increasingly attracted artists, cultural tourists and holidaymakers, and these have become major elements in its modern-day economy. Overall, Cornwall has experienced steady growth over the past decade, but its economy is still one of the weakest in the UK and within the EU generally. As a consequence, average earnings in Cornwall are among the lowest in the UK (ONS, 2019b). In terms of its local government, Cornwall is one of the 38 English ceremonial counties that continue to have an administrative identity in their own right. It is one of the six ‘unitary’ counties in England that have taken on responsibility for running all local government services in their areas in recent years.5 Cornwall became a unitary council in April 2009. At that point, its six former district councils and the former county council were brought together to create a single unitary council known as ‘Cornwall Council’. In terms of population and land area, it is now one of the largest local authorities in the UK. Internally, Cornwall’s territory is divided up into 213 civil parishes, each of which has its own directly elected town or parish council. Nineteen of these micro-councils are designated as town or city councils,6 while the remaining 184 are rural parish councils (Cornwall Council, 2019a). The populations covered by these ‘micro-councils’ vary in size from less than 150 to more than 25,000 (St Austell). A major review of Cornwall’s town and parish governance is currently under way and is due to be completed in 2020. As for England, it is part of the island of Great Britain which lies off the north-west coast of mainland Europe. England occupies some 62% of Great Varieties of localism 69 Map of Cornwall showing Cornwall Council’s 19 Community Network Areas and the county’s main towns Areas and the county’s 19 Community Network Map of Cornwall showing Council’s 4.2 Figure 70 Varieties of localism Britain’s land area and shares the island with the territories of Scotland and Wales. In 2018, the estimated population of England was just under 56 - mil lion inhabitants (ONS, 2019a). This means that its population was larger than that of all but 24 of the world’s sovereign states in that year. With regard to population density, England – with 430 people per km2 in 2018 – is much more densely populated than many other countries in the world. England has four urban conurbations of more than a million inhabitants (Greater London, Greater Manchester, West Midlands/Birmingham and Leeds/West Yorkshire). In terms of population growth, England experienced growth of 7.9% between the census dates of 2001 and 2011; and from 2011 to 2018 its population grew by a further 5.6%. This rate of demographic growth outstrips that of most other countries in Europe (Eurostat, 2013). In terms of its political governance, England is almost unique for such a large territory in that it does not have its own dedicated government or legislature. Constitutionally, England forms part of the UK, and it is also the UK’s largest and most dominant territory. However, over the course of time, England’s political identity has become almost completely subsumed within that of the UK. As shall become clear later in this case study, the ambiguity of England’s position is putting increasing strain on the way in which the UK as a whole functions. With regard to decentralization and localism, England currently has 343 local councils. These are of five main types – county, unitary and district councils, as well as London and metropolitan boroughs. Each type of council has its own slightly different combination of powers and responsibilities, and some councils have overlapping jurisdiction for the same geographical areaWilson ( and Game, 2011). Each local council has its own body of elected councillors and is accountable directly to the UK government through the Ministry of Housing, Communi- ties and Local Government (MHCLG). The number of local councils in England has gradually fallen over the past 40 years as a result of amalgamations and ration- alizations (Leach, 2009), to the point where the UK now has the largest and most democratically remote local authorities in the whole of Western Europe (Bogda- nor, 2009a). In addition, the powers and finances of local authorities in England have been severely curtailed by central government in recent times, particularly as a result of the public ‘austerity’ policies that have been pursued across the UK since 2010 (Lowndes and Gardner, 2016). In addition to the above pattern of local councils, there are also separate local bodies in England responsible for policing and crime matters (38 police authorities, each headed by a directly elected Police and Crime Commissioner); economic development (38 Local Enterprise Partnerships [LEPs] across England); and in the field of health, 135 Clinical Commissioning Groups and 223 specialist providers – NHS Trusts – across England. All of these bodies have varying degrees of local autonomy vis-à-vis central government and local councils. Below the level of the 343 principal councils, there are also some 10,000 minor councils in England, known variously as city, town, parish or community councils (TPCs). These are to be found mainly in rural areas, and they cover about 30% Varieties of localism 71 of England’s population (House of Commons, 2019). More significantly, all TPC powers in England are discretionary. In this sense, TPCs cannot be directly compared with their counterparts in India or in other European countries like France and Germany, where they form the basic tier of state governance in constitutional terms. However, as Coulson (1998: 248) acknowledges, what TPCs lack in consti - tutional powers and in service and financial responsibilities, they do at least partly make up for by being elected through democratic suffrage. They are also able to levy an annual tax precept on the local population they serve. As noted earlier in this chapter, recent British governments have taken some small but significant steps to increase the powers and influence of this ‘micro-tier’ of governance in recent years (DCLG, 2006a; Buser, 2013).

The UK and the British Political Tradition As its name implies, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a union of four historic territories (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire- land) forming a single sovereign state. The UK is often referred to as ‘Great Brit- ain’ or just ‘Britain’. Founded in 1801, the UK previously included the whole of the island of Ireland. However, in 1921 the Irish Republic seceded from Britain, with just the northern province of Ulster remaining within the union. As of 2019, the UK still has 18 crown dependencies and overseas territories. These are mostly small island groups and enclaves. They include Gibraltar, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Until recently, the UK was a member state of the European Union (EU). However, following a referendum in 2016, the UK formally left the EU in January 2020. Of the four territories that form part of the UK, England is by far the largest, in terms of both population and land area. In 2018, England’s population was estimated at 84% of the UK total of 66 million, and its land area comprised 53% that of the UK. The equivalent figures for the other three main territories of the UK are:

• Scotland: 8% of the UK’s population and 32% of its land area • Wales: 5% of the population and 9% of the land area • Northern Ireland: 3% of the population and 6% of the land area.

The UK is a unitary state with a strong central government machine. Until quite recently, there was no intermediate or regional tier of governance standing between the UK central government and its local councils. Accordingly, many central government departments (e.g. Environment, Transport, Work and Pensions) operate through locally based offices, or through arm’s-length bodies constituted at the national level. For much of the twentieth century, there was an increasing degree of centralization in the UK, particularly in relation to public services (Bogda- nor, 2009a). Since the 1990s, however, this centralizing trend has been rolled back somewhat, with the formal devolution settlements that have been agreed for 72 Varieties of localism Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (see earlier), and, latterly, the more limited devolution initiatives that have taken place in England (see next sub-section). Traditionally, government in the UK has been closely identified with the ‘West- minster model’. According to Andrew Gamble, the key features of this model are parliamentary sovereignty, strong cabinet government, accountability through free and fair elections, majority party control of the executive, formal parliamentary conventions and an institutionalized opposition (Gamble, 1990; Marsh, 2011: 37). This is also the basis of what David Richards and others have described as the ‘British Political Tradition’ (BPT). Unlike more participatory political cultures, the BPT represents a fairly limited conception of what representative democracy entails. It is based on the top-down view that power should rest with central government and that the ‘government knows best’. This belief is used to justify elite rule and the concentration of power at the heart of the system (Blunkett and Rich- ards, 2011). As a reaction to this orthodoxy, Rod Rhodes in the 1980s developed the notion of the ‘differentiated polity’. This was intended to describe the way in which governance in the UK seemed to be evolving at that time. This alternative, ‘postmod- ern’ conception of government emphasizes pluralism, networked governance, contested political traditions, intergovernmental relations, power dependence and a hollowed-out stateRhodes, ( 1988 and 1997: 180–200; Marsh, 2011: 38). In contrast to the Westminster model, the differentiated polity suggests that the executive is deeply segmented and that there are significant differences between ministers and departments within it. On this view, what characterizes British government most strongly are contestation and relationships of bargaining and exchange, rather than unity of purpose. According to David Marsh, the differentiated polity has over time become the ‘new orthodoxy’ in academic theorizing about the British state Marsh,( 2011: 46). To support this view, Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders argue that the New Labour government’s groundbreaking devolution measures in respect of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in Greater London as well, have provided a clear institutional underpinning for the notion of the differentiated polity in the UK. Yet at the same time, these reforms have prompted the British state into developing new strategies, both formal and informal, in order to maintain its overall steering capacity (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 100). One obvious formal strategy has been the agreement of a Memorandum of Understanding between the UK government and the three devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This has paved the way for the establishment of a machinery of intergovernmental relations, with its own distinctive procedures and associated schedule of bilateral and multilateral meetings. These devolution initiatives have placed England in an increasingly anomalous position in relation to the rest of the UK, and this perception has been sharpened by the Scottish independence referendum which took place in September 2014 (Jeffery, 2015). Vernon Bogdanor argues that the devolutionary changes enacted by the Labour governments of 1997–2010, along with other legislative changes such as the Varieties of localism 73 passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, the substantial reduction in the number of hereditary peers in the House of Lords (1999) and the establishment of the UK’s Supreme Court in 2009, are effectively creating a ‘new British Constitution’. This has superseded the conception of a ‘unitary’ British state based on parliamentary sovereignty and so confidently defended in the works of constitutional theorists such as Walter Bagehot and A V Dicey (Bogdanor, 2009a: 285). However, despite their far-reaching scope, Labour’s reforms have done little to dispel the widespread disenchantment that people continue to feel with politics in the UK. All Labour’s reforms have managed to achieve is a redistribution of power ‘downwards’ or ‘sideways’ to unelected elites, whether they be local, professional, or based within civil society (Bogdanor, 2009b). The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been partially dismantled but by no means completely. Successive UK governments have continued to steer clear of any reforms that might be based on genuine popular sovereignty, rather than on the more limited parliamentary version which emerged from England’s Glorious Revolution (Fukuyama, 2011: 417–420). Lat- terly, the national referendum vote in favour of Brexit has injected much more uncertainty into our understanding of what the British constitution entails. Brexit has made the arguments for a proper codification of the constitutional relationship between the UK, England and the three devolved administrations much more urgent than before (Bogdanor, 2019: 267–273). It has provided the sort of jolt that might at last propel the UK into becoming a fully constitutional state.

Recent developments in sub-national governance in the UK The current position regarding sub-national governance in the UK may be seen as the result of two distinct ‘waves’ of devolution which have taken place over the past 20 years. The first was mandated by the Labour government in the period from 1997 to 2000, and the second by Conservative-led governments since 2012. The first wave can broadly be described as formal, ‘regional-level’ devolution.7 It includes Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Greater London. Each of these devolved administrations has its own directly elected assembly and political leadership, as well as substantive governmental capacity in its own right. Each of them also has a lower tier of elected unitary councils that is responsible for providing locally based services in its area. The second wave of devolution applies in England only. It is best described as informal devolution at the ‘sub-regional’ level’, and it is based almost exclusively around England’s larger cities. Since 2010, Conservative-led governments have been encouraging cities outside London to sign up to ‘City Deals’. These are bespoke, place-shaping agreements between councils, LEPs and UK government departments, aimed at promoting aspects of economic development in their areas. They give cities greater powers over financial and planning matters. Their legal basis is set out in the Localism Act, 2011. Recent UK governments have also encouraged groups of local councils to come together to form ‘Combined Authorities’ (CAs). CAs are a new type 74 Varieties of localism of sub-regional governance body based on the idea of multi-area partnerships (DCLG, 2006a). The arrangements for setting them up were originally passed into law by Labour in its 2009 ‘Local Democracy’ Act. CAs’ powers were later consol- idated and extended in the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act passed by the Conservative government in 2016. CA status enables a group of ‘sovereign’ local authorities to come together to create a larger ‘combined’ public body for the purposes of economic development and transport planning. Latterly, CAs have become the government’s preferred mechanism for reforming sub-national governance in England. Since many of the new CAs are located in the North of Eng- land, they have become known collectively as the ‘Northern Powerhouse’. With this in mind, a government minister for the Northern Powerhouse was appointed in May 2015. As of spring 2020, there were ten devolved sub-regions (or CAs) in England. These were Cambridgeshire/Peterborough CA, Greater Manchester CA, Liverpool City Region CA, North East CA, North of Tyne CA, Sheffield City Region CA, Tees Valley CA, West of England CA, West Midlands CA and West Yorkshire CA (LGA, 2020). The devolution deals agreed to date in England have been based on a fairly consistent ‘core menu’ of powers, with some ‘specials’ added in for particular cases. The core powers that have been granted to most CAs include those over planning and land use; integrated transport planning; support to businesses; commissioning of adult and work-related training; and managing investment and regeneration monies, including EU structural funds. The ‘specials’ that have been devolved to some CAs, but not to others, include powers over housing, sustainability and renewable energy, health and social care, and culture Sandford,( 2018: 9–12). Most of the ten CAs listed here have their own elected mayor and Chief Execu- tive. However, none of these authorities can really be described as fully fledged governments in their own right. In institutional terms they are really no more than a ‘superstructure’ overlaid on the local authorities that have come together to create them. They exist mainly to support the elected mayor and to carry out a certain degree of high-level co-ordination and strategy. In practice, however, they rely to a large extent on the capacities of the individual local authorities that comprise them. These capacities vary depending on the size and effectiveness of the authorities concerned. A further point to note about these ‘second-wave’ devolved authorities is that they do not provide anything like a complete territorial coverage of England’s land area. They are randomly located in places that have been successful in deploying their political power and influence in relation to central government, or else which have shown exceptional cohesion and determination in pursuing their territorial aims. Around them, there are many other areas which may have either City Deals in place (see earlier) or half-developed devolution proposals outstanding which have still to ‘make it over the line’ in terms of government approval. These areas are even more reliant on the capacities of their local councils. In contrast to Scot- land, Wales and Northern Ireland, local devolution in England (outside of Lon- don, at least) remains patchy and is still very much a work in progress. Varieties of localism 75 Finally, whether they belong to the first wave or to the second, each of the UKs devolved settings has its own bespoke set of devolved powers, and no two of them are completely alike. Once again, the main cleavage is between the three ‘devolved nations’ plus Greater London on the one hand and the rest (i.e. the ten Combined Authorities) on the other. The latter are still effectively English local authorities with a few ‘bells and whistles’ added on. Moreover, under the recent premierships of Theresa May and Boris Johnson, it has become clear that the earlier momentum for sub-regional devolution reform in England has effectively stalled for the time being. The Conservative Party manifesto for the 2017 General Election contained a pledge to consolidate the approach of previous years and to establish a common framework for how devolution should operate in England in the future (Conservative Party, 2017: 32). The framework, though still eagerly awaited by some, had not been published by the time this book went to press.

Recent governance developments in Cornwall Although it is predominantly a rural county, Cornwall has one significant thing in common with the ten CAs listed previously. It, too, has been offered a bespoke devolution deal by the UK government in recent years. This sub-section looks at the specific factors which lie behind this rather unexpected offer from the UK government. We also assess how Cornwall’s devolution deal has enhanced its reputation as a place where place shaping and localism are being addressed with competence and confidence.

Cornwall – a land apart? As noted at the beginning of this section, Cornwall has all the structural disadvantages associated with its peripheral location within the UK. In economic terms, Cornwall remains relatively deprived, and it can still sometimes be difficult to access in bad weather, or during the main holiday season. Its post-war decline has been exacerbated by the widespread perception of it as a ‘lifestyle destination’ for holidays, retirements and second home ownership. This has led to an idealized view of Cornwall which is sharply at odds with the experience of many of those who live there (Willett, 2016). Over time, Cornwall’s relative backwardness has prompted many of its young people to move away from the South West as soon as they are old enough to do so. Despite significant levels of inward migration, a pattern of decline has been evident in Cornwall for many years. The critique of Cornwall as a ‘lifestyle destination’ forms the basis for an important strand of political consciousness in the county. This finds expression in the policies of Cornwall’s leading nationalist party, Mebyon Kernow (MK),8 which was founded in 1951. MK describes itself as a progressive, left-of-centre political party, based on the principles of social justice, environmental protection 76 Varieties of localism and prosperity for all. Crucially, it sees the Cornish as one of four historic nations coexisting on the British mainland, with the same rights to self-determination as the English, the Welsh and the Scots (Mebyon Kernow, 2016). In November 2000, MK played a leading part in establishing the Cornish Constitutional Convention. The main objective of this non-partisan alliance of political and civil society organizations was (and still remains) to establish a devolved Cornish Assembly, or Senedh Kernow. This would be a body which operates along similar lines to the Welsh Assembly in one of its earlier incarnations. The Senedh would have the power not only to enact secondary legislation but also to opt out of particular areas of devolved competence if it chose to do so ( Cornish Constitutional Convention, 2002: 7). Despite its strong nationalist pitch, MK’s successes at the ballot box over the course of its 70-year existence have been very few and far between. In April 2020, for example, it had just four out of 123 elected members on Cornwall Council. Nevertheless, it is argued that MK’s impact on Cornwall’s politics, and particularly on the way in which Cornwall is viewed from beyond its own borders, has been significant (Deacon et al., 2003). This can be evidenced by the fact that many of Cornwall’s nationalist aspirations and structural problems have been addressed by a succession of recent policy initiatives. In 2005, for example, the Kernewek language was included in the Euro- pean Charter for the Protection of Regional Minority Languages, thus putting Kernewek on a par with other Celtic languages such as Welsh, Gaelic and Bre- ton. More recently, the UK’s coalition government supported the inclusion of the Cornish people under the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Cornwall Council, 2014: 22). This was formally agreed in 2014. More significantly, since 2001 the Cornwall/Isles of Scilly sub-region has been the only English territory to receive a dedicated stream of grant funding from the EU. The sub-region is now nearing the end of its third seven-year programme of EU financial support, covering the period 2014–2020. This has brought with it a total of 610 million euros in European grant funding since 2014 (Cornwall Council, 2015a). A very large proportion of the European funding received since 2001 has been invested in the Combined Universities Cornwall (CUC) project. The CUC was established in 1997 by the Universities of Exeter, Falmouth and Plymouth, and by the further education sector in Cornwall. This was with the express intention of reversing the trend of young people leaving the far South West after completing their secondary education (Combined Universities Cornwall, 2016). Among other things, EU funding has been heavily invested in developing the two main CUC hubs at Tremough, near Falmouth, and at the Treliske Hospital site in Truro. Both of these developments have received strong support from the public sector and from business interests in Cornwall, and Cornwall Council has a seat on the CUC’s steering and executive groups. According to the CUC’s website, some four out of five further education students at CUC colleges are currently from Corn - wall, as are around a quarter of the university students enrolled at the Tremough campus. Varieties of localism 77 Cornwall Council – a new institutional design Prior to 2009, the structure of local government in Cornwall reflected the classic two-tier pattern established in England’s rural areas by the last major reorganization of local government in the UK in 1974. As a result, the former Corn- wall County Council had been made responsible for school education, libraries, social care, highways, strategic planning and waste disposal across the whole of Cornwall. As for the six districts, they each had responsibility for housing, local planning, leisure and waste collection within their respective areas. In budgetary terms, this division of functions amounted to some 80% to 20% in favour of the county council. In January 2007, the former Cornwall County Council was one of 26 English councils to submit a business case to the UK government aimed at establishing an all-purpose unitary authority for the whole of Cornwall. This followed an invitation to councils in England’s remaining two-tier areas in Labour’s Strong and Prosperous Communities White Paper. The invitation criteria asked councils to demonstrate how a new unitary council would provide both ‘effective strategic leadership’ and ‘genuine opportunities for neighbourhood empowerment’, as well as offering ‘value for money and equity in public services’ (DCLG,: 2006b 12–15). At the time, these criteria were criticized for being confusing and contradictory. In particular, the emphasis on strategic leadership was seen as reducing the scope for effective neighbourhood empowerment and vice versa (Leach, 2006; Elcock et al., 2011: 332). And yet the designing-in of these two seemingly conflicting elements – strategy and community empowerment, meso and micro – can be just as easily seen as heralding a new, ‘multi-level’ approach to thinking about sub-national government in England (Harmes, 2012). The county council’s business case for unitary status was set out in a comprehensive three-part document entitled One Cornwall, One Council (Cornwall County Council, 2007). This effectively addressed the application criteria set out in the government’s invitation document. Cornwall’s submission proposed (Part 1, pages 28–32) a ‘new framework of governance’ based on the establishment of a new pattern of ‘Community Network Areas’ (CNAs) and an enhanced role for Cornwall’s 213 town and parish councils (Part 1, pages 40–41). This new governance structure would be overseen by a single strategic local authority for the whole of Cornwall. These changes, together with the creation of a new council- owned development agency aimed at promoting economic regeneration locally, would enable the new unitary council to speak with a much stronger voice nationally and internationally. The new structure which emerged from this reorganization was designed to create a synergy between sub-regional strategy on the one hand and community-based localism on the other. One of the most significant institutional innovations in the design of the new council was the creation of 19 Community Network Areas (CNAs) covering the whole of Cornwall (see Figure 4.2). The CNAs are an entirely new tier of spatial governance, created partly to compensate for the disappearance of the six former 78 Varieties of localism district councils. Each network area serves a recognizable group of local communities, based mainly around one or more key towns. The Community Network Panels (CNPs) are intermediate-level representative bodies whose main tasks are local liaison and co-ordination. They are concerned principally with ‘governance’ activity, rather than with carrying out ‘government’ functions per se. The two core elements in the panels’ membership are representation from local Cornwall Councillors on the one hand and from local TPCs on the other. Key local agencies are also regularly invited to attend panel meetings. According to one of the main architects of the new council structure, the principal benefits of these new networks are, firstly, that they draw in local people who are community-minded but who don’t necessarily want to become elected councillors; secondly, they bring local organizations like the police, health and the voluntary sector together around the same table, something which couldn’t be done easily under the previous arrangements. Finally, town and parish councils vary hugely in the neighbourhoods and populations they serve, and yet their interests are closely bound up with those of neighbouring communities. In the light of these factors, establishing a formal mechanism to address issues of common local interest was considered to be an essential stepCornwall ( Council Interview 1, 2009). Each of Cornwall’s 19 community networks is supported by a full-time Community Link Officer from Cornwall Council’s Localism Service. For each network area, the council maintains a comprehensive statistical profile which is available online (Cornwall Council, 2010a). Since 2009, this resource has been used by the council and by the networks themselves to assist with drawing up plans for each local area. In practice, it has taken several years for Cornwall’s new CNA system to settle down and become fully effective. The council’s first governance review carried out in 2012–2013 (Cornwall Council, 2012: 29–31) raised serious doubts about the network panels’ effectiveness, including:

• Lack of clear purpose and clarity regarding their role and function • Panels being mainly ‘talking shops’ and having few powers to take action or to make budget decisions • Panels not being well attended by the local community, nor by town and parish councillors • Panels being seen as an extra layer of bureaucracy, thus preventing proper engagement with communities.

With these criticisms in mind, Cornwall Council has worked consistently since 2014 to improve the effectiveness of the panels. It has clarified their status and their role as forums for local engagement. This was particularly relevant when the controversial devolution of Cornwall’s public library provision was being discussed in 2016–2017 (Cornwall Council, 2016a). The council has also introduced a system of budget delegation to panels, especially for spending on local highways and other special projects Cornwall( Council, 2015b, 2019b). CNP Chairs Varieties of localism 79 now also have a meeting once every quarter with the council’s portfolio holder for Climate Change and Neighbourhoods, where matters of concern, both Cornwall- wide and in particular localities, are discussed (Cornwall Council, 2018). Apart from working through the 19 CNPs, Cornwall Council has also sought to deal directly with Cornwall’s 213 town and parish councils (TPCs). This was seen as a high priority for the new council because, under the previous arrangements, TPCs were felt by some to have become Cornwall’s ‘forgotten sector’ (Cornwall Council Interview 2, 2010). From its earliest days, the new council made it clear that it wanted to establish a one-to-one relationship with each town and parish council. Accordingly, Cornwall Council invited TPCs to sign up to a formal agreement (Cornwall Council, 2010b), setting out the basis on which the two parties would work together. Built on the principle of mutuality, the agreement covered such issues as communications, consultations and the arrangements for regular meetings. More tangibly, Cornwall Council actively sought ways of devolving specific powers and responsibilities to TPCs. For example, as part of its ‘Active Partner- ing’ initiative, the council identified 25 service areas that might be suitable for devolution (Cornwall Council, 2010c). These included street cleaning, play areas, tourist information and car parking. By the end of the council’s first four-year administration in May 2013, a total of 23 service packages had been officially handed over to 16 different TPCs across Cornwall, and a further 80 schemes were at various stages of negotiation (Cornwall Council, 2013). In addition to facil - itating discussions on local devolution, Cornwall’s Localism Service was also supporting TPCs in other ways – for example, by assisting them to draw up neighbourhood plans under the Localism Act 2011,9 or by helping them to draw up local resilience plans to deal with the effects of storms and flooding, or by supporting towns with high street regeneration projects under the government’s town centre regeneration programme (HM Government, 2012). One of the towns which has been at the forefront of the double-devolution agenda is Falmouth (seeFigure 4.2). Together with its close neighbour Penryn, Falmouth has a population of 33,000. It has a significant seafaring tradition, and it was previously a county borough in its own right before its status was down- graded as part of the nationwide reorganization of local government in 1974. In recent times, Falmouth has become home to a new university campus (see earlier in this section) whose student numbers have grown steadily in the decade since 2010. According to its senior management, Falmouth Town Council has fully embraced the devolution agenda that Cornwall Council has been pursuing in recent years. The town now runs its own public toilets, visitor information, CCTV camera system, business improvement activity and preventative youth work. More recently, it has taken over responsibility for running the town’s library/one- stop-shop service. In order to fund the continued provision of these facilities, Falmouth has been willing to raise its council tax precept substantially in recent years. For example, in 2014–2015, the town’s precept was increased by more than 29% in comparison with the previous year. By raising taxes in this way, the official 80 Varieties of localism view is that the Town Council is simply responding to the expressed wishes of its residents and businesses, which it consults regularly on policy options (Cornwall Council Interview 5, 2015).10

Political and organizational support for localism in Cornwall In both its initial design and in its strategic priorities since 2009, Cornwall Council has been explicit about its commitment to localism. The latter has been a consistent theme running through the council’s first three administrations (2009–2013, 2013–2017 and 2017–2021). The council’s first administration took the decision to invest more than £2 million per annum in creating a dedicated Localism Ser- vice. This in turn enabled Cornwall to employ some 30 full-time equivalent posts and to develop a service whose distinctive approach was to work generically on a place-by-place basis across all types of service issue. Despite the harsh austerity policies pursued by the UK government in the past decade, the council’s localism budget has been mostly protected from financial cuts. Recently, the localism budget has even been increased again so as to allow the council’s support for the 19 CNAs to be strengthened and also to boost the management capacity of the service (Cornwall Council, 2018). In May 2011, following a Cabinet reshuffle, the council created its first dedicated Cabinet portfolio for ‘Localism and Devolution’. Since then, there have been five holders of the portfolio. Two of them have subsequently gone on to become Leaders of the Council and another was also the council’s Deputy Leader during much of the time that he held the portfolio. This means that the localism agenda has always enjoyed the backing of the council’s political leadership. It has also enjoyed widespread support from ‘back bench’ councillors across the political spectrum. In 2017, the name of the localism portfolio was changed to ‘Neigh- bourhoods’ and, at various points over the past few years, the localism portfolio has also been officially tied to other areas of responsibility, including ‘Green Cornwall’ (2012), Property (2014–2017) and, currently, Climate Change (2018 to present). In June 2013, as part of the council’s internal governance reforms, localism also gained its own dedicated scrutiny committee, now called the ‘Neighbour- hoods Overview and Scrutiny Committee’. Cornwall’s Localism Strategy, agreed by the council’s Cabinet in January 2016, confirmed localism as one of Cornwall Council’s key organizational development priorities. All elected members and council employees are now expected to take account of localism in their day-to-day dealings with the public. This is appropriate given that the process of devolution is now affecting the work of most council departments, not just the Localism Service itself. Localism is gradually becoming part of the council’s overall culture ( Cornwall Council, 2015c). It is also interesting to see how localism in Cornwall is increasingly being linked to the notion of ‘place shaping’. Unlike localism, place shaping is a rather more top-down notion which has featured prominently in thinking about local and sub- national government in the UK for more than a decade. One of its first appearances Varieties of localism 81 was in the Lyons Report of 2007 on the future funding of local government. Accord- ing to Lyons, place shaping goes well beyond local government’s role as a service provider and regulator. It comprises elements such as building and shaping local identity, working to make the local economy more successful, understanding local needs and commissioning the right services to address them ( Lyons, 2007: 3). The key point about place shaping is its strategic and leadership focus. Officers in Cornwall report that all council managers are expected to be aware of the place- shaping implications of their role and have recently been invited to attend awareness training in it (Cornwall Council Interview 8, 2018).

The range of localism and place-shaping work in Cornwall A key point to understand about the Localism Service in Cornwall is that it has not been designed as a ‘delivery service’. Rather, its aim is to work in a holistic manner with communities of place, interest and need. With this in mind, one of localism’s biggest organizational challenges has always been that of persuading the council’s main service directorates such as Children and Families or Economic Growth and Development to work in a more ‘localist’ wayCornwall ( Council Interview 2, 2010). From 2010 until 2016, the Localism Service was located within the Chief Executive’s department. This meant that for a while the service was effectively seen as ‘the Chief Executive’s agent in local communities’. Its role was seen as coming in and setting things up, providing initial support, and then withdrawing and allowing local people ‘get on with it’ for themselves, while still maintaining a watching brief. The longer-term goal of the Localism Service was seen as helping to change the dependency culture in many local communities. A high-profile example of the impact that the Localism Service has had is the work carried out since 2009 to tackle certain public order problems in Newquay (BBC Spotlight, 2019). The need for an initial strategic response arose from adverse publicity in the national press and media surrounding the deaths of two unaccompanied teenagers, both of whom were with large groups of youngsters holidaying in the town. Their accidental deaths while drunk late at night led to sharp criticism in the UK press and media concerning the state of affairs in Newquay. This in turn led to an explosion of anger among local residents, who marched on meetings, first of Newquay Town Council and then of Cornwall Council, demanding ‘to have their town back’. Cornwall’s Localism Service and the police jointly led the partnership response to the crisis, working among others with Newquay Town Council, the local residents association, licensees and other local businesses. The partnership effort also included children’s safeguarding services, which took the lead in developing procedures to prevent unaccompanied youngsters from getting into trouble while staying in the town. These procedures have involved the regulation of private dwellings offering holiday accommodation to minors and a robust pursuit of absent parents when necessary. The rapid response of Cornwall’s authorities drew very positive attention from the UK’s Home Office and from other national agencies. More than ten years after the initial incidents took place, 82 Varieties of localism the Newquay Safe Partnership continues in existence and is still active today, especially during the main holiday seasonCornwall ( Council, 2019c). A further significant development in Cornwall’s approach to localism in recent years is the way in which it has embraced the voluntary and community sector (VCS). In 2014, the VCS in Cornwall comprised around 4,000 separate organizations, employed over 22,000 staff and involved more than 150,000 individual volunteers (i.e. more than a third of Cornwall’s adult population) in its activities (Richardson, 2014). In that year, for the first time, the sector was invited to attend Cornwall’s annual localism summit for town and parish councils, and it is now regarded as a key player in Cornwall’s localism landscape. An increasing number of TPCs understand the advantages of working with local voluntary organizations or Community Interest Companies, and sharing the benefits of the easier access that such organizations have both to external funding and to tax advantages such as Business Rates Relief (Cornwall Council Interview 3, 2015). The VCS in Cornwall is now also an active candidate for the devolution of services and assets in its own right, alongside the TPCs. It has been the lead partner in about 10% of the devolution schemes agreed so far (Cornwall Council Inter- view 6, 2016). Some of these schemes are driven by the public health agenda and by the need to address issues such as loneliness and isolation, especially among older people in rural communities. A number of community transport schemes, mainly run by VCS organizations, have already been put in place to tackle this problem in Cornwall. A fundamental point about this kind of provision is that it is inherently local and neighbourhood-based. This means it needs to be nurtured from the bottom-up, rather than willed into being from the top-down. With this in mind, Cornwall’s Localism Service has played an increasing role in champion- ing this social action approach and in providing a two-way signposting service between local VCS groups and health and social care commissionersCornwall ( Council, 2016b). In addition to the work of the Localism Service over the past decade, it is worth noting the range of place-shaping activity that has developed since 2017 within the council’s Economic Growth Directorate. This work is focused mainly on Cornwall’s towns, and one of its key elements is managing the council’s relationships with businesses and private sector developers (Cornwall Council Interview 8, 2018). Most of Cornwall’s towns now have place-shaping forums where business representatives work alongside elected councillors, officers and civil society representatives. These partnership bodies are mostly distinct from the CNPs described earlier. One of the most advanced local place-shaping groups is the St Austell Bay Eco- nomic Forum (SABEF). This body covers the three CNAs of St Austell, China Clay and St Blazey/Fowey/Lostwithiel (see Figure 4.2). The Forum is chaired by the high-profile Chief Executive of St Austell Brewery. In 2018 SABEF agreed a five-year business and economic plan for the area. It also formed a community interest company (CIC) which won a £1.2 million grant from MHCLG to deliver a garden-town scheme for St Austell and its surrounding area. This project is Varieties of localism 83 based on a strategic analysis of the area’s unique selling points. These were identified as its China Clay history; its outstanding gardens and open spaces (e.g. the nearby Eden Project); and its superb natural collection of rare trees, believed to be unique in the South West. The CIC’s Board contains a mixture of private sector representatives, Cornwall Councillors and TPC reps drawn from the three CNAs located in the SABEF area. Despite there being some tension between the business and the councillor representatives, the CIC Board is widely felt to be providing effective leadership for place shaping in the areaCornwall ( Council Interview 8, 2018).

