The Fall of Berlin
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The Origination and Evolution of Radio Traffic Analysis: World War II
DOCID: 3860741 UNCLASSIFIED The Origination and Evolution of Radio Traffic Analysis: World War II ( b ) ( 3 ) - E' . L . 86 - 3 6 ____I ··· Tb;• artitle it UNCLASSJF1ED OJrcept for the author's biography which is classified as marked. The bombing of the Philippines by the Japanese on 8 December 1941 came as a shock to the United States even though some Americans were braced for other attacks following the infamy of Pearl Harbor the previous day.1 After the near destruction of the U.S . fleet in Hawaii, the Japanese were focused on the rows of B-17s and P-40s parked neatly in the mid-day sun at Clark Field. MacArthur's air force was destroyed on the ground on that Monday afternoon without a fight. On that day, Lieutenant Howard W. Brown, a radio intelligence veteran attached to the Second Signal Service Company at Manila, changed the mission of the Army intercept unit from Japanese diplomatic to potentially more lucrative air force communications and began reconstructing the tactical military nets serving the attacking Japanese. Thus began U.S. Army radio traffic analysis in World War II. In Europe, our entry into the war spurred closer cooperation with British signals intelligence. Radio traffic analysis, as indeed the entire field of Sigint, was comprehensively developed by the British following more than two years of war with the Germans. Bletchley Park, home of Britain's Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), became the center of Allied Sigint efforts in World War II. This included the preparation and training of U.S. -
Deutsche Generäle in Britischer Gefangenschaft 1942–1945. Eine
289 Von vielen deutschen Generälen des Zweiten Weltkriegs sind häufig nur die Laufbahndaten bekannt; Briefe und Tagebücher liegen nur wenige vor. Für die For schung sind sie oft genug nur eingeschränkt zugänglich. So fällt es nach wie vor schwer, zu beurteilen, wie die Generale selbst die militärischen und politischen Geschehnisse der Zeit zwischen 1939 und 1945 rezipiert haben und welche Folgerungen sie daraus zogen. Wichtige Aufschlüsse über ihre Kenntnisse von den nationalsozialistischen Massenmorden oder ihr Urteil über den deutschen Widerstand gegen Hitler bieten jedoch die Abhörprotokolle deutscher Stabsoffiziere in britischer Kriegsgefangen schaft. Sönke Neitzel Deutsche Generäle in britischer Gefangenschaft 1942-1945 Eine Auswahledition der Abhörprotokolle des Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre UK Die deutsche Generalität hat sich der öffentlichen Reflexion über ihre Rolle wäh rend des Zweiten Weltkrieges weitgehend verschlossen. Das Bild, das sie vor allem in ihren Memoiren von sich selbst zeichnete, läßt sich verkürzt auf die Formel bringen: Sie hat einen sauberen Krieg geführt, hatte von Kriegsverbrechen größe ren Ausmaßes keine oder kaum Kenntnis, und die militärische Niederlage war zu einem Gutteil den dilettantischen Eingriffen Hitlers als Obersten Befehlshaber in die Kriegführung zuzuschreiben. Es erübrigt sich näher darauf einzugehen, daß dieses Bild von der Geschichts wissenschaft längst gründlich widerlegt worden ist. Aber nach wie vor wissen wir wenig darüber, wie die Generäle die Zeit zwischen 1939 und 1945 rezipiert haben, welche Kenntnis sie von den militärischen und politischen Geschehnissen hatten, die über ihren engen Arbeitsbereich hinausgingen, und welche Schlußfolgerungen sie hieraus zogen. Zur Durchleuchtung dieses Komplexes ist vor allem der Rück griff auf persönliche Quellen wie Briefe und Tagebücher notwendig, die allerdings nur von einem kleinen Personenkreis vorliegen und zudem oft auch nur beschränkt zugänglich sind, da sie sich in Privatbesitz befinden1. -
A War of Reputation and Pride
A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….………………. -
Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East
