596-4500 James P. Rouhandeh, Esq

Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263 Filed 05/17/19 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 5381

Michael R. Griffinger, Esq. Liza M. Walsh, Esq. GIBBONS P.C. WALSH PIZZI O'REILLYO’REILLY One Gateway Center FALANGA LLP Newark, NJ 07102-5310 1037 Raymond Blvd, Suite 600 Tel.: (973) 596-4500 Newark, NJ 07102 James P. Rouhandeh, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Tel.: (973) 757-1100 David B. Toscano, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Michael R. Shumaker, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP Julie E. McEvoy, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) 450 Lexington Avenue William D. Coglianese, Esq. (pro(pro hac New York, NY 10017 vice)vice) Tel.: (212) 450-4000 JONES DAY Neal A. Potischman, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Andrew Yaphe, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Washington, DC 20001 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP Tel.: (202) 879-3939 1600 El Camino Real AttorneysAttorneys forfor Defendant Sanofi-Aventis Menlo Park, CA 94025 U.S.U.S. LLC Tel.: (650) 752-2000 Attorneys forfor Defendant Novo Nordisk Inc. Melissa A. Geist, Esq. REED SMITH LLP Princeton Forrestal Village 136 Main Street, Suite 250 Princeton, NJ 08540 Tel.: (609) 514-5978 Shankar Duraiswamy, Esq. Mark Lynch, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Henry Liu, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 662-6000 Attorneys forfor Defendant Eli Lilly and Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No. 17-699 (BRM) (LHG) IN RE INSULIN PRICING LITIGATION ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263 Filed 05/17/19 Page 2 of 4 PageID: 5382

NOTICE OF DEFENDANTS'DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

TO: All Persons on ECF Service List

COUNSEL:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc., Sanofi-

Aventis U.S. LLC, and Eli Lilly and Company (collectively "Defendants"),“Defendants”), by

and through their respective undersigned counsel, shall move before the

Honorable Brian R. Martinotti, U.S.D.J., at a date and time to be determined by

the Court, at the Clarkson S. Fisher Building & U.S. Courthouse, 402 East State

Street, Trenton, New Jersey 08608, for an Order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), partially dismissing the Second Amended Class Action Complaint.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT in support of this Motion,

Defendants will rely on: a) Defendants' Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of

Partial Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint and b)

all other pleadings and proceedings on file.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that a Proposed form of

Order is submitted herewith.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Defendants hereby

request oral argument.

2 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263 Filed 05/17/19 Page 3 of 4 PageID: 5383

Dated: May 17, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

By: s/ Michael R. Griffinger Michael R. Griffinger, Esq. Christopher Walsh, Esq. Calvin K. May, Esq. GIBBONS P.C. One Gateway Center Newark, NJ 07102-5310 Tel: (973) 596-4500

James P. Rouhandeh, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) David B. Toscano, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 450-4000

Neal A. Potischman, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Andrew Yaphe, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 1600 El Camino Real Menlo Park, CA 94025 Tel: (650) 752-2000

Attorneys forfor Defendant Novo Nordisk Inc.

By: s/ Liza M. Walsh Liza M. Walsh,Walsh, Esq. WALSH PIZZI O'REILLYO’REILLY FALANGA LLP 1037 Raymond Blvd, Suite 600 Newark, NJ 07102 Tel.: (973) 757-1100 Michael R. Shumaker, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Julie E. McEvoy, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) William D. Coglianese, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 879-3939

3 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263 Filed 05/17/19 Page 4 of 4 PageID: 5384

Attorneys forfor Defendant Sanofi-Aventis U.S.U.S. LLC

By•By: s/ Melissa A. Geist, Esq. Melissa A. Geist, Esq. REED SMITH LLP Princeton Forrestal Village 136 Main Street, Suite 250 Princeton, NJ 08540 Tel.: (609) 514-5978 Shankar Duraiswamy, Esq. Mark Lynch, Esq. (pro(pro hac vice)vice) Henry Liu, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 662-6000 AttorneysAttorneys forfor Defendant Eli Lilly and Company

4 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 1 of 32 PageID: 5385

Michael R. Griffinger, Esq. Liza M. Walsh, Esq. GIBBONS P.C. WALSH PIZZI O’REILLYO'REILLY One Gateway Center FALANGA LLP Newark, NJ 07102-5310 1037 Raymond Blvd, Suite 600 Tel.: (973) 596-4500 Newark, NJ 07102 James P. Rouhandeh, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Tel.: (973) 757-1100 David B. Toscano, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Michael R. Shumaker, Esq. (pro( pro hac vicevice)) DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP Julie E. McEvoy, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) 450 Lexington Avenue William D. Coglianese, Esq. (pro(pro hac New York, NY 10017 vicevice)) Tel.: (212) 450-4000 JONES DAY Neal A. Potischman, Esq. (pro( pro hac vicevice)) 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Andrew Yaphe, Esq. (pro( pro hac vicevice)) Washington, DC 20001 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP Tel.: (202) 879-3939 1600 El Camino Real Attorneys forfor Defendant Sanofi-Aventis Menlo Park, CA 94025 U.S.U.S. LLC Tel.: (650) 752-2000 Attorneys forfor Defendant Novo Nordisk Inc. Melissa A. Geist, Esq. REED SMITH LLP Princeton Forrestal Village 136 Main Street, Suite 250 Princeton, NJ 08540 Tel.: (609) 514-5978 Shankar Duraiswamy, Esq. Mark Lynch, Esq. (pro( pro hac vicevice)) Henry Liu, Esq. (pro( pro hac vicevice)) COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 662-6000 Attorneys forfor Defendant Eli Lilly and Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE INSULIN PRICING Civil Action No. 17-699(BRM)(LHG)17 -699(BRM)(LHG) LITIGATION ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED DEFENDANTS'DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 2 of 32 PageID: 5386

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGEPAGE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...... 1

BACKGROUND ...... 2

LEGAL STANDARDS ...... 4

ARGUMENT ...... 4

I. The RICO Claims Should Be Dismissed Again ...... 4

II. Claims Relating to Newly Added Insulins Should Be DDismissedismissed ...... 11

III. Certain State Law Claims Should Be Dismissed ...... 13

A. Arizona ...... 13

B. California ...... 13

C. Colorado ...... 15

D. Georgia ...... 15

E. Louisiana ...... 17

F. Minnesota ...... 19

G. Mississippi ...... 19

H. Utah ...... 20

I. Washington ...... 21

J. West Virginia ...... 22 22

CONCLUSION ...... 23

i Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 3 of 32 PageID: 5387

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGEPAGE

Cases

Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyMalley-Duff-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) ...... 9