Cornwall’s devolution deal and New Frontiers strategy In addition to developing its localism and place-shaping work at the micro scale, Cornwall Council has taken steps to raise its profile as a sub-national player capable of making effective interventions at the UK and EU levels. Critical to this is Cornwall’s partnership with the offshore Isles of Scilly Council. Under the EU’s regional development arrangements, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly (CIOS) together constitute a NUTS-2 sub-region. Since 2001, CIOS has qualified for its own dedicated stream of regional development funding (see earlier in this sub-section). Furthermore, with its recent national minority and ethnic language initiatives, Cornwall is now seen in Council of Europe circles as a serious cultural player in its own right. With this degree of European recognition already to its credit, it was perhaps not surprising that Cornwall’s bid for unitary status was one of just a handful of cases approved by the Labour government in 2007. This was a crucial decision in that it gave councillors and officers a green light to develop a completely new institutional design upon a relatively blank canvas. Cornwall’s successful unitary bid enabled it to transform itself from a rather conventional local government backwater into a dynamic, can-do sub-region which for the past decade has been at the forefront of localism and place-shaping developments across England and the UK. The influence of Mebyon Kernow, and its proto-nationalist aspirations for Cornwall (see earlier in this sub-section), may have given Cornwall Council the confidence to request a whole range of new devolved powers from UK central government. These were set out in the Case for Cornwall document which was prepared in advance of the UK general election in 2015. A final draft of the -doc ument was shared with UK civil servants and MPs at the start of the election campaign. The document set out Cornwall’s case to be granted enhanced powers across 12 distinct policy areas, including transport, energy, environment, housing, planning, health and social care, as well as local taxationCornwall ( Council, 2015d). By the time the council came to approve the final document in July 2015, the newly elected UK government had already taken steps to offer Cornwall a devolution deal of its own, and Prime Minister David Cameron was on the point of making his way down to Truro to attend the formal signing ceremony.11 So rapid was the 2015 Conservative government’s response to the Case for Cornwall 84 Varieties of localism that the council’s elected members and officers were at least partly taken by surprise (Cornwall Council Interview 7, 2018). The devolution deal agreed between Cornwall Council and the UK government in 2015 involved eight principal work streams across the following policy areas: culture and heritage, employment and skills, energy and environment, health and social care, management of EU funding streams, public estate, support to business and transport. With the exception of business support, all these areas had featured in the original Case for Cornwall document. However, a number of other areas highlighted in the Case for Cornwall, such as housing, planning and local taxation, were not included in the government’s devolution offer. This was ostensibly because the council did not want to accept the imposition of an elected mayor for Cornwall as part of the deal. Nor did it wish to become a Combined Authority in the same way as the metropolitan cities of the Midlands and the North of England had done (Cornwall Council et al., 2015: 24; see also earlier in this section). Since 2015, the council has been working to implement its devolution deal. It eventually managed to resolve the issue of not having an elected mayor by persuading the government to accept its proposal for a Cornwall/Isles of Scilly Leadership Board (CIOSLB). This strategic partnership body includes top-level membership from both Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly Councils; Cornwall/Isles of Scilly LEP; Devon and Cornwall Police; NHS Kernow Clinical Commission- ing Group; Cornwall Local Nature Partnership; Cornwall Association of Local Councils (the umbrella body representing TPCs in Cornwall) and a representative of Cornwall’s six Members of Parliament. Although CIOSLB has no executive powers of its own, it is seen as a valuable forum for strategic consultation and guidance. Like the CNPs (see earlier in this sub-section), its role is more about governance than about exercising the specific governmental responsibilities. Its formal meetings are broadcast live on the web, and this provides an element of accountability and public assurance. Some of its terms of reference are based on those required in law for Combined Authorities. For example, in terms of membership, the number of elected representatives on the board slightly exceeds that of non-elected officialsCornwall ( Council Interview 7, 2018). Cornwall’s 2015 devolution deal has now been implemented, and positive outcomes have emerged from several of the work streams, especially those around transport, energy, business support and the management of EU funding streams. In public transport for instance, Cornwall Council has been given local commissioning powers and a devolved budget of £126 million per annum by central government. Cornwall’s new commissioning powers have successfully galvanized the main transport operators in the sub-region to ‘up their game’ and to improve the services they offer. By late 2018, the local bus companies had already brought some 80 new vehicles into service and had collaborated with the council over the introduction of contactless payment arrangements, smart ticketing and real-time traffic flow systems to aid punctuality. As for the main rail operator, it had also agreed to double the number of services it runs on Cornwall’s main line from Penzance to Plymouth, starting in 2019. As a result of these improvements, the Varieties of localism 85 number of passengers using public transport in Cornwall had already increased by some 1.4 million a year, with particularly strong growth recorded among young people (Cornwall Council Interview 7, 2018). However, progress has been slower within some of the other work streams, particularly in the field of health and social care. More than any other in the deal, this work stream continues to be bogged down by the lack of a national vision concerning the future direction of adult social care in England Cornwall( Council Interview 7, 2018). Devolution has been instrumental in driving programs of work such as culture and heritage much further forward than might have been the case if there had been no devolution deal. The deal has given Cornwall Council much greater ‘clout’ in terms of persuading central government agencies such as the Environment Agency and English Heritage to ‘get around the table’ and remain there. -With out the deal, officers are convinced that Cornwall would never have been given approval for its two deep geothermal energy projects, one at United Downs in West Cornwall and the other at the Eden Project. Whenever officers encountered reluctance on the part of Whitehall civil servants to engage with this issue, they could simply counter by saying: ‘look, it’s here in the deal’. However, while the deal has certainly enhanced Cornwall’s upward influence vis-à-vis central government, this effect is fading quickly as the 2015 deal gives way to the next phase of devolution work (Cornwall Council Interview 7, 2018). Cornwall’s New Frontiers (NF) strategy was unanimously agreed by the CIOSLB at its meeting in April 2018. The strategy is set out in three parts, each of which has a separate document of its own. The first document covers Post-Brexit Frameworks, the second focuses on developing Cornwall’s distinctive strengths and the third is concerned with securing more devolved powers and funding for Cornwall. These three documents, together with their 19 chapters and their 104 separate ‘asks’, constitute a powerful statement of intent for CornwallCornwall ( Council Interview 7, 2018). NF is very much an enhanced version of the 2015 Case for Cornwall document. However, it has been structured in such a way as to provide the council and its partners with complete flexibility over how its various elements are prioritized. An important point to understand about NF is that it is not being seen as a big one-off event like the 2015 devolution deal was. Rather, it has been deliberately designed to be an ongoing process whose priorities are constantly shifting in response to changing political circumstances. In autumn 2018, the CIOSLB was focusing its efforts on nine priority ‘asks’, including the development of a Spaceport at Newquay Airport and the exploration of Cornwall’s substantial lithium deposits Morris,( 2017; Cornwall Council Interview 7, 2018). Finally, for a number of years Cornwall has been working with other UK councils to promote the claims of some of Britain’s more peripheral areas. With this in mind, the council’s zero-carbon lead has been heavily involved in discussions with Western Power Distribution12 and with representatives of other UK regions and nations (especially Wales and Scotland) to try and address the problems with the electricity grid’s capacity in the South West. According to the view taking shape in these conversations, the UK’s peripheries should now be regarded as 86 Varieties of localism important energy hubs in their own right, with freedom to set their own priorities on how renewable energy technologies should be developed and to decide on how their product should be distributed ( Cornwall Council Interview 4, 2015). The case for these areas is set out formally in a document titled Britain’s Lead- ing Edge, which was launched at the annual LGA conference in Brighton in July 2019. Focusing exclusively on England, the report notes that there is an inbuilt bias in economic investment in favour of cities. Graphics used in the document show how the bulk of investment funding runs along England’s central spine, with the areas outside it heavily disadvantaged by comparison. In a neat rhetorical inversion, these ‘fringe’ areas are described in the document as Britain’s ‘leading edge’. The document states that between 2001 and 2016, the average Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita in England grew by 71%; but within ‘leading edge’ areas, the growth rate was only 50%. This is one of the main reasons why the UK has the widest disparity in regional GVA of any country in the EU (Cornwall Council et al., 2019: 6–7). The report calls on other local authorities who want to see a fairer system of funding and investment in the UK to join the leading edge movement. The movement is now actively exploring partnerships with think tanks, academic institutions and private sector sponsors to add capacity to its work and to amplify its collective voice.

Reflections on localism, place shaping and devolution in Cornwall, England and the UK This case study presents a multi-level analysis of how both the core and the secondary aspects of localism are being addressed in the UK currently. The picture that emerges is one of a governance system that finds itself in a state of considerable flux currently, particularly in England. To paraphrase Gramsci’s well-known quotation,13 the UK’s top-down political order is under huge pressure currently, but a new one to replace it is not ready to emerge yet. Despite the recent devolution of powers to the UK’s Celtic nations and a growing recognition of the need for devolution in England, the British state still remains firmly in the grip of the British Political Tradition (BPT). This has much to do with the way in which England’s electors currently dominate the UK’s political settlement. It can be argued that the BPT is not just about a culture of top-down governance in the UK but also about the ambivalence which the state has shown towards many aspects of Britain’s EU membership since 1973 (Morphet, 2013 ). Ultimately, this is what paved the way for 2016’s English-led vote in favour of Brexit. Coming on top of the narrowly won Scottish Independence referendum in 2014, Brexit can be seen as the outcome of tectonic forces shifting within the core of the English nation/British state. The main elements of the union have slowly been prised apart by a long-running drift towards localism. Brexit represents a counter-offensive by elements of the established order to try and reverse what they see as a dangerous trend, and to double down on the certainties provided by the BPT (Niven, 2019). Varieties of localism 87 Running parallel with this, significant steps have been taken- by UK govern ments in recent years to establish sub-national devolution, place shaping and localism across many parts of the UK. This has occurred under both the Labour governments of 1997–2010 and the Conservative-led governments of 2010–2019. As a result, a process of re-spatialization is gradually taking place in many parts of England. At the meso level, what seems to be emerging is a general consensus on the viability of ‘sub-regional’ as opposed to regional units of governance. This is producing is a pattern of city- and shire county-based sub-regions, on the EU NUTS-2 model. Moreover, the Combined Authority provisions contained in recent UK legislation provide a flexible fit for this emerging consensus. Mean- while, at the micro level, there is now also a broad view emerging that local communities at the P1 and P2 levels should be able to exercise more substantive political powers in their own right. With this in mind, the 2011 localism reforms (and particularly those relating to neighbourhood planning) can be seen as the first steps towards enshrining such powers in UK law. As for Cornwall, its unique identity has been decisively shaped by its Celtic heritage and by the peripheral position it occupies in relation to England and the UK. Within England, Cornwall has been rather more inclined than most areas to challenge the orthodoxies of the British Political Tradition, particularly in recent years (Deacon et al., 2003). Interestingly, since the millennium, Cornwall’s stock has risen significantly following the EU’s recognition of its need for economic development and by the award of substantial sums in European cohesion funding. This has given impetus to Cornwall’s aspirations for greater self-governance, and these are now recognized by all the UK’s main political parties (Werran, 2015). An indication of this is the fact that Cornwall was given specific approval to establish a new unitary council in 2009. Not only is Cornwall Council now one of the UK’s largest local authorities in financial and territorial terms, but it has also been created in accordance with a distinct new multi-level design. This is with the aim of aligning strategic capacity and micro-level community engagement, within a single political organization. The main story of Cornwall Council’s first decade is that councillors and officers have worked purposefully to implement the council’s original design. Much of this is down to the ongoing commitment of the Liberal Democrat and Independent Groups on the council, which have formed the two most recent hung-council administrations in Cornwall since 2013. As the majority party on the former Cornwall County Council, the Liberal Democrats also submitted Cornwall’s unitary bid to the UK government in 2007. Since it became a unitary council in 2009, Cornwall Council has developed into an effective, ‘can-do’, multi-level body. It has made efforts to cultivate collaborative relationships with its towns and parishes, its voluntary sector and its public and business sector partners (Cornwall Council Interview 6, 2016). Having become the first rural authority in England to be offered a devolution deal by the UK government in 2015, it is now in a strong position to lead the way for other parts of non- metropolitan England. 88 Varieties of localism What are the future prospects for the UK, England and Cornwall? The EU referendum vote of 2016 and the subsequent Brexit policies of the Con- servative governments led by Theresa May and Boris Johnson are bringing the prospect of the break-up of the UK much closer than ever before. The Scottish government is now committed to calling a second independence referendum in response to the UK government’s high-handed treatment of the Brexit issue. Meanwhile, the once intractable Irish question has also been raising its head insistently. This is in the context of the UK government’s discussions with the EU and the Irish Republic concerning future trading and customs arrangements on the island of Ireland, as well as the recent long-running suspension of the Northern Ireland power-sharing Executive.14 Meanwhile, the UK Supreme Court has been involved several times recently in clarifying the powers and the legal entitlements of citizens, the devolved administrations, the Westminster parliament and even of the UK government itself (Mabbett, 2019). In many ways, the nation’s constitutional settlement is being tested to its limits. Each successive challenge seems to confirm the point that the UK’s current constitutional arrangements are no longer fit for purpose and that a full-blown crisis of UK governance may not be very far away. This may well arise from a formal breakdown in relationships between the UK government and the one or more of the three devolved administrations. As far as sub-national governance in England is concerned, the case of Cornwall Council outlined earlier offers a worthwhile template for what the future pattern of sub-national governance across England might look like in the future. A pattern of some 40–45 sub-regional city/rural regions, with devolved powers, might be sufficiently embedded within English history and culture for citizens to feel that they can identify with it at an emotive level (Carter, 2010). Such a pattern would also be institutionally robust, because it would combine sub-regional strategy with collaborative, two-way engagement involving local communities at the P1 and P2 levels. Finally, with regard to Cornwall, its prospects may well depend on the shape of future sub-national reform affecting the pattern and the powers of local councils in England. When reform comes, it is most likely to affect local government finance, where current levels of austerity and tight central government control cannot be sustained for very much longer. This may result in even greater centralization of certain key services such as adult social care, in order that it can be aligned more closely with health, or even greater centralization of schools, in order to create a national education service across the schools sector. By the same token, there is likely to be greater pressure on shire counties such as Cornwall to become involved in regional consortia for the purposes of economic development, transport, policing and other blue light services. Already, following its recent electoral review, Cornwall Council is facing the prospect of the number of its elected councillors being reduced by almost 30%, from 123 currently down to 87 in the next council elections in May 2021 (LGBCE, 2019). Despite all these drivers for consolidation, there are also likely to be counter- vailing pressures for greater local capacity to be created so as to ensure that recent national commitments regarding greater public investment in environmental Varieties of localism 89 protection, carbon reduction and public health can be implemented. In this respect, Cornwall, with its strategic capacity, its economies of scale, its wider partnerships, as well as its strong local ground-game, is well placed to respond positively to many of the political scenarios that may arise.

Notes 1 In terms of the typology set out in Chapter 2, the first two of these sub-scales correspond to the P1-type of ‘single-place’ community. The third corresponds to the P2- and P3-types of ‘aggregated’ and ‘extended’ community. 2 This echoes some of the arguments advanced in Chapter 3 on the democratic benefits of micro-states (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2019: 8). 3 Extract from B R Ambedkar’s statement in the Indian Constituent Assembly, 4 November 1949, quoted in Chakrabarty (2017: 167). I say much more about village panchayats and the territorial design of the modern Indian state in Chapter 6. 4 Three years after the publication of Barber’s book (i.e. in September 2016), the inau- gural meeting of the Global Parliament of Mayors (GPM) did in fact take place in The Hague, with Barber himself as an honoured guest. Barber died the following April. An annual GPM event is now held in the autumn of each year. 5 The others are Isle of Wight (1995), Northumberland (2009), Shropshire (2009), Wilt- shire (2009) and Dorset (2019). 6 Cornwall has one city, Truro (pop. 21,500 in 2019). Truro is the main seat of government for Cornwall. 7 No doubt many Scots and Welsh nationalists in particular will baulk at this characterization. 8 The name means literally ‘sons of Cornwall’ in the Kernewek language. 9 Fifty-seven different TPCs were at various stage stages of involvement in this process in May 2013. 10 Interestingly, the average (Band D) council tax precept for TPCs in Cornwall has risen by some 153% between 2009 and 2020. By contrast, Cornwall’s Band D precept for spending on all local services, including police, fire and rescue, has risen by some 38% over the same period. These figures were provided in personal communications from Cornwall Council officers in July 2020. 11 Cornwall’s devolution deal may also have been a way of ‘rewarding’ Cornwall for electing six out of six Conservative MPs in the 2015 general election. This was the first time in almost 50 years that the Conservative Party had won a ‘clean sweep’ of all Cornwall’s MPs. In terms of parliamentary representation, Cornwall has remained exclusively Conservative in the two subsequent General Elections of 2017 and 2019. 12 This is the public body which operates the electricity grid in the south-west of England. 13 La crisi consiste appunto nel fatto che il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere (‘the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born’). Quotation from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Diaries Volume I, written in 1930. 14 The Assembly was in fact suspended for three years between January 2017 and Janu- ary 2020.

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One of the three research questions addressed in this book (see Chapter 1) is how localism can make a meaningful contribution to the design of political institutions and systems. Some empirical aspects of this question have already been explored in the case studies on Catalonia/Spain and Cornwall/England/UK, presented in Chapters 3 and 4. This chapter, too, is concerned with the political design, but it approaches the issue from a theoretical standpoint. Here, the aim is to examine some of the many ways in which localism can be aligned with notions of good and effective governance. The overarching concept this book uses in order to frame what good and effective governance is all about is public value. However, the argument presented here rests on a far broader understanding of PV than that which is current in the academic literature (see, e.g.Benington and Moore, 2011). In this chapter, what has hitherto been seen essentially as a managerial notion is radically extended to include fundamental public goods such as political order and the rule of law, political and economic development, democratic accountability, human wellbeing and environmental sustainability.

On public goods and public value Throughout history values have been an essential element in the establishment of political order (Fukuyama, 2011: 3–25). Where values have featured most prominently in the civilizations of the past, they have typically been nurtured by religious institutions, for example by the Brahmin caste on the Indian sub-continent or by the Christian church in Western Europe. In both cases, these value-based institutional actors developed a distinctive role for themselves in relation to the ruling elites of the time Fukuyama,( 2011: 287). In Western Europe’s case, this led to the establishment of an institutionalized religious authority which eventually became powerful enough to convince temporal rulers that they were not the most authoritative source of law. Colin Crouch argues that for many centuries the church’s ‘value power’ in Europe rested upon the fact that it was able to make the critical connection between personal morality, on the one hand, and the wider law governing social, economic and political relations, on the other. In other words, the church was able Localism and public value 97 to effect a synthesis between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ dimensions of value. Gradually, however, the state began to champion aspects of the public realm in a more systematic way itself, and eventually it came to be seen as the foremost player in this arena (Hegel, 1821). Indeed, the modern welfare state can be seen as the ultimate embodiment of the state’s role in promoting value within the public realm. A useful way of looking at modern states is to assess the balance that exists between political, private and value power ( Crouch, 2011: 70–73). As for the notion of public value, there was some introductory discussion of the term in Chapter 2. There, it was noted that while PV has positive normative connotations, it is also highly flexible in its application. Its meaning is almost synonymous with those of other, more conventional terms such as the ‘public good’ or the ‘common good’. Here, however, ‘public value’ will be used in preference to either of those two expressions. In British English, the term ‘public good’ is probably best understood in a singular or quantitative sense, as in the phrase ‘x is generally seen as a public good’. It will therefore be used in this book whenever that sense is specifically required. As for the term ‘common good’, it is considered to have too much of a campaigning tone, and so is not used in this study. In addition, there is the term ‘public interest’, whose meaning overlaps to a considerable extent with that of public value. However, ‘public interest’ is a term which is probably best reserved for legal or forensic contexts, and so will not be used here either. What is especially useful about the term ‘public value’ is its ability to indicate an outcome or a state of affairs resulting from intentional policy making. Thus, it can be argued that a sustained focus by governments on the achievement of public ‘goods’ should in principle lead to the creation of public ‘value’. As previously mentioned, this book adopts a very broad interpretation of the term ‘public value’. It seeks to extend the term to cover all aspects of good and effective governance. It sees PV in all its potential variety as the ultimate goal of governmental strategy and action (Mulgan, 2009: 4). Following a general discussion about the fundamental features of public value, the chapter addresses three particular value domains in detail. Each of them is critical for the development of contemporary society and for the design of political systems across the world. Though each of the domains highlighted is substantially different from the others, all three of them are connected at a deeper level, as we shall argue later in the chapter. The first – democracy – is about society as a whole, and about political participation and accountability. The second – human wellbeing – is about indi - viduals and their health, development and flourishing. The third – environmental sustainability – is essentially about place and about the physical, economic and social systems which constitute it. The aim will be to show how localism typically aligns itself with each of these three core dimensions of PV, and how it is currently shaping and developing each of them in new directions. Throughout the chapter, the focus will be on how public value can be generated, not only within localities, regions and sovereign states but also across multi-level political systems. With this specific perspective in mind, the chapter concludes with a brief consideration of a further ‘whole-system’ aspect of public 98 Localism and public value value: territorial cohesion (TC). This is in the context of how public value is currently being addressed within the European Union (EU).

Core domains of public value The two fundamental features of public value are ‘political order’ and ‘political development’ (Fukuyama, 2011, 2015). To a greater or lesser extent, both of these features can be observed within the world’s more advanced states. The first of the two features, political order, rests on the presence of three basic conditions. These are

• a capable state, run on non-patrimonial (i.e. impersonal) lines • respect for the rule of law • the existence of political accountability.

The fact that some societies are capable of achieving a successful balance between these three conditions is, Fukuyama argues, one of the great miracles of modern politics, because it is not at all obvious that they can be combined effectively. Furthermore, most citizens within the societies concerned are unaware of the long political struggles that have had to be endured in order for advanced political orders to reach their present stage of developmentFukuyama, ( 2011: 14). Political order is essentially about peace and stable government and about the corresponding absence of war and oppression. For many theorists, it constitutes the first and most fundamental question in politics (Williams, 2005: 3; Hall, 2015: 267). Fukuyama argues that all advanced states have combined the three basic conditions of political order in differing ways, but their overall effect is to open up the path towards political development. Indeed, they allow three specific effects of political development to come into play. The first is economic growth, which is essentially about increased material wellbeing and prosperity. Economic growth leads to social mobilization, and this in turn leads to the growth of ideas about what constitutes legitimacy in the political sphere Fukuyama,( 2015: 43). How- ever, according to Fukuyama, successful political development is by no means an automatic consequence of economic growth, nor of the other two effects just highlighted. In each case, it is the precise mix and phasing of these effects which is critical to achieving successful political development. Fukuyama argues that the combined effects of economic growth and democracy, have radically transformed the prospects for political development in today’s world. What this means is that there is now a multiplicity of routes towards development, and that states have a range of choices in this respect that were simply not available in pre-Malthusian times ( Fukuyama, 2011: 474). In the modern world, political development can be driven not only by social mobilization at home but also by efforts being pursued at the international level. This means that developing countries now have the scope to adopt a wide range of development models, regardless of their indigenous traditions. There are now many international Localism and public value 99 agencies working in the field to support developing states, which means that states no longer have to reinvent the wheel in this regard. What it also means is that societies are now much less trapped in their pasts than they used to be. Despite the emphasis in this chapter on the benefits of political order and development, it is also important to be mindful of the ever-present possibility of political decay. This is a phenomenon that a growing number of scholars have been drawing attention to in recent yearsFukuyama, ( 2015; Runciman, 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019). All political institutions are subject to decay if they do not adapt to changing circumstances. For example, modern political institutions are especially susceptible to ‘insider’ or elite capture, a process that Fukuyama labels with the term ‘repatrimonialization’ (Fukuyama, 2015: 464). Fukuyama illustrates his thesis with particular reference to the United States. The American state has accumulated so many veto players that it can now reasonably be described as a ‘vetocracy’. The US political system is trapped in a malign equilibrium, and too many powerful actors seem to have an interest in keeping it that way (Fukuyama, 2015: 493–494). Fukuyama suggests that political develop - ment and political decay are similar in many ways to biological evolution. The main difference is that, in human systems, political actors are able to exercise a degree of agency over how their political institutions are designed and reformed (Fukuyama, 2015: 524). The argument advanced in this book is that, while political order and political development are the key foundational elements of public value, there are also other more specific domains of value which are common across all states. These major ‘public goods’ include democracy and accountability, human wellbeing and environmental sustainability. Normatively, each of these should be seen as essential to the operation of a well-ordered polity in contemporary conditions, at whatever scalar level it may be constituted. Accordingly, these major domains of public value must also be considered key components of political design, whether it be of specific institutions, individual sovereign states, or of more geographically extensive political orders. Two of the three public goods just highlighted – democracy and human wellbeing – have traditionally been seen as the prerogative of sovereign states to provide acting on their own account. However, as this chapter explains, many international agencies in recent years have been supplementing the efforts of states to promote human wellbeing across the world. With regard to environmental sustainability, it is now widely accepted that most of the required policy goals can only be achieved if they are pursued on a broader front. This includes action at the global, national and local levels, and it goes well beyond what most sovereign states can achieve just on the basis of their own efforts. In addition to the three major domains of public value outlined earlier, there are other important, but less fundamental, elements of PV. Like environmental sustainability, these public goods are well suited to being addressed within the context of multi-level political systems, but they also have the advantage that they can be effectively pursued by sovereign states acting alone. This chapter therefore 100 Localism and public value briefly considers one of these system-based dimensions of PV in particular, that of territorial cohesion (TC). This and other domains of PV, such as intergovernmental mutuality, are essentially about system articulation (Cvetkovic and Kellner, 1997), and they are well suited to an MLG approach to political analysis.