Kiev 1941 In just four weeks in the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht wrought unprecedented destruction on four Soviet armies, conquering central Ukraine and killing or capturing three-quarters of a million men. This was the battle of Kiev – one of the largest and most decisive battles of World War II and, for Hitler and Stalin, a battle of crucial importance. For the first time, David Stahel charts the battle’s dramatic course and after- math, uncovering the irreplaceable losses suffered by Germany’s ‘panzer groups’ despite their battlefield gains, and the implications of these losses for the German war effort. He illuminates the inner workings of the German army as well as the experiences of ordinary soldiers, showing that with the Russian winter looming and Soviet resistance still unbroken, victory came at huge cost and confirmed the turning point in Germany’s war in the east. David Stahel is an independent researcher based in Berlin. His previous publications include Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009). Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 Kiev 1941 Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East David Stahel Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao˜ Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru,UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107014596 c David Stahel 2012 This publication is in copyright. -
Persecution, Collaboration, Resistance
Münsteraner Schriften zur zeitgenössischen Musik 5 Ina Rupprecht (ed.) Persecution, Collaboration, Resistance Music in the ›Reichskommissariat Norwegen‹ (1940–45) Münsteraner Schrift en zur zeitgenössischen Musik Edited by Michael Custodis Volume 5 Ina Rupprecht (ed.) Persecution, Collaboration, Resistance Music in the ‘Reichskommissariat Norwegen’ (1940–45) Waxmann 2020 Münster x New York The publication was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft , the Grieg Research Centre and the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster as well as the Open Access Publication Fund of the University of Münster. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Th e Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografi e; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de Münsteraner Schrift en zur zeitgenössischen Musik, Volume 5 Print-ISBN 978-3-8309-4130-9 E-Book-ISBN 978-3-8309-9130-4 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31244/9783830991304 CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 Waxmann Verlag GmbH, 2020 Steinfurter Straße 555, 48159 Münster www.waxmann.com [email protected] Cover design: Pleßmann Design, Ascheberg Cover pictures: © Hjemmefrontarkivet, HA HHI DK DECA_0001_44, saddle of sources regarding the Norwegian resistance; Riksarkivet, Oslo, RA/RAFA-3309/U 39A/ 4/4-7, img 197, Atlantic Presse- bilderdienst 12. February 1942: Th e newly appointed Norwegian NS prime minister Vidkun Quisling (on the right) and Reichskomissar Josef Terboven (on the left ) walking along the front of an honorary -
The Battle of Moscow
Centre for Comparative and Public History Department of History Chinese University of Hong Kong In-Service Teacher Training Course Conflicts and Cooperation in the Twentieth-Century World Lecture 3:3: “World War II” Source 6 The Battle of Moscow Context: To the German Fuhrer Adolf Hitler, Moscow was the key to bringing about the surrender of the Soviet Union. From October 1941 to January 1942, the Soviet capital served as the key battle ground between the German Wehrmacht and the Soviet Red Army. The successful defense of Moscow became a rallying point for opponents of the Axis and sowed seeds of mistrust and dissension at German military headquarters. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Battle_of_moscow05.jpg Questions: 1. Given Germany’s remarkable success in the first two years of World War II, how were the Allies able to turn the tide and defeat the Nazi forces? 2. What advances in technologies and tactics altered military tactics and outcomes during World War II. Assignment: Divide the class into groups and assign them each a notable World War II military battle or campaign, e.g. the invasion of Poland (Operation Fall Weiss), Battle of France (Fall Gelb), Battle of Britain (plus Operation Sealion), Siege of Leningrad, Battle of Moscow, North African Campaign (the Desert War), Battle of Sicily, Battle of Normandy, Battle of the Bulge, Battle of Berlin. Require each group to report on the combatants’ tactics, the importance of the encounter, and the outcome. Their reports can be fashioned in a variety of ways - dispatches to headquarters, letters to relatives, or newspaper accounts. -
The War Hitler Won: the Battle for Europe, 1939-1941