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...... 4, 11

Baraka v. McGreevey,McGreevey , 481 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007) ...... 4

Blaylock v. First Am.Am. Title Ins. Co.Co.,, 2008 WL 8741396 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2008) ...... 21

Blewett v. AbbottAbbott Labs.,Labs. , 86 Wash. App. 782 (1997) ...... 21

Camowraps, LLC v. Quantum Dig. VenturesVentures LLC,LLC , 2015 WL 2229280 (E.D. La. May 12, 2015) ...... 19

CaseExperts, LLC v. CompStar Sys., Inc.,Inc. , 2010 WL 4553926 (W.D. La. Nov. 3, 2010) ...... 18

Chevron Corp. v. Donziger,Donziger , 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016) ...... 5

Cox v. AthensAthens Reg'l Med. Ctr.Ctr.,, 631 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) ...... 16

Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,Inc. , 728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1989) ...... 5, 7, 8

David v. VolkswagenVolkswagen Grp. of Am.,Am., Inc.,Inc. , 2018 WL 1960447 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2018) ...... 15

ii Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 4 of 32 PageID: 5388

Foster v. Denenberg,Denenberg , 616 F. App'xApp’x 472 (3d Cir. 2015) ...... 11

Futterknecht v. ThurberThurber,, 2015 WL 4603010 (D.N.J. July 30, 2015) ...... 5, 10

HLD Enters., Inc.,Inc. , v. Michelin N. Am.,Am., Inc.,Inc. , 2004 WL 2095739 (N.D. Ga. June 29, 2004) ...... 16

Holmes v. Sec. Inv'rInv’r Prot. Corp.Corp.,, 503 U.S. 258 (1992) ...... 10

Humphrey v. CitiBank NA,NA , 2013 WL 5407195 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2013) ...... 20

Hurricane Fence Co., Inc. v. Jensen Metal Prods., Inc.,Inc ., 119 So. 3d 683 (La. Ct. App. 2013) ...... 18

IberiaBank v. Broussard,Broussard , 907 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2018)2018)...... 17, 18

In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig.,Litig. , 749 F. Supp. 2d 224 (M.D. Pa. 2010) ...... 13

In re Fredeman Litig.,Litig. , 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1988)1988)...... 5

In re Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig.,Litig. , 2019 WL 653854 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2019) ...... 22

Johnson v. Collins Entm'tEntm’t Co.Co.,, 199 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 1999)1999)...... 5

Johnston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Carpenters Local UnionUnion No. 1578,1578 , 728 F. Supp. 1142 (D.N.J. 1990) ...... 5

Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.Corp.,, 63 P.3d 937 (Cal. 2003) ...... 14

Martinez v. Nash Finch Co.Co.,, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Colo. 2012) ...... 15

iii Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 5 of 32 PageID: 5389

Mayberry v. BristolBristol-Meyers-Meyers Squibb Co.Co.,, 2009 WL 5216968 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) ...... 20

Miller v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.,Inc. , 769 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (D. Utah 2011) ...... 21

Monroe v. McDaniel,McDaniel , 207 So.3d 1172 (La. Ct. App. 2016) ...... 18

Morrell v. WellstarWellstar Health Sys., Inc.,Inc. , 633 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) ...... 16

MSP Recovery Claims v. Sanofi Aventis U.S.U.S. LLC,LLC , 2019 WL 1418129 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2019) ...... 13, 19

Nat'lNat’l Org. forfor WomenWomen v. Scheidler,Scheidler , 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001)2001)...... 5

Nat'lNat’l Rural Telecomm. Co-op. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,Inc. , 319 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ...... 14

Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim,Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) ...... 5

Ronnoco Coffee, LLC v. WestfeldtWestfeldt Bros., Inc.,Inc. , 2018 WL 902202 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 15, 2018) ...... 18

Scheuerman v. Nestle Healthcare Nutrition, Inc.,Inc. , 2012 WL 2916827 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012) ...... 13

Shersher v. Superior CourtCourt,, 154 Cal. App. 4th 1491 (2007) ...... 14

Steamfitters Local UnionUnion No. 420 WelfareWelfare Fund v. PhilipPhilip Morris, Inc.,Inc. , 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999) ...... 5

Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc.,Inc. , 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) ...... 9

Switzer v. CoanCoan,, 261 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 2001) ...... 5

iv Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 6 of 32 PageID: 5390

Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.Co.,, 2001 WL 821831 (D. Minn. July 5, 2001) ...... 19

WamsleyWamsley v. LifeNet Transplant Servs. Inc.,Inc. , 2011 WL 5520245 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) ...... 22

WhiteWhite v. WyethWyeth,, 705 S.E.2d 828 (W. Va. 2010) ...... 22

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 4 ...... 10

18 U.S.C. § 1964 ...... 6,6, 7

GGA.A. CCODEODE ANN.ANN . § 10-1-372 ...... 16

Miss.MISS . CCODEODE ANN.ANN . § 75-24-15 ...... 20

UTAHUTAH CCODEODE ANN.ANN . § 13-11-19 ...... 21

W. VA.V A. CCODEODE § 46A-6-104 ...... 22

W. VA.VA. CCODEODE § 46A-6-106 ...... 22

Other Authorities

Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide (5th(5th ed. 2018) ...... 6,6, 8

U.S. Dep'tDep’t of Justice, Civil RICO: A Manual for FederalFederal Attorneys (2007)...passim(2007) ...passim

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Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc. ("Novo(“Novo Nordisk"),Nordisk”), SanoSanofi-Aventisfi-Aventis U.S. LLC

("Sanofi"),(“Sanofi”), and Eli Lilly and Company ("Eli(“Eli Lilly")Lilly”) ("defendants")(“defendants”) respectfully

submit this memorandum of law in support of their PartialPartial Motion to Dismiss the

Second Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint"“Complaint” or "SAC")“SAC”) pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In its prior decision in this case, the Court determineddetermined that plaintiffs are

indirect purchasers and that they accordingly lack standing to pursue RICO claims.

While plaintiffs acknowledge that they are indirect purchasers and that they may

not seek damages, they have nonetheless rere-pleaded-pleaded their RICO claims to seek

injunctive relief. But RICO does not grant private plaintiffs a right of action for

injunctive relief, and in fact, the United States possessespossesses exclusive authority to

seek injunctive relief under RICO. Accordingly, thethe Court should again dismiss

plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claims in their entirety.

In addition, the Court should dismiss plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ cclaimslaims relating to three

newly asserted insulin products, as to which plaintiffsplaintiffs tack on a handful of

conclusory allegations for the first time in this llatestatest iteration of their complaint.

