The Governance of Galileo
Report 62 January 2017
Amiel Sitruk Serge Plattard
Short title: ESPI Report 62 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in January 2017
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ESPI Report 62 2 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 5
1. Introduction 7 1.1 Purposes, Principle and Current State of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 7 1.2 Description of Galileo 7 1.3 A Brief History of Galileo and Its Governance 9 1.4 Current State and Next Steps 10
2. The Challenges of Galileo Governance 12 2.1 Political Challenges 12 2.1.1 Giving to the EU and Its Member States an Effective Instrument of Sovereignty 12 2.1.2 Providing Effective Interaction between the European Stakeholders 12 2.1.3 Dealing with Security Issues Related to Galileo 13 2.1.4 Ensuring a Strong Presence on the International Scene 13 2.2 Economic Challenges 14 2.2.1 Setting up a Cost-Effective Organization 14 2.2.2 Fostering the Development of a Downstream Market Associated with Galileo 14 2.2.3 Fostering Indirect Benefits 15 2.3 Technical Challenges 15 2.3.1 Successfully Exploiting the System 15 2.3.2 Ensuring the Evolution of the System 16 2.3.3 Technically Enabling “GNSS Diplomacy” 16
3. The Exercise of Galileo Governance within the European Framework 17 3.1 Framework of the European Space Programmes 17 3.1.1 The Space Ambitions of the European Union 17 3.1.2 The EU-ESA Framework 17 3.1.3 The Galileo Programme in the EU Space Policy 18 3.2 Galileo Governance Scheme, Actors and Prerogatives 18 3.2.1 Definition of the Governance Scheme 18 3.2.2 Phases of the Programme 19 3.2.3 Main Actors 20 3.2.4 Relations between the Main Actors 25 3.2.5 Other Actors in Governance 26
4. Current Issues in the Galileo Governance Scheme 29 4.1 Transversal Aspects 29 4.1.1 The Necessarily Complex Governance of the Programme 29 4.1.2 The Constraining Framework of the European Union 30 4.1.3 Issues Caused by the Programme Management at the Political Level 31 4.1.4 Issues Relevant to the Current Status of the GSA 32 4.1.5 The Uneven Interests of Member States 33 4.2 Exploitation 33 4.2.1 Influence of Resources Limitations on Exploitation 34 4.2.2 Complexity of the Exploitation Scheme 34 4.2.3 Issues Related to the Relationship with ESA and GSOp 34 4.3 Security 35 4.3.1 Influence of the Complexity of the Governance Scheme on Security Management 35 4.3.2 A Misperception of Security Issues 36 4.3.3 Some Innovative but Incomplete Solutions 37 4.3.4 The Specific Case of the PRS 37 4.4 International Relations 38 4.5 Commercial Development, Uses Spread and Innovation 39
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4.5.1 Lack of a Standardized Input Structure for Galileo Users 39 4.5.2 Commercial Service and Liability Issues 40 4.5.3 Issues Related to the Indirect Benefits of Galileo 41 4.6 Evolution of the Programme 41
5. Towards an Optimisation of the Governance Scheme for Galileo 42 5.1 Scenario Scheme 1: Basically Keeping the Governance Scheme Provided by the GNSS Regulation 42 5.2 Scenario Scheme 2: Creation of a Single Common roof GNSS Agency 44 5.3 Scenario Scheme 3: The GSA as a Coordinating Agency for a Galileo Steering Board 47
6. Conclusion 49
Annex 51 A.1 Other Components of the “System of Systems” 51 A.1.1 Other GNSS 51 A.1.2 RNSS 54 A.1.3 International Organisations 55 A.2 Galileo Uses and Communities of Users 56 A.2.1 Location-Based Services 56 A.2.2 Road Applications 56 A.2.3 Aviation 56 A.2.4 Rail 57 A.2.5 Maritime 57 A.2.6 Agriculture 58 A.2.7 Surveying 58 A.2.8 Timing and Synchronization 58 A.2.9 Potential Military Uses 59 A.3 Location of the Different Galileo Centres 60 A.4 Galileo Architectural Overview 61 A.5 GSA Headcount 62 A.6 Signals Broadcasted by Galileo and the other Navigation Satellite Systems 63 A.7 U.S. Organisational Structure for GPS Governance 65 A.8 List of Interviewees and Contacted Persons 66
List of Acronyms 68
Acknowledgements 71
About the Authors 71
ESPI Report 62 4 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
Executive Summary
The rise of the European Union (EU) as a main Unfortunately, the Galileo programme has European space actor is reshuffling the cards faced important problems and this has re- in the European architectural organization of sulted in significant delays – upcoming exploi- space activities. While, until recently, space tation is 13 years behind the original schedule activities were managed by the Member States – and the final cost of the programme – 9.9 through their national agencies or within the billion € (under current economic conditions) European Space Agency (ESA), the emergence by 2020 – has tripled. These tribulations have of the EU in this field has introduced a third led to successive evolutions in its governance institutional actor. They are all ultimately em- scheme, until the most recent changes in anations of the European states, but their pur- 2013, which are based on a triangular config- poses, their competencies, the principles they uration of the Commission, ESA and the GSA. are based on, and the rules they follow, are Since then, the deployment of the constella- different. This brings about a need for new tion has taken place at a steady rate, with ini- governance schemes, able to coordinate space tial services having started in December 2016. activities appropriately to get the best out- In this report, we undertake an analysis of the comes from their joint initiatives in the space current European governance of the European field. GNSS, focusing on Galileo, which is seen as a So far, this new ambition of the European Un- potential laboratory for the governance ion has translated into the development of schemes of the next European space initia- programmes in two areas: Earth environment tives. The state of play in the exploitation and security monitoring with Copernicus, and phase that has just started is reviewed, in or- satellite navigation with EGNOS and Galileo. der to identify potential improvements in the However, there is a difference between those current setting. In particular, this study will two domains: the European States and ESA pay close attention to the positioning of the have carried out Earth monitoring activities for GSA, a new actor called upon to play a critical decades, but EGNOS and Galileo are the first role in the programme. European satellite navigation programmes and The focus on the GSA is motivated by the cen- the choices made for their governance reflect tral role this agency will now play in two key this new leadership. Unlike Copernicus, where areas: the EU still strongly relies on ESA, EUMETSAT and national capabilities for operations, the EU 1. Security. Due to the pervasiveness of has fully taken over programme management GNSS in our daily lives, Galileo/EGNOS for, and exploitation of, EGNOS and Galileo, must ensure service reliability and conti- through its executive arm, the European Com- nuity to remain credible. mission. In order to deal efficiently with those new kinds of missions, it has also created a 2. International relations since it would be le- dedicated entity, the European GNSS Agency gitimate after 2020, in our view, for the (GSA). GSA role to be at par with other GNSS/RNSS providers to foster global But EGNOS and Galileo should also be distin- governance “rules of the road” for main- guished from each other. EGNOS, as a Satel- taining a harmonious coexistence between lite Based Augmentation System (SBAS), has these different PNT systems. been created to complement a GNSS – initially the GPS – and thus does not resolve the issue Regarding methodology, the information gath- of dependency on the U.S.. Galileo is a far ered to prepare this report is based on two more complex and ambitious project, aimed at kinds of inputs: endowing the EU and its Member States with 1. Interviews with different actors involved in their own GNSS-type Positioning, Navigation Galileo’s governance, and stakeholders in and Timing (PNT) system, providing worldwide its environment (users of Galileo, other services. It is the largest infrastructure project European entities etc.), conducted under ever undertaken by the EU, a major sover- Chatham House rules; eignty tool and a great opportunity for Euro- peans to access the promising markets of 2. Analysis of the currently applicable regu- GNSS, which cover a broad range of areas. lations and other documents that define
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the governance framework, as well as a and the resulting absence of an entity fully re- literature review. sponsible for system exploitation. This report first identifies the political, eco- The final chapter proposes three scenarios for nomic and technical challenges associated maximizing the impact and reach of the pro- with the governance of Galileo, to determine gramme. The first is based on the assumption the generic features necessary to ensure the that the current framework is maintained, and success of the programme. adjustments are made within it. The second envisages the creation of a single roof entity, The second chapter describes the governance with a bespoke legal status, that brings to- scheme set up for the period 2017-2020, de- gether the GSA and part of the ESA Navigation fined by the current Galileo-specific regula- Directorate, as owners of most of the technical tions and the general regulatory framework competences, to be in charge of exploitation. applying to EU programmes. In particular, the The last scenario is based on the transfor- distribution of prerogatives between the Com- mation of the GSA into a mainly administrative mission, the GSA and ESA, and their relations, agency, with most technical tasks entrusted to are analysed. the private sector. Given the challenges to be overcome, and the These scenarios have different strengths and internal organisation of the programme, the weaknesses and are diversely tailored to the third chapter points out specific issues that will various objectives of the programme. The likely be faced by the current governance choice of the most relevant one will depend on scheme in the exploitation phase. These in- a preliminary and definitive identification of clude: a complex and sometimes non-optimal technical, political and strategic priorities. But distribution of prerogatives, the interference of this is outside the scope of this report: it must political considerations in programme man- be left to policy decision makers and should be agement, some potential conflicts of interest, decided, in our view, before 2020. the problem of insufficient means in the GSA,
ESPI Report 62 6 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
1. Introduction
expected to be fully operational by 2020. The U.S with WAAS and WAGE (for military), the 1.1 Purposes, Principle and Europeans with EGNOS, the Indians with GAGAN and the Japanese with MSAS, already Current State of Global own and operate a Satellite-Based Augmenta- Navigation Satellite Sys- tion System (SBAS) completing GPS. China and Russia are developing their own systems tems (GNSS) with SNAS and SDCM respectively. In addition, some commercial SBAS, such as StarFire, are GNSS mainly provide two kinds of services on being developed and owned by private compa- a worldwide basis: positioning and navigation nies. Lastly, two other systems, the Indian on one hand, and precise timing on the other. IRNSS (fully deployed) and the Japanese Thanks to their outstanding features – in par- QZSS (under deployment) provide GNSS ser- ticular their accuracy and global nature, they vices on a regional scale (see Annex A.1). have found their way into various markets in different fields: transportation (road, aviation, maritime etc.), science (surveying, geodesy etc.), military (troop positioning, missile guid- 1.2 Description of Galileo ance etc.), but also banking services and en- ergy networks management (precise time Galileo, like the other GNSS, is based on three stamping and synchronization) and mass- segments: a space segment, a ground seg- market location based services (smartphone ment and a user segment. and tablet applications). The space segment is the constellation of sat- The principle of these systems is straightfor- ellites. For Galileo, at the end of deployment, ward: receivers carried by users receive radio this constellation will be composed of 30 Me- signals (using specific frequencies within the L dium Earth Orbit satellites following circular band, from 1 to 2 GHz) continuously broad- orbits at an altitude of 23,222 km with an or- casted by GNSS satellites. The data sent con- bital period of 14 hours. They will be located tain the time of their broadcasting, as provided in three different, equally spaced, planes with by an atomic clock on board each satellite, an inclination of 56° to the equator. Eight sat- these clocks all being synchronized. Knowing ellites plus two spares (also transmitting sig- at any time the positions of the satellites nals) are positioned in each plan. The lifetime (ephemeris), the receivers then compute their of the current satellites (IOV and FOC) is the- 3D position from the time of arrival of the sat- oretically more than 12 years2. Each satellite ellite-emitted signals1. The timing function fol- uses two hydrogen maser atomic clocks – one lows the same principle, delivering accurate active, one as passive redundancy – and two time from space-based atomic clocks world- rubidium atomic clocks – one as active redun- wide. The features of these systems (accu- dancy, the other as passive redundancy3. racy, integrity and availability) can be im- The core ground segment is composed of two proved locally by Satellite-Based or Ground- sub-segments: the Galileo Mission Segment Based Augmentation Systems that integrate (GMS) and the Galileo Control Segment additional external information into the calcu- (GCS). The main functions of the GMS are or- lus process, together with the satellite signal. bit determination, clock synchronization, eval- As of January 2017, four GNSS have been de- uation of signals’ integrity and uplink to the ployed or under deployment: the U.S. GPS and Galileo fleet of the data needed for the Galileo the Russian GLONASS reached full capacity as downlink. The GCS monitors and controls sat- early as 1995, while the European Galileo and ellite platforms and payloads as well as the the Chinese BeiDou are being deployed and constellation as a whole. There is also a third
1 A minimum of four satellites is needed to get a position
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sub-segment, the Galileo Data Dissemination access is restricted to users authorized by Network (GDDN), which securely intercon- governments and some European Union nects the centres of the core facilities – be- bodies, following common rules6. The tween each other and with other facilities. PRS, using encrypted and more robust Lastly, complementing those core facilities, signals, is mainly envisaged for sensitive the exploitation and service provision of Gali- applications requiring continuity of service leo relies on other ground based centres per- and integrity. The extension of this service forming specific functions mainly related to se- to other users is possible, eventually on a curity or services: the Galileo Security Moni- fee basis. The PRS, accessible through se- toring Centre (GSMC), Time and Geodetic Ref- cure PRS compatible receivers, will be erence Service Providers (TSP, GRSP), the provided in the E1 and E6 frequencies and Galileo Reference Centre (GRC), the European will be analogous to the P(Y) and L2-M GNSS Service Centre (GSC), the SAR Mission GPS signals on L1 and L2 frequencies. Control and Rescue Control Centres, and the The Commercial Service (CS) is a service Galileo Integrated Logistics Centre (see without equivalent in the other GNSS, cor- 3.2.5.5). The number of those facilities and responding to the specific income gener- their interactions is one of the main sources of ating ambition of Galileo, since the use of complexity in the programme (see Annex A.4). this service, professional or commercial, The user segment consists of the receivers will be charged. It is intended to deliver that are carried by users, and which solve the added value data by comparison to the navigation equations in order to compute nav- Open Service, especially through authen- igation coordinates and to provide accurate tication services and improved accuracy, timing4. allowing new kinds of applications7. Nev- ertheless, the content of such added value Galileo, as a second generation GNSS, in- seems not to be fully defined yet. To- cludes all the advanced features of modern gether with the OS signals, the CS will use GNSS and is expected to provide high perfor- two signals in the E6 frequency8. mances as compared to the current constella- tions. In particular, thanks to the higher alti- The Search and Rescue Service (SAR) is tude of the satellites, their more accurate the Galileo contribution to the COSPAS- clocks and the use of double frequencies sig- SARSAT system for search and rescue op- nals, Galileo should be especially accurate erations, detecting emergency signals (space ranging accuracy minimum perfor- emitted by beacons and able to return mances level <2m for the Initial Open Ser- confirmation that help is on the way. The vice)5. Another main difference is its civilian signal broadcasted by Galileo as part of nature, while the three other GNSS are oper- this service uses the L6 frequency. ated by the respective Ministries of Defence. In addition, Galileo will offer an integrity mon- In line with those specificities, by 2020 Galileo itoring service complementing OS, or even will offer several different services: open signals coming from another GNSS, to The Open Service (OS) is the standard provide additional integrity information service of Galileo. Similar to the open ser- needed for life-critical applications. This integ- vices offered by other GNSS, this service rity monitoring service is derived from the provides free of charge positioning, navi- abandoned “Safety of Life service”, and its im- gation and timing information worldwide. plementation has been postponed for the time The OS uses E1, E5a and E5bfrequencies, being. More information about the aforemen- and will be comparable to the service de- tioned frequencies are given in Annex A.6. livered by GPS on L1C/A, L2C and L5fre- quencies. The Public Regulated Service (PRS) is the most complex service delivered by Gali- leo. Like the OS, it provides positioning and timing information worldwide, but its
4 “Galileo User Segment.” 21 October 2014. European 7 “Galileo, the European Satellite Navigation system, Space Agency 19 December 2016
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1.3 A Brief History of Galileo concessionaire and in charge of the implemen- tation of the contract. Its prerogatives also in- and Its Governance cluded the preparation of the Commission pro- posals regarding GNSS, the modernization of The history of Galileo is tumultuous and the the system, and all aspects related to security, governance scheme has changed over time in particular security accreditation for the before being provisionally stabilized in the cur- GNSS programmes12. rent configuration. Nevertheless, numerous The GJU launched a concession call in October choices made in the past still have an influence 2003 and received four offers. In 2005, the on the current situation. GJU, unable to select one of them, asked for It is considered that the programme was initi- the merger of the two remaining submitting ated after the famous speech of the Transport consortia, leaving the GJU with a single candi- Commissioner Lord Neil Kinnock (1995-1999) date13. This unforeseen evolution of the pro- in 19989. While the tripartite agreement had cess, as well as the parallel delays of the pro- formally launched EGNOS earlier the same grammes, had numerous causes. Among year, Lord Kinnock argued for the develop- them, disagreements among member states ment of a European civilian GNSS, emphasiz- regarding public procurement (the ESA “geo- ing the related economic perspectives, but graphical-return principle”14 being de facto re- also the need for Europeans to develop such a introduced by some member states), the loca- project for security and sovereignty purposes. tion of major ground installations, the poten- In 2000 and 2001, ESA and the EU equally tial military uses of PRS, an underestimate of funded the definition of such a system. Con- the technological complexity of Galileo and of vinced by the Commission, the EU Council ap- its risks, and on top of these, a progressive proved the launch of Galileo in April 2001, with decrease in political support to the pro- three subsequent phases: development, de- gramme15. In January 2007, the GJU was dis- ployment and exploitation, the latter foreseen solved and the GSA officially took over all its as occurring in 200810. tasks. Negotiations stopped at the beginning of 2007, the merged Consortium refusing the The model initially retained for programme risks incurred by the prevailing set up. In funding was a Public-Private Partnership March, the Commission’s Vice President (PPP): while the development was to be Jacques Barrot sent a letter to Member State funded by the public sector (ESA and the EC), Transport Ministers, listing the problems faced the deployment and exploitation phases were in the negotiations and setting an ultimatum supposed to be implemented by a concession, to the merged consortium on the establish- and financed by both public and private sec- ment of the operating company. Following one tors. In accordance with this PPP model, in of the scenarios proposed by the Commission, May 2002 the Council established the Galileo the Transport Council decided to abandon the Joint Undertaking (GJU)11 to implement the PPP model16,17. activities related to the development of Galileo within a unique legal entity, and in July 2004, It nevertheless renewed its support to the pro- a Community Agency, the European GNSS Su- ject and endorsed a full-public funding pervisory Authority (GSA), to ensure respect scheme, from the Community budget. This of public interests related to European GNSS scheme was supported by most Member programmes. To that end, the GSA was the States, as well as by the Commission and the GNSS regulatory agency contracting with the Parliament. As a consequence, the governance scheme evolved in 2008 and 2010 with two
9 Kinnock, Neil. European Strategy for GNSS. 14 The fair return principle ensures that the ESA countries SPEECH/98/210 of 20 Oct. 1998. Toulouse.
