E-ASIA """'n" of .~••" h.~ri •• http://e-asia.uoregon.edu ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL M354-18A
CIVil AFFAIRS HANDBOOK JAPAN SECTION 18A: JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION OVER OCCUPIED AREAS - BURMA
94009~!~7 MATTERo-Th.lnlor. U '3 NOf RESTRICTED 0 0 l\ I\cSll\\CllD DISSEMINATIO d the ....ntiol chorocl.",hC' no. t2... L •ined in restricted documents on cfSOn known to be in the see..I&l\ m:t1o:i::~o moterial may be 'idven to :::,Pol undoubte.d loyalty o~d . ores U 0. d StoiCS on to per k but win not c servicc. of me nt C cooperating in Government WOf ~uthorit.Cd militory disc.rct10~ w'"'; .:r;hc publiC or to the press c:c;:~ ~:o-51 15 Mar 1944.) communicate . (Sec also por. 23 I t-----.---l publiC ,clations agenCies.
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES 2 AUGUST 1944 ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL M354-18A Civil Affairs
CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK JAPAN SECTION 18A: JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION OVER OCCUPIED AREAS - BURMA
Heaclquarters, Army Service Forces, 2 August 1944
RESTRICTED. DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER.-Th. Infor- mation contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given to any person known to be in the service of the United· Stales and to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in Government work, bu' will not be communicated to the public or fa the press except by authorized military public rela'ions agencies. (See also par. 23b, AR 380-5, 15 Mar 1944.)
Unit.J StateJ Go"",tI'lelll Pr;n'ing omce, WOf~ing'on : 1944 m:STRICTED _11_
HUMllERIliG SYSTEM or
ARKY SERVICE J'ORCES MAllUALS
The main lIUbject matter of each At"rAY Service J'orc8s Manual 1s indicated by consecutive numllerlng within the folloving categories:
Ml - K99 :Basic IUld Advanced Training Kl00 - K199 ArtDJ' Specialized Training ProgrAtll and Pre- Inducti on Training M200 - M299 Personnel and Morale K300 - 11399 Civil Affaire M400 - K499 Supply and Tran.portatlon K500 - 11599 necal K600 _ 11699 ·Procurement and Production M700 - M799 Administration M800 - M699 Miscellaneous M900 - up Equipment. Materiel. Houe1.og and Construction
JIlI:.UX Army Service :Forces ~.(anual M 354 - lU, Civil Af~air8 Handbook, Japan, Japanese Adm1nletrR.t1on Over Occupied Ares8 - Burma, has been -prepared under the supervision of the Provost Marellal General. and 1s pUblished for the information and guidance of all concerned. LSPX 300.7 (18 NOT. 43);] By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL: W. D. STYER, Major General, General Staff Corps, Chief of S1aff. OFFICIAL: J. A. ULIO, Major General, Adjutt'\nt General. USTRICTEIl - 111 - Thie etud..v on Japl!U1ese Admin1stration Over Occupied Areas - Burma was prepared for the MILITARY GOVElUlMENT DIVISION of the omclIl OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENlIlllAL by the RESF.ARCH AND AllALTSIS lllWlCH OFFICE 07 STRA'l'EGIC SERVICES OFFICERS USING TJlIS !/J.T:ERI.u. ARE REi/UESTED TO fwrE SUGGES~IONS .\lID CRITICISMS INDICATING THE REVISIONS OR ADDITIONS \iIIICH 'wOULD MAKE THIS MATE'lIAL MORE USEroL FOR Tm:IR PURPOSES. TIlESE CRITICISMS SHcxr..n llE SE;IT TO TRE CHIEF OF TRE LIAISOll AND STUDIES mlAllOH, MILITARY GOVERlIMENT DIVISION, PMGO, 2807 MI!IlITIONS BUILDIlIG. WASHINGTON 25. D. C. RESTRICTED _ iv - INTROroCTIOll Purposes of the Civil Afr"irs Handbook The bade objectives of civil affaire officers are (1) to assist the Commanding General by Quickly eet"bllsh1ng thOle orderl,. condition. which 'Will contribute most effectively to the conduct of military operations, (2) to reduee to a minimum thf!' human 8utferlnc and the material dAmAge re8ulting from disorder and (3) to creAte the cond.1 tiona which .....111 make it poulible for civilian agencies to function effectively. The preparl\tion of Civil Affairs Handbooks 1s R pB.rt of the effort to cRrry out these responslbl11U". 88 efficiently and humanely as 1, pOf'e1ble. The HAndbooks do not deal ..,tth plans or policies (which will depend upon chA.ngi~ and unpredictable developments). It should be clearly understood that they "do not imply anY ,,:1 ven official program of ~. They- are rather reAdy reference source books containing the b'ls1c faetual 1nformation needed for planning and pol1ey mBking. P.ESTrtICTED £lY11 !rr!l~~ ~!~Q~QQ!~ !Qtl£!1 Q!1!11~! 1. Geographical and Social Back&round 2. Government flnd Administration 3. Legal Affaire 4. Government I'1nance 5. Money And Bank1D;g 6. Natural Resources 7. A&rlculture 8. Industry And Commerce 9. Labor 10. Public work' and Utilitiee ll. Transport4.t1on Systems 12. Communication. 13. Public Health £',.nd Sanitation 14. Public Safety 15. Education 16. Public \felfare 17. Culture.l Institutions 18. Js.panes8 Administration Over Occupied Area. Thi. study on Japanese Administration Over Occu.pled Areas - Itw-ma va8 prepared for the MILITARY GOVEIlIIIlENT DIVISION of the OFFICE 07 THE PROVOST MAllSllAL GlJIlEllAL by the RESEARCH Am) AIlALYSIS BRANCH, OnrCE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - vi - TABlE OF CONTENTS Page SUWMRY v11i I. Ha'i TIlE JAPANESE OBTAINED CONTROL OF BURMA 1 A. Newspe.per Propaganda 1 B. JapanIS Choice of Burmese Collaborators 1 C. Burm.se Aid to Japan, Military and Civilian 5 II. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPl!ENT OF JAPANESE POLICY TO 1 AUGUST 1943 9 A. The Displacement of ThaIdn Control, Jun.-J~ 1942 9 B. Ba Maw'a Provisional Government, August to December 1942 11 C. Bases of Burman Hostility Toward the Japanese, 1942 15 D. Japan' 8 Pledge of Independence for Burma, January 1943 17 E. Preparation for Burma's Independence, May to August ,1943 20 III. JAPANESE ADllINISTRATIVE 1!ETH0DS AND OBJECTIVES 23 A. Charactar of the New Burma Government 23 B. Applications of Japanese Control 25 C. The Difficult Rola of Ba l'a,,'s Dictatorship Z7 D. Current Administrative Trends, June 1944 31 IV. THE MAJOR PROBlEMS OF GOVERNMENTAL ADllINISTRATION J4 A. Revenue Deficiency and Official Corruption J4 B. The Persistance of Lawlessness 36 V. BURMA'S ECONOMIC PROBlEllS 42 A. ,Initial Effects of Japanese Control 42 B. Efforts to Solve the Agricultural Problem 44 C. Attempts at Retioning and Price Control 48 D. The Proble. of Civilian Goods Transportation 54 E. Japanese Control of Business Activities 56 F. Ogawa's II... Program, of Economic Regi.entation 60 VI • ATTITllDFoS OF SPECIAL GROUPS III BURMA 65 A. The Buddhist Monks 65 B. The Indian Indepandence League and Ar1JIy 70 C• The, Position of the Karens 75 D. The Shans, Chinsse, and Kachins 77 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - v11 - TABlE OF CONTFNTS (CO/I'D) Page VII. BURlIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE flAR EFFORT 79 A. Voluntary Agencies and Associations 79 B. Forced Labor BetteUons: Latyon Tat 81 C• The Burma Army 85 D•. Burman Participation in the Campaign of 19~ 90 E. 'Current Trends in Administration 91 VIII. MAPS IlunIa 1x ReUef IIap of Southeeat Asia x ReU.f Map of South.ast Asia xi IX. APPENDIX: PERSONNEL 93 A. Japen.s. Administrative Personnel in Burma 93 B. Partial Li.t of Burmes. Adm1ni.trative Personnel 94 RESTRICTED REST'lICTED -?i11- ~ The Jlflanese have pursued a policy in Burma which ha!\ combined direct mil!tary control with indirect administration through the ar;encies of a Burma Government which they themselves 8Fonsored. Their program has been imaginatively planned and boldly executed. Starting ~itJl. relntively little positive local cooperation they have enlisted the aid of important elements of Burman society by eonvinc'lng them that Burma has a stake in Japan's victory. Bunnea8 initiative has been allowed generous expreuion in govern:nenta.l, econol'llic, and social activities. This study (1) tra~e. the development of Japants administrative program, (2) analyzes the salient aspects of Japanese military control, (:5) outlines the major governmental M.d economic problema which oonfront the civilian Bunnese adminletration, and (4) evaluates Burtl&'s oontri bution to Japan's m.ilitary effort. RESTRICTBD -lx- RESTRICTED I - -~r P.ESTRICTED 1. ROYI THE JAPANESE OBTAINED CONTROL OF BUR/.lA A. New8paper Propaganda As early as 1937 paid Japanese propaganda, attackinc both the Britlsh and the Chinese, appeared in the Bunnesp. vernl'lcular prass. It reached its climax 'l't1th the opening of the Furma Road in 1939, but was cduntered thereafter by tl;le influence of Chinese advertising judiciously distributed, and by the exohange of several goodwill missions between China and Buma. The net results of Japaneso propagand:ist efforts before 1941 were not very significant; nor were thp. 800 Japanese residents of Burma locally influential. A nationalist paper in UflJldRlay even suggested t.iat, once independ~nt, Burma should form an allianco with China, Siam" and Indochina - "a powerful combinntion which will fenr no foe." B. Japan's Choice of Burmese t;:nllc.bor!ltcrs l\ virulent quarrel developed in the fall of 1939 between Burmese political leaders a=xd the British Governor. ThI3 immediate occasion. by way (If reply to a request of the modarate-minded Premier. was the Governor's resurrection of a 1931 statement of the Secretary of State for India that Burma 'W:)ulC! not be overlooked if nevI refoM'!ls for Ind~a were eont..ernplated. The statement affirmed ~rl tain' s continnln!; purpose to develo!" responEible covt:'rnment in se!"arated B'.lnna as an inte::;ral part -:f the Ei:lpire .but with the denr conn?tation that London a10no ·would detennine the character and the OCcAsion of 5r:ecific me!\SHres quite' tTldcpendoutly from what might hAppen in Ir.dia. This ctatement had been th'3 ~ c61el-ro of t.lote rnbid RESTRICT!m ~cEST~lCTED - ~ - I!In+.i -::;eparationist f!-lTOr of the earl,>, thirties. !ts reiterllt.ton ope?"d o)rl wounds nr.d afforded Japan an excellent OPFortunit)' to select a co oreratinr; p.:roup. Opposition to thA 9r~.tish focuRed in ty.·o political eroups. The first was thp. fl'o-called "Freedom Bloc" founded earlier in 1939 bj' ex !'rp-mi.t"r Sa t~aw. It ir:.cl\~ded c~rte.in leadera ,:"f the revolutionary Dobamo. (Burma) party, Thnkin Uyn~ The.kin Aung San, and Thakin Nu •.as well as Ba tls.w and his Sinyetha group, U HI!!!. l!in, EandoolA. IT Sein, Dr. The:r. Maunt, and U 1"Jn Aung. All of these men later filled hith posts in th"'! Jap9.nflse-cponsored rogime. The "Freedom Bloc" in 1939 do::l:anded i!1lll1erliate and unconcitional inrlependence for Punna, rf" je cting in adv8_nce any constitution drafted 'in EnGland. In January 19403 Dr. Thein Uaung ret'lrned _from a "pleasure" t.rip to· Ja~an. He was met at the dock by Ba Maw Rr.companied by the Jara!lese conslll and other Japanese rp.sidents of Naneorm •. Be. Maw's pArsonnl motives in making extremA poU tical dema!los were open to q11eRtf.on. Hts political game of solidtin& non-Burmese votes in the HOUGe of Representatives to hold himself in power had playAd out earlier in the year. He 'WaS now outflanking his nationalist critics by 8s8umJng an uncOT:1prOUlisingly revolutionarJ' 5t~d. In 1940 he resigned his seat in til" lechlature and was ev"ntually placed in jail for delib"rately seditions utterances. The majority of Thakins., on the other hand. including many young soci8listicall~'-inclinedex-university studBnts. enjoyed a reputation for sincer!t:t ·.uunatehed by an"v other anti:-British polltical RESTRIC~ED RESTRICTED - 3 - group in Burma. The "Freedom Bloelt i tee1£ was not a distinct pol!tioal party but rather a group upholding the banner of Burman pol!tical and economic independence. The second focal point of opposition to the GOvernor was the Myochit (patriotic) party of U Saw, then l!inister 'bf Agriculture and Forests. U Saw had visited Japan in 1938, and his paper, ~~, was openly friendly to. the Japanese. U Saw'e followers definitely 80Ugh't political power and courted the support of the unprogressive "Young Pongyi Assooiation" lIhich could influence local sentiment and deliver the meded votee. ~ ~ offered to accept the genuineness of Britaln' 8 declared war aims if London would promise Burma Dominion status immediately after the war. Before the end of 1939 U Saw took over the premiership, and eventually htl Government provoked such a cor.tplete deadlock that the Governor felt obliged to rule by the emergency powers afforded him in the constitution. In 1941 U Saw journayl'ld to London and 7;"ashington in an abortive attempt to seoure a commi tment on Dominion status for Burma. He was arrested by British author i.ties in the Near East while on his way back to Burma, for alle ged sediHallS· communication with Japan. The consieerations which dictated Japants choice of the "Freedom. Bloc" instead of U Saw's r.~yochits as collaborators are fairly obvious. Ba Maw and the Thakins were young, enthusiastic, educated, and for the most part poersoDal1y honest, while U Saw had finished only the seventh standard and was a corruptionist. He took his cue too often from ill-informed Buddhists RESTRICTED ~FSTRrr.TED - 4 - who were backed' by well-to-do cooservfl.tivo Burman supporters of the monasteries. U Saw's Myochit eonstituency 'WaS adm!ttedly more re:ore aentative of the Bunnee" people, who admired the Tha.kins for their ardent natiohaliBm but had no understanding of radical socialistic principles and distrusted ,the modernistic heterodoxy of the University. But the basic advantages to the Japanese in using the TheJci.ns were three: (1) They had already made a clean break with the British and could be trusted therefore tc;. keep the locret of Japanese plans; (2) they woul~ contribute enthusiastic Bupport for the invasion and would lend color to Japan's pretent~on8 of liberation; (3) their 10 tel1i~ence and pro&ress!ve outlook would not be hampered by the in timidating i.!1fluence of' reactionary religious brouPS. Japan's decision to seek active Burman collaboration coromi tted her inesoapably to generous r~cognition of Burman political aspirations. The Thakins would be least likely of any group to compromise on that question. Not"much ia known about Japanese underground operations in Burma before the invasion. A professional man at Rangoo"o named Suzuki headed their" espionage effort. Various Japanese banking and business houses in Rangoon and. the barbers. photographers. masseurs. and shopkeepers scattered about no doubt aided him•. "Japanese fishermen operated in mysterious ways among the islands off the Tenasserim coast. Only a small group of care fully selected Burmese were made party to Nippon's military designs. Those "included thirty-two Thakin oonspirators who were assembled on Halnan Island RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 5 - for coaching in their specifio roles. This group eventually arranged for several score reliable key men to execute the program. in Burma s.s planned. There was no sftrioua attempt to precipitate a gfmeral rising &&ainst British authorities until the campaign was' well under way. '!'he initiative in thele preparations was undoubtedly Jap"!18se. That Ba Maw himself was party to the Japanese plot 11 highly probable, since he was retained QD several occaaioDa as legal coun.el by Dr. Suzuki, head of Japanese espionage in Rangoon. But he took DO part in executing Japan.. ose plane until 1'"eleaaed from his Mogok jail in North Burma when the Japanese overran that area in late .\pril 1'942. During hia imprisonment t..;'e "Freedom Bloc" had ·remalMd oautiously Active. c. Burmese Aid to Japan, Military and Civilian Many diffioulties. now familiar. faoed the Allied military forees in the oampaign of 1942. 308tile elements of the Burmee" population aSlhted the Japanese as informers. guides. arsonists. and saboteurs. LoCRl intelligence facilities were available only to the Japanese. Es sential labor for the operation of port and railway taoUlties dispersed. Suppliel to make possible Chinese alaistance were not at onoe &Tailable. The defenSive value of "face" enjoyed by local Britilh residents carried With it no appeal tor na~ive cooperation. And the government's literal appeal tor law and order _s to the aurm.an. insipid beside the intoxicat ing enthulia. of their 01111 ThaJdn leaderl ot the independence movement•. Chiet amon::: the acttve organ1aA'tionl focu..inr; both 'the Burmese oPPolitloD to the Allie. and aid to Japan was the "Bunaa Independence RESTRICTED PESTRICTED - 6 - Army. " Originally recruited and partly equipped by Japane 818 agents. this anny was designed "more for propaganda than for military purposes. Under the aeGis of the Thakins, several hWldred enthusiastic but un trained young men responded to the n rat app~al; and 8vent'J.ally twenty five to thirty thol.lsand joined, anr.ing themselves from abandoned British eqJJipment. They were radicA.l. ultra-nationalistic, and pro-Japanese. The Thakin Army regarded itself 8S the poor man's tool against the rioh, as well as the instrument of Burna's liberation. From the Japanese point of view the body was designed to {;iV8 color to 'the pretension that the invaders came for the purpose of freeing Burma from the yoke of Western imperialism. Tl;e Burma Independence J,rmy was the .spearpoint of the Japanese propagandist attack. It held its tir.t review at Rangoon on 25 March 1942. During the latter phases 01' the campaign, however, the Burma Independence Any fell into considerable disrepute. Its ranks came to in-::lude disorderly and criminal element.. Sinoe the army lacked proper uniforms and was itself obliged to live off the country, its activitiea were sometime. identified with the looting and violence which attended the collapse of civil government. In the lower Irrawaddy delta the B.I.A. had a serious encounter wi th the Karens, and it incited a veri'table pro gr.am on Indian residents. In Upper Buma, the AnDy was accused of dis order and failure to st;ppress dacoity, or armed robbery. The Japanese authorities were obligi'ld on several occadons to restrain the enthusiastio RESTRICTED RRSTRICTED - 7 - but undisciplined group.. They apparently blocked the B.I.A. iror.!. enterine; the Shan plateau; they rebuffed i t8 moves in the Arakan regi.on; they checked its activitiE'S generally throughout Upper Burma. "hen the campl\ign ended, th~ B. I.A. was beooming a nuisanoe to the Japanese and an important factor in creating social disorder. The radical Thakins also set up "Free Burmese Civilian Administra tions" 1n the wake of the adnncing Nipponese forces.. This 'lovement started at Tavoy and moved northward. Larger cities like Moulmein and Rangoon were administered directly by t."e Japsnese author!ties, bu't elsewhere in Lower Burma the Free BunneS8 Administrations exercised control. Prior Japanese planning WIls responsible tor the promptneu wi:th which the movement sta.r1;ed and t":le similar!ty of pattern followed throughout. The Thakin plan 'of' govftrnment was bote;' simple and thoroughgoinC. All local officials under the 3ritish regime, incl uding the vllh.ge headrn.en, were set aside in favor of agents operating under Thakin... lappointad Chief Administrators for the several districts. The la.tter officers superintended co:mnittees of' eight or ~en men, eRch of whOM he!l.ded 11:' one phase of local governmental a.d:ninistration. Eventually the Prosident of the' '!halein party, Tun Ok, was installed at Rangoon and given power to review all such appointments. But in act"o.1ality no effective central control was exercised, lritit the resul t that policy and degrees of inef.fi.ciency varied widely from place to place. REST~ICTED -B- The Freo BurnoS8 o!'ficials received no pay, and the people paid no taxes aside Croln their obligation to feed and house both t."le ci.