The Complaint is devoid of factual allegations connconnectingecting those products to the

purported "scheme"“scheme” alleged by plaintiffs, which is unsurprising given that these

products all came to market long after the vast majoritymajority of the conduct described in

1 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 8 of 32 PageID: 5392

the Complaint and addressed in the Court'sCourt’s prior ruruling.ling. Finally, the Court should

dismiss in whole or in part ten of the state law clclaimsaims asserted in the Complaint for

reasons specific to those statutes, as set forth below.below.

Because plaintiffs have had numerous bites at the apple,apple, both individually

and collectively, the claims that do not survive shouldshould be dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

On February 15, 2019, the Court issued a decision grantinggranting in part

defendants'defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended ClaClassss Action Complaint. ECF

No. 252 (the "February“February 15 Opinion”).Opinion"). In that decision,decision, the Court dismissed

plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claims for lack of standing pursuantpursuant to the indirect purchaser rule,

because, among other reasons, plaintiffs conceded "that“that they, [as] consumers, are

not the first party to pay for the analog insulin aatt a purportedly inflated price"price” and

thus are "quintessential“quintessential indirect purchasers"purchasers” for purposespurposes of the rule. Id. at 17-18;

see also id. at 25 (holding that "Plaintiffs'“Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the indirect

purchaser rule, and as such, Plaintiffs lack standingstanding to maintain this action pursuant

to RICO”).RICO").

The Court also dismissed seventeen of the fifty-sevfifty-sevenen state law claims

asserted in the First Amended Class Action ComplainComplaintt for lack of standing,

because "no“no named plaintiff resides in [the] state, nor is there any allegation of

injury in [the] state,"state,” and dismissed nine additionaladditional state law claims for lack of

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standing because no named plaintiff from that state had purchased a product from

one of the defendants. Id. at 31-35. Finally, the Court dismissed plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claim

under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act in light of plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ concession that

the statute requires direct privity of contract. Id. at 38 n.19. In an accompanying

order, the Court granted plaintiffs leave to "file“file an Amended Complaint consistent

with the Court'sCourt’s ruling.”ruling." ECF No. 253 at 2.

On March 18, 2019, plaintiffs filed the Second AmendedAmended Complaint. In this

complaint, plaintiffs have rere-pleaded-pleaded their RICO clclaimsaims and added a request for

injunctive relief under RICO. SAC TT¶¶ 429-30, 441-42.441-42. Plaintiffs acknowledge

that they did "not“not amend[] their allegations to claclaimim that [they] purchase their

analog insulins directly from [defendants],"[defendants],” and statestate that they "assume“assume [that] the

Court'sCourt’s ruling that the indirect purchaser rule barsbars the plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claims for

damages under RICO will apply equally to the plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint.”Complaint." Id. ¶ 429 n.36. Plaintiffs also re-pleadedre-pleaded nineteen statestate law claims

that the Court had previously dismissed for lack of standing.'standing. 1

1 Those are SAC Counts Five (Alabama), Ten (Colorado),(Colorado), Eleven (Connecticut), Twelve (Delaware), Twenty-OneTwenty-One (Louisiana),(Louisiana), TwentyTwenty-Three-Three (Maryland), Twenty-FourTwenty-Four (Massachusetts), TwentyTwenty-Eig-Eightht (Mississippi), TwentyTwenty-- Nine (Missouri), Thirty-TwoThirty-Two (Nevada), Thirty-SixThirty-Six (North(North Carolina), Thirty-SevenThirty-Seven (North Dakota), ThirtyThirty-Nine-Nine (Oklahoma), FortyForty-One-One (Pennsylvania),(Pennsylvania), FortyForty-Two-Two (South Carolina), FortyForty-Three-Three (Tennessee), FortyForty-Si-Sixx (Virginia), FortyForty-Seven-Seven (Washington), and FortyForty-Eight-Eight (West Virginia). See February 15 Opinion at 31 n.12 & 33 n.13 (enumerating the state law claims dismisseddismissed on standing grounds).

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LEGAL STANDARDS

A claim should be dismissed if, assuming its well-pleaded allegations of

fact are true, it fails to plausibly show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See,See ,

e.g.,e.g. , Ashcroft v. Iqbal,Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Legal conclusions, "labels,"“labels,”

and other conclusory allegations—suchallegations—such as "unadorned,“unadorned, thethe-defendant-unlawfully--defendant-unlawfully-

harmedharmed-me-me accusation[s]"—areaccusation[s]”—are not assumed to be true and cannot establish

entitlement to relief. Id. at 678. Rather, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient“sufficient factual

matter"matter” that, taken as true, allows the court "to“to drawdraw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."alleged.” Id.;Id. ; see also Baraka v.

McGreevey,McGreevey , 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (courts "are“are not compelled to accept

unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation”allegation" (quotations omitted)).omitted)).

ARGUMENT

I. The RICO Claims Should Be Dismissed Again

In its February 15 Opinion, this Court held that plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claims "are“are

barred by the indirect purchaser rule, and as such, Plaintiffs lack standing to

maintain this action pursuant to RICO.”RICO." February 1515 Opinion at 25. Accordingly,

the Court dismissed the RICO claims. Although plaintiffsplaintiffs recognize that the

Court'sCourt’s ruling applies to RICO damages claims, plaintiffsplaintiffs contend that the Court'sCourt’s

ruling does not apply to their new request for injunctiveinjunctive relief. SAC ¶ 429 n.36;

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see also ECF No. 261 at 1 (plaintiffs representing that theythey "have“have not re-pleadedre-pleaded

their dismissed claim for money damages under RICO”RICO").).

The Court should again dismiss plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claclaims,ims, including the

request for injunctive relief. As courts in this DDistrictistrict have consistently and

repeatedly held, the RICO statute does not grant privateprivate plaintiffs a right of action

for injunctive relief. See Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,Inc. , 728 F. Supp.

1123, 1137 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Futterknecht v. ThurberThurber,, 2015 WL 4603010, at

*4 (D.N.J. July 30, 2015); Johnston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Carpenters Local UnionUnion No.

1578,1578 , 728 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting in dicta that RICO "makes“makes no

provision for private equitable relief').relief”).2 Rather, RICO limits the availability of

injunctive relief to actions brought by the federal government. Indeed, the U.S.