Localism and democracy In a historical sense, the struggle for democracy, particularly within Western countries, represents one of the original public goods. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, democracy has been a key factor in the establishment of the modern, liberal-democratic nation state. However, as Chapters 3 and 4 also explained, the nature of democracy in sovereign states is evolving rapidly, particularly with the development of the governance paradigm, and with the growing importance of place. Gary Bridge and his colleagues argue that one of the main impacts of the reconfiguration currently unfolding in the public realm is on our accepted notions of democracy (Bridge et al., 2013: 306). Recognizable frameworks of public accountability and responsibility for service provision are being replaced by more amorphous, less structured networks in which local governance bodies can appear as just one player among many others. This leads to uncertainties concerning the appropriate scale of political action, in terms of both social mobilization and government decision-making. As political and social issues increasingly cross regional, national and international borders, questions about ‘who is affected?’ become just as important as ‘who counts as a member?’ Similar concerns are expressed by Erik-Hans Klijn and Chris Skelcher (2007: 588). The question they pose is whether by giving ‘structural advantage to certain private interests in the process of making or shaping public policy decisions’, governance networks are undermining democratic legitimacy. They examine a number of possible conjectures about current developments in governance. On the one hand, there is the stark possibility that governance networks may simply be incompatible with democracy. Alternatively, networks may be seen as a worthwhile extension of the democratic process. This is because they engage a wider range of actors in political decision-making, thus ‘oiling the wheels’ of representative democracy as it struggles to govern in an increasingly complex environment. Alternatively, governance networks may be no more than just a tool within a much more extensive political game, in which national government and its elite backers are able to shape networks in line with their own strategic advantage (Crouch, 2004; Newman, 2005). Or finally, the relationship between representative democracy and governance networks may be part of a transition away from state-centric governance, and towards a more fully fledged form of polycentrism, characterized by decentred, distributed nodes of authority. This perspective inter- prets the current tensions that exist between legitimate democratic government and relatively informal governance networks as a sign of fundamental changes taking place within society as a whole. It sees political decision-making as ‘a complicated negotiation about values . . . in which process cannot be separated Localism and public value 101 from outcome’Klijn ( and Skelcher, 2007: 598). On this account, democracy is being redesigned through actual practice within governance networks. From a neighbourhood governance perspective, Bailey and Pill address a similar range of questions through the lens of local empowerment (Bailey and Pill, 2015). These two scholars quote the influential US literature on the importance of ‘mediating structures’ such as churches, voluntary associations and other civil society bodies (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977). These structures can often provide support for empowerment at the local level and so reduce the need for local dependency on the central state. Within this context, Bailey and Pill identify two main ways in which empowerment can be framed. ‘Restricted’ empowerment denotes the top-down sharing of powers offered by a powerful principal such as a sovereign state. On the other hand, an ‘open-ended’ approach sees empowerment as a gradual progression from individual actions through to those which are carried out at a collective level (Bailey and Pill, 2015 292). A crucial factor determining the approach adopted is the nature of the ‘governance space’ in which the process of empowerment plays out ( Gaventa, 2004). The governance space concerned may be a ‘restricted’ or an ‘invited’ one, offered from the top-down; or it may be one which is ‘claimed’ or ‘created’ from the bottom-up; or it may even be ‘ambiguous’ ( Newman and Clarke, 2009). Depending on how such space is constructed, it can open up genuine opportunities for citizens, particularly those who are the most marginalized, ‘to recognize, assert and expand their own identities’ (Fischer, 2009: 250). This links to John Dewey’s assertion in his classic work The Public and Its Problems about the need for government to ‘call a public into existence that can understand and act in its own best interests’ (Dewey, 1987). The question of how such a public can be created is one of the core questions of public value theory (Moore and Benington, 2011: 272). The challenge in calling such a public together is to do so in a way that it allows the individual members of that public to deliberate with others as a collective, while recognizing the diverse backgrounds and interests of the membership as a whole. According to Ercan and Hendricks, both deliberative democracy and localism start from the premise that, as residents of their neighbourhoods and users of public services, all citizens possess a unique level of practical knowledge. The broader goal of both approaches is therefore to improve the democratic legitimacy of collective decision-making and to deepen democracy through public engagement and empowerment (Ercan and Hendricks, 2013: 423). However, Ercan and Hendricks note that there are a number of major objections to localism as a basis for enhancing democracy. The authors identify and address four theoretical challenges in particular:

• firstly, greater local powers do not necessarily mean greater democratization • secondly, localism often reinforces existing power inequalities • thirdly, one-off participatory forums do not equate to local democracy • finally, localism narrows the scale and impact of participation. 102 Localism and public value Ercan and Hendricks argue that each of these challenges can be addressed through appropriate institutional design. However, the fact remains that deliberative mechanisms still tend to be poorly integrated into existing democratic processes and institutions (Ercan and Hendricks, op. cit.: 432). However, it is important to reject any suggestion that localism is necessarily in opposition to the idea of the state. Ercan and Hendricks call for the ‘old’ institutional norms of advocacy and representation to be reconciled with the ‘new’ norms of inclusive citizen involvement and open deliberation. They note that the extent to which localism can contribute to democratic renewal is a question ripe for empirical research. Given the widespread disenchantment felt in many parts of the world with the way in which democracy operates (Stoker, 2006), there is every incentive to explore ways of extending and deepening democratic structures and processes. Michael Saward (2003) puts the emphasis on procedural approaches that work from broad democratic principles and that can be tailored to particular contexts anywhere in the world. Graham Smith (2009) is more explicit about the principles that should underlie any innovations in the democratic arena. These include the democratic goods of inclusiveness, popular control, transparency and considered judgement; and the ‘institutional’ goods of efficiency and transferability across different cultures and scales of governance. At the most detailed end of the spectrum, Archon Fung (2006) sets out three broad dimensions along which democratic participation may be based. These are participant selection; communication and decision-making; and authority and power. Each of these dimensions has several different modes of realization and they can be put together to form a three-dimensional model, or ‘democracy cube’ as Fung calls it. This ‘cube- shaped’ model may be used by academics and policy makers to generate a range of institutional design choices that are capable of addressing the requirements of democratic decision-making in different contexts. One specific design vision that responds to many of the issues highlighted both in this section and the last one is that which was set out more than 25 years ago by Paul Hirst in his influential bookAssociative Democracy. Hirst argues for the principle of associationalism to be adopted as the basis for bringing about the political reform of big government and the state. In essence, associationalism seeks to combine the individual choice of liberalism with the public provision of collectivism (Hirst, 1994: 20). In its modern form, associationalism rests on the two guiding principles of

• primary associations as the cornerstone of democratic governance • the pluralization and federalization of the state.

In his book, Hirst sets out his detailed ideas for reforming both the economy and the provision of welfare along associationalist lines. With regard to the economy, the aim of associative reform would be to move towards an economy in which small and medium-sized enterprises play a much bigger part than they do at present; where ownership is more firmly rooted within a locality; where capital Localism and public value 103 is predominantly raised within a specific region; and where collective services and economic regulation are provided by means of public–private partnerships between trade associations and regional government (Hirst, 1994: 128). Decen- tralization and locally embedded ownership are key elements of his approach. Similarly, an associationalist welfare state would be decentralized and pluralistic. It would be divided into self-governing regions, into distinct and competing voluntary associations and into different, functionally distinct service sectors. The poor and vulnerable would still be able to receive common minimum entitlements, but they would be able to choose from a number of different agencies to provide them. Although associationalism requires a considerable degree of devolution to voluntary associations, Hirst also argues that some effective form of wider public power (i.e. some form of ‘government’), based on representative democratic principles, should remain in place. Among other things this would be responsible for legislation, high-level regulation, taxation, and the payment to all citizens of a General Basic Income. The state would also help to ensure that both associations and commercial companies exercised their responsibilities in an open and democratic fashion. A defining feature of the contemporary ‘turn’ to localism is the emphasis that it places on bottom-up political participation and policy action. The intrinsically positive value of bottom-up localism rests on two important grounds. The first is that the local is invariably the setting in which the real-world effects of policy actions that have been decided further up the chain of political command actually work themselves out in practice Bailey ( and Pill, 2015). Thus a commitment to localism in political analysis is also a commitment to be held accountable by real-world, objective outcomes in local communities. Secondly, and just as importantly from a normative point of view, bottom-up localism can be seen as an essential adjunct to the public goods of democracy and accountability. Here the argument is that democracy and accountability for individual citizens are automatically strengthened when they are aligned with the collective dimension of democracy for localities and communities. Thus, a key conclusion to be drawn from the argument in this section is that the notion of democracy itself needs to be extended to embrace not just the rights of individual citizens, and of groups or classes of citizens, but the ‘place-based’ rights of local neighbourhoods and communities as well.

Localism and human wellbeing The term ‘wellbeing’ is used here to embrace a range of factors connected with the health, education, happiness and flourishing of individuals. Historically, it constitutes a second significant wave in the establishment of public value within the political realm, and the first to become truly internationalized. In the current global context, human wellbeing is usually referred to as ‘human development’, and it is now a major thrust of the United Nations’ humanitarian programmes and 104 Localism and public value interventions (UNDP, 2020), as well as those of many other international non- governmental organizations (NGOs). In some parts of the world, levels of wellbeing are relatively well advanced, particularly where they are underpinned by welfare state systems. Welfare state policies are based on the assumption that the state should play a significant role in helping to meet fundamental human needs. Such needs can be understood as being partly individual, and partly social in nature. According to Doyal and Gough, the two most basic human needs applying to individuals are ‘survival/health’ on the one hand, and ‘autonomy/learning’ on the other (Doyal and Gough, 1984: 10). In order to act effectively as agents, human beings need not only to be able to survive physically but also to have enough sense of their own identity so as to be able to carry out intentional actions. This in turn implies a need for ‘creative consciousness’, that is the ability to formulate goals and the strategies required to achieve them. In all cultures, language skills are necessary for individuals to learn how to order their world conceptually and to decide how they will operate in it. Essen- tially, language is a social phenomenon which is taught and used by people interacting with each other. Thus, successful individual action always occurs within a wider social context and relies on the healthy, autonomous existence of others. Doyal and Gough argue that, in addition to having these basic human needs, individuals share a number of basic social needs. These are material production, biological reproduction, cultural transmission and political authority. These wider social needs must also be fulfilled if the basic human needs of individuals are to be met, and if society as a whole is to function effectively. Material production involves more than just the making of goods. It includes the exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services as well. As for cultural transmission, this involves the passing on of key social norms and understandings from one generation to the next. However, the process of cultural transmission can only succeed if it is supported by political authority and by some system of legal sanctions. In Doyal and Gough’s account, the fundamental framework of human needs set out earlier is complemented by a further dynamic element. This is the optimization of human needs through time and history. At the level of the individual, and in the right conditions, this may lead to human flourishing and liberation. At the level of society, it can be realized through the establishment of social and political structures that are designed to maximize human flourishing. According to Doyal and Gough, the main precondition for meeting human needs is the presence of redistributive mechanisms underpinned by the state. This becomes an argument for some form of welfare state, defined as the collective recognition by society of certain human needs, and the organization of mechanisms to meet those needs (Doyal and Gough, op. cit.: 25–32). Thus, state intervention has a key role to play in ensuring that basic human needs are met and that human potential is maximized.

Global dimensions of wellbeing and human development As mentioned earlier in this section, universal human development is a central and long-standing aim of the UN. Since its formation in 1965, the United Nations Localism and public value 105 Development Programme (UNDP) has been promoting and monitoring levels of human development and wellbeing across all of the UN’s member states. Each year since 1990, the UNDP has published an influential Human Development Report. The latter is the most authoritative global statement of the various elements which go to make up human development, as well as its opposite: deprivation. These are encapsulated in the report’s presentation of its Human Development Index (HDI). This is a composite statistical measure of each member state’s relative level of human development/deprivation. Its principal uses are to rank states’ overall levels of development against one another, and to measure their individual and collective progress from one year to the next. Since 2010, the Human Development Report has presented four complementary indices of development in its statistical tables. These are the basic HDI (comprising four measures covering life expectancy, number of years spent in full-time education, and gross national income per capita); a second version of the HDI specifically adjusted for inequality; a Gender Equality Index; and a Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index (UNDP, 2015: 204). Taking all these measures into account, the global HDI figure for 2019 (the latest year for which data are available) was 0.731. However, in 2010 the global index figure stood at 0.68, and in 1990 it stood at 0.57. Accord- ing to the UNDP, there has been a gradual improvement in the overall level of human development as measured by the HDI over the past 50 yearsUNDP, ( 2010). Progress in education has been substantial and widespread. This reflects not just improvements in the overall quantity of schooling provided but also the growth in women’s access to education across the world. Advances in human health over the period have also been significant but have slowed in recent years due largely to some dramatic reversals in Sub-Saharan countries and in the former Soviet Union. Progress in income per capita has varied widely across different countries. On average, per capita income in rich countries has grown much more rapidly in the past 40 years than it has in poorer ones. Paradoxically, this suggests that progress in education and health can themselves do much to drive successes in human development, even where economic growth itself is less pronounced ( UNDP, 2010). This last point is confirmed in a more powerful way by Wilkinson and Pickett in their influential bookThe Spirit Level. These authors analyse data from 23 mainly advanced states across a range of wellbeing-related outcomes, including physical health and life expectancy; obesity; mental health and drug use; educational performance; teenage births; exposure to violent crime; imprisonment and pun- ishment; and social mobility. They argue that, across each of the aforementioned indicators, the extent of problem conditions appears to vary according to the level of income inequality within the state concerned. Furthermore, the extent of problems is consistently greater among the better-off groups living in unequal societies than it is within the same groups living in societies where there is greater equality.

Co-production and the relational state With regard to advanced states, many are now beginning to realize that they need to take human wellbeing much more seriously than they have in the past. This 106 Localism and public value stems from the perception that wellbeing is not an automatic consequence of economic growth (Mulgan, 2009: 71). High levels of wellbeing correlate with a wide range of factors including national wealth, state welfare policies, income equality (or the lack of it), social tolerance, political freedom and the rule of law. Together, these factors explain some 70–80% of the differences between countries. Govern- ments are increasingly moving away from acting as the providers of welfare and public services for people, to acting with the public in order to achieve common goals. This shift can be understood as one from a ‘delivery’ state to a ‘relational’ one (Mulgan, 2012: 20). The goal of improving relationships with the public may encourage new ways of involving the public in the day-to-day business of government. However, not all parts of the state can, or indeed need to, become relational to the same degree. Care for the elderly is an excellent example of a service in which a relational approach can pay real dividends, but there are many other official functions and services that are best delivered in an automated and trans- actional way. The perceived desire of governments to improve relationships with their citizens is also behind the growing interest in the ‘co-production’ of public services with citizens and clients. From a public value standpoint, John Alford argues that co-production is absolutely necessary for some services, if they are to have any positive effect at all. To the extent that public sector clients derive their own -pri vate value from a service, they are in a similar position to that of any private sector consumer. Both private and public sector ‘customers’ are involved in an exchange with the providing organization. However, because in the provision of a public service no money changes hands, the exchange is much more of a social, than an economic, one (Alford, 2011: 146). Seen in this way, the exchange between a public organization and its clients is one in which the clients ‘pay’ not with money but with specific behaviours. This is the essence of co-production. In many cases (e.g. support for the unemployed), the service in question can only really succeed if there is effective co-production with the client. The same can even be said of a statutory function such as tax assessment. Alford outlines the key factors that will induce public service clients to both co-operate and co-produce. These are sanctions, material rewards, and non-material ‘motivators’. The latter include various types of motivating behaviours such as: encouraging the client’s own sense of competence; increasing the client’s self-worth and confidence; encouraging social contact with clients and a sense of belonging; and convincing clients that the service is worthwhile and effectively organized. Indeed, the process of delivering private value to individual public service clients can have the effect of creating public value on a much broader scale for citizens overall. In contrast to Mulgan’s view of the relational state, Marc Stears (2012) argues that the state’s role is not so much relational, as it is one of promoting stand- ardization. The state can ‘standardize’ human and social experience in a number of different ways, including through legislation and regulation, and also through the way in which it shapes social norms and experiences. If states care for relationships, then they should seek to do what they can to create the standardized Localism and public value 107 background conditions in which relationships can flourish. The state- can help peo ple to find the physical space, time, organization and power which they need in order to build effective relationships, but it is unlikely ever to be the main agent of a relational revolution itself. Mike Bennett (2006: 35) argues that the state’s role is to maintain a community of citizens who not only are free to pursue their own individual projects but also understand that they are part of a broader political community in which interests are both shared and contested.

Universal basic services One of the obvious conclusions to be drawn from the previous discussion is that, while the role of national government may be seen essentially as one of stand- ardization, it may be more appropriate to see that of regional, local and neighbourhood governments as promoting much closer relationships with citizens in relation to the conduct of government and the delivery of public services. The kind of approach that might be considered in this context is that of Local Public Support (LPS). This is an idea put forward several years ago by theUniversity of Birmingham Policy Commission (2011). The Commission defines LPS as ‘the co-ordination of all available resources (including public, private, civic and personal) to offer “helpful acts” of various kinds . . . that are appropriate to need and circumstance, and which promote individual and collective well-being’ (Univer- sity of Birmingham, 2011: 50). In order to make LPS work, four key conditions need to be fulfilled: firstly, citizens need to become ‘co-authors of their wellbeing’. Secondly, there needs to be a new type of public servant who is able to fulfil a variety of roles and who is equipped with a range of skills regardless of professional identity. Thirdly, it is necessary to have a ‘connected and connective’ local government or local voluntary sector, which is close to the communities it represents. Finally, it is also necessary to design a much clearer and more detailed accountability framework between national government and localities (see also Chapter 7). The kind of framework that might be envisaged in this context is a system of ‘Universal Basic Services’ (UBS) along the lines proposed by a number of scholars recently, including Ian Gough (2019). The notion of UBS has been proposed by the Global Prosperity Institute as a way of making a broadened range of public services available locally, in order that citizens can access certain levels of security, participation and opportunity within their local communities. In this context ‘basic’ means not just a minimum level of service but also one which is both ‘essential and sufficient’Gough, ( 2019: 534). The services available to citizens under the UBS umbrella would include health, education, housing, nutrition, transport and access to information. Under UBS, everyone would be entitled to access these services, regardless of their ability to pay. According to Gough, most basic human needs can be satisfied through the ‘foundational economy’. This includes all the everyday services that people use regularly, including those which are part of the welfare state. In both the UK 108 Localism and public value and Europe, the foundational sector of the economy accounts for some 50% of employment and of overall spending. It is predominantly local in character, and it is usually taken for granted until it fails (Gough, op. cit.: 537). The elements of the foundational economy differ from other parts of the economy in two ways: firstly, its benefits tend to be delivered through infrastructure, networks and branches, as opposed to the purchase of specific commodities; and, secondly, it is also rela - tively sheltered from international competition. However, this raises the question of how this extensive range of basic needs satisfiers should be provided. Should it always be delivered by the public sector, or by voluntary associations as Paul Hirst has proposed (see previous section)? And is the implication that public and voluntary-sector involvement should be extended further into fields like -bank ing, housing and IT connectivity? There is always a danger of officials, experts or politicians telling people what they think they should have. Identifying suitable needs satisfiers therefore requires a ‘dual strategy’: on the one hand, that of citizen involvement and decentralized practices, but equally of practices that are informed by relevant scientific findings and professional expertise. UBS should therefore be part of a locally based, problem-solving approach, rather than a more centralized, ‘preference-aggregating’ one (Gough, 2019: 536).

Localism and environmental sustainability According to Robert Cox and Daniel Béland (2013: 307), sustainability has become a dominant theme in policy discourse. Originally used in the field of environmental policy, the term ‘sustainability’ is now routinely used in other sectors such as finance, markets, employment, energy, and institutional and process design. The notion of sustainability suggests a growing concern for the long-term effects of actions and decisions. It also implies an increasing dissatisfaction with current policy approaches. As an idea, sustainability, particularly in its environmental sense, represents the third and the most contemporary of the three major paradigms of public value highlighted in this chapter, and the first to engage all nations and localities across the world on an equal basis. Politically speaking, environmental sustainability is much more about whole systems and networks than it is about individual institutions or particular territorial units. At its core, environmental sustainability is about the relationship between human beings and nature. This relationship is captured in the idea of the Anthropocene, that is the claim that we have now entered a new geological age: that of humans.1 According to Jedediah Purdy, we now live in an age when nature can no longer be said to exist as something apart from humanity. In the Anthropocene, all our landscapes and natural environments, urban, rural and even those which are uninhabited, have been comprehensively shaped by human activity (Purdy, 2015: 1).

Urban and rural dimensions of space, place and scale With this in mind, it is possible to distinguish between two generic kinds of place/ space. On the one hand, there is that which is heavily inhabited by humans, and Localism and public value 109 on the other, that which is largely uninhabited or ‘natural’. Natural spaces or ‘wildernesses’ have always been highly relevant for certain cultural and political imaginaries, including those featured in the works of ecological, conservationist and Green thinkers such as John Muir (1901), Aldo Leopold (1949) and more recently George Monbiot (2013). However, a more relevant spatial distinction is that which is conventionally drawn between urban and rural environments. Gen- erally speaking, both the urban and the rural can be regarded as forms of ‘inhabited’ rather than ‘natural’ space. As far as urban space is concerned, Davoudi and Stead (2002: 269) note that the history of urbanization can be traced back about 5,000 years to when the first cities began to appear in Mesopotamia. These were not only relatively small agglomerations but also highly dependent on the rural settlements surrounding them. The extent of urbanization gradually grew during the medieval period, but it did not really gather pace until the time of the Industrial Revolution. Davoudi and Stead argue that before 1850 there was no society anywhere in the world that could properly be described as urban, and even by 1900 only Britain could realistically be regarded as an urban nation. Today, by contrast, more than half of the world’s seven-plus billion population are city dwellers, and now all industrial nations are highly urbanized. The distinction between urban and rural environments may be defined in several ways. The two criteria most often used for definition in the UK and Europe are population density and land use. With regard to population, a distinction is usually made between ‘dense’ urban locations (i.e. those with more than 500 inhabitants per km2) and ‘intermediate’ urban locations. On the other hand, ‘sparsely populated’ areas are those which contain fewer than 100 inhabitants per km2 (Stead, 2002: 300). As for land-use definitions, they usually designate as rural areas those locations where the main land-use features are: agriculture, forestry, mineral extraction, landfill, water and open space. On the other hand, the definition ‘urban’ is usually applied to locations where the principal land-use factors are residential, industrial, commercial and transport-related. One definitional uncertainty that muddies the distinction between urban and rural in many parts of the world (though not so much in the UK and Europe – see more later) concerns the precise extension of urban centres’ boundaries. For example in South-East Asia, the growth of extended metropolitan regions where agricultural and non-agricultural activities are spatially integrated makes the standard European distinction between urban and rural especially difficult to apply (Tacoli, 1998: 148). A second major uncertainty which hangs over any neat definition of urban space is the fact that cities depend for basic services on an area which extends well beyond the city boundaries themselves. This is expressed in the concept of cities’ ‘ecological footprints’ (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). The size of a city’s ecological footprint is typically several times larger than that of the urban area concerned. This is where considerations of scale and power start to come into play, as well as those of place and space. In the UK the accelerating pace of urbanization and its associated problems have provided the context for a marked ‘urban–rural dichotomy’. This came to the 110 Localism and public value fore particularly strongly during the course of the nineteenth century (Hunt, 2005; 13–184). For a long time this led to two fiercely opposing schools of thought. On the one hand, there was the anti-urban view which idealized the rural way of life and expressed regret at its disappearance; on the other was the pro-urban view which saw industrial cities as the main drivers of progress, innovation and modernization. It is likely that these conflicting perspectives marked the fault line of major power shifts taking place in society, which themselves were being brought about by shifts in geographical and political scale. More specifically, they also influenced the founding fathers of the UK planning movement to try and draw very clear dividing lines between town and country environments (Davoudi and Stead, 2002: 270). Patsy Healey (2002: 333) argues that the idea of an urban–rural dichotomy has been a factor in European policy making as well. In some parts of Europe, cities were the centres of elite activity, while rural areas were merely seen as some kind of supporting backcloth. In other parts of Europe, however, it is rural locations which have been treasured as a kind of superior counterpoint to the city. Either way, the illusion of separation between town and country runs deep and still manifests itself in the organization of government in many cases. Against this background, it is interesting to note how the most recent policy initiatives at both European and UK level have sought to promote a more balanced and integrated approach to spatial development across urban and rural areas European( Com- mission, 1999; Local Government Association, 1999). This is encapsulated in the increasing prominence being accorded to the concept of the ‘city region’ within both the UK and Europe. The increasing attention being given to city regions raises a key question about the theoretical relationship between urban and rural locations and the interdependence between them. This can be understood in a number of ways, but perhaps the critical issue here is the nature and quality of that interdependent relationship and how it plays out in particular circumstances. To what extent, for example, can the relationship between rural and urban be characterized as one of complementarity, cohesion and openness to the wider world? To what degree is it one of dominance, exploitation and insularity? Following Massey (1995, 2005), it may make sense to see ‘natural’ and rural spaces, not only as the main source of crops and raw materials for adjacent urban areas to consume, transform and distribute for trading purposes but also as a key site for meeting the leisure and spiritual needs of urban residents. These varying functions can be subsumed under heading of ‘ecosystem services’ (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Jordan and Russel, 2014). For their part, cities and towns can be seen as providing their adjacent rural communities with access to enhanced levels of social and commercial activity such manufacturing, trade, finance, politics and culture. With rising global population, the assumptions of urban–rural interdependency and ecosystem balance outlined in the earlier theoretical discussion now find themselves under severe strain in many parts of the world.Wimberly and Morris (2006: 2) present figures to show that as global population increases, the Localism and public value 111 proportion of those living in rural areas is also falling significantly – from some 70% of the world’s population in 1950, to just under 53% -in 2000 and to a pro jected 39% by the year 2030. The authors note that around the globe, the greatest extremes of poverty and lack of development also tend to be concentrated in rural areas. In addition, rural inhabitants often have to put up with the effects of waste products produced by nearby cities. This disparity in power, prosperity and patterns of living between urban and rural areas in many parts of the world raises major questions for the continuing viability and sustainability of the regions most severely affected.

The case for sustainable development and local policy action In The Age of Sustainable Development, Jeffrey Sachs outlines the ways in which modern economic development is now coming up against the constraints imposed by the world’s ecosystems. The resulting tension manifests itself in the following environmental pathologies: climate change, ocean acidification, ozone depletion, agricultural and chemical pollution, over-use of freshwater resources, harmful land practices, and reduction in biodiversitySachs, ( 2015: 185–193). Overcoming these effects represents the core challenge for sustainable development. One of the challenges of addressing global food security for world’s rapidly growing population is the huge variation in farming systems across the world. Agriculture now constitutes some 40% of the world’s total land area. However the spread of agriculture can also lead to harmful deforestation in some parts of the world (Sachs op. cit.: 331). Similarly, farming can cause environmental harm through excessive use of nitrogen fertilizers and an over-concentration on livestock farming. Meanwhile, the global food chain itself is being threatened by climate change and by ocean acidification, as well as by excessive groundwater pumping and the introduction of invasive species. There are, however, a number of basic remedies that sustainable farming practices can focus on. These include the use of more drought-resistant and nutritious crop varieties and the adoption of ‘precision farming’ farming methods, particularly in low-income countries (Sachs, op. cit.: 349–350). Sachs also outlines the huge pressures that are being placed on the earth’s biodiversity. When biodiversity is threatened, ecosystems as a whole are diminished, and the services they provide become degraded. Indeed, it is humanity’s assault on the world’s ecological systems that is effectively threatening all other species currently (Sachs, op. cit.: 456). This is despite the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) agreed at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. In this context, the effects arising from deforestation and unmanaged aquaculture are particularly acute. Indeed, some aspects of the CBD, including the headline goal of reducing the rate of biodiversity loss, have failed completely, according to recent official assessments (Sachs, op. cit.: 476). Of all the environmental sustainability challenges outlined earlier, however, the one that governments across the world currently consider to be the most urgent is 112 Localism and public value runaway climate change. According to John Dryzek and his fellow authors (Dry- zek et al., 2011: 3), ‘climate change is perhaps the most profound challenge ever to have confronted human, social, political and economic systems’. At a global level, the climate challenge is being addressed through the United Nations Frame- work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which has been signed by all the member states of the UN. Representatives of the Convention’s signatories meet every year in December to assess the global situation and to make new proposals. The Convention receives expert advice from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In the fifth and latest of its periodic assessments, published as four separate reports in 2013–2014,2 the IPCC confirms that global warming and the climate and environmental changes resulting from it are pro- ceeding apace across the planet. Currently, the world is emitting some 55 billion tons of greenhouse gases per annum, of which around 35 billion comes from CO2. Despite the actions already taken through the UNFCCC, the level of emissions is rising steadily (Sachs, 2015: 401). This poses massive threats to the world’s ecosystems and to the future of human existence as we know it. That said, there are some obvious ways in which damaging climate change can be mitigated, for example through greater energy efficiency and through a major shift in fuel use. Such a shift requires the expansion of energy generated from renewable sources such as solar, wind, hydro, tidal, marine, biomass, underground, geothermal and anaerobic digestion. One of the distinctive features of energy derived from these sources is its essentially ‘distributed’ nature. Renewable energies do not need to be generated through the burning of fossil fuels, most of which have been extracted with considerable effort and cost from beneath the earth’s surface. Rather, most of the above sources of energy can be accessed by using technology to harness a range of natural forces within local settings. Many analysts argue that a more localized approach to energy generation could be just as effective as conventional large-scale production, particularly when it is supported by an ‘intelligent’ distribution infrastructure. According to Jeremy Rifkin, the world is on the cusp of a convergence of communications and energy regimes. According to him, this coming together of internet technology and renewable energies is now ushering in a ‘third industrial revolution’. With renewable energies increasingly set to form the basis of the economy, a new organizational dynamic is beginning to emerge. As Rifkin argues, ‘these dispersed energies will be collected at millions of local sites and then bundled and shared with others over intelligent power networks to achieve optimum energy levels and maintain a high-performing, sustainable economy’ (Rifkin, 2011: 115). Despite this optimistic assessment, there are institutional and political factors which continue to work powerfully in favour of the conventional, large-scale energy production. The most deep-seated of these is what Catherine Mitchell, writing about the UK energy market in particular, calls the ‘regulatory state paradigm’. Mitchell compares this to a ‘band of iron’ holding the existing market-led framework for energy supply together (Mitchell, 2008: 2). This way of thinking about energy has led recent UK governments to reach for nuclear energy as a potential solution to the problems of energy security and climate changeBaker ( Localism and public value 113 and Stoker, 2013: 598). In many recent UK government documents, nuclear power has been presented alongside renewable technologies as a positive, ‘low- carbon’ response to the challenges posed by climate change DECC,( 2012: 18). Unlike renewable energy, however, nuclear is the most environmentally dangerous, not to mention the most centralized of all power-generation technologies. Yet Baker and Stoker note that many governments around the world now appear to be moving in the direction of nuclear power, with 61 new nuclear reactors under construction and over 500 others at various stages of planning reported in 2011. In addition, Baker and Stoker observe that public support for nuclear remains quite strong in Britain, unlike in some other European countries such as Germany (Baker and Stoker, 2013: 587–589). A similar pattern of ‘regulatory state’ think - ing can be detected in the current debate taking place in the UK and in some other countries, over the use of fracking for shale gas. Like nuclear energy, fracking is a sophisticated technology which requires a critical mass of large-scale finance, logistical capacity and centralized regulation to support it. That said, in the light of the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement and of the latest assessments from the IPCC (IPCC, 2018, 2019), a number of the world’s countries are now beginning to commit themselves to net-zero emissions by the year 2050 (or in some cases earlier than that). The list of countries that have now committed themselves to a net-zero target includes the UK and several member states of the European Union (EU), as well as the EU as an organization in its own right (Climate Home News, 2020).3 However, a number of large and powerful states including Australia, Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United States are still actively resisting concerted climate-change action. Yet, even while progress on the global front is being held up by a group of recalcitrant nations, most sub-national, city, and local governments across the world are declaring themselves to be fully in support of action to address climate change. For example, in the United States, where the federal government had a fairly poor record of support for global climate action in recent years, many individual states and cities – for example California, Florida and Seattle – have taken purposeful action in areas such as emissions reporting, expansion of public transport, and public education (Rabe, 2007; Giddens, 2009: 127). Similarly in India, the state of Gujarat has made proactive use of its powers under the country’s federal constitution to become a notable leader in energy developments in the sub-continent (Jorgensen, 2012; The Ecologist, 2014). In addition, one can point to the solemn commitments entered into by the C40 group of the world’s 96 major cities, as well as those made by the 20,000-plus signatories of both the EU and the Global Covenants of Mayors. All of these local governments are focused on combating climate change and the many other factors that are threatening the world’s ecosystems ( Global Covenant of Mayors, 2020).

