The Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc.

HIROSHIMA

AND 1 NAGASAKI 9 3 7

to EVENTS LEADING TO 1 THE BOMBS 9 4 5

WAS THEIR USE JUSTIFIED? NagasakiNagasaki

J R W Richmond MONOGRAPH 167

Monograph No. 167 No. Monograph

J R W Richmond W R J Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Hiroshima HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

1937 TO 1945

EVENTS LEADING TO THE BOMBS WAS THEIR USE JUSTIFIED? An extended transcript of a lecture to The Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc by Lieutenant J R W Richmond RN Rtd - May 1996. The author served aboard HMS SWIFTSURE, a unit of the British Pacific Fleet, during "Operation Iceberg" and in the preparations for a significant involvement in "Operation Olympic".

THE JAPANESE GREAT EASTERN-ASIAN WAR 1995 saw the celebration of ‘Australia Remembers’. We heard of many deeds of great heroism and bravery during the World War II years, wonderful stories, but the cynic in many of us must ask ‘what has Australia, and indeed, the world, forgotten’ and how much of what we accept today as being ‘true’ history is the result of distortion, diminishment and re-written accounts, particularly by political apologists and groups with economic and other special interests including many latter-day historians with an axe to grind? It is an emotive issue, this Battle in the Pacific. Most people take it for granted that it started in 1941 when Japan bombed Pearl Harbour. It seems to have been forgotten that Japan started its Great Eastern- Asian War in 1931, when they annexed Korea and Manchuria, set up puppet governments and moved on into the northern states of China. There were many long, bloody battles. It was about that time that the Washington Naval Treaties were being negotiated and many in naval circles have looked upon the results of those treaties with dismay. Nicely organised by politicians, who carved up the proportional size of major naval forces between America, Britain, Japan, Italy and France in the ratio of 5:5 each to USA and Britain, 3 to Japan, 2 to Italy and 2 to France, with special constraints on tonnage and armament of and . Britain, as will probably be recalled, had far too many old battleships and warships from World War I and thus had little leeway in producing new vessels; although the Pacific powers, USA and Japan, took the opportunity of developing and building powerful new warships within this 5:5:3:2:2 relationship. However, that era produced the seeds of doubt in London about Japan’s intentions and, as I understand from very good sources, the British Admiralty anticipated a confrontation with Japan coming to a head somewhere about 1945. Of course, in the early 1930’s Germany wasn’t considered a threat. Japan was the only problematic issue, and that presumably in 10 to 15 years hence. Nevertheless it did give the an opportunity to think, conceive and design. Out of those deliberations came the Town Class, and later the Colony, 6 inch gun cruisers, the Tribal Class , the concept of the King George V battleships and aircraft carriers with armoured flight decks. With the Pacific in mind, Britain wanted more 8 inch gun cruisers but couldn’t fiddle the tonnage figures to do anything about it. So it was proposed to modify, in what I suppose might now be called a ‘mid-life update’, the 8 inch County Class cruisers. HMS LONDON was taken out of service in the late thirties to be reconstructed as a prototype for the other 12 Countries. What a difference there was to be in profile and style!

REFER DIAGRAM 1 Tragically, the events of Europe overshadowed this construction program. LONDON was not given the intended new engines and boilers to improve her range with existing fuel storage and consequent weight saving, but she was given an updated fire control system, much better bridge superstructure, more modern communications and better aircraft handling facilities. I had the privilege of being a member of her recommissioning crew in 1941.

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1 DIAGRAM 1 LONDON (Portsmouth Dockyard, September 14 1927) : over 10,000 tons. Complement: 650. Length: pp 595 feet; oa 633 feet. : 66 feet, Draught: 17 feet (mean). Guns Guns: ArmourArmour: 8-8"; 50 cal.8-8 inch, 50 cal. 4"4” Deck. 8-4" AA 8-4 inch AA. 2"-1.5"2”-1½” Gun houses.houses Many smallerMany smaller. 3"3” C C TT. TorpedoTorpedo Tubes Tubes: 8-21" (quadrupled)8-21 inch (quadrupled)

As Built After Reconstruction

Machinery: Parsons geared turbines. 4 shafts. Designed SHP 80,000 = 32.25 kts. Oil fuel: 3200 tons. Boilers: 9 Admiralty 3-drum type.