2 2 The Third Circuit has not yet addressed the issue. See Steamfitters Local UnionUnion No. 420 WelfareWelfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,Inc. , 171 F.3d 912, 935 n.20 (3d Cir. 1999). One court of appeals has held that privateprivate plaintiffs cannot seek equitable relief under RICO. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim,Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1986). Three others have eexpressedxpressed "substantial“substantial doubt"doubt” as to whether RICO allows private plaintiffs to seek eequitablequitable relief. Johnson v. Collins EntmEntm’t 't Co.Co.,, 199 F.3d 710, 726 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Switzer v. CoanCoan,, 261 F.3d 985, 992 n.14 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); In re Fredeman Litig.,Litig. , 843 F.2d 821, 828 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that district coucourtrt could not grant a preliminary injunction for a private plaintiff under RICO). TwoTwo courts of appeals have held that RICO authorizes a private plaintiff to seek ininjunctivejunctive relief. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger,Donziger , 833 F.3d 74, 139 (2d Cir. 2016); Nat'lNat’l Org. forfor WomenWomen v. Scheidler,Scheidler , 267 F.3d 687, 698 (7th Cir. 2001), rev’drev'd on other grounds,grounds , 537 U.S. 393 (2003). Defendants are not aware of any case in whichwhich a district court in this Circuit has followed either Donziger or Scheidler as to this issue, and the "trend“trend of decisions . . . is distinctly negative"negative” on the issue.issue. Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide 261-62 (5th ed. 2018).

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Department of Justice, which has enforcement authorityauthority under RICO, expressly

holds that view. U.S. Dep'tDep’t of Justice, Civil RICO: A Manual

for Federal Attorneys 26-33 (2007), available

at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2010/11/12/2007civil-https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2010/11/12/2007civil-

rico.pdf ("DOJ(“DOJ RICO Manual").Manual”).

Curley and the Department of Justice both rest their concconclusionlusion on the text

and legislative history of the RICO statute. RICO’RICO'ss plain text authorizes equitable

relief only in cases brought by the government, and limits private plaintiffs to

seeking treble damages. The relevant provisions state:state:

(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not llimitedimited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any intereinterest,st, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable rerestrictionsstrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaginengagingg in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign cocommerce;mmerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterenterprise,prise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.

(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings underunder this section. Pending final determination thereof, the ccourtourt may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions,prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactorysatisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.

(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reasonreason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefortherefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover

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threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of thethe suit, including a reasonable attorney'sattorney’s fee . . . .

18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a)1964(a)-(c).-(c).

These provisions establish a straightforward framewframework.ork. Section 1964(a)

grants district courts "'jurisdiction“‘jurisdiction to prevent andand restrain'restrain’” RICO violations "by“by

issuing the full range of ‘appropriate'appropriate orders'orders’ availableavailable to courts of equity.”equity." DOJ

RICO Manual at 27 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)). AndAnd although section 1964(a)1964 (a)

does not state who can seek such orders, section 1964(b)1964 (b) does: "[t]he“[t]he Attorney

General may institute proceedings under this section,"section,” and thus a court can enter

interim "restraining“restraining orders"orders” or take other actions "it“it shall deem proper"proper” in a case

brought by the Attorney General.

"proceedings“proceedings under this section,"section,” and "on“on its face makes no provision for

injunctive relief'relief” for private plaintiffs. CurleyCurley,, 728 F. Supp. at 1137. Instead,

section 1964(c) is a self-contained subsection that limits private plaintiffs to suing

for "violation[s]“violation[s] of section 1962"1962” and limits the scopescope of relief in private actions to

treble damages. The fact "that“that Congress made an exexpresspress provision for an

equitable remedy in suits brought by the government and simultaneously declined

to make a similar provision for private actions carcarriesries with it the strong suggestion

that no private equitable remedy was intended."intended.” Id. (citing WollersheimWollersheim,, 796 F.2d

at 1082-83); seesee also DOJ RICO Manual at 28 ("[T]he(“[T]he statute makes it cleclearar that

7 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 14 of 32 PageID: 5398

Congress did not authorize private parties to bring actions for equitable relief.”);relief.");

Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide at 262 (explaining thatthat the RICO statute'sstatute’s

"silence"“silence” as to the availability of injunctive reliefrelief for private plaintiffs "has“has largely

been interpreted as barring"barring” such relief under RICORICO).).

The legislative history of the statute confirms thatthat RICO does not grant

private plaintiffs any right to equitable relief. Initial versions of the legislation

expressly authorized a private injunctive remedy. CurleyCurley,, 728 F. Supp. at 1137.

Congress dropped those provisions, however, from thethe final bill enacted into law.

Id. By removing the private right of action for equitequitableable relief from the final

version, Congress "apparently“apparently explicitly rejected a private injunctive relief

provision."provision.” Id. (citing WollersheimWollersheim,, 796 F.2d at 1085); seesee also DOJ RICO

Manual at 28 (explaining that RICO’sRICO's "legislative“legislative historyhistory confirms that it vests the

Attorney General of the United States with the exclexclusiveusive authority to bring suits for

equitable relief').relief”).

Congress further confirmed that it intended to rejerejectct a private right to

equitable relief when, shortly after enacting RICO, it considered a bill that would

have authorized "injunctive“injunctive actions by private persons"persons” under RICO. DOJ RICO

Manual at 32; see also AgencyAgency Holding Corp. v. MalleyMalley-Duff-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,Inc., 483

U.S. 143, 155 (1987) (explaining that "the“the purpose of the [proposed] bill was to

broaden even further the remedies available under RRICO,"ICO,” including by

8 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 15 of 32 PageID: 5399

"permitt[ing]“permitt[ing] private actions for injunctive relief').relief”). That bill, however, never

became law. DOJ RICO Manual at 32. The legislativlegislativee history thus demonstrates

that (1) when Congress enacted RICO, it rejected a private right to injunctive relief

that had appeared in earlier drafts of the bill; andand (2) Congress subsequently

rejected legislation that would have expressly added a right to equitable relief for

private plaintiffs under RICO. Id. at 31-33. "The“The clear conclusion to be drawn

from the legislative history is that, consistent withwith RICO’sRICO's text, Congress intended

to create a private right of action only for treble damages."damages.” Id. at 33.

That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that CongressCongress modeled RICO'sRICO’s civil

remedies provision on provisions of antitrust law thatthat similarly authorize damages,

but not injunctive relief, for private litigants. Id. at 28-29 (citing, inter alia,alia ,

Holmes v. Sec. Inv'rInv’r Prot. Corp.Corp.,, 503 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1992) and Sedima,

S.P.R.L. v. Imrex,Imrex , 473 U.S. 479, 486-90 (1985)); see also Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc.,Inc. ,

667 F.3d 273, 317 (3d Cir. 2011).

Specifically, RICO’sRICO's sections 1964(a) and (b) are modeledmodeled on section 4 of

the Sherman Act, which confers "jurisdiction"“jurisdiction” on cocourtsurts to "prevent“prevent and restrain

violations"violations” by entering equitable relief, but expreexpresslyssly authorizes only the Attorney

General "to“to institute proceedings in equity.”equity." 15 U.S.C.U.S.C. § 4; seesee also DOJ RICO

Manual at 30-31. Separately, RICO’sRICO's section 1964(c),1964(c), governing the rights of

private parties, is modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act (now codified at 15

9 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 16 of 32 PageID: 5400

U.S.C. § 15), which authorized treble damages for privateprivate litigants. See Holmes,Holmes ,

503 U.S. at 267. After "[t]he“[t]he Supreme Court repeatedlyrepeatedly recognized that . . . the

Sherman Act did not authorize private parties to bringbring suit for injunctive relief,"relief,”

Congress passed section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.U.S.C. § 26) to expressly

authorize private parties to seek injunctive relief.relief. DOJ RICO Manual at 29-30.