Joining up the domains of public value As highlighted in the previous section, one of the key features of environmental sustainability is the systemic nature of the phenomena it is most directly concerned 114 Localism and public value with. This is also clear from the close interrelationship that exists between each of the UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Sachs’s account of them rests on a vision of rational, goal-based development, underpinned by principles of good governance, global ethics, and a belief in the power of human progress. As Sachs argues, sustainable development is both a normative outlook and a science-based analysis of complex systems. In this sense, it is an all-embracing concept capable of providing a comprehensive rationale for public policy and for political problem-solving (Sachs, 2015: 43). As Sachs makes clear, the actions needed to achieve sustainable development not only include those that come under the heading of environmental sustainability but also encompass most aspects of human wellbeing and economic development. For this reason the list of SDGs – which were agreed by the UN in September 2015 – includes several which address environmental issues- spe cifically: for example, ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation (SDG6); ensuring access to affordable, sustainable modern energy (SDG7); taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG13); conserving the ocean and marine resources (SDG14); and protecting and -restor ing territorial ecosystems, sustainably managing forests, and halting biodiversity loss (SDG15). To go alongside these, there are also SDGs which relate directly to human wellbeing, for example ending hunger (SDG2); ensuring healthy lives for all (SDG3); ensuring high-quality education and lifelong learning for all (SDG4); achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls (SDG5). The list of SDGs also includes goals which relate directly to economic development, such as providing sustainable economic growth and decent work for all (SDG8); and building resilient infrastructure and promoting sustainable industrialization (SDG9). Finally, SDGs include some ‘cohesion’ goals, such as reducing inequalities in and among countries (SDG10); and promoting peaceful and inclusive societies (SDG16). The date specified for completing the programme of global transformation set out in the SDGs is September 2030 (Sachs, op. cit.: 486–489). One domain of public value that is specifically not included in the UN’s list of Sustainable Development Goals is democracy. As Sachs argues, sustainable development is an idea which binds together the distinctive realms of society, economy, environment and politics. But the aspect of politics that Sachs particularly has in mind in relation to the SDGs is good governance, rather than democracy per se. For Sachs, governance has a range of important elements associated with it, and it applies as much to private businesses as it does to governments and public sector bodies. In specific terms, good governance requires that all relevant organizations operate according to the rule of law, and according to the principles of accountability, transparency and responsiveness to the needs of stakeholders. In the political sphere, good governance puts the onus on governments to secure the active engagement of the public on critical issues of policy, and to conduct themselves with fairness and honesty at all times (Sachs, op. cit.: 42). While on normative grounds it is difficult to fault this vision of good governance, it does nevertheless come across very strongly as the view of a professional public Localism and public value 115 servant. While high standards of governance are certainly essential for tackling the systemic problems the world is facing, it is also true that Sachs tends to under- play that part of democracy which is about the clash and the reconciliation of conflicting political interests and values.

Territorial cohesion within political systems: the case of the European Union Consideration of how the various core dimensions of PV are linked together at a systemic level allows us to widen our analysis in this chapter and to look at one further domain of public value: that of territorial cohesion (TC). As a public good in its own right, TC is principally about the process of governance itself, as well as about system articulation. In this section, we explore this ‘system-based’ dimension of public value in the multi-level context of the EU. As noted in Chapter 3, the EU is a distinct new form of political order based on inter-state solidarity; the rule of law; trade and economic integration; a broad cultural heritage; and a shared set of rights and values. Although elements of its distinctive approach to governance are still emerging, and although it sometimes appears in danger of being overwhelmed by the various problems which face it, the EU is a political enterprise that is fully worthy of empirical attention. This short case study looks at how the EU addresses the territorial governance challenge it faces and at how, throughout the course of its history, it has systematically championed the secondary, or meso, aspect of localism in particular. At the end of the section two principal case-study questions are addressed: what are the factors explaining the EU’s approach, and what are the EU’s prospects as a unique political enterprise?

Introduction to the EU The European Union is not a sovereign state but a macro-scale, political and economic union made up, since February 2020, of 27 sovereign states. Its combined population, estimated at just under 447 million (Eurostat, 2020), is the third largest in the world after those of China and India. Its legal basis is set out in a succession of treaties agreed since its foundation as the European Community in 1958. Its name was officially changed to the European Union after the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993. The EU has a number of key institutions. The EU Council, which is composed of the heads of government of the 27 member states, is the EU’s main forum for political decision-making. It is chaired by the EU president who is elected by the heads of government to serve for a term of five years. The current president, Charles Michel, is a former prime minister of Belgium (see Chapter 3) and he began his term of office on 1 December 2019. The EU Council is supported by the European Commission, whose headquarters are located in Brussels. As the EU’s permanent ‘civil service’, the Commission supports the various councils 116 Localism and public value of member state ministers which meet on a regular basis to decide the details of EU policy. It also administers the allocation of EU funds. The Commission has its own president who in effect acts as the Chief Executive of the EU. The current Commission President is the former German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen. Her five-year term of office, like that of Charles Michel, began on 1 December 2019. As a civil service-type body, the EU Commission not only implements EU Council decisions but also has specific powers to propose new EU legislation and regulations. Throughout the course of its history, the Commission has consistently made use of these powers and it has steadily expanded its policy remit as a result. This is what British and other opponents of the EU appear to have in mind when they refer to the ‘unelected bureaucrats in Brussels’ (see later in the chapter). The Commission President is supported by 26 other EU commis- sioners, one nominated by each of the EU’s member states. In addition to these two executive bodies, the EU has a directly elected European Parliament, whose members (MEPs) are elected by direct suffrage once every five years. Each member state has the right to elect a certain number of MEPs, calculated in accordance with the size of its population. The total number of MEPs in the current parliament, elected in May 2019, is 705. The European Parliament is based in three separate locations: Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg, and its members move around regularly between these three sites. Established in 1979, its substantive powers remain somewhat limited in relation to the EU Council and the EU Commission. However, as a deliberative body, it does wield a considerable amount of influence, and it is certainly now a key player within the European public sphere. The EU also has its own Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) located in Luxembourg. Established in 1952, the ECJ is the highest authority on all matters concerning EU law. Nineteen of the EU’s member states share a single currency, the Euro, which was introduced in 2002. Together they form the Eurozone, a grouping of states whose monetary policy is set by the European Central Bank (ECB) based in Frankfurt. With this book’s theme in mind, it is worth noting that the EU has also established a Committee of the Regions (CoR). This advisory body was founded in 1994, and it contains representation from regional, city and local governments across the whole of the EU. In 2020, the CoR had 350 members, of which each member state had at least five (Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta), and other states many more, up to a maximum of 24 (France, Germany, Italy). Under the EU’s Treaties, the CoR has a right to be consulted on all proposals which directly affect the EU’s regions and cities. It also has the power to make direct representations to the European Court of Justice on how the EU’s subsidiarity principle should be applied in specific cases. Though the CoR has an important symbolic role within the EU’s institutional landscape, it is far from being a central player within the EU’s decision-making machinery (see alsoChapter 8).

Rescaling within the EU and the rise of the meso As stated earlier, the EU is neither a sovereign state, nor is it a federal one. Rather, it is a fairly close-knit ‘federation of states’, but one which has some Localism and public value 117 very powerful institutions in common. Nicolaidis (2001) suggests that, as a political grouping, the EU goes much further than any federation in history has ever done before. It offers the world a cosmopolitan vision of what -gov ernance beyond the state might look like. In this post-federal order, legitimacy resides not so much in the territorial locus of sovereignty but in the effec - tiveness and responsiveness of governance processes across a broad spatial canvas. Indeed, in recent years, where the EU has been most innovative is in the way it has sought to exploit the flexibilities offered by multi-level and networked governance. One of the most noticeable impacts of EU governance on the territorial politics of its 27 member states has been to drive forward the logic for a regional scale of organization. This rescaling trend can be explained by a number of different factors. It has been partly driven by new patterns of centrality and peripherality, which have emerged within the new institutional context of the EU itself Keat-( ing, 2013: 10). However, more fundamental to the process of rescaling have been the dynamics of global capitalism, as it has developed over the past 40 years. This development was briefly highlighted earlier, in Chapter. The3 evolution of capitalist production has meant that certain locations have become key nodes for the flow of communications and business transactions. City regions, for example, have outpaced other parts of their respective states and are seen increasingly as the engines of economic development Brenner,( 1999: 41; Keating, op. cit.: 113). Michael Keating describes this turn towards the regional scale of organization within the EU as the rise of ‘meso’ government. However, meso-level government takes a wide range of forms across the EU. The type of constitutional regime under which the meso level operates within different EU states varies between ‘classic’ federalism (Austria, Belgium, Germany); regional government or regional state (Denmark, France, Italy, Slovakia); and a range of other variants. 4 These developments are not the outcome of EU-led reform or policy making as such. They arise from the dynamics of ‘competitive regionalism’ within the different member states themselves. As Keating argues, meso-government is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with a spectrum of different possibilities inherent in it (Keating, op. cit.: 109).5 Where, however, the EU has wielded a more direct influence on territorial -pol icy is through the fundamental attachment it has always shown towards the idea of subsidiarity, and its promotion of economic development at the regional level (Elias, 2008).

Subsidiarity and the EU’s territorial agenda The principle of subsidiarity was enshrined in the Single European Act of 1986. In essence, subsidiarity is about the level at which government powers are most appropriately located, with the proviso that such powers should be exercised at the lowest possible level that is compatible with effective government. How- ever, what is especially at stake with the EU’s commitment to subsidiarity is the direct challenge that some see it as posing to the notion of the sovereign state; 118 Localism and public value particularly where it is considered that some sovereign powers might – perhaps even should – be exercised at the sub-national, rather than at the national level (see for example the case of Catalonia/Spain in Chapter 3). In the case of the EU, the Single European Act quickly led to an emphasis on the region as the main driver of economic development. From the early 1980s onwards, the European Commission had already begun work on creating an administrative classification and database of the constituent territories making up the EU at varying levels of population (Eurostat, 2016). This was the ‘nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’ (or NUTS) classificatory system, and it became the basis for the allocation of the EU regional payments after the Single European Act came into force. Anwen Elias notes how the introduction of EU regional policy and the early constitutional changes in favour of subsidiarity (for example the formation of the EU Committee of the Regions in 1994), gave regional actors new opportunities to access public funding and to participate directly in the policy-making processes of the EU. ‘Regional actors’ in this case included: regional and local authorities; sec- toral regional associations; and regionalist and minority nationalist parties. Many of these players sensed an opportunity for Europe to transform itself into a polity that ‘gave legal and institutional recognition to the cultural and linguistic specifi- cities of historic nations and regions’ (Elias, 2008: 484). However, by the time of the millennium much of the ‘hype’ that had been associated with the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ had begun to subside. By then it was becoming clear that only the very best resourced and connected of European regions were in a position to exercise any real influence on the EU’s decision-making processes. Meanwhile, national governments had proven themselves to be highly adept as ‘gatekeepers’ of the EU’s regional funding programmes. In more recent years, however, with the expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe, there has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of the local and regional levels of governance within the EU. This has arisen in connection with the EU’s ‘territorial agenda’ which came to prominence in the mid- 2000s in the run-up to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in June 2009. It is set out in some detail in the European Commission’s Green Paper of 2008. This document offers a far more coherent and comprehensive spatial development strategy for the EU’s diverse geography than any of the Commission’s earlier proposals. There are a number of significant aspects to note in connection with this new direction in European regional policy. Firstly, it is overtly place-based and holistic in its emphasis, rather than being focused around discrete policy areas. Secondly, the main idea driving it is ‘cohesion’, that is to say ensuring that all parts of the EU enjoy comparable levels of prosperity and wellbeing, and that the needs of the more disadvantaged communities are given priority for public funding. Finally, there is a commitment to ensuring that all levels of government, as well as business and private actors, are effectively involved in decision-making, using an approach based on mutuality and multi-level governance (CEC, 2011: 9). Localism and public value 119 Territorial cohesion and spatial flexibility Territorial cohesion (TC) was introduced brieflyChapter 2. in Its main purpose, as mentioned earlier, is to address the structural disadvantages which some parts of the union experience relative to those which are more economically advanced. In some regions, the disadvantages to be overcome consist typically in overpopu- lation, industrial decline and environmental degradation; in others they are more about geographical remoteness combined with a lack of transport and communications infrastructure (CEC, 2008: 7). As mentioned earlier, the principal advantage of a TC approach is that it cuts across individual sectors and encourages an integrated and strategic approach to policy. This in turn encompasses economic effectiveness, social cohesion, and ecological balance. It puts the sustainable development of individual places at the heart of policy making and institutional action (CEC, op. cit.: 4). It can be seen as an attempt to promote a kind of ‘spatial justice’ within the EU. It is very much the sort of approach to governance that Jef- frey Sachs (see previous section) would identify with. In 2009 the principle of economic, social and territorial cohesion was officially enshrined in sections 174–178 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty European( Parliament, 2016). Cohesion is now also the driving principle behind the allocation of funds from the EU’s seven-year grant funding programmes (CEC, 2011). This ‘convergence’ funding now accounts for over 80% of the EU’s regional aid budget and over 100 regions in 18 member states were receiving allocations from this source in 2011 (Holder and Layard, 2011: 366). The beneficiaries included Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, among other regions and sub-regions in the UK. Holder and Layard argue that the territorial cohesion agenda is leading to some interesting experiments in territorial governance across Europe, including the new European Groupings on Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs). A key feature of these recent collaborations is that they involve the efforts of public and private sec - tor partners at all levels, each with broadly equal status, as part of an integrated approach to place-making. Quite a number of the newly established EGTCs are cross-border in scope (e.g. Lille/Tournai in France/Belgium; or Galicia/Norte in Spain/Portugal). With more than 30 such groupings already in existence (or proposed) in 2011, this initiative was felt to have the potential to ‘substantially re-pattern the EU itself’ (Holder and Layard, 2011: 373). The DG–Regio, which spearheads the EU spatial project, makes no distinction between places which straddle national borders and places lying entirely within the boundaries of a member state: they are all seen as being ‘within the territory of the EU’. Further- more, the creation of new spatial scales through the impact of cohesion policy provides new opportunities for Europe-wide institutions and sub-national players to work alongside each other to influence EU policy making. This new flexibility in territorial and sub-national identities within the EU implies that there is scope for the region to become an ever more flexible construct within the context of the EU in the future. No longer does it necessarily have to be tied in to any particular state or administrative structure (Conzelmann, 2008). 120 Localism and public value Meanwhile the EU’s territorial agenda has also helped to bring about cross- border collaboration at the level of the nation state. The macro-regional strategies that have evolved as a result of this initiative are significant because they routinely involve EU member countries working with neighbouring non-EU countries on issues of shared concern. According to Gänzle et al. (2019), there were recently four of these macro-strategies in existence across the EU, covering the Adriatic – Ionian, Alpine, Baltic and Danube regions. In total, these strategic partnerships involved 15 different EU member states working with a total of 11 different non-member states, including the former soviet nations of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. In the main these groupings are politically led, and EU regulations prevent them from accessing funds directly from the EU’s regional budgets (Gänzle et al., 2019: 163).

Reflections on the governance of the EU: the end of the ‘permissive consensus’? From all this, it is possible to argue that the EU is a polity which is working collaboratively to marshal knowledge and to govern in the long-term interests of its citizens and constituent territories. It is a good example of how public value might be created within an extended, multi-level political system. It also illustrates what a strategic approach to governance might look like in practice ( Mulgan, 2009: 251). There are, of course, alternative perspectives to this upbeat assessment of the EU’s territorial governance. Jeremy Richardson (2018) offers one of the most cogent critiques of the EU’s policy-making style. His assessment is particularly relevant in the light of Brexit and of the challenges to EU governance currently being presented by various parties of the far right in Europe. Richardson argues that over a period of time EU elites have taken advantage of the post-war ‘permissive consensus’ over European integration, in order to create an ‘EU policy- making state’. While the EU has achieved a great many benefits for its citizens, its depoliticized approach to governance has alienated some of its citizens to such an extent that they are now challenging the very idea of the EU’s existence ( The Independent, 2016). Over the years, the EU’s institutions have become adept at task expansion, with the European Commission being the leading player in this process. It has created a vast policy superstructure which raced well ahead of what many people across Europe feel comfortable with (Richardson, 2018: 121). Richardson notes that, despite its institutional messiness and the complexity of the issues it is dealing with, the EU has been quite effective as a policy-making system. Nevertheless, in recent years, its institutions have also shifted towards a more coercive, top-down style, which was most particularly evident in the way Greece was treated over the three financial bailouts it received from the EU between 2010 and 2015. In addition, there is a very dense system of interest group activity within the EU’s core. Many of the groups operating within this nexus have calculated that Localism and public value 121 they can gain a great deal more by mobilizing at the EU level than they can by operating nationally, where their demands often fail to meet with success. The result is an almost symbiotic relationship between the Commission and those interest groups (Richardson, op. cit.: 122). This may have had the effect of distancing the Commission from public opinion generally across Europe.6 More significantly, since 2015, the Commission has also become embroiled in the highly sensitive area of refugee quotas. This has brought it into direct conflict with many member states and their electorates. Also, it may have been a mistake for the EU to have been so doctrinaire about its freedom of movement policy, particularly when this was being challenged by the UK in 2015. Richardson argues that if public support for the EU is not to fall even further, its institutions must be prepared to be much less active in the future than they have been in the past. Andrew Jordan and his colleagues note that the EU’s undoubted achievements, particularly for example those in the field of climate change (CEC, 2016), rest on a series of paradoxes: for example, its wish to lead, even though it is a leaderless system; or its preference for ambitious policy goals, even though it has limited policy tools at its disposal. From this they conclude that a great deal of effective governing can be done even without the existence of a central locus of executive power. They also note that in some circumstances the tension between the simultaneous desire for unity and diversity can turn out to be a good deal more enabling than limiting (Jordan et al., 2011: 263).

What are the future prospects for the EU? One consequence of the UK’s formal departure from the EU and of the current negotiations over trade and other ongoing ties has been to sharpen the political debate about the future of Europe. In many ways, Brexit has provided an urgent new context in which publics across the EU can debate the legitimacy and future viability of the European project. Out of this debate, a number of different scenarios may emerge. Among the most likely is the development of a more flexible, ‘multi-speed’ Europe (Habermas, 2001). Some aspects of the EU’s current arrangements, for example banking, financial regulation and the common currency, clearly demand even closer integration than exists currently. It is unlikely that all the EU’s member states would necessarily wish to sign up to closer integration in all of the areas just highlighted. With this in mind, it is possible that a more strongly defined inner and outer core of Euro - pean nations may begin to take shape around key policy areas such as trade, financial regulation, defence, agriculture, climate change and environmental protection. Jürgen Habermas argues that an EU of two or three speeds would certainly be preferable to one that breaks up or just crumbles away (Habermas, 2001: 25). As Richardson argues, it is now probably true that the depoliticized governance style of the EU’s core institutions has advanced far enough, and that the 122 Localism and public value time has come to ‘let some politics back in’ to the EU enterprise. The starting point for this must surely be to reform the powers of the European Parliament, so that it can begin to play a more central role in European affairs. However, for this to happen there would need there to be far more pan-European activity across all political platforms and parties. The Greens, for example, already have an instantly recognizable political brand, not just within the EU but internationally as well. However, other political platforms need to develop their branding and messaging in the same way, and (along with the Greens themselves) they need to get used to waging their campaigns across state boundaries.7 In addition to reforming the European parliament, Habermas argues for the Committee of the Regions to be upgraded into a more powerful ‘chamber’ so as to give sub-national state actors a stronger say in formulating EU policy (Haber - mas, 2001: 24). Meanwhile, the DiEM25 movement has proposed the creation of an entirely new body: a Constitutional Assembly for Europe to be composed of four equal representative blocks: 25% of its membership to be appointed randomly from the entire body of European citizens; 25% to be directly elected by European citizens via transnational lists; 25% to be appointed to represent member states; and the final 25% to be appointed to represent territories and municipalities (DiEM25, 2018: 7). Obviously, proposals of this nature take us firmly into the realm of institutional design. This topic, and its relationship to localism in particular, is addressed in the next chapter.

Notes 1 Since 2008, a formal claim in respect of the Anthropocene has been under consideration by the Geological Society of London. The claim was officially endorsed by the Society in June 2019, subject to the determination of an agreed start date. 2 The UNFCCC’s Sixth Assessment Cycle is currently under way and is scheduled to report in 2021. 3 The Climate Home News website in July 2020 listed 26 individual countries which had committed themselves to a net zero-emissions target. Eleven of them were EU27 countries. 4 These other variants of meso governance include the ‘state of the autonomies’ in Spain (see Chapter 3) and (during the time when the UK was still an EU member state) ‘devolution’ in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England (see Chapter 4). 5 It should also be said that the frame of reference for Keating’s use of the term ‘meso’ is that of the ‘standard’ European nation state. In that respect, it differs significantly from the frame of reference for the meso level adopted more generally in this book (see Chap- ter 2). According to the latter, the meso level covers a far broader population range, from 250,000 up to 50 million. 6 For example, in December 2011, the Commission really did publish a directive (EU No. 1333/2011) regulating the curvature of bananas for sale in shops! 7 This transnational approach is already being pursued by DiEM25, a European populist party of the Left founded in 2016 by the former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varou- fakis (De Cleen et al., 2020). In early 2020, the party had national electoral ‘wings’ in eight European countries. Localism and public value 123 References Alford J (2011): ‘Public Value from Co-production by Clients’, in J Benington and Mark H Moore (eds.) Public Value: Theory and Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 144–157 Bailey N and M Pill (2015): ‘Can the State Empower Communities through Localism? 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This chapter addresses the last of the three research questions set out in Chapter 1: namely, how can localism make a meaningful contribution to the design of political institutions and systems? Here, the question of design will be examined the - oretically and empirically. The early part of the chapter addresses the issue of political design directly and reviews some of the key academic literature devoted to it. The issue of design principles is considered and seven key principles for effective political governance are proposed. The chapter then discusses some -cur rent design trends, particularly those which involve designs inspired by federalism, multi-level governance (MLG) or localism. It concludes with a case study of exceptional political design and implementation – that of modern India and its sub-national state of Kerala. What is noteworthy about the design of the Indian state is the powerful strain of localism and MLG running through it.

Institutions, political systems and their design In his authoritative account of institutional design theory, Robert Goodin (1996) argues that, in all spheres of social and political life, institutions have the same defining characteristic. They are ‘stable, valued and recurring patterns of behaviour’, which offer predictability and reliability to individuals and society. How- ever, institutions can, and often do, change and, as time goes by, new institutions begin to emerge. According to Goodin, institutional change may occur in one of three ways: by accident, by evolution or via a process of conscious design. Sometimes, institutional change may come about as a result of two or more of these mechanisms interacting together. Of particular interest to Goodin, however, is the issue of intentionality. In this connection, it is often the case that institutions emerge through a design process which does not work out exactly as envisaged, thus opening up the possibility of ‘unintended’ design effects, as well as those which were originally planned. This can occur when the legacy of the past con- strains the scope for a completely new institutional departure. With regard to political institutions, John Dryzek distinguishes two of their main constituent elements. The first is the ‘institutional hardware’ of rules, operating procedures and principles. Second, intertwined with this hardware, is the ‘software’ of society’s competing discourses (Dryzek, 1996). When examining a Designing for localism and MLG 129 particular reform or institutional change, one of the key questions that has to be asked is: which discourses are being reinforced as a result of the reform in question, and which are being disadvantaged? Turning specifically to theories of design, Goodin (1996) cites Bobrow and Dryzek’s definition of design as ‘the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular context’ (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). Generally speaking, within the broader design literature, the emphasis is on the ‘goodness of fit’ that exists between the designed object and the context in which it is set. However, it is important to be aware that theories of optimal design often end up conflating normative with empirical considerations. Thus, it is possible to argue that ‘institutions that have been around for a while are most likely to be the ones that are more nearly optimally designed to fit their environment’ (Goodin, 1996: 35–36). This is where notions such as sustainability and resilience, first mentioned in Chapter 2, come into play. That said, it also has to be recognized that the reshaping of political institutions can only be accomplished within the scope of ‘realist constraints’, or more specifi - cally within ‘the spaces that remain’ once such constraints have been taken into account (Dryzek, 1996: 121). According to Dryzek, such spaces are most likely to be found in political circumstances which are either volatile or indeterminate, such as war and its aftermath, revolution or following an economic depression. They are also to be found beyond the confines of the nation state, at the international level or else (and most interestingly of all, as far as this book is concerned) within the local context. It was argued in Chapter 2 that a key feature of modernist political discourse is the idea that governance institutions and processes can be rationally shaped in order to achieve particular social and political ends. However, as Pierson (2000) and other theorists have pointed out, there are many reasons to doubt whether the design of political institutions can ever be entirely rational, either in intention or in effect. For example, there is often a tendency towards ‘stickiness’ to be found within institutions, as well as the phenomenon of ‘path dependence’, which frequently works to make institutional structures self-reinforcing over time. Despite such constraints, it is hard to overestimate the potential that design has for achieving desirable political ends such as greater efficiency, effectiveness and/ or legitimacy in governance, as well as greater social and political cohesion. The establishment of new public institutions, or of transformed political structures and processes, can be seen as an opportunity to deploy rational, critical and creative thought. More fundamentally, such efforts also draw on ‘mechanisms of hope’ (McCann, 2013) and an expectation on the part of decision-makers and citizens that collective life can be changed for the better as a result of reform.

Top-down, bottom-up and collaborative political design Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts (2013: 171) argue that political design covers a wide spectrum: from heroic, foundational moments such as the vesting of a new constitution or the introduction of a major program of reform to many 130 Designing for localism and MLG smaller, disparate acts of adjustment carried out by strategic actors on the ground. Lowndes and Roberts use the term ‘institutional bricolage’ to describe the latter approach to design. Where institutional actors are confronted with path dependency, risk aversion or constraints on resources, bricolage is often the only type of innovation that is feasible (Lowndes and Roberts, op. cit.: 181). Lowndes and Roberts note that it is rational choice scholars who have done the most to promote the idea of political design (Lowndes and Roberts, op. cit.: 172). In the rational choice literature on this topic, there are clear resonances with the principal-agent model, as well as an emphasis on creating structures of control which can monitor reforms for their effectiveness and make adjustments where necessary. By contrast, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010) emphasize the fallibility of many political designs that have been conceived from the top- down. Institutional designers working in this way can never fully control the uses to which their creations may be put, and there are always ways in which less powerful actors, or those whose discourses have had less influence on a particular design, can subvert it. Very often they are able to achieve this by exploiting gaps and ambiguities in the institution’s rules, and by then carrying out their own bits of redesign (Thelen, 2009). For her part, Elinor Ostrom lays particular emphasis on the empowering qualities that institutions possess, in so far as they allow rule takers to exercise a degree of latitude when putting institutional rules into practice. Ostrom is particularly concerned with the ways in which local actors develop their own rules-in-use from the bottom-up. On the question of design, she notes that ‘a series of relatively autonomous, self-organized resource governance systems may do a much better job in policy experimentation than a single central authority’ Ostrom,( 2007: 18). Institutional design can thus be seen as a positive sum game from which both rule takers and rule makers are able to draw significant benefits ( Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 173). A key point to bear in mind about any political design project is that the very stability of institutions is what makes them difficult to reform, and yet the need to do so is often compelling. Political reform is a crucial part of the process whereby actors develop ‘an understanding of what constitutes a good society without necessarily being able to achieve it’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 91). It is inevitable that political actors will seek to engage in design activity, and it is entirely appropriate that they should do so. However, in most cases they will fail to meet their objec - tives. This is the enduring paradox of design in the political arena ( Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 185–198).

Designing large-scale political systems? A key point that flows from the account of institutional design given so far is that it can be applied to a wide range of political arrangements at different scalar levels. It can be used in relation to specific government structures and administrative processes, as well as to nationwide electoral or constitutional arrangements. In Designing for localism and MLG 131 this book, it is proposed to apply the term even more broadly so that it embraces entire systems of MLG. The degree of extension the book has in mind here is specifically the ‘continental’, ‘sub-continental’ or macro scale of activity (see Chap- ter 2). Of course, there are practical limits on the capacity of any single group of actors to design a system of interlocking institutions and processes for a continental or sub-continental political space. Nevertheless, the idea that conscious design at this level might be possible, even if only in theory, has a normative value in its own right. It can provide the basis for the critique and judgement of existing arrangements, as well as of potential future ones. This argument for extending the focus of institutional design much more broadly than many of its most distinguished adherents have attempted to do previously is inspired by critical theory (Habermas, 1987), and it takes our enquiry almost into the realm of normative political thought. Nevertheless, the position being advanced here must be understood as one which also seeks to retain a footing within the camp of empirical political science. This study, therefore, deliberately faces in two directions at once. This is the approach advocated by Archon Fung with his use of the term ‘pragmatic equilibrium’. For Fung, any normative conception of politics should be able to generate institutional effects that embody its central values. Where a particular normative conception of politics has institutional consequences that are consistent with its values, then it may be deemed to be in pragmatic equilibrium with itselfFung, ( 2007: 444). Thus, in setting out the principles for a sub-continental, multi-level polity with a significant localist dimension at its heart, this book deliberately seeks to balance normative and empirical considerations against each other. Before this chapter moves on to consider the broad principles that should underpin the design of political systems and institutions, one further point needs to be made about the design approach being advocated here. It is both different in kind from and also much broader in scope than ‘merely’ setting out the optimum arrangements for democratic decision-making. Some of the requirements for that task were outlined briefly in the previous chapter (Hirst,; 1994 Saward, 2003; Fung, 2006; Smith, 2009). In his 2009 book on democratic innovations, Graham Smith sets out four ‘democratic goods’ (inclusiveness, popular control, transparency and considered judge - ment) and two ‘institutional goods’ (efficiency and transferability) that should govern the design of democratic systems. Where this account differs from those of Smith and many others is that it leans much more towards the institutional side of Smith’s analysis than to the democratic one. This positioning stems from the particular balance this book is seeking to strike between normative and analytical perspectives. While democratic legitimacy clearly has to be regarded as a fundamental element in the design of political institutions, it can all too easily become focused on the freedoms and rights of individuals in relation to the sovereign state. As this book has already argued in Chapter 5, democratic legitimacy is a key domain of public value. However, it is no more than that. As one domain among several, it cannot fully encompass the broad polycentric interplay of individuals, 132 Designing for localism and MLG collectivities, institutions and systems. For that reason, it is not seen as sufficiently broad to stand as the defining rationale for this analysis.

Principles for institutional and system design The first step in envisioning the type of governance institutions and processes that might be appropriate for a contemporary macro-level political system is to establish an appropriately broad set of design principles. Goodin, in his seminal text discussed previously, outlines five such principles (Goodin, 1996: 39–43). These, he reminds us, are all drawn from ‘theories of the middle range’. In accordance with the overall thrust of his argument, Goodin’s five principles are partly analytical and partly normative in nature. Furthermore, it seems clear from the way in which his principles are presented that they are intended to apply both to single institutions and to whole polities. In order, Goodin’s five principles are as follows:

• Revisability: the new institution/polity should possess enough built-in flexibility to be reformed in the light of experience • Robustness: the institution/polity is capable of adapting to new circumstances but is not so fragile that it can be easily overwhelmed by them • Sensitivity to motivational complexity: the institution/polity is designed to accommodate both individual self-interest and society’s more principled, altruistic impulses • Publicity: the institution/polity is transparent and capable of being convincingly explained and defended. In other words, it is seen as legitimate • Variability: the institution/polity incorporates, and positively embraces, a varied range of organizational forms.