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new regulations that gave the Commission 1.4 Current State and Next management of the programme and consider- ably diminished the role of the GSA (renamed Steps as the European GNSS Agency), keeping only prerogatives in security accreditation, security Currently, with the launch of four additional monitoring and market uptake actions while satellites on 17 November 2016, 18 satellites bringing it under Commission control18,19. The are in orbit, although two of them were initially initial project for the 2010 regulation proposed launched into incorrect orbits (in August by the Commission provided for tight control 2014), and required moving to usable orbits, of the Commission through the chair of the Se- while one IOV satellite lost some of its trans- curity Accreditation Board and a number of mission capabilities23,24. According to the Eu- equal votes for all Member States on the GSA ropean GNSS Service Centre25,26, as of 20 De- Administrative Board20. Nonetheless, the cember 2016, 11 satellites were usable and Commission kept a veto right on some deci- worked well, while four additional ones were sions. Based on this firmer ground, the pro- under commissioning. Two batches (14+8) of gramme finally managed to launch the first FOC satellites have been contracted in the past four In-Orbit Validation (IOV) satellites in years and the contract for the last batch (8 2011 and 2012, initiating the deployment of satellites) should be awarded soon. On 15 De- the satellites constellation and securing the al- cember 2016, the programme decided to priv- location of frequencies. In 2013, in line with ilege stability, awarding the Galileo Service the new Multiannual Financial Framework Operator (GSOp, see 3.2.5.5) contract to providing the budget for the 2014-2020 period Spaceopal, which was already exploiting the and the general progress of the programme, a constellation under deployment. On the same new regulation driven from the perspective of day, an important working arrangement defin- the upcoming exploitation redefined again the ing the relation between ESA and the GSA for governance structure, introducing a tripartite the exploitation phase was signed. configuration based on the Commission, ESA and the GSA21. This regulation restored the Most of the ground segment has been or is close to being deployed: the first version of the importance of the GSA, becoming the entity intended to progressively take over responsi- core ground segment was expected to be fully deployed by mid-201727,28. The GSC was es- bility for the exploitation of Galileo, the opera- tions of which are outsourced. In 2014, a new tablished in May 2013, the GRC in May 201629,30. Two GSMC were created in Saint- regulation complemented those changes, fo- cusing on the internal organization of the Germain-en-Laye (France) and in Swanwick GSA22. Those two last regulations set the cur- (UK), but the fate of the second – which is a rent governance scheme, as described in 3.2.
18 European Parliament and Council. Regulation (EC) N°
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back-up facility – may, or may not, be com- changed, numerous industrial contacts will be promised by the Brexit procedure31. In 2015, awarded and the global governance scheme signals usable for testing were produced, pav- will be evolving. This is also a challenging pe- ing the way for a service validation campaign riod. As a matter of fact, the declaration of ser- carried out in 2016. Thanks to this progress, vices is the opportunity to test the competen- the initial services (OS, SAR and pilot PRS for cies, interfaces and organization of the pro- tests) were declared on 15 December 2016 of- gramme, but also carries a strong political fering good ranging performances, but limited meaning, aimed at establishing the credibility continuity and availability since the constella- of the programme in order to stimulate the tion is still under deployment. market, re-engage member states, secure funding in the next MFF, and demonstrate the This acceleration of the programme will go on relevance of the current governance. and even intensify in the coming months. Two Ariane launches are planned, adding 8 satel- This scheme should go on until 2020, with the lites to the constellation by the end 2018. progressive step up of the GSA, in line with the While exploitation was supervised by ESA over deployment of the system towards Full Oper- the past years, it will be the role of the GSA as ational Capability. The following phase, Full of 1 July 2017. Indeed, since 1 January 2017, Operational Capability II, will be framed by a the programme has entered into a six months new regulation whose elaboration will begin in handover process devoted to the development 2017. In parallel, the programme will prepare of GSA know-how. This is thus a major transi- the next generation of Galileo, for deployment tion phase, since within six months time the expected to start by 2025. initial services will have been declared, the en- tity in charge of the exploitation will have
31 Amos, Jonathan. “Tim Peak, Brexit and the UK Space Sector.” BBC News 16 July of 2016.
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2. The Challenges of Galileo Governance
Governance can be defined as the combination can also become an active instrument of sov- of norms, rules, adjudication procedures, and ereignty, as the widespread use of Galileo enforcement mechanisms set up in order to could provide for the same lever of influence frame the interaction and decision-making over other countries massively using it. De- processes among the different stakeholders pending on the scope of uses of Galileo, espe- involved in a collective problem. Thus, there is cially for security applications, it could also a need for governance when there are differ- give the Europeans more leverage within ent actors, with potentially different broader NATO, or support autonomous intervention of objectives, that need to be coordinated in a European forces, independently from the U.S., proper way to achieve to the best extent their by being assured of having a reliable GNSS33. common goals. Depending on the context, the It should also be noted that developing such a chosen criteria to assess governance are di- common infrastructure fully owned by the EU verse, from ethics to performance. In a tech- and having strong security implications is a nical and industrial context, the governance of new step for the EU. As such, Galileo is also a a programme emphasizes its results: those symbolic project for the EU, whose success processes are above all chosen in order to en- could pave the way for other similar EU pro- sure the achievement of the programme’s ob- jects, with a strong security dimension, and in jectives. In the case of Galileo, the question of strategic fields such as space. The project is governance is fundamental, given that this thus also building sovereignty at the European programme involves the European Union, level. ESA, and their Member States, all three differ- ent actors that must be associated in order to ensure the success of the programme. 2.1.2 Providing Effective Interaction between the This question raises a preliminary interroga- European Stakeholders tion: what are the challenges faced by the pro- There is a complexity inherent in the govern- gramme that governance is aimed at taking ance of Galileo in the space field that arises up? This chapter intends to list and classify from the various natures of the stakeholders these challenges in three categories – political, within the European organizational architec- economic and technical. In practice though, ture. While all other GNSS programmes in- one should keep in mind that they are all in- volve a single country, and are under the con- terrelated and influence each other. trol of one military institution, Galileo intends to be the GNSS of the EU as well as of its 28 Member States, and associated third coun- 2.1 Political Challenges tries34, and to rely on the European Space Agency, an institutionally distinct, intergov- ernmental agency. Yet, the involved stake- 2.1.1 Giving to the EU and Its Member States an holders have different interests. For instance, Effective Instrument of Sovereignty Member States are interested in the project in various ways: some are especially motivated Securing European independence in the field by the industrial benefits of the programme; of GNSS has been one of the main incentives others wish to be directly involved in pro- in development of the Galileo project since its gramme oversight. Due to their own geo- 32 beginnings . This concept has passive and ac- strategic concerns or priorities, they also have tive components. The first concerns the miti- different views on the purposes of Galileo gation of European vulnerability to denial of (possibility of military uses, services usable for access to a GPS and/or GLONASS. This vulner- commercial purposes, etc.). In addition, they ability is constantly increasing, as GNSS tend have different cultures: the European Com- to be used for critical applications in more and mission, as a supranational regulatory institu- more fields. But for the same reasons, Galileo tion, has specific views and procedures that
32 Kinnock, Neil. European Strategy for GNSS. 34 The EU is the owner of the programme, but gives the SPEECH/98/210 of 20 Oct. 1998. Toulouse
ESPI Report 62 12 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
are different from the ones of the ESA, the lat- structure rigid enough to ensure the applica- ter being an intergovernmental research and tion of security measures, and flexible enough development agency, while Member States to adapt to new threats to be able to react also have their own organisations, skills and quickly to constantly evolving security chal- knowledge. lenges. In the case of Galileo, security issues are significantly complicated by the distribu- On top of this, the articulation between all the tion of associated prerogatives between the actors, as well as setting up all the governance governance stakeholders. Security tradition- structures, must be done in accordance with ally pertains to Member States, which also EU general rules and regulations (financial have different views and requirements on the rules, comitology35 principles etc.), creating matter. The involvement of other EU institu- additional constraints. tions, like the European External Action Ser- vice (EEAS) or even non-EU actors, such as 2.1.3 Dealing with Security Issues Related to Gal- NATO, is a further factor of complication. ileo It should be noted that ensuring security is not Even as a civilian programme, security issues only important per se, since it is an also im- are central to Galileo. On the one hand, there portant component of the trust that can be is an increasing number of GNSS-dependent placed in the system. Security is thus a major activities (in 2011, 6-7% of Europe’s GDP went enabler for the other political and economic through GNSS36). On the other hand, safety- objectives of the programme – in particular, critical applications are developing at a steady international relations (see 2.1.4) and market rate and throughout various fields – from au- development (see 2.2.2). Therefore, security tonomous cars to aviation and various govern- is indeed a major challenge for Galileo, as it mental activities – making GNSS into a de has to compete in this area with systems un- facto critical infrastructure. Hence, this grow- der military control. ing criticality induces a new vulnerability, and Should military use of Galileo be developed, all GNSS are becoming first priority targets for those issues will become especially pressing, hostile third parties. This development inevi- while other governance questions, such as the tably poses a range of security issues to be implementation of a relevant interface with dealt with in order to ensure the reliability of the military, will be a rising concern. Galileo. Indeed, there are risks related to the satellite signals (spoofing, jamming etc.), to specific processes (security key distribution for 2.1.4 Ensuring a Strong Presence on the Interna- instance), to the physical protection of the tional Scene system (satellites and ground installations), The environment of Galileo is composed of and to cyber attacks. In particular, the in- other satellite navigation providers: three creasing number of incidents and full-scale other GNSS (GPS, GLONASS and BeiDou) and demonstrations of jamming and spoofing gives two RNSS (IRNSS and QZSS). The existence rise to growing concerns about the reliability of “common aversions” and “common inter- of GNSS. Such a strategic and complex pro- ests” between them makes interactions inevi- gramme can also be exposed to the risk of table. These interactions are likely to trans- sensitive information leaks that could increase form this set of coexisting systems into a “sys- vulnerabilities. tem of systems”, whose components are de- Addressing these issues requires an appropri- scribed in Annex A.1. As one of the four global ate organization and a security culture to ef- PNT systems, Galileo has a number of obliga- fectively anticipate, detect, and protect tions to fulfil in order to take part in the gen- against such threats, and react properly to eral governance of such a system of systems. stop or mitigate their effects. Security is an in- Firstly, the EU and its Member States need to herently complex issue, since hostile players continue to protect the radio frequency spec- trying to attack the system are, by essence, trum and more specifically the L band, a scarce always one step ahead. This makes illusory and fragile resource shared by the global pro- any definitive planning to secure the system, viders. This is achieved by taking strong and and justifies the need to set up a management
35 The comitology is the set of procedures constraining the control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of Commission decision-making process that has been cre- implementing powers. ated in order to ensure the control of the Member States 36 European Commission. Fact Sheet: Frequently asked over the Commission implementation of EU laws and, in questions - Galileo, the EU's satellite navigation pro- this context, of the programme. For more information see gramme. 28 March 2015. Brussels: European Union Regulation (EU) N° 182/2011 of the European Parliament
ESPI Report 62 13 January 2017
aligned positions at the World Radio-commu- chipsets industries, and above all the develop- nication Conferences, and being part of the ment of new GNSS applications. regular exchanges that take place within the But maximizing this positive economic impact annual meeting of the International Commit- firstly requires ensuring widespread utilization tee on GNSS and its working groups. Fre- of Galileo. Reciprocally, the development of quency allocation related issues are not ad- Galileo-compatible applications and receivers dressed as such in this report. will encourage its use, with all the associated Second, it has to ensure the full compatibility economic and political benefits. While the of Galileo with the other constellations, mean- stakes are high, Galileo comes in an especially ing that the emission of Galileo signals will not competitive environment, as GPS is already interfere with signals produced by others. It considered today as the “golden” standard, will also be interoperable with the other sys- GLONASS is operational, and BeiDou is de- tems, which implies the requirement for Gali- ploying now at a steady rate (see Annex A.1). leo signals to be processed together with sig- In a multi-constellations approach, processing nals coming from other constellations so as to signals from more than one constellation pro- achieve, for instance, a positioning fix. vides better performance to some extent. Above three, the positive effects related to the Third, Galileo will participate in discussions number of available satellites are, in most of and negotiations with its partners to set up the cases, negligible. With four GNSS, numer- common measures to mitigate intentional and ous applications markets are expected to be- unintentional jamming and spoofing. In addi- come significantly competitive. tion, it will also be participate in reaching com- mon performance standards, a coordination Yet, all the GNSS provide a free and non-dis- process that is currently underway. criminatory service, competing mainly on the reliability and availability of the systems and Last, owning a GNSS involves a responsibility their providers. To build such credibility and toward the international community, and es- stand out in this competitive environment, pecially to our allies. Indeed, as a passive sys- Galileo must prove itself to be a secure system tem available to anybody, GNSS could be used that provides high technical performances. by entities hostile to the interests of our part- The programme must also demonstrate a real, ners. The governance of Galileo must be able long-term commitment and sufficient stability to react effectively in case of international cri- of the system and its objectives. It is also im- sis, which requires the ability to take quick de- portant to act quickly regarding the most im- cisions regarding the system, for instance to portant decisions – declarations of services, deny local access to it. deployment of satellites, modifications of the system as well as its future development. This last point implies not only building strong un- 2.2 Economic Challenges derstanding of the market to be able to act wisely, but also to take on a pro-active role, with an effective market communication strat- 2.2.1 Setting up a Cost-Effective Organization egy and stimulating the market through incen- tives. This intimate relation with the markets Whatever the programme, cost effectiveness must also fuel thinking about further system is one of the main objectives of its governance. evolution, in order to appropriately plan the This is even truer for a costly, long-term pro- technological trade-offs. gramme such as Galileo. In addition, the par- tially commercial nature of Galileo, especially In all these considerations, it should be noted with its commercial service, raises considera- that GNSS applications cover different fields, tions such as profitability and return on invest- involving different communities of users, each ment, which are extraneous to other public, having its own specificities and requirements. military-oriented GNSS. Accordingly, optimi- These communities are composed of profes- zation of resources in programme manage- sionals or individual customers, sometimes co- ment will be a main objective of governance, existing in the same field. Among professional which implies the elimination of useless redun- applications, depending on their degree of ma- dancies and the best use of the competencies turity and criticality, some applications are of each involved actor. highly regulated, framed by well-established standards and certification processes. On the other hand, less critical or developed GNSS- 2.2.2 Fostering the Development of a Down- based professional applications are mainly un- stream Market Associated with Galileo regulated. Moreover, one of the main trends of One of the main economic benefits expected the last decade is the explosion of individual from Galileo is the growth of downstream mar- applications and the spread of personal GNSS kets, including the fostering of receivers and receivers for various uses.
ESPI Report 62 14 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
The achievement of this priority goal for Gali- 2.3.1 Successfully Exploiting the System leo, that is market development, thus requires setting up relevant interfaces with the differ- The first technical challenge is to make the ent communities in order to understand their system fully operational, ensuring continuous needs and requirements, to be flexible enough satisfactory functioning, i.e. meeting the de- to adapt accordingly and, taking into account fined performance requirements. Continuity of their specific features, to find the appropriate service is an absolute priority: a signal degra- level in the value chain and the appropriate dation lasting only seconds or minutes can tools to stimulate demand and maximise the have major consequences, and such vulnera- adoption of Galileo. The specifics of each field bility could dramatically worsen with the of applications, related communities and the spread of critical GNSS-dependent applica- Galileo services targeting them, are presented tions and processes. For similar reasons, the in Annex A.2. system should not be operated in a way that is misleading to users. Other features of the Another dimension triggered by this commer- system should also be ensured to meet the po- cial ambition, and thus specific to Galileo, is litical and economic objectives of the pro- the liability issue. The spread of Galileo uses, gramme: sufficient robustness and availabil- and especially of its commercial service, ne- ity, high-level accuracy, capacity to react to cessitates a clear, effective chain of responsi- the requests of users, etc. And of course, se- bility covering cases of failure, in order to build curity can only be guaranteed through the ap- up user confidence regarding the added value plication of appropriate technical solutions and of Galileo. For regulated applications, these li- processes. ability issues strongly depend on the ability of the programme to ensure that the system is This means continuously providing a global appropriately certified. signal while the number of active satellites constantly changes and repositioning manoeu- vres are frequent, as well as conducting 2.2.3 Fostering Indirect Benefits ground and in-orbit tests, together with satel- lite recalibrations, and testing changes in op- Beside these benefits, more indirect returns erational modes. This also implies constantly can be expected from Galileo. The new possi- monitoring the system in order to be able to bilities provided by Galileo, as a commercial, appropriately react in case of emergencies high performance GNSS, could lead to a num- while disturbing its functioning to the least ber of new applications that themselves bring possible extent. Last but not least, satellite productivity gains and other benefits for Euro- lifespan requires regular replenishment – and pean economies. the associated launch – and reconfiguration, Such new applications could also lead to the while the ground segment as well as the space removal of current, costly redundant systems, segment are subject to upgrades. All these ac- e.g. positioning marine beacons or aviation tivities need proper planning to efficiently al- ground navigation systems. For this purpose, locate resources. Galileo must deliver better performances and Exploitation therefore necessitates gathering reliability than those provided by the current diverse competencies and setting up the ap- redundant systems. propriate structure and communications to en- Fostering these kinds of indirect benefits re- sure effective coordination. GNSS satellites quires defining a clear policy regarding GNSS, are quite simple, but the ground segment is a as part of a broader strategy that is properly large information system covering complex coordinated with other sectorial policies in or- activities that require diverse and specific der to get the best outcomes from the system. skills (satellite control, encryption, cyber secu- rity, telecommunication, signal dissemination, user interface, maintenance etc.) while the user segment presents specific, additional 2.3 Technical Challenges constraints.