~ll~ and militRry brQJ1ches of t.l-te Thakin authorities. But the le.tter laid a heav,r ~.f\"1d on the well-to-do. ThSj' arbitraril~ requisttioned suppliee, valuables, transportation facilities, and premises as ne~dod. By the beginninG of the rains in June 1942, the arrogant Fr!'e BltrmOf)6 Adr.lin:!.s trstione ~d r:\ade them:selves highly unpopular with village elders and Ot.'1I'lT conservative Eurmans. In Upper 9ur.na, the Japanese anthorities had ph.ced men 'of their own choosiag in the key distr:l.ct pO:Jts at Uyinzyan, Shwobo, Kyaukse, and Mandalay so that the Free Administrations never got under WRy. Thtt general s1tuatlon was ripe in the sW1Il'l1or of 1942 for 8. transition to the more conservative leaderah:lp under the newly liberated :Jr. Ba. Maw. RES'i'RICTllD RESTRICTED - 9 - II. Cw/ONOLOGICAL DEVELOP1!EllT OF JAPANESE POLICY TO AUGUST 1943 A. Tho Di8plac~ent of Thakin Control, June-July 1942 At the close of hostilities in Yay 1942, Bunna was in a deplorable state. Hundreds of towns and villages were in ruins. Transportation was at a standstill. The 'rOT1lll!Ir inmates of all of the prisons and in sane asylums were at lares. .Arson, looting, and physical violenoe were raging 'everywhere. The anarchio situatlon was obviously beyond the oon trol of the Free Burmese A.dm1nis·tratloDs, and drastic measures were called for. As t.lteir first move the Japanese milltary authorities assembled at llaymyo on 3 June 1942 a selected group of BuT:'lan pol!tical leaders 't9 serve as a Central Government Preparatory Conn!ttee. Dr. Ba Yaw was appointed head of the group on 6 JW18. This Committee was charged with laying the groundwork for a Provisional Govftrnr.tont and Mobilizing Burmese support ror the Japanese regime. '!he conquerors pledged themselves to end the prevailing disorder and promised post-war independence for Burma. About t."le first of July the Committee ;'floved its headquarters to Rangoon. The sl)cond move. of the Jepa~eec authorities was to install their own "Peace Cor.rnles!oners" in all important centers. Their duties were to assist i:'1 thft restnrf\tion of law and order and to watch over the ac- tivities of thl'l Free Burr.18se Administrations. When the Japanese officials began to Bet aside t.he policies and decisions of' the ThaJdn governmental ngenci6s~ the authority of the latter e\·nporated~ and when titular Burmese P.ESV1CTED REST:lICTED - 10 - ~ov~rnor8 weTe eventually selected on nomination by Be. Maw' B Central Preparatory Cor.rnittee the Thftkin-controll"d Free Burmese Associations were eliminated entirely. The Japanese Peace Comminioners" in ~ ~ control,. enlhted the sympathy of 'the conservative Burmese gentry by returnitlb as much &s possible of the requisitioned property which t!le Thakins had seized. Both the Karenll and tlle Indiana ware "taken Wider Japanese protection. Indian IBndlor,ds ftre even permitted to sub mit proof of their titles. Importe.nt leaders of tha Thakin party were placated by being granted proL1.inent places in Ell Maw's centre;l a.dr.linistration, but the rank and file or the unpopular ~akin orrich,Idom in out~ying areas were 8UllUnarlly Cispl!lced. The population eenerally welcomed this mO"V8 towards more conserYntive control. The third measure of the JaranAse in lAssening Thakin control was to dsr:o.obilhe the turbulent D'.1:-nl\ Independence Arm.." many of whose of£1cers refused to act under .TllpN16se direction. lI.ost of thf't trC\<)ps 'were given n Rna.ll eratnity and sent hOf!l.e at the end of July 1942. Colonel Aun:: S e;I"l. who had been placed in comIlu'lnd on 5 July 1942, and a felY other h:.:~ officers were allo'''ed tn c8.rry on at the head of a skeleton force of two or thr9~ thou::;and men, which was rechristened on 24 A1Jcust n.s the nunna ~ .4.r.:lY. J.iartial enthusias:n itmled1ately declii1ed. l'.ost 0;' tile BUl'l!lese vernllcular papers apolo~izerl profusely to their readers for t.~e shabby treamfmt accorded by the authorities to 3urma's national heroes. a1tholl..:;h II Widespread conservative opinion, critical of the 'rmy. approved its cisbandr:l6nt. RESTRICTED - 11 - The recrimination atainst the Japanese which dev€lloped within certain elements of the !3.!.A. ranks is reflected in the first hand disclosures of the refugee Thakln Thein Pe. It was Thein Pe's opinion that the Allil'J& might be ablo to exploit in their turn th~ zeal and sincerity of the Independenoe Army a.;ainst thft Japanese. The latter apparently incurred this risk because of the impossibility of gaining , control of tho s1tuation wi. thout th" backing of conset'vatiV5 elp.nents of society and the 'assistance of experienced Suman administrative personnel. B. Ba H~.w' s Provisional Government, A1le;ust to December 1942 Dr. Ba Maw was selected as head of t he first Pr'Jvislonal Govern- mant. He. was one of the few recognized Burman political leaders who was nco+' provincial in his point of view. His degreft was from A. French University (Bordeaux), and he was well acquainted with l'!Orld affairs. He was a ~lever lawyer am an experienced administrator. He was avari",iou8 for r,Jwer, but not porsonally dishonest. Ba Maw had organized the "Fr8edom Bloc" and was coon!t~8d tn 80ch.1 policies under his SinyetJla (poor man t 8 pA.rty) program which were almost as far to the left as were the communistic leanin~s of the Thakins. Hence his '3levation fitted well into the scheme for the arual{;l!U1l!ltion of his Sinyetha and the Tilakin or ~ parties into the sole authorized political oresnization within the coun+.r:r. Ba Maw was capable of play~n{; en ar,",itr~ry, dictator~.al role. His f;.rst public statement procl.aL~~d "One Pllrty, One Blood, On~ ·'''01C8, O!le COl'l.- RESTRICTED - 12 - The Provisional Administration as set up by Be. Maw on 1 August 1942, was on pre-war lines. '[Tndor the nine Government Departments operating from Rangoon were thirty-odd BurmoS8 district Governors and Chiefs of Police reoommended by the Central Preparatory Committee. A number of the higher posts were reserved for fonner mempers of' Be. Maw' 8 ."Freedom Bloc" 8Jld the collaborating Thakin leaders, but the routine adm.in.i strativa posts were filled largely with oareer men oonnected with neither PlU"ty. Former judges, public works administrators, forestry officials, revenue colleotors, ciVil surgeons, and even the police constabulary who had served under the British regime we.re invited to return to their posts under oath of allegiance to the Japanese-sponsored a'.1thorities. They combined useful qualities of administrative experience.. docility, and lack of political co~ection8. The rates of pay were leAS by half than the civil service had preViously enjoyed. These old members of tha civil servioe were considered highly suspect by th~ ultra:-nationalistic elements and their conduct lf8.S there fore severely scrutinizt'td. Hence selected members of the Dobama-Sinyetha group were assigned as "Political Commissars" to spy upon the routine 'Qra.nches of the s.,rvices. Thus the district Gove:onors (Kayaing-WUllR) were "advised" by po1iticA.1 Kayalng-gal..l.ng-saungs. These pA.rty agents were s('lmetime~ secretly app03nted and paid, so that their identity was not always cUscovered. In theory all matters of policy must h3 approved by them; but in actuality, the Jap1\nese played off adMinistrative and RZST2ICTED RESTRICTED - 12 - The Provisional Administration as set up by Ba Maw on 1 August 1942, was on pre-war lines. t'ndeT the nine e;.,verJ1lllent Departments operating from Rangoon were thirty-odd BurmoS8 distriot Governors and Chiefs of Police reoommended by the central Preparatory Committee. A number of the higher posta were reserved for former lllempera of Ba Maw' II ."Freedom Bloc" and the collaborating Thakin leaders, but the routine admin.istrativ8 posta were filled largely With career men connected with neither Pl\Tty. Former judges, public works administrators, forestry officials, revenue collectors, civil surgeons,. and even the police constabulary whQ had served under the British regime were invited to return to their posta under oath of allegiance to the Japanese-llponsored Authorities. They combined useful qualities of administrative experience. docility. and lack of political connections. The rates of pay were leRs by half ths.n the civil service had previously enjoyed. These old m.embers of the civil service were considered highly suspect by the ultra:-nationalistic elements and their conduct wall there fore severely scrutinized. Hence selected members of the Dobamtl-Sinyetha group were assigned as "Political C01llnissara" to spy upon the routine 'Qra.nches of the 8~rvices. Thus the district Gove:-nors (Kayaing-WUDtt) were "advised" by political Kayaing-gaung-saungs. These party agents were s(lmetime~ secretly appo:inted and paid. so that their identity was not always rliscovered. In theory all mlltters of policy must bl) approved by them; but in actuA.iity. the Jap#\nea8 played orf adninistrativ8 e.nd RZSTRICTED RESTRICTED - 14 - to have been reserved at t~ outset for the party agencies and tho Military Police. Tho Japanese apparently took little T8spons.lbility tor adminis trative detail. and relegated their own partioipation to the baokground. To all appearances the Buna.eS8 agencies enjoyed complete administrative autonomy. Exce~t for policing activities. Military coercion was kept direfully out of sight. As a notable exception" the Japanese oontrallos! the bUdget directly. since their own funds were beine uaed. They a110 instalifld Joint Secretaries to be associated with other key Departments or the central goverl'Ullent. And at the district level (as indicated e.bove. p. 9 ) Japa.nea8 Peace Commissioners and political advilen were associated With the Burmese officials who exerted direct supervillon over the populatioD. The general inefficienoy of Ba Maw's Provisional Government was aggravated by the political necenity of retaining in executiTtJ polltioDI, a n'umber of young Thakins whose primary qualificatioD wal that they had participated in revolutionary activitie8 under Briti.h rule and had plotted With the JA.panese. Only a portion of Ba Maw's personal follow- ing had had administrative experience. Dr. Thein Maung, the Minister of Finance and later ambassador to Tokyo. was probably the ablelt of the group. For soree time, Ba M'lw':'Ii author!ty was probably a8 much lacking in substance as we~e his grandioso declarations of policy. Disunity and inefficiency abounded. PopUlar disorder threatened to f;et completely out of hand. RESTR!CTt'D ;{ESTRTCTED - H - C. .eases of Sunnan Hostilitr Towarri the JA.pnnese, 1942. Rising Burman opposition to the JI\['aneso durinc; the c10sini; mcnths of 1942 spranZ basicall~' from thr~e situationB: (1) violl1tion by the foreign l)oldiers of Purmese di~itJ' and sense of propriet~t, (2) the irr.positinn of forced. l:lbor, (3) national ~lstr'.1~t of Japan t s pol1tical intentions. Outrageou's offenses cOr."mitted br t'::.e Japanese soldiers against the persons and property of the civilian population aroused hatred and dis- eust. Particularly resented WA,.S the overbearing custom of the JapRnese, when provoked, of slappir.g Bunnans in the face... Criminals werA barbarously tQrtured.. Soldiers defiled monastic premises. They shot the cultivators' oxen whenever they wanted fresh meat, precIpitating a serious shcrtage of draft animals. Intense popular feeling developed in late 1942 over Japanese re quisi,tioning of Bunnan labor to restore transportation f'lcnities. The only system of forced labor to which Burmans were accuatom.,d was in tJ1.eir industrialized prisons. ThAy had always been decidedlr uninters6ted in the typAf! of oorr.mon labor ordinarily perfonned by Indian coolies. Since food was plentiful in the villages, the JapA.nes~. need of workers was gr.eater than the workers' need of wages. Vhen radio app"3als and other forms of cajolery failed to secure reaults, the mil!tary authorities established recruiti!1o bureaus throughout all Burma which ber;an forcibly to enroll from five to thirty workers from each villat:e according to its size. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 16 - Popular appoaition to such practices became so bitter that the 9urmes8 authorities took the part. of the people. The recTuitln:; progrlUP, at Rangoon and o.t Bassaln apparently rll.n complp.tely aground bsfore 'the end of 1942. At Iosain, Ba !Jaw counselled the people to obey the author Iti~s, but he interveued t.o secure the suspension of a militar~{ order for eVP'lcuatin$ a large area withaut AllY compensation to the people affect ed. l'hen 8. regular nat~.onal Labor Service Bureau Wf\S establhhelj in late December 1942, empouered to force the pooplc to cooperate with the amy in rebuilding Burma's resources. Sa Maw's influence was apparently suf ficient to hold up its optlration. Pacifica:tlon was a more UTcent need than was the exaction of labor ,ervlces. As a third source of hostility towards the Japanese, politically conscious eler:tents of the Burm8Il population distrusted Japan's tieclarod intentions with respect to Bunna's independence. They had ;"0 desirf.J to substitute Japanel$e for British masters. This feeling was particularly intense among dise;runtled Thakins" includlnb even.members of :£Ia Uaw'a Provisional Government. Under any circumstance.s, anti-Japanese senti ment was latent in Burman nationalism and was manifesting itself as early as 1942. The Japanese Chie;f of Internal Affairs admitted in December 1942 that polttical "incidents" were growing more trequent. It should be noted that official sources .in India disoounted heavily the significanoe of this rising nationalist opposition to Jaranese control. They declared that such tJ, development, even if true, could not mean that RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 17 - the B'lrmans had become pro-British, since their chief goal, frequently reiterated, lftI.s freedom _from all roreten con'trol. Everyt.l'ling depended upon whether or not the Jape.n8s8 could convince the Burma....u; of the sincerity of their promises of political freedom. The Japl!U19Se were trying hard. They were avoiding as much as possible inter ference with Burmese adninistrative agencies, and were taking full advant age of·thf:lir 8nOrmO'..lt prestige arising from demonstrated military proW8l1S. They had made considerable proCress by the end of 1942 in enlisting the backing of socially cO!lservative Burmans including many of the former ci"lJ"il servant class who feared Thakin radicalism. But the situation wae far from satisfactory from the Japanese viewpoint. They needed positive Burman cooperation to grapple with the probleras of lawlessness. economic deterioration, and risinG political disaffection, not to speak of derense against impending British counter-attack. D. Japan's Pledge of Independence for Bunna, January 1943 TC'jot s unqualified announcement before the Japanese Diet on 28 January 1943 that Burma's independence would be recognized wi. thin the year was calculated to tranlform a situa+'ion which· was rapidly becoming a polltical liabllity into an asset for Japan. Whether growing Burmese oppoaition to th~ Provisional Government rorced the hand of Japan in this particular cannot be positively Rffirmed. Tokyo probably realized that right and left wing, groups in ,Burma could be joined and political deterioratioh arrested only by projecting the Bingle po~rrul unifying goal for all RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 18 - elements of the populatjon, 'namely inde'lpendence. 'lhe declaration was a positive .and deliberate move. It was not made conditioll8.1, as were JA.:'&n'S: earlier proposala, on prior demone:tra'tion of Burman cooperation. Full cooperation had not been realized by January 1943. If the Japan ese had thought it politically expedient to delay the declaration they could have found good excuse' for doing 80. Instead, they played their trump card early in the gBmo. Tojo'-8 pledge altered the entire drift of Burman opinion. Japan could now appeal for un!ted support on the ground that Burma'lS freedom was dependent on Japan'lS victory. British spokesmen admitted the force of this move if the Burmese could be persuaded to believe it sincere. Every sort of publicity stunt was used to impress Tojo's deolaration upon the consciousness of the people. The Rangoon redio ma'de it the ex clusive them~ for several weeks. One can discount considerably the ad vertised hysterical response of the Surmans and still recognize that a psychologioal victory of major proportions had been achieved by the Japanese. Burma I 8 disoontent did not immediately disappear, but the at mosphere in which the' problems could be attacked was oompletely altered. United effort was now possible. Ba Maw left for Tokyo in early Maroh 1943, where he was feted and flattered o.n every hand and even granted all. Imperial audience. Speaking before a 1* rty rally on 17 April after his return, the Premier said: RESTRICT:lD FESTRrCTED - 19 - "The long souGht independence of Burma haa at last taken shape •••• It is up to this organ [pobama - Sinyeth~ to wake 'the people up to their reaponaibility snd work ror the opportunity which Nippon haa opened for us." By the middle of April the Government' a propaganda and the ''In- ~onclusive results of the Are.kan campaign" were having decisive effect. Burman reelinr; was steadily bf:lcorning unified behind the Japanese program. The crucial question of whether or not the Brlthh 'Would return immediately to Burma was answered in the negative during !!arch and April, while Ea Maw and the Japanese were completin:; their plana. General Wavell's thrust toward Akyab encountered difficulties in the ny of terrain and a Japanese defense too great to overcane. The Arakanese were not un- friendly apart from the fact that they resented the presence of Indian troops. In the Chindwin area, the looal population wa" affording io- creasing assistanoe to the Japanese. The ift.ngate expedition of 1943 into the KAchin seotion. of northern Burma .round the population friendly, but hesitant to cooperate openly for fear of Japanese reprisals. Wineate found no organized anti-Japanese activity to balance the influence of secre.t enemy agents; nor were the people as yet auffering serious economio privation under the new regime. The important milltary achievements of the "Chindits" were lost on the villagers who witneseed instead the piece meal retirement of harr"ied groups, necessarily leaving their collabor- ator. to the mercies of the Japanese. A report from New Delhi conoluded "that the villagere of north Buma would t.ltink twice before they gave help another Year. The British had loet face. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 20 - E. Preparation for Bunna'S Independence, May to .4.uguat 1943 The fonrt!ltion of a Burma Independence Preparatory Commi tt88 on 1 May 194:5 was sequel to the events of the previous three months. It m.arked the triumph or Ba L!aw's Provisional Government in enlisting responsible Burman Bupport. A uUlD.ber of the Comnittee members were Burman leaders who had been pro-Brlthh in their sympathies. The group included three ex-Ministers, one ex-Senator.. seven ex-members of the House of Reprosentatinl, the fanner Commissioner of Rangoon, the former Advooate-General, &D eX-Chief Justice of the High Court, and a leading representative from both the Karen and the Burmese Chril.tian communities. T"'1 of t.... rnembe:s had bo.n knighted by tho British King. only nin. of twenty-two were Thakina•. The Committee met on 8 May and began the task of draft.ing an instrument of gov8tT.ment. During the three months that ·the Independence Preparatory Committee sat at Rangoon.. Ba Maw kept in close touch With Tokyo authorities. At Shonan (Singapore) :in earlY' July he saw Tojo.. who duly impressed. the Bunnelle leader with Burma'lI rellpon.lbllity for defending Greater East Asia and for securing the independence of IndiA.. Tojo was pleased by the cordial attitude of his .visitor. He declared that the Burmese were ~e first nation of East Asia that had fully and .p~ntaneoullly attached i t.elf to Japanese ideal.. Japan" he .aid.. would never pendt Burma to be en.laved again. Mr. Renzo Sawada" an experlenc&d and able career diplomat" waa designated by Tokyo as Burma's ambassador-adviser on 20 July. RESTRICTED R£STRICT:s::D - 21 - He was installed at Rangoon on 26 July. Hia appointment was an indication of the importance which Japan attached to Burma. Burma'a fonnal declaration of independence, at Government House OD the morning of 1 August 1943, was a gala affair. Following the reading of the Declaration, which stressed repeatedly Bunua t s obligations to Japan, the spokesmen announced that :::r. Ea Maw had been proclaimed Naingandaw Adipadi (Chief of St8:te) of Burma. Arter an appropriate five minute interval, Sa Y.aw entered the room to the accompaniment of royal music, the audience standinG. He seated himself in the gilded chair on the dais and took an' oath to rule the country honestly and with justice in accordance with the Wishes of the people. Thereupon he departed again to the accompaniment of royal music. The session adjourned until eleven t.i.irt~'. Arter a second ceremonious entry, the variGu8 Cabinet mBmbers took the oath of office followed by the several members of the Privy Council. The entire ~:"Oup then left the hall. At one p.m. the Declaration of In dependence was broadcast to the nation. 4t 4t30 p.m. Bur:na declared war on Great Britain and the United States. This was followed fifteen minutos later by Japan's recognition .of Burma' 8 independence and the l'Iigning of an alliance plllct. Ostensibly no strings were attached to Japan's action. The treaty provi.ded in general terms for Japanese-Bu1"!D.ese cooperation in the prose cution of the war 8.."lc\ the advancement of GEA prosperity and left rnatters of detail to be negotiated a8 need arose. The Japan'3se military ,adminis tration was explicitly withdrawn and the Burma Defense Army was transferred RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 22 - to governmental control and reohristened the National Defense Army. Japan promised to surrender all enemy a"setsI mills, refineries, factories, mines, transport and COnu:!lunication properties, and harbor installations to the Burma Gov'3rnment a1 t.-"'ough for the pres~nt Japan would continue to oper ato &.11 factlities for tra..'1sport and cO!l1I!l.unicatlon. Apparently a pre.. liminary pact of unknown import was also signed regulati:lg Eurman T"lations to the Shan states and Ke.renni, which had never been adrni::listo~ed by the Provincial GovernMent. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 23 - IIr. JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE IJETHODS AND OBJECTIVES A. Character of the New Burma Government The personnel of Burma IS "independent" govertlr.l.ent as announced on August 1943 was evidence of the increasing stability of Be. Maw t s regime. The Dew group of men was stronger and more representative than was the Preparatory C0D1l111 ttee, all twenty-two of whom continued to serve in the Government in some capacity or other. There were now five ex-Ministers from the Brltieh regb18 ins.t.,ad of three, six ex-Senators (four of whom had been appointed by the Governor) instead of one, ten fanner members of the House instead of seven, a former BUr:n8S8 Acting-Governor, two additional persons who had been knighted by the British !:lng, and I!ll1 additional ex member of the High Court. Thakin influenoe in the Cabinet remalnAd strong, with six portfolios out of the sixteen, but Ba Maw held the balance of power. Thaklns haIti the posts of Deputy Prime Minister, Com!'I1unications and Irrigation, Welfare and Publicity, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Education and Health, and Agriculture. Two Thakins, Tun Ok and Ba Sein, lost th~ir portfolios, perhaps bocause of incompetence or personal difference~, and had to be content with the empty honor or ambassadorial appointments to Nankin/; and l!anchukuo. They were replaced by Lert-wine; Thaldns. Dr. Thein Maung -continued temporarily in the post of Fina...'lce Minister, assisted by U Aye, fenner :-Hnistcr of Home ,41'fa1rs (1940) under TJ Saw, as Taxation Minister. Justice !l.nd Home Affairs were in experienced hands. The strong Supreme Court and the twenty-odd "eldE"r statesmen" named to the Privy RESTRICTIill RESTRICTED - 24 - emJIleil were calculated to serve as the balance 'W!tsel. Conspicuously absent were important political leaders who had previously drawn support from reactionary pongyi elements. The Government was not under priestly control. The provisional ConstitutioI\ which had been drawn up by the Independ ence Preparatory Cornmi ttee~ concentrated virtually the entire author!ty of the state in the hands of Be. Maw~ the Adipadi. He could appoint and dis miss Cabinet and Privy Counci 1 members at will, and exercise full legis lative and judicial authority. Cabinet Ministers must operate within policy framework determined by Be. Maw in consultatioD with the group &s s. whole •.The Privy Council wo,s in no sense a legislative body or public rorum, but merely an agency to as·slst the Adipadi on matters of budget. taxation. and treaties if and when he might seek its couns81. It was actually assembled only three times from I August to May of the following year. If circumst!Ulces should permit. the Adipadi was more or less com mitted to inaugurate machinery for popular legislat1"on within a year following the date of independence or within a year after the termination of the war, but th.e initiative presumably was entirely in his hands. He could establish a Public Service Qmtmission to select Government officials and could set up a body to draft a per:nanent constitution whenever he chose to do 80. No limits were set for Ba Maw·s war-time tenure of ofrice. The Government was, theoretically a personal rather than a party dictator ship. Evon t1)e Dobalna-SJnyetha party me."llhers took an oath of allegiance to tht'l .o\dipadi perso!lal1y. RESTRICTI;n RESTRICTED - 25 - B. Applications or Japanese Control Top authority in Burma lay with the Japanese military command wherev:er they saw fit to exercise it. They took over the operation of all existing transportation and rapid communication facilit1e8# and 8upervis.ed extensive Dew road and railway construction. They 8up05rvlsed the 'enliating and em.. ployment of all labor levies. They requ1sitioned food, materials and draft ani~18 as needed, a1. though they usually paid for supplies taken. To check the 8 pread of epidemt,c disease, the milltary imposed compubory inoculation upon travellers using the railway. or important highways. The army a180 sponsored the anti-rat campaign ror the suppression of cholera. Military Police were activo in suppressing daoo!t bands especially in districts through 'Which lines ot cOI!lD1unication ran. In actual theatres ot operation. high-handed repressive measures were imposed. The military commanders dictated the choice of village head men and held their appointees personally responsible tor cO,mpliance on the part of their villages with, all orders and regulations imposed. Unpaid home-guard units called ~ (Japanese term meaning literally "coast" or "frontier" guard) were organized for each communi'ty. More important were the seoret Giyud8.ll (volunteer torce) und~r Japanese pay which ."re drawn trequently from "bad hat" elements and recruited in each Village for intelligence and counter-espionaze purposes. The only way the villagers could esoape from the system was to flee to the jungle. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 26 - Japanese civilian advisers of the Bum.. Government functioned behind the scenes in unpublicized fashion. The single early exception was Renzo Sawada. Japanese ambassador and plenipotentiary, who openly took over the direction c·r Burma's toreil7'l policy as adviser to Foreign Minister Thakin Nu. Although Burma was recognized as an independent ltate by various Axis members and satel!!tea, her diplomatic rel"tion. were restrioted to Tokyo alons UDder a special Japanese qualifioation of the prerogative. ot 8.over eignty. Anonymous Japanese advisers participated on all important oom mittees connected with war mobilizationl labor servioe, price control, agricultural adjustment, religiou8 and cultural artairs, and propaganda. The names of important agent. appear in Appendix A. The Japanese controlled Burma's tinancial attairs partly through the multitarious operations ot the Yokahoma. Specie Bank and the otficial Southern Regions Development Bank, and partly by virtue of their advhory capacity to the Burma Central Bank whioh they helped start in January 1944. The key figures in the latter connection were the Chief' AdTlser Chuichl Shimooka, fonnerly head of the Kyoto branch of the Bank of Japan, and Deputy 'Adviser Tsuyoshi Ishida, head ot the Burma branch of the Southern Development Bank. A "supreme economic adviser" in the pereon ot a prominent Japanese profellSor and statesman, Gotaro Ogawa, was sent to Rangoon in December 194:5, alleGedly at the request ot the Burman Govern ment. His work will be considered in a latter conneotion. The m&jor portion of routine governmental control over the people RESTRICTED - 27 - was entirely in Burman hands. :':inOT off.icials as well as the pOf'J}eti('lr) generally were apparently convinced that Burma WPlR in fact independ~nt~ 'While higher officials contributed to th", iJ lusion by persister.tly stress- inE; the th8I:l.C or Burma 's creat debt to Japan. rduc"l+.ion, religious affairs, revenue and taxation, llli.cit and civil law were left in .:!l;.l"'!Ilese hands. Native tnt tiati~'~ was also P~r""...itted in social act1vity for nationd ist and war-promottonal ends. C. The !:>ifficult Role of Bft. Maw's Dictatorship Japan's rehson for making broad politic'al t}Qncogsions to Burma was expr"~81y to raeUltate the regL'D.cntation of the nation for war. The mil i tary authorities intended" 0'£ course, to supervise the operation. But the "independent" Eunna :::iovernment, as an ally of Japan and l"Ca11y an enem.y of Dr!tain and America" was to be the instrument for brinGinG the people Into line. ~y concentratihc theoretical dictatorship in the hands of Be. Maw the Japanese obliged him "to assume tho rAsponsibility for mobil ization, including the discipl!n!n::: of his tntrflctable cO'..lnt.r:-ymen. The Ati:l.padi functioned therefore not only at the level of colhbor ation with his Japanese advisers, but also as }'e"ader of the official party and a8 head of the regular admtnistrative hierarchy. The official ~ Slnyetha party membership was youthful and reasonably honest, nA-tionalistic but lacking experience" and only fairly well disciplinod. PA-rty lenders dom.inated the Cabinet nl'ld the Sunna Army. Throu(;h a special ''.nashin (Dictator's) COJTl:1ittee and the so-called Guidance Corps, set up RESTRICTED - 28 - in September 1943, the rank and file p~rty members char.l.pioned the policles of the '}overn.'D.ent before th" p~ople. Only a few mEr.lbers 'Were qualified to OCCU?y high ad.!ntnistrative posts. But as district political 'l.dvisers, 0:- !~yaing gaung saUJ'1e;s, they exercised officious auThority. Only the courts fl.9pear to have been free from thetr direct supervision. Althoue;h the party was handicapped by the jealousy of the Bunnese elders and. weakened. by some cleavages, there nevertheless was no rival group in Burma that could approach it in agerossivenos8 and cohesive strength. Neverthelass a party made up of revolutionary agitators is not easy to control. Their relations with the older civil servioe per- sonnel whom sa. Maw was ~blibed "to use for the performance of subordinn'te ndminis'trativ8 du'ties, were particularly bad. new nationalist leader6 denounced the service members as fawnine;, parasitea and 8 uspected them of harboring pro-!3ritish sentiments: Denied political support, the rec;ule.r civil administration oould not command proper respect and obedi- ence from the people. Their morale was also reduced by draetic eoonomies in adminj strative expenditures. Be. Maw's position was highly vulnerable. lie was fully commit'ted to collaboration with the japanese. Be also personified Burma t s pol!tical and social aspirations as the leader of their "independent" Government and the head of the only legal polltical party. He was., at the same time, responsible for the maintenanoe of law and order" the collection and expenditure of public funds, and the promotion of public welfare eenerally. RESTRICTED RESTRT~7ED - 29 - These woule. be difficult tasks under the most favorable conditiona ~ The sale unifyi.ng factor was the spontaneous response of all Burmese to the cause of Burma 18 independence. Ba '!.I\W'S inordinate pride and personal 8J!l.bl tl0D prevented him from admi:tting to the Japanese that he did not dare to force on his people full cn!'!!.pliance with Japanese demands for fear of al1enati~g popular support. He had many political enemies in the country. His followers for the most part were unorthodox radicals whose roots did not go much deeper intp Bunna t s cultural traditioD8 than the fervid poBtical agitation which characteriz.ed the decade preceding the war. If Tokyo's grfU'lt of independence should prove an empty (asture. popular support ot B8. Maw would disintegrate. Be. tlllw took his exalted position very seriously. His slogan, "One Party, One Blood, One Voice, and One CODmand," was rar from dem-ocratiOl his pUblic appearances were invariably drama.tic and attended by royal music; he received the oath of allegiance to himself personally fro~ all Government officials; he treated the Privy Council, dra'Wll from all politioal Croups, as a mere advisory body available for .oonsultation at the behest of the Sovereign. Th.e offioial novermnent newspaper ~ !Chit (~ !!:!.) "Whioh he inaugurated in November 1943 featured the jdipadi' ~ picture in numerous poses, described hi.! faoial expressions, quoted his utter- ances in £\.tIl, and catalogued his daily routine. The Japanese flattered Be. Maw by having an artist paint his portrait in ?il and a sculptor pre pare a six-foot statue of him. RE9TRICTED RESTRICTED - :!o - The build-up of :8a !In'''' s preeminence was obviously oV9rdone. 1'en days after his elevation &s A.dipadi a leadinb newspaper editor berl\ted his countrymen for Rhowing their lack o£' respect for the leader' B author- tty as follows: "If a man works for the country in a certain position it is thought that dislike for the individual should be set aside, and due respect should be given to his superior postticn on every occasion. It In late AUf;ust 1943 the Adipadl hUr_self exhorted his people to demonstrate a greater degree of confid'ence in the leaders of the govermnent and army, and warned that vicious criticism of the party would not be tolerated. The formal celebration of independence was delayed from 1 August until 25 September when it was ,made to coincide with Japan's cession of all but two of the Shan Sta.tes to BUT)'na, and with the risine props.';A.ndist pressure for greater cooperation with the Tokyo New Order in Ellstern Asia. There was much spontaneous enthusiasm for independence, but Iittle for the new regime. T)3eaffected elements of Upper Burma wer-e given a 1imited opportunity to state their griew.nces in early October 1943 at a four-day conference of'el!::hteen c!istrict Governors. Three items on the agenda concerntld (1) a reexamination of thR entire do:nestic political situation; (2) the maintenance of discipline for Government officials; (3) the organiZfl.tional relations between the Governnv3ntal administration and the DobaT'!l.a-Sinyetha party througbDut the country. RESTRICTED ~STRICTED - 31 - The ~ ~ ~ ~ of 19 October disclosed 'that the political advisers (Kayaing-gaung-saungs) wi thin the several districts were tak ing precedence over regular officials on the ground that they alone ha.d access to the Adipadi. A similar meeting of the Governors of Lowor Burma announced for later in the month never c<;mvened. The press repeatedly crt1;lc1sed Be. Maw' 8 regime on 8~ch sore points &s the con tinued use of the English language in hieh government circ1es.- and ehall~ nged the p.arading of once-ccmnunistlc Thakins in expensive flannel trousers Md shirts of fine quality. D. Current A Some change in the administrative system which subjected Ba Maw te irreconcilable political dsnanrht was inevitable. The Adipadi did not deliver to the Japanese 8 regimented nation according to specificationlS~ and ...s in fact encounteri!1& considerable popular oppesltion. In con nec'tion wfth a comprehensive program of economic self-sui'ficiencr~ to be described in a later connection~ the newly appointed Japanese "supreme economic adviser" projected a new administrative plan .early in 1944. He. l'UUloUDced the:t Buma prop"r would be divided· into three administrative regions with the Shan states constituting a fourth~ each of lrhich would be independently governed in matters of revenue. poltc~. education~ and engineering services. A Governor L'"ld Superintendent of' Police was appoint ed for each region. Deputy Governors for the fifteen priority districts, although named by the Central Goyernment, were &i ven full control over !:ESTRtc~ RESTRICTED - 32 - the appointment aDd dismissal of subordinate personnel Wi thin their own jurisdictions. Fundamental decidons of poliey were to be made by a joint Burman-Japanese planning commi tt88 at Rangoon. The results of the new arrangement are still conjecturaL It obviously breaks up into manaeeable units the unwieldly administrative system" and should conceivably force the ~rloul s8ctions to salTe their own inescapable problems. No longer Is all 8x8cutlVB action to be channelled through the Adipad1. Japanese military agencios will now be able to deal directly with each of the four regional governors who _ill be powerless to resist their demands. The dispersal ot authority and division of patronage 10'11'01 ved in the soheme must lnentably mean an end of sine;le..party control and the building up of rival politioal figures to Ba lIaw. Popular discontent arising fram. continued.· lack of consumer necessities especially in Upper Burma Will tend increasiIl&ly to emphasize Japanese responsibil1ty for their sufferings. Upper Burma can realize no conceivable economic advantage from enforced economic self-sufficiency, but Uandalay's independence from Lower Bu:rman control may gratify sectional loyalty and quiet political unrest. U Po Sa, the designated Governor at Mandalay, is a former head of Cooperative Land lJorte;,age Banks and ~d COnnllssioner, a native of Kyaukse (irrigation center below Uandalay), and a follower of neithar Ea Jlaw nor the Thakin8.