When one attempts to apply these five principles to the kind of multi-level context this study has in mind, it is clear that some of the design principles set out here are better suited than others. The principle that stands out most strikingly in this respect is variability. Of the five principles identified by Goodin, this is the one that is most likely to be relevant in the context of an extended, sub- continental political space, containing different geographical levels of governance. On the other hand, the principle which may be most difficult to apply across an extended span, even within a well-defined political space, is robustness. The level of social and institutional co-ordination required to achieve a sufficient degree of institutional robustness across a whole sub-continental territory is significant in its complexity. It would require a highly developed platform of institutional systems and processes in order to support it. In the twentieth and twenty-first -cen turies, societies and political systems have shown themselves to be increasingly capable of establishing and maintaining a high degree of co-ordination across geographical space, more so than has ever been achieved in history beforeGid- ( dens, 1984, 1990). However, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Designing for localism and MLG 133 and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment have pointed out (IPCC, 2018, 2019; MEA, 2005), the achievements which modern societies have demonstrated in this respect are increasingly being put at risk through climate change, pandemics and the ecological degradation of the earth’s ecosystems (see Chapter 5). As for Goodin’s remaining three principles, those of revisability and sensitivity to motivational complexity both require that a degree of bottom-up influence be present within the political system if they are to be successfully realized in practice. This is most likely to be the case if local, national and international civil society, as well as city and local governments, have a significant role to play in the design and creation of institutions (Barber, 2013). The degree to which this can occur within an extended political system is likely to vary widely. Finally, with regard to the remaining principle (publicity), this is also relatively difficult to achieve at the sub-continental level, as it implies the need for broad consensus on political and other fundamental values across a very wide range of communities and political interests. Some complex political systems such as those which operate within the European Union (EU) and on the Indian sub-continent are making slow progress towards establishing a common public discourse and common political values. But within each of these sub-continental spaces, such progress still remains a fragmented and, at times, highly contested affair (Zielonka, 2006; Drèze and Sen, 2014). Goodin’s five principles are useful for orienting our initial thinking around the values upon which the design of contemporary political systems should be based. However, for present purposes, it is important to establish a set of design princi - ples which is relevant to contemporary systems of multi-level political governance. The principles we adopt should seek to incorporate all the key dimensions of social and political life which have been introduced and discussed in the earlier chapters of this book – namely place, governance scale, democracy and account - able government, human wellbeing, environmental sustainability, cohesion across geographical space/scale, and bottom-up influence and mutuality. On the basis of these factors, it is possible to set out seven broad design principles for effective political governance at the continental/sub-continental level. With localism specifically in mind, the principles set out next have been formulated to reflect the critical importance of mutuality and bottom-up influence within the political system as a whole. However, the key point to note is that these are macro-level principles, and the expectation is that they should be able to command discursive agreement across the whole of a continental or sub-continental space. In contrast to Goodin’s five principles outlined earlier, the set which follows has a distinctly normative flavour:

• Rootedness: the political system recognizes and promotes the unique value of all the individual places located within its territory • Environmental awareness: the political system ensures that the highest priority is given to the effective management and development of all natural ecosystems within its area 134 Designing for localism and MLG • Human wellbeing: the political system ensures that all persons living within its ambit are able to benefit from the most advanced standards of health and education, and all other relevant aspects of human development • Citizenship: the political system ensures that all persons within its ambit are able to enjoy effective human and citizenship rights, and are able to contribute as responsible individuals to civil society, to business and to political governance at all levels • Mutuality and territorial cohesion: the political system ensures that government institutions at all levels work proactively to enhance the legitimacy and capacity of all others within the system as a whole, for the benefit of citizens and also for the environments and communities that citizens are part of • Sustainability and resilience: the political system works purposefully with citizens and social partners, and with the wider international community, to address a range of long-term human, social, environmental, economic and institutional challenges, and also to minimize risk in all sectors and at all levels • Learning and public value: institutions and processes within the political system positively encourage political and social learning so that public value can be promoted from the bottom-up, as well as from the top-down.

How should one expect these institutional design principles to impact on the micro and meso scales of place and organization? Clearly, some of them have a much more direct relevance for local communities than others on the list. Those which stand out most obviously in this regard are rootedness, mutuality/territorial cohesion and bottom-up learning. As for the others, it can be argued that they all have some important implications for the micro/meso levels but that their relevance is less direct. With regard to political powers and processes, perhaps the most important principle to highlight is that which concerns mutuality and territorial cohesion. This raises the question of where sovereignty within a polycentric or multi-level system should ultimately lie. One of the more radical implications of adopting an MLG perspective, which is also inherent in the idea of territorial cohesion, is that MLG treats all levels of governance as having absolute parity of esteem with each other, at least in principle ( Piattoni, 2009: 164). However, as Simona Piattoni also acknowledges, even many academics find this aspect of MLG difficult to engage with, let alone the majority of politicians and ordinary citizens. To adopt an MLG perspective is to enter into a way of thinking that can soon undermine the notion that political sovereignty should rest unequivocally with the nation state. Faced with this prospect, one might wish to argue that sovereignty should lie ultimately at the supranational or global level; or else that it might be devolved principally to the sub-national or city level; or that it could be shared across a number of different levels of governance interdependently (seeFrug, 2014, discussed in the next section). The approach to institutional design outlined in this book, and which is encapsulated in the mutuality/territorial cohesion principle set Designing for localism and MLG 135 out earlier, presupposes that there are mechanisms in place to ensure that political sovereignty is shared across a range of different governance levels. This in turn also implies a significant enhancement of the local dimension in politics.

Design trends in national, regional and local governance The obvious starting point for this brief analysis is the shifting balance of power between the world’s nation states and their main sub-national divisions. In federal states, the balance of powers between the federal government and those of constituent states/provinces is set down in an agreed founding document or constitution, and the main elements of the relationship are formally enshrined in law. This in itself implies a clear element of intentionality in the way in which federal polities are typically established. In some cases, (e.g. the United States, Switzerland) the federal government is a creation of the sub-national tier. It was originally set up on the lower tier’s behalf to fulfil executive functions across the whole of the national territory. According to most analyses, around 25 of the world’s 195 sovereign states at the time of writing are classified as federal. These include some of the world’s largest states in terms of population and/or land area, for example India, the United States, Brazil, Russia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Canada, Australia and Argentina. With regard to federal governance specifically, Alfred Stepan has drawn a useful distinction between ‘coming together’ and ‘holding together’ dynamics in federal systems (Stepan, 1999). Examples of the former type are the United States, Aus- tralia and Switzerland; and examples of the latter type include India and Belgium. States belonging to the former type are generally held to be ‘demos-constraining’ in their effects, while the latter are considered more ‘demos-enabling’. ‘Demos- constraining’ federations tend to have much stronger mechanisms to protect the constitutional position of their sub-national units; whereas the internal mechanisms of ‘demos-enabling’ federations are generally looser, for example weak second chambers and/or more informal systems of intergovernmental relations. These allow greater scope to political entrepreneurs to get involved in the shaping of the system as a whole Tillin,( 2015: 630–634). Overall, the institutional landscape in such states is more flexible, and it is easier for them, for example, to set up new sub-national units. All these factors apply quite strongly in the case of India, as we shall see later in this chapter. In Chapter 3, it was noted that the number of states in the world has more than doubled in the past 70 to 80 years, and also that much of the increase is due to a rise in the number of micro- and other small states during this period Alesina( and Spolaore, 2003). It was also noted how this phenomenon is linked to the global trend towards decentralization, which has been evident in many sovereign states over the same timescale (Bohlken, 2016). Perhaps the most authoritative evidence for this trend comes from the longitudinal data gathered by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks and their collaborators. Their aim has been to record growth in the powers of regional governments since the end of the Second World War (Hooghe 136 Designing for localism and MLG and Marks, 2016). To support their research, the authors are able to draw on an extensive international database covering 81 Western, post-communist, Latin American, Southeast Asian and Pacific countries.1 The database records the development of sub-national/regional governance from 1950 to the present day. This in turn allows a measure of ‘regional authority’ to be generated. Regional authority is defined as ‘the capacity (of a regional jurisdiction) to make legitimate and binding decisions for a collectivity’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2016: 29). With regard to how data in the database are classified, Hooghe and Marks identify two overarching domains. The first of them, self-rule, aims to capture the degree of authority which a sub-national government is able to exercise within its own territory. The second, shared rule, expresses the degree of authority a sub-national government is able to exercise within the whole of the state of which it is part. These two core domains are decomposed into a number of specific indicators so as to allow the level of variation between different jurisdictions to be quantitatively assessed (Hooghe and Marks, op. cit.: 35). From the specific measurements produced by these indicators, a Regional Authority Index (RAI) can be calculated for each of the 3,465 regional governments whose details are currently held in the database. With regard to worldwide trends in regional authority over the course of the past 60 years, Hooghe and Marks (op. cit.: 44–64) draw the following key conclusions from their data:

• there has been an increase in regional authority in 52 out of the 81 countries featured in the database • the average RAI has increased from 8.12 in 1950 to 12.62 in 2010 • the spread of RAI scores between different countries over the period in question has become greater, suggesting a trend towards divergence between different jurisdictions over this time • a growing number of countries have acquired a second tier of regional authority over the period, suggesting that governance is gradually becoming more multi-level in nature. However, this trend reached a peak in the 1990s, and it has not been so noticeable in recent years • on average, countries whose details are recorded in the database experience regional reform once every 13 years. Larger countries with populations of more than 10 million are particularly prone to reform • the gap between federal and unitary states has narrowed appreciably over this period, with many unitary states also gaining significant levels of self-rule at the regional level.

Despite the marked shift that has taken place in the constitutional relationships that many nation states have with their main sub-national divisions, there still seems to be relatively little evidence of the micro-tier of governance figuring prominently in national governance reform. There is of course the long-standing example of Switzerland, where 13 of the country’s 26 constituent cantons have Designing for localism and MLG 137 populations of less than 250,000.2 More significant, perhaps, is the example of the modern state of South Africa, whose constitution, ratified in 1996, states in Chap- ter 3, Section 40, that ‘in the Republic, the government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government, which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated’ (quoted in Frug, 2014: 3). Gerald Frug sees this formulation as an ‘innovative conceptual advance’. By using the term ‘spheres’ rather than ‘levels’, the South African constitution communicates a sense of empowerment as far as national, provincial and local governments are each concerned. This is because the national governance structure is not presented as a hierarchy; instead, each ‘sphere’ of government has its own ‘distinctive’ role to play within the whole. Describing the governance spheres as ‘interdependent’ is an acknowledgement that each of them has an effect on how the others operate, and because they are also ‘interrelated’, each of the spheres is expected by definition to work together with the other two Frug,( 2014). In this context, India’s 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments of 1993 are probably the most comprehensive example of a state and sub-continental governance reform that genuinely seeks to enhance the role of local communities. It is to this landmark case study that we now turn our attention.

Visionary localism: the case of India and Kerala The multi-level ‘cluster’ of India and Kerala, together with the latter’s 1,200 municipalities and villages, can be regarded as a real-world exemplar of localism in practice. The case study presented here begins with a brief account of the foundation of the modern state of India following its independence from British rule in 1947. The sub-national structure of India is then outlined, including the constitutional relationship between its national government and its sub-national states and union territories. An introduction to the southern state of Kerala then follows, including its distinctive politics and its recent spectacular advances in the field of human wellbeing. This leads into the two main sections of the case study, which outline India’s far-reaching local government reforms of 1993 and their subsequent implementation in Kerala. The case study concludes with an assessment of how effective the reforms have been and of India’s and Kerala’s prospects for the future.

The Indian sub-continent and the modern state of India India is one of three new states created on the sub-continent in the wake of Britain’s rather hasty and chaotic withdrawal in 1947. At the eleventh hour, this resulted in Britain’s ‘Indian Empire’ being partitioned into two separate independent states: India and Pakistan. At the time of independence Pakistan consisted of two geographically separated territories: East and West Pakistan. The eastern enclave of Pakistan eventually became the new Republic of Bang- ladesh in 1971. 138 Designing for localism and MLG The India that has emerged from the decolonization process is a ‘mega-state’ in terms of population and land area. Its current population of 1.35 billion inhabit - ants makes it the world’s second-largest country, with just under 18% of the global population. Furthermore, its population is on course to exceed that of China by the middle of the twenty-first century ( Drèze and Sen, 2002: 191). In terms of its land area, India is the seventh-largest country in the world. These factors, together with its distinctive peninsular geography, its social and linguistic diversity, and not least its economic and cultural power, mean that India can be regarded as a state on a truly sub-continental scale. More than most other world states, India is a rationally constructed polity with strong institutions and distinctive bureaucratic and legal traditions. India is notable for having a strong framework of state institutions in the broadest sense. These include its constitution; its bicameral parliament; its proliferation of national boards and commissions; its centralized bureaucracy with (until recently at least) its five-yearly planning framework; its courts and legal system; and its armed forces. But India is also a federal country, and each of its 28 states has an elected parliament with devolved political powers of its own. These powers are firmly enshrined in India’s constitution. That said, the consensus among scholars is that the balance of power between the union government and the states is firmly tilted in favour of the former (Fukuyama, 2013: 363;Tillin, 2015: 634). This is an important issue for localism and multi-level governance, and it will be explored in more detail as this account unfolds. A key point concerning India’s arrangements is the manner in which its secular institutions of state are generally able to ‘stand outside’ of day-to-day politics. This is a relatively unusual state of affairs, and it is impressive even by the standards of many advanced democracies. The Indian state’s ‘moderating’ role is embodied in the functions of the union presidency and its proactive stewardship of India’s constitution, and most especially in the governance of its federal states and territories. India’s founding fathers clearly intended that the secular state, with its guarantees of civil and political rights for key minorities, should actively contain the potentially disruptive effects of the nation’s religious and social cleavages (Lijphart, 1996: 262). With this in mind, Lijphart notes that India has been willing to grant a considerable amount of autonomy to cultural and linguistic groups, and to tolerate separate educational arrangements and specific rights for religious and racial minorities. With regard to democratic politics, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen note that India has a highly pluralistic political culture and a healthy rate of turnout in elections, particularly among lower-caste voters Drèze( and Sen, 2014: 251). Another notable feature of the Indian system is the fearless independence of its judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court of India. However, delays are also endemic within India’s court system, and its judgements can often take years to emerge. India’s constitution guarantees citizens both a range of fundamental citizenship rights and a number of social and economic entitlements, such as the right to work, to education and to public assistance. In practice, however, Designing for localism and MLG 139 India’s political system has failed to deliver these entitlements to many of its citizens (Kapur, 2010). With regard to human development, India was ranked 129th out of 189 nations by the UN in 2019. This places it well down into the third quartile of states on the UN’s Human Development Index – that is, among those nations deemed to have ‘medium’ levels of development. India’s performance across a range of human development indicators is strongly criticized in a recent work by Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. According to these authors, in areas such as child and female health, India ranks alongside many of the poorest countries in Southern Asia and Sub- Saharan Africa. In addition, the educational attainment of children and young people in many of India’s schools is also a major cause for concern. Overall, India is a country of stark inequalities, where around three in four people still struggle with poverty and with very low levels of human and social development (Drèze and Sen, 2014).

Localism and the formation of the modern state of India In the period leading up to Indian independence in 1947, the main opposition to British rule came from the Indian National Congress. This broadly based political movement was formed in 1885. Congress was headed by a group of very able and progressive politicians, several of whom went on to lead the newly independent state in its early stages. Perhaps the best known member of this ‘golden generation’ is Mahatma Gandhi, who led the Congress movement from 1920 to 1934. Gandhi was a charismatic leader who was able to connect exceptionally well with the Indian masses. More significantly, he was able to mobilize them effectively too. However, his ideas were often at odds with those of his fellow Congress lead - ers. He was a prolific writer and thinker, and elements of his political thought are set down in a vast output of letters, interviews, articles and pamphlets. Many of these were published during his lifetime. Since his death they have been collected, systematically edited and re-published in a number of different editions. Gandhi’s writings are characterized by a holistic and inclusive approach to politics and, most strikingly perhaps, by his systematic adherence to the principle of non-violence (Brown, 2008: ix–xxxi). Gandhi maintained this stance even in the face of several notorious episodes of British military repression during the final years of colonial rule. At one point, as leader of the Congress, he controversially argued that India should become a semi-independent dominion of Britain. How- ever, in 1929 he was forced to back down on this point in the face of strong opposition from the rest of the Congress movement ( Rudolph and Rudolph, 2008: 27). For his main inspiration, Gandhi looked to rural India where people interacted in small-scale communities and economies, and where he believed the spiritual dimension of life had not yet been corrupted by Western materialism. He argued that the forthcoming prospect of independence from Britain offered Indians the opportunity to construct a new polity in which individuals might at last begin to treat each other as equals and recast their social and political arrangements 140 Designing for localism and MLG accordingly (Brown, 2008: xvii). Gandhi made his fullest exposition of this vision in a pamphlet of 1941 entitled Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place. In this publication Gandhi covered a very wide range of progressive topics, including community cohesion, the removal of untouchability, equal treatment of women, encouragement of village industries, revival of indigenous languages, reform of education, and village health and sanitation. Gandhi’s ideal society rests on two fundamental premises: firstly, the autonomy of every village unit, no mat - ter how small or humble it may be; secondly, the fact that each unit is interdependent as well as autonomous. Gandhi explains that interdependence has to be understood in two ways: on the one hand, the internal interdependence that exists among a village’s residents; on the other, the external interdependence that each village shares with other similar communities across a wider geographical space (Gandhi, 1941 [2008]: 165). Gandhi’s vision is clearly a precursor to several major strands of contemporary political thought, including Green political theory, as well as localism in its ‘core’ sense. This may explain why Gandhi’s writings still resonate so powerfully in many parts of the world today. However, as we saw in Chapter 4, on the issue of the supremacy of village- based governance, Gandhi found himself at odds with many of his contemporaries within the independence movement. Those Congress members who championed the claims of the lowest castes in Indian society, such as B R Ambedkar, were convinced that genuine social progress could only be achieved through the creation of a strong federal state built on the foundations laid down by the British colonial powers. Similarly, Jawaharlal Nehru, who took over from Gandhi as the leader of Congress and who went on to become India’s first post-independence prime minister (1947–1964), was also known to be sceptical of the transformational possibilities of Indian village society (Mitra, 2001: 105). Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby the village governance system (known by the Hindi name Panchayati Raj) was accepted as a ‘Directive Principle of State Policy’ under what was eventually to become Article 40 of the Indian constitution (Mathur, 2013: 11). This article encourages India’s new sub-national states to organize Gram Pan- chayats (i.e. village councils) and ‘endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government’. How- ever, this provision was not made binding on India’s states at that time.

The sub-national structure of the Indian state Following independence in 1947, it took several years for the sub-national structure of the new Indian polity to emerge fully. The colonial authorities bequeathed a territorial patchwork in which 14 British-administered provinces were inter- spersed with 552 semi-autonomous princely states. Three of India’s 14 provinces shared some of their territory with that of the hastily created state of Pakistan. This left the newly installed Indian government with the significant task, firstly, of unpicking all the outstanding cross-border issues with Pakistan and, then, of carrying out a large-scale territorial restructuring within its own borders, before Designing for localism and MLG 141 finally being in a position to pass its first States Reorganization Act in 1956. The Act formally did away with all the princely states, the vast majority of which were absorbed into 14 new sub-national states which were thereby created. The latter included Kerala, whose boundaries were specifically drawn so as to bring together all of Southern India’s Malayalam-speaking communities into a single territory. Language (rather than religion or ethnicity) continued to be the basis for most of the subsequent changes in state boundaries that took place until 1966 (Tillin, 2015). Later, after 2000, a second wave of new states began to appear in the main Hindi-speaking belt in northern India, for example Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Utta- rakhand and, most recently, Telangana in 2014 (see Figure 6.1). Also notable is the creation of a number of small new states and territories within the border areas of north-eastern India (e.g. Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh). The creation of this latter group of states has been dubbed ‘cosmetic federalism’ by some. This is because it has been seen as masking the Indian government’s real desire to consolidate its control over this sensitive region, particularly because it lies on the borders with Bangladesh, China and Myanmar (Tillin, 2015: 636). This seems to be a good illustration of the ‘holding together’ nature of India’s federal arrangements (see earlier in this section). As a result, India now has 28 sub-national states and eight directly administered ‘union territories’. India’s internal governance has been described in the literature as a ‘heavily centralized, quasi-federal system’ (Jorgensen, 2012: 13). In this context, it is significant that Article 1 of the country’s constitution refers to India as a ‘union of states’ rather than as a ‘federal state’. For some at least, this highlights the fact that the union is not grounded on the explicit assent of the states themselves, and also that the states have no power to secede from the union should they wish to do so (National Institute of Open Schooling, 2015). The Indian president appoints the governor and the senior judges in each state, and he/she may take over direct control of the state’s affairs at any time on the recommendation of the governor. Over the years, this is a power that Indian presidents have repeatedly seen fit to make use of. The controversial ‘President’s Rule’ provisions set out in Article 356 of the Indian constitution have been deployed on more than 130 occasions since the federal constitution came into effect in 1949. Generally speaking, President’s Rule has been imposed for quite short periods lasting for up to a year at a time in most cases. However, in a few instances (most notably during the inter-communal riot- ing in the Punjab in the 1980s and the early 1990s) it has remained in force for up to three or four years. In Kerala, President’s Rule has been used in total on five occasions, most recently in 1979–1980. Jayotirindra Dasgupta defends both the existence of this measure and its frequent use in the Indian context. He argues that it should be seen as a safety valve to prevent ethnic and religious tensions from spilling over and tearing the nation’s fabric apart Dasgupta,( 2001). He also points out that in 1994 India’s Supreme Court laid down strict guidelines on how Article 356 should be used. These guidelines have been largely adhered to since then. 142 Designing for localism and MLG At the time of writing, President’s Rule has been imposed 23 times since the millennium, and since May 2014, under the present BJP government, it has been used on ten separate occasions: in the states/territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Delhi, Maharashtra (twice), Uttarakhand (twice) and Jammu/Kashmir (four times – see end of this chapter). On a constitutional level, the 28 state legislatures are each entitled to elect representatives to the Rajya Sabha, or Council of States, which is the upper house of the Indian parliament. The Rajya Sabha has a maximum membership of 250, and each state is represented in strict accordance with its share of India’s total population. Thus, as new states are created, the representation of one or more existing states is reduced accordingly (Tillin, 2015). Currently, Kerala has nine indirectly elected representatives in India’s upper chamber. The Rajya Sabha has certain powers of scrutiny and amendment over draft government legislation, but these are fairly tightly circumscribed. It also has limited powers to propose new legislation and the creation of new all-India services. In addition to their own elected governments and legislatures, the states have formal powers in 66 specific policy areas (including 18 different aspects of taxation and revenue collection), for which they alone are responsible. They also share power ‘concurrently’ with the union government in a further 47 policy areas. Both of these categories of powers are formally set out in Schedule 7 of India’s constitution. The same schedule also specifies 100 -pol icy areas for which the federal government alone is responsible. Many of these federal responsibilities are connected with transport and communications, as well as with the ‘conventional’ areas of defence, foreign affairs, currency and nuclear energy. In practice, all three of these categories of powers consistently overlap and merge with each other. Indeed, the precise mix of responsibilities between state and union varies in accordance with the characteristics of the particular policy area in question. With regard to environmental sustainability, for example, many of the most relevant powers for tackling its effects lie with state governments. These include the states’ responsibilities for agriculture, water, land improvement and public health. As for energy, it is one of the 47 policy competences that are shared between the union government and the states (Jorgensen, 2012: 14). This means that the states have a reasonable amount of scope to drive forward developments in the climate change field. However, the picture is complicated by the union government’s tight control over financial and economic policy (Jorgensen, op. cit.: 16). The powers of India’s 28 states have also been given a significant boost since the enactment of the constitutional reforms on local self-government in the early 1990s. States have the main responsibility for organizing and fostering local self- governance in their areas (Mathur, 2013). By its very nature, this is a task that the Indian government simply would not have the capacity to perform by itself. The constitutional reforms therefore give India’s states some discretion to shape local government systems in accordance with their own political priorities and values. However, they are required to abide by certain mandatory elements in the 1993 legislation. Designing for localism and MLG 143 Introduction to Kerala The state of Kerala was formed out of the former princely states of Cochin and Travancore in the south, together with the Malabar district of the former Madras Presidency in the north. Kerala’s boundaries were drawn up in such a way as to include as many as possible of the Malayalam-speaking peoples of south-western India. Linguistically, therefore, it is a highly cohesive state with nearly 97% of its population recorded as speaking Malayalam as their first language in the 2011 census. The geography of Kerala is quite distinctive. The state occupies a long strip of land extending some 580 km along the south-western flank of the sub-continent (see Figure 6.1). From an Indian perspective, Kerala is a small to medium-sized

Jammu and Kashmir

Chandigarh Himachal Pradesh Punjab Uttarakhand Haryana National Capital Territory of Delhi Arunachal Pradesh Sikkim Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam Nagaland

Bihar Meghalaya Manipur Jharkhand Gujarat Tr ipura Mizoram Madhya Pradesh West Bengal

Daman Chhattisgarh Odisha and Diu Maharashtra Dadra and Nagar Haveli Telangana

Goa Andhra Karnataka Pradesh

Puducherry Puducherry Tamil Nadu Kerala Lakshadweep Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Figure 6.1 Political map of India, showing the location of Kerala Source: ontheworldmap.com 144 Designing for localism and MLG state. In terms of population Kerala, with 33.4 million inhabitants, was the 13th largest of India’s 35 states and territories at the time of the last national census in 2011, with 2.8% of the total population.3 As for land area, Kerala is the 22nd largest of India’s states and territories, covering just 1.2% of India’s land mass. However, one aspect in which Kerala outplays most other Indian states is in the concentration of its population. At 859 inhabitants per km2, it is the third most densely populated of India’s 28 states. Even more significant is Kerala’s low rate of population growth in comparison with the rest of India. At the time of the last census, Kerala was the slowest growing state in the whole of India. Between 2001 and 2011, its population grew by only 4.9%, compared to an all-India average of 17.6% (Census of India, 2011a).4 Socially speaking, a much lower proportion of Kerala’s population is made up of Scheduled Castes and Tribes than is the case across most of India. In the 2011 census, the percentage of the population from these two groups in Kerala was 10.6%, as opposed to more than 25% across India overallCensus ( of India, 2011b). As for religious affiliation, there is a much more equal balance between the main religious communities in Kerala than there is in many other parts of India. In the 2011 census, Hindus accounted for 54% of Kerala’s total population, Muslims 27% and Christians 19%. With regard to government and politics, Kerala has its own democratically elected legislature and government based in the state capital Thiruvananthapuram5 (see Figure 6.2). The government is headed by a Chief Minister and a Council of Ministers, both of whom are elected by popular mandate every five years. The most recent state-wide elections in Kerala took place in May 2016. Political life in Kerala is fiercely competitive and is dominated by two main political blocks: the centre-left UDF, led by the Indian Congress party; and the far left-leaning Left Democratic Front (LDF), led by the ‘Marxist’ version of the Communist Party of India. These two rival blocks have alternated in power for one term at a time, going all the way back to 1982. Currently, it is the LDF which governs the state. Following the 2016 elections, it has a majority of more than 40 seats in Kerala’s 141-seat, unicameral assembly. Kerala’s Chief Minister and government are accountable not only to their electors but also to the State Governor, who is appointed for a five-year term by the President of India. Under India’s constitution, the Governor acts as Kerala’s nominal head of state. Kerala also has its own High Court, which is headed by a Chief Justice and based in Ernakulam in central Kerala. The Chief Justice and all the other High Court Judges attached to the court are also appointed by the President of India. In economic terms, Kerala has been one of the better-performing Indian states in the past 15 years. In 2012–2013, Kerala’s total GDP was the 11th largest among India’s 36 states and union territories. Along with much of the rest of the Indian economy, Kerala’s GDP has grown annually by a rate of 12–16% since 2004. A particular feature of Kerala’s economy in the past 20–30 years is the very large number of young people who have left the state to go and work abroad. A report prepared a few years ago for Kerala’s State Planning Board estimated that the total number of Keralites working overseas in 2014 was nearly 2.4 million, an Designing for localism and MLG 145

Figure 6.2 Administrative map of Kerala, showing the state’s 14 districts Source: infoandopinion.com 146 Designing for localism and MLG increase of 3.6% over the figure reported three years earlier The( Indian Express, 2014). The vast majority of Keralan migrants are working in the Gulf States and in the Middle East, from where they send remittances back to Kerala on a regular basis. Many of these migrant workers are young professionals with good educational qualifications. They have relocated to the Middle East to find better paid work than that which is available at home. One of the main aspects of Kerala’s short history as a state is its outstanding record on a range of human development indicators over the course of the past 30–40 years. This is a policy achievement which has drawn significant attention from international agencies and academic researchers since the 1990s. Kerala’s principal achievement is to have broken the grip of some of the deep- seated inequalities that have traditionally weighed upon Indian society. Kerala has reached Western levels of human development6 in a number of key areas by implementing its own distinctive policy solutions and by using relatively modest levels of resource in order to do so. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen present detailed evidence from India’s 2011 census to show that Kerala continues to lead the way among Indian states on a wide range of human development indicators such as the proportion of its people living in ‘multi-dimensional’ poverty; male and female life expectancy; under-fives mortality; child and female health; male and female literacy; number of years spent in secondary schooling; proportion of women in employment; and even the level of newspaper readership (Drèze and Sen, 2014: 289–335).