General Notes: LONDON was designed by Sir William J Berry, and ordered under 1925 estimates. Laid down February 22 1926, and completed February 5 1929. Was originally of the same appearance as DECONSHIRE and SUSSEX, but as reconstruction bears no resemblance. She could easily be mistaken for a ship of FIJI type at a distance, but may be distinguished by tall SL platform before mainmast. In 1937, whilst European rearmament was being discussed and plans were being put into practice, with German aggression dominating political thinking, as a result of the Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7 the Sino-Japanese War commenced and Japan pushed on against China. There were in Peking, massacres, particularly of civilians and, in Shanghai and Nanking. It seems to have been forgotten that 200,000 Chinese people were butchered in ‘The Rape of Nanking’. We’re used to ‘big figures’ being bandied about today, but because of the event in Europe at that time nobody said ‘boo’ - not the League of Nations, not America nor Britain. It’s sad reflection of the memory and research of our latter-day historians that this was the case, and has apparently been forgotten. In October 1938 a Japanese expeditionary force landed at Bias Bay, only a few miles north-east of Hong Kong, and occupied the country lying between Hong Kong and Canton, completely cutting off Hong Kong from the rest of mainland China. Many in Hong Kong then considered the Colony as indefensible, nevertheless a strong British military presence was maintained.

REFER MAP 2 - JAPANESE EXPANSION By 1941 Japan controlled Manchuria, North China, and had advanced deep into the Yangtze Valley and occupied strategic coastal provinces. They occupied both sides of the Pearl River delta and Hainan Island off the south coast of China. Hong Kong was surrounded by a hostile army on the Sham Chan River and blockaded by the Japanese

2 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 Map 2

Navy in the South China Sea.

JAPAN MOVES AGAINST THE ALLIES - 1941 The threat of invasion was constant and eventually took place on December 8 1941, simultaneously with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour and landings on the east coast of Malaya. These were the catalysts for the formation of the alliance between the British Empire, USA and China. British and Indian troops bravely resisted the Japanese onslaught on Kowloon for a few days before retiring to Hong Kong Island. On December 18, the Japanese landed on the island and after staunch resistance the British Forces capitulated on Christmas Day. It is seldom acknowledged that in December 1941, the Japanese extended international involvement started with the invasion of Hong Kong and their landings in Malaya, not the attack on Pearl Harbour, but historians writing up the story of that period of time ignore the fact that Hong Kong and Malaya are on one side of the International Date Line and Pearl Harbour on the other, so the offensive didn’t start in Pearl Harbour 8 hours earlier, but in Hong Kong and Malaya 16 hours before Pearl Harbour. Taking advantage of the European struggle Japan swamped the Pacific Islands and prepared to move further into Malaysia and South East Asia. The rate of advance of Japanese forces into the Pacific area and down to Singapore on the mainland is sufficiently well known and documented to preclude the need of detailing it here. Suffice to say, by 1942 they completely dominated the area. As John Winton has said in his book ‘The Forgotten Fleet’... ‘In six months the Japanese seized an empire of 90 million people, which stretched from Rabaul to Rangoon and contained 88% of the world’s rubber, 54% of its tin, 30% of its rice, 20% of its tungsten and the rich oilfields of the East Indies, at the cost of some 15,000 men, about 400 aircraft and a couple of dozen warships, none of them larger than a ’. It must be remembered that Russia was not at war with Japan at this time, and cool, but reasonable, relations existed between those two nations.

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 3 THE ALLIES STRIKE BACK By early 1942 America had recovered sufficiently from the shock of Pearl Harbour and the assault into their ‘backyard’, to implement plans to counterattack and recover lost territory. Naval forces were augmented, military strategy formulated and equipment developed. In April 1942 General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, South West Pacific, Admiral Chester W Nimitz USN, C-in-C Pacific Ocean Area, whilst Britain retained responsibility for the Indian Ocean (Admiral Sir James Somerville RN) Malaya and Sumatra (General Sir Archibald Wavell). Later, in August 1943, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten RN was appointed Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia.

REFER MAP 3 - ALLIED COUNTER ATTACK Arguably the turning point in Japan's assault in the Pacific came with the Battle of the Coral Sea at the beginning of May 1942, and the action off Midway Island a month later. Slowly and relentlessly, but with serious losses of American manpower in the Army and the Marines, the tide was turned and the American forces recovered vital territory with its Navy in the ascendancy. It should be remembered that mainland China was also endeavouring to repulse Japanese aggression in their country. Communist controlled areas with irregular armies under Mao Tsetung (Red Army) and guerillas in the south and west; as well as the Nationalists under Chiang Kaishek (Kuomintang Forces) based on Chungking supported by the US 14th Air Force under General Claire L Chennault and the 20th and 21st US Bomber Commands, but all with very difficult lines of supply, harried and constrained Japanese strongholds from Chinese home territory. Now consider the critical period, late 1944. The battle in Europe was still going on. In particular the Americans were somewhat disheartened that the D-Day operations on Normandy in June 1944 had not produced the immediate results expected, but even then they were more concerned with the defeat of Japan. How to achieve it? With protection all the way around the Japanese homeland by controlling the