RICO lacks any provision comparable to section 16. Id. at 31. "Juxtaposed“Juxtaposed with

Congress'sCongress’s explicit modeling of RICO’sRICO's private trebletreble damages provision ‘on'on the

civil-actioncivil-action provision of the federal antitrust lawlawss . . . ,',’ the absence of a

counterpart to Section 16 makes clear that Congress did not intend to create a

private right to equitable relief under RICO.”RICO." Id. (quoting Holmes,Holmes , 503 U.S. at

267).

As Curley and its progeny have held, the Department of JusticJusticee has likewise

explained, and the language of the statute and legislativelegislative history confirm, RICO

does not authorize private litigants to seek equitaequitableble relief. See also Futterknecht,Futterknecht ,

2015 WL 4603010, at *4 (dismissing claim for injuncinjunctivetive relief under RICO

because "the“the federal RICO statutes do not provide a private right of action for

injunctive relief').relief”). Thus, plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claims should again be dismissed

because injunctive relief is not available to privateprivate litigants, and because the

indirect purchaser rule bars plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claim for damages (as plaintiffs recognize).

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II. Claims Relating to Newly Added Insulins Should Be DismissedDismissed

More than two years after filing their initial compcomplaint,laint, plaintiffs now assert

claims relating to three other insulin products: TTresibaresiba (manufactured by Novo

Nordisk), Fiasp (manufactured by Novo Nordisk), and Basaglar (manufactured by

Eli Lilly). Compare SAC ¶ 1 with First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF

No. 131) ¶ 1. Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ tagtag-along-along claims relatingrelating to those three products should be

dismissed because there are no factual allegations connecting those products to the

purported "scheme"“scheme” alleged in the Complaint. See Iqbal,Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678

(complaint must allege "more“more than a sheer possibilitypossibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully"unlawfully” and must include "factual“factual enhancement[senhancement[s]"]” to state a claim); Foster v.

Denenberg,Denenberg , 616 F. App'xApp’x 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissaldismissal where

plaintiff merely "speculat[ed]"“speculat[ed]” that various transactionstransactions "must“must necessarily have

involved fraud”).fraud").

In fact, plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ allegations relating to TresibTresiba,a, Fiasp, and Basaglar

undermine any suggestion that those products are rerelatedlated to the claims asserted in

the Complaint. The gravamen of plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claims is that defendants engaged in a

putative scheme with PBMs to "widen“widen a secret spread"spread” between the list and net

prices of their insulins. See SAC ¶ 2. Plaintiffs also allege that "defendants“defendants havehave

engaged in an arms race of false benchmark price increases"increases” in a "lock“lock-step”-step"

manner. Id. TT¶¶ 8, 9, 321. But plaintiffs never allege that therethere was any "spread"“spread”

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between the list and net prices for Tresiba, Fiasp, and Basaglar; nor do they allege

that defendants increased the list prices of those products in "lock“lock-step.”-step." To the

contrary, plaintiffs acknowledge that Tresiba, Fiasp,Fiasp, and Basaglar were only

recently introduced to the market and have prices thatthat have remained relatively

constant. See, e.g.,e.g. , id. rlf¶¶ 308-09, 318; id. at 82 fig.10; id. at 86 fig.13; id. at 87

fig.14.

Indeed, the Complaint does not include factual alleallegationsgations as to these

products that are similar to the allegations regardingregarding the products that were the

subject of plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ prior complaints. Instead, plaintiffs merely include charts

reflecting that the products have undergone a singlesingle price increase (Fiasp and

Basaglar) or two price increases (Tresiba) in the yearsyears since they were introduced.

See id. at 82 fig.10; id. at 86 fig.13; id. at 87 fig.14; compare id. I¶¶ 320-21

(alleging "exponential“exponential benchmark price hikes"hikes” and thatthat Sanofi and Novo Nordisk

raised prices as to two other products—Lantus and LLevemir—inevemir—in "perfect“perfect lock-

step"step” on "thirteen“thirteen instances since 2009").2009”). Because plaintiffs do not make factual

allegations substantiating their claims that TresibTresiba,a, Fiasp, and Basaglar have any

connection to the underlying purported "scheme,"“scheme,” alalll claims relating to those

products should be dismissed.

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III. Certain State Law Claims Should Be Dismissed3

As set forth below, various state law claims should be dismissed in whole or

in part as well.

A. Arizona

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act ("ACFA")(“ACFA”) should

be dismissed because plaintiffs are indirect purchasers,purchasers, as this Court held in

dismissing similar ACFA claims in the MSP Recovery matter. MSP Recovery

Claims v. Sanofi Aventis U.S.U.S. LLC,LLC , 2019 WL 1418129, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 29,

2019) (dismissing ACFA claim and holding that "Plaintiffs“Plaintiffs are subsequent

purchasers for the purposes of the ACFA and as such,such, cannot maintain their ACFA

cause of action against Defendants").Defendants”).

B. California

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the California Unfair CompetitionCompetition Law ("UCL"),(“UCL”), Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, should be dismissed to thethe extent that plaintiffs seek

"restitution“restitution and disgorgement."disgorgement.” See SAC ¶ 546. First, it is well settled that

3 3 Because an amended complaint "supersedes“supersedes the prior complaint,”complaint," a defendant is "entitled“entitled to make"make” arguments for dismissaldismissal of the claims asserted in an amended complaint regardless of whether the defendantdefendant raised those arguments in a prior motion to dismiss. Scheuerman v. Nestle Healthcare Nutrition, Inc.,Inc. , 2012 WL 2916827, at *5 n.7 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012); see also In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig.,Litig. , 749 F. Supp. 2d 224, 232 n.6 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (similar).

13 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 20 of 32 PageID: 5404

disgorgement "is“is not an authorized remedy”remedy" under thethe UCL. Korea Supply Co. v.

Lockheed Martin Corp.Corp.,, 63 P.3d 937, 941, 943-47 (Cal. 2003).