Kerala’s sub-nationalism and the Kerala model Prerna Singh traces the process by which Kerala’s distinctive identity was forged. Singh’s intention is to highlight the beneficial effects of an effective political com - munity, and his argument is linked to the notion of a distinctive ‘Kerala model’, that is to say a society characterized by advanced social outcomes achieved against a background of considerable material povertySingh, ( 2010: 290). Singh develops his argument through a historical analysis of social development in Ker- ala in the fields of education and health. He identifies three historical periods in Kerala’s sub-national ‘journey’, tracing first the absence, then the emergence and then finally the flourishing of sub-nationalism in Kerala. The first period focuses on the semi-autonomous, princely states of Travan - core and Cochin in the years leading up to the 1890s. During this time the socio- economic and political life of the region was built around the identities of caste and religion. Indeed, the caste system in the territory which today is called ‘Ker- ala’ was considered by many to be the most backward and oppressive in the whole of India. The social reformer Swami Vivekananda referred to Kerala at the time as ‘a madhouse of caste’ (Singh, 2010: 283). During this period Protestant missionaries gave all castes their first experience of Western-style education, but there was little support for collective welfare or for the provision of social services. The missionaries drew the attention of the British colonial authorities to Designing for localism and MLG 147 the problems experienced by many people living in this part of India. This led the British authorities to issue the princely rulers of both states with a warning of possible annexation. This in turn forced the governments of Travancore and Cochin to take some limited steps to improve the social conditions of the people in the years between 1860 and 1890 (Singh, op. cit.: 284). However, until the end of the nineteenth century, lower castes continued to be denied access to government schools and were not allowed full access to healthcare facilities. The second period identified by Singh focuses on Travancore and Cochin from the 1890s up to the formation of the modern state of Kerala in 1956. During this period, the emergence of Malayali sub-nationalism became a trigger for social development. In the words of one noted historian of Kerala, ‘a society which had remained fundamentally unchanged for 700 years came unhinged’ (Jeffrey, 1976). Missionaries actively espoused lower-caste causes and supported their protests. Moreover, an upwardly mobile, local elite with its recent experience of Western-style education now sought political advancement for itself. The first stirrings of sub-nationalism became apparent in the ‘Malayali Memorial’, a peti- tion demanding greater involvement in the organization of public services. This was submitted to the Travancore government in 1891. By the early decades of the twentieth century, these sub-national stirrings had grown into a powerful demand for a united Malayali homeland. This was exemplified in the activities of the Aikya Kerala movement which came to prominence during the 1920s. On the back of their campaigning, a consensus emerged among all castes that educational and health facilities should be extended to all Malayalis, irrespective of religion, class or caste. This in turn led to the introduction of a range of education and healthcare policies in Travancore and Cochin from 1900 onwards ( Singh, 2010: 285). By the 1940s, these two southern princely states had established themselves as frontrunners in the field of social development in India. How- ever, it is important to emphasize that, despite the area’s social policy advances, actual levels of social development in ‘Kerala’ in 1947 were still relatively low. With the establishment of democratic institutions in Kerala in the 1950s, there emerged a pattern of tightly contested elections involving the Communist Party of India (who were vociferous supporters of all forms of Malayali sub-nationalism) and the Indian National Congress. The third historical period identified by Singh runs from the 1950s up to the present day. During this period, the rhetoric of the Communist Party in Kerala has contained many ‘sub-nationalist/welfarist’ overtones (Singh, op. cit.: 287). Indeed, social welfare has emerged as a key point of contention between the two main governing coalitions in Kerala, as each has sought to outdo the other in extending the welfare net further. Successive state governments – both LDF and Congress/UDF – have devoted their efforts to providing a system of primary education and basic healthcare to cater for the needs of even the poorest Malayalis. This has been in marked contrast to most other Indian states. So strong has the political consensus over this issue been that no major public service or redistributive programme in Kerala has ever had to be reversed, despite 148 Designing for localism and MLG the state’s precarious financial position and despite periodic declines in the level of financial support from the Indian government. During the post-independence period, the combination of top-down state policies and bottom-up social activ- ism has led to remarkable social gains in Kerala, and these have been consistent across all castes and social classes. For example, a member of the Scheduled Tribes in Kerala is nowadays 20% more likely to be literate than in any other Indian state. Kerala’s history of a powerful and inclusive sub-nationalism has now become sufficiently established for it to be regularly showcased onthe international stage by India’s government. According to Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, Kerala’s success in reducing poverty over the past 50 years has been remarkable in international terms, despite the relatively slow growth of its domestic economy. Even the former British district of Malabar, which in terms of educational and social development was much further behind the other parts of Kerala at the time of independence, had managed to ‘level up’ with the rest of the state by the 1980s. Kerala has ben- efited from strong social movements which have championed education, along with a general level of emancipation of the lower castes. It has also profited from a long-standing tradition of openness towards the rest of the world through its extensive trading activity and its long-established pattern of inward settlement. While at the time of independence Kerala was already quite well advanced compared with the rest of British India, many of the achievements for which it is so widely admired today are the results of its own post-independence public policies (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 102)

Towards decentralization and localism in India As highlighted earlier, Gandhi’s über-localist vision of an India based on the supremacy of village governance was not endorsed by the founding fathers of the Indian Republic. Their only concession to Gandhi’s supporters was the insertion in the constitution of a discretionary provision (Article 40) encouraging India’s new sub-national states to organize Gram Panchayats (i.e. village councils), and to ‘endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government’. At the time of independence there were already many village panchayats in existence in India. These ‘customary’ panchayats Pur, ( 2007) were traditional local government bodies, whose origins could be traced back more than 4,000 years. Over that time, their fortunes had fluctuated in response to political developments on the sub-continent. During British rule, for example, their influence declined steeply, as larger-scale administrative units such as the block, the district and the municipality were introduced by the colonial authorities. Under the Brit- ish, an administrative structure based on top-down supervision and control was established across much of India. This was embodied in the role of the District Collector, or chief official. However, during the later period of British rule, the colonial powers began to take active steps to restore the powers of the village Designing for localism and MLG 149 panchayats, most especially as part of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2010: 561). These gave India’s 14 provinces a specific responsibility to promote local self-government in their areas. After Independence, the issue of village government went onto the political back burner. However, it soon became clear that India’s national development programme was running at an alarmingly slow rate. The complications involved in establishing India’s new internal governance structure (see earlier in this section) meant that there was only limited capacity available to drive forward the government’s national renewal agenda. This crisis led to the establishment of a major commission of enquiry under the chairmanship of Bhalwantrai Mehta to look once again at the issue of local self-governance. The commission’s report was published in November 1957. One of its principal recommendations was the establishment of an enhanced Panchayati Raj system across the whole of India, with three tiers of governance – village, block and district – in rural areas. Addi- tionally, Mehta recommended a genuine transfer of power and resources from the states to these proposed new local bodies (Chakrabarty, 2017: 191). These were radical, decentralizing proposals, and it took some time for them to be accepted by the Indian establishment. The Bhalwantrai Mehta recommendations languished for some 20 years before a second committee of enquiry on local self-government (the Ashok Mehta Com - mittee) was established in 1977. Later on, two further committees of enquiry fol - lowed in quick succession – in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Generally speaking, these later enquiries favoured a Panchayati Raj model based on two levels of governance in rural areas, rather than three, with the block generally preferred to the village as the most local tier. Meanwhile, the Bhalwantrai Mehta recommendations and those of the later enquiries were already being taken forward and acted upon by some of India’s sub-national states. Thus, during the 1970s several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka and West Bengal, took advantage of their discretionary powers under Article 40 (see start of this sub-section) to legislate for the establishment of their own, mostly three-tier, Panchayati Raj systems (Mitra, 2001). By the late 1980s significant cross-party support had built up for a comprehensive reform of local governance structures in India. The establishment of a new system of Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) was now finally being acknowledged as a high political priority nationally. It was seen not only as the key to kick- starting economic and social development in rural areas but also as a means of restoring stability to an Indian republic which had been passing through a period of relative crisis since the mid-1970s. At the same time, decentralization policies were also being promoted strongly by international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund Chakrabarty,( 2017: 6). Ironically, the quintessentially bottom-up issue of local self-governance now became an urgent top-down priority for India’s national elite (Jayal, 2007: 6). Thus, the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts were passed by the newly re-elected Congress government in 1992. Both Acts came into force in April 1993. 150 Designing for localism and MLG The main features of these two groundbreaking Acts were as follows:

• The creation of Gram Sabhas (or village assemblies) in every village or urban ward as a way of anchoring democracy within local communities • The establishment of a uniform, three-tier structure of village, block and district councils in rural areas • A requirement that all council seats should be filled by direct elections every five years (or by indirect elections in the case of block and district councils), from within the area covered by the council • A requirement that at least a third of all elected councillors and council chair- persons should be women • A requirement that Scheduled Castes and Tribes should have representation on each council in accordance with their share of the area’s population • The establishment of a local election commission and a local finance commission in each sub-national state to oversee elections to, and the finances of, PRIs • The creation of a District Planning Committee in each Panchayati Raj cluster to promote bottom-up planning • The establishment of an indicative list of 29 functional areas from which PRIs were empowered to draw up their local plans Chakrabarty, ( 2017: 217–226).

Apart from these key requirements, states were given considerable latitude as to how, and at what speed, to put their new systems of local self-governance into place. Mitra notes that the 1993 decentralization reforms have been implemented in a variety of ways across the countryMitra, ( 2001: 104). Today, almost 30 years after the date on which the reforms first came into force, some 250,000 village councils have been established across India in accordance with the reformed Pan- chayati Raj model (Aiyar, 2018). These newly constituted councils now cover almost 100% of the country’s rural population. It is no exaggeration to say that this is the largest decentralization of power to have taken place in human history. As a result of the major constitutional changes in 1993, much of the responsibility for delivering basic services in India now lies with the recently established tier of municipal and village councils. The 11th schedule to the 73rd Amendment Act lists 29 areas of responsibility that the newly constituted local councils may now be entrusted with. These include: agriculture and all forms of water management; forestry and fisheries; local industry, roads and housing; energy and power distribution; poverty alleviation; family and social welfare; health and sanitation; school, technical and adult education; and libraries and culture (Ministry of Jus- tice, 2015). In Kerala these wide-ranging responsibilities are delivered by an extensive, multi-level pattern of elected local government bodies of which there are 1,200 in the state currently. Services in Kerala’s urban areas are delivered by 93 unitary councils. In the six largest cities of Kannur, Kochi, Kozhikode, Kollam, Thrissur Designing for localism and MLG 151 and Trivandrum, these unitaries are called ‘municipal corporations’; and in the 87 other designated urban areas of Kerala, they go by the title of ‘municipalities’. In Kerala’s rural areas, public services are delivered through a three-tier governmental structure consisting in total of 14 districts, 152 blocks and 941 Gram Panchayats.

Democratic decentralization in Kerala and the ‘new’ Kerala model Despite Kerala’s startling improvements in the field of human and social wellbeing, it has still remained relatively backward in economic terms. Because of this, the state has found it increasingly difficult to finance its costly welfare system. This is the main drawback to what René Verón has described as the ‘old’ Ker- ala model (Verón, 2001: 606). During the 1990s there was a growing consensus within the state on the need to strengthen the productive base of the economy, in order to reduce unemployment and consolidate the social gains made in the recent past. This, together with an accompanying focus on democratic decentralization, became the launch pad for a ‘new’ Kerala model in the 1990s. The constitutional basis for the state’s new policy approach was set out in the Kerala Panchayati Raj and Municipality Act of 1994. This was formulated in the light of India’s 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts of the previous year (see earlier). Kerala’s 1994 Act provided for the establishment of a pattern of Gram Sabhas at village and urban-ward level, which all citizens have the right to attend. The intention was to establish a new form of direct democracy, with Kerala’s Gram Sabhas also being granted significant new powers over the selection of beneficiaries for public funding, as well as rights to advise on local plan prioritiza- tion, and to carry out social audits. In addition, the 1994 Act created a range of independent oversight bodies to support the development of the reformed local government sector. These included a State Election Commission; a State Finance Commission; an Ombudsman and a Tribunal for Local Governments; and a State Development Commission. The latter is chaired by Kerala’s First Minister and it includes all the members of the Council of Ministers, as well as the Leader of the Opposition, the Head of the State’s Administrative Service, the Chairs of Kerala’s 14 District Panchayats and many other representatives from the local government sector. The 1994 Act was amended in 2005 to strengthen the constitutional position of the Panchayati Raj sector in Kerala. As a result, while Kerala’s state government may now issue general guidelines to elected local governments, it cannot routinely interfere in their legitimate business, nor overturn their decisions except in the gravest of circumstances. These might include a council’s failure to set a budget, or a mass resignation of local councillors. Even then, the state is only empowered to act in accordance with due process. Significantly, the effect of all these measures has been to give the local government sector in Kerala rather more protection in relation to the sub-national state, than Kerala itself enjoys in relation to federal law. 152 Designing for localism and MLG In August 1996, Kerala’s newly elected LDF government voted to allocate 35–40% of the state’s annual budget to development plans drawn up by local governments and communities themselves. More significantly, functions, powers and resources were transferred to local governments in one fell swoop (Singh Kang, 2002: 3). In this way, stakeholders at all levels were obliged to co-operate with each other in order to make the new system work. The hope was that this bold move would unleash a ‘new dialogue and consensus’ and replace the ‘conflict and collision’ approach that had previously characterized politics at the state level. The ‘People’s Campaign’ in Kerala was designed to bring about a deepening of democracy. The political goal was to use planning as an instrument of social mobilization (Heller et al., 2007: 629. See alsoFukuyama, 2015: 40–41). The people’s planning process was expected to proceed in four clearly defined stages: firstly, general meetings of citizens (i.e.Gram Sabhas) at village and urban-ward level in order to place issues and problems onto the public agenda; secondly, development seminars at a village and urban-ward level involving community representatives, and aimed at exploring solutions to the problems identified by the Gram Sabhas; thirdly, task forces at block or municipality level to firm up specific proposals and plans; and finally the formulation of a district-level budget to implement the eventual, agreed plan. In its early stages, the campaign had a strong participatory character. Its centrepiece was a massive public training programme involving civil society organizations and over 100,000 individual citizens. One of the most high-profile contributors was the People’s Science Movement, which worked with women’s groups specifically to increase female participation in the planning process (Heller et al., op. cit.: 630). Final decisions on the proposals were made by elected politicians. In the first year of the programme, around 150,000 projects were proposed by local communities, of which some 68,000 were eventually implemented (Franke, 2007). In order to help carry out the massive new task of assessing local plans, the State Planning Board recruited some 4,000 retired technical experts and professionals to assist with evaluation work on a voluntary basis. This group of volunteers was known at the Voluntary Technical Corps (VTC). The VTC helped to provide membership for the block-level expert committees which advised the district-level planning committees in their appraisal of plans. These expert committees were a key organizational innovation. At a stroke they removed much of the traditional bureaucracy from the project approval process. Indeed, without this infusion of civil society expertise, ‘line departments would have paralyzed local planning through inertia and outright resistance’ (Thomas Isaac and Heller, 2003: 95). Today the people’s planning approach in Kerala has matured into a well- established system of bottom-up self-governance. According to Sunny George, Gram Panchayats in Kerala tend to have larger populations and geographical areas than those in most other Indian states. The average village council area in Kerala is just under 38 km2 and covers an average population of 26,200. Designing for localism and MLG 153 However, these figures mask a considerable degree of variation. As for Kerala’s 152 block panchayats, their average population is around 170,000. Unlike village councils, blocks and districts have no powers to impose taxes. However, they can collect fees, raise loans and, in the case of districts, they can also issue revenue bonds and raise money on the financial markets for the financing of development works (George, 2014: 8–9). One particular case-study village, Pazhayannur in Palakkad District (see Fig- ure 6.2), had a population of some 43,000 residents in 2014. This was spread over an area of 59 km2. Of its 22 elected councillors, ten were women. Its local budget had increased from 1.6 million rupees in 1990–1991 to 100.6 million in 2011–2012. Of this latter figure, some 23% was raised locally through fees and taxes. Since local self-government took effect in Kerala, Pazhayannur council has assumed responsibility for more than 50 public institutions and bodies, including pre-schools, schools and health establishments (George, op. cit.: 22). In 2014, the council had ten working groups dealing with aspects such as infrastructure, economic development/poverty alleviation, agriculture, water supply/sanitation, a range of social policy areas, as well as good governance. In previous years, it had achieved significant improvements in housing, with at least 100–150 additional new properties having been provided from public funds each year since 2002–2003. At the same time, Kerala’s local self-governance arrangements have been extended to incorporate the state-sponsored Kudumbashree mission. Kudum- bashree is a Malayalam word meaning ‘family prosperity’George, ( 2014: 16), and the programme named after it is a poverty alleviation initiative aimed at empowering women’s agency. It is run predominantly by women, and one of its major functions is to act as an informal lending bank for the poor. It is organized and delivered at three very local levels: (1) micro-level neighbourhood groups; (2) ward-level development societies; and (3) community development societies at the Gram Panchayat or municipality level. At the time of writing, this state- sponsored mission has succeeded in establishing local societies in nearly 20,000 (or 95%) of Kerala’s electoral wards. Even more significantly from a localism point of view, Kudumbashree currently has some 300,000 ultra-local neighbourhood groups registered in communities right across Kerala. These are all bottom-up local initiatives, nurtured and supported collaboratively by Kerala’s state government (Kudumbashree, 2020). Regrettably, there is insufficient space in this book to present Kudumbashree’s ongoing work or achievements in the detail they undoubtedly deserve. However, what can be said about it with great certainty is that, more than any other political initiative in modern India, Kudumbashree comes closest to embodying the village-level ideal-type set out in Gandhi’s Constructive Programme proposals (Gandhi, 1941 [2008]: 165). Over the past 20 years,Kudumbashree has been steadily expanding its influence across Kerala. It offers a model of state-sponsored citizen activity at the micro level that could also potentially be effective in many other parts of the world. 154 Designing for localism and MLG Critical perspectives on local self-government reform in India and Kerala How effective have India’s local self-government reforms been over the past 25 years, and what have they achieved locally and nationally during this period? A range of perspectives is set out below, some relating to India as a whole and others relating specifically to Kerala.

India At the local level, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) have to compete with a range of other institutions, all of them responsible for delivering services to local people. The most significant of these is the District Administrative System which has existed in India since colonial times (see earlier). The District -Col lector (DC) stands at the apex of this system. His/her main duties are revenue collection and the maintenance of law and order. In addition to these core duties, the DC tends to be given responsibility for any national initiative or function which does not have a field office of its own in the district. The DC is- effec tively the ‘eyes and the ears of central and state government’ at the local level (Mathur, 2013: 119). All state governments have made legal provision for DCs to investigate any malpractice or misuse of powers by PRIs. In reality, the DC and his/her team still tend to dominate the decision-making process in many rural panchayats (Jayal, 2007: 24). Kerala is the only state so far to have taken the radical step recommended by the Bhalwantrai Mehta Commission in 1957 (see earlier) of bringing all locally based civil servants directly under the control of PRIs (Mathur, op. cit.: 121). PRIs also have to contend with the impact of a range of other ‘parallel bodies’ working at the local level. These are mostly active in the fields of water supply, sanitation, health and primary education. They are not linked to PRIs and are not accountable in any way to them. The activities of these bodies regularly cut across the work of panchayats and undermine the holistic planning approach envisaged as part of the local government reforms (Jayal, 2007: 13). K P Krishnan, for example, describes the duplication that exists in the provision of water resources in one district of Karnataka. He presents a picture of long pipe runs, lack of data regarding water usage, and confused and overlapping responsibilities between the democratically mandated municipalities on the one hand, and the state’s water supply and drainage board on the other. The latter is primarily responsible for building plant and infrastructure, while the municipalities are expected to run the supply system once the infrastructure has been built. Krishnan argues that the supply of water is a critical part of local infrastructure. Its specialist nature and the need to ensure that water supply is effective, both point to the desirability of a single agency to run the service Krishnan,( 2007: 316). Another of the competing institutions that continue to operate alongside the new constitutionally mandated PRIs are the Caste Panchayats (CPs). CPs are -tra ditional bodies whose origins go back many centuries. They play a major role Designing for localism and MLG 155 in regulating personal and social behaviour within local communities. In recent years, they have been known to enforce harsh measures in particular against women and lower-caste citizens who offend against traditional norms, for -exam ple by taking part in inter-caste marriages. The punishments meted out in such cases have sometimes included honour killings. This means that the actions of CPs often receive more prominence in the media than those of the democratically elected panchayats themselves (Mathur, 2013: 126–131). With regard to gender, India’s constitutional amendment has largely achieved its aim. In most states, the proportion of elected women representatives stands close to the 33% mark, and in some states it is much higher. However, there have been a number of problems with this reform in practice. In most states, a woman cannot be re-elected for the same constituency once her initial five-year term has expired. Another factor working against the women’s representation (and that of disadvantaged groups in general) is the abuse of no-confidence motions against them filed by other councillors and/or by members of the public. In some states, however, any woman removed in this way has to be replaced with another woman. With regard to their participation in panchayat business, many women representatives focus their efforts primarily on family and domestic issues. But there also instances where elected women councillors have had a significant impact on issues across the board. However, too many women representatives are still forced to put up with discrimination, hostility and, at times, even outright violence (Mathur, op. cit.: 82–93). With regard to India’s lower castes (or Dalits), their number as a proportion of the overall population varies across different states. Generally speaking, Dalit representatives also suffer from discrimination and exclusion. Their participation is often more effective where the panchayat itself is led by a Dalit chairperson, or where an NGO is offering close support to the panchayat as a whole. As for India’s tribal people (Adivasis), they make up some 8% of the national popula - tion (Mathur, op. cit.: 101). Adivasis have a special right to local self-governance through the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996. However in practice, the PESA Act has not led to the degree of tribal empowerment envisaged. This is often because their tribal homelands happen to be in areas which are rich in natural resources, including water. An egregious example of the type of issue which can arise is the case of the Coca Cola bottling plant in Perumatty Village Panchayat in Palakkad District, in Kerala (Mathur, op. cit.: 107–108). In 2017, a 15-year legal dispute between the local panchayat and Coca Cola was resolved in favour of the Panchayat by India’s Supreme Court. However, at the time of writing the villagers had still not received any of the financial compensation to which they were entitled Konikkara,( 2019).

Kerala Regarding the current state of decentralized governance in Kerala, M A Oommen (2016) offers a comprehensive assessment in which positive features are carefully balanced against those which give cause for concern. 156 Designing for localism and MLG According to Oommen, PRIs in Kerala have experienced enormous growth in terms of the financial sums at their disposal. Between 1993/94 and 2013/14, their budgets increased by a factor of 48. No other Indian state has made such a high proportion of public funding available to its most local tier of government. Secondly, Kerala has devolved power to local people and enabled them to get directly involved in shaping political decisions within their communities (Oom- men, op. cit.: 8). Thirdly, the state government has taken steps to ensure that the allocation of public funds to local governments is conducted on a rational and equitable basis. The various elements of the state’s financial allocations are linked in a transparent way to its overall tax revenues and to the levels of expenditure set out in the state plan. A fourth positive feature is the decentralized planning process itself. This combines popular participation with input from experts and decision- making by democratically elected politicians. It demonstrates that participatory and representative democracies are able to co-exist and complement each other quite effectively in Kerala (Heller et al., 2007). On the debit side, there is evidence that the recommended planning methodol- ogy (with its 16 stages) has become far too onerous for many PRIs. It not only needs to be streamlined but also systematically informed by the outcomes of previous projects (Oommen, op. cit.: 10). In addition, there has over the years been a noticeable falling away in the quality of citizen engagement with the people’s planning process. This is a particular concern given that better educated Keralites are now much less likely to take part in it than they were in the past. A further problem is the lack of effectiveness of the performance and audit systems which have been put in place to strengthen accountability and to reduce the risk of corruption. Oommen sets out a ‘roadmap’ of measures that would help to strengthen the local governance system in Kerala. Firstly, a ‘stable and sound’ financial reporting system for PRIs urgently needs to be put in place by the state government. Currently, there is no proper balance sheet of local government activities or of their costs and outcomes that can be presented to the public in a transparent way. Secondly, the problem of endemic corruption needs to be tackled head-on. Vested interests in the land and local extractive industries are currently threatening the environmental sustainability of many parts of the state, and PRIs need to have more effective powers to deal with this (Oommen, op. cit.: 13). Thirdly,- agri culture in Kerala now needs to developed ‘as a joint venture with PRIs’. It must become ‘a natural and organic part of Kerala’s development process’. Finally, any restructuring of decentralized government in Kerala must take full account of the Kudumbashree mission, whose activities have now become integral to the way in which local governance is organized in Kerala.

What are the future prospects for India and Kerala? As mentioned earlier, India’s demographic growth is projected to continue for several more years yet. With China’s population having already peaked, India is set to become the most populous country in the world. When that happens, India’s Designing for localism and MLG 157 population is expected to stabilize, and then gradually to start falling again by mid-century (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 191). One implication of this is that India is likely to become one of the world’s strongest markets for consumer goods and for technological innovations in sectors such as agriculture and renewable energy generation. It is also likely to provide a testing ground for new types of intervention in the fields of nutrition, healthcare, education and skills. Despite its potential as an economic leader, India does have a significant Achil- les heel in the form of its desperately low levels of human development (Drèze and Sen, 2014) and the rampant degradation of many of its natural environments (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 227). India’s greatest problem in this respect is its consistently poor record of policy delivery. More often than not, this is down to the highly adversarial nature of Indian politics and to the rigidity and inefficiency of its cen - tralized bureaucracy (Fukuyama, 2013). With regard to the latter, it is to the credit of Narendra Modi’s current government that it has embarked on a programme to bring about radical changes in India’s bureaucratic culture, for example by replacing the State Planning Commission (and its associated system of national five-year plans) with the new National Institution for Transforming India, or NITI Aayog (Virmani, 2015). This step indicates the Indian government’s intention to create a more flexible ‘governance’ culture, and to overhaul the administrative machinery inherited from the British Raj. Under the New Public Management approach being pursued by Modi’s cabinet, India’s government would seek to operate much more as an ‘enabler’ than as a direct provider of services itself. The cultural shift foreshadowed in these proposals may have a profound effect on Indian public life over the next few years. As for Kerala, it is of some consequence that one of the two main political alliances competing for power in the state is competently and responsibly led by a party of the far left. Certainly, Kerala is the only democratic polity in the world where Communist Party candidates have been standing in elections since 1957 and regularly winning power through them. For a time, the prospect of far-left rule in Kerala seemed to unnerve the Indian state. Between 1959 and 1980, it inter- vened several times to impose president’s rule in Kerala. Its interventions invariably coincided with periods when the LDF was in government (Government of Kerala, 2017). Today, however, though Kerala remains very distinct culturally and politically from the rest of India,7 it is thoroughly integrated with the Indian state and with the wider Asian and Middle Eastern world. The international reputation that Kerala has gained for its social and political achievements, and for its cultural and tourism offer, is now firmly established ( Tharoor, 2007: 266–281). The current LDF government elected in 2016 has embarked on an ambitious program of social and environmental reform under the overall title Nava Kerala (NK) to be delivered mainly through local governments. NK includes four large-scale missions in the fields of education, environmental management, health and housing. In many ways this is the successor to the LDF’s highly acclaimed People’s Plan Campaign of 1996 (see earlier). It will be interesting to see whether this is one of the factors that helps to keep the LDF in power in the 158 Designing for localism and MLG next state elections in 2021, thus breaking the one-term pattern that has repeated itself in Kerala since 1982. Across India and more widely, there are concerns that the secular threads so delicately woven into India’s founding design may be starting to unravel dan- gerously. This is as a result of two highly partisan decisions taken by Narendra Modi’s ruling alliance since it increased its parliamentary majority in the national elections of May 2019. In both cases, the decisions have significant constitutional implications. In October 2019, the Indian government revoked the autonomy of the much-troubled state of Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, the state was occu- pied by the Indian military, and all local opposition was crushed through the imposition of martial law. Subsequently, the state has been split into two directly administered union territories8 (Ellis-Petersen, 2019). At the time of writing, the political lockdown of Jammu and Kashmir continues in place. Significantly, the former state was the only one in India which had a majority Muslim population. The second major recent development in India is the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which was passed by parliament in December 2019. This provides a pathway to Indian citizenship for illegal migrants of Hindu and other religious backgrounds who are fleeing persecution in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. However, the Act specifically excludes any Muslims fleeing those countries from claiming Indian citizenship. This is the first time in the history of modern India that religion has been used as a criterion for deciding who can and cannot be an Indian citizen. It has led to widespread unrest and civil disobedience across much of the country. A number of states, including Kerala, have refused to participate in the government’s plan for a National Citizen’s Register (Chaudhuri, 2019). In January 2020, Kerala became the first state to challenge the CAA in the Indian Supreme Court. This is on the basis that it runs counter to the secular principles which are enshrined in India’s constitution (The Times of India, 2020). After more than 70 years of constitutionalism, localism and multi-level governance, India seems to be heading for a significant clash between some of its competing ethnic and territorial interests. This may affect India and its neighbouring states in fundamental ways in the years to come.

Notes 1 However, their database does not currently include data on India or China. 2 The smallest of these (Apenzell Innerrhoden) had a population of just over 16,000 in 2019. 3 Ten years on from the 2011 census, however, this figure would still place Kerala among the 50 largest states in the world in terms of population. 4 Kerala was in fact the only Indian state whose decadal rate of population growth remained in single digits between 2001 and 2011. 5 The anglicized name for this city is Trivandrum. 6 Kerala’s Human Development Index score was calculated at 0.790 in 2011 (Government of India, 2011: 257). This was not only the highest among India’s 28 states but also high enough to place Kerala on a par with those nations deemed to have ‘very high’ levels of development in that year (UNDP, 2011: 127). Designing for localism and MLG 159 7 For example, none of the 20 MPs that Kerala returned in 2014 and 2019 were from the majority BJP party or from the wider NDA alliance of which the BJP is part. 8 These two newly created union territories are called ‘Jammu and Kashmir’ and ‘Ladakh’ respectively.

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Thischapter looks at how the political design principles set out in Chapter 6 can be applied. The most obvious application is through the design process itself, and that issue is discussed specifically inChapter 8. Here, the focus is on a related, but secondary, application of the design principles: that of evaluating the outcomes of policies and political reforms, particularly from the point of view of localities. As already noted, the ‘local’ is the site where the real-world implications of public policy are most directly experienced and where any contradictions ultimately have to be resolved (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993; Bailey and Pill, 2015). As for evaluation, it has a clear semantic link with the notion of ‘value’ and, in this case, with ‘public value’ particularly. As we saw in Chap- ter 5, public value (PV) focuses on the long-term outcomes of public policy decisions. This chapter begins by considering the question of policy outcomes and the issues that are most typically involved when it comes to evaluating them. It then sets out the main elements of a proposed outcomes framework for localities. This is built on the design principles that were presented in Chapter 6. The chapter shows how the framework can be applied to one of the book’s earlier case studies: that of the Cornwall/Isles of Scilly sub-region in south-west England. The chapter concludes with a short case report of an ambitious attempt to evaluate public value outcomes at the area level. This is the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) process that was implemented briefly in England in 2009–2010.

Policy evaluation and achieving public value Views on how feasible it is to evaluate large-scale reforms in the public realm vary considerably. Among the pessimists are March and Olsen (1983: 289) and Pollitt (2007: 285–286). Christopher Pollitt notes that structural reforms and their eventual outcomes are often connected by long causal chains. In addition, large- scale structural changes tend to be multifaceted, so it is often necessary to distinguish between those elements which are working effectively and those which are not. Structural change seldom takes place within a vacuum – many factors are in play simultaneously. 164 Local outcomes By contrast, Erica Wimbush (2010) makes an important link between policy evaluation and the idea of accountability. Evaluation is an important means by which government can demonstrate to the various publics and stakeholders it serves that it has achieved the goals it set for its period in officeBarber, ( 2017). Sanderson (2002: 15–17) argues that the effectiveness of evidence-based policy making can be improved through the long-term evaluation of policy initiatives once they have been implemented. This in turn implies the need for sound knowledge management systems in order to ensure that evaluation can be used effec - tively in later policy making (Mulgan, 2005: 220). In this context, Wimbush (2010: 9) draws an important distinction between ‘performance accountability’ and ‘population accountability’. The first is about individual organizations and the ‘results’ they achieve in specific, service-related areas (e.g. schools and the exam results obtained by their students). Population accountability, on the other hand, is about overall public value and the long- term ‘outcomes’ achieved by institutions and by a range of social partners working together (e.g. educational levels within the population as a whole).Bovaird and Löffler (2003) note that the measurement of quality of life outcomes such as improved educational standards is an important part of evaluating the effectiveness of public governance. With regard to public sector reform, Boyne et al. (2003: 42) note that the core task of evaluation is to measure the gap between the former position under the old arrangements and the changed position under the new. However, if useful lessons are to be learnt, evaluation needs to be seen as more than just a cost–benefit analysis of the changes achieved. It needs to be driven by theory as well. Theoretical depth helps to give evaluation much greater explanatory power. Currently, one of the most powerful theoretical frameworks available to help guide governments and researchers in the task of evaluation is that provided by public value, particularly the broadly based version of PV that was set out in Chapter 5. Public value in this maximal sense is closely linked with the overall principle of Enlightenment, as outlined by Steven Pinker in his two recent books The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) and Enlightenment Now (2019). One of the striking features about these works is their use of performance data and historical perspective to help evaluate the steady march of human, social and political progress over the past 350 years. The strength of Pinker’s approach is its relentless focus on outcomes, and also the fact that it covers a wide range of public value domains, including democracy and human rights, human wellbeing, environmental sustainability and the growth of knowledge generally. My task in this chapter will be to try and apply a similar breadth of focus to public value outcomes at the local level.