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies The War Hitler Won: The Battle for Europe, 1939-1941 Robert Citino "A Distinctive Language": The German Operational Pattern In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite unlike anything in living military memory. With their fearsome tank (Panzer) formations operating as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force (Luftwaffe) circling overhead, the Wehrmacht ran through or around every defensive position thrown in its path. The opening campaign in Poland (Case White) smashed the Polish army in 18 days, although a bit more fighting was necessary to reduce the capital, Warsaw.1 Equally 1 For Case White, begin with the belated "official history" commissioned by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Das Deutsche Reich und Der Zweite Weltkrieg, volume 2, Die Errichtung der hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), especially "Hitler's Erster 'Blitzkrieg' und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa," pp. 79-156. Labeling this "official history" is misleading--it is far more a meticulously researched critical history by a team of crack scholars. Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland, 1939, Department of the Army Pamphlet no. 20-255 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956) continues to dominate the field, and Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1978), pp. 169-176, is still useful. Both Pat McTaggart, "Poland '39," Command 17 (July-August 1992), p. 57, and David T. Zabecki, "Invasion of Poland: Campaign that Launched a War," World War II 14, no. -
Polish Contribution to World War II - Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia 12/18/15, 12:45 AM Polish Contribution to World War II from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
Polish contribution to World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 12/18/15, 12:45 AM Polish contribution to World War II From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The European theatre of World War II opened with the German invasion of Poland on Friday September 1, 1939 and the Soviet Polish contribution to World invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939. The Polish Army War II was defeated after more than a month of fighting. After Poland had been overrun, a government-in-exile (headquartered in Britain), armed forces, and an intelligence service were established outside of Poland. These organizations contributed to the Allied effort throughout the war. The Polish Army was recreated in the West, as well as in the East (after the German invasion of the Soviet Union). Poles provided crucial help to the Allies throughout the war, fighting on land, sea and air. Notable was the service of the Polish Air Force, not only in the Allied victory in the Battle of Britain but also the subsequent air war. Polish ground troops The personnel of submarine were present in the North Africa Campaign (siege of Tobruk); ORP Sokół displaying a Jolly the Italian campaign (including the capture of the monastery hill Roger marking, among others, at the Battle of Monte Cassino); and in battles following the the number of sunk or damaged invasion of France (the battle of the Falaise pocket; an airborne ships brigade parachute drop during Operation Market Garden and one division in the Western Allied invasion of Germany). Polish forces in the east, fighting alongside the Red army and under Soviet command, took part in the Soviet offensives across Belarus and Ukraine into Poland, across the Vistula and towards the Oder and then into Berlin. -
HEINRICH HIMMLER: a Detailed History of His Offices Commands
2016 NEW BOOKS 13 HEINRICH HIMMLER: A Detailed History of his Offi ces Commands and Organizations in Nazi Germany Rolf Michaelis • All of Heinrich Himmler’s roles and offi cial positions are described in detail • Himmler’s actions and effects documented, from Reichsführer-SS to commander-in-chief of Army Group Vistula • Military actions of the Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei documented, as well as the National-Socialist policies Reichsführer-SS, Chief of German Police, Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, Reich Minister of the Interior, Commander of the Replacement Army, and Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Vistula—Heinrich Himmler ultimately combined all of these positions in his person. All of his roles are described and explained in detail for the fi rst imet in this comprehensive book. What were the tasks of the Security Police compared to the SD (Security Service)? What was the function of the Dienststelle SS- Obergruppenführer Heißmeyer? Th ese and other questions are answered in this book, which also describes combat operations by the Waff en-SS and the Ordnungspolizei. Th e resett lement of the ethnic Germans and the deportation of the Jewish populations of Europe also form part of the book, as do the detailed history of Army Group Vistula. A total of 275 illustrations, together with the complete texts of several of Himmler’s speeches complete this outstanding book about the man responsible for the implementation of National- Socialist policy. Rolf Michaelis specializes in books on the Waff en-SS and has writt en over thirty to date. He lives in Berlin. -