As a complex, cutting-edge technological pro- These issues will be especially burning during gramme, Galileo is necessarily faced with the upcoming period, from 2017 to 2020, as technical challenges that its governance both the deployment and the exploitation scheme should help to solve. In particular, the phases will overlap. Setting up and modifying diversity of technical tasks and the distribution the constellation will have to take into account of relevant competencies among the different the constraints of exploitation of the system actors necessitate defining appropriate re- and service provision. This will result in con- sources and allocating prerogatives to ensure stant trade-offs between exploitation and de- that relevant interfaces are established be- ployment. tween them.
ESPI Report 62 15 January 2017
2.3.2 Ensuring the Evolution of the System GNSS technologies in Europe, and more gen- erally, fostering innovation in the GNSS area The other highly technical task that must be as well as in related fields. tackled parallel to exploitation is to plan and prepare for the future development of Galileo. Logically, this activity requires very high-level technical skills, and this has deep implications Indeed, though the exploitation of Galileo has for programme management since gathering just begun, the pressure of the competitive such competencies necessitates the involve- environment compels the programme man- ment of different actors: ESA, the GSA, indus- agement to already think about its evolution. try, GSOp etc. Furthermore, future develop- It is indeed a positive signal that needs to be ment should be user-driven, requiring a con- sent to economic stakeholders, showing a stant and intimate link with market stakehold- long-term commitment to the programme. ers to ensure proper integration of their Moreover, by 2020 the GPS performances requirements and needs in the Galileo next should be highly improved with the first oper- generation design. ational GPS III satellites, while the BeiDou constellation should be fully deployed. Thus, In short, the evolution of Galileo necessitates even if Galileo’s Full Operational Capability is the implementation of a structure able to expected to deliver performances at least channel relevant information flows between equal to those of its current competitors, if not governance stakeholders and users. better, it will be necessary to start deploying a new generation by 2025 to maintain a techno- logical edge, enabling the achievement of the 2.3.3 Technically Enabling “GNSS Diplomacy” economic objectives of the programme as well Ensuring state-of-the-art performances of the as accounting for obsolescence, which will re- system through effective exploitation and quire progressive replenishment of the orbital timely and relevant evolution is not the only plans. technical challenge faced by Galileo. As men- Parallel to those economic considerations, the tioned above, to be fully effective Galileo must evolution of the system serves another pur- ensure compatibility, and eventually interop- pose of the programme: developing and keep- erability, with other constellations. This means ing high level competencies associated with that technical solutions must be found to con- cretize the cooperation schemes agreed with other systems37.
37 One example of this kind of “technical enablement of di- tion, following the provision of the 2004 agreement to en- plomacy objectives” is the development of MBOC modula- sure a high interoperability between GPS and Galileo sig- nals.
ESPI Report 62 16 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
3. The Exercise of Galileo Governance within the European Framework
the competitiveness and innovativeness of the European space sector; reinforcement of Eu- 3.1 Framework of the Euro- ropean autonomy in space; strengthening Eu- rope’s role as a global actor and the promotion pean Space Programmes of international cooperation; as well as the practical delivery of space activities through 3.1.1 The Space Ambitions of the European Un- the establishment of appropriate partnership ion with all the stakeholders. Historically, space activities in Europe have 3.1.2 The EU-ESA Framework been handled by the Member States both through their national space agencies and Prior to these developments, the EU and ESA within the European Space Agency (ESA). Re- had already signed a framework agreement in cently, the European Union has been increas- 2003 to take advantage of their complemen- ingly involved in the space field, considering tary competencies and be able to develop am- that it could bring diverse kinds of benefits: bitious space projects under a coherent gen- economic (increased competitiveness, innova- eral approach that also reduced ineffective re- tion stimulation etc.), social (environmental dundancies. protection, civil protection etc.) and strategic (consolidation of political, technological and This agreement covered different fields, in- economic independence, security applica- cluding navigation and space-related spec- tions). This conception of space activities high- trum policy. It paved the way for the progres- lights their political and economic dimensions sive definition of a coherent, articulated Euro- and is thus fully in line with the Europe 2020 pean space policy, set up a “Space Council” strategy. bringing together the Council of the EU and the ESA Council at Ministerial level, and mentioned In line with these ambitions, space became a practical arrangements for cooperation be- shared competence between the EU and the tween ESA and EU in future joint projects. Member States in 2009, when the Lisbon Concretely, different kinds of cooperation Treaty gave a legal basis to EU space activi- models were evoked, including coordinated ties. Indeed, Article 189 of the Treaty on the co-funded activities, EU participation in ESA Functioning of the European Union provides optional programmes, and ESA management for the definition of a European space policy of EU space-related activities in accordance and proposes the development of an EU Space with EU rules41. Programme. It also explicitly mentions the Eu- ropean Space Agency as a partner in this Though the signature of this agreement was a field38. In accordance with these legal provi- major step forward, the agreement remained sions, the European Commission has produced very general and did not resolve many of the various communications since then. In 2013, concrete negative effects arising from the cul- the Commission outlined a space industrial tural and organizational differences between policy strongly insisting on the necessity of the two institutions. Furthermore, this agree- creating a European competitive space indus- ment did not take into account the evolution trial basis39. The last communication, released of the role of the EU in the space field as de- in October 2016, defines a Space Strategy for fined by the Treaty of Lisbon three years later. Europe40, which elaborates on previous goals, Those persisting cooperation issues convinced since this strategy is based along five lines: both institutions that this framework could not the maximization of the benefits of space for be definitive and should be improved. In 2014 EU society and the economy, enhancement of the Commission released a communication
38 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 40 European Commission. Space Strategy for Europe. 189
ESPI Report 62 17 January 2017
stating its views on some of the remaining dif- space initiatives that could lead to further de- ficulties, especially pointing out the disparities velopments, such as a European launchers in financial rules, the asymmetric membership policy43. The latest Commission communica- (which would become especially significant tion, “A Space Strategy for Europe” confirmed with Brexit), the lack of policy coordination the importance of the programme within the mechanisms and the lack of political account- EU space policy, as a major element of the five ability of ESA. It also considered different sce- axes mentioned in 3.1.1. The next concrete narios across the board to solve those issues, commitment in the near term lies within the from keeping the status quo to ESA becoming upcoming negotiations for the next Multian- an EU agency42. nual Financial Framework (MFF, see 3.2.1) for the period from 2021 to at least 202644. In the meantime, relations between ESA and the EU institutions and organs are mainly de- fined through delegation agreements and working arrangements related to the specific 3.2 Galileo Governance phases of each programme. Scheme, Actors and Pre- 3.1.3 The Galileo Programme in the EU Space rogatives Policy The communications of the Commission, as 3.2.1 Definition of the Governance Scheme well as the resources allocated through the Fully funded and owned by the European Un- multiannual financial frameworks, have regu- ion, the definition of a Galileo governance larly confirmed that, together with Copernicus, scheme follows the rules established within Galileo is one of the two flagship space pro- the primary treaties of the Union: the Treaty jects of the European Union. The total cost for on European Union and the Treaty on the Galileo and EGNOS, from 1994 to 2020 was Functioning of the European Union. As a con- around € 13 billion. For the 2014-2020 period, sequence, the structures of Galileo govern- the EU allocated € 7,071 million for the two ance and the prerogatives of the involved ac- GNSS programmes, of which € 4,930 million tors are defined by regulations produced are dedicated to Galileo. This significant through the ordinary legislative procedure, in- amount, in a period of severe EU budget pres- volving the European Commission, the Euro- sure, demonstrates a strong commitment pean Parliament and the Council of the Euro- from EU institutions to the programme so far. pean Union (see 3.2.5.2). Those regulations The launch of the Galileo programme preceded are completed by decisions produced either the legal formalization of the EU’s ambitions in through the same procedure, or by the Com- space through the Treaty of Lisbon and the fol- mission, in accordance with comitology 45 lowing communications of the European insti- rules . Last, given the security dimension of tutions, as well as the framework agreement the programme, the Council and the High Rep- between ESA and the EU. Nevertheless, as the resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and programme has changed over time, its evolu- Security Policy (HR) make decisions related to tion has been taken into account in the current Galileo as part of their responsibilities in the arrangements. In particular, Galileo in its cur- Common Foreign and Security Policy. rent phase can be seen as a project fully The budget of the programme is established in funded by the EU, parts of its execution being the Multiannual Financial Framework, which is delegated to ESA, as defined in the 2004 defined for a duration of at least 5 years, usu- framework agreement; hence EU ownership of ally 7 years (see 3.2.5.2). Because of the Galileo. many intricacies the programme has gone As one of the pillars of the European Space through, different regulations have been Strategy, full deployment and exploitation as passed, while several have been amended or well as the market uptake of Galileo have been repealed. Furthermore, the main regulation set as priorities in the communications of the known as the “GNSS Regulation” (see below), Commission detailing the EU strategy in this which defines the modalities of the pro- field, and are seen as an engine for European gramme implementation, is expected to be re- vised with the evolution of the programme and
42 European Commission. Progress report on establishing 44 “Multiannual Financial Framework: shaping EU expendi- appropriate relations between the European Union and the ture.” 12 April 2016. European Council and Council of the European Space Agency (ESA). COM (2014) 56 final of 6 European Union 19 December 2016
ESPI Report 62 18 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
the definition of the MFFs. Currently, the MFF. Other than these framework legal provi- framework of this governance is determined sions, relations between different actors are by five regulations regarding the programme, clarified through delegation and working the structure of management, and particularly agreements detailing the concrete processes the GSA, the PRS and some specific security of cooperation for the different phases of the aspects. These include: programme. For programme implementation 2013 - Regulation (EU) N°1285/2013 of 3.2.2 Phases of the Programme the European Parliament and of the Coun- According to the current GNSS regulation, the cil on the implementation & exploitation of Galileo programme is divided into four phases, European Satellite Navigation Systems each having its own budgetary line: definition; (hereafter referred to as “GNSS Regula- development and validation; deployment; and tion”). exploitation46. The effective governance For the setting up of the structures for the scheme depends on the specific phase. It is management of EGNOS and Galileo: worth mentioning that from 2017 to 2020, two phases will be overlapping, since deployment 2010 - Regulation (EU) N° 912/2010 of will be achieved in 2020 while the exploitation the European Parliament and of the Coun- phase started on the 15 December 2016. cil of 22 September 2010 setting up the European GNSS Agency, repealing Council The definition phase, ending in 2001, corre- Regulation (EC) N° 1321/2004 on the es- sponds to the system structure design and the tablishment of structures for the manage- determination of its elements. It was equally ment of the European satellite radio navi- funded by ESA and the EU, for a total cost of 47 gation programmes and amending Regu- € 133 million and managed by ESA . lation (EC) N° 683/2008 of the European The development and validation phase, ending Parliament and the Council. in 2014, included the construction and launch 2014 - Regulation (EU) N° 512/2014 of of two experimental and four In-orbit valida- the European Parliament and of the Coun- tion operational satellites, the setting up of the cil of 16 April 2014 amending Regulation first ground infrastructures and the validation (EU) N° 912/2010 setting up the Euro- of the system based on this mini-constellation. pean GNSS Agency (hereafter referred to It was almost equally funded by the EU and as “GSA Regulation”). ESA, and was carried out by ESA. For the definition of the rule of access to public The deployment phase started in August 2014 regulated service: with the launch of the first Full Operational Ca- pability (FOC) satellite. The deployment of the 2011 - Decision N° 1104/2011/EU of the space segment consists of the construction, European Parliament and of the Council of setting up and protection of the FOC satellites 25 October 2011 on the rules for access completing the constellation – with at the end to the public regulated service provided of the deployment, 24 active satellites and 6 by the global navigation satellite system spares - and of scalable maintenance or other established under the Galileo programme. necessary operations. For the ground seg- ment, this phase consists in the setting up and On the security aspects: protection of all necessary ground-based infra- 2014 - Council Decision N° structures including control centres, service 2014/496/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on as- centres and radio-navigation data-processing pects of the deployment, operation and infrastructures. It also includes all prepara- use of the European Global Navigation tions needed to start the last phase. This Satellite System affecting the security of phase, fully funded and managed by the EU, the European Union (hereafter referred to should lead to the provision of enhanced ser- as “Joint Action”). vices by mid-2018, ending up with the full de- ployment of the system (FOC 2) before 31 De- It should also be noted that a new GNSS reg- cember 2020. ulation is expected to be defined in 2019 to cover the years beyond 2021, in parallel with the preparation by the Commission of the next
46 European Commission. Regulation (EU) N° 1285/2013 47 House of Commons – Transport Committee. Galileo: of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 De- Recent Developments HC 53, First Report of Session cember 2013 on the implementation and exploitation of 2007-08 (Incorporating HC 1055, Session 2006-07) – Re- European satellite navigation systems and repealing Coun- port, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evi- cil Regulation (EC) N° 876/2002 and Regulation (EC) N° dence. 4. 683/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Brussels: European Union. 9-10.
ESPI Report 62 19 January 2017
The exploitation phase started in December produced under the programme and relations 2016 with the provision of initial services, in- with other countries and international organi- cluding the Open Service (OS), the Search & zations. Since those negotiations can be com- Rescue Service (SAR) and the Public Regu- plex, the EC is supported by the Member lated Service (PRS) for pilot tests. It comprises States (especially on security subjects) and the management, maintenance, continuous ESA (for technical expertise) through a dedi- improvement, evolution, protection and re- cated coordination process before and after plenishment of the space-based and ground- negotiations. The EEAS also provides support based infrastructures, as well as any other ac- and takes part in negotiations. Regarding mar- tivities aimed at smoothly running the pro- keting development, the Commission has high gramme. It also includes certification and level powers in the promotion of Galileo’s standardization activities, service provision uses. It also assesses the impact of Galileo on and associated marketing, and cooperation EU competitiveness for the upstream & down- with other GNSS. The development of the next stream markets, services provision and end generation of the system and the evolution of users. the provided services are also part of this Last but not least, the Commission has re- stage48. The handover of exploitation manage- sponsibility for the security of the programme, ment, from ESA to the GSA, will take place at in accordance with the requirements of mem- the beginning of this phase. This phase is fully ber states. It thus supervises the implementa- funded by the EU (€ 3 billion for 2014-2020) tion of those requirements, trying to ensure and managed by the EC. that they have minimal delay and cost impact on the programme. It also plays a coordination 3.2.3 Main Actors role for the entities involved in security, and provides advice for the Joint Action (see 3.2.3.1 The Commission 3.2.5.3). Concerning the PRS, the Commission updates and amends the Common Minimal Prerogatives Standards to take into account developments in the Galileo programme. The role of the European Commission (EC) in the European GNSS programmes is mainly de- Internal organization regarding the Galileo fined by the GNSS Regulation, and further programme specified by particular regulations and imple- menting decisions. In order to fulfil its tasks concerning Galileo and EGNOS programmes, the Commission has The Commission has overall responsibility for set up a specific directorate for the EU Satellite the Galileo programme, and is in charge of the Navigation Programme, under the authority of management of the funding allocated through the DG GROW (Directorate-General for Inter- the MFF. This includes taking the major pro- nal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and grammatic decisions, defining the associated SMEs). This directorate consists of three units, objectives and priorities, establishing the pro- with a total staff of 75 evenly split between the gramme’s legal and policy frameworks as well Programme Management unit, the Legal and as the missions, service and security require- Institutional Aspects unit, and the Applica- ments while ensuring the coherence of those tions, Security, International Cooperation (in- decisions with other EU funding programmes, cluding market uptake) unit. notably H2020. In particular, the EC defines the operational and technical specifications of In addition, the Commission has set up two the services and takes into account the future expert groups for specific subjects, gathering evolution of the system. The last component EC representatives, member states and ex- of this overall responsibility is that the Com- perts. The first one is the Security Board for the European GNSS, which advises the Com- mission supervises other actors, oversees the 49 implementation of the programme, ensures a mission on security related matters . This is clear division of tasks between the GSA and where member states present their security ESA and mitigates cost, schedule and perfor- requirements, which are discussed in order to mance risks. The Commission also provides reach a consensus that will enable decisions to member states and the European Parliament be implemented by the GSA and ESA in their with all relevant information. industrial contracts. The GSA, ESA and EEAS can only be associated as observers, providing In addition to these aspects of its general re- non-binding inputs to the EC. This expert sponsibility over the programme, the Commis- group has six working groups: National Expert sion manages, on behalf of the EU, the assets Team (WG-NET), Public Regulated Service
48 This is also funded by the programme H2020 from the 49 European Commission. Commission Decision of 20 April Union and by the programme NAVISP on the ESA side. 2009 establishing an expert group on the security of the The new satellites should begin to replace the current gen- European GNSS systems. Brussels: European Union. eration around 2025.