Towards a local outcomes framework What are the features of a positively functioning localism that officials and researchers should be seeking to evaluate within a multi-level political context? On the basis of what has been set out so far, I identify five specific aspects that should be included within the framework. These are (1) distinctive local identity; Local outcomes 165 (2) local prosperity and flourishing; (3) effective civil society and governance at the community level; (4) positive horizontal links with other similar communities, both locally and further afield; (5) autonomy and effective upward influence on wider power structures. In addition to these five inherently local features, I see it as essential to include two broader, system-level features which are instrumental in facilitating an effective approach to localism. These are (6) the existence of a specific constitutional status for localities and regions and (7) effective high-level arrangements for promoting mutuality and cohesion at the regional and local scales. Each of these aspects forms the basis for one of the seven ‘positive localism’ indicators set out next. They point the way to what an effective focus on localism could look like within a broader multi-level system. They can be set out as a seven-point framework of aspects and descriptors as follows.

Aspect 1 – local identity • the locality concerned has a distinctive, well-defined identity • the locality is effectively promoted through landscapes, buildings, histories, images, the arts and culture.

Aspect 2 – local prosperity and flourishing • people in the locality contribute effectively to a sustainable local and wider economy • people enjoy good levels of health, education and wellbeing, and a reasonable standard of living.

Aspect 3 – civil society and governance • the locality has a vibrant and diverse social and cultural life • a significant number of the locality’s residents contribute meaningfully to decision-making and governance • local ecosystems are well managed and the locality as a whole is resilient.

Aspect 4 – links with the wider world • the locality and its residents enjoy good transport, communication and activity links with other nearby communities, and with places further afield • the locality welcomes visitors and people from outside, including those from different races and cultures.

Aspect 5 – autonomy and upward influence • the locality and its citizens are regularly able to bring effective upward influence to bear upon the broader power structures that govern their lives • they are also able to shape their own affairs accordingly. 166 Local outcomes Aspect 6 – constitutional recognition • the constitutional arrangements of the jurisdiction of which the locality is part explicitly recognize the role that localities have to play • these arrangements also give localities appropriate powers so that they can carry out their public functions effectively.

Aspect 7 – mutuality and cohesion • the jurisdiction in question is able to take effective steps to help localities address any structural disadvantages which may affect them • the jurisdiction also has effective arrangements in place to enable localities to work with other social and political partners to address issues of wider interest and concern.

The framework set out here can be worked up in much more specific detail, with quantitative indicators provided for each aspect and descriptor. The numerical values recorded for each indicator might then be combined to produce an Effec- tive Localism Index for each region or local area. This should form part of the agenda for further research and development arising from this study (seeChap - ter 8). However, even as it stands, the framework can be used to generate a broad-brush assessment of any locality at a given scalar level. The assessment can be presented as a set of narrative findings, as set out in the next section. Here, I apply the framework to the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly (CIOS) sub- region of England (see case study inChapter 4) to produce the following illustrative commentary.

Evaluating local outcomes in Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly

Aspect 1 – local identity The CIOS sub-region has a strong local identity and is distinct in many ways from the rest of Britain. Cornwall has its own ancient language, which is now recognized in the European Charter for the Protection of Regional Minority Languages (Cornwall Council, 2014: 15), as well as its own unique mythical legend in the shape of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table. Despite its cultural dis- tinctiveness, CIOS has been under the economic dominance of mainland Britain for the past 150 years. In this connection, it has been regarded as a prime destination for holidays, retirements and lifestyle-inspired, professional relocations. Since the millennium, however, local public sector bodies backed by EU funds have begun to address the deep-seated issues inherent in the sub-region’s peripheral status. More recently, these efforts seem to have unearthed a new potential identity for Cornwall in particular, as a south-western ‘powerhouse’ for renewable energy technologies. Local outcomes 167 Aspect 2 – local prosperity and flourishing Quality of life indicators show that CIOS is a very satisfying place to live. The natural environment is of good quality, social cohesion is high, crime is relatively low, and health and education outcomes are reasonably well in line with UK and EU averages (Cornwall Council, 2010). And yet, the standard of living in CIOS is relatively low in comparison with other parts of the UK ONS,( 2019) and also with that in much of Western Europe (Eurostat, 2015). As for the sub-region’s economy, it is currently in the process of being regenerated and, to some extent, rebalanced. With its still plentiful deposits of china clay and other valuable minerals (Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LEP, 2020: 51–52), and its outstanding tourism and leisure offer, the argument may be made that Cornwall’s economy is fundamentally stable and sustainable. ‘Early-mover’ development of its renewable energy potential could well transform it into a world-leading centre for sustainable energy technologies.

Aspect 3 – civil society and governance People living in the Cornwall/Scilly sub-region have relatively good opportunities to participate in social and cultural life. Some aspects of the latter, such as theatre and gastronomy, are of particularly high quality and have a reputation for excel- lence that goes beyond the sub-region’s borders. Cornwall also has a very high level of volunteering in comparison with most other parts of the UKCornwall ( Council, 2010). However, the range of racial and international diversity within the sub-region’s public and cultural life tends to be rather narrow. Thanks to Corn- wall Council’s recent efforts and those of some of its town councils, there are increasing opportunities for Cornwall’s citizens to contribute to decision-making in their area, but many of these are organized from the top-down rather than the bottom-up. As for the resilience of the sub-region’s natural environment, its coasts and river estuaries have been heavily affected by storms, flooding and erosion in recent times. Cornwall Council has taken the lead in responding to the problems that the increasingly severe weather has posed. Partly as a result of these experiences, public understanding of the pressures that the sub-region’s ecosystems face is relatively high. There are a number of policies in place, or else currently being pursued, aimed at putting ecosystems management in CIOS onto a more sustainable footing for the future: for example, Cornwall Council’s recent declaration of a climate emergency and its ambition that the whole of the county should become carbon neutral by 2030 (Cornwall Council, 2020); or the resilience plans that have been put in place by many local communities across the sub-region.

Aspect 4 – links with the wider world CIOS enjoys reasonably strong activity links with communities further afield. This is due to a number of factors, including the steady outflow of young people who, despite moving away, continue to retain strong family ties within the 168 Local outcomes sub-region; its growing population of ‘internal migrants’ who have moved down from other parts of Britain to settle there; and the large numbers of visitors from the rest of the UK and from Western Europe, who come to appreciate the area each year. However, the sub-region’s transport links to the rest of the UK by road, rail and air are still somewhat fragile; and because of its relatively inaccessible geography, Cornwall’s own internal transport links are often rather slow and easily overwhelmed, particularly during the summer period. A key strategic example of the transport pressures being felt within the sub-region is the Cornwall/Scilly link, which lost its regular and very reliable helicopter passenger service in 2012. Since then, links from the mainland to the Isles of Scilly have often been out of action, particularly during the winter months.1 These transport pressures continue to be a factor in Cornwall’s relative isolation from the rest of the UK. However, some of these pressures are being effectively addressed through the work on rail and bus travel which has recently been carried out as part of Cornwall’s devolution deal with central government (see Chapter 4).

Aspect 5 – autonomy and upward influence The sub-region’s upward influence has been directed as much at the European level of governance as it has at the UK. As far as the EU is concerned, CIOS has been a priority for major economic investment since the time of the millennium. This investment has helped Cornwall to expand its higher education and skills offer, and more recently to modernize its broadband infrastructure. European funding is now also helping Cornwall to develop its huge potential as a renewable energy test-bed and powerhouse. As for its ability to exercise upward influence within the UK, Cornwall was clearly fast-tracked for unitary status by the Labour government in 2006–2007, even in the teeth of some very fierce opposition locally and nationally (Chisolm and Leach, 2008). Less than ten years later, Cornwall received fast-track treatment again, this time from a Conservative government keen to make it a test-bed for England’s first non-metropolitan devolved authority. Cornwall’s local governance continues to be highly regarded in UK government circles, and it is often used by them as a source of best practice (seeChapter 4).

Aspect 6 – constitutional recognition Constitutional recognition of localities is an area of significant weakness currently within the UK’s political and constitutional arrangements. This is in marked contrast to the position in India where the position of state and local governments is clearly set out in the country’s constitution. The same is true of many other federal or semi-federal states such as Germany and Spain. Despite the legal changes introduced by recent Labour and Coalition governments in the UK to bolster the general powers of local government,2 the local state in England still remains far too fragmented and dominated by the centre. In Cornwall, for example, a great deal of effort still has to be expended in co-ordinating the few remaining local Local outcomes 169 government functions, such as planning, economic development and social care, with a whole range of more centrally controlled functions such as health; schools, colleges and higher education; energy and the environment; welfare and employment; roads and rail; agriculture and fisheries; and heritage. In addition, local governments in the UK have no formal input into the national legislature as they do, for example, in India through the upper house, the Rajya Sabha (see Chapter 6), or in Germany through the Bundesrat.

Aspect 7 – mutuality and cohesion These are also weak features of the UK’s approach to territorial governance. Over many years, the powers of English local authorities have been steadily eroded, particularly (but not only) by Conservative-led governments. The performance of local government in England has been subjected to ever-tighter controls, and its levels of funding have been severely reduced Stoker,( 2004; John, 2014). How- ever, in recent times, the UK government’s traditional neglect of its peripheries has been counterbalanced to some extent by the EU, where mutuality and cohesion are much further developed than in the UK (see Chapter 5). In the case of CIOS, for example, EU cohesion policy has acknowledged the sub-region’s long period of decline and has recognized its need for new investment in skills and economic development. However, this valuable source of cohesion support is about to cease now that the UK has confirmed its decision to leave the EU. At the micro level, Cornwall Council has been working hard since 2009 to develop a new kind of local cohesion mechanism – its system of 19 Community Network Panels – to encour - age towns and parishes to work together more effectively with each other and also with the council. This governance reform has had mixed success, but over the past few years the council has shown great persistence in addressing the shortcomings of the panel system and seeking to make it work more effectively (seeChapter 4).

This assessment of Cornwall’s strengths and weaknesses is presented here principally an academic exercise, but it is offered as an illustration of the kind of area- based evaluation that might possibly be carried out for localities more generally. It was inspired by a UK policy initiative that was introduced in England in 2007, implemented for one year only in 2009–2010 and then quickly abandoned after the UK’s change of government in May 2010. The initiative is described in the brief case report which follows.

Evaluating localism: Area Assessment in the UK and Cornwall, 2009–2010 The Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) was a process developed by the UK’s former Audit Commission under Gordon Brown’s Labour government (2007–2010). CAA emerged from a long line of inspection regimes which -succes sive UK governments have put in place to assess the effectiveness of local public 170 Local outcomes services. Inspired by New Public Management thinking, these regimes have been a prominent feature of the UK’s public service landscape since the mid-1980s, especially in England (Massey and Pyper, 2005: 133–150). What made CAA different from the other inspection regimes it grew out of was its focus, not so much on the effectiveness of single institutions or services but on the outcomes achieved across whole areas at the P2 and P3 level (see Chapter 3). CAA was particularly concerned with how local public services worked with each other and with business and civil society to produce public value outcomes for an entire area. Unlike the localism framework outlined earlier in this chapter, the CAA was not based on a detailed set of public value principles. However, it did have four ‘underpinning themes’. These were sustainability, inequality, support for vulnerable people and value for money (Audit Commission, 2009a: 14). As an assessment framework, the CAA was based on three core questions which were addressed to all the main partner organizations within the area concerned:

• How well do local priorities express community needs and aspirations? • How well are the outcomes and improvements that are needed being delivered? • What are the prospects for future improvement?

The collective performance of the local partners in relation to these three core questions was assessed according to the standards set out in a national framework of 198 public service indicators (DCLG, 2008). These indicators covered a wide range of public value domains, including environmental sustainability, human wellbeing and political participation. Another feature which set CAA apart from other inspection regimes is that it did not result in the area concerned being awarded a specific rating at the end of the assessment process. Rather, CAA used a system of red and green flags to indicate either aspects of exceptional performance that could stand as examples of best practice for other areas to follow (these were indicated by green flags) or service areas where the current level of outcomes, and those expected in the future, gave rise to major concerns (these were indicated by red flags)Audit ( Commission, 2009a: 21). As a system, CAA was carried out fully in England for just one year only (2009–2010). In that year, the Cornwall area was awarded one green flag for exceptional performance. This was for the local partners’ success in improving skills and further education in the county. In the same year, Cornwall also received two red flags, one for its shortcomings in children’s safeguarding and wellbeing, and the other for the inadequacy and poor quality of its housing stock (Audit Commission, 2009b: 3). After May 2010, the CAA system and the national indicator set on which it was based were quickly swept away by the incoming government. The CAA was seen by the Conservative-led coalition as an example of the ‘big government’ approach associated with the New Labour years ( DCLG, 2010), and it was quickly con- signed to history. However, although in some respects the CAA was a stiflingly top-down process, it does remain the only inspection regime in the recent past to Local outcomes 171 have focused attention on public service outcomes for an entire area. This is without doubt its most valuable defining feature. For that reason, it has been used as a model for the localism framework set out earlier in this chapter. One of CAA’s main shortcomings was its rather ingenuous assumption that England’s emaciated local public sector (seeChapter 4) might be capable of shaping local policy outcomes to any significant extent. Allied to this was CAA’s apparent myopia regarding the extent to which national policy and wider global factors also influence the performance of local public services. CAA lacked a multi-level perspective, and care has been taken to ensure that this shortcoming is not repeated in the outcomes framework set out earlier in the chapter. More importantly perhaps, the timing of CAA’s introduction was unfortunate, coming as it did just as the Labour government was losing public support following the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Significantly, there has never been any demand from politicians or from the relevant policy communities for CAA to be resur- rected. Despite this, it is important to record its distinctive features before all memory of it is erased by time.

Notes 1 The regular helicopter link from Penzance to Scilly was finally restored in March 2020 (Cornwall Live, 2020). 2 Firstly, by granting local authorities the power to ‘promote the economic, social and environmental wellbeing’ of their areas (Labour through the Local Government Act, 2000) and, then, by vesting them with a ‘general power of competence’ (Conservative/ Liberal Democrat Coalition through the Localism Act, 2011).

References Audit Commission (2009a): Comprehensive Area Assessment: Framework Document. www.audit-commission.gov.uk (accessed April 2009) Audit Commission (2009b): Cornwall: Area Assessment. www.audit-commission.gov.uk (accessed December 2009) Bailey N and M Pill (2015): ‘Can the State Empower Communities through Localism? An Evaluation of Recent Approaches to Neighbourhood Governance in England’, in Envi- ronment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 33(2), 289–304 Barber, Sir M (2017): Delivering Better Outcomes for Citizens: Practical Steps for Unlock- ing Public Value. www.gov.uk/government/publications/delivering-better-outcomes-for- citizens-practical-steps-for-unlocking-public-value (downloaded 4 August 2020) Bovaird T and E Löffler (2003): ‘Evaluating the Quality of Public Governance: Indicators, Models and Methodologies’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 69(3), 313–328 Boyne G, C Farrell, J Law, M Powell and R Walker (2003):Evaluating Public Manage- ment Reforms. Buckingham: Open University Press Chisolm M and S Leach (2008): Botched Business: The Damaging Process of Reorgan- izing Local Government, 2006–2008. Trowbridge, Wilts: Douglas McLean Cornwall Council (2010): Place Survey 2008. www.cornwall.gov.uk (accessed February 2010) 172 Local outcomes Cornwall Council (2014): Why Should the Cornish Be Recognised as a National Minority within the UK? www.cornwall.gov.uk (accessed May 2015) Cornwall Council (2020): Carbon Neutral Action Plan Progress Report. www.cornwall. gov.uk (accessed March 2020) Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Economic Partnership (LEP) (2020):Draft Industrial Strategy. www.cornwall.gov.uk (accessed March 2020) Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2008):National Indicators for Local Authorities and Local Authority Partnerships: Handbook of Definitions . www. gov.uk (accessed March 2020) Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2010): Decentralisation and Localism Bill: An Essential Guide. www.dclg.gov.uk (accessed December 2010) Eisenschitz A and J Gough (1993): The Politics of Local Economic Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Local Initiative. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Eurostat (2015): Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Current Market Prices by NUTS2 Regions. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10r_2gdp&lan g=en (accessed 22 June 2015) John P (2014): ‘The Great Survivor: The Persistence and Resilience of English Local Gov- ernment’, in Local Government Studies, Vol. 40(5), 687–704 March J and J Olsen (1983): ‘Organizing Political Life: What Administrative Reorganiza- tion Tells us about Government’, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 77(1), 1–19 Massey A and R Pyper (2005): Public Management and Modernisation in Britain. Basing- stoke: Palgrave Macmillan Mulgan G (2005): ‘Government, Knowledge and the Business of Policy Making: The Potential and the Limits of Evidence-Based Policy’, in Evidence and Policy, Vol. 1(2), 215–226 ONS (2019): Weekly Pay – Gross £ – For All Employee Jobs: United Kingdom 2019. ons. gov.uk (accessed December 2019) Pinker S (2011): The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Penguin Books Pinker S (2019): Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Pro- gress. London: Penguin Books Pollitt C (2007): ‘Structural Change and Public Service Performance: International Les- sons’, in Public Money and Management, Vol. 27(5), 285–291 Sanderson I (2002): ‘Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making’, in Public Administration, Vol. 80(1), 1–22 Stoker G (2004): Transforming Local Governance: From Thatcherism to New Labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Wimbush E (2010): ‘Accountability for Outcomes – International Lessons’, in Public Money and Management, Vol. 30(1), 8–10 8 Localism and political systems in the twenty-first century

This final chapter focuses on the design of political institutions and systems. Not only is design thinking a key element of an engaged political analysis (Stoker, 2013), but it is also particularly relevant at the present time, as countries struggle with the Covid-19 pandemic which has engulfed the world during 2020. This unprecedented public health crisis has forced governments to take a series of exceptional steps, severely curtailing normal life and commerce in order to protect the lives of citizens. The widespread restrictions that have been imposed may take years to unwind fully, and the pandemic’s longer-term impacts will affect many public functions, regardless of whether they are carried out by government, commerce or civil society. There is already much speculation about how the institutions and processes that shape our everyday lives will be transformed in the light of the crisis. Will the crisis have the same long-term impact on society and politics as the two World Wars did in the twentieth century? Are we at a historical turning point where political systems are set for a quickening in the pace of reform and redesign? In this chapter, I begin by restating the main arguments across the whole of the book so far. I then go on to consider some of the main elements of the twenty- first-century design context, particularly the pre-Covid impacts of globalization and economic development, as well as the counter-trend in authoritarian populism which is now rampant in many parts of the world. At this point I also consider some current trends in multi-level governance (MLG), as this is where any redesign of systems is likely to be focused in future. This leads to the chapter’s main section on localism and the design of political systems. Here, I set out several ideas for systemic political reform, as well as some thoughts about how political design activity is likely to become more institutionalized in the years to come. The chapter concludes with some key statements about localism and the design of political systems.

The argument so far

Chapter 2 The term ‘localism’ denotes a clear valorization of the local dimension in politics and is often counter-posed to the power of the state and/or the impact of 174 Localism and political systems in the 21st century globalization. Localism can be understood in both a core and a secondary sense, depending on the scale of the events being described. Core localism focuses on activity at the micro scale of social and political organization. Secondary localism denotes activity at the meso scale, immediately below the level of the sovereign state. The best framework for analysing localism is that provided by MLG. Local- ist activity and discourse may flow from one of three power dynamics: top-down, bottom-up or collaborative. In real-world situations, two or more of these dynamics may be present alongside each other. For the purposes of political analysis, it is the mix between them that matters (Evans et al., 2013: 614).

Chapter 3 Place, space and scale are fundamental elements of social and political organization. But while place and space are important, it is ultimately scale which is the decisive factor in power relationships Swyngedouw,( 1997: 145). Most communities of place, at whatever scale they are constituted, have a specific identity, as well as an element of social structure and political governance. These elements are formed through sociological processes of ‘structuration’, and they may result in ‘scalar fixes’ of varying temporal durations ( Brenner, 2001: 604–609). Over the course of history, scalar structuration processes have become increasingly sophisticated. In recent times, they have resulted in the emergence of sovereign states as the default mechanism for co-ordinating affairs within the public realm. In the early stages of state formation, the principal dynamic was towards integration and assimilation. After 1950 this pattern began to change, and many states began to decentralize certain policy functions (Bohlken, 2016; Hooghe and Marks, 2016). At the same time, there has been a significant growth in international relations activity involving sovereign states, as well as a notable growth in the number of small states operating independently within the international system (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). In addition, many key aspects of finance, trade, economics and culture have moved beyond the ambit of states altogether and have become part of globalized networks of relationships. This has resulted in many smaller and medium-sized states choosing to align themselves with geo- regional power blocks, where the economic interests of their citizens can be better served within a globalizing world. The most prominent of these blocks is the European Union (EU). This formidable institution, which has been likened to a modern-day empire (Zielonka, 2006), has been at the forefront of developing a flexible style of MLG, where policies and measures are built on the inputs of multiple actors, geographical hubs and scalar levels (Piattoni, 2010). The unique modus operandi of the EU has gone some way towards promoting the idea of regional and sub-national autonomy within a wider sub-continental system of governance. However, the EU has been powerless to intervene effectively in the fraught stand-off over territorial sovereignty currently playing out between Catalonia and Spain. Localism and political systems in the 21st century 175 Chapter 4 The contrast between ‘old’ and ‘new’ localism is explored, particularly within the context of the UK. ‘Old’ localism is principally about established local governance, which in certain parts of the world has a long and distinguished history. At the same time, the establishment of local governance structures in developing countries continues to be a major focus of international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Shah and Shah, 2006). Theo- ries about the role of established local governance have emphasized either its contribution to a wider system of national government or its role as a vehicle for the expression of local identity Pratchett, ( 2004). In some countries, there are well-developed systems of neighbourhood governance, and this has led to an increasing amount of academic and policy interest in the issue of governance at the micro level (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). The primacy of locality governance has received critical support from Green political theory and from citizen initiatives built on digital technologies, such as the Transition Network (Hopkins, 2011). Such initiatives are aimed at challenging the conventional discourse of neighbourhoods as rural backwaters of parochialism and ignorance Tomaney, ( 2012), or as post-industrial wastelands where communities find themselves left behind by the impacts of globalization. The fact is that digital technologies have brought about a significant transformation in the position of local communities vis-à-vis elites and established power geometries (Sassen, 2006). They allow localities to bypass existing power hierarchies and to connect with each other across physical space, thus enabling them to exercise a much greater ‘localist’ influence on world affairs. For example, city mayors are now convening annually to meet within their own Global Parliament (Barber, 2013). The shifting nature of contemporary localism within an MLG system is reflected powerfully in the case study of the Cornwall/Isles of Scilly sub- region. Although conscious of its distinctive identity and of its desire to be an autonomous political player, Cornwall is somewhat constrained by having to operate within the UK’s top-down governance culture ( Blunkett and Richards, 2011).

Chapter 5 Public value (PV) is a fundamental element in the design of political institutions and systems (Benington and Moore, 2011). The chapter argues that PV should be understood in the broadest possible sense as encompassing all aspects of good and effective governance. PV indicates a set of outcomes, or a state of affairs, resulting from previous social and political action and policy making. It should be seen as the goal of all governmental strategy. Two fundamental pillars of public value are political order and political development Fukuyama,( 2011, 2015), but we should also be aware that, if good and effective governance is systematically undermined, states can also end up sliding into political decay (Fukuyama, 2015: 455–548). The chapter discusses three major domains of public value, which are 176 Localism and political systems in the 21st century applicable to some degree across all polities. These are democracy and accountability, human wellbeing and environmental sustainability. The chapter discusses how localism intersects with each of these domains. Of the three, democracy and accountability is the one with the longest historical pedigree, whereas environmental sustainability is the one that has emerged most recently. Environmental sustainability is also essentially about whole ecological systems, rather than about individual institutions or specific territorial units. In policy terms, these three major domains of public value are increasingly being addressed in a joined-up way, and this is particularly evident in the broad scope of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in Septem- ber 2015 (Sachs, 2015). In addition to the three major domains just highlighted, the chapter discusses a further, system-based, domain of public value: territorial cohesion (TC). It shows how TC is being addressed within the context of the EU. The advantage of TC is that it cuts across individual sectors and encourages an integrated and strategic approach to policy. This in turn encompasses economic effectiveness, social cohesion and ecological balance. It puts the sustainable development of individual places at the heart of policy making and institutional action (CEC, 2008). It can be seen as an attempt to promote a kind of ‘spatial justice’ across the diverse territorial communities of the EU.

Chapter 6 This looks specifically at the design of political institutions and systems. Political institutions can emerge naturally, or they can be intentionally designed to achieve specific purposes. However, not all political designs turn out as their sponsors intended (Goodin, 1996). Political design is as much about the ‘software’ of com - peting political discourses, as it is about institutional ‘hardware’ of structures and procedures. There is likely to be much more scope for political redesign in circumstances which are volatile or indeterminate, and where the ‘realist constraints’ which normally make reform difficult are less in evidence (Dryzek, 1996). This is because of the phenomenon of ‘path dependence’, which tends to make institutional structures self-reinforcing over time and to inhibit the scope for major reform (Pierson, 2000). In these circumstances, only small-scale reform or institutional ‘bricolage’ is possible. In fact, political reformers must accept the fact that they will generally fail to meet their objectives (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Political design may be carried out at different levels: at that of individual institutions; or at that of a whole polity; or even, in principle at least, at the level of an entire, sub-continental political system. The more extensive the canvas, the more important it is for political design to be based on an appropriately broad set of principles. The chapter sets out seven design principles for effective political governance at the continental/sub-continental scale. The principles have been formulated with localism and public value specifically in mind, and they represent a particular normative stance. The seven principles concerned are (1) rootedness; Localism and political systems in the 21st century 177 (2) environmental awareness; (3) human wellbeing; (4) citizenship;- (5) mutual ity and territorial cohesion; (6) sustainability and resilience; and (7) learning and public value. With regard to current design trends, while many states have been moving towards a more decentralized pattern of territorial governance over the past 70 years (Hooghe and Marks, 2016), there are as yet few examples of states that have been designed with micro-level governance in mind. One notable exception is India, whose major constitutional reforms of 1993 established a third tier of federal governance at the village and urban-ward level. These groundbreaking Indian reforms were inspired by the visionary localism of early twentieth-century political reformer Mahatma Gandhi (Chakrabarty, 2017).

Chapter 7 This chapter discusses how public value outcomes can be evaluated at the local level. In order to facilitate this task, the chapter sets out a local outcomes framework based on seven key aspects, including (1) local identity; (2) local prosperity and flourishing; (3) civil society and governance at the community level; (4) links with the wider world; (5) autonomy and upward influence; (6) constitutional recognition; and (7) mutuality and cohesion. The first five of these aspects are intended to capture features which are inherently local in nature. The remaining two refer to system-level features which are believed to be essential in enabling an effective approach to localism within a multi-level context. The framework is used to present an illustrative assessment of recent localism policy in the Cornwall/ Isles of Scilly sub-region in south-west England. The framework was inspired by the Comprehensive Area Assessment, which was developed by the UK’s former Audit Commission, and used in England for one year only in 2009–2010.

The book’s main questions With regard to the three questions set out in the book’s opening chapter, the first of them (‘What is localism about and what does it involve?’) is addressed principally by the conceptual and analytical arguments set out in Chapter 2. The second (‘How useful and important a concept is localism?’) is addressed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The final research question‘How ( can localism make a meaningful contribution to the task of institutional and system design?’) has already been addressed through the arguments set out in Chapters 6 and 7. I will now complete my analysis of that question in the remaining part of this chapter.

The twenty-first-century design context According to Stephen Pinker (2019: 81), there has been a hundredfold increase in gross world product since the time of the Industrial Revolution. As a result, many parts of the world have experienced a ‘Great Escape’ from poverty. In recent years, the Great Escape has been followed by a ‘Great Convergence’, as many 178 Localism and political systems in the 21st century more countries have become rich in their turn. For example, by 2008 the world’s population (6.7 billion at the time) had an average income equivalent to that of Western Europe in the 1960s, and throughout the whole of this period extreme poverty has continued to decline. According to Pinker, globalization has turned out to be a ‘bonanza for the poor’ (Pinker, op. cit.: 92). Although there has been a rise in financial inequality in the wealthier nations since 1980, this has been more than offset by the overall decline in inequality worldwide. The relative ‘losers’ of globalization have therefore been lower-middle-class citizens in better-off countries. That said, even these ‘losers’ have continued to see modest increases in their standard of living during this period, and there has also been a gradual reduction in absolute poverty at the bottom of the income distribution (Pinker, op. cit.: 118). In response to these developments, there have been two major backlashes against globalization over the past 20 years. On the one hand, there has been the rise in anti-establishment radicalism and the threat of protest, and even terrorism, which arises from it. On the other – and partly to counter to the challenge of anti- establishment radicalism – there has been a rise in authoritarian populism of the nationalist Right. The latter can be seen in the emergence of ‘strongmen’ leaders in a number of countries across the world, including Putin in Russia, Erdogan in Turkey, Orban in Hungary, Modi in India (see Chapter 6), Duterte in the Philip- pines, Bolsonaro in Brazil and Trump in the United States. These leaders and their programmes represent a pushback of tribalism and authoritarianism against the Enlightenment values that have driven political development across the world, particularly since the end of the Second World War (Pinker, op. cit.: 333). Accord- ing to Pinker, those who support Donald Trump and other authoritarian leaders are the losers, not so much of economic competition as of competition in the cultural sphere. What now seems to be emerging internationally are two broad groupings of states: on the one hand, there is a group of mainly small and medium-sized states, but including the EU as well, that remain broadly committed to a world order based on good governance and on public value principles; on the other, there is a group of mainly larger countries that have swung towards a much more ‘heroic’ view of the sovereign state. These nations, and many others within their ambit, are bent on projecting their economic and military power, and are reluctant to be bound by international law and institutions except where it suits them. The number of countries belonging in each of these camps is in regular flux, and much depends on which regime is in power in a state at any one time: for example, the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump, as opposed to the same country under Barack Obama. The British government’s recent decision to leave the EU represents an unmistakeable bid to join the latter group of states. In the light of the most recent events, however, a key uncertainty is what impact the Covid-19 pandemic will have on the emerging international order as it has been briefly sketched out here. In the light of the common threat now facing the world, will there be more co-operation and shared action between the world’s sovereign states in future, or less? Localism and political systems in the 21st century 179 One of the effects of political regimes led by nationalist ‘strongmen’- is to con centrate power at the political centre and to diminish the influence- of state legis latures and territorial governments, including in countries where governance at the sub-national level is already well developed, as, for example, in the United States, Brazil and India. But even in states where the political style of the regime is less polarizing, there can be tensions between the political centre and the state’s sub-national territories. This may explain why the long-term global trend towards decentralization has slowed perceptibly in recent years (Hooghe and Marks, 2016 : 52), and why the creation of new sovereign states, particularly smaller ones, has also stalled since the millennium (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2019). The question is whether these trends will eventually resume in the same direction as before, or whether they will go into reverse at some point. On the other hand, there are massive global pressures for greater resilience to be developed at the level of regions and localities Sovakool( and Brown, 2009; Bulkeley, 2011). Many of these pressures arise from the urgent ecological challenges which the world is facing Sachs,( 2015; see also Chapter 5). The ecological case for greater localism seems to be supported by the international experience in dealing with the Coronavirus pandemic so far. The states that have been most effective in stopping the initial spread of the disease, such as New Zealand, South Korea and Germany, have been able to achieve this by following World Health Organization guidelines and focusing on mass local testing, follow-up contact tracing, and support for vulnerable individuals within their communities.1 In the absence of an approved and widely available vaccine for the virus, sustained local health interventions are likely to be the only effective way in which the effects of the pandemic can be kept at bay. All this helps to build the normative case for a more local dimension to be built into political design at the global level.