· The Japanese were lar~l'Ily respoNlible for introducing into Rangoon and vicinity early in 1944 Il system. of Neighborhood A88ociationa for the RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 33 - handling of local admini.stratlve problems. Presumably the plan will ?8 extended. The arrangement is borrowed from Japan (where 1t is kown as Tonarigumi) but la similar to the ao-oalled "ten-house l;aunge" which operated ineffectively in LolWlr Burma under British rule for purposes of village police and collective resistance to dace!ty. Under the Nftighborhood Associations, the heads (gaungs) of ten-household un!t8 must accept responsibility for the conduct of every member of th6ir respect!vo croups. Village headmen, in turn, are obliged to arrest .un- eoopl'lrativ8 gaUn{;;B and send them, not to· th.e civil police, but to the JapaMse authorities for puniehment. The Neighborhood Associations are supposed to supervise air raid precautions, as well as cammodity distri- bution and prioe oontrol. In communities remote from theatres of oper- ations the Associations theoretically are to take the place of the Giyudan (espionage) units. There is every reason to conolude from past history that Bumans w111 oppose any effort to introduce a neighborhood system of political espionage especially for Japanese ends and in con junction with the rationing of con!umer goods. RESTRICTED - 34 - IV. THE !.lAJOR PRnBIEl!S OF GO'lERIlMEIlTAL ADlUNISTRATION A. Revenue Deficiency and Official Corruption The Burma Government has from the beginning- lacked the neceuary revenue resources either to' insure independenoe of action or to sustain an et'fectiv8 administration. No tax collections were made in 1942, and they were resumed with great irrecula.rity in 194:5. Landownera who were confronted With their tax billa in the spring of 1943 pled inadequate warning. l4any Wanted the Government to accept rice in payment. Some districts asked for a revision o"t land a ••esmonta. Land taxes due in Karch were still being collected in November. a considerable portion in paddy. !..funiolpal taxes .'ere resumed on the basis of heavy disoounts OD the a!nounts owed. Some cash was realized by the auctioning off of liquor licenses and thCl promotion of "a aeriea of aute lotteriea (five by January 1944). Two of theae realized profita of only 142,000 IUld 131,000 rupeea reapectively, a dilllappointing ahowing. It required more thlln aix mont.~a for the government to diapose of two million rupee.' worth of Independence Commemoration Banda, lsaued on 1 August 1943. They bore no intereat but carried chances on semi-annual prize drawing. to run for ten year.. In the first budget of August 1943, estimated reTenuea were only one fifth of expenditures. Under the circumstancea the Japanese, who underwrote the dericit through the Southern Development Bank.. also dictated expenditures. It made Iittle difference that the Burma Central Eank agreed in Karch 1944 RESTRICTED R~STRICTED - 35 - to make ~ood the contef:l.plated 200 million ropee deficit for 1944-45, since Japanese funds made up a considerable portion of the 70' millions of capital which originally went into that institution. It was not until the final month of 1943 that .t\1nds" ere made available for ed ucational purposes. The. University attempted to reopen in Febroary 1944 on the St. John t s Convent grounds in Rangoon but had less than 15 percent of its prewar enrollmen~. The Teachers I Treining College had been struggling alone for the previous year in the same quarters with very small classes. since the Japanese had taken over the University estate. Other agencies were ;tn equally bad cirCUMstances. The civil hospitals were closed f~r lack of funds and per.onne!. The Veterinarian Department falteTed so badly that cattle disease took heavy toll in central Burma, .seriously aggravating the shortage of dra.ft animals al ready oaused by exoesllive slaughtering. The Forestry Department was greatly reduced as were services requiring tschnical engineering train- ing. lack of adequate revenues had a qualita.t1ve as well &s a quantitive effect on the government services; Administrative dishonesty beoame Widespread. Reduced salaries (except on the 10',"8st levels). rising prices, and generally impaired morale contributed to low standard~ of publio servioe. Civil servants eVidently regarded their opportunities for graft as the reward. of office. The Central authorities apparently received little aid from the people in correcting abuses. A pro:ninent Cabinet member cOr.lplained in RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 36 - December 1943, for example, that the people tal,ked enough 8.I!long them selves l1bout official corruption, but they refused to report ape-cific offenses to those responsible for ending them. A "dearness" allowance, which was added to the salaries of all Government employees in January 1944 to COveT increased costs of living, inspired a newspaper editor to hope that officials could now be "required to perfor:n their respective duties conscientiously without extorting bribes." In connection with the reorganization of the administration on a regional basis, already descri bed, the Adlpadi propa.sed to seleot four regional Commis sioners, "men of integrity and rich in service experience," whose i:mnediate task .liQuid be to dismiss all undesirable government officials and to eradicate bribery and oorruption canpletely. But the imposition of unpopular regulatory measures will increaSe the tendency for graft. Such palliative measures will not be sufficient to solve a baffling administrative problem. B. The Persistance of Lawlessness The .initial improvement over the anarohy which prevailed in Burma in April and Uay <'t" 1942 W8.8 attributable almost entirely to Japahese efforts. iihereas the Bunua Army apparently took no re8ponsibility for surpressing lawleBs bands, the Japanese garrisons in the large centers and the !!ilitary Police outposts in all of the smaller towns suppressed criminals with a heavy hand. The Japanese interfered promptly in Lower Burma to rescue both the Karens and the Indians from Burmese abuse. The REST'lICTED - ~7 - Burman civil police were used III a kind of auxiliary raTes for terre'ting out illegal possession of anns and for performing unimportant ohore•. Wi thin the bounds of their control the Japanese :iilitary Police cowed the oivilian' population and even in'timidated their own soldll'try. But repressive measures could not improve the Iituation beyond a certain point. Unemployment was ·rife and lawl"lane81 tlourilhed in areaa remote frOt:1 milltary control. Gun. were eaeily obte!nable and rifle ammunit10n was particularly plentiful. Travel in ~ parts of the country eonti:1ue~ unsa.te. The "bad hat" eleaent in many quarters took up the smuggling of opium and the illegal manufact>.uo of liquor. Concerted efforts 'Were made to i!nprove this situation. Burman delegations of governmental spokesmen and politically-minded monks went to Upper Burma in Septe!a.ber 1942 to calm the fearl of the people and to explain the necessity of cooperating with the Japanele authorltle.. The Provilional Government alia attempted to organize Tillage defenses agaw.t dacoit bands. Educatod Burman! recruited tor t.lt.e force were exhorted to do their U~08t for the welfare of the country. The firlt clals of ninety... eii;ht Japanese... trained police officers was graduated in F~brUary 1943. Eventually a group of selected candidates ft.1 .ent ~ Japan to ltudy police administration. The Japanele High Command also made strenuoul effortl to hold down friction between the army ~d the people. Outside the central garrison~d points, the soldiers Were spread. thinly. It is probable, therefore, that however ofrenaive the Japanese! oidiers mAy REST!lICTED REST!UCTED - 38 - have been in particular oall8S, populAr hOltil!ty toward them lIaB not an important contributing factor to lawleslnese. The basic problem lay partly with police corruption and low morale, and partly with the uncooperative att!tude of the public. The lent-standing feud between Burmese oriminal elements and the old polioe eOD8tabulary persisted. but witil tile latter no" thoroughly intimidated. Similarly the ·traditiOD of popular non-oooperation 111 th the police, carried over fro-. British rule, was supported by general dislike of harsh Japane'8 metAodl of punishment and by fear of outlaW'll whom the 'Yillagea m.lcht prefef to buy off rather than to 0ppolle. With thousandl ot criminale at large and the public uncooperative, many ot the constabulary began 'to supplement their meager incomes by accepting proteotion money frc:a the 1awle•• bandl, especially those engaged in remunerative activities ~onneoted with opium, liquor and stolen goods. It is significant in this connection that polio. action against. illicit opium peddlers was apparently confined to Chine•• offenders althOUgh others must have been. engaged in it. At the end at the first year of alien control, the di.couraged Japanese Chief ot Political Affairs declared flatly that the BUl"lllO polioe sy.tem 1lOuld 'havo to be completely reorganized and newly-trained officers sent into all or the districts. Violent erime as well aa thievery oontinued rampant in DJrma throudt OI.1t 1943. Btl l!ft.W exhorted court judges on leveral oceasiol1l to exert: every effort to etem the 'tide and prov~ded cOJDpensation tor oinl eenanta RESTRICTED Rl:S~ICrED - ~9 - killed or disabled while on duty. Nenpapers are filled with stories about thefts of cl!leh. opium., iron nuts and bolts, bicyclel', cattle. clothing, piece goods, intatl:ta' layettes from "the hospital, cooking 011, t~ler~oM wire.. a."ld even the gold off the Shwedacon pagoda. Thore are alIa numerous accounts of gMl.bl1.ng brawls and penonal attacks. Edi'tora occasionally marvel at the courage or tho pollee in fighting dacoit bands.. Th'!'t Adipadi himself did not help matters any when, in connection with Burma'. deelara'tion of independence in August 1943, he reduoed the unexpired sentences at all conTlets by one-third, released out right 320 prison Inmaus .elected by lot, and commuted to life imprison ment the death sentences ot riTO "worthy" offenders. Japanese repressive measures were ruthleu and highly unpopular. Anyone stealing military supplies, tamperin& with communications, or 1n jurln& Japanese personnel was liable t;o hl5aTY penalty. l'hole vi'lb,ge. were wiped out for harboring offenders. Dacoits were cruelly executed, and information was extorted from them by torture, l"011ipping and denial of food and water were freely used. Some "bad hats" purohased iImnunity by joining the Giyudan units and turning informers. When, in connect ion with the anti-rat cMlpl!li(?1, Government inspectors threatened that the Japanese would thrash noncooperating Burma.nl!l, the leading n81l'8paper had harsh words for those who thus disturbed the harmony that must obtain between the people and their Japanese allies. On another oocasion an editor urged that the t:eople should trust the Nipponese army t'ully, sinoe RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 40 - It waa trying to he,lp Burma ge~ independenoe. In another attempt to imprQve relat10na the .!!! Light 2! Burma gaTe rull details of an a.et of olemenoy on ~e part of the Japanese eODDaodor at '!'harrawaddy who, in the presenoe ot respeotable 01 tizens and monks, lectured eighty persons accused of dacolty and made them drink "oath-water" and sign a statement not to be mischiovous in the future. The jail wal proba't'lly already full. Some lessening of lawlennen has apparently been realized during the first half of 1944. The decline of unemployment due to .an loorell'e of domestic manufacturing actlvlt~el and the enlilltment, voluntary and otherwise. of practically all elements ot the population in the war program" is probably the greateat contributing ractor. The Govenaent Itself hal also improved. It enjoys the service. of many reaponlible leader~ of 13urmese public 11fe. ~o have put serious erfort into 'the attempt to establish a latilfactory administration. The talk 11 not ealY. Progreslive mem.be-rl of the government haTe constantly been obliged to defend enlightened mealurel again.t ilolat10n lit demands that they concentrate on "e. Ipecial Burmese order of thinr:I." Disgruntled elements haTe no organized "ft.y of regiltering complaintl be cause of the unrepresentative-character ot ~ hWls regime. ProteS" haTe therefore been frequently channelled through the Buddhilt Venastic AlIlociation. .E!. ~ Japanese military oontrol acting through and· UOtmd the chi.lian. authoritiel hal allO compromiled the GOTen:nentll position. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 41 - In spite; therefore, of the powerful appeal of tho" independet;ce tlleme, the peofle have. not accepted the gOV8rnI:1ent &S the~r own nor accorded it financial support, compliance with official regulations_ or assistance in the suppression of crime. Few if any of the objeotors to Ba Maw and the Japanese, however. seem to regard the Unlted llatloDs as an aid in realizing their national aspirations. RESTRICTED R'lSTRICTED - 4.2 - v. BlJRIIA'S ECCJio:lIC PRO!ll.aIS A. Initial Effects of Japanese Control The primary economic effects of Japanese occupation of Dunna wer:e bad. In addit100 to the destruction caused by milltary opera t100.8, and -the attrition resultinf; fronL chronic lawlessness, Burma sutfered paralysis of trade. The cessatim. of rice exports le1"1; an accumulation of' som.e three million bushels of paddy i'rOlll the 1941 crop, 80 'that the area of 01.:1tivatlm for 1942 was some 30 percent under nonnal.. Unable to sell their rice, Burmans aleng 'the rivers took: up fishing, and the Japanese started a fish-c8Jllling industry. Prices were so 10'&" that farmera 8aw no reason to harvest their crops, until the.military authorities in the raIl of 194:2 bought up and stored a portion of' the !:rain carried over from the previous year. Initial efforts to encourage the raising of cotton and vegetables produced mea~er resulta. Some Indian laborers moved into Ranl!';ocn where they found work under the Japanese, but in general depression and unemployment prevailed. The virtual cessation of foreign and domestic trade made stocks of many types of consumers I good irreplaceable. The shortage of cloth. thread, matcl-.es, cooking oils, soap, snit, kerosene, and leather goods became particularly acute. Thus at the very time that the paddy market was in a state of collapse, com."i'Iodity prices rose alarmingly. By the sprinc; of 1943 regular items of clothing: at R~goon cost from seven to twelve ti.r.l.es their price in January, of 1942. The liberal RESTRICT;:D RESTRICTED - 43 - distributlC1l of Japanese military ourrency printed en flimsy paper and graduated to decimal fractions of a rupee aggravated the price spiral. Hard mCXley disappeared and shopkeepers accepted Japanese notes only tmder duress. Meanwhile thieves did a thriving business in stolen articles of clothing. The lack of ;neans of internal transportatiCl1 hampered the -distri bution of goods that were p-vailable. Rail end highway facilities were used for military needs. As a result, the price of rice in the dry belt of central Burma. in March 1~43 was several times that at Rangoon. Cumulative problems arising from the dislocated economy were unevenly distributed. The rolatively self-sufficient villager suffered much les8 privation at the outset then did his city cousin. The impositim of an equitable system of uniform prices was impossible under the circumstances. Ir. addition, the bargaining traditions of the Oriental bazaar stood firmly in the way of any fixed price standards. Execu tive orders condemning profiteerin(; and black market operations, therefore, "had little effect. Under these difficult circumstances the Government found it neces- sary to ;ive the paddy cultivators sorne tangible assistance. The Government lowered farm rents, and set up Cooperative Credit Associa tions (which about ten percent of the peasants joined), and Land Mort!e:ge lJanks to protect owners from forced transfer of title. 750,000 rupees were appropriated for agrarian pruposes. Cultivators paid Virtually no taxes in 1942. AccUI:lulate.d interest on debts, R3STRICTF.D RESTRICTED - 44 - owed particularly to the Indian Chettyar mcmeyl8.ndera, was cancelled. The debt-ridden delta farmers could at least be grateful that their burden of interest-payments was lifted; and could even look forward to attaining direct ownership of paddy tracts. The Japmea8 ruled that non-resident landlords, :noatly Chettyara, could recover their holdings only if they established proot of their claw, a thing diftlcult to do because most of the recorda had been destroyed. The Chettyars were not allowed to return to the moneylendinG business, hut their agents did revive in December 194:2 the old Bank of Chet- tinad a8 the People's Bank. This institution has served a8 a ra- pos!tory for Chettyar c;l#lUns and has derived some inecn. frem land rentals paid in kind and at approximately 1':.alf of the previous rate. But ~he underlying eCOI1011lic situation could not be improved by such superficial expedients. By the end of 19.2 the people were eriticizing the Government severely for not doing anything to eor rElet unemployment or the lack of a market for their rice. Ba Maw appealed pUblicly for patience with his Government as well as for popular understanding of the Japanese. 3. Efforts to Solve the Agricultural Problem In early May 1943 the Depar'bnent of Agriculture announced a scheme to buy rice at R:s. ao per 100 ba:skets of 46 pO\D1ds each (a low price but considerably above the market) from. the farmers of the thirtoen rice-growing districts of Lower Bunna. Purchases from. a given indi vidual beyond the first 300 baskets would be paid for 50 percent in RESTRICTF.D F.~STRICTED - 45 - cash and tho T8Ill.l!linder in prorni.s:sory notes (Price Bonds) of the Executive Adr.1inistratiCll. The prOr;TI!U'Il. was to begin .in June and extend over a fouT-r.lontha' period. Special supervisory officers tmder took to enforce the regulations. The scheme was not intended to solve the problem; it was essentially ,8 response +'0 popular &&ita- tion for 80me measure of relief for needy cultiYatoTa who had neither the ':l8ans nor the incentive to plRZlt a new crop, and who threatened to surronder their t.enenc1es. A government spokesmen e~orted the discouraged cultivators to grow cotton, jute, grou:ad nuts, S8SSamum, castor beans, and vegetables instead of rice. People, he insisted, should cease grumbling a.bout the war not being over and instead apply their energies productively so that they mif;ht be able to liTe through it. As the rainy season c8l:l.e to an end in late September 1943,. it apparent that somethin~ drastic would have to be done about Bunua's a~ricultural situation. The glut of paddy was the principal embarrassment. ?h.1l'l1erous complaints were current about dishonest dealin@'s of Government purchasing agents,. end the fifty percent cash rUlina'; included in the scheme had reduced the effective price to only 40 rupees oar 100 baskets, a figure cCl'lsiderably below the cost of production. In Bassein district the price eventually sagged to • mere 20 rup!'es. Meanwhile Japanese interruption of civilien freight shipments to Upper Burma produced the astounding price at Mandalay of 300 to ~,.IOO rupees fOT 100 baskets of paddy. The situation was RESTRICTED - 45 - complicatee 't-y th~ worst rice crop in yellTs. The total acreage was o!11y around s ixt? percent o!: n.orma,l and in some ar~e 5 of' ~he tiel"ta it was only one-third. Lateness of the rains reduced the crop to 9.n average of fifty peroent of nOrJ!lB.l. or 8,?proxlmately one r.'