Map 3

4 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 many islands in that area and still being in possession of much of Eastern Asia, the Japanese military government was belligerent and confident. The American Air Force considered the only way to defeat Japan was to bomb, bomb, bomb and burn, burn, burn with incendiaries. General Curtiss Lemay with his Superfortress B-29s in late 1944, had made successful incendiary attacks on mainland Japan (in one raid on Tokyo over 150,000 died!) and was certain ‘we can bomb Japan into submission’. The US Navy said they wanted bases closer to Japan, take Formosa and ‘we can starve Japan of food and war materials by annihilating their ships’. Which, to give them credit, they eventually did. But MacArthur, the US Army and the US Marines said ‘you’ll never defeat Japan unless you land and defeat them on the ground. They will never learn their lesson unless we occupy Japan’. Accordingly plans were laid to occupy the Volcano Islands and Okinawa. The consensus in the Pentagon over that period to early 1945 was ‘yes, an invasion of Japan is necessary’. The strategic planners in the Pentagon came up with a double operation codenamed ‘Olympic’ and ‘Coronet’. ‘Olympic’ was to be based in Okinawa, to invade and seize the southern part of Kyushu. 400 miles or 650km away, ‘Coronet’ was to be based on the little island group of Eniwetok (2,200 miles or 3,500km from Tokyo). Instructions were passed to the Force Commanders at the end of March 1945 to study and put up their ideas as to how they were going to achieve these objectives.

REFER MAP 4 - OPERATIONS CORONET AND OLYMPIC To gain an idea of the distances involved for these Operations, consider a similar offensive on Sydney, or rather the old capital Parramatta, situated as it is an equal distance from the coast as is Tokyo within Tokyo Bay. First, Operation Olympic, it would be necessary to occupy New Caledonia from whence to launch an attack on Queensland and secure bases around Maryborough to provide territory on which to build airfields and bases for the support of the main invasion force building up on Fiji or Tonga. To develop the main assault on Parramatta (similar to Operation Coronet) it would be necessary to effect landings somewhere around Nelson Bay, Port Macquarie, Wollongong and Jervis Bay. To encircle Parramatta the invading force would have to go through a very highly populated area, hostile in every way.

REFER MAP 5 - SOUTH PACIFIC AREA It wasn’t going to be an easy operation. The American strategic planners, who had no knowledge of the potential development of the atom bombs, expected to involve 5 million men. They finally reckoned on their casualties being not less than 2,000,000. Not only were the lives of men in the invasion force to be considered, but Japan had let it be known that the lives of over 400,000 allied prisoners of war and civilian detainees in Japanese hands were at risk; all of whom were to be executed in the event of an invasion of Japan. Can one imagine the political dilemma? Franklin D Rooseveldt had died on April 12 of that year, 1945. Truman, his successor, was not quite as pragmatic, but found it a daunting situation, and Churchill found it no easier; nor did Attlee who became British Prime Minister in July. Nevertheless the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave the ‘green light’ for Operation Olympic in mid July and the Force Commanders immediately commenced implementation of the agreed plans. It is now known, but obviously the Americans at that time didn’t realise, that the Japanese over the same period (late 1944 and early 1945) were very concerned that the war wasn’t exactly going their way; they could see they were being pushed back but they still had a tremendous defensive situation and many millions of men under arms. The Military prepared a study, which gave a chillingly accurate forecast of what the Americans could set out to do! Take Kyushu, and 3 or 4 months later, attack the Kantu Plain, and advance on Tokyo.

REFER MAP 6 - CLOSING IN ON JAPAN By April 8 1945, the Japanese High Command issued to their commanders in the field instructions on how to handle the defence of Japan which, in effect, said ‘don’t worry about the beaches, let them land

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 5 Map 4

Map 5

then we’ll get them with the Kamikazes and annihilate their ships and their forces after they have landed. The Americans don’t like bloodshed; they won’t take it; they will sue for peace’. So it is now evident that the Americans would have been faced with what the Japanese Command had not only accepted but preached and drilled into their soldiery; ‘you are fighting to the last man and the last bullet which you will keep for yourself'. This military philosophy was indoctrinated into the entire population of Japan, citizens were wielded into a formidable Home Guard called (and were armed with) ‘bamboo spears’. Records show that by June 1945 the Japanese Supreme Command had implemented

6 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 CLOSING IN ON JAPAN 5 JUNE 1944 TO SPRING 1945