Designing political systems In addressing the issue of political design, there are three distinct aspects to address. These are set out next under the following sub-headings: core issues; key areas of system design; and options, structures and prospects.

Core issues As noted in Chapter 2, ‘design’ is an Enlightenment concept which valorizes the importance of rational thinking about ends and means (Goodin, 1996). This raises an important question about the philosophy of political design, and about the type of normative commitment it represents. In recent years, a comprehensive rationale for rational political design has been provided by Stephen Pinker in his book Enlightenment Now.2 For Pinker, the term ‘enlightenment’ ties together four major themes: reason, science, humanism and progress (Pinker, 2019: 8). Pinker notes that in the eighteenth century, Enlightenment hopes for progress were very much focused on the development of institutions. Human-inspired constructs such as 180 Localism and political systems in the 21st century governments, laws, places of learning, markets and international organizations were all seen as being suitable objects for the application of reason in the pursuit of human betterment. One of the most famous documents of the Enlightenment period, the American Declaration of Independence, proclaimed that governments are established in order to ensure that individuals enjoy the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and also that governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed (Pinker, op. cit.: 12). This sentiment not only reflects an Enlightenment point of view but also forms the basis for today’s public value ethic. As emphasized throughout this book, contemporary political design has to take into account the complexities of MLG. In this context, one of the core challenges of many design briefs is to deal convincingly with the challenge of ‘articulation’ between the different layers of governance within an MLG system Cvetkovic( and Kellner, 1997). This is particularly so, the broader the design context happens to be. As we saw in Chapter 5, for example, Paul Hirst sets out a compelling case for voluntary-sector associations to take over the responsibility for local welfare provision from public sector institutions (Hirst, 1994). Yet Hirst never really explains how his proposed pattern of ‘associationalist’ welfare providers will interface with the wider structures of public power which also form an essential part of his vision. Similarly, the main weakness of Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of village republics within the new, independent state of India is that it pays no attention at all to how reformed village governance bodies will interface, either with large centres of population situated nearby or with the national state apparatus (Gandhi, 1941). Fortunately for us, India’s modern state of Kerala is able to offer a world-leading example of how ultra-localism at the neighbourhood level can be articulated effectively with the public policy priorities of a highly populated sub-national state. With its Kudumbashree mission, in particular, Kerala has succeeded in translating Gandhi’s utopian vision of local neighbourhood governance into practical organizational fact (see Chapter 6). This in turn raises questions about the overall power dynamic which lies behind political design in general. Should it be seen as a blueprint to be imposed from the top-down, or does it represent a radical break with the past to be inspired from the bottom-up? Or should it instead seek to balance a number of diverse and conflicting approaches? Given this book’s defining focus on localism, there are many reasons why it might be tempting to come down in favour of a bottom-up approach to political design. However, the wider explanatory power of MLG has also been acknowledged throughout the book. In my view this is the perspective which ultimately has to be the decisive one. The approach to political design favoured here, therefore, is the ‘balanced diversity’ approach. This would seem to be especially well suited to addressing the broader design requirements of sub- continental political systems.

Key areas of system design – some proposals What follows is a brief outline of some specific areas of political design, which might be developed within political and territorial systems in future. All the areas Localism and political systems in the 21st century 181 discussed next have one thing in common: they have a distinct element of place and/or localism associated with them. A low-profile starting point would be the establishment of an official register of all ‘recognized places’ located within a particular jurisdiction. This would be a detailed database of all relevant places, no matter how local or insignificant they may appear to be. To qualify for inclusion in the register, a place would not necessarily require an element of formal political governance. Nor would it need to have any built or human element to it; it might be an uninhabited area such as a forest or a moor. Reform along these lines would allow individual polities and political systems to develop a detailed geographical profile of all the places which make up the territory for which they are responsible – in effect, a sort of modern Domesday Book.3 This could be a useful resource for supporting the ecological management of the territory and for addressing wider cohesion policy. In due course, such a database could also provide the basis for extending place-based rights, entitlements and representation (see later). A second area of reform would involve the establishment of a system of Uni- versal Basic Services (UBS) for all individuals and local communities within the relevant jurisdiction (Gough, 2019; see also Chapter 5). This could include a Universal Basic Income for adult citizens financed out of taxationvan ( Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017), and perhaps supplemented from philanthropic dona- tions. As Gough concedes, this approach would involve much greater government intervention in the foundational economy than exists at present. A system of UBS would ensure that all citizens were entitled to access the services officially deemed to be essential for supporting everyday life, including nutrition, accommodation, transport and information technology. Not all the services specified within the UBS spectrum would necessarily be offered free of charge at the point of delivery, and by no means all of them would be provided by public agencies. The task of striking the right balance between different types of providers would fall to the relevant local, regional and national authorities. The system would need to reflect wider social norms and attitudes and be shaped by public debate and dis - cussion. Under a UBS system, the precise balance of designated services would need to be regularly reviewed and all major changes should be confirmed through a process of democratic decision-making. A third area of systemic reform involves an extension to the way in which individual democratic rights are conceived, particularly the right to political representation. At present, such rights are focused predominantly on the individual citizen. This leads to a mindset in which rights are generally seen as applying to individuals alone. Thinking about rights in this rather atomized way can undermine the notion of democratic rights in general and can risk leaving individual citizens exposed if they have to defend their rights against an overmighty state or bureaucracy. The weakness of this ‘methodological individualism’ has been identified previously by a number of eminent scholars, including MichaelSandel (1982) and Iris Marion Young (1986). This book has made a strong case for the extension of collective democratic rights to a whole range of entities, including localities of all sizes. As argued in Chapter 5, democracy and accountability for 182 Localism and political systems in the 21st century individual citizens are immeasurably strengthened when they are aligned with the collective dimension of democracy for localities and communities. In implementing rights reform along these collective lines, a number of different factors need to be taken into account. Localities and neighbourhoods would need to be officially defined for the purpose of being able to exercise their place- based rights. This is where the formal register of recognized places proposed earlier could play a critical role. And the constitutional rights and powers of places would also need to be formally set out in legislation. Finally, the rights of formal representation of all local governance bodies would need to become an accepted part of local, regional, national and international governance. For example, the powers of the EU’s Committee of the Regions (seeChapter 5), which was considered to be a significant institutional innovation when it was first created in 1994, might now be extended so as to more closely match those of the European Parlia- ment. Perhaps the Committee’s remit might even be extended so that in future it becomes a Committee of the Regions and Localities? Or maybe it could morph into a new and equally influential Committee of European Mayors? This last area of reform could be part of a much more thoroughgoing effort aimed at establishing localism as a formal constitutional principle, similar to that of equal rights, for example. Accordingly, the local dimension would become a key factor in all policy making and evaluation. This is where something like the localism framework presented in Chapter 7 could have a useful role to play. All relevant state policies could be evaluated to establish how effective they are in improving local outcomes across a range of key public value domains. New constitutional rights for regions/sub-regions and localities could also be framed so as to enable them to form transnational partnerships with other similar entities internationally, provided that such links have the support of local citizens. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, trans-local activity of this kind is already well established in many parts of the world today. One current example is the EU’s Group- ings on Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs), which were described in Chapter 5 (Holder and Layard, 2011). Many of these groupings are cross-border initiatives involving government, private and civil society partners, and their role is to address key issues of common territorial concern, particularly where these cross international borders. I have drawn attention to the increasing profile of international groupings such as the C40 Cities and the Global Parliament of Mayors, both referred to in Chapter 4. This increasingly fluid pattern of cross-border activity on the part of cities, regions and localities is now a key element in the contemporary political landscape, and it should certainly be a part of macro-level thinking about optimal system design.

Options, structures and prospects Today, political and institutional design activity is already well established across the world, especially through the international development activities of organizations such as the World Bank or Development Alternatives Localism and political systems in the 21st century 183 Incorporated (usually known by its short title, DAI). Obviously, there is a specific and well-understood rationale for the international development work that these organizations are involved in. Nevertheless, it is noticeable just how much activity in this field – both past and present – involves the design and implementation of decentralized governance programmes in developing countries, as highlighted in Chapters 4 and 6. For example, the comprehensive local self-government reforms that took place in India in the early 1990s were very much influenced by the World Bank and its two major development reports of 1989 and 1992 respectively (Chakrabarty, 2017: 52). Decentraliza- tion of both governance and economic activity continues to be a major theme within international development. This can be seen in the work that DAI is currently engaged in to support the establishment of a new regional tier of government in Morocco (DAI, 2020). The international development aspect of political design is a well-established part of the current scene and it will no doubt continue to flourish in years to come. There are, however, other models for organizing and institutionalizing political design activity. It could conceivably be delivered by academic institutions, or by private consultancy, or even by government itself. Or it could be delivered through some hybrid arrangement that encompasses more than one of these organizational types. As far as academia is concerned, Gerry Stoker (2010: S80) conceded some years ago that the political science profession lacks a ‘design arm’ and that it really needs to develop one if the discipline is going to be seen as relevant by politicians and policy makers. That point notwithstanding, some of the most highly respected institutional design work to emerge from the academic sector in the past 50 years is that which developed from the 1970s onwards under Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and their Bloomington School collaborators at the University of Indiana ( Aligica and Tarko, 2012). In particular, Elinor Ostrom went on to develop a worldwide reputation for her work on polycentric systems and the collaborative governance of the commons (Ostrom, 1990), culminating in her receiving the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2009.4 The Ostroms’ highly influential work in this area shows that there is scope for the higher education sector to develop considerable expertise within the ‘applied’ sub-discipline of political design, provided there is suitable investment in research and consultancy capability. Of the three organizational options listed earlier, private consultancy is perhaps the most flexible, but it will often be unable to provide the institutional mass needed for large-scale projects. By contrast, a government agency specializing in design is likely to have a degree of credibility in the field and a reasonable level of institutional capacity to go with it. However, it may also be inflexible in its approach and quite liable to be influenced by a range of political- pres sures. In contrast to these two models, a university setting is likely to have both the requisite capacity and an internal culture geared to producing high-quality, independent research. Higher Education research operations are also routinely carried out in collaboration with other academic institutions worldwide, and they 184 Localism and political systems in the 21st century may even be able to attract the support of enlightened government partners, for example the EU. A university research institute of the kind envisaged here could address any number of research and development priorities within the field of political design. These might include some of the critical issues that have been raised in the pages of this book, for example further studies into articulation within MLG systems; place-based public policy; ultra-localism, including Kerala’s Kudumbashree mission; and the detailed development of a Localism Index for quantifying the effectiveness public policy outcomes in localities (see Chapter 7). A research agenda of this type is likely to provide plenty of challenging material for an engaged political science to address. It is certainly possible to look forward to a time when the multi-level design of political systems will become both more institutionalized and more mainstream at the same time.

In conclusion: ten propositions 1 Localism is a perspective which places a special value on the local dimension of social organization and politics. In politics, localism should be seen as part of a broader pattern of multi-level governance. 2 As a perspective, localism can be used to analyse political events at both the neighbourhood level (core localism, or ‘real’ localism) and the level of regional/sub-national government (secondary localism). 3 Localism is one of several perspectives which explore how the geographical notions of place, space and scale are currently being reimagined globally. 4 These perspectives are shining a new light on our accepted notions of the sovereign state. Over the past 70 years there has been a tripling in the number of states across the world, many of which are either small or very small. 5 Over the same period there has been a burgeoning of public policy activity within states and a steady growth in decentralization in most of the larger ones. 6 Public policy activity within states has been focused on various fundamental domains of public value, including the establishment of peace and political order; the pursuit of political and economic development; the promotion of democracy and accountability; the establishment of systems to support human wellbeing; and efforts to achieve environmental sustainability and promote territorial cohesion. Public policy is becoming ever more integrated and system-focused. 7 Today, there is increasing scope for localities to act as agents in their own right. They are rapidly emerging from centuries of parochialism and lack of political power. 8 Across the world, increasing emphasis is being placed on political reform and on the redesign of political institutions and systems. 9 So far, very few states have undertaken reforms based on micro-level design. The main exception is India, which created a third constitutional tier of Localism and political systems in the 21st century 185 village councils and municipalities in 1993. The Indian reforms are based on the utopian vision of Indian political reformer Mahatma Gandhi. 10 If there are to be more reforms of this kind in future, political leaders must reconcile the idea of a unitary sovereignty vested in the nation state with that of autonomy at the regional and local levels. A radically different approach is needed – one where sovereignty is shared across all the constituent parts of a polity, and where local communities have a distinct role to play in the design of political systems.

Notes 1 See Gaskell and Stoker (2020) for an early analysis of the differences of approach to tackling the virus between the UK and Switzerland. Meanwhile, in India, the state of Kerala has been very successful so far in managing the effects of the pandemicSpinney, ( 2020). 2 However, Pinker’s book is not actually about political design as such, and the issue of design is not explicitly discussed by him. 3 Although, hopefully, a much more scholarly and benign version of the original Norman document! 4 Ostrom was the first woman to win the Economics prize. She is one of only two women laureates in the whole of the prize’s 50-year history to date.

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Note: Page numbers in italics indicate a figure on the corresponding page.

Age of Sustainable Development, The 111 Case for Cornwall, The 84 Alesina, A., and E. Spolaore 28, 47, Catalonia/Spain: challenges in, 2012 – 2017 135, 174 43 – 45; future prospects for 49 – 50; Ambedkar, B. R. 59, 140 historical and constitutional background Anthropocene, The 108, 122 of 39 – 40; introduction to 37 – 39, area assessment 163, 169 – 171 38; modern background of 41 – 43; associationalism 102 – 103 reflections on governance of45 – 49 Associative Democracy 102 centralization 12, 27, 71, 102 austerity 42 Chandler, J. 55 Autonomous Communities 37 – 42, Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 158 46autonomy 36 – 37, 47, 56, 68, 140, city regions 26, 74, 110 158, 165, 185 civil society 7, 15, 43, 152, 165, 170 Clarke, N. 13 Bailey, N., and M. Pill 101, 163 Clarke, S. 62 Baker, K., and G. Stoker 113 collaborative approaches to localism 17 Bambery, C., and G. Kerevan 39 – 46 Combined Authorities (CAs) 73 – 75, 84 Barber, B. 27, 65, 89 communities of place 24 – 25 Barcelona 37 – 38, 40, 42 – 43, 45 – 47 community 11 – 12 Basque Country 39, 46, 48 – 50 community localism 16 Benington, J. 10, 62; and M. Moore Community Network Areas (CNAs) 69, 96, 175 77 – 78; Community Network Panels 78, Bentham, J. 55 96, 183 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 142, 159 competition state 9 Big Society 61 conceptual analysis of localism 11 – 12 Blunkett, D., and D. Richards 108, 172 Congress (Party) 139 – 140, 158, 161, 163 Bogdanor, V. 70 – 73 Conservative (Party) 61, 73 – 75, 83, Bohlken, A. 27, 28, 55, 135 87 – 89, 168 – 171 bottom-up localism 17, 103 Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and boundaries of scale 23 Place 140 Brenner, N. 23 – 24, 25, 26, 117, 174 Convention on Biodiversity 111 Brexit 86, 88, 121, 178 co-production in wellbeing 105 – 107 Britain’s Leading Edge 86 Corbett, J., and W. Veenendaal 29, 179 British Political Tradition 71 – 73, 86 – 87 Cornwall Council 66 – 69, 76 – 89, Brown, J. 139 – 140 166 – 167, 169 Cornwall, England, UK: area assessment C40 Group of Cities 65, 113 in 169 – 171; British Political Tradition Cameron, D. 83 and 71 – 73; devolution deal and New capitalism 26, 30, 117 Frontiers strategy in 83 – 86; evaluating Index 189 local outcomes in 166 – 169; future ecological footprint 109 prospects for 88 – 89; introduction Elliott, J. H. 39, 41 – 45 to 66 – 71, 67, 69; as a land apart empires 33 – 35 75 – 76; new institutional design for empowerment, local 101 Cornwall Council in 77 – 80; political Enlightenment 10, 59, 164, 178, 179 – 180 and organizational support for Enlightenment Now 164, 179 localism in 80 – 81; range of localism environmentalism 12 – 14 and place-shaping work in 81 – 83; environmental sustainability 9, 99, recent developments in sub-national 108 – 114, 142, 156, 176 governance in 73 – 75; reflections on Ercan, S., and C. Hendricks 101 – 102 localism, place shaping and devolution EU Covenant of Mayors 65, 113 in 86 – 87 European Commission 115 – 116, 120 – 121 Coronavirus 178 – 179; see also Covid-19 European Committee of the Regions (CoR) pandemic 47, 116, 122, 182 Covid-19 pandemic 173, 178 – 179 European Economic Community (EEC) Crouch, C. 96 – 97 28, 41 Cvetkovic, A., and D. Kellner 30, 31, 180 European Groupings on Territorial Cohesion (EGTCs) 119, 182 Daly, H. 13 European Parliament 45, 116, 122, 182 Dasgupta, J. 141 European Union (EU): as empire 33 – 35; Davies, J., and M. Pill 60 – 61 end of permissive consensus in Davoudi, S.: and A. Madanipour 109; and 120 – 121; future prospects for 121 – 122; D. Stead 109, 110 introduction to 115 – 116; rescaling decentralization 9, 135 – 136, 150 within 116 – 117; subsidiarity and democracy 8; localism and 100 – 103 territorial agenda of 117 – 118; territorial design: designing political systems cohesion and spatial flexibility of 179 – 184; institutional and political 119 – 120 systems 128 – 132, 179 – 184; large-scale political systems 130 – 132; options, Falmouth, Cornwall 76, 79 structures and prospects for 182 – 184; federalism 10, 17, 36, 117; federal principles for institutional and system governance 135, 144 132 – 135; proposals for 180 – 182; top- Finlayson, A., and J. Martin 62 – 63 down, bottom-up and collaborative Franco, F. 40, 43 129 – 130; trends in national, regional Frug, G. 137 and local governance 135 – 137; twenty- Fukuyama, F. 98, 99 first century context for177 – 179; Fung, A. 102, 131 visionary localism in India and Kerala and 137 – 158 Gandhi, M. 18, 59, 139 – 140, 148, 153, 180 Deutsch, K. 26 Gender Equality Index 105 Development Alternatives Incorporated geographies of power 23 (DAI) 183 geography 12 – 14 devolution 9, 72 – 75 George, S. 152 DiEM25 122 Germany 44, 47, 71, 113, 168 – 169, 179 differentiated polity 72 – 75 Giddens, A. 22, 23, 62, 132 Distant Proximities 30 globalization 1, 29 – 31, 59; effects on local District Collector 148, 154 communities 12, 60 – 63; impact on poor Dobson, A. 58 and rich nations 178 double devolution 58 Goodin, R. 128 – 129, 132 – 133 Dowling, A. 37, 42, 46 – 49 Gough, I. 107 – 108, 181 Doyal, L., and I. Gough 104 governance 25, 28; design trends in Drèze, J., and A. Sen 138, 139, 146, 135 – 137; established local 54 – 56; 148, 157 and government; meso level 117; Dryzek, J. 8, 29 – 30, 112, 128 – 129 micro level 58 – 61; neighbourhood Dunleavy, P. 8, 29 – 30 56 – 58; networked approach to 32; 190 Index political community, public goods and Klijn, E.-H., and C. Skelcher 100 sovereignty in 35 – 36; polycentric style Krishnan, K. P. 154 of 32, 62 – 64 Kudumbashree 153, 156, 180, 184 government, limits of 25 – 27 Gramsci, A. 86 Labour (Party) 14, 61, 72 – 74, 83, 87, Great Britain see United Kingdom 168 – 171 Green political thinking 13, 58, 109, 140 Left Democratic Front (LDF) 144, Gurney, G. 63 157 – 158 level 11; scale as 23 – 24 Habermas, J. 122 Liberal Democrat (Party) 87 Heller, P. 152, 156 Lisbon Treaty 119 Hildreth, P. 16 local empowerment 101 Hirst, P. 102 – 103, 108, 180 local government 12, 15, 17, 116; Hooghe, L., and G. Marks 16, 26, 35 – 36, bottom-up influence of133, 137; climate 135 – 136 change addressed by 113; funding of 81, Hopkins, R. 16, 17 88; of India 150 – 158; power of 54, 56, Human Development Index (HDI) 105, 58, 68, 168 – 169; social welfare programs 139, 158 and 32; stability with 55; structure of 34, human needs 104, 107 55, 63, 73 – 74, 77, 79, 83, 142; Universal human wellbeing 57, 97, 99, 103 – 108, 114, 134 Basic Services and 107 localism: bottom-up 17, 103; If Mayors Ruled the World 65 collaborative approaches to 17; India: critical perspectives on local self- community 16; conceptual analysis government reform in Kerala and of 11 – 12; conditional 16; core and 154 – 156; democratic decentralization secondary varieties of 15, 174, in Kerala 151 – 153; future prospects 184; democracy and 100 – 103; for Kerala and 156 – 158; Indian sub- environmental sustainability and continent and modern state of 137 – 139; 108 – 113; in flux in Cornwall, England, introduction to state of Kerala in 143, UK 66 – 89, 67, 69; geography, 143 – 146, 145; localism and formation environmentalism, politics and 12 – 14; of modern state of 139 – 140; micro-level globalization and 29 – 31; human design in 184; sub-nationalism of Kerala wellbeing and 103 – 108; key themes in 146 – 148; sub-national structure of and paradigms on 2 – 3; mapping the 140 – 142; towards decentralization and intellectual and conceptual landscape localism in 148 – 151 of 6 – 11; micro level governance and institutional and system design 2, 10; 58 – 61; new 14, 56, 62 – 64; old 54 – 56; principles for 132 – 135 as political doctrine 1; questions and intellectual and conceptual landscape of aims on 1 – 2; representative 16; social localism 6 – 11 and political organization of 14 – 16, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 22 – 24; sovereignty and 37 – 50; ten Change (IPCC) 112 – 113, 132 – 133 propositions for 184 – 185; three international relations system 27 – 29 dynamics of 16 – 17; trans- 64 – 66; Isles of Scilly 83; Cornwall/Isles of Scilly twenty-first-century design context for sub-region (CIOS) 76, 119; evaluating 177 – 179; visionary 137 – 158 local outcomes in CIOS 166 – 169 locality 7; localities 174 Local Public Support (LPS) 107 Jammu and Kashmir 142, 158 – 159 Lowndes, V.: and A. Gardner 70; and H. Jayal, N. 149, 154 Sullivan 17, 57 63, 175; and L. Pratchett Johnson, B. 75, 88 61; and M. Roberts 129 – 130, 176 Jordan, A. 110, 121 Lyons, M. 81 Jorgensen, K. 113, 141 – 142 Juncker, J.-C. 44, 48, 51 macro-level principles (for political systems) 133 – 134 Keating, M. 26, 36, 47 – 48, 117, 122; and Macron, E. 44 A. Wilson 41, 47, 49 Madrid 38, 39, 42 – 44; see also Catalonia/ Kerala see India Spain Index 191 Marks, G. 8, 9, 26 – 27, 33 – 34, 36, 135; Partido Popular (PP) 42, 45 – 46, 48 and L. Hooghe 32 path dependence 129 Marx, K. 30 people’s planning (Kerala) 152, 156 – 157 Massey, D. 13, 23 – 24, 63, 110; and P. Jess Piattoni, S. 15 – 16, 31 – 32, 134, 174 15, 22 Pierson, P. 129 Mathur, K. 140, 142, 154 – 155 Pinker, S. 164, 177 – 178, 179 May, T. 75, 88 place 7; categories of 24 – 25; communities Mebyon Kernow (MK) 75 – 76, 83 of 24 – 25; place shaping 80 – 82 Merkel, A. 44 policy evaluation 163 – 164 meso government 117 political community 35 – 36 ‘meta-governance’ 9 political design see design Michel, C. 44, 48, 50 – 51, 115, 116 political development 98 – 100 micro-level governance 58 – 61, 177 political order 35 – 36, 86, 98 – 100, Mill, J. S. 55 115, 175 Mitra, S. 59 – 60, 150 political science 2, 14, 16, 29, 131, Modi, N. 157 – 158, 178 183 – 184 Morris, D., and K. Hess 14, 62 political systems 2, 4, 16 – 17, 23, 97, 99, Mulgan, G. 9, 97, 106, 120, 164 133; design of 130 – 132, 179 – 184; Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index 105 territorial cohesion within 115 – 122 multi-level governance (MLG) 3, 13, politics 12 – 14 15 – 16, 22, 134; in empires and political polycentric world order 6, 16, 22; orders 31 – 35; sovereignty and 36 governing locally in 62 – 64 mutuality 3, 17, 79, 100, 118, 133 – 134, populism (authoritarian) 34, 173, 178 165 – 169, 177 Pratchett, L. 14, 56 President’s Rule 141 – 142, 157 National Strategy for Neighbourhood public goods 35 – 36, 96 – 98 Renewal 61 public policy 8 – 9, 184 nation state 25 – 27 public services 9, 62, 106 – 107, 147, natural localities 13 170 – 171 Nehru, J. 140 public value (PV) 10 – 11, 96 – 98; core neighbourhood governance 56 – 58 domains of 98 – 100; joining up the New Local Government Network domains of 113 – 115; policy evaluation (NLGN) 62 and achieving 163 – 164; public goods ‘new’ localism 14, 56, 62 – 64 and 96 – 98; territorial cohesion (TC) New Public Management 32, 157, 170 and 115 – 122 Newquay, Cornwall 81 Puigdemont, C. 44 – 45, 49 Nicolaidis, K. 117 NUTS Classificatory System, 83, 87, 113 Rajoy, M. 42, 44 – 45, 48 Rajya Sabha 142 Obama, B. 178 regional authority 136 ‘old’ localism 54 – 56 relational state 105 – 107 Oommen, M. A. 155 – 156 repatrimonialization 99 Ostrom, E. 130, 183 resilience 9 outcomes, local: area assessment in the UK Rhodes, R. 72 and Cornwall 169 – 171; evaluation of Richards, D. 72 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 166 – 169; Richardson, J. 120 – 121 policy evaluation and achieving public Rifkin, J. 112 value in 163 – 164; towards a framework Roman Empire 33 – 34 of 164 – 166, 177 Rosenau, J. 30

Pakistan, 137, 140, 158 Sachs, J. 111 – 112, 114 – 115, 119 Panchayat/Panchayati Raj 59, 140, Sanchez, J. 44 148 – 155 Sandel, M. 181 Paris Climate Change Agreement 113 Sassen, S. 63 – 64, 175 Parliament of Mayors 65, 89, 182 scalar fix26, 174 parochialism 2, 4, 27, 59 – 60, 66, 184 scalar structuration (ScS) 23 – 25, 174 192 Index scale 7, 23 – 24 town and parish councils (TPCs) 65, Schumacher, E. F. 13 77 – 79, 82 Searle, J. 7 Transition Movement/Network 13, 16, 58, Second World War 27 – 28, 47, 135, 178 64 – 65 Shah, A., and S. Shah 54 – 55 trans-localism 64 – 66 Singh, P. 146 – 147 Travancore and Cochin 143, 146 – 147 Small Is Beautiful 13 Trump, D. 178 small states 28 – 29, 47, 135, 174 typology of place 24 Smith, G. 102, 131 Smith, J. T. 55 (Unidos) Podemos 42, 45, 49 – 50 Smith, N. 24, 25, 26 unitary (government) 24, 68, 70 – 71, 77, social and political organization 14 – 16; 83, 87, 136, 150, 168, 185 core dimensions of 22 – 24 United Democratic Front (UDF) 144, 147 South Africa 137 United Kingdom 1; area assessment sovereign state 4, 7 – 9, 27 – 29, 47 – 48, 65, in 163, 169 – 171; British Political 71, 97, 99 – 101, 115 – 117, 132, 135, Tradition and 71 – 73, 86 – 87; sub- 174, 178 – 179 national governance in 73 – 75; see also sovereignty 35 – 36; localism and Cornwall, England, UK 37 – 50, 185 United Nations (UN) 28; Development space 7, 108 – 110 Programme (UNDP) 104 – 105; Spirit Level, The 105 Framework Convention on Climate states 8; international relations system and Change (UNFCCC) 112; Sustainable size of 27 – 29; limits of government and Development Goals (SDGs) 114 25 – 27; small 28 – 29 United States 1, 10, 13 – 14, 27, 60, 113, Stears, M. 106 179; federal government in 135; origins Stepan, A. 135 of ‘localism’ term in 62; under Donald Stoker, G. 2, 62, 113, 183 Trump 178; as vetocracy 99 strategy 9 Universal Basic Services (UBS) Strong and Prosperous Communities 107 – 108, 181 (White Paper) 77 urban and rural dimensions of space, place strongmen leaders 178 – 179 and scale 108 – 111 sub-nationalism: in Catalonia 37 – 50; in Kerala 146 – 148 Varoufakis, Y. 28, 48, 122 subsidiarity 10, 16, 116 – 118 visionary localism 137 – 158 sustainability 9; localism and Voisey, H., and T. O’Riordan 63 environmental 108 – 113 voluntary and community sector sustainable development 9, 13, 58, (VCS) 82 111 – 113, 114, 119 von der Leyen, U. 116 Sustainable Development Goals 114, 176 Switzerland 54, 135 – 136 welfare state 32, 97, 103 – 104, 107 Swyngedouw, E. 24, 31, 174 wellbeing and localism 103 – 108 Wilkinson, R., and K. Pickett 105 territorial cohesion (TC) 3, 10, Williams, R. V. 60 115 – 122, 176 Wilson, D., and C. Game 54, 56, 59 territory 7, 26, 36 – 37, 40, 68, 70, Wimberly, R., and L. Morris 110 – 111 140 – 141, 181 World Bank 28, 55, 182 – 183 ‘third industrial revolution’ 112 World Trade Organization 28 Tillin, L. 135, 138, 141 – 142 time-space distanciation 23 Young, I. M. 7, 11, 15, 181 Tomaney, J. 60, 63 You’ve Got the Power 58 Tönnies, F. 59 Towards a New Localism: A Discussion Zapatero, J.-L. R. 41, 42 Paper 62 Zielonka, J. 34 – 35, 174