Second, the Court should also dismiss plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ cclaimlaim for restitution under

the UCL because plaintiffs plead no facts suggestingsuggesting they are entitled to such

relief. Under California law, the remedy of restitutionrestitution "compel[s]“compel[s] a UCL

defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those

persons in interest fromfrom whom the propertyproperty was takentaken.".” Id. at 944 (emphasis

added) (internal citation omitted). Restitution "must“must represent the return of money

or property the defendant acquired”acquired" from plaintiffs,plaintiffs, Shersher v. Superior CourtCourt,,

154 Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1498 (2007), and is measuredmeasured "by“by the defendant'sdefendant’s gain."gain.”

Nat'lNat’l Rural Telecomm. Co-op. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,Inc. , 319 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1085-86

(C.D. Cal. 2003).

Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants acquired andand retained any money

from plaintiffs. Instead, they contend that they areare entitled to damages in the

amount of "the“the difference between the drugs'drugs’ pointpoint--ofof-sale-sale prices and a reasonable

approximation of the drugs'drugs’ true net prices."prices.” SAC ¶ 14. However, "restitution“restitution

‘must`must represent the return of money or property the defendant acquired,'"acquired,’” and

defendants have not "acquired"“acquired” the difference betweenbetween pointpoint-of-sale-of-sale prices and net

prices from plaintiffs. Instead, the pointpoint-of-sale-of-sale price is paid to the dispensing

pharmacies and plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ own allegations confirm that defendants receive only the

14 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 21 of 32 PageID: 5405

"net“net price"price” for their insulins. See, e.g.,e.g. , id. ¶ 324 (alleging the price that Novo

Nordisk "receive[s]“receive[s] after rebates, fees and other priceprice concessions . . . is the ‘net'net

price").price’”). Accordingly, plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claim for restitutionrestitution under the UCL should be

dismissed.

C. Colorado

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Colorado Consumer ProtectionProtection Act ("CCPA")(“CCPA”)

should be dismissed to the extent that plaintiffs seekseek monetary damages because

the CCPA does not permit class action claims seekingseeking such relief. See David v.

VolkswagenVolkswagen Grp. of Am.,Am., Inc.,Inc. , 2018 WL 1960447, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2018)

("The(“The CCPA does not permit class action claims for monetary relief. As such,

Plaintiff'sPlaintiff’s putative class claim will be dismissed.")dismissed.”) (internal citations omitted); see

also, e.g.e.g.,, Martinez v. Nash Finch Co.Co.,, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1218 (D. Colo. 2012)

("The(“The plain and unambiguous language of the [CCPA] compels the conclusion that

. . . actual damages . . . are not available to claclasses.").sses.”). Because plaintiffs here seek

monetary damages through a class action under the CCCPACPA (which expressly

prohibits such claims), the Court should dismiss allall claims under the CCPA.

D. Georgia

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Georgia Uniform DeceptiveDeceptive Trade Practices Act

("UDTPA")(“UDTPA”) should be dismissed because the alleged pricingpricing "scheme"“scheme” is not

actionable under that statute. The relevant provisionsprovisions of the UDTPA were enacted

15 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 22 of 32 PageID: 5406

to "prevent“prevent sellers from luring customers with dubiousdubious representations that prices

have been ‘slashed.’”'slashed.'" HLD Enters., Inc.,Inc. , v. Michelin N. Am., Inc.,Inc. , 2004 WL

2095739, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June 29, 2004). Thus, deceptivedeceptive pricing claims are not

covered by the statute in the absence of any allegationallegation that defendants induced

plaintiffs to purchase defendants'defendants’ insulins by makingmaking "false“false or misleading

statements . . . concerning . . . price reductions"reductions” available to the plaintiffs. GGA.A.

CCODEODE ANN.ANN . § 10-1-372(a).

Cox v. AthensAthens Regional Medical CenterCenter,, 631 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. Ct. App.

2006), is directly on point. There, uninsured plaintiffsplaintiffs alleged that a hospital

violated the UDTPA by publishing and charging "inflated"“inflated” prices to uninsured

patients while providing discounts to insurers and insured patients. The court held

that the plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed "in“in the absence of allegations that

[the hospital] presented appellants any price inducementsinducements to choose [the hospital]

for medical care.”care." Id. at 798. Other courts have likewise dismissed claiclaimsms relating

to allegedly artificially inflated prices for healthhealth care services to uninsured

patientspatients—even—even where, as here, plaintiffs alleged thatthat the defendant misled them

about what the other entities pay for the same goodsgoods or services. See Morrell v.

WellstarWellstar Health Sys., Inc.,Inc. , 633 S.E.2d 68, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting claim

under the UDTPA that hospital failed to "disclos[e]“disclos[e] the differences in pricing"pricing” for

uninsured versus insured patients); seesee also Michelin,Michelin , 2004 WL 2095739, at *4

16 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 23 of 32 PageID: 5407

(dismissing UDTPA claim where the plaintiffs allegedalleged that the defendant "did“did not

offer the same price reductions to the Plaintiffs whichwhich the Defendant offered to

other classes of distributors, and misled the PlaintiffsPlaintiffs about whether it was offering

price reductions to their competitors”).competitors").

Likewise, plaintiffs here allege that defendants violatedviolated the UDTPA because

they misled uninsured and underinsured patients, whowho paid for insulins based on

benchmark prices, about the rebates and net prices offered to other payers. See

SAC IN¶¶ 2, 8. However, they do not allege that defendantsdefendants offered fraudulent price

reductions to induce uninsured and underinsured patientspatients to purchase insulins.

Plaintiffs therefore fail to state a claim under thethe UDTPA.

E. Louisiana

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Law ("LUTPA")(“LUTPA”) should be dismissed becausebecause plaintiffs do not allege

that defendants acted with the requisite "specific“specific purpose of harming the

competition.”competition." Separately, plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claim for injunctiveinjunctive relief under LUTPA fails

for the independent reason that the statute does notnot allow private plaintiffs to seek

such relief.

Under LUTPA, a defendant'sdefendant’s "motivation“motivation is a criticacriticall factor,”factor," and a

defendant may be liable only if its actions were takentaken "with“with the specific purpose of

harming the competition.”competition." See, e.g.,e.g. , IberiaBank v. Broussard,Broussard , 907 F.3d 826, 839-

17 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 24 of 32 PageID: 5408

40 (5th Cir. 2018); Monroe v. McDaniel,McDaniel , 207 So.3d 1172, 1180 (La. Ct. App.