Map 6

their plans for the defence of their homeland in an operation they called ‘Ketsu-Go’ in which was involved 2.35 million troops, backed up by 4 million Army and Navy civil employees and a 28 million strong civilian militia. At this time Japan still had over 12,000 aircraft of all types. A hundred underground plants were in various stages of completion. No less than 1,130 planes were produced in July 1945 alone. Several thousand air cadets with only seventy hours of training, or less, were being indoctrinated for suicide missions - piloting ‘flying bombs’ with no hope or intention of returning to base. The Japanese Navy still had 19 serviceable destroyers. These were to discharge over 100 human torpedoes, ie midget bow-fitted with high explosives to mount suicide attacks on the invasion fleet. To accompany this naval effort, Japan had a thousand suicide motor boats with explosive charges to be detonated on impact. Indeed a very effective defence force! One can talk about the PLO and IRA having few personal qualms about wreaking vengeance on their foes, but their resolve seems to have been exceeded by the patriotic fervour of the Japanese people, both civil and military, young and old. Although 30,000 Americans landed on Iwo Jima on February 19 1945, it took much longer to capture the island than they had bargained for. 7,000 Americans were killed and 15,000 injured, out of that force of 30,000. About 20,000 Japanese were defending the island. Only 1,038 Japanese survived; mostly seriously wounded. All the others were killed or suicided rather than be taken prisoner. Iwo Jima was not taken until March 27. The assault on Okinawa commenced on March 26 1945 - Operation Iceberg. There were 100,000 Japanese

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 7 troops stationed there - almost every one of them died - either killed or suicided. One third of the civilian population committed suicide - mothers jumped over the cliffs with their children in their arms rather than be subjected to the invaders.

VOLCANO ISLANDS AND OPERATION ICEBURG FEBRUARY - JUNE 1945

Map 7

REFER MAP 7 - VOLCANO ISLANDS The Americans lost 7,000 killed (in the Army) and 31,000 wounded out of their total force of 182,000 landed. They had to commit half a million personnel to that operation. US Navy lost 4,907 men killed, 4,800 wounded, 36 ships were sunk, 368 damaged. Britain and the Commonwealth with a comparatively smaller force, the British Pacific Fleet, supported the operation. Whilst it must also be acknowledged that the attacks on the British Pacific Fleet were not as concentrated as those on the US Navy, the defence of the ships, with the experience of five years intensive operations world wide behind them, together with armoured flight deck carriers was noteworthy. Nevertheless BPF suffered 83 dead and 87 injured, but lost no ships. The Americans lost about 600 aircraft, the Japanese nearly 10 times that number - most of them Kamikaze. To take an island 100km long, 25km wide at its broadest point it took from April 1 when the first landing took place, to July 2. When one stops to think about the magnitude of these losses and what the strategic planners in the Pentagon were hearing from Europe, with all their great plans on hold as the Germans held out over the winter of 1944 and spring of 1945, and the realisation that for Operation Olympic they wanted more than 500,000 soldiers for the landings in an operation of similar size to D-Day in Normandy; and they needed a further million for Operation Coronet, together with the logistics and covering naval forces involving an estimated 5 million men - where were they all going to come from? It was easy in the early planning days - they assumed they could have moved troops and ships en bloc from Europe, but VE Day was not achieved until May 8 1945. Britain was no longer happy about having to move forces who had been involved in the long struggle for Europe out to the Pacific. Naval vessels were available, in fact a lot of new construction was coming on stream. The Americans suddenly found that there was an increasing resistance at home to the idea of large numbers of soldiers being moved from Europe to the Pacific, and, indeed, reluctance to commit personnel to what was then, obviously, a bloody war. Politicians and civilians alike were having second thoughts about a prolonged confrontation in the Pacific. The expanding Russian influence in Europe was having a big diplomatic effect and the Allies didn’t want to see the Americans pulling out, as that would leave Europe to the mercy of the Soviets. It was a huge problem.

REFER MAPS 8 & 9 OLYMPIC AND CORONET

8 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 MapMAP 88

One now hears about peace overtures having emanated from the Japanese; yes, there was a ‘Peace Party’, but from what one now can determine it was comprised principally of retired diplomats, professionals, intellectuals and members of the Emperor’s household and family, people who had travelled extensively and could ‘see the writing on the wall’. A small but elite group. However, the military clique was firmly in charge, and they were implacable. It was a dilemma. The ‘Peace Party’ had the ear of the Emperor but it seems were powerless to sway the military government.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION - THE ATOMIC BOMB At about this same time (late 1944 - early 1945) British and American scientists were working on the Atom bomb in USA. They knew how to effect a controlled explosion of uranium, unfortunately the use of basic uranium meant having an enormous and very sensitive bomb. With any bump or bang the bomb was liable to explode. It was a very frightening situation, as an aircraft carrying it could well be blown to bits if it suffered sudden turbulence or was hit by the odd bullet, or even a near miss. But the boys in the back room worked on an artificial element, plutonium, a derivative of uranium, which they felt was going to provide a much better weapon - it imploded rather than exploded and was going to be lighter and easier and safer to transport.