ESPI Report 62 20 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
(WG-PRS), Protection of Classified Information among both public and international part- (WG-PCI and COMSEC), PRS User Segment ners50. Standards (WG-PUSS), Incident Response Co- However, this status is also constrained by ordination Working Group (WG-IRC) and PRS regulations and rules regarding, in particular, User Segment Standards (WG-CDA). The sec- resources management: the framework of the ond expert group is the Search and Rescue GSA is not only delineated by the five regula- Galileo Operations Advisory Board. It deals tions aforementioned (3.2.1), but also by gen- with the SAR Service, defining its operational eral provisions and their interpretations and exploitation model so as to facilitate its in- through internal decisions. Those complemen- tegration into the Cospas-Sarsat system. tary regulations and decisions are: Though the DG GROW is in charge of pro- Regulation (EU, Euratom) N° 966/2012 of gramme management, it is not the only DG the European Parliament and of the Coun- related to Galileo, since DG MOVE, DG cil of 25 October 2012 on the financial CONNECT, DG HOME and DG AGRI are cus- rules applicable to the general budget of tomers of Galileo for their own programmes. the Union; An inter-service group, meeting on an ad-hoc basis at the DG, Directorate and experts level, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) allows the concerned DGs to anticipate pro- N° 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the gramme developments, identify concrete ac- rules of application of Regulation N° tions for their own programmes and inform the 966/2012; DG GROW of their requirements. Decision of the Administrative Board of 25 Following the rules of comitology, Member April 2014 adopting the GSA Financial States scrutinize EC programme implementa- Regulation 2014; tion and exploitation through a European GNSS Programmes Committee (see 3.2.5.4). Decision of the Administrative Board of 25 April 2014 adopting the GSA Financial 3.2.3.2 The GSA Regulation Implementing Rules 2014. It should be noted that, in 2012, the problem GSA status of the multiplication of agencies, their hetero- The GSA is a decentralized (or regulatory) geneity and lack of accountability to the Euro- agency of the EU and a key element of Euro- pean institutions led them to engage in reflec- pean GNSS governance. Such agencies are in- tions that resulted in the endorsement of a le- tended to improve the functioning of EU insti- gally non-binding common approach. This ap- tutions, and are tailored for the completion of proach, which is still in effect, aims at specific administrative, technical or scientific specifying further the place of the agencies tasks. They are created through secondary within the EU, their modalities of creation and legislation (usually a Council regulation), with- dissolution, their funding rules, their budget out a predetermined life span, and endowed management, their structure and the control with legal personality. In its current form, the over them exerted by the Commission and the GSA was set up by the Parliament and the other European institutions. The GSA, with its Council through Regulation (EU) N° 912/2010, current organization is regarded as a role amended by the Regulation (EU) N° 512/2014 model concerning the implementation of those (GSA Regulation). recommendations51. The activities of decentralized agencies are su- Prerogatives of the GSA pervised by an Administrative Board com- As mentioned in the introduction, the role of prised of EU Member States as well as the the GSA, its prerogatives and its internal or- Commission. They enjoy fewer constraints in ganization, has changed several times since their functioning as compared to the Commis- the beginning of the Galileo programme. The sion since they have greater flexibility on Agency was created in 2004 to protect the budget matters, better reactivity and the ca- public interest within the former Galileo PPP pacity to hire highly specialized staff – espe- model, and given with an important core of re- cially through the recruitment of external con- lated prerogatives (concession contract imple- sultants. They should be less influenced by mentation, security management, PRS related general political issues than European institu- activities, Member States coordination etc.). tions, and benefit from an increased visibility After a drastic reduction of its role, the last regulation gave an important role back to the
50 Ramboll-Euréval-Matrix. Evaluation of the EU decentral- agencies. COM (2015) 179 final of 24 April 2015. Brussels: ised agencies in 2009, Final Report Vol. 1: i. European Union. 7. 51 European Commission. Progress report on the imple- mentation of the Common Approach on EU decentralized
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GSA as the entity that should progressively of the systems, certification and standardiza- take charge of system exploitation. tion operations and service provision, and ac- tivities relative to the evolution and develop- The current prerogatives of the GSA are now ment of the system and its services. The GSA mainly defined by the GNSS Regulation, com- is also expected to provide the Commission pleted by the GSA Regulation. They are of two with technical expertise and contribute to the kinds: some prerogatives are fully owned by definition of mission, service and system evo- the GSA (“core prerogatives”), whereas others lution. are delegated by the Commission through a delegation agreement. Other delegated tasks are marketing develop- ment prerogatives with the promotion of ser- Core prerogatives vices, applications and fundamental elements The GSA is responsible for the security of the such as Galileo-compatible receivers and chip- system in the fields not covered by the Com- sets, research and development prerogatives mission (as defined by the GNSS Regulation), (with tasks related to Horizon 2020 and FP7) the Council and the HR (as defined by the and tasks associated with the PRS. Council decision N° 2014/496/CFSP). In prac- Internal organization of the Galileo pro- tice, it plays a key role in this area through: gramme 1. Monitoring of system security and execut- General ing instructions from the Council or the HR in case of security threats; The internal organization of the GSA in its cur- rent form is essentially defined by the GSA 2. Responsibility over programme security Regulation. But this is also strongly influenced accreditation, through implementation by the progress of the programme itself. In- and monitoring of security procedures and deed, as the GSA will take over the exploita- security audits. tion in 2017, its organization is currently not The GSA also has specific responsibilities re- stable, as well as its size. From a staff of 112 garding the PRS: it manages access at system in 2013, the GSA numbered 153 staff in 2016. level, supports and coordinates the national That year was the peak of the ramp-up since Competent PRS Authorities (CPA), assists the only 6 additional staff are expected by 2020. EC in the respect of CMS (see 3.2.5.1), pro- However, this headcount is also increasingly vides PRS related security analysis and is pro- completed by external consultants and the posed to be the CPA for EU PRS participants overall staff could continue to increase – there (Council, Commission, EAAS, agencies) and were 15 in 2015 and 35 in 2016. Those figures international organizations52. do not include the operations for the exploita- tion of the system outsourced to GSOp. The The last core prerogatives of the GSA regard detailed GSA headcount and its evolution are market development, in coordination with the given in Annex A.5. Commission. It provides market analysis for Galileo services, and establishes an action plan The structure of the Agency is divided into to foster their uptake by user communities. three organs: This includes certification and standardization The Administrative Board actions, as well as the establishment of con- tacts with relevant stakeholders to promote The Executive Director the uses of Galileo services and understand The Security Accreditation Board (SAB) their needs. The Administrative Board Prerogatives delegated by the Commission: The Administrative Board is composed of a Nevertheless, the main prerogatives are dele- representative per Member State, four repre- gated by the Commission. The most important sentatives from the EC and a representative one is the management of exploitation, whose without voting power from the Parliament. The operational activities are outsourced to GSOp. SAB, the HR and ESA are also invited as ob- The GSA thus manages all the related con- servers. A decision is taken by an absolute ma- tracts, including with the operator, but also as- jority of the members. sociated with the other service facilities (GRC, GSC, GSMC, Time and Geodesy facilities, SAR The Administrative Board has authority over Ground Segment and Validation Test Bench). the core activities of the GSA, overseeing them Those prerogatives include system infrastruc- and the associated expenses, except those ture management, upgradeable maintenance carried out by the SAB and those delegated to
52 The PRS chain is very specific, and particularly decen- which the Member States agreed. The CPAs receive re- tralised. Each Member State has to establish a CPA, which quests from their users and directly transmit them to the defines for its country the PRS users and their access to GSMC, which orders GSOp to implement. GSOp only im- the service, following the Common Minimum Standards on plements the request and is not “aware” of its origin.
ESPI Report 62 22 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
the GSA by the Commission. Those delegated The Ground Segment is made up of two con- activities represent more than 90% of the cur- trol centres and a global network of transmit- rent expenses of the GSA and for those tasks, ting and receiving stations. Those two centres, the Executive Director is directly accountable located at Fucino (Italy) and Oberpfaffenhofen to the Commission and indirectly to the pro- (Germany) are redundant: they both manage gramme Committee to which the EC reports53. the core control functions (spacecraft house- The Administrative Board adopts annual and keeping and constellation maintenance) and multi-annual programmes for the GSA that mission functions (determination and uplink of need to be accepted by the Commission. It is navigation data messages to provide the nav- not clear at the moment to what extent this igation and timing services)55. board will oversee Galileo operations, but one Control functions are supported by a Galileo can expect than its responsibility will increase Control Segment (GCS), of which the other el- later54. ements are five globally distributed Telemetry The Executive Director Tracking and Control stations (TTC) communi- cating with the satellites for regular contacts, The Executive Director implements the tasks contingency contacts and long-term test cam- defined as part of the annual and multiannual paigns. work plans agreed within the Administrative Board or delegated by the Commission. The Mission functions are supported by a Galileo only exception is related to tasks under the re- Mission Segment (GMS) global network of Gal- sponsibility of the SAB. These include market- ileo Sensor Stations (GSS) continuously mon- ing development, management of the exploi- itoring navigation signals from satellites. The tation, the implementation of security require- GMS communicates through a global network ments, and security monitoring etc. of Mission Up-Link Stations (ULS) located in five sites: Svalbard in Norway, Kourou in Nine entities are under the responsibility of the French Guyana, Papeete in French Polynesia, Executive Director: Sainte-Marie on Reunion Island, and Noumea Security department in New Caledonia56. Market Development department Remote stations (TTC, GSS and ULS) are con- nected to the GCCs by a hybrid communication Project Control and Quality management network including special radio, wired data department and voice communication links. Galileo Security Monitoring Centres Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC) Galileo Programme Management The Galileo Security Monitoring Centre is com- EGNOS Programme Management posed of two facilities, one in charge in Saint- Germain-en-Laye (France) and a back up in Internal Audit Swanwick (United Kingdom). They are the Communication only GSA major operational centres where most of the staff are insourced. They are in- Administration volved in three areas: Though the GSA headquarter is located in Pra- Security: Monitoring security threats and gue, the GSA has set up centres in different the operational status of systems compo- parts of Europe. Most of them are dedicated to nents; exploitation (Ground Segment), or to service provision to users (Galileo Services Facilities). PRS: Ensuring the security of PRS infor- Their locations are listed in Annex A.3 and the mation dissemination and the interface scheme of their interactions is given in Annex with governmental entities and Galileo A.4. The main Galileo centres are described core components; below. Emergency: Implementation of “Joint Ac- Galileo Control Centres (GCC) and associated tion” instructions following a Council or HR elements decision in case of emergency (see 3.2.5.3). Galileo Reference Centre (GRC)
53 European GNSS Agency. Multi-Annual Work pro- 55 “Galileo Ground Segment.” 18 September 2014. Euro- gramme 2014-2020. 2013. Prague: European Union. 29. pean Space Agency 19 December 2016
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Together with the use of Key Performance In- It is potentially open to any state, but in prac- dicators (KPI), the GRC, located in Noordwijk, tice, a limited number of experienced member is one of the two parallel ways set up by the states attends it. The CDA deals with the man- GSA to monitor the performance of the opera- agement of EU cryptographic materials neces- tor. This centre provides the GSA with an in- sary for the functioning of the system. dependent system to evaluate the quality of the signals and the operational performance of 3.2.3.3 ESA GSOp both through specific campaign-based analysis and daily monitoring. The operations Prerogatives in the GRC are outsourced (and independent The GNSS Regulation provides ESA with differ- from GSOp), but the centre can also use ex- ent prerogatives during the deployment and pertise available in member states and the the exploitation phases. However, those two data they collect. Its operations started pro- phases are likely to overlap until 2020, and gressively with the declaration of initial ser- this evolution will take place progressively. vices. During the deployment phase, the Commis- European GNSS Service Centre (GSC) sion delegates to ESA system design and de- The GSC is the gateway for users and will be velopment, as well as the associated procure- operated by GSOp. This is intended to be the ment. Concretely, the ESA/GSA interface will single user interface for the Open and Com- become the main ESA interface for the pro- mercial Services, providing constant infor- gramme and ESA will only procure and launch mation about the health status of the system, the satellites for the Commission. This interac- communications in case of system outage tion is framed by a convention of delegation (equivalent to the civil aviation “NOTAM”) and and validated by the GNSS Committee. Fur- an interface with all the information needed for thermore, ESA continues to supervise the ex- chip or receiver manufacturers as well as mar- ploitation of the constellation under deploy- ket information. ment operated by a private operator until mid- 2017, the first months of 2017 being dedicated When the Commercial Service is delivered, it to the handover to the GSA. will be hosted by the GSC: the outputs and in- puts will be channelled to the CS Service pro- The precise role of ESA during the exploitation vider through this centre. phase is mainly defined through a working ar- rangement with the GSA (see 3.2.4.3). ESA is Security Accreditation Board (SAB) the system architect of Galileo, in interface The Security Accreditation Board is a hierar- with the GSA. Procurement and integration of chically independent structure within the GSA, the components of the ground segment and in a way parallel to the Administrative services are done directly for the GSA. In par- Board/Executive Director couple. The inde- allel, ESA fosters the know-how transfer asso- pendence of the SAB decision-making process ciated with the handover of responsibility for is thus ensured, though the resources are still exploitation. It will then continue to provide provided by the Agency. In order to prevent technical support related to exploitation and its technical isolation, SAB staff are also part maintenance, carrying out laboratory tests of the Security department. It is composed of and providing technical solutions for detailed one representative of each member state, of maintenance cases and complex technical is- the Commission and of the HR. sues in the current system. ESA will also pre- pare the evolution of future generations of the The SAB is situated at the end of the security- system (design, elaboration, follow-up, pro- ensuring chain. It accredits the systems and curement and validation). major operations of the programme (launches, early services, Joint Action implementation for During these phases, ESA also provides tech- instance), assessing the remaining risk and nical expertise to the Commission. In particu- risk mitigation plan of the systems through an lar, the space agency is involved in the inter- iterative process, and then sensitizes the national negotiations regarding Galileo, where Commission before it takes a decision. Addi- it delivers inputs and processes the technical tionally, the SAB briefs to EC on specific secu- outputs of the negotiations. ESA also carries rity-related subjects, if necessary, and sits on out research activities regarding the first the European GNSS Programme Committee. phases of the system’s next generation and Galileo’s infrastructures, which are funded as To fulfil its missions, the SAB has set up two part of the EU Horizon 2020 programme. technical bodies: the Galileo Security Accredi- tation Panel (GSAP) and the Crypto Distribu- Internal organisation regarding the Galileo tion Authority (CDA). The GSAP plays a main programme role, preparing the technical aspects of SAB On the ESA side, the Galileo programme is car- decisions through analysis, reviews and tests. ried out within the Directorate of Navigation,
ESPI Report 62 24 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
supervised by a Programme Board gathering since the next phase involves an increase in ESA Member States. ESA/GSA interaction. At the beginning of 2017, the Directorate was made up of 254 full time equivalent staff, with 3.2.4.2 GSA-Commission more than 80% involved in the Galileo pro- The relationship between the GSA and the gramme. Among them, 20 staff are supervis- Commission takes place through different ing the system operator until the full handover channels, corresponding to the different kind to the GSA. of prerogatives entrusted to the GSA. The In accordance with the evolution of preroga- Commission is represented on the Administra- tives of ESA, the Agency is going through a tive Board of the SAB – with no voting power staff reorganization. By the end of the process, – and directly delegates a number of tasks to the total number should be the same, but most the GSA. This kind of interaction is clearly operational activities will be discontinued and framed by the regulations regarding the or- system design activities will restart for the de- ganisms of the EU. The delegation interface velopment of the Galileo next generation. largely predominates given the nature of, and the budget for activities which are not dele- gated57, with which the Administrative Board 3.2.4 Relations between the Main Actors is marginally associated, meaning that it re- ceives updates on progress at each Board Given the entanglement of their prerogatives, meeting but has no decision-making power on the three actors of the governance triangle are the delegated tasks. As the Regulation im- in regular interface on different aspects of the poses tight conditions on the related delega- programme management. In particular, they tion agreements, it gives the Commission all take part in the Programme Change Control strong control over the GSA. This means lim- Board, a trilateral board where any modifica- ited responsibility, compared to the status first tion of the technical configuration of the pro- given to the GSA and to the other EU agencies, gramme is discussed. Yet, this board meets which are mainly supervised by member occasionally in today’s programme. In addition states. to those trilateral relations, they have also bi- lateral interfaces between them, which are de- This provision, in line with the GNSS regula- tailed below. tion, is justified by the fact that the Commis- sion has de jure responsibility for the pro- 3.2.4.1 Commission-ESA gramme. Since the GSA in its current form is a young organization, the member states and Relations between the European Commission the Commission considered that it was neces- and ESA are complex by nature. The two insti- sary to stabilize the GSA before entrusting it tutions have different histories, different pur- with greater responsibilities, and the GSA poses and different organisational cultures. seems to share this view. One can expect a The Commission is a political institution that progressive increase in the autonomy of the has been created within the frame of the EU GSA, in line with the consolidation of its com- construct, while ESA is an independent inter- petencies, to be finally suitable for the full han- governmental organisation created for scien- dling of exploitation by 2020. This will be de- tific and research purposes. cided in the next GNSS regulation and though The current relation is mainly a vertical one: the best option is an autonomous GSA, fully in the Commission, as programme manager, del- charge of exploitation, other scenarios are egates tasks to ESA, and exerts tight scrutiny possible. It will of course depend on the results over the activities of the agency, including sys- during the next two years, but such consider- tematic information from the EC and the sub- ations are also included in more general think- mission of costs estimates from ESA. The del- ing about the roles of all the stakeholders of egation agreement stipulates, inter alia, the governance. conditions for the use of the allocated funds, This is not the case for the SAB which, because the actions to be implemented for system de- of its hierarchical independence from the Ex- sign and development, management proce- ecutive Directorate, and its composition, may dures as well as follow-up and control be seen as a tool in the hands of the member measures. The current GNSS regulation also states to balance the power of the Commis- specifies that the degree of control of the EC sion, de facto able to block important deci- over ESA should be analogous to that of the sions. EC over an EU agency. The intensity of such interactions is nevertheless on the decreasing