2016). Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ complaint is devoid of any such allegations. In fact, plaintiffs

allege the opposite: Plaintiffs contend that defendantsdefendants have engaged in "seemingly“seemingly

collusive”collusive" behavior with one another. See, e.g.e.g.,, SAC ¶ 321. This is fatal to

plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ LUTPA claim. See CaseExperts, LLC v. CompStar Sys., Inc.,Inc. , 2010 WL

4553926, at *6 (W.D. La. Nov. 3, 2010) (dismissing LUTPA claim where the court

was "not“not persuaded"persuaded” that taking action "for“for one'sone’s ownown benefit constitutes action

taken with the specific purpose to harm the competicompetition");tion”); see also Ronnoco

Coffee, LLC v. WestfeldtWestfeldt Bros., Inc.,Inc. , 2018 WL 902202, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 15,

2018) (granting summary judgment where no evidence was presented that the

alleged action was taken "with“with the specific purpose of harming the competition”competition"

and holding that without "evidence“evidence of such animosity,"animosity,” the defendant "was“was acting

simply to protect its own financial interests, as permittedpermitted by Louisiana law”).law").

Because plaintiffs do not allege that defendants actedacted with the "specific“specific purpose of

harming the competition”—andcompetition"—and in fact allege preciselyprecisely the oppositeopposite—their—their LUTPA

claim should be dismissed.

Moreover, plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief underunder LUTPA fails for the

independent reason that "the“the right to injunctive rerelieflief under LUTPA is available

solely to the state through the Attorney General.”General." Hurricane Fence Co., Inc. v.

Jensen Metal Prods., Inc.,Inc ., 119 So. 3d 683, 688 (La. Ct. App. 2013); see also

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Camowraps, LLC v. Quantum Dig. VenturesVentures LLC,LLC , 2015 WL 2229280, at *2 (E.D.

La. May 12, 2015) (holding that "as“as a matter of law [a private] plaintiff cannot

obtain injunctive relief according to LUTPA”)LUTPA") (collecting(collecting cases).

F. Minnesota

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Minnesota Deceptive TradeTrade Practices Act

("DTPA")(“DTPA”) should be dismissed to the extent that the claim seeks monetary

damages, as this Court held in regard to the DTPA cclaimlaim asserted in the MSP

Recovery matter. MSP Recovery ClaimsClaims,, 2019 WL 1418129, at *19 & n.16

(holding that "Plaintiffs“Plaintiffs may maintain their DTPA actionaction only as it seeks

injunctive relief and attorneys'attorneys’ fees”fees" because the DTPA "disallows“disallows the recovery of

monetary damages");damages”); see also Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.Co.,, 2001 WL 821831,

at *4 (D. Minn. July 5, 2001) ("The(“The language of the DTPA makes plain that

injunctive relief is the sole statutory remedy for conduct falling within its ambit.").ambit.”).

G. Mississippi

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Mississippi Consumer ProtectionProtection Act ("MCPA")(“MCPA”)

should be dismissed due to plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ failure to ccomplyomply with the MCPA'sMCPA’s prepre-suit-suit

dispute resolution requirement.4 A private plaintiff may not bring a claim under

the MCPA until she has made a "reasonable“reasonable attempt toto resolve [the claim] through

4 4 Defendants raised this argument in their prior motionmotion to dismiss (see( see ECF No. 158-2 at 17-18), but the Court declined to reachreach the argument in light of its dismissal of the claim for lack of standing. FebruaryFebruary 15 Opinion at 41.

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an informal dispute settlement program approved by the Attorney General.”General." Miss.MISS .

CCODEODE ANN.ANN . § 75-24-15(2). Plaintiffs do not allege that theythey made any such

attempt. SAC ¶¶ 697-701.

As federal courts—includingcourts—including in this District—haveDistrict—have held,held, a plaintiff'splaintiff’s failure

to satisfy this requirement mandates dismissal of MCPAMCPA claims. See Mayberry v.

BristolBristol-Meyers-Meyers Squibb Co.Co.,, 2009 WL 5216968, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) ("The(“The

burden falls on Plaintiffs to attempt to resolve thethe matter through a program

approved by the [Mississippi] Attorney General; however,however, Plaintiffs failed to do

so, and therefore, their MCPA claim is dismissed foforr this reason.");reason.”); seesee also

Humphrey v. CitiBank NA,NA , 2013 WL 5407195, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2013)2013)

(dismissing MCPA claim where the complaint "allege[d]“allege[d] no attempt by Plaintiff to

resolve her MCPA claim through an informal dispute settlement program approved

by Mississippi'sMississippi’s Attorney General before filing suit"suit” and explaining that failure to

satisfy that "prerequisite"“prerequisite” is "fatal“fatal to a MCPA claclaim").im”). For the same reason,

plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ MCPA claim should be dismissed.

H. Utah

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Utah Consumer Sales PracticesPractices Act ("UCSPA")(“UCSPA”)

should be dismissed to the extent that plaintiffs seekseek monetary damages because

the UCSPA does not permit class action claims seekingseeking such relief except under

narrow circumstances that do not exist here. Those exceptions apply only where

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the acts or practices violate (1) rules adopted by the Utah Consumer Protection

Division; (2) a final judgment; or (3) a consent agagreementreement to which the defendant

was a party. UTAHUTAH CCODEODE ANN.ANN . § 13-11-19(4)(a); see also Miller v. Corinthian

Colls., Inc.,Inc. , 769 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1342 (D. Utah 2011) (explaining(explaining that the

UCSPA only permits a class action seeking money damagesdamages if an "act“act was

prohibited by an administrative rule, judicial decision,decision, or consent judgment").judgment”).

Because plaintiffs do not allege any of those circucircumstances,mstances, their UCSPA claim

should be dismissed to the extent that it seeks monetarymonetary damages.

I. Washington

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the Washington Consumer ProtectionProtection Act ("WCPA")(“WCPA”)

should be dismissed because indirect purchasers, lilikeke plaintiffs, lack standing

under the WCPA. As Washington courts have explaineexplained,d, an "indirect“indirect purchaser

has not suffered cognizable injury under the [W]CPA."[W]CPA.” Blewett v. Abbott Labs.,Labs. , 86

Wash. App. 782, 790 (1997); see also Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.Co.,, 2008

WL 8741396, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2008) ("The(“The [W]CPA[W]CPA has consistently

been interpreted to favor direct victims of unlawfulunlawful practices and exclude indirect

victims.").victims.”). Thus, courts have "applied“applied antitrust and RICO statutorystatutory standing

principles to [W]CPA claims”claims" to dismiss suits broughtbrought by indirect purchasers.

Blaylock,Blaylock , 2008 WL 8741396 at *7, *12; see also Blewett,Blewett , 86 Wash. App. at 790.