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 9 Map 9

Very few people in the military - either British or American, and certainly not the strategic planners of Operations Olympic and Coronet, were at all aware of what was going on. The Manhattan Project, as it was called, was coming to a climax and the first experimental plutonium bomb was to be ready to test in the middle of July 1945. Truman and his advisers, including Stimson, Secretary of State, obviously felt this could provide the answer as to how to deal with Japan. Quite coincidentally, the aftermath of the war in Europe posed the question - ‘How are we going to politically redraw the map of Europe and the Far East?’ The Potsdam Conference was scheduled for July 16 1945, at which this issue was to be decided, and also what was going to be done about Japan. So we find Truman and Churchill preparing for this conference, with neither in a very happy state of mind, particularly Churchill. The British elections had been held on July 5. The election results had not yet been declared as they were awaiting ‘postal’ votes, particularly from the British Military in Europe. (Here I have a major complaint for the Royal Navy’s BPF who were denied the right to vote because it was consider too difficult to arrange it with so many ships at sea and so far away. So we didn’t get our vote. It has since been shown that it may well have changed the result of the election!!) Churchill knew he was to be out of office so he arranged to take Clement Attlee along with him to Potsdam ostensibly to show British solidarity with the Labour Party in front of Stalin; but in fact to initiate him into Summit Conferences.

10 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 So as far as Japan was concerned, we now know that in June 1945, some overtures were being made diplomatically to Moscow. Very few people seem to remember that Japan and the Soviets had finalised, in June 1941, a mutual non-aggression pact and the military government of Japan clung to that lifeline. At the beginning of June the Japanese Peace Party made overtures to Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Secretary. Whilst they didn’t get a lot of encouragement, they got no actual discouragement. On June 2, the Japanese Supreme Council heard about this and on June 6 they made a declaration to the military that the battle would go on and they would not accept any nonsense from this Peace Party. Truman was travelling to Potsdam anticipating that he was to go ‘cap in hand’ to the Soviets to come into the war and support the American landings in Japan, particularly with airbases in Sakhalin and Sikhote Alin (Vladivostok) as well as troops, dreading the thought of Soviet involvement as he realised that what RussIa was doing in Europe could be repeated in Asia, but he couldn’t see any alternative. Without that support the military outlook was looking pretty grim. On July 16, while the Allied leaders were in Berlin, the trial plutonium bomb was burst most effectively. By July 17 Churchill and Truman knew the bomb was functional, and agreed it should be used; they didn’t need to ‘kow-tow’ to Stalin. Stalin was told on the 20th that they had this awesome new weapon, and he agreed with the declaration - the Ultimatum of Potsdam on July 25 calling upon the Japanese to surrender unconditionally. On July 22, whilst Potsdam was still in session, the Emperor and his advisers demanded that the Supreme Council think seriously of suing for peace. Nothing happened. Three days later the Potsdam Ultimatum was received. On July 27 the Japanese Iinformation Bureau put out a communique saying that Japan had decided to ‘ignore’ the ultimatum. The exact word used was ‘mokusatu’ which literally means ‘kill with silence’. This was meant to reassure the pacifists in Japan and satisfy the extremists. It did neither. The Allies interpreted the communique as a flat and final ‘no’ from Tokyo. The Potsdam Conference broke up August 2, and on his way home President Truman sanctioned the dropping of the first of the nuclear bombs. The targets selected were Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura (a major seaport at the crossing between Kyushu and Honshu), and Nagasaki (a major seaport and industrial centre, on Kyushu’s western seaboard).

ATOMIC BOMB Only two bombs were ready at that time and their components had been brought out from San Francisco aboard the USS INDIANAPOLIS to Tinian in the Marianas. It is perhaps ironic that the USS INDIANAPOLIS, continuing from Tinian to the American Naval Base in Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, was torpedoed by the Japanese 1.58 and sank so quickly that no distress message was sent. Only 318 of the ship’s company of nearly 1,200 were picked up. She was the last major Allied warship to be sunk in World War II. Crews on Tinian assembled and armed the bombs. On August 6, after some unfavourable weather, the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. It was the uranium bomb known as ‘Little Boy’; nicknamed after President Truman, and detonated 2,000 feet about the city. 42 square miles were flattened. Although precise numbers have never been agreed, at least 80,000 people were killed outright, a further 10,000 missing and 37,000 seriously injured. It wasn’t a defenceless quiet little country town as many of us have been led to believe. It was the military headquarters for the Japanese Southern Command. It was one of the big armament and manufacturing centres. The War Minister in Japan is reported as saying ‘The Americans only have one bomb... . we will take no notice’. The lack of diplomatic response from Tokyo led to the second bomb being programmed. At 5pm August 8 in Moscow the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, told Ambassador Sato that war would be declared on Japan effective from the morning of August 9. The depleted Kwantung Army in Manchuria then found itself battling against superior Soviet forces. At the same time other Russian