!! Uion tone above annual local consumption. But in Upper Burma where shorte.::e already existed f'rO!!l lack of' transportation, cattle disease played havoc with cultivation. The yield here was at le&st . one-half !:\Ulio:t tons short of actual ne~ds. The effort to divert paddy fanners to jute and cotton production turned out very badly. Some jute was plRnted in five districts of the delta, but the soil and climate of the area were not suitable for cotton. Scandalous fraud in the Cotton Distribution Association also demoralized the program.. The total cotton acreage fQr 1943 was aotually lower than in the previous year. In Upper Burma, where the price of rice wa:'J hiGh, n:- economic incentive obtained for cultivators to change over to unf8lT'liliar cOl'IInodities and methods of cultivation. It was necessary ror a special State Paddy Advisory Council to begin sessions in late September 1943. It emerged in October With a proposal that the government buy 52 million baskets of paddy (about 1.2 million tons), the estimated surplus of the new crop, at 80 rupees per 100 'baskets. The treasury would also redeem for cash the promissory notes e;iven Ol~t under the previous purchase scheme. Those who sold paddy to private purchasers would get 20 rupees extra at the outset and another 20 when the rice reaohed the zovernmen't warehouses. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 47 - The authorities thereafter would undertake to sell rice trom r,overn- ::::lent stocks at a fixed price•. This latter policy depldeq, of couree, Upal their ability to distribute rice. The Council a.lso proposed to have the state purchase land and assign it to needy t~ant farmers who would agree to substitute cotton and jute cultivation for rice. ;,. ro'organized Burma Cotton Guild and a Cotton Control Bureau would absorb that cammod! ty and pro mote the manufacture of cloth. The actual hiring of Paddy Inspectors at 300 rupees per month plus travel- ling allowance be~an earlym January 1944. Applicants must have had experience in the rice business and be able to provide character testimonials from two high government officials. Meanwhile the Agricultural Department lent 4,500,000 rupees to Lower Burma cultivators to enable them to harvest their crop. Wost of the fund was given directly to agriculturalists not members of cooperatives, on the basis of village security only. District officers administering the progr~ were exhorted to "carry out their duties conscientiously•••placing the interests of the cO\Dltry in the forefront." In the meantime, the Youth's League, official Dobama Sinyetha party members, village political advisers (gaung saungs) and the National Service Association organized voluntary bands to help in the harvesting. Apparently most of the meager crop was gathered. The final decision on the rice control progr8Jll. was to try to .stabilize annual production at 4 millim. tons or about two-thirds the pre..war level. The 1944-45 budget allocated 37 million rupees for government purchase of rice but recoveries of loans made during the RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 48 - previous year were included within that S\.Il1. The government would also purchase all of the new cotton, groundnut and S8SSamWl. s8ed:, tLT)d allocate such produce for consumption purposes. Farmers cooperatdng in the cotton program would be supplied by the Gov8rn:n.ent with salt, sugar, matches, and other daily necessities. The Government ad- vocated also the growing of vegetable gardens, the protection of draft cattle, and the reexamination of the system of Cooperative A8Socia tiona. The evtlntual plan of Burma's agricultural program for 1944 as formulated by a supreme Japanese adviser, Otaro Ogawa, .followed in teners! the lines laid down in the autumn of 1943. c. Attempts at Rationing and Price Control Several attempts of the BUrpl8Se author!ties during 1943 to m pose rationing and price control were unsuccessful. Any such effort was bound to be difficult in Oriental bazaar marketing where no price had ever been fixed and every purchase was normally the occasion for bargaining. The first regulations imposed in May 1943 applied only to meat, fish, and kerosene; while other articles in short supply suoh'R.s onions, ja~gery (sugar), cooking oil, salt, and many other foods were not at first affected. The controlled ;>rice of fish and pork was about dcuble the pr~-war figure, and beef was two-thir~ higher. Volunteer watchers near the :neat stalls of the baz;a.ars re ported sales above the fixed price and secured the arrest of offenders. ';'ihen one merchant refused to sell his live fish at fixed prices, customers killed, weighed, and purchased them lmder i:nmedi1lte police RESTRICTED -RESTRICTED - 49 - authorbati central Burma was 80 great that the cCXltrolled prices were available only for government officials and members of the police. ·Volunteer groups and police sel,.od the entire stock of a pork proflteer at Rangoon, and a quantity of hoarded oil and other goods at Thonze and placed them on sale at controlled prices. In Rangoon the distrl :bution of kerosene was handled by the sale" of tickets to householders redeemable at dealer'8 shops. who in tum collected the price of their ail from the government. The merchants generally countered official regulatioo by with holding their [.cods from the market. Well-to-do consumers had to buy clandestinely at exorbitant pric~8; the poor did without. The leading RlIlllgoon newspaper accused the Government of excessive benevolence towards the poor without proper regard for the interests of the mer chants. The editor criticized severely the arbitrary l':l.ethods adopted by the police and the youthful vigilantes, the ~-~-daing, to enforce \mifom. price contr~l. Many important items, such 8s,oooking oils and vegetables, he pointed out, were not covered at all. The editor aho declared that government rice purchases would not ·he.1p if the needed consumers' gooa-were not rr.ade available for purchase. The Burman authcrities, he concluded, must arrange to import the necessary commodities. ii'ben the governJ:1ent.attempted in early August to establish temporary price ceilings for foods other than meat, the entire structure of RESTRICTE:D RESTRICTF.D - 50 - control broke down.. Thia break-dO'l'llD started at .Henzada where the Commissioner, after consulting with the merchents, abruptly withdrew his order for the temporary fixing of prices of chillies, ceiens, and cooking 011, and restored freedom of trade. 'l'he action was hailed by the brokers of Rangoon, and the supplementary orders had to be withdrawn. Hoarded goods immediately reappeared a'l. the market but the relief was' more ps:rchologicB.1 than mat~rial. The regulatlcu8 regarding meat prices remained theoretically in force, but with only occasional attempts at enforcement. Spiraling prices caused increased dismay. The Burman authorities sought in vain for Japanese assistance in illlproving the supply and distributicn of foodstuffs, elothing and other commodities. A comparison of prices of staple items clearly shows how Local production and distribution hnve failed to make good· the lack of con suoers' roods arising from cessation of imports. Clothing prices at RnngoClll in April 1943 r.ere seven to twelve times the pre..war fi£'Ure. Sewing thread was sev,anteen times as costly. The mobilization of textile equipment within Burma and Japanese shipment of some old spinning and weaving machinery to Rangoon in July apparently did Iittle more than retard the rate of deterioraticn and provide the a..rmy with minimum needs. By November the price of a lengy! (Burmese skirt) Bnd shirt at D8ssein was more than t.wice /18 much a8 at RargoOll in April. Ltatches cost Rs.l per small box. Sugar was a Japanese r.:lCl1opoly exeept 1n the black market at 8 tQ 10 rupees per viss (tlu:ee and one-half pomds). RSSTRICTED RS5TRICTED - 51 - The ~)rice situation became pro[ressively worse in the !1orth. !~ails cost Rs.25 por viss at Prone, and constituted about r.RIf the COAt of constructing a boat. Dried fish was alrr.ost "four times more costly at Prome than at Rangoon. At Mandalay in November 1943, a basket of rice cost R8.20 while harvest hands received Rs.4 per day plus meals and cheroots as against 3/4 rupee in 1940. Pork, and fowls cost 7 to 11 rupees per viss (twice their price at Rangoon) i shirts were Rs. 35 each even though strictly rationed. Old bed linen was being cut out for clothing. At Myitkyina, still farther north, clothing was \mobtainable even fer soldiers at" the end of the year. Salt cost Rs.12 per viss; rice Rs.23 per basket at the control.led military prices; matches Rs.4 to 5 for a box of sixty sticks. Japanese .agents commandeered COtmtry boats to bring up rice for the anny· alone, and systematically stripped the inhabitents of what food thoy did.not hide. The shorta~e of consumers I goods was so serious that Ba Maw carried the delIllUld for relief direct to the Greater East Asia Con ference at Tokyo in November 1943. In his pripcipal speech the Adipadi at the Conference insisted that the civil'ian froot cO':lld not effectively support the military front without proper food, clothing, housing, and transport:aticn, end that the resources of all GEA should be made available to defend the particular point attacked. Unreported at the time was his proposal that a representative ~3STRICTED· - 52 - Standing Centi'd ConunH;tee or Council be set up to care for "such vital pro~lems as food and transportaticn." The 811UU8 point was echoed in the RangoCll ra.lfy celebratine the Conference when the Burmese Deput;y -Premier· told his troubled listeners that economic discussions ·"involved such issues as the fair exchange of commodities, md the mutual supplying of goods to each CO\D1try. n But neither the goods nor the shipping was available. and military consideratlQ'ls took complete pre cedence with the Japanese. The ~ople and the civilian authorities of Burma were left to fend for themselves. When the Rangoon authorities in September 1943 bagen perforce to consider the re-establishment of effective price control, two Control Boards were set up. me Burmese and the other Japanese. D18 cussion presumably took the form of negotiaticne Notably absent from the Burmese board were the radically minded Thakins, and present en it were conservative representatives of the Privy Council, the Burmese Chamber of Commerce, and the Burma Services Associatime Equally significant was the fact that the Japanese would now be party to any joint decisim.e Action was long delayed, in spite of increased newspaper ~omplaint about soaring pricese One trend which the negotiations over com.i1odity controls were taking was indioated by the announoement in, Ootober that the ten household Neighborhood Assooiations (already menticned in oonnecticn ·with Japanese Administraticn) would be utilized in Burma for dh tributing food cO!mllodities. Branches of the Assooiations were sup posed to have been set up for this purpose in all the principal RESTRICTED ,:ES TRI CTED - 53 - cities and towns by mid""l~ovember. The Government after consultatim with buyers acd sellers issued the first order for the control of feod prices on 15 November. From neither traders nor the public was satisfactory cooperation secured. Q1 1 Decer.lber !ill dealers in RengoCl\ and vicinity selling eighteen specified varieties of foodstuffs (nine types of meat, six vegetables and eggs, rice find cooking: oil) were commanded to register with the Commodity and Price Control Branch before 31 December on pain cf three years' imprisonment and/or fine. A Government spokesman declared t.hat public tradin,: in the black market and protection of hoarders must not defeat this second attempt to set up effective price controls. The proposed price levels for specific items of food, if and when they should be available, were eventually arrived at by joint discussion between the Government Price Controller, officials of the local branch of the Defense League. Nipponese officers, and the brokers and merchants concerned. Q\ 6 January 1944 the first control order of 15 11 ovember was explicitly repealed and order no. :5 substituted. This latter listed maximum prices, both wholesale and retail, for all kinds of fish, ngapi (fish paste), beef, pork, mutton, fowls, eggs, and onions. The order applied only to Rangoa'l and immediate vicinity. Purveyors of the specified goods were forbidden to hoard, or refuse to sell, or to adulterate either quality or weight on pain of a: three years' im- . prisonment and/or fine. Absolute shortage of clothing made pointless any attempt at price control of this commodity. Instead the East Asia Youth's teague in certain camnunities began in November to RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 54 - distribute used clothing to the needy. That this further effort at price control was ineffective because of popular non-cooperation is substantiated by the an nouncement by the Japanese on 12 February 1944 that the first 19 Neighborhood Association leaders and their 120 assistants for Rangocn had only then been named and that the system would be extended shortly into three adjacent districts of the delta. The Ileighborhood Associa tiOn! were suppose<,i to have been already enforcing the commodity control program for three months in all important Bur.nan tovms. Under condi tions of rising popular resentment over shortage of goods, the organi zation of Neighborhood A;ssociations was likely to crystalize discontent rather than secure compliance to regulatiCl1.8 • D. The Problem of Civilim Goods Transportation With the railroad completely monopolized by the Japanese for military purposes, the government did what it could to move foodstuffs And other goods to needy areas. Rice was plentiful in all points of .Lower Burma and cotmtry boats could serve the delta. Upper Burma was the principal problem. The Govenunent's Transport Bureau opened a training class fer prospective officers in early November 1943. 'The leader announced at the outset that the major problem was lack of vehicles. Party agencies were also active. The KOoyaing ga\mg saung (Burmese district political adviser) of Thayetmyo prepared a series of through cart tracks over which "convoys of foodll could travel north ward. The Comrnerce Depnrtment in January 1944 announced plans. for RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 55 - opening four distribution depots at My1ngyan, Sagaing, Yenangyaung, and Pye.'i'tbwe. The Propaganda Bureau announced on 23 January that "it only remains for food end clothing difficulties to become les8 and be over before very long. II Both rice cultivation and cart transportation in Upper Bunu were hampered by the lack of draf't cattle. Excessive slaughtering by the military had started the probler.t. Anthrax and hoof-and-mouth disease had followed.. killing off half or more of the oxen 1D central Burma. Bullocks had to be purchased from LOlt'er Burma at six to ten times the price .they had been 'Worth before the invasion. The newspapers in 9ctober 1943 began to advocate more effective govern ment control' over slaughtering. Privately sponsored meetings urged the people on both economic and religious grounds to stop eating the flesh of cattle and buffaloes. By January 1944 the Propaganda Bureau itself was asking the people to abstain from eating beef in order to avoid entire depletion of the cattle supply. The Education and Health Department tried to cancel all butchers t licenses, and fouod that black market operations and bribery were blocking their endeavor. $ome communities eventually banded together to purchase the local slaughtering licenses at auction and thus prevent further killing. Lon~ range Japanese plans for increased cattle and horse breeding were of no assistence in the immediate situatiat. The Burman demand for access to some railway facilities finally reached the public pre.es. The Sun on 19 Deceinber served notice that RESTRICTED RBSTRICTF.D - 56 - if ttle Government did not take effective measures to improve trans- porta'tion end provide food at reasonable prices. discontent might get out of hand. (k1 18 January 1944, a meeting of Rangoon merchants petitioned the Government that !lumens be allowed to use certain railway stations in Upper BUMna for transport of good southward. Their assumption was that freight cars would be returning empty after carrying military supplies up-country. It "'as a matter of considerable rejoicing when en Z February 1944 the Yemethin statim was reopened for civilian use after b"eing closed for eie;ht months. But this slifht concession merely em\,hasized the general prohibitim. There still was no more, than token opportunity (ane car a day) for north-bound traffic. The Director of Propaganda complained in the same iss.ue or the paper that reported the concess'ion. about the un speakable difficulties of transport. and claimed that the Transport Bureau lI(as distributing civilian food as well as military supplies by all meRnS available. A special Ministry or Supply was created in April 1944 to attempt further to facilitate transportatim. com modit;:t control end paddy purchosi::tg. E. Japanese Control of Business Activities Japanese economic control in Burma centered on their monopoly or credit facilities and the operation or key industries. During the first year of Japanese cootrol. the private Yokoh&r.!A SPftcie Bank end its several operating branches in Burma Virtually mcnopolized the banking-business. (kl 3 AUfZ:ust 1943. the official Japanese Southern RESTRIC= RESTRICTED - 57 - ~velopnent Benle opened business at Rangocn. It took over the management of Tokyo' 8 treasury acco1.mts, the underwriting of the needs of the Burma Government, and the task of approTing of orad!ta tor cO!lIMTcial tmdertakinga. All accounts held in Anti-Axis banks has to be reported to the JapanesB, and semi-annual applicatic:o had to be lM.de for the bsuance and renBwal ot all c redita of aore tbm 100,000 rupees. A Bunna Central Bank was planned to attract local deposita, aplXl80r a \I1ifona currency. and take responsibility ror financing governmental expenditures. It would alao provide ti CQ1 venient ray.de to cQD.ceal the actual financial control exercised by the Southern Development Bmk. A YO\Z1g Burman was sent to Japan in July 1943 for opecial banking training. An important banking com' mittee inciuding Japanese advisors ..... set up in 0a:.1y August. This Central Bmk C~ittee, under the chairml!UUlhip ot Dr. Thein )(atmg, the Finllnce Minister end Ambassador designate to Tokyo, recom mended on 29 September that a State bank capitalized at Rs.IO million should be opened by the first of November. Actually, the sale of capital stock did not get under way \a1t~l late Nov81llber, and tho bank it.olf did not opon uotil 11 January 1944. In tho and, the capitalization was raised to 70 millions, with the Japanese probably ccntributing most of it. Government