57 European GNSS Agency. Multi-Annual Work Pro- gramme 2014-2020. 2013. 29.
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3.2.4.3 GSA-ESA The main role of member states concerns the security of the programme, more specifically Though the GNSS regulation requests the regarding security accreditation and the PRS. Commission to clearly divide the tasks be- This service works in a highly decentralized tween the GSA and ESA, this aspect as well as way, based on national Competent PRS Au- most of the modalities of their interaction dur- thorities (CPA), which is the interface with the ing the exploitation phase are defined in a bi- PRS authorized users that member states des- lateral way, through the working arrangement ignate. For this, in November 2015 common signed in December 2016. This arrangement is minimal security requirements – the Common a contract, as the EU financial regulation per- Minimum Standards (CMS)58 – were agreed. taining to the agencies only allows them to The Commission also needs member states’ have contractual agreements, including with expertise regarding security for negotiation on public entities. It is divided into three specific the use of PRS by a third state. They are also contracts, defining a relation with multiple involved in the Joint Action through the Coun- components. The main one, contained in the cil. two first specific contracts is vertical: the GSA is the customer of ESA, which provides the Besides these general prerogatives, several ground segment and implements the system Member States have specific responsibilities in to reach FOC 2.0. The GSA thus pilots ESA ac- the programme. Some have Galileo infrastruc- tivities as this binding working arrangement tures on their territory and are responsible for provides, with a juridical text supported by their protection. Member States’ agencies are market, technical and management annexes. supposed to provide technical support to the However, the working arrangement gives Commission, and some of them are signifi- more autonomy to ESA in the management of cantly involved in specific tasks: CNES will op- its procurement in comparison to the 2014 erate the SAR service, and the DLR owns 50% agreement. of the current GSOp, Spaceopal. In parallel to this interface, another compo- It should be noted that though Galileo is nent of the GSA-ESA relation, defined by the owned by the EU, Switzerland and Norway, as third specific contract, corresponds to a hori- associated countries, play an important role, zontal interaction and addresses two issues. each in a different way: A Swiss Company pro- First, ESA provides the technical support to the vided the atomic clocks used in the payload, GSA that this agency needs for exploitation while Oslo accepted the deployment of two im- and for specific tasks, with a defined amount portant Galileo ground bases on its territory. of resources. Second, the arrangement pro- vides coordination mechanisms and board de- 3.2.5.2 The Council and the European Parlia- cisions in order to harmoniously manage the ment deployment of the constellation by ESA and its exploitation by the GSA. ESA also supports the The Council and the European Parliament are, GSA for the evolution of the system during ex- together with the Commission, the main actors ploitation by proposing relevant technical so- of the “Meta-governance” of the programme, lutions. i.e. the definition of the Galileo governance scheme and resources. 3.2.5 Other Actors in Governance Regulations defining the structure of the pro- gramme management are produced through the ordinary legislative procedure: proposed 3.2.5.1 Member States and Associated Third by the Commission and adopted by the Parlia- States ment and the Council. The Council also plays Though Galileo is a fully funded EU pro- a specific role in producing decisions for the gramme, member states potentially have Common Foreign and Security Policy related strong influence over the programme since aspects of the programme. they are involved from all sides: within the The two institutions also exert a major influ- Council, the SAB, the GSA Administrative ence on the programme through the definition Board, the ESA Ministerial Council and ESA of the multiannual budget of the EU as well as Navigation Programme Board, and in the Eu- the annual appropriations. Both are defined ropean GNSS Programme Committee. The GNSS Regulation also allows member states, with the approval of the Commission, to di- rectly fund specific elements of the pro- gramme.
58 Cameron, Alan. "System of Systems: Galileo turns 12 — or 9." GPS World 7 January 2016.
ESPI Report 62 26 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
through a special legislative procedure59: they (in practice, to the GSMC). Though the normal are adopted by the Council after approbation procedure envisages decisions to be made by of the Parliament. In practice, the European the Council, if the HR decides that the situation Council also plays a main role in orientating requires an emergency decision, she/he will be the Council of the EU. endowed with this responsibility. The Council and the European Parliament are The EEAS has organized itself for these pur- informed about the evolution of the pro- poses, notably setting up a GNSS Threat Re- gramme (costs, risks, calendar, results but sponse Architecture (GTRA). also working arrangements, delegation agree- ments, industrial contracts and decisions 3.2.5.4 European GNSS Programme Committee taken after accreditation) by the Commission. In particular, the Galileo Interinstitutional The European GNSS Programme Committee Panel (GIP) has been set up for this purpose, was created following the rules of comitology. but this structure has proved hard to remain It monitors and supports the activities of the active. It has not been used over the last two Commission and is also a space for dialogue years. The European Parliament and the Coun- with member states, though there are also re- cil also can revoke delegated acts regarding dundancies with the ESA Navigation Pro- security. Lastly, the GSA Administrative Board gramme Board and the GSA Administrative also reports to them, and the Parliament has Board. It has, de facto, an advisory function. a representative without vote at the GSA Ad- This programme Committee has four working ministrative Board. groups: The Council has two additional prerogatives. Galileo Commercial Service (CS WG) First, it plays a major role in international re- Compatibility, Signal and Interoperability lations, mandating the Commission for inter- Working Group (CSI WG) national negotiations60. In the case of Galileo, it specifically approves the PRS access negoti- Galileo Reference Centre Working Group ated by the Commission with third states and (GRC WG) international organizations. Second, it de- European GNSS Evolution Working Group cides, together with the HR, upon the emer- (EE WG) gency decisions raised by international risks to be taken as part of the Joint Action61. The last working group also includes ESA and GSA representatives in addition to member Thus, concretely speaking, those two institu- state representatives. tions have a limited role within the pro- gramme, but a major, though occasional, role 3.2.5.5 GSOp on the programme ambitions and governance, especially through the development of GNSS As mentioned above, exploitation operations regulations and the multiannual financial are outsourced by the GSA to a private com- framework. pany, GSOp. The corresponding bid solicitation conducted by the GSA was finalised at the end 3.2.5.3 European External Action Service of 2016, extending the mission of Spaceopal that had already been operating the building The European External Action Service (EEAS) constellation under a contract with ESA. The and especially its Head, the High Representa- contract value is €1.5 billion. tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), are not involved per se in the Galileo GSOp operates the two Galileo Control Cen- programme governance but the service is pro- tres, the Galileo Service Centre and the other vided with major responsibilities in the man- relevant exploitation infrastructures provided agement of emergency cases according to the by the programme, requiring around 200 staff. Joint Action defined by Regulation 2014/496. It is in charge of the space and ground seg- ments operations for the Open Service and the This Joint Action covers cases of threats to the Commercial Service. This includes launches, EU or member state security or essential in- routine maintenance (the detailed/special terests, for instance linked to international cri- maintenance is carried out by ESA), satellite sis and related to the exploitation of Galileo, requiring the giving of instructions to the GSA
59 “Multiannual Financial Framework.” September 2016. Union 19 December 2016
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station-keeping, signal dissemination and user should provide the operator with a liability lim- interface provision. ited to specific contractual ceilings, since the tender documents define the GSA as the ser- GSOp is responsible for ensuring that the pro- vice provider, in principle liable vis-à-vis us- gramme complies with the Galileo Services ers62. The GSA is liable up to a second ceiling, performance requirements. It is expected to while the final liability is to be borne by the have relative autonomy thanks to procure- Commission. ment procedures allowing it to autonomously settle minor issues and realise minor develop- Since the GSA is the customer of GSOp, there ments. The GSA supervises its activities is a less formal relationship with ESA. How- through Key Performance Indicators (docu- ever, the GSA-ESA working arrangement pro- mentation update, reactivity, availability, cov- vides that the space agency supports the GSA erage, etc.) and direct monitoring of GSOp in the management of the GSOp contract with performance through the GRC. GSOp also re- a dedicated team, and interfaces with GSOp ports through an escalation process depending for coordination purposes during the exploita- on the seriousness of the problems encoun- tion and deployment activities overlap. tered. Concerning liability, the GSOp contract
62 Baumann, Ingo. “State of Play in the European Union” Inside GNSS December 2015.
ESPI Report 62 28 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
4. Current Issues in the Galileo Governance Scheme
Since the entry into force of the 2013 GNSS system. While this phase has just begun, and regulation and the 2014 GSA regulation, the on the eve of the preparation of the next reg- Galileo programme has made dramatic pro- ulation, the intention here is to identify a num- gress. On the institutional side, those new reg- ber of potential issues, and in the next chap- ulations continued the work started in 2008 in ters propose recommendations to overcome order to set up relevant structures of govern- some difficulties that may jeopardize healthy ance to ensure fully public management of governance. Galileo. The GNSS regulation clarified the pro- vision of each actor, and outlined the effective mechanisms to be implemented for the next phases of the programme. With the re-consol- 4.1 Transversal Aspects idation of the GSA, triangular governance, that is expected to continue until 2020, was insti- 4.1.1 The Necessarily Complex Governance of the tuted and will be then revised in the next Programme GNSS regulation. The GSA regulation accord- ingly established a clear organisation structure One of the features of the current governance for the GSA and its internal mechanisms. To- of Galileo, as described in Chapter II, is its gether, they created an effective institutional complexity, which originates from different framework for the deployment phase, and pre- sources, and their interactions with each pared the stage for the upcoming exploitation other: the current European institutional con- phase. figuration in the space field, the general EU As a consequence, very good operational re- framework, and the history of the programme. sults have been obtained since then. The de- First, as described in (3.1.2), the organisa- ployment of the space segment, in particular, tional architecture in the space area at the Eu- strongly accelerated with the launches of 14 ropean level rests on three pillars: the Euro- FOC satellites between August 2014 and No- pean Union, the European Space Agency and vember 2016. The last one, on 17 November the Member States, the latter holding back for 2016, sending four satellites into orbit, also the Galileo programme. The EU is increasingly demonstrated the possibility of using the Eu- the political driving force in this field, propos- ropean launcher Ariane, rather than the Rus- ing, funding and now managing two new pro- sian Soyuz, for the next launches of Galileo, grammes in the space sector. In parallel, most ensuring European independence in this pro- of the technical competencies in this domain gramme. In parallel, most of the ground seg- are within the European Space Agency. For its ment facilities have been deployed, and on the part, the GSA has increasing weight on secu- user side, the initial services were declared on rity and market development, and is develop- 15 December 2016. The performances ob- ing rapidly in exploitation expertise thanks to served and announced on this occasion seem the knowledge gained from the EGNOS exploi- to be remarkably good63. Clearly, the pro- tation. While ESA is an unavoidable partner for gramme has taken off, leading to a current sit- European Union space programmes, there is uation significantly different from 2013. no standard or reference institutional scheme However, those good operational results do of cooperation between the two organizations and this hampers the overall efficiency of the not guarantee that the governance scheme 64,65 provided by the current GNSS regulation is op- management of the programme . Without an up-to-date and stable framework, accepted timal, nor that it is fully adapted to the next step of the programme: the exploitation of the by all stakeholders, the current unachieved structure of governance may give way to the
63 With in particular the following figures: Ranging accu- 65 European Commission. Report from the Commission. racy: ~0.8 m; UTS dissemination accuracy: ~ 9,5 ns; GPS- Progress report on establishing appropriate relations be- Galileo time offset: ~6.8 ns. More information at tween the European Union and the European Space
ESPI Report 62 29 January 2017
expression of conflicting views, in particular eations potentially exacerbates the issues re- regarding the rules of programme manage- lated to differences of cultures, functioning ment but also concerning the institutional evo- and purposes. lution of the European approach to space. This Another important resulting problem is the necessarily leads to the development of com- separation, within this complex structure, of plex, sub-optimal cooperation processes since control of programme management key pa- the chosen schemes are also the outcome of rameters – cost, calendar and performance. ad-hoc compromises between ESA and EU The distribution of prerogatives and compe- bodies. tencies prevents those key parameters to be Second, the European Union is a complex managed by a single entity, impeding the es- structure in itself, and this feature reflects on tablishment of the leadership necessary to its programme management. Unlike the other move the programme efficiently forward. GNSS programmes, where the governance is Though the governance scheme was different, easier because of military control, the Union this dilution of responsibility and its negative involves twenty-eight member states with di- impacts on governance was already pointed verging interests, as well as its own institu- out by the Court of Auditors in 200967. That tions. While those institutions differ in nature being said, significant progress has been made (intergovernmental or community for in- recently to converge to a more effective net- stance) the executive and legislative powers work structure of governance. In particular, are distributed among them, through complex the delegation arrangements and the recent procedures. Hence a heavy machine, the func- working arrangement between the GSA and tioning of which is subject to inertia and lack ESA have provided a sound base to clarify of flexibility that may weigh on the governance those interactions. of an operational programme. The third source of complexity is at the pro- 4.1.2 The Constraining Framework of the Euro- gramme level and is related to the choices pean Union made in the past about the project and its suc- cessive evolutions (see 1.3). The current con- The framework of the European Union con- figuration is indeed partially the consequence strains programme management especially of the decisions made to address issues the because of the nature of the institutional in- programme faced earlier on, and not only the struments available for its implementation. In- result of a concerted thought to create from deed, the necessity to quickly put back on scratch an optimal governance scheme taking track the project after the failure of the PPP advantage of the status and competencies of prevented the development of institutional each actor. In particular, the EC, the GSA and and legal tools (organs, processes, rules etc.) the ESA had different roles in the first config- corresponding to the new ambitions of the EU uration, and the prerogatives they progres- in the space field. The governance schemes sively got in 2008 and 2014 through the suc- retained in 2008 and 2014 were based on ac- cessive regulations evolved in the current sit- tors and processes that preceded the pro- uation because of the needs of the moment. gramme’s quantum change from a PPP to a fully public funded model, bound by general As a consequence, all the actors of the gov- regulations and thus not tailored to the specific ernance triangle have been endowed with needs of the management of large space op- tasks which have never before been part of erational systems. their core business: initially, in 2004, the GSA was not created to be in charge of the exploi- Thus, after the failure of the PPP, the only legal tation of the system, which was supposed to basis to fund the programme was the Trans- be operated by a private company through a European Transport Networks Frame (TEN-T), PPP model; ESA plays the role of a procure- which involved specific rules regarding the ment agency while it is a structure dedicated governance of Galileo. In particular, the TEN- to research and development; and the Com- T was developed for civil applications usually mission is for the first time responsible for the without strong security components, and as- overall management of a large space pro- sumes a shared competence of the MS and the gramme66. This hitherto unseen distribution of Commission. Currently, the general regulatory prerogatives and its sometimes blurred delin- requirements bind the actors of the pro- gramme in their internal functioning. The comitology rules apply to programme imple- mentation and thus constrain the actions of
66 Council of the European Union. Council Regulation (EC) 67 European Court of Auditors. The management of the N° 1321/2004 of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of Galileo programme's development and validation phase. structures for the management of the European satellite Special Report N° 7/2009. Brussels: European Union. 34. radio-navigation programmes. Brussels: European Union. 3-4.
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the Commission regarding the management of 4.1.3 Issues Caused by the Programme Manage- Galileo. Furthermore, the EU financial regula- ment at the Political Level tion released in 2012 also firmly binds the ex- ecution of the budgets attributed to the Com- The evolution of the role of the Commission is mission, providing in particular limited room to probably the main consequence of the failure manoeuvre in its recruitment procedures, its of the PPP model. The Commission saved the authorized manpower, and corresponding sal- programme through its will, pushing for a fully aries of its workforce68. To a lesser extent, the public funded model and proposing itself as actions of EU bodies under Commission con- overall manager of Galileo. This salutary solu- trol, such as the GSA, are framed by a specific tion was probably the only option at that time “Framework Financial Regulation” – a dele- but as was identified by the Court of Auditors gated regulation of the Commission – and its in 2009, it also presented some risks, in par- declination through the GSA Financial Regula- ticular as a result of the limited experience of tion of 2014. Those regulations a priori enable the Commission in the management of this 73 more flexibility in resource manage- kind of programmes at that time . As a mat- ment69,70,71. ter of fact, the management of operational programmes is not a classic function for a po- Furthermore, European Union rules also con- litical and regulatory institution like the Com- strain relations between Galileo governance mission. This requires a way of functioning, actors and the way they interact, since the le- the setting up of specific processes and an ap- gal form of the delegation and working agree- propriate, result-oriented culture that the ments as well as the possibilities they offer are Commission had to develop at that time. Fur- also specified by the aforementioned regula- thermore, the political nature of the Commis- tions. In particular, the delegation agreements sion may also have an influence on the pro- are framed by the Framework Financial Regu- gramme management. Indeed, this institution lation, mainly through its Article 872. They also is particularly sensitive to the broader political impose a contractual form for the relations of context of the European Union. While the po- EU agencies with bodies external to the EU, litical momentum of Galileo has largely worn adapted from relations with private actors. down, it is difficult to protect the programme The resulting contractual nature of the work- from reallocations of human resources to is- ing arrangement between ESA and the GSA sues considered more pressing (Brexit, mi- has deep implications: it may dissociate the grant crisis, etc.). So far, the European Com- interests of the Agency and those of the pro- mission has managed to preserve the staff re- gramme. Indeed, it tends to redefine the role sources granted to the programme, but has of ESA from steering industrial management not significantly increased them for the exploi- and risk mitigation to a more “industrial” role, tation phase (see Annex A.5). The Commission delivering specific services on the request of is also more exposed to public opinion and to the programme management and thus having the risk image carried by the programme and an interest in defending the limits of its com- this can slow down or misdirect the decision mitments regarding them. making process. On the one hand, it can lead Here as well, endeavours have been made by to an exaggerated aversion to the most pub- the three actors to improve those institutional licly perceived risks – legal and budgetary. On relations. For instance, the delegation agree- the other hand, some decisions that should be ment from the Commission to ESA and the based on purely technical considerations – for working arrangement between the two agen- instance, the launch of satellites or the loca- cies provide ESA with more flexibility in its pro- tion of the GSA facilities – might be also influ- curement and, on paper, has significantly clar- enced by political considerations. ified the relations between the two agencies The dilution of responsibilities within the EU for the coming years. But some constraints re- framework, the competing views of some main unavoidable as long as new instruments, member states, and the focus on the most im- more adapted to this kind of programme, are mediate issues due to limited staff resources, not developed. until recently has hampered the development
68 European Parliament and Council of the European Un- 70 European GNSS Agency. Decision of the Administrative ion. Regulation (EU, Euratom) N° 966/2012 of the Euro- Board adopting the GSA Financial Regulation 2014 of 25 pean Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on April 2014. the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the 71 European GNSS Agency. Decision of the Administrative Union and repealing Council Regulation N° 1605/2002. Board adopting the GSA Financial Regulation Implement- Brussels: European Union. ing rules 2014 of 25 April 2014. 69 European Commission. Commission delegated regula- 72 European Commission. Ibid. 3-4. tion (EU) N° 1271/2013 of 30 September 2013 on the 73 European Court of Auditors. The management of the framework financial regulation for the bodies referred to in Galileo programme's development and validation phase. Article 208 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) N° 966/2012 of Special Report N° 7/2009. Brussels: European Union. 40. the European Parliament and of the Council. Brussels: Eu- ropean Union.