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 11 forces invaded Japanese occupied North China from the north, east and west. They also carried out minor operations against Japanese garrisons in southern Sakhalin and the northern Kuriles. By the third week in August, having ignored the Japanese surrender agreement of August 15, Harbin, Changchun and Shenyang were all in their hands - the puppet state of Manchuria had fallen to the Soviets. No official peace overtures having been instigated by Tokyo, on August 9 the second atomic bomb was dropped not originally intended for Nagasaki, a secondary target, but the Kokura Arsenal and the city where the trains and all the trade with the main island of Japan, Honshu, converged with the big production areas of Kyushu. This time the plutonium bomb was used - nicknamed ‘Fat Boy’ after . The bombers spent three hours trying to find a clearing through the cloud layers and see their primary target. They couldn’t, so the secondary target, Nagasaki, and its huge Mitsubishi armament factory, was selected. They found Nagasaki reasonably cloud free but they were running out of fuel, long way to go home, so did the best they could, missing the prime end of the target, near the harbour, by about 3 miles, but as the factory was 3½ miles long, the other end bought it. It also eliminated many of the civilian population. Here about 35,000 people were killed, 5,000 missing and 6,000 seriously injured. That really did make the Japanese stop and think. In Tokyo the effect of the Russian involvement on the side of the Allies, the invasion of Manchuria together with the second bomb on August 9 led to the Emperor’s decision to cut through the continuing disagreements between the peace party and the warmongers in the government, and make an offer of surrender to which the US responded on behalf of the Allies next day. Two more bombs had arrived in Tinian and further raids were planned for the 13th and 16th, but on the 12th there was sufficient indication for diplomatic sources that Japan was about to throw in the towel, that Truman stopped those two bombs being dropped. There was further frenzied argument from the military dissenters in the Japanese Cabinet over terms, but on August 14 the Emperor once more took the overriding decision to accept the Potsdam terms in full and end the war. So, on August 15, Japan surrendered. I’ve always liked that signal from the C-in-C, Third Fleet, Admiral Halsey USN;- ‘The war with Japan will end at 21200 hours on August 15th. It is likely that Kamikazes will attack the fleet after this time as a final fling. Any ex-enemy aircraft is to be shot down in a friendly manner’.

THE AFTERMATH

SURRENDER AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS-OF-WAR The Pacific War had taken a dramatic turn with the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 respectively. On August 10 the British Chief of Defence Staff, Field Marshal Alanbrooke, proposed to the British Cabinet that immediate steps be taken to bring succour and relief to Internees and POW’s, particularly in what had been British territory in the Pacific area. Intense diplomatic activity ensued. The Australian War Cabinet were asked to assist with troops from Borneo and Morotai as well as naval units. Apparently the Defence Secretary, and Secretary to the War Cabinet, Sir

12 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 Frederick Shedden advised Australian Prime Minister Chiffley on August 12 that sending troops to impose colonial control in Hong Kong would surely damage Australia’s relations with China and would also impede her demobilisation program. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Evatt suggested Australian participation might stir up Chinese criticism of the Dominion’s White Australia’ policy in retaliation. Although the Australian Chiefs of Staff supported both a naval and army contribution to this humane effort, including the reoccupation of Hong Kong, Australian involvement was cut back by the Cabinet on August 17 to a short term loan of ‘some Australian naval units’, namely six minesweepers. Australia could scarcely refuse the ‘loan’ of these mine sweepers of the Bathurst Class. 20 of them had been ordered and paid for by the Admiralty for use in the Royal Navy, with construction in Australia. 36 more were eventually built for the RAN and 4 for the RIN. All the RN vessels were manned by RAN personnel, although only 13 were retained under RN Operational Control. Of the 20 RN vessels 18 comprised the corvettes of the 21st and 22nd minesweeping Flotillas operating with the British Pacific Fleet Train, and the other two served as RAN corvettes seconded for operations with the Navy. On August 13 Admiral Bruce Fraser, C-in-C, BPF, was instructed by the Admiralty to proceed with arrangements to provide two Task Forces to afford relief for British Internees and POW’s in Hong Kong, Formosa and on the China coast, particularly Shanghai.