spauors of the Central Bmk praised it as a means of achieving finencial inde pendence tor BunJ1&, not as a r.teens at tinenclng the war. It was obvious that Japanese and Burman Idea~ RESTRICTED RBSTRICTED - 56 - differed considerably as to proper functioo of the blllILk. To the extent that Japanese objectives of corralling Burman resources for war purposes were a;>parent, the popular enthusiasm for the project ,cooled. On the whole' there appears to have been much less aggressive activity in Burma on the part of Japanese business interests than in other lAnds occupied by them. It is highly significant that before the Central Bank was actually lauched the Japanese authorities accepted the proposal that any Japanese engaged in ncn-military business in Burma should pay the same tax 6.S Burman businessmen retroactively a8 of 1 August. Amcng the more important 8x8J:l.ples the Nippcn Trading Canpany has taken over much of the wholesale -distributing business in the country and had acted particularly as supplier for the anny. The Fippcn-Burma Timber Unl00 danmates ita field. The Ataka Company operates an iron works; both l.u:tsui end Uitsubishi handle rice and ttrnber; the Senda Company occupies the place vacated by the British Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, with Yamashita X.X. operating additional river transport throughout" the delta. The Yama,;uchi Bicycle Works manufactures vehicles in Rengocn. Japanese firms havo also started a match factory and a fish cannery. They have taken over the salvaging of oil and :mining equl}Xl1ent. But Japanese 1Jmnigrants have not invaded seriously those lower levels of ~unn.als eCCl1.omic life vacated by In~ians and Chin~se. To rnaii::l.tain Burman goodwill by not overcrowdinG their cO\mtry, the Japanese RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 59 - have allowed little immigratioo.. In November 1943,. Domei reported only 1760 civilian natiooals in the comtry. Prosepctive Japariese emle:rants not specifically selected by the Army were required. after September 1943, to apply through the f)nigrents Association or the Cott!Xl CuItivaters Association for recommendatioo. by the Greater East Asiatic Affairs Minister. The Army alone issued the final pennits. The Japanese military have further cultivated conservative Sunnan support .by ehcouraging the property-owning groups to becane active in meditun end sms.l1-scalo business affairs. All "enemy" properties not needed for the war effort have been turned over to the Rurma· Govemment. Large scale orad!ts are subject to review every s1x months and resident JapBn8Se have to pay the same taxes as the Burmans as explained abOTo. The business appeal is a pOlr8rful one. Durmans haTe long can.. plained that alien capitalist daninated their economic lifo and ab sorbed the fruits of the cO\mtry's ample resources. Their three principal competitors - the British, Indians, and to sOnte extent the Chinese - are temporarily eliminated by the war and Bumans have been avidly "attempting to take advantage "of their golden op portunity. To promote such ends they have organized a Chamber of Commerce and a Trades Associaticn. The Central Bank from the Burman viewpoint was instituted to pool local capital reseTTes for invest ment purposes. The training of State Scholars to be sent to Japsn has been focused in the fields of engineering, bankin"g, industrial management, end various types of manufacturing. Upon their return the RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 60 - Bumans will expect them to organize businesses suitable to the country in accordance with an official Five-Year Plan for industrial develop!Uent. The fact that Burman economic agitation has thus far achieved 11 ttle substantial reaults 1s not surprising. Burmans lack technical training as well as resources. COIn!!lerce generally is paralyzed for lack of transport and by attempted government price control in the face of A. limited supply of goods. Private businessmen also face the competltim of Thakin-sponsored cooperative stores r\D1 by the Burma Cooperative Trading Society,. which have been particularly successful in RangoCl1. The East As!'. Youth '.8 League also operates several co operative. stores, the profits of which are turned over to the f\Dlde of the League. Nevertheless it is true that economic opportunities for ambitious BurmMS are limited more by circumstances than by overt Japanese competition. The ·Japanese, however, expect to provide all technical assistance from the outside that Burma w111 need. F. Ogawa '8 New Program of Economic Regimentatim The Japanese have finally discarded their hands-off 'policy with respect to Burma's economic problema. The Burmese authorities had tried with meager success to reorganize agriculture and to establish orice control. Da Maw's theoretiljal dictatorship had been unwilling or unable to coerce the cultivators after vohmtary appeals failed to secure their cooperat1m. Fe.rnine thl'eatened in central 8J'ld northern Burma and popular discontent ..s On the increase. To work: RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 61 - out a coordinated program of land utilizatim, Tokyo sent to Rangoon in December 1943, a "supreme econanic adviser. rt The man chosen for the post was General Gotaro Ogawa, formerly professor of Economics at Tokyo's Imperial University, a prominent member of the Diet, and for many years a manager of the Lfensolto party. He had served a8 Vice-Yinister of Finance and, in 1936-37, was Minister of Comr:'eTce end Industry. The appoinment 0.£ a ranking economist tmder military guise signalized Japan's intention to back the new program with the necessary torce. The military could depend no longer on Adipadi Ba Maw ~o execute their plms. Ogawa's assignment was to work out a scheme by which BurJ'llA could be econanically solf-sui'ficlen't, not mly as a whole but in i t8 several provincss a8 well. De accomplished a good deal during his three-tlODtbs t missim to Rangoon. He got the aforementicned Central Bank in operatiCl1, outlined the drastic decentralizaticn of governmental machinery already described (pages 31-33), decreed a policy of forced utilization of land and labor resources, began the actual organizatial of Neighborhood Associatiau, and established a Politico-Economic Collaboraticn Committee to supervise the entire program. He then returned to Japan at the end of March 1944, leaving the Government to 8xpla1Jl the nature of the plan to the' natiCZl. Of primary significance was the fact that Ogawa promised Burma practically no help in moving surplus rice or in supplying consumer goods. Burmans, he said, would have to crganiae the'ir 0'fII1 medium RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 62 - &nd small-scale production. tmits equipped with make-shift facilities•. Such establishments, he decreed# would haTe to be widely distributed so as. to be near the various centers of consumption. To transport essential commodities he recommended the large scale mobilization of ox-carts. But this was only scanty relief to offer a people euffer- ing fran two years I deprivaticn of imported consumer goods and whose <:apacities for solf-help were severely: limtted. Burma knew finally that she could expect no help from abroad, end at the same time must undergo a continued monopolizing by the military of all modem internal transport by highway, railway, or river. Ogawa's cro1'fl1ing measure of regi.'Il.entation is his program of land and labor utillzaticn. Instead of purchl!lBing unused land, u had been ccntemplated in the fall, the state will simply take over during the coming year all agricultural lands not being cultivated. All labor not otherwise usefully occupied will be mobill;ed for needed work al such lands, sUbjeot to allo'bnent by distriot Governors, town.- ship officers, and local agricultural committees. All draft cattle may be simil~rly requisitioned and allotted as required, but if such are not available, men DIlst pull tile plows. The Government pro- poses to provide capital loans and subsistence for all workers en state-controlled lands, buy all of their produce at a fixed price, .and superintend its allocation. The several districts have been givm priority ratings for such emergency administrative measures (15 first class, 15 second class, 3 third class districts) and a planning beard RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 63 - aided by Japanese advisors has formulated the fundanental regulations. Mr. Ogawa did no~ explain" how such a scheme could ever be en- forced effectively in Burma by local canmittees, township officers and t:olitically ambitious Deputy Governors. The Privy Council were merely informed of the total program in late March after Ogawa returned to Japan; they were not asked to approve it. How much perturbatim Burman aut:lorities felt over the prospective applicaticn of the state- directed agricultural production may be judged f'rom the nervous shifting of administrative personnel connected with it. Agricultural Minister Than Tun transferred to the new Ministry of Su~ply in mid-April; the subcommittee of the Central War Council was reshuffled on 9 May; Dr. Sa Han, able brother of Ba Maw, went to Tokyo m 14 Uaywtthout solicitation, appe.rently to present Burma's rejoinder to Ogawa's provocative scheme. Ae;ainst the time when the onset of monsoon rains would open the 1944 agricultural season and force action CIl the plan, Ba Maw ~ 3 May granted a measure of self-government to 32 mtmicipa lities, initiated an effort to reform and strengthen the police ad- ministration, and set up a Government Personnel Renovation Bureau for the express purpose of eliminating uncooperative officials. The Government is preparing for difficult times., Thero would appear to be no practicable alternative to Ogawa's program of enforced self-sufficiency for Burma in view of existing shortages of goods and shipping. The crucial question is whether agricultural regimentation can be attained wi. thout wide-scnle military REsTllICTED REST~ICTl:lJ - 64 - ooercion. Tokyo will, of course, try to get the Burman author!tisl to apply the necessary persuasion, while Ba Maw will postpone that hard choice 8.8 long AS possible. But the eituation :.0.11 not allow indefinite delay, tor the planting selllion 18 at hand. Either force will be \tsod now to 'whip the cultivators into line at the rilt of alienating lA.rge sections, or it will be needed later to curb rlot~ng Arising from inevitable andunrel~eved distress. The ohanoes are strongly In favor of Increaeing military pre.sure to secure complianoe in all crttical areas. Japanese Domei on 10 June announced that rJwi th the arrival of the planting sea80n, fann-reared Japahese soldiers will be de.patched to each Village to eneol,lrage and lead them" in accordance with details minutely pl~nned. RESTRICTED - 65 - VI. ATTITUDES OF SPECIAL GROUPS IN BURlIA J.. Tho Buddhist lIonks The most important soeial group in Bunna not '!"epresented in Ba :.:aw t s religiously unorthodox government are the Buddhist ~ (monks). Japanese occupation at the outset cost them heavily in perlonal inconvenience and 1088 of prestige. TIle soldiers showed scanty respect for the sanet!ty of pongyi kyaungs (litona::;teries). When monks co~plalned that theJ.' were heine; too meagerly sustained by p'.lbl10 gifts.. they were faced with regulations limitinc the number tor each village and With the annoying suggestion that they set t."le people a bood example by performing useful work. The apprehens ion of a large nU!!1ber of oriminals masquerading in ~ robes may have been the basia for the report that several hundred recalcitrant monks were aent down to Malaya. The devout monk. were probably thorou:;hly frightened and withdrew as rar alftly as possible from politics and the Japanese. A considerable fraction of the younger politically-minded ~ actively supported the Japanese durlnb 'the campal&n. The monks' opposition to British rule had been intense. The army shot many of them as fifth columnists. ... British officer once characterized the Buddhist priests as "the worst Japanese-loving RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 66 - denls in all South Asia and the tap root of most of Burma's troubles." Monks were also employed by the Japanese in ,ne latter half of 1942 to set up c.ooperatinc vil1,"age commi tt888. In Ocrtober several hundred monks trained for propagandist purposes were reported operating in Upper Bunna. Thus an active groups of monks, whose political intereste exco8ded their regard for monastic vows, abandoned piety for propa ga~dlsin:;. and, by retaining their robes, effectively neutralized the revulsion which the larger canssrvative·fa-ct!on felt for the Japanese. This latter non~politlcal element Qf Buddhist clergy with 1ts center in.. Upper Burma, probably would carry the greater influence with the Buddhist v~lla&er, but only if granted the same opportunity for impact. Eoth Burmese and Japanese authorities went out of the way to placate the ponGYili. Visiting generals and Ba Maw (an ex-Chrhtian) made gifts to the Shwedagon pagoda in Rangoon. In an effort to enlist the active collaboration or the monks with the new order. Ba Maw armounced a plan on 9 1Iay 1943 to organize a Yaha Sangha (Supreme Priesthood) Alsociazion. which the monks or all sects would be eligible to join. Immediate control would be assigned to a special Working Committee l'lho should. select the twenty elderly Chief State Sayadaws (Revered Teacherl) to be evenly divided between Upper and REsratc TED RESTRICTED - 67 - Lower Bunna, 'tIho 'Would direct all reliGious activities of the Association. The Chief Sayadaws might have advisers to 8.ssist them and they could also profit by the counsel of the junior Sayadaw8, ten from each of the thirty-odd districts of Burma. Ba Maw's plan was ar~ed Qut at Rang~on at the end of July in a stormy twelve-day contest between the Upper and Lower Burma SUddha [51(1 AS80ciations. The political victory was won by the pro Government Lower gurma faction. Among the ten euidance precepts agreed upon for oberv&nce b:1 all monks were the realization of Bur:na's New Order" the expulsion of the enemies of Bums. and Nippon, and the fosterin: of friendly relations with Japan. The Government appar~ntly agreed ·to acknowledgl"J the religious author!ty of the l.!aha Sangha while the latter would lend its prayers and blessings to Burma's "independence" and the Greater East ~sia war. But the Government's group did not get complete control; re1igiously~ the conservative party won. Their influence is seen in the action of the Sayadawgyis (ruling teachers) in prohibiting a youn~er group of pongyis from entering medical ~chool because the act was allegedly incompatible with their religious code; while at the SRme time ~hese officials remai"ned indifferent to various flagrantly sinful' act~ of other monks in their own group. The Government felt obliged to accept RESTRJC~ED RESTRICTED - 68 - the ruliog of the religious authorities in th1e matter. Ba }'fawt 8 offieial policy a8 Adipadi has been to pay high re verence to Buddhi 8m in general and to regard the head Sayadaw a't Rangoon 8.S qualified to speak for all of the monks of Burma. Soon a.fter his elevation to Chief of State he made a ceremonial viiit to the Shwedagon Pagoda~ where he was received by hi. l41nistera, the Privy COWlO!! .. Pagoda trustees, and leaders of .the Buddhbt As sociations.. all to the accompaniment of royal musio. Af'ter offering prayers. he paid hil respects to the All-Bu~ Supreme Council ~, and pre,sented to them an offering of Rs. 150,000 in the manner of the Burmese kings. The priests responded with prayer for the world. In September 1943.. through the Religious Department of the GoTernment he announced the revival of cooprehonaiV8 Vineya (Pali .oripture) examinations for prie.ts at seven different levels of competence for thirty-one of the Buddhilt districts of Burma. Many of the examina tions were duly held. Thill action constituted a substantial gesture on the part of a man of wel!ltern training to the dign!ty and significance of the Buddhist educational standards prevailing 1n the times of the Bunnan klne;s. But in spite of e;overnnent encouragement" the Buddhist religion in Sllrma is clearly in decline. A newspaper report reveals that most RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 69 - of the mmks have departed from religious centers such as RmgoCl'l and Mandalay" probably because of banb1ngs end lack of provision for their needs.- The editor urged that the govenunent take n census of all ~ in Burma with special concern for locating the most learned mcnks, and exhort the people to cmtribute to their essential needs and to collect ~ scripture libraries for serious study. The Dob~a-Sinyetha party group is trying hard to persuade the monks to engage in pre.aching tours in behalf' of government ends, Buch as tho'suppression of crime" friendship with Japan, economy of personal expenditures, national pTogr~ss, and the New Order in East Asia. But the government Is not interested in pranoting religim as SUCh, especially of all unpro[reSSiV8 type which advocates a head-in-the sand isolationist devotion to a strictly Burmese order of things. A genuine rapprochment between the government and conservative BUddhists. is probably impossible. The pol icy of the Japtmese with reference to Buddhism in Burma has followed their original propagandist emphasis of :the ?ommm religious tie between the t1'fo states, and has been integrated with a broader cultural program. Both Burmese and Japanese author!ties haTe been very sensitive to Allied claims that Shinto was being propagated in Burma. Shinto emphasis has in fact been cc.nfined to the building of a national shrine located on one of the slopes of the Shwedagm pagoda platform md dedicated to the spirits of Burma' II heroic dead. The Japanese have not interfered with the Burmftse Government's handling: of the~. ene specific project has been \I1dertaken to RESTRICTED RBSTRICTED - 7Cl- aecli::'l&1:ize BUT:ll8D. Rino.j'ana (Southern) !)uddJ!isrn. to 31 ien Japanese soil. It is to huild in Japan an exact replica of the destroyed Dotataung flA-coda, formerly located in. the lower wharf district of Rangoon. The BUn(l8Se Buddhists appear to have been genuinely flattered by this gesture, and, with the approval of the ~ Sangha, various Sayadaws (ehl)ots) contributed relics to be enshrined in the new struc ture. This projact seems to be the basis of Japenese clams that a portion of the genuine ashes of the Buddha has been transferred fran Burma to Japan. But 1t is inconveivable that the jealous Buddhists of Burma would part wit.h &nything so sacred &s Buddha's ashes. B. The Indian Independence League end Anny The sacmd group in Burma toward which the Japanese have developed a special policy is the estimated hal.r million Indians that were left behind after the cMlpaign or 1942. Japanese sponsoring 01" the Indian Indepertdence League was designed to stim.ulate a concerted demand both o'":'tside and within India for freedom for India frOtl). , ~'. '!3ritish rule, and to croate +..he appearance of solidarity m this ques- tion amcng all the peoples of Eastern Asia. The League's progre.m. has followed much the same pattern in all the occupied countries or the Southern regions. But peculiar complications in Burma developed from its closeness to India and the opposition of the Bunnese popula- .latim to the presence of the Indians on their soil. The exagr:;erated concern which the Japanese showed for the wel fOore of the Indian reddents of Burma contrasted sharply with the RESTRICTED RF.ST!l!CTED - 71 - treatment tho latter received from the Burmese. Rums.' s Indians remembered two savage rl\cinl clasho6" and half of them at the time of the invas"ion preferred to brave the defl.dly overland routt" to their homelan.d rather than to face the perUs of unrestrained Burmese vio lence. Everywhere Indi.ana were intimidated and abused. Shopkeepers lost their goods and oeased doing business. taborers in the delta suffered a veritable pOGrom. Relief Clllr.t~ from .the Japanese. They halted the attaoks on Indians and forestalled. similar developments in Upper Burma. They drew floating coolie labor t.o Ran&Qon and gave it employment. Co operating Indians. although British subject., were not considered 8.S onl!llUy nationals. Some Anglo-Indians captured in the aot of escaping from Burma were put in conoentration camps but a considerable number eventually r.ot back their old jobs on tho railways and in the communication services. Indian landowners were eventually giTeD opportunity to pr.ove their claims. M1 Indian Resident'.l!I Auoci·ation was set up under the direct aupervision of the Japaneae Army to control the assets of non-resident Indiana. The military authorities did not flout Burman nationalist aentiment by insisting that Indians be taken into Government employ. The Japanese also acquiesoed in the Burman ruling of 16 October 1942 forbidding the entr~ of additional Indian. into Burma. 