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Because plaintiffs here are "quintessential“quintessential indirectindirect purchasers"purchasers” (February 15

Opinion at 18), their WCPA claim should be dismissed.dismissed.

J. West Virginia

Plaintiffs'Plaintiffs’ claim under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection

Act ("WVCCPA")(“WVCCPA”) fails because that statute does not apply to cases involving the

purchase of prescription drugs. The WVCCPA creates a private cause of action for

individuals who allegedly "suffer[]“suffer[] an ascertainableascertainable loss"loss” "proximately“proximately caused”caused" by

any "unfair“unfair or deceptive"deceptive” act or practice in connecconnectiontion with a consumer’sconsumer's

"purchase[]“purchase[] or lease[]”lease[]" of "goods“goods or services."services.” W. VA.VA. CCODEODE §§ 46A46A-6-106(a),-6-106(a), (b);

id. § 46A-6-104; seesee also SAC IN¶¶ 860, 866. But in WhiteWhite v. WyethWyeth,, 705 S.E.2d 828

(W. Va. 2010), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that "[t]he“[t]he

private cause of action afforded consumers under WestWest Virginia Code § 46A46A–6–-6-

106(a) does not extend to prescriptionprescription drug purchases."purchases .” Id. at 838 (emphasis

added). The court thus ordered dismissal of the cacasese alleging that the defendant

pharmaceutical manufacturers made "misleading“misleading statementsstatements in advertising,

marketing, and labeling"labeling” prescription drugs for the treatment of postmenopausal

disorders. Id. at 831, 838; see also In re Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig.,Litig. ,

2019 WL 653854, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2019) (dismissing(dismissing WVCCPA claim in

case centering on the sale of generic prescription drugs); WamsleyWamsley v. LifeNet

Transplant Servs. Inc.,Inc. , 2011 WL 5520245, at *9 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 10, 2011)

22 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 29 of 32 PageID: 5413

(finding that WhiteWhite "buttressed"“buttressed” the court’scourt's decision to dismiss a WVCCPAWVCCPA claim

centering on the defendants'defendants’ supplying of "human“human tissuetissue products").products”). Because

plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ WVCCPA claim is based exclusively on plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ purchases of

prescription insulins, the claim should be dismissed.dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request that the Court

dismiss with prejudice: (1) plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claims in their entirety; (2) plaintiffs'plaintiffs’

claims as to the three newly added insulin products,products, as discussed above; and (3) ten

of the state law claims, as set forth above.

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Dated: May 17, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Michael R. Griffinger Michael R. Griffinger, Esq. Christopher Walsh, Esq. Calvin K. May, Esq. GIBBONS P.C. One Gateway Center Newark, NJ 07102-5310 Tel.: (973) 596-4500

James P. Rouhandeh, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) David B. Toscano, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 Tel.: (212) 450-4000

Neal A. Potischman, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Andrew Yaphe, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 1600 El Camino Real Menlo Park, CA 94025 Tel.: (650) 752-2000

Attorneys forfor Defendant Novo Nordisk Inc.

24 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 31 of 32 PageID: 5415

By: /s/ Liza M. WalshWalsh Liza M. Walsh, Esq. WALSH PIZZI O’REILLYO'REILLY FALANGA LLP 1037 Raymond Blvd, Suite 600 Newark, NJ 07102 Tel.: (973) 757-1100

Michael R. Shumaker, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) Julie E. McEvoy, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) William D. Coglianese, Esq. (pro(pro hac vicevice)) JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 879-3939

Attorneys forfor Defendant Sanofi-Aventis U.S.U.S. LLC

25 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-1 Filed 05/17/19 Page 32 of 32 PageID: 5416

By: /s/ Melissa A. Geist Melissa A. Geist, Esq. REED SMITH LLP Princeton Forrestal Village 136 Main Street, Suite 250 Princeton, NJ 08540 Tel.: (609) 514-5978

Shankar Duraiswamy, Esq. Mark Lynch, Esq. (admitted propro hac vicevice)) Henry B. Liu, Esq. (admitted propro hac vicevice)) COVINGTON & BURLING LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 662-6000

Attorneys forfor Defendant Eli Lilly and Company

26 Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-2 Filed 05/17/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 5417

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE INSULIN PRICING Civil Action No. 17-699(BRM)(LHG)17-699(BRM)(LHG) LITIGATION ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-2 Filed 05/17/19 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 5418

THIS MATTER having been brought before the Court on the motion of

Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc., Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, and Eli Lilly and

Company (collectively, "Defendants"),“Defendants”), for an Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissing certain claims in the Second Amended Class Action Complaint

with prejudice. The Court having considered the submissions of the parties, and

the arguments of the counsel, if any; and for good cause shown,

IT IS, on this ______day of ______,, 2019;

ORDERED that Defendants’Defendants' partial motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and it

is further

ORDERED that the following claims in the Second Amended Class Action

Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice as against all Defendants:

(1) plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ RICO claims in their entirety (counts 1-2);

(2) plaintiffs'plaintiffs’ claims as to the three newly added insulin products: Tresiba,

Fiasp, and Basaglar; and

(3) ten of the state law claims (counts 6, 9, 10, 15, 21, 27, 28, 45, 47, and

48).

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, U.S.D.J.

i Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-3 Filed 05/17/19 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 5419

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE INSULIN PRICING Civil Action No. 17-699 (BRM) (LHG) LITIGATION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-3 Filed 05/17/19 Page 2 of 3 PageID: 5420

I, MICHAEL R. GRIFFINGER,GRIFFINGER, hereby certify as follows:

1. I am an attorney at law admitted to practice before this Court and an

attorney at the firm, Gibbons P.C., attorneys for Defendant Novo Nordisk Inc.

("Novo")(“Novo”) in the aboveabove-captioned-captioned matter. On May 17, 2019, pursuant to Local Civil

Rule 5.2, I caused the following documents to be electronically filed and served:

• Defendants'Defendants’ Notice of Partial Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint; • Defendants'Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Partial Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint; • [Proposed] Form of Order; and • this Certificate of Service.

2. Service was made on this date upon all counsel of record in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the District of New Jersey’sJersey's Local

Rules on Electronic Service.

I hereby certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware

that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject

to punishment.

Dated: May 17, 2019 By: s/ Michael R. Griffinger Newark, New Jersey Michael R. Griffinger, Esq. GIBBONS P.C. One Gateway Center Newark, NJ 07102-5310 Tel.: (973) 596-4500 Fax: (973) 596-0545 [email protected] Case 3:17-cv-00699-BRM-LHG Document 263-3 Filed 05/17/19 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 5421

Attorneys forfor Defendant Novo Nordisk Inc.