REFER MAP 10 - SOUTH EAST ASIA

Map 10

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 13 On August 16 General MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in South East Asia, to whom Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten Commander SEAC Forces was now subordinate. Apparently on August 19 MacArthur had given instructions that no landings or surrenders were to take place in his area before he signed the main surrender documents in Tokyo. I have no means of knowing whether this information reached Admiral Harcourt, certainly we subordinate officers were unaware of the order. Meanwhile in South East Asia Command (SEAC) plans for the counteroffensive and invasion of Malaysia and Singapore were scheduled to begin on August 27 now had to be put on hold. Troops and ships were afready on the move and had to ‘cool their heels’. In the teeth of the south west monsoon at its height, they sought shelter under the lee of Simalur Island off the west coast of Sumatra and the Nicobar Islands. It was not until August 30 that minesweeping began off Penang and Sabang so that the ports could be entered as soon as a Japanese surrender was signed and acknowledged by General MacArthur. Perhaps it would be salutary at this stage to consider the plight and aspirations of the Allied prisoners of war and civil Internees in Japanese held territories. Japan surrendered on August 15 1945 (14th on the American side of the International Dateline) and after four years of captivity they were looking forward to early relief from their sufferings. By early August the speed of events in the Pacific had accelerated so much, that plans for the invasion of Japan were being rapidly converted into plans for the occupation of a defeated enemy’s territory. On August 10 the British Chief of the Defence Staff, Field Marshal Alanbrooke, proposed to the British Cabinet that immediate steps be taken to bring succour and relief to Internees and POW’s. Intensive diplomatic activity ensued. British troops and personnel in South East Asia had been poised to invade Malaya and Singapore, so were readily available to give a sympathetic response, but on August 16, as General MacArthur had been appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in the whole of South East Asia, as well as the Pacific area, to him and his staff fell the responsibility of coordinating all activities leading to the release of POW’s, Internees and the occupation of enemy held territory. Naturally the British, Australians, Canadians and indeed all the Allies wished to be in at the kill, be present and represented officially at the final surrender ceremony in Tokyo. On August 18 the Australian War Cabinet approved of the attachment of an Australian Service delegation at the Japanese surrender which was to be led by General Blamey with officers of the three services as advisers to him. These were to be Commodore Collins and Captain Dowling - RAN, Lieutenant General Berryman - Army, and Air Vice Marshal Bostock and Air Commodore Brownell - RAAF. Off the Japanese coast with the American Navy was the British Force comprising HMS KING GEORGE V, INDEFATIGABLE, two cruisers and ten destroyers, including HMA ships NAPIER and NIZAM. Belatedly they were joined by their C-in-C Admiral Bruce Fraser in his flagship HMS DUKE OF YORK which had sailed from Guam on August 13, her first entry into the Pacific combat zone. On August 19 US and Japanese delegations met in Manila to arrange for the Allied occupation of Japan. On August 28 the first US Forces arrived in Japan; they were aircraft technicians and were followed two days later by the 11th Airborne Division which landed at Atsugi airfield and the US 4th Marine Regiment which went ashore at the Yokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo Bay. On the same day, August 30 1945, a party of 536 sailors and marines from the British Commonwealth under the command of Captain H I Buchanan of the Royal Australian Navy, landed in Tokyo Bay as part of those initial forces for occupation. They were drawn from the British KING GEORGE V, and the British cruiser NEWFOUNDLAND, the New Zealand cruiser GAMBlER and the Australian destroyers NIZAM and NAPIER. The party had been allocated the responsibility of taking over and disarming the Japanese naval establishments on three small island fortresses at the entrance to Tokyo Bay, guarding the great naval base of Yokosuka and a sector of the base itself, and the men carried out their task with excitement and alacrity. On September 2 1945 the actual surrender ceremony, which has been well publicised and need not be retold here, took place on board the American battleship MISSOURI with representatives of all the Allied Forces taking part and signing the main document. In South East Asia the first surrender to be arranged was that at Penang on September 2 signed aboard