'The Indian Independenoe League WIlS organized under Japanes" g'..Itdanoe not in Burma. but at Bangkok. Thailand. on 15 June 1942. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 72 - Rash Dehar! Bose. an Indian nationalist long resident in Japan" as sumed the presidency of the representatlvo Council of the League.• The first meeting of the Rangoon chapter was held m 10 August 1942. For the Indians in Rurma' the League ftmctianed actually as a protec tive end relief associatim. For the Japanese, it was primarily a cloak: for their efforts to enlist Indian prisoners of war for purposes of espionage.. sabotage, end propaganda within India and especially among the British-Indian forces. All who would agree to fight with Japan for the independence of India were promised release from. prism and'Rs.5 per month. Tokyo advertised en 17 October 1942 that 400 Indil!lIl prisoners of W8.! ,had accepted the crrer. The activities of the League in Burma dropped canpletely out of the news during the winter and spring of'1942-43, probably to avoid ruffling thA feelings of Burmese nationalists who would resent any aggressive Indian r.1ove. Serious ag~tatioo in Burma of the Indian Independence program . began during June 1943 at the celebration of the first anniversary of the founding of the League. A mass meeting under Indi8Il chainnan ship listened to fiery speeches advocating freedom for India. Dr. Thein Maung, representing the Burman government, expressed the hope that the celebration of 1944 would.be held in New Delhi•.His words carried the 1."llplication that Burmans did not relish getting .in valved in the Lea~els affairs. Similar rallies were staged in Thailand and Mala~ra. Tajo's speech before the Japanese Diet en 17 June referring to prospective independenoe for Burma and the Philll pines was designed for the ears of India's four hundred million people RESTRICTED RESTRIGTED - 73 - who, hE'! said, were awaiting Japanese aid. The program was a build-up for the dramatic appearance in Tokyo during the third week of June of the Bengali revolutionary, Subhas Chandra Bose. The transference of Subhas ChandrA. Bose fran Berlin to Tokyo was a major development in Axis propaganda strategy. lie took over the leadership of 'tl18 Indian Independence League from Rash Behar! Bos8 (no kin), and transf-erred the propagandist emphasis frem civil dis obedience within India to militant attack on British rule from. both within and outside India. He established his heetdquarters 81Jlai.g the rl\tl8tically rmti-Brltish Indian population At Singapore, where the Japanese had set up their main school for training fifth columnists. He was also sure' to arouse a considerable response fUnong revoluticnaries within India, and especially in famine-threatened Bengal. His in fluence would also increase the effectiveness of the Japanese In spired Fifth-columnist (JIFCs) entering India who already had begun to occaaion British Indian author!ties considerable weasiness. Since Burma was the only Japanese-occupied territory contiguous to India, Bose had to make it his operational base. Because of the Mti-Indian sentiments of the:Burmese. his preparationA required more t~an six months. Ba Maw's consent was probably given at the ~ime of' his visit to Singapore in mid-July 1943, when he conferred with- both Tojo and Bose. The conversations were resumed when Bose visited Rangoal a1 29 July and again a:l 24 September" on the occasions of RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 74 - Burma's declaratial of inpependence and its fomal celebraticn. As a result of Bose'a firs:t visit the Indian Independence League in B\l1"l'l18. recovered somewhat from ita ineffectiveness and timidity, Burma's independence set an eX8Jl1ple tor Indt-a and Bose's high standing in G~ circles gave hie followers greater confidence. Tangible re f'111 ts were not loog in ccming. en 21 August the Burma GOV8l"1'U11ent QC -cepted Tokyo's rulinr; that Indians, although British subjects, would not be considered enemy alien.They could even become eligible for Burman 01 tiz8nship "under a naturalizaticn law to be enacted in the near future." IndiBJ:l residents in nations friendly to Burman would thereafter be permitted to enter, pass through, and reside in Burma, thus reversing the exclusim rule ()f October 1942. The need for additional Indian labor may have ~¥tfluenced the latter actim. Tokyo cited the new regulations o,s a sacrificial con t.ributioo. by Burma to the cA.ua.e of GSA nnd the Burma chairman of the Independence League hailed the decision I\S being constructive. On his second vist to Rangoon in September 1943, Bose made f\ deliberate effort to enlist Muslim 8Uppor:t by a ceremODiQU8 visit to the Bunna tanb of .9ahadur Shah, the last of the Mogul emperors. On this occasion he appeared in a milita~J 1.mifom and reviewed a \mit of the "Indian National Army" probably the JIFC group at Mingaladan. A few 'of Rangoon's hard-pressed middle-class Indians, already objects of rel,ief by the r..eague, may have started taking military drill. but the Indian force could not have amo1.mted to much. RESTRICTED RZSTRIcnD - 75 - Tho 13urr.'lose were r:;radually being conditioned to having Indien military units on their Ow:l soiJ. Bose did not transfer his Free India Government headquarters ·to Burr.'l& until 7 January 1944; shortly tl-.ereafter he took over the care of the Burma government's Absentee Indians' Property Dcpar'tment set up in 1942. Only a few battalions c£ the IndiA.n Uational Army have ever been reported in !3urm.fl_ They haye been used by the Japanese to encourage desertims and to foment sabotage. None have ~een associated with the Bunna Army in any way. The Burma Governnent does not in fact aclotowledge any obliS&tion to- participate in Bose t s projected in- vasim. of India. Burma is the tocporary hoat of the Indian Government and Army, but would like to be rid of her ~e8ts as 80en 8S possible. Both Ind~an civilians and soldiers within Burma are regarded as un- welcane by the Burmese and as not fully, trustworthy by the Japanese. ", c. The Position of the Karens The strong Karen community in Lower Burma did not willingly sub- m.it to Ba Maw's regime. Acrimonious relations with the Bunnese throu'!:h- out the Irrawaddy delto. continued until Mayor June of 1943. The friction centered at Bassein, where the Karens, probably on ~ood grotmds, were suspected of being loyal to the British. Meanwhile the recognized national leader of the Karens, Sir San C. Po of Bassein, decided that the acceptance of Japanese control was the only means of assuring protecticn for his people. He therefore hagen urging his followers to quit giving aid to British soldiers and agents. He RESTRICTED RESTRICTSD - 76 - beC8.Tfl6 a member of the Independence Pre?uatory Camnittee in Uay 1943 and joined the Privy Cmmetl in the rollowing August. Ba :.!c.w thereupon pledged non-discrimination against Karens in all matters of governmental policy and received in return a pIedra fran the Karen Centre1 Council to support the war. But the Kart"'!1s 8.5 A. whole did not actively cooperate. During the summer of 1943, the Japanese authorities searched suspected Karen premises in Be.s~ein and confiscated all private radio sets. When, in September, the Japanese apprehended two Br!tish soldiers ~an the Karens had concealed for eighteen mentha, a new crisis arose. The assisting !Carena, when arrested, made matters worse by de·claring that they had acted on orders frOJll their national leaders. The authorities taok full advantage of the situation to bring the Karens in line. Japanese end Burmese members of the Labor Bureau infonned representf\tiv8 Yaren lenders assembled on 8 October that every re sident cf Burma must accept responsibility in the Letyon Tat (Labor Servi ce Corps); and that the individuals present must tour the dis tricts of Henzada. Maublln, Myaungmya, Pyaponl and Dassein to or bar-he Karen units for the Ccrps. The Dur:nese spokesman explained that the required cooperation had already been secured fran the Indian people. A few days later Japanese mili.te.ry officers forced the three outstanding Karen leaders, Dr. San C. Po, his sen C. C. Po, end Saw Shwe Tl.m Kya of Uyaungmya, to issue a signed circular dated 14 October warning that if the Karen conununity did not cooperate with RESTRICTED RilSTRICTtD - 77 - their friends, the Jf\panese, in ferreting ou't enemy agents, the of rendine: villages would be wiped out, guilty and innocent alike. The Karen leaders uTeed full acquiescence in the Japanese demands since there was no feasible alternative. Karon opposltion to the Japanese is probably considerably less virulent then their ineradicable hatred of the Burmese. It is signi ficent that l{arens have provided fully hAlf of the enlis1:l!lent for the so-called ~ Tat, or service battalions, of the Japanese anny. They have borne a heavy burden of forced labor and most of them doubt less hope for Allied. rescuo .SOal. The Pwo Karena have been more thoroughly Bunr.anized than have the Sc;aw. and probably share 11 measure of the Burmese I'!lnthusiasM. for independence. D. The Shana" Chinese" and Kachins The Shan pl)oples ot northern Burma appear to be both anti-British and anti-Chin.,se. Such sentiments have been strengthened by extensive Allied employment of Gurkha and Kachin forces in north Burma. In the Shan Sta:tee proper" popular attitudes have been affected by increasing economic distress arid by the officious interferenc.e of ~rmese adr.tin istrators in opposition to the author!. ty of the Sawbwas (local princes). The Chinese resident in Eunna have apparently kept their political opinions to themselves and have stayed out of harm t s way as far as possible. Thtdr relations with the Burmese have continued to be fairly satisfactory in spite of the fact that they !leem to have given no RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 78 - positive support to the war. The Japanese-sponsored Burma branch of the Overseas Chinese Associat10n apparently aroused little if any response from local Chinese. A Mi11tary Publicity Corps reeru!ted by the Nankint &'J.thor1ties in China ear-a to Burma in February 1944 fOT the avowed purpose of promoting more genuine support of Japan t s ends by the local Chinese cOImll.uni'ty. As a result of the inoreased pressure" Burma' 8 eM.ncse business men contributed 200,000 rupeel!l fo!' the purchase of Japanese planes, and Chincse faroers subscribed half that SWIl a fE'lw weeks later. The President of the Un!ted Chinese ~.s8ociationl!l E'lxplained that it W8.S only natural for the Chinese to help at a time when they were "enjoyin~ normal bUsiness while thousands of Japanese. Indian and 9ur.MSB soldiers are shedding blood" not far away. The Kachine of Myltkyina. district have had a hard time. They dislike the Chinese almost as much as they despise their Surmese and ShA"l neighbors, and the J8fanese at once put them under very heavy pressure. Communi ties were required to furnish the .-'apane~e with approximately one laborer per household under threat of severe reprisals. Villai;6 chiefs wore caref'..111y selected and Tr.fl.de personally accountable for controll ing tl"!eir 'people. As a reault I:loet of the lachine fled to the jungle. v.ar.y of them have since c;iven military sl:.pport to the Allies. Sy contrast, the population of the Chin Hills was r.luch more thoroubhl)~ intimidated by the Japanese and has cooperated With Allied forces to a li>nitE'd dogree only. RESTR!CTED ·Rr,STRICTED - 79 - VII. B\1R!.!AN l'f.RTICIPATIOI IN THE l1AR EFFORT A. YohmtaTy Agencies and Associations All voll~tary war service agencies designed to 'lid in mobilizing civilian activities for general welfare and defense were placed lU'lder the arb!trary control of Be. Maw as "Anashin 11 (Dictator) in September 1943. A special Leadership Army or Cuidan~e Corps headed b)' prauinent members of the official Dobama-Sinyetha party group is enpowered to act. for him. They are responsible for championing official govem mental policy end perfecting popular coll aboration with it. All re cognized civilian agencies are included in what is called the Circle Army or Corps of r,neels. There are approximately a score of such units in all. The most important agency is the llyenma ~ Aphwe or Natlcnal Service Associatioo.. It has blanket charge of the promoticn of relief work• .8 ir raid precautions, fire-fightinG, sanitary measures, prevention of crime, and numerous social service functions. It has conducted a series of three-mmths training classes open to tho~e who sl.!bscribed to the Dobe.ma-Sinyetha creed of "One Blood, lAle Voice, Ole Order." The East Asia Youth's League is all)O slightly less importent. It maintains meny branches throughout the country and has sponsored numerous aotivities. The League has spied arrested law breakers, and l~ctured to youth against. crime. It has given elementary instruction in sanitation, 9T{;enized volonteer R£STRICTED RESTRICTED - 80 - schools for yotmger children, and enlisted laborers for the harvesting of paddy. In more direct 8upport of the war errort, Youth Lear;\l8 members have solici'ted subscriptions for loans and civilian defense runds, gene without meals in order that the Burma Army might eat, end advC?cated united Bupport of independence efforts. A specially in doctrinated semi-militarized branch of the Youth League took the name Kaybodaing, or Civil Defense Service Corps. liembers are pledged to put the interests of the cowtry before their persQ'1al safety and to demonstrate always an aggressive self-sacrificing spirit. The Corps acts as a vigilante troup to enforce governmental regulations in o.lose cooperation with the police. In very lar&8 measure it has been the younger generaticn, rather than the elder, that has worked to consolidate the new regime. The woman contribute to the Circle Army through the Women's Patriotic League and the National Girls' Association. These deal with nursing service, first aid, soldiers' assistance work, and general propaganda. Madame Ba Maw and other politically prominent women have taken the lead. On the local -level there A.re village defense \ttlits and counter-espionage acencies, which are often Japanese inspired. }.finor organizations devoted to literary, cultural, educatimal, re ligious, end relief purposes have burgeoned. Although the net re- sult in most cl>.ses may have been only an increase of busy work, the VAried activities have provided an cutlet for the energies of all who RESTRICTED R':STRICTED " 81 - felt an urge to do something about BurmaI s independence and who were denied political or Military participatiCl'l. The organizations have contributed to social integration and proTided positive alternatives to unsocial inclinaticns. B. Forced Labor Batta.lions: Letyon Tat en the basis of Japan's promise of indepp'fldence, made in January 1943, ~e Burmese Government, as pointed out earlier, shifted its appeal for labor service to a patriotic basis. Those not permitted to shed their blood for Durma's freedom, the appeals emphasized" ought to be willing to sweat for it. In this way they could show their gratitude for Japan's generous assistance to the naticn. The 3urma Reconstruction National Labor Service Corps was promptly dubbed the "Sweat Army," or Letym~. The Government pranised to provide food and housing acccr.onodations for "all vohmteera, and even suggested that they might take their families with them. At the same time the Japanese military still exercised the power to require forced labor on a local and short tem 1)9sis. The first contingent .of the Resconstruction Army enlisted for probably three months, was sent to ThMbyuzayat Ob the Tha.iland border below Moulmein to work Cl'1. the new railway. The workers' tem of service ra."1 out in late May 1943. A new group was recruited CI1 the plea that Bunnan cpoperation would end the ""ar quickly and ensure their goal of independence. A Central Labor Service Bureau, headed by Thakin Ba Sem and including six Japanese officillls, was established RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 82 - to care more a~equately for the needs of the SW6Plt Army. Its principal branch office was at Thanbyuz.ayat. Ba Sein promised to provide medical care. free postal service, and Burmese-prepared rice and curry. but re vealed the dissatisfaction omong the workers by adding: that he "hoped that there will be ~o further complaints and grievances." He denounced as enemies of the people persons of lazy habits and trouble makers "..ho deserted at the earliest opport\m.ity. An auxiliary ~~ or !lspare time" Corps tried to absorb the leisure of the numerous idle. But no· amount of propa~anda could add glamor to labor service. The response was far from satisfactory and a complete overhauling of the system we.s due. On 22 August 1943; the government announced a drastic reorgftIli zation of the Labor Service Corps on a nation-wide basis. To make the proposal less repulsive recruits were to be assigned to regia:i"s where the climate resembled that of their homes. The ~overnment was to compensate six months of service in the Corps with letters of appreciation, a grant of land, and a present in cash or goods. It offered also to provide the same care for injurhs suffered in cm nectial. with labor service as was given to military casualt.ies. A National Service Deliberati.ve Council and a Central Service Advisory Board were set up in September, under a Burmese chairman, to absorb all previous.Service Corps boards and oommi ttees. The new "front-line" labor policy was accompanied by vigorous newspaper plens that the nation becane war-minded. If t.~e people could bring themselves to "eat, sleep, ccme and f:0 in terms of war," recruits RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 83 - for the Burma Army and the Letym ~ would no longer be Bcarce. Bunnans wer~ told they must be Willing to defend their hard-wan free- dam by joining the service corps. 