Chapter 4. Resurfacing
Chapter 4 SURFACING Y•Z The Allied liberation of Germany from twelve years of Nazi tyranny en- tered its fi nal phase in January 1945. On the country’s eastern and western fl anks, the Alli es swept over Germany’s pre-1939 boundaries and began the quick, albeit costly, destruction of the Third Reich. By 31 January, the Red Army had reached what would soon be the new eastern border of the German state, the Oder River, a mere forty miles from Berlin.1 The liberation of the city, however, took another three months. For the city’s submerged Jews, victory could not arrive soon enough. The years sub- merged, during which they were almost continually on the run through the shadows of Berlin, had taken their toll on the health and emotional well-being of all those still alive in the city. However close victory was, the focus of the average submerged Jew remained day-to-day survival in a city that had become increasingly diffi cult to navigate, geographically as well as personally. The ferocity of the air raids continued, and the So- viet advance inundated the city with hundreds of thousands of refugees, making daily life chaotic. As the Red Army closed in during April and launched “Operation Berlin,” the full horrors of the Nazi war were fi nally brought home to bear upon Berliners, non-Jews and Jews alike. When it was over, Berlin lay in ruins, but its Jewish residents were free. The cost of liberation, however, was heavy, and the experience of liberation complex.2 As World War II entered its fi nal phase, the divisions between the surviving U-boats and the non-Jewish population began to blur. -
Downloaded for Personal Non-Commercial Research Or Study, Without Prior Permission Or Charge
Blackwell, James W. (2010) The Polish Home Army and the struggle for the Lublin region. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1540/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] By James Blackwell Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD Department of Central and East European Studies Faculty of Law, Business and Social Studies Glasgow University The Polish Home Army and the struggle for the Lublin Region - 1943–1945 1 Abstract Between 1939 and 1944 the underground forces of the Polish Government-in-Exile created an underground army in the Lublin region, which, at its height, numbered 60,000 men. The underground Army was created in order to facilitate the reestablishment of an independent Poland. The Army that was created, the AK, was in effect, an alliance organisation comprising, to varying degrees, members of all pro-independence underground groups. It was, in Lublin, to always suffer from internal stresses and strains, which were exaggerated by the actions of the region’s occupiers. -
Dispatches BAKERSFIELD CA PERMIT NO 66 from Decision Games #39 FALL 2020
PRESRT STD US POSTAGE PAID DISPATCHES BAKERSFIELD CA PERMIT NO 66 FROM DECISION GAMES #39 FALL 2020 (661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax | P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390 | DECISIONGAMES.COM Excerpt from Strategy & Tactics #50 The Last Strategies By Stephen B. Patrick Germany By December, 1944, the Axis existed only in Hitler’s mind. Accordingly, all strategies were Hitler’s. Germany was fighting on four fronts by this time: the west, Italy, Poland and the Balkans. The last two were nominally one front, but, because the two Soviet drives were basically independent, they had to be treated separately. Hitler’s strategy, such as it was, was one of desperation and wishful thinking. He was convinced that the Anglo-American alliance with the Soviets could not endure. Subsequent events proved him right. What he failed to recognize was that the mutual hatred they bore for Nazism was sufficient to hold the alliance together for the duration of the war. Hitler seemed to have few illusions about Germany’s chances to win the war. He now wanted to settle for destroying Communism. Hitler convinced himself that he could work out an alliance with the Anglo- Americans and the three would then crush the Bolshevik menace. To “encourage” the British and American governments to see things his way, Hitler felt he needed a major victory in the west. He may not have seriously believed he could root the western Allies, but he did expect to deliver a blow that would seriously upset the western timetable. He also hoped to so upset morale at home in the western alliance that the German Panzer V Panther on the Eastern Front, 1944.