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of a long term programmatic vision. The Court a distinct agency involved only in the GNSS of Auditors identified this issue in 2009, both field, is in theory less subject to broader polit- for EGNOS and Galileo programmes74,75. There ical pressures. The different contractual struc- is a persistent difficulty in clearly defining the ture of agencies also enables hiring staff in features of Galileo services fifteen years after more cost-effective ways, facilitating the ac- the end of the definition phase: the Commis- quisition of specific competencies. In practice, sion has not yet adjudicated the disagreement these expected positive effects need to be con- between member states on the applications of firmed. the PRS (see 4.3.4), the Safety of Life service First, the mentioned advantages of an agency has been abandoned because of the lack of in- for such a programme might be hampered by terest from the targeted users, and the Com- the de facto insufficient independence of the mercial Service is suffering from delays (see GSA. Indeed, the Commission keeps a tight 4.5.2). This difficulty points out insufficient control over the Agency, which limits its au- preliminary thought about the nature and the tonomy, except for the SAB. Within the Admin- objectives of the programme. The remaining istrative Board, the Commission is the most ambiguity concerning the division of preroga- important player thanks to its right of veto on tives between GSOp and the GSA also sug- the main decisions77. But its control is even gests that the question of the model of exploi- more important through the delegation of pre- tation has not fully been settled (see 4.2.3). rogatives (see 3.2.3.2), for which the Execu- Last but not least, the late taking of important tive Director of the GSA reports directly to the decisions regarding the exploitation phase, Commission, rather than to the Administrative only some weeks before the declaration of in- Board. It is worth noting that this practice is itial services (choice for GSOp, working ar- somehow a drift from the initial provisions, rangement etc.), and the complexity of the as- which mention the exceptional character of sociated transition phase (see 1.4), composed delegation78. While an agency should take ad- of a superposition of difficult tasks in an unu- vantage of its relative autonomy, compe- sual sequence (the service provider could tences and awareness of the risks faced by the change six months after the beginning of the programme, far from any political influence, service provision), also reveals a lack of antic- the GSA is currently, more than most other ipation and planning. decentralized agencies, dependent on the Nevertheless, the Commission, with the de- Commission. The need to increase the respon- gree of latitude it disposes, seems willing to sibilities of the GSA is a shared opinion. There- increasingly address these issues as shown in fore, the sequence should ensure that the GSA its announcement in the recent Space Strat- elaborates its proper awareness of the priori- egy for Europe of the release of a radio navi- ties and risks in order to gain maturity before gation plan in order to facilitate the introduc- taking on higher responsibilities. In this re- tion of GNSS applications in different sec- spect, the example of EGNOS is enlightening tors76. It could multiply the positive economic since the Administrative Board is still second- fallouts expected from Galileo (see 4.5.3). The ary in this programme: all the issues are pri- Commission has also clearly identified the marily discussed within the GNSS Programmes need to start work now on the evolution of the Committee. However, a positive signal in June programme. Those decisions show a commit- 2016 was the nomination of Jean-Yves Le Gall ment to the future, which is central for the a heavyweight in the European space land- other stakeholders of Galileo, including the us- scape, also France's inter-ministerial coordina- ers. tor for European satellite navigation pro- grammes, as the chair of the Administrative 4.1.4 Issues Relevant to the Current Status of Board. the GSA In addition, the GSA faces difficulties in acquir- ing the expertise necessary to successfully Given the limitations emanating from the po- carry out its mission, and in particular to man- litical dimension of the Commission and the age the exploitation of the system (see 4.2.1). rules applying to this institution, the progres- These difficulties have multiple causes, one of sive transfer of some of its responsibilities to them being the geographical location of the the GSA, as foreseen by the current GNSS reg- ulation, seems beneficial. Indeed, the GSA, as
74 European Court of Auditors. The management of the 77 In particular, the approbation of the annual and multian- Galileo programme's development and validation phase. nual work plans of the GSA requires the vote of the Com- Special Report N° 7/2009. Brussels: European Union. 36. mission representatives. See article 5 paragraph 7 of the 75 Ibid. 46. GSA regulation for more information. 76 European Commission. Space Strategy for Europe. 78 See Article 8 of the Decision of the Administrative Board COM (2016) 705 final of 26 October 2016. Brussels: Euro- adopting the GSA Financial Regulation 2014 of 25 April pean Union. 3. 2014.
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GSA headquarters in Prague79. Another one is their effective influence is difficult to assess for the steep slope in the building up of the re- different reasons. quired staff and competencies: exploiting an First, the multiple channels indeed give them infrastructure like Galileo is a new activity for multiple entry points, but the positions they both the Commission and the GSA. The head- take are not necessarily consistent within the count of the GSA for the period 2014-2020, different institutions. Second, their interests, planned in accordance with the current GNSS engagement and organization regarding the regulation, was made following an external programme strongly differ: some member consultancy for the Commission in 2013, but states are more interested in the industrial what was found to be necessary has not been benefits of the programme, others in its man- granted to the GSA finally. The workforce plan agement or in the security aspects. They do has not been significantly updated to meet ac- not share the same views on the perimeter of tual needs. As a consequence, in order to meet uses of Galileo services, especially regarding its responsibilities, the Agency substantially military uses as well as the definition of some relies on outsourcing, which already amounts services. Last, they have more or less held to more than 30% of the staff, and eventually back from programme management since it is costs far more (this point is developed in funded through the EU. In practice, they have 4.2.1). Partially because of the difficulty of made little use of the examining power they gathering competencies, the ESA must sup- are provided by the regulations of the Euro- port GSA for the next years, as part of the pean GNSS Programme Committee. In partic- working arrangement (see 3.2.4.3). Aware of ular, they have never challenged the current these risks, the GSA should ask the Parliament ratio of power between the institutions, and in and the Council for more resources at the be- particular the dependency of the GSA. One of ginning of 2017. the main roles remaining in their hands Last, the GSA has not yet settled into a stabi- through the Council of the European Union is lized mode of functioning conducive to the the definition of the MFF, which provides Gali- management of operations. This task is partic- leo with funding for a five-year period. How- ularly challenging given the evolving and het- ever, the associated trade offs involve dra- erogeneous portfolio of prerogatives of the matic amounts of money, and Galileo is just a GSA, with tasks as different as exploitation very small part of them: therefore, this frame- management, market development and secu- work is not appropriate for detailed discus- rity accreditation. Therefore, immediate atten- sions regarding the programme. tion should be paid to the capacity of the GSA Finally, the area where the member states are to acquire quickly the expertise needed to suc- still strongly influential is security, since they cessfully ensure the shift toward exploitation, still have not formally entrusted the European while carrying out the full spectrum of its ac- institutions in this matter, keeping with them tivities with all the necessary very different most of the associated prerogatives. Here as competencies80. Moreover, the late negotia- well though, progress is being made, espe- tion of the working arrangement and contract cially regarding the GSA. relating to the interfaces with ESA and GSOp (see in 4.2.3) might be a factor of instability. The Member States may re-engage on the re- As a matter of fact, its content, the preroga- newal of the political momentum for Galileo tives demarcation with GSOp and the extent associated with the declaration of initial ser- of the involvement of ESA in the activities of vices. the GSA strongly condition its needs. At the same time, the accumulation of different del- egation and working arrangements (for EGNOS, for the different phases of Galileo, 4.2 Exploitation etc.) may lead to further complexity. The transversal issues discussed in Chapter 4.1 – particularly those concerning the GSA 4.1.5 The Uneven Interests of Member States that will undertake the exploitation of the sys- tem – have specific impacts on the exploitation In theory, member states have a major influ- of Galileo. ence on the programme (see 3.2.5.2). Yet,
79 Indeed, most of the European specialists in the GNSS wages are relatively low and thus non-competitive in com- field come from Western Europe, and it is thus necessary parison with the ones in ESA or in the industry. to bring this expertise in Czech Republic. Yet, the Euro- 80 The GSA has been entrusted with the exploitation in pean regulation provides for the application of a correction 2013, with the GNSS regulation. The GSA Work Pro- coefficient to the remuneration of European expatriate offi- gramme 2016 mentions explicitly the difficulty for opera- cials, based on the local prices (see
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4.2.1 Influence of Resources Limitations on Ex- and consolidate its position within the GNSS ploitation governance. As compared to the resources granted in the GPS programme, the GSA works on a tight 4.2.2 Complexity of the Exploitation Scheme budget. Indeed, for the 2014-2020 period, Like the programme as a whole, the organisa- Galileo deployment and exploitation is funded tional structure set up to undertake the exploi- with around € 5 billion. In comparison, the tation of Galileo is based on a complex scheme budget granted to the GPS during the 2014- involving many actors. As described above, 2017 period amounts to about US$ 4 billion81. the GSA is still under the tight control of the This issue is even more burning when it comes Commission, and the latter is de facto involved to human resources: the difficulty that the in system exploitation. The outsourcing of ex- GSA has in gathering the expertise as de- ploitation introduces another actor84, while the scribed in 4.1.4 is of special concern regarding Galileo Reference Centre, which monitors the exploitation. Indeed, there is no doubt that the system’s performances in parallel to the KPI Agency shows good will to meet this imminent supervision, is also outsourced and adds a fur- responsibility, and has learned a lot from the ther layer. Last, ESA is also involved in exploi- exploitation of EGNOS. However, Galileo is a tation since it provides important technical far more complex system and its exploitation support to the GSA for this mission (see requires significantly higher technical and or- 3.2.4.3). ganisational skills. Indeed, the GSA, being in In the longer term, the provision of more ser- charge of the exploitation of an operational vices will bring additional actors. Indeed, the space system on a 24/7 basis, will carry out SAR is provided by the CNES, and the Com- activities of a very different nature than any mercial Service should also introduce a specific other decentralised agency. service provider. The PRS will be based on a Furthermore, the total headcount of the decentralised model, including national au- Agency needs to be considered from a quanti- thorities providing the service to their users. tative standpoint. As described in 4.1.4, the Though related activities will be channelled headcount has not been tailored to meet the through the GSA, all those actors will add fur- requirements for each task and especially for ther complexity to the exploitation of the sys- exploitation. The date of its beginning has tem. slipped since 2013, but the yearly authorised Similar to programme management at large, GSA manpower has not been significantly up- this succession of layers is likely to dilute the dated (see Annex A.5). As a consequence, responsibility for exploitation and might be while exploitation started to be transferred to detrimental to the quality of the services de- the GSA in January 2017, the total staff has livered. In particular, a failure could lead to already mainly been consolidated, and should aggravated damages if vigorous and quick ac- not significantly increase to support this new tions cannot solve the issue. Even before the activity. This gap between the progress of the declaration of initial services, while opera- programme and the resources granted, which tions-related issues and the exploitation is pointed out in the GSA Work Programme for scheme were far simpler (only ESA and a pri- the year 201682, may exert a strong pressure vate operator involved, no services provided) on the current staff, leading to further risks. there were some difficulties in identifying the To bridge this shortage of manpower, GSA is causes of problems and solving them by con- contracting with external consultants and in- tracting with industry. Moreover, this blurred ternally redeploying in-house staff from ad- scheme hinders confidence building in the sys- ministrative tasks to operational activities83. tem. However, this large resort to outsourcing – 35 consultants and 4 seconded national experts, while the exploitation of Galileo involves 43 in- 4.2.3 Issues Related to the Relationship with house agents – entails three main issues: it is ESA and GSOp not adapted to steering the large contract with Until 2020, the GSA will have to manage both GSOp, it is far more costly, and it prevents the the deployment of the system and its exploi- GSA from building and keeping the internal ex- tation, two tasks that will be carried out by two pertise needed to fulfil its tasks in the long run actors: ESA is entrusted with the deployment of Galileo, and GSOp will operate the system.
81 “Program Funding.” Global Positioning System 19 De- 83 Ibid. 64. cember 2016
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Those two activities – and thus the associated border will be clarified following a “bottom-up entities – might conflict. While ESA intends to approach” by the skills and the initiatives of update the system and realise the related the operator, while it should be decided by the tests, the operator favours its stability. The programme management. Here as well, the GSA will thus require a deep understanding of unclear demarcation of prerogatives may re- the system from a technical point of view in flect an incomplete programmatic vision order to make the appropriate arbitration be- and/or insufficient resources within the tween two entities endowed with strong tech- Agency. nical competences. Besides this issue, the sep- In the current situation, it seems challenging arate, complex interfaces with each actor also to entrust an entity with the full responsibility raise specific questions. for service provision and the exploitation of The relationship between the GSA and ESA is the system. GSOp operates, but all the facili- going through an important evolution as part ties and the constellation are provided by the of the change in the governance scheme oc- GSA. The latter has the mandate to be in curring with the beginning of the exploitation charge of exploitation, but has not the tech- phase. This new relationship is defined by a nical competencies to alone assume end-to- working agreement that was signed on 15 De- end responsibility. Such expertise is partially cember 2016 (see 3.2.4.3). This important present in ESA, which is expected to hold back agreement was announced for 2015, but the from programme management. The Commis- negotiations, especially complex and re- sion has an overall responsibility, but is far source-consuming, lasted far longer than ex- from the day-to-day exploitation. Therefore, it pected and were finalized only some days be- is difficult to identify, at this time, an undis- fore the beginning of the handover. However, puted, fully competent entity assuming the the two parties reached an agreement that role of “Mr Performance” for Galileo. The ab- seems to offer a satisfying base for the exploi- sence of such an incarnation, as well as of any tation phase – though it still needs to be con- other means for guaranteeing the systems’ firmed in practice. This interface is indeed performances could compromise the achieve- complex (see 3.2.4.3) and the agencies will ment of the programme objectives, especially have to develop trustworthy collaboration to regarding the spread of its uses (see 4.5.1). implement the arrangement in the best man- ner. There are also some lingering uncertainties re- 4.3 Security garding the interface between the GSA and GSOp. To begin with, contract ambiguities seem to remain about the delineation of their 4.3.1 Influence of the Complexity of the Govern- respective prerogatives, especially regarding ance Scheme on Security Management services provisions. Indeed, the tender states As described in Chapter 4.1.1, the number of that GSOp will operate the GSC – which is the user interface, but assigns the service provi- involved actors is a clear factor of complexity. But in the field of security, insufficient trust sion to the GSA. Therefore, there may not be a clear role separation between the operator between them makes the issue even thornier. dealing with the “back office” – the operations In particular, member states are not yet ready to fully entrust the Commission when it comes – and the GSA in charge of the front office – the user interface. This complex delineation of to this subject – and do not necessarily trust each other. Unlike other aspects of the pro- tasks also concerns the decision making pro- cess: for instance, the responsibility for taking gramme, they keep for themselves a number of prerogatives in security, as evidenced by an important decision, such as using a spare satellite, seems unclear. The management of the functioning of the Security Accreditation operations through Key Performance Indica- Board for instance. The positioning of the member states, their differences of opinion, tors (KPI), though complemented by direct monitoring within the GRC, may also be a and sometimes, their lack of consistence and constancy in the different institutions they are source of questioning. Those indicators are not yet stable since it is difficult for the moment to involved in, make governance of the security aspects especially complex. define reference values. Since the KPI are not defined in the unclassified tender documenta- In the absence of an appropriate pre-existing tion, one can also wonder whether their nature structure within the EU in charge of security, is definite and, in particular, if they help in fully the prerogatives have been distributed be- defining the “make or buy” limit between the tween different actors: the Commission, the GSA and GSOp85. This could mean that this GSA, ESA, EEAS, etc. (see 3.2.3 and 3.2.5).
85 European GNSS Agency. “Galileo Service Operator” Tender Information Package. GSA/CD/14/14 of 24 Decem- ber 2014. Prague: European Union.