22 September 1943 was proclaimed as National Service Day. The full week of formal celebration of Surma I s independence, 1d1ich began on 25 September, was timed to bring the agitation to a climax. The threat of forced labor service was a factor in sUl!lulating enlistment in the Burma Army, as will appear below. The actual' forced-labor program was started in October. Karena and Indians were first brought into line. Conscription of Burmese began during the last week of October. Sp~cially assigned, Thakin party leaders and Japanese recruiting officers took 'the initiative. Quotas were set for each corrummity and village headmen were responsiblo for producing the required number of men, distributed theoretically so as not to hinder agriccltural work. A twelve day effort in l.Iaubin di~ trict ending CIl 5 November produced 700 "recruits," a considerable m.unber of whom-were the sons of headmen. The ca."!l.paign in Pegu dis trict was opened about tha same time, with a Nippon officer present. The workers received one rupee per day plus rice end salt, and a uniform consisting of green trousers, a shirt, and C8l\VI!lS shoes. Overseer interpetl3'rs who could spel!lk English got Rs.l50 per mcnth. The men lived and worked tmder Japanese guard and were shot at if they I!lttempted to escape. Poor food and the lack of recreational RSSTRICTED RESTRICTED - 84 - fae111ties were chronic complaints; the service was highly unpopular. So many substitutes (at Rs.IOO) made deserting e. profe~sion, and had so many amateur imitators, that headmen were made liable to arrest if they did not report deserters. Nevertheless, the recruitment of Karana from the delta area was particularly heavy;. and the program was gradually extended to all parts of Burma. In add!t100 to their work ttl the Th.'\iland railway, the Letyon ~ battalions ,-",ore used widely for road construction and i:. he pre paration of air fields. For· the lA.t-ter purpose the regular Labor Corps was usually supplemented by local forced levies. A special group was recruited for, service at Rangoon in December 1943, where two new camps were set up to house them. In theatres of military opera.. tions the Japanese exact.ed labor from Villages lmder threats of severe 1?unishrnent to the headmen by the drem Military Police. It was easier to levy these additional workers than to try to recover deserters from the labor battalions. The first fiv.e Letyon ~ were recruited from March to October 1943; and next four were called up .from lJovember to JanuarJ' 1944. More than .350 numberp.d Vi.bor battlllions of wknown size have been referred to in the press. Patriotism within the several battalions has been strong enou~h to elicit from meager waLes periodic contributions ranginc from 1000 to 4000 rupees, for the support of the Bun.A. Army. The Japanese radio boasted on 19 March 1944 that "Bur.na has been RESTRICTl:D RESTRICTED - 85 - supplying a larGer amount of labor service than any othf'Jr one of the Southern RSGlons b close concert with the Japan~se forces. II c. The Burma Army It will be recalled that after Japan's summary disbartding of the BUt""l18 Independence Army in the summer of 1942, martial enthusiasm among Burmans suffered It Budden collapse. The three battalions of the so... callAd "Defense Army" which survived the dismissal were under theoretical BWT.lan _control, put the commands were given in Japanese. the discip1i!lltw£l.s strict.. the hOllTa long, the pay poor. No amouc:t of cajolery could persuade the youth to reenlist. Colonel Atmg San paraded lUa "rump" Defense Army at frequent intervals; govemment leaders extolled the glories of the soldier's life; the Japanese alleged that BUTr.l8 was not f1 t for independence if' the people would not help prevent .th~ British from returning. But it was all to no avail. The magic word "independence'· had disappeared fran the army's title and the Burmans obviously regarded the .force as an alien thing. The Ja;>anese did not abandon their endeavor to recruit a native a~y in Burma, en intogral part of their effort to [1 ve vitality to the concept of Greater East Asia. Their·progress was alo,," but methodi cal. They started the training of 300 young officer cadets. i.hen the first group was graduated on 31 March 1943, thirty of the ntl.'llber were selected for additional training in Japan. Dur5.:1g the spring a a:sTRICTED RESTRICTED - 88 - Youth's Military Corps tor boys of fourteen to sixteen ye£!.rs also got l.mder way. In May 1943 the· Japanese initIated what they OR-lIed the Retho Tat, Ii labor ReTvice branch of their own army for which adventurous Burmana would vohmtcer for three-year service. The rirs~ two hundred candidntos were exMdned CI'\ 9 May; and two Japanese recruiti!'lg parties toured Lower Burma fran 15 :Lay to 9 June en itl!leraries which assigned an average of two days to each locnlity. The provisionin!\ end pay for Burmana were the same as for the Japonese forces, nmning from Rs.60 to Rs.140" a month for family meo living out of barracks to Rs.IO to Rs.45 for barrflC?k troops. This volunteer Relho force numbered eventually some ~OOO in all. About half of them were Karens. They performed onerous duties ccnnectod with supply services. And were also scattered among rer;ular Japanese field troops at the approximate ~atio of one to twenty-four. Promoters of' the Bunna Amy proper bestirred themselves in J\.Ile and July 1943 to meet this Japanese oc:npetiticn. The recruiting ap peal was renewed allover the country. Patriotic ore;ani£ations toured districts adjaoent to RangOQ'l to colleot vohnteers. The results were still very meager. At the end of' July. the Rangoon radio was still complaining of the lack 01" pUblic response. When Japan turuad over the command to the newly organized Durma Govern r.lont on 1 Aug-ust 1943,. the Defense Army nunbered not more than f\ RESTRICTED RF.STRICTED - 87 - few thousand of ill-equipped and dllgrlllted men. A major difficulty for the BUl"!DA ArrAy was the inability ot the government to provide it with food, clothing, boats, and myriad other nooelllsities. The an"'ounced official blue Wlifonn with open collared blouse sot orf by a peacock emblem and Japanese-style cap was in sharp contrast to the tattered uniforms actually aTailable. The Uilitary Preparatioos Depar'bnent Ildvertised in July for the services of qualified shoemakers end tailors to outfit the Arr!1"J, and I.ater asked for persons who mew how to make soap. Funds did not always exist for paying the .Rurma Army o.nd a private's pay even then...... s below that of the Roihe Tat. Popular reference to the competing Hotho Tat &s the "Bin Oh Ta1;." a phrase adopted from a Burmese ex prossia:1 rooening "'about to go into the curry pot." ~flected nationalist jealousy of the too-success.ful Japanese endee.vor at recruiting. as compared with the gathering of their own a.rm.y. For l!l number of weeks after the Burma Government took over rull oontrol of the Defense Army on 1 August 1943. enlistinr; agenoies con tinued to encO\.mter d1scour~ing responsQ to their appeal for volun teers. Conscription was never oontemplated. To avoid the popular ob jection to the word "Defense" in the Army's title the Supreme National Defense Council en 15 September .formally adopted the name "Burma ·National Army" instead. One paper preferred the simpler tenD "Burma Army." Tacit admission of the impossibility: of enlisting disgruntled elements of the old Burma Independence Army, as well as a desire to RESTRICTED RESTRICTED c 88 - conciliate them, CRn be seen in the officially published advertise- ment that 4000 clerical appointr.lents ,,"-ere being reservod for Dun:1a t 8 ex-soldiers. Jealousy of the new Commander-in-Chief who succeeded General Aung San, now Defense Minister, was another factor in the Anny' s dis- content. A dinner party for the malcontent army lenders was star;ed at Government Bouse in carly September at which the principal 8;:>eaker praise& the nelt leader as one "''ho could ably serve the ~omtry. He added, "Now is not the time for personal recri::ninations end divisions. It is the time to work together in unity to reach the necessary (':oal." A government spokesman at the di~:'lor admitted that the anny was suf.. fering hardship along with tho rest of the country, hut promised to do everything possible to Deet its essentiA.l requirements. Subsequently t.he girls' division of the Asia Youth League advertised that they would " s ti.tch the torn clothes of the members of the Burma Def~nse Army who. although paid only Rs.7 each month" have noble hearts." The Government's approach was sometimes in harsher vein, as the following declaration of a recruiting officer illustrates: "The Burmese Army does not want those who have to be forcibly enlisted and those who enrolled themselves for pay and po~ition•••• only those who will sacrifice their lives in defense of the country••• Those who have to be rounded up by the police to attend meetings are cowards••• Anybody who serves in the Amy must be able to \.'!'1dergo poverty, must dare to l'\urder, and must have courage to die. II The tide of low enlistment eventually turned. Towns in Lower Burma orgenhed elaborate !,arades for volunteers. winding up at mass RESTRICTED RESTRICT~~ - 89 - meetings in the cinema where the district and to....nship officers acte"d 8S chairmen and masters of cerenonies. The ladies threw flowers; the tOlm elders furnished cheroots; and sanem8 fed the !",eroes with chicken palau. By mid-October 1943 the force was growing l'Iteadily. This· increase was probably stimulated by tJreat. of forced labor. The second class of reserve officer cadets also graduated in October and applications were solicited for one' hl.mdred military cadetships of two years duration for youth under sixteen years, offering clothes, rations and Rs.IO per month pocket mcmey. An Army Ordinance dated 16 '"'! ovember improved the tanks and pay of the Army presumably to Rs.IO minimum. per moo +'h. By early December, more recr-uit8 were 'lvailable for the Anrry than could be cared for. The force was meagerly equipped !'or fighting, but was "nevertheless capable of performing guide and patrol work, garrison duty, and the protection of lines of communfcation. It was clearly an auxiliary body. Shans were "9resent in fairly large numbers while Karens were few. The latter obviously preferred the Heiho battalion~ to the Burma Arra.y. The new Officers Traili.ing Class for January 1944 was thrown open Q'l a competitive basts to enlisted men already in the anny. Something less than all-out popular support of the army is r.evertheless sUf<(.est8d in Aung San·' s plea of 4 January: "Our forces aro your forces ••• ; (they) are not for. the purpose of ill-treating you, but for your protection. Enlarge our forces; er..courage them. Rise all Burmans and defend our own soil." RESTRICTED -90- D. Burman ?articipatlon in the Cllrnpaign of ],,944 The function of the Burma Army during the fira.t six mcntha of the 1944 clU'!I.paign was prlnlarily to rrotect Japanese lines of ccnmuni cation and to assist the supply servicos for active theatres of opera tion. It did very l~ tt18 actual fighting. In Northem Dunna and to a less degree in the Upper Chindwin Buman troops accompanied the Japanese CD patrol activities. They manned anti-aricratt defenses in certain areas. and patrolled certain sections of the Arum coast. Surman troops took no immediate part in the Jtlpan8se attempts to in vade India. and were apparen:tly no1; brought into contact with the several battalions "f' ~ose 's Indian Army .8ssociated with. that effort. Apparently the Burma Arn.y engaged in Sor:l8 fighting along the railway to !J:yitkina against the airborne Chindit bands, l'there they displayed creditable l':\arkso8nship but lacked staying power. The degree of popule.r enthusiasm. tor the Burma Anoy is re flected in vohmtary contributions for its 9upport. The appeal haa been organized since September 1943 on a monthly basis. Contributions came from business finns, individuals, schools, party ~roups, social organizations, and fran the hard-worn earnings of the Letyoo~. The collections for Je.nUA.ry 1944 were over 2B,OOO rupees, more than in any previous month, but far less t.han is needed for the expenses in volved. Youthful chBmpions of the ~rr.l.y are far fran satisfied with the response of their well-to-do elders whom they accuse of coo.ct!ID tration on promoting their own private interests and not sacrificing for the new nurma, a sig'J1ficnnt evidence of cleavage between age groups. RESTRICTED ~£STR!CTED - 91 - Relations between the Burma Army and the JapA.nese cOlllUand he-ve not been fr1enr11y. One report say. that qUArrels of such violent nature have occured t~t deaths resulted. ThA Burman forces ,are only parttall,.· equipped. but they resent any implication t.'lat they are inferior as soldiers to the Japanese. If the ::!unna Army is anti-Japanese in its spirit. as alleged. it is none the less intensely anti-British. and will oppose bitterly the return of British and Indian troops. Hostility to the- British constitutes the essential basis of coopera tion between the two forces. Leadere of the Burma Go.vernme!lt have staked both their perB:) nal and their nation's future on a Japanese victory. But most Burmans probably believe that the Burma .Arm.y single-handedly could defend their national existence. and therefore want the Jepanese to leave, Upper Burma has never been friendly to the invaders. 'The Government is continually obliCed ,to emphasice Bunna's debt to Japsn. Further agricultural regimentation will intensify popular opposition. The difference iii one of method rather than of &oa1. No evidence exists that the politically-conscioul!I Burmese have discounted in the least their desire for independence or will ever acquiesce in a retum to their pre-war colonial status. E. Current Trends in Administration A number of able Burmana in the Govermnent are worki11&. hard to improve the administration and thUI establish their country'l RESTRICTED RSSTRICTED - 92 - capacity for self-rule. They can depend on the support of orgfUl:\,zed elements of Burmnn society and popular enthusiasm for independence. Improvements ir. education, police, courts, and general efficiency have been realized. In Januar~~ 1944, a "dearness" allowance (approxi mately 20 percent) was added to salaries of government employees end compensation WAS provided for injury or death sustained in line of duty. Civil SerVice examinations have been posted regularly since October 1943 for many departments of the govemment. The Civil Ser vice. Corn..YTlission has endeavored to eliminate- party control of the police by givin!!: preference to candidates who "have not been too closely attached to any.party .or political lender." Party leaders, (Glltmg, saung~) have ceased their officious interference in the upper levels of the adMinistrA.tion, and continue active only on the level of local affairs. Thirty-two mtmicipalities have recently been promised a measure of local autonomY end thf3 ten dency eenerally 'within the Government is toward decentralization of control. If the present Bu~eEle adminis'toraticn is allowed the op portunity, it \v11l no doubt make a much stronger case for Burma's political competence than the COtmtry could ever make for its economic or r:tilitary self-sufficiency. - 93 - RESTRICTED VIII. APp~mIX: p~SOJmEL A. Japanese Administrative P'3rsonnel in Surma Ashida, Milita,:"y officer e!1forcinc price controls in RanGoon. Eiray&natii, Makoto, Second Secretary in the Japanese E)nbassy. !ida, General, Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Bunna, 1942. Ishida, Tsuyoshi, Deputy Japanese Adviser to the Central Bank of Burma. Ismoura, Major General Takeauke~ ~f.llitary .4ttacl:6 to the Dnbauy. Ito, lHas Matsuko, teacher of Japanese to Be. !,!aw's dauthters; 9.180 member of Anny Press Section. Kaboashi, Captain, Military Security officer who threatened the Karans. Kitazawa, a Japanese Counselor. Kawabe, General, Successor to lida. Mi~ami, ColonAl, Japnnese Commander of the 3Unna Independence Army. l1iya.'Jtoto, Hideo, aide to Dr. Ogawa. Miyazaki, T., Chief Administrator of Nipponese }lilitary Office for Enemy Properties Depar1:nent. Nishimura, Takuma, Lieut. General, Governor of Shan States to December 1943. Ogawa, Dr. Gotoro, Japanese Supreme Economic Adviser. Ozeki, Shoken, aido to Dr. Ogawa. Sakurai, Kyogaro, Adviser to General !ida's !Jilltary Adcinistration; also wealthy mfUlager of the Nippon T:''Pewriter Company in Burma; now in Japan. Sawada, Renzo, Japanese Ambassador and ?olitical Advisor. Sh1rnazu, Consul Coneral in Rangoon. Shimooko, Chuichi, Chi'3f Adviser to Burma Centr-al Bank. Shozo, lwao, President of the Navs.! Sducation Depar1:7nent, Rangoon. Tamatugiji, l::eut., Japanese Broadcaster in Rangoon. Troaur!\, Masataro, Attachb to the Ja.panese Embassy in Burma. RESTRICTED - 94 - Tatsumi, Miashi, Director of Internal Affairs Department of the Japanese Military Administraticm. Tokano, Genshin, Chief of the Japanese Administrative Secre tariat. B. Partial List of Burmese AdministrRtive Personnel The Cabinet Adipadi and Prime Minister, Dr. Ba Maw. Deputy Prime },~ln1ster. Thakin Mya. Uinister of National Defense, Thakin A\U'1& Sen. Vice-Minister, U Aung Than. Minister of Cooperation and Miscellaneous Af'f'airs, U T1.n Aung, (Also chaiman ,of politicfll section of the Canmittee for Collaboratim. ) Minister of Religion, Welfare and Publicity, Bandolla U ~ein •. Oi"rector of Propaganda, U Ttm. Shein. Minister of Taxatim, U Aye. Undersecretary, U Ba Tu. Foreign Minister, Thakin Nu. Undersecretary, U Shwe Ra. !Hnister of Justice, U Thein Uaung. Minhterot Agriculture and Lands, Thakin Lun Baw. Minister of' Commerce, Industry (includes mines), and Handicraft.. U Uya of Yamethin. Secretary, U Nyul. Minister of Supply, Thakin Than T\m.. (Al:io chairman of economic section of Collaboration Committee.) RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 95 - Secretary. U Tin. Director of Transport 9ureau. U HIe. Pee Director Commodity Bureau, U Ko Xc. Director Paddy Purchase Bureau, U Theitt. Minister of Communication and .Irrication, U Lay (1) Uaung Minister of Interior, U Be. Win (Also GOV8nlOr of Shan States) Director Burma Prison Branch, U Be. Thein. Inspector-General of Pol ice, U Ohn Gy8.lJ Minister of Education 8!ld Heal th, U Hla Min. Director of Education, U Cho. Minister of Forestry, Public Works and Reconstruct-ion, U Hla Pee Officers of the Privy Council Presldent, Sir U Thwin. VieR-President, U Ba Hlain(o Secretary, U Tun Tin. Deputy Secretary, U Seine Civil Service Comrnissicn Director, U De. Maung Chein. Secretary, U Lwin. National Service Department Director, U Be. Lwin. High Court Chief Justice, Sir llya Bu. RESTRICTED RESTRICTED - 96 - Justices: Sir J. A. Maung Gyl. U ~yint. R~{"istrar; U ThA.ung Sein. Regional Directors Upper Durma, Mand'llay Governor, U Po Sa. State Chief of Police, U !J:aung Gale. Middle Burma, Basseln. Governor U Saw RIa Prll. Stlite Chief' of Police, U Ohn Chein. Lower Burmn, R81lgoal.. Governor U Hla Pee S4;ate ·Chief of Police, U Ba l.~aung. Shan States, Taunggyi. Governor, U Ba VTln (Also Home Minister). State Chief of Police, U Ba Maung. Burma Cantral Bank Governor, U Ba Maung. i~CJlager, U Chit Tun. Burma' s Ambassador to Tokyo Dr. Thein Ms:ua,g. RESTRICTED