14 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167 HMS NELSON. The same day HMS LONDON’s Royal Marines occupied Sabang and ceremoniously hoisted the British and Dutch flags in the port. On the evening of September 4 the surrender of 77,000 Japanese personnel in Singapore and Jahore was signed aboard HMS SUSSEX, by Lieutenant General Christison representing Admiral Mountbatten, Supremo of SEAC, and the reoccupation of Singapore commenced at 11 am the following day. It was not until September 12 that Admiral Mountbatten, together with his three Commanders in Chief, Admiral Sir John Power, General Sir William Slim and Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, accepted the formal surrender of all Japanese forces in South East Asia; and over the next week to ten days the British, indeed the Allied Forces made their landings throughout Malaysia and the Singapore area releasing, at last, the Prisoners of War and Internees. Australia having accepted responsibility for accepting the surrender of the Japanese forces in the Bismarck’s Archipelago, the Solomons and New Guinea. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board had asked Admiral Fraser for a cruiser, or other large ship, in which to conduct the surrender ceremonies. Admiral Fraser made the HMS GLORY available, together with the sloops HMS HART and HMS AMETHYST. The surrender of the Japanese forces was accepted by General B A H Sturdee of the Australian Army on GLORY’s flight deck off Rabaul on September 6. Also in company were HMA Ships VENDETTA, KIAMA, DUBBO, LITHGOW, TOWNSVILLE, RESERVE (a Fleet Tug), and ML’s 808 and 811. It only remains to tell the sad story of Task Group 111.3, earmarked for the repatriation of British Nationals in Formosa, Shanghai and neighbouring Chinese ports, consisting as it did of the cruiser HMS (flying the flag of Rear Admiral R M Servaes RN) the light fleet carrier COLOSSUS, the cruiser ARGONAUT, and the destroyers TYRIAN, TUMULT, TUSCAN and HMAS QUIBERON. They assembled in Leyte (Philippines) and Admiral Servaes found himself under the direct command of Vice Admiral T Kincaid USN and the US 7th Fleet. The British force left Leyte on September 3 and arrived in Kiirun (Formosa) on September 6. Five days later Admiral Servaes transferred his flag to HMS BELFAST which had recently arrived on station and reinforced his Task Group together with the River Class frigates HMS BARLE and HELFORD as well as the hospital ship MAUNGANUI and the Fleet Train tanker SAN AMADO. Sadly Admiral Kincaid had not worked with the British before this time, or indeed with any other navy and was very intolerant towards them. He had little knowledge of China, and had little interest in cooperating with his British counterparts. Having heard of the Royal Navy’s entry into Hong Kong he despatched part of his Task Force TF74 with the apparent intention of evicting it from Hong Kong (I was there when they arrived) and gave the greatest offence to all. Eventually they duly retired and left us to continue our good work. I perhaps can best summarise the effort involved in the repatriation of POW’s Internees by quoting verbatim from John Winton’s book 'The Forgotten Fleet': ‘POW’s and internees (including those in Java) distributed over a vast area, in some 250 known camps. all required urgent and simultaneous repatriation. ... On the whole things went extraordinarily well, and the recovery and repatriation of prisoners of war and civil internees was most successful and speedy, considering the gigantic areas over which they were spread and the endless problems involved, ... the tragedy is that so many did die in the last few weeks, before the Surrender and even after. ... The problems of repatriating such great numbers over such great distances were indeed endless (some prisoners even said, with a bitter wit, that RAPWI stood few "Retain All Prisoners of War Indefinitely") but by the end of October over 70,000 prisoners of war and internees had been repatriated from Singapore to India, Australia and the United Kingdom; almost all of them were transported by sea, only about 3,000 being flown out’. A not unhappy end to an unhappy tale of misery, barbarity and privations at the hands of their Japanese captors.

Monograph 167 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki 15 1945 April 12th Roosevelt dies and Truman becomes US President. May 9th US Interim Committee meets under Secretary of War Henry Stimson to discuss bombing of Japan May 9th President truman announces Germany’s surrender May 16th Pilots arrive at Tinian Island to prepare for Hiroshima June 11th Franck Report July 15th Victorious Allies begin Potsdam Conference July 16th American test bomb exploded in New Mexico July 26th America delivers ultimatum to Japan August 6th Uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima August 8th Russia declares war on Japan Plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki August 14th Japan Surrenders November Williamsburg declaration: America and 15th Britain declare co-operation and call for a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission The most dreaded symbol of the twentieth century. The development of a mushroom cloud, as analysed by the US Strategic Bombing Survey.

BIBLIOGRAPHY I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness, to among others, the authors ... G Herman Gill RAN 1942-1945 Collins 1968 David Day Reluctant Nation Oxford Uni Press 1992 Robert Guillian I Saw Tokyo Burning Doubleday & Co Inc 1981 Alfred Cooper The Burma Mountain Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1983 John Winton The Forgotten Fleet Michael Joseph 1969 Edwyn Gray Operation Pacific Leo Cooper 1990 Basil Collier The War In The Far East Heineman Peter Bates Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946-1952 Brassey 1994 Edwin Ride British Army Aid Group 1942-1945 Oxford Uni Press 1981 Sir Louis Le BaiIly The Man Around the Engine Kenneth Mason 1990 D M Goldstan K V Dillon Rain of Ruin Brassey 1995 J M Wenger

16 Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Monograph 167

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