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Beside the potential redundancies this in- Indeed, security management has long been duces, it might be counterproductive to have associated with the military, which is certainly so many actors in this domain (leaks, respon- an erroneous view (see 2.1.3). There is, on the sibility dilution etc.). Actually, the programme contrary, a specific difficulty for Galileo: the should ideally be supported by central man- programme has to ensure a level of security agement of security related issues. Currently, similar to military GNSS providers, while com- the GNSS regulation provides the Commission plying with civilian rules and procedures in a with the overall responsibility for security; variety of domains (communication, procure- however, it has neither the culture nor the ment, etc.). competencies to deal with those issues in de- Thus, this dimension has been strongly under- tail. And even if the Commission can gather estimated since the beginning of the pro- such expertise within working groups (see gramme. The fact that Galileo will not be a 3.2.3.1) that support its actions, potential R&D project anymore in early 2017 and that conflicts of interests remain: leaving the com- as soon as the operations start, it might be mand of security to the political level is not under attack, has long been neglected. An compatible with effectiveness of operations. In analogy can be made with the Internet: in its the same way, ESA also does not have strong early years, nobody could imagine the poten- security culture since none of its programmes tial for attacks while nowadays, cyber security can compare to Galileo in this matter. The GSA is omnipresent86. The increasing criticality of does not seem ready to assume such a respon- GNSS should indicate that a similar phenome- sibility for the moment: though clear progress non could happen for those systems, and in has been observed recently, it still requires fact is happening today. This misperception more competencies, independence and staff to explains why security was not included ex ante consolidate its position in this field (see 4.3.3). in the programme management. Thus, rather This complexity leads to confusion on various than a set of conditions to ensure from the specific issues. One of the most significant is outset in order to enable the programme, the status of the validation chain– where up- leading to cost-effective and proportionate de- grades are tested before their implementation cisions, security requirements have been per- in the system. Indeed, though the status of ceived as undesirable, secondary constraints the operational chain is clear – it is owned by adding technical difficulties and thus often the Commission, and has been accredited by postponed, or lately introduced upon request the SAB, the ownership of the validation chain of a member state. This untimely full aware- is still subject to debate, and not accredited. ness of security issues is also amplified by an This function should be clarified, since all se- exogenous cause, which is its inherent com- curity is to be moved to the operational chain, plexity (see 2.1.3): threats evolve very later in the programme. quickly, requiring the ability to deal with new risks during the development of the system87. The limited resources and the necessity of 4.3.2 A Misperception of Security Issues moving the programme forward to make up For Galileo, the security-related issues arise in for wasted time has also prevented properly 88 a very different way from other GNSS. This addressing these issues . comes from the civilian nature of the pro- This is a concrete drawback on the pro- gramme, but also from the essence of the EU, gramme: not being tackled fully and promptly, since security still mainly pertains to the mem- security entails sometimes dramatic cost over- ber states. And within the EU, the Common runs and delays: for instance, numerous secu- Security and Defence Policy is the domain of rity requirements now specified by the SSRS89 the European Council and of the High Repre- were not foreseen when ESA contracted Gali- sentative. The Commission and its agencies leo’s elements, and those security require- are thus purely civilian institutions, as well as ments were simply not included. This current ESA. Though the nature of those is consistent difficulty to promptly account for security has with the civilian purposes of the system, this been present since the beginning of the pro- has impacted on the security culture within the gramme, and was already mentioned by the programme and thus has given way to a mis- Court of Auditors in 200990. However, it would perception of these issues for Galileo. be unfair to consider that this problem is only
86 Gutieriez, Peter."At ENC 2014: A GNSS Wake Up Call 88 Gutieriez, Peter."At ENC 2014: A GNSS Wake Up Call for Europe." Inside GNSS 16 April 2014. for Europe." Inside GNSS 16 April 2014. 87 The change of opinion of the United States regarding 89 SRSS: System-specific Security Requirements State- Galileo illustrates this irreducible issue: while they initially ment. opposed to its development, the U.S. later understood that 90 European Court of Auditors. The management of the a second GNSS was an opportunity to get an overall en- Galileo programme's development and validation phase. hanced robustness when they became more aware of the Special Report N° 7/2009. Brussels: European Union. 27. security risks.
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linked to the governance of Galileo: GPS is had had no operational role, since the exploi- currently suffering the same kinds of issues tation of the constellation was done by ESA. with the deployment of the OCX91, but it is for According to the working arrangement, after a sure accentuated by the lack of anticipation transition period, the GSA will have to submit mentioned in 4.1.3, and the inexperience of the accreditation application to the SAB during the involved institutions in comparison with the exploitation phase. This decision may raise those in charge of the other GNSS. a risk of conflict of interests regarding security accreditation92. 4.3.3 Some Innovative but Incomplete Solutions In its decision 2014/496, the Council also cre- ated specific procedures to react should issues Galileo is the first programme handled at the caused by international events affect the ex- Community level with such a strong security ploitation of Galileo and necessitate the giving dimension. It has required the establishment of orders to the GSA. This procedure is espe- of new structures able to cope with those is- cially innovative as it allows the Council or the sues. This has led to innovative solutions – HR to direct orders to an agency under Com- that could be reused in future programmes – mission control, and in general, endows the HR but which could be improved in order to max- and the EEAS with large responsibilities in imize their benefits. such a situation (see 3.2.5.3). It also confirms Indeed, the GSA has managed to develop the anchoring of the security aspects at the in- some know-how in security and it is a better tergovernmental level, since the appropriate fitted actor than the Commission in this mat- decision is taken or confirmed by the Council, ter. While this culture is not spread across the with the Commission having a minimal role. Agency, the GMSC has acquired key expertise This illustrates the difficulty of tackling secu- in this field, with, in particular, a valuable un- rity issues in the current EU frame. This pro- derstanding of the associated challenges. The cedure is also delicate as in some cases – re- scheme set up for the PRS (see 3.2.3.2) is also sponding to the request of an ally to deny the a notable compromise, given the initial diffi- use of Galileo to a hostile entity for instance – culties. But here too, the problems related to the decision ought to be taken quickly, and staff consolidation identified in 4.1.4 appear as could imply a huge political risk, for the HR in a limitation. particular. This is why everything should be done to simplify and automate the decision- The Security Accreditation Board is also a new, making process with, especially, the establish- innovative instrument aimed at tackling a new ment of all the relevant communications lines kind of issue within the European Union, allow- and the appropriate organization of all the ac- ing the member states to play a key role in tors (including the member states). It is note- security safeguards in programme manage- worthy that such an important decision was ment. Yet, the current configuration is some- made in 2014 (the 2004 Joint Action did not what flawed by its belonging to the GSA. This define a specific procedure) and that progress does not respect a wise principle of power sep- in implementing it has been relatively slow. In aration: the accreditation should not be done particular, some member states have shown by the operator. Admittedly, the GSA regula- little interest or even difficulty in organizing tion provides for the clear independence of the themselves appropriately and some important SAB regarding the decision making process, protected communication lines were not set up but there are still concerns related to the de until recently. facto dependence of the SAB on the resources provided by the Executive Director. This is an- other example of the influence of programme 4.3.4 The Specific Case of the PRS history on the present configuration: the ac- Security issues are especially critical for the creditation within the GSA was relevant when PRS, which is the most complex service pro- the Agency was the European GNSS Supervi- vided by Galileo and the “crown jewel” of the sory Authority, whose mission was to manage system. Though interesting solutions have the public interests in the PPP. This also illus- been found to manage this service while re- trates the risks potentially incurred from inad- specting the interests of each Member State equate human resources: as a matter of fact, with the setting up of CPA and the agreement the SAB staff is part of the same security de- on CMS (see 3.2.5.1), fundamental issues partment as the rest of the GSA security teams have still not been solved, especially the de- in order to prevent knowledge isolation. So finitive purposes of this service. While some far, such a configuration has not led to signif- member states would like to allow military icant issues. But until the end of 2016 the GSA uses, others consider that this system has a
91 Gutierrez, Peter. "GAO: New GPS Ground System, Not 92 This kind of conflicts of interests exists in some other GPS III Engineering, Primary Cause for Delays." Inside programmes, like WAAS. However, Galileo is a far more GNSS 30 November 2016. complex and critical system.
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commercial potential, and their positions are move, as it provided Galileo with advanta- sometimes inconsistent or changing. This is a geous conditions to become the second most major concern because, should the system be important GNSS, highly interoperable with used for military purposes – and in particular GPS – a place that has since been challenged for missile guidance – it would introduce new, by BeiDou. But the Europeans did not manage important security constraints. Furthermore, it to solve the issue of the PRS frequencies over- is illusory to think that the PRS can be seen as lay with China, while the U.S. quickly settled standing on its own: the security issues it gen- their problems with Beijing, reaching an erates reverberate on other services. Thus, if agreement in 2010 and formally beginning co- such a decision were made, the programme operation with a Joint Statement in 2014 set- would necessarily have to adapt. The fact that ting up discussions in the fields of compatibil- this issue has not been solved yet is critical ity and interoperability notably93. Last, the is- and is a consequence of the difficulty of mak- sue raised by the “UK surprise patent”94 on a ing definitive, strategic decisions at the begin- key GPS/Galileo technology that could have ning of the programme: such issues must be limited the uses of the services coming from settled quickly, since Galileo needs stability both signals, was quickly resolved by the U.S. now, with the declaration of initial services. as it came to an agreement with the UK in Jan- uary 201395. The European Union reacted less In any case, member states seem to be in- strongly and managed to resolve the issue creasingly interested in this service, and they only in April 201696. themselves recently broke the taboo of the military dimension of Galileo mandating the This apparently less effective European “GNSS EDA to work on the definition of the future mil- diplomacy” has different causes. The first is itary needs for GNSS, especially Galileo. Ac- probably the lack of a “single desk” – another cordingly, in mid-2016 the EDA created a ded- consequence of the complexity of the govern- icated European Military Satellite Navigation ance of Galileo within the EU framework – that Policy working group. The use of Galileo is en- makes difficult both the achievement of a com- visaged as part of the multi constellation solu- mon position and the clear expression of it. In- tion, together with GPS. But here as well, if the deed, several institutions have the legitimacy decision to use this system for military pur- to play a role in this domain. The Commission poses is taken, it should be as part of a larger is the programme manager, the Council is en- defence plan in Europe, and not only as an in- dowed with important prerogatives in this field teresting and powerful technical system. The (see 3.2.5.2), member states have important complex chain of command also concerns the expertise, the EEAS is the “diplomacy service” military: there are fewer concerns with the of the EU, ESA has the technical competencies, clear, apparently more manageable chain of and the GSA will be in charge of exploiting the command of the GPS, while private exploita- system. In the current compromise, though tion could also raise other concerns. This com- the Commission is supposed to have leader- plexity may not be sufficiently conducive for ship as mandated by the Council and sup- international cooperation: the U.S. seems not ported by the other institutions, the European interested in using PRS for highly sensitive ap- delegations appear to be less organized and plications, for instance. Galileo should thus efficient than their counterparts. As an exam- demonstrate its security reliability if such ap- ple, the ICG includes representatives from plications are intended to be tackled. some of the different European institutions mentioned above, totalling far fewer members than others and without real coordination be- 4.4 International Relations tween them. Furthermore, the discussions taking place in As global systems, the GNSS exploitation nec- those international relations can be highly essarily compels international relations, above technical: for instance, for compatibility is- all with other GNSS providers (Annex A.1). sues, it is necessary to be able to demonstrate Thus far, the efficiency of “Galileo diplomacy” the effects of a specific position on the spec- has proven to be limited. The 2004 agreement trum. But few ESA experts are present, and with the U.S. was certainly an important the GSA is not even associated with the inter-
93 “Joint Statement U.S.–China Civil Global Navigation Sat- and endangered the EU-U.S. agreement. For more infor- ellite Systems (GNSS) Cooperation.”19 May 2014. Global mation, see Davis, Dee Ann. "British Military Claims Patent Positioning System 19 December 2016 on GPS, Galileo Civil Signal Structure" Inside GNSS 27
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national negotiations, weakening the Euro- 4.5.1 Lack of a Standardized Input Structure for pean position. Security is also an important Galileo Users factor of credibility97. Additionally, the other GNSS providers, operating military systems, In terms of performance, for most applica- take advantage of the support of their ministry tions, the main criterion that influences the of defence. One can hardly identify such choice to use a particular GNSS is trust in its strong support on the European side. Besides, continuity of service. From this point of view, this lack of political weight is also illustrated by guaranteeing satisfactory conditions of exploi- the difficulty of defend Galileo in European tation and security, as discussed above, is a spectrum regulatory authorities – like the necessary condition to ensure the spread of CEPT or ETSI, which also undermines the Eu- the uses of Galileo. 98,99 ropean position . Both those technical com- But it also depends on the capacity of the petencies and this apparent lack of political GNSS provider to clearly understand the spe- support can give the impression to interna- cific technical needs of each community of us- tional partners that they do not have a credible ers, including the difficulty arising from their and legitimate interlocutor facing them. diversity (see Annex A.2). Meeting all these In fact, despite the repeated commitment of requirements to a high degree thus necessi- the Galileo stakeholders to develop the system tates a constant, long term connection with all globally, it seems that the international rela- those actors, in order to design the system and tions concerning Galileo are hindered by the its services accordingly, and to adapt them lack of an ambitious long-term vision. The Eu- during their exploitation. In other terms, the ropeans seem to focus mostly on the deploy- communities of users want to have the possi- ment and the exploitation of Galileo, taking bility to influence the technological trade-offs the international outreach of the programme of the programme, which requires the pro- for granted, without really considering the pro- gramme to be organised accordingly. For the gress made by other actors in this field. For development of the first generation, this was instance, BeiDou has increasingly gained cred- not the case: the Court of Auditors estimated ibility on the international scene, China gives that the technical specifications of the system itself the means to fulfil its ambitions with im- did not take sufficiently into account users’ portant, highly coordinated and technically needs, and the recent Commission communi- skilled delegations allowing them to talk on an cation “Space Strategy for Europe”, considers equal footing with the U.S. that the development of the second generation should be more user-driven101,102. The aban- donment of the “Safety-of-Life Service”, which did not meet aviation requirements even 4.5 Commercial Develop- though it mainly targeted this community, ment, Uses Spread and In- demonstrates that, at least during the defini- tion phase, the programme was weakened by novation its relative isolation from the GNSS community of users. Since the beginning, the economic and com- The current GNSS regulation still does not pro- mercial dimensions of the programme, as well vide a clear solution to dealing with this issue; as its repercussions in terms of innovation and in particular, the prerogatives distribution re- growth have been regarded as the main ob- mains somehow confusing. Indeed, on the one jective of Galileo, together with sovereignty hand, the promotion of uses involves the Com- and independence objectives100. In spite some mission, in particular when there is a need to of Galileo’s competitive edges, the current create a regulatory framework or when this governance also presents issues that mitigate activity implies international agreements. On these advantages, which seems to contradict the other hand, the GSA is the formal interface the declared goals. with users, accompanying member states as they develop applications and standards. Alt- hough the Agency has undertaken important
97 De Selding, Peter B. “U.S., Norwegian Paths to En-
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endeavours in this field and has acquired a sig- Failing such involvement, external entities cer- nificant level of competency, resulting in a tifying the system for specific applications progressive increase in its role, it is currently would in the end mostly rely on the political not yet sufficiently geared for really proactive commitment of the Commission on perfor- campaigns. Moreover, there is no formal and mance. Given the liability issue associated generic structure to allow the different Euro- with such a certification (an entity certifying pean or national communities to provide in- the system becomes partially liable), the po- puts to the governance since countries organ- tential use of Galileo for the highest safety crit- ise themselves when they want. This means ical applications remains to be seen. that communities of users are unevenly repre- sented, depending in particular on the degree of organization of their country regarding Gal- 4.5.2 Commercial Service and Liability Issues ileo. There is, for instance, inter-ministerial The service that most embodies the commer- coordination in France aggregating the re- cial ambitions of Galileo is the Commercial ser- quirements of institutional users and providing vice. Notwithstanding, this service has suf- them to the GSA: this scheme seems to satisfy fered from important delays: the CS was ex- the communities of users involved, but most pected in 2015 but it was not part of the initial of other countries do not have this kind of co- services and is now expected in its first version ordination. This lack of a formal structure by 2018103,104. A vision shared by the member providing an entry point to users encouraged states of what it should be is emerging – a high ESA to create a forum for aviation in order to accuracy and authenticated service (the latter gather their specific requirements, the GSA by 2020), but its definition could change being involved on its part too. A normal situa- again, and this will have technical repercus- tion would be to have such prerogatives, as sions. The decision to provide such a service is much as possible, in the hands of the GSA. a risky bet that no other GNSS providers have A further distinction should be made for the taken: they are all based on the dichotomy of promotion of the uses of Galileo, since the ap- free service/military encrypted service. Deliv- proach strongly depends on whether this is an ering such a service also removes from the pri- unregulated or a regulated application. In the vate sector the possibility of providing added first case, the most important feature is to be value to the open service. So far, it seems that well connected to receivers’ manufacturers the GSA has not yet found a service provider and applications developers, especially sensi- to deliver it. One may also wonder whether tive to the need of consumers in competitive, these features, on the eve of the rise of a non-regulated markets. multi-constellation world, will still offer undis- puted competitive advantage. This is significantly different for regulated ap- plications. Here, the main issue is to comply One of the advantages of the Commercial ser- with the standards established as part of the vice, together with a reason for its complexity, regulation. There is thus necessarily a process is the existence of multiple liability issues that of certification, which is complex, and the aim arise from the contractual relations along the is not just to meet the user requirements, but service chain. There is no international legal most importantly to demonstrate that those instrument governing liability, and the other requirements are met with a sufficient level of GNSS providers seem to have avoided getting trust. On this point, the current governance involved in such issues. At the European level, scheme of Galileo does not envisage a single the need to establish a relevant framework has entity fully accountable for the performances long been identified (the collapse of the PPP of the system. Furthermore, no entity external model is largely due to the lack of such a lia- to the chain of exploitation, technically com- bility scheme) but the most recent GNSS reg- petent and independent from the programme ulation still does not provide for it. The liability management, is entitled to assess and vali- of the Commission and the GSA is thus regu- date the performances delivered, as is the lated under the general provisions of Article case for other critical operational systems: 340 and through the contract with GSOp. The EASA for EGNOS or planes, safety authorities regime of EGNOS seems well defined (the op- for nuclear power plants etc. The GRC moni- erator takes out insurance and is liable up to a tors the performances of the system – which certain ceiling, followed by the GSA and then is one essential aspect of the issue – but is not the Commission) and would probably apply to independent. Actually, performance validation Galileo. In any case, the success of the Com- should have been undertaken since the defini- tion of the system’s technical specifications and the inception of the development phase.
103 Gutierrez, Peter. "Galileo Themes, Threads and 104 Godet, Jérémie. “Galileo Initial Services.” Presentation. Visions." Inside GNSS January 2016. GALILEO: Dawn of a New Age of GNSS Service. Webinar online. 19 December 2016.
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mercial Service will partially depend on the im- 4.6 Evolution of the Pro- plementation of a clear and specific liability framework. gramme
There is a clear awareness that the evolution 4.5.3 Issues Related to the Indirect Benefits of of the programme should be prepared up- Galileo stream, even if the first constellation is not yet Lastly, indirect benefits expected from the fully deployed. As mentioned above, the Com- programme, both regarding economic fallouts mission also considers that this evolution and innovation stimulation should not be un- should follow a more user-based approach derestimated. Chief among them is the poten- than in the first generation (see 4.5.1). The tial withdrawal of ground-based stations for Commission has already set up a working aviation and maritime beacons, which are group that strongly engages member states in costly and irreplaceable infrastructure at the the preparation of the next generation. How- moment. With the generalized use of Galileo, ever, the GSA, which developed a valuable as part of a multi-constellation or not, one can knowledge of the market, acquired growing expect that at some point, an only-GNSS- technical skills and is constantly in touch with based-approach will ensure sufficient robust- GSOp, as well as ESA, which owns most of the ness and continuity of service to allow the re- related expertise, are only observers in this moval of other redundant PNT systems for working group. The Commission is also pre- specific applications. This is a real potentiality paring the revision of the GNSS regulation ac- that brings important economic benefits to the cordingly, together with a funding envelope for programme. However, this milestone does not the next MFF. seem to be currently in the scope of the pro- The limited human resources have an influ- gramme management. This would require ence on this question as well: the development both an approach based on the extent of use of a new Galileo generation should be embed- of Galileo for the relevant applications, and the ded in a programmatic vision that still has to development of a broader European PNT policy be deepened (see 4.1.3). Currently, with all identifying GNSS positioning within the gen- the short-term issues that still need to be ad- eral European and Member States radio navi- dressed, the programme management has “its gation architecture, and taking full advantage head to the grindstone”, rending difficult the of the redundancies and synergies with other allocation of resources and competencies to GNSS. In that sense, the announced release of longer-term issues. As in the case of market a radio navigation plan by the Commission in development, the setting up of an appropriate its last communication is an encouraging sign. structure taking into account the needs of us- The U.S. and Russia already have such instru- ers will have a major impact on the effective- ments (respectively with the Federal Radio ness of the technical choices that will be made Navigation Plan and the GLONASS Federal Pro- as part of evolution planning. gramme 2012-2020) and this broader view al- lows them to proactively foster the use of their Last, some ambiguities remain. Concerning GNSS in to maximize these kinds of direct or funding, the GNSS regulation provides that the indirect benefits. future generation will be funded by the budg- etary line of the exploitation phase. The same Among the other issues, a more transverse regulation also states that the Commission approach within the Commission between DG mandates ESA through the H2020 pro- GROW and the other DGs (in particular DG gramme, but only for the preparatory phase. MOVE) should be encouraged. A working After that, this evolution should be the respon- group has been established for this purpose, sibility of the GSA: staying with the current re- which has not yet proven to provide fruitful co- gime seems to be somewhat contrary to the ordination. Last, the IPR policy applicable to regulation, and the working arrangement will the programme, which consists in giving the not clarify it since its priorities are rather fo- intellectual property of the elements produced cused on the end of the deployment and the to the Commission – as is provided for in the implementation of FOC 2. Yet, the GSA cur- current GNSS regulation – might not be the rently seems undersized to take over such a best way to stimulate innovation. responsibility, though this last consideration will also depend on the definitive scheme of interactions with GSOp and ESA (see 4.2.3) that is to be implemented.
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5. Towards an Optimisation of the Governance Scheme for Galileo
The preparatory works for the next GNSS reg- prejudice. However, the relevance of those ulation will begin in 2017, and this gives the models of governance also depends on the member states an opportunity to consider new guidance the member states want to provide governance schemes for the Galileo pro- to the programme. gramme. In this perspective, but also in order to explore longer term possibilities, we make some propositions for concrete governance changes that could facilitate solving efficiently 5.1 Scenario Scheme 1: Basi- the issues identified in Chapter 4. Though cally Keeping the Govern- many of them are related to, or are the con- sequences of, broader challenges regarding ance Scheme Provided by the European space sector and its actors, we the GNSS Regulation intend to provide only programme-level pro- posals. For this purpose, three alternative gov- The first scenario scheme consists naturally in ernance schemes are considered, mainly the extension after 2020 of the provisions stip- based on the variation of the positioning of ulated in the current GNSS regulation and de- GSA within the organizational architecture. scribed in Chapter II of this report. This Scenario scheme 1 is the most conservative, scheme is unavoidable in the short term, since while scenario schemes 2 and 3 would require it started to be implemented from the begin- more political will as they assume deeper ning of 2017. In the long run however, it would changes in the governance structure, but they be profitable to make adjustments – while could also provide more significant improve- staying in the same general framework – to ments. limit as much as possible the risks identified in It should be noted that the possibility of hav- Chapter 4. Noticeably, the Commission/GSA ing ESA exploiting the system – as was the and ESA/GSA interfaces should be improved in case until the initiation of the handover to the order to ensure better functioning of the GSA. GSA – has been ruled out. It was considered Indeed, a number of issues identified in this at the beginning of the programme – before scheme of governance are associated with the the PPP model was chosen – and did have weakness of the GSA, both in terms of staffing some merits. ESA, which defined, developed, and insufficient autonomy. As shown in Chap- and deployed Galileo and was provisionally in ter V, these two questions are strongly inter- charge of its exploitation before the declara- related, and mainly result from the fact that tion of services, has thorough system exper- most GSA tasks are delegated by the Commis- tise. Not being in charge of the exploitation, sion. Therefore, an important adjustment the GSA could have been brought back in the would be to entrust the GSA with those pre- role of GNSS Supervisory Authority it was ini- rogatives as core tasks, enhancing its flexibil- tially designed for. However, such a scheme is ity regarding human resources management, no longer politically viable considering today’s limiting its dependence on outsourcing, and state of play of the different European stake- improving its capacity to recruit the necessary holders involved in GNSS. In particular, exploi- specific expertise. This consolidation could tation and service provision are not part of ESA also be supported by a reorganization of its in- historical missions, and the evolution of the ternal means: market development activities Agency demonstrates its desire to stick to its could be outsourced in order to concentrate traditional research and development activi- resources on operational activities. This long- 105 ties . term consolidation of in-house expertise would The sole criterion considered for the three sce- strongly help the Agency to fulfil its missions nario schemes is the improvements they can under the best conditions. offer to the programme, without any kind of
105 When European states decided to entrust themselves charge of the operations. In the field of telecommunication, with a satellite meteorology programme, ESA developed ESA developed and launched the first satellites for Eutel- the space segment that was then put in the hands of sat, and currently keeps designing space systems for the EUMETSAT, an ad-hoc intergovernmental organisation in company.
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Figure 1: Scenario scheme 1 based on a “Standard GSA”
An indirect consequence would be the rise of the GSA. This would greatly simplify the chain- the GSA Administrative Board as one of the of-responsibility and, through the re-introduc- main governance organs, and the main chan- tion of an intergovernmental dimension within nel of control of programme management over programme governance, it could reinforce the
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re-engagement of the member states. In par- 5.2 Scenario Scheme 2: Crea- allel, the Commission would keep an important influence on the GSA, thanks to an increase in tion of a Single Common its representatives and/or votes on this board. Last, increasing GSA autonomy would help roof GNSS Agency protect the programme from the general polit- The second scenario scheme is based on the ical issues to which the Commission is sensi- tive. In addition, such a more relaxed control reduction of the complex triangle of interac- of the Commission over the GSA would allow tions to a more classical “users – operator – the Commission to focus on the definition of developer” chain. Given that the GSA in its high level requirements associated with the current configuration is insufficiently tailored development of a strategic vision for the pro- (both in terms of headcount and expertise) to gramme, and on the expansion of interna- assume the central role for operating such a complex system as Galileo, the best way to tional activities, notably cooperation with the other GNSS providers. achieve optimal synergies would be the crea- tion of a “common roof” GNSS agency, bring- In parallel, the ESA/GSA interface in the cur- ing together most ESA Galileo staff (those who rent state of play is widely regarded as re- are not involved in R&D for the programme) source-intensive and a source of further com- and the GSA staff. plexity. The working arrangement has brought solutions, but its effectiveness has to be Similar to EUMETSAT, the role of ESA would be proven in practice. In particular, a specific ef- secured since the Agency would be in charge fort should be made to clarify the delineation of the development of the new generations of the system. Facing a unique, highly competent of prerogatives between the two agencies since the remaining uncertainties, the some- agency, the Commission could focus on the times insufficient trust, and the resulting po- definition of programme political oversight and tential overlaps of their actions remain major the definition of its high level requirements, as sources of both strain and of resources waste- in the previous scenario scheme. fulness. Therefore, the transfer of compe- The most immediate benefit of such a config- tences that will take place in the next years, uration is the dramatic reduction in the com- through the handover and then as part of the plexity of governance, especially through the working arrangement, is especially important. reduction of complex and resource-costly in- As a matter of fact, it would limit the depend- ternal public interfaces (see 4.1.1). In this sce- ence of the GSA and simplify the GSA/ESA in- nario scheme, the governance scheme is terface by reducing it as much as possible to based on only two, far more manageable, in- its vertical component. terfaces: the complex, multi-dimension cur- This scenario scheme would therefore allow rent GSA/ESA relation is replaced by a classic ESA to focus on its field of expertise: in partic- operator/developer interaction, while a unique ular through the development of the next Gal- Political level/Programme level interface sub- ileo generation, but also by being more closely stitutes for the current heavy and rigid Com- associated with the international negotiations. mission/GSA and Commission/ESA delega- However, such a result seems to require a sig- tions. The additional resources and the en- nificant increase in GSA resources. hanced flexibility provided by this simplifica- tion would thus significantly improve Those adjustments can mitigate the effects of programme management. several identified issues, but this governance scheme remains intrinsically partially dysfunc- Furthermore, this new “Super GSA” would be tional, as described in Chapter 4. The scheme strong enough to ensure, as a core task, the is indeed especially complex, implying the di- exploitation of the constellation. As a conse- vision of key control parameters between the quence and unlike the current GSA, the status different actors and the multiplication of inter- of this entity should be decided in accordance faces. It also hampers the international out- with its function: its legal form should be re- reach of the programme and maintains poten- vised in order to ensure its successful estab- tial conflicts of interest in security (both in the lishment. Within the EU, it could probably be SAB and in the Commission) as well as in the done using the possibility of departing from guarantee of performance. These problems the financial framework regulation provided by could be partially tackled by a significant in- crease in the means associated with the pro- gramme: for instance, the allocation of more own resources to the SAB, would limit the de facto dependence of this board on the rest of the GSA. But the scheme itself remains subop- timal, as similar results may be obtained with fewer resources.
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the general rules of the EU106. Other possibili- provided through the Administrative Board, ties include the creation of another kind of both by the Commission and the Member agency within the EU, more adapted to the States. Here as well, this steering role of the specific constraints associated with the exploi- Commission could be enhanced through an in- tation of an operational system delivering a crease of its representatives, or votes. Both 24/7 service, or the setting up of an interna- the Commission and the member states tional organization – like EUMETSAT – manag- should be there as users of the programme: ing the exploitation of the system owned by concretely, they should be appropriately rep- the EU107. It seems indeed necessary to pro- resented by delegates mandated to represent vide to such an agency sufficient room for ma- the interests of the community of users from noeuvre, especially regarding human re- their country or from the EU. This could be sources management. In particular, the head- done by upstream inter-ministerial coordina- count authorized for the agency should be tion at the national levels and inter-DG coor- more flexible – less dependent on the MFF, or dination within the Commission. By co-steer- even removed – and the recruitment process ing a consolidated single roof agency, the simplified to enhance the agency’s adaptabil- Commission could also concentrate its re- ity. Wages should also be less dependent on sources on the international relations, being the location of the agency, as under the cur- supported in this area by the expertise of the rent Financial Framework Regulation. Such single roof agency making available an end-to- improvements seem to constitute a prelimi- end understanding of the technical issues, and nary condition for the significant increase of the extended SAB for security questions. Such in-house expertise that would be required for a strongly consolidated GSA could even be the the establishment of such an entity. single window entity that assumes responsibil- ity over international relations. Such a scheme would also ensure important continuity in the programme since the single ESA, keeping the R&D competencies, would roof agency would take advantage of the ex- remain the architect of the system, a task that perience and knowledge accumulated by ESA fully corresponds to its core activities. Such a over the past years. Thanks to this expertise, positioning would ensure the best use of its the “super GSA” would be able to manage the competencies and prevent issues related to contract of GSOp in the best conditions and the insufficient delineation of the competen- with limited risks, or even eventually, directly cies devoted to ESA, while aligning the inter- operate the constellation, similar to ests of the Agency with those of the pro- EUMETSAT. As a technical pole within the pro- gramme. This would optimise the use of avail- gramme, it could embody the role of “Mr. Per- able competencies. formance” currently missing: an entity fully in This second scenario scheme is paradoxically charge of exploitation and controlling the key the most classic if compared to the other sim- parameters of programme management. For ilar European space programmes (EUMETSAT its part, the SAB should be dissociated from and formerly Eutelsat) and the most innova- this entity to become a separate body accred- tive in comparison with the scheme envisaged iting the system. Given the type of governance for Galileo so far. It presents many advantages of the SAB (fully intergovernmental) and the (continuity, governance simplification, better nature of its activities, this new agency could use of the competencies within each entity, be part of the CFSP and placed under Council experience of comparable projects, etc.). In authority. Going this way, conflicting interests addition, the clear division of security prerog- in security would be dramatically reduced. In atives, the high degree of independence of the the same way, another agency, under council exploitation entity, and the way the Member authority or even external to the EU, should be States could control it, pave the way for de- created to certify the performance of this sys- fence applications, especially through the use tem. Alternatively, an entity already existing, of PRS. In parallel, the growing importance of able to do this kind of certification service and the GSA for international relations would ena- having the relevant competencies (or the ca- ble having a central actor for the future ex- pacity to acquire it), independent from the pected international agreements regarding programme could take up this responsibility. this service. However, this scenario scheme This programme management would follow also entails some uncertainties: in particular, the orientations and high level requirements
106 The article 208 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) N° 107 One can consider that the specificities of the tasks that 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of such an entity would undertake – in comparison to the 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the ones carried out by other EU agencies – provide an oppor- general budget of the Union allows decentralised agencies tunity to create entities with a new status, endowing the EU to “depart from the framework financial regulation“ if “their with a more tailored instrument for the exploitation of oper- specific needs so require and with the Commission's prior ational systems, that could be reused in future projects. consent“.
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the appropriate status to be given to this “su- changes and significantly modify the bases of per GSA”. The biggest difficulty remains the the programme one more time. political will needed to introduce those
Figure 2: Scenario scheme 2 based on a “Super GSA”
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ad-hoc engineering issues. All inputs gathered by the GSA would feed the work of its Admin- 5.3 Scenario Scheme 3: The istrative Board, which could become the effec- tive steering committee of the programme. GSA as a Coordinating Last, the GRC could become the performance Agency for a Galileo Steer- certifying entity for the system, without con- flict of interests given that responsibility for ing Board service provision is left to the private sector.
The third scenario scheme is based on the op- Under such a configuration, the transfer of posite paradigm that frames scenario scheme workforce from the Commission to the GSA 2: rather than incorporating the GSA within an that is foreseen for the period 2014-2020 entity concentrating most of the technical could be significantly amplified to leave to the competencies in order to simplify governance Commission only the highest level tasks (defi- and limit the number of interfaces, the GSA nition of long term strategies, negotiation of could forsake most of its current technical pre- high level international agreements etc.). Pro- rogatives to become mainly an administrative gramme management would be left to the agency, providing a unique interface with all steering committee, where the weight of the the other stakeholders (actors of governance, member states and of the Commission could GSOp and institutional users) in order to sup- be balanced. port a programme steering board that would Given the essentially administrative nature of take responsibility for the management of Gal- such a GSA, ESA would be mainly in interac- ileo. tion with GSOp, being mandated by the steer- Transforming the GSA into such a mostly ad- ing committee to produce for this entity the ministrative agency involves transferring its new versions of the system. At the same time, security and technical prerogatives to other the space agency would be the only public bodies. On the one hand, the exploitation and technical pole within the governance, limiting service provision could be fully outsourced to wasteful redundancies and associated internal GSOp, bringing back the GSA to a role similar interfaces. Its knowledge of the system, as its to that envisaged when the Agency was cre- developer, would allow the Agency to provide ated, in the frame of the PPP model. On the its technical expertise to the steering commit- other hand, the security related prerogatives tee on demand, as well as for international ne- (security monitoring and accreditation) would gotiations. The technical management of the be assigned to a distinct agency under Council system having been left to the private sector, governance, similarly to what is described in it would confirm ESA in its role of a research the second scenario scheme. This way, this and development organisation. GSA as a “GNSS Administration” could concen- This approach is the closest to the one envis- trate its resources on becoming a structure re- aged at the beginning of the programme: it ceiving inputs from all the stakeholders of the emphasizes its commercial dimension and re- programme, following an approach based on moves most of the technical and operational thematic working groups. In particular, all the tasks from the EU. This scheme redefines the European institutional actors (national minis- governance as mainly user-driven, and proba- tries and the Commission DGs) should take bly fosters the development of efficient supra- part in boards overseeing specific fields of national GNSS related policies thanks to its GNSS applications (aviation, LBS, etc.) in or- sectoral coordination at the European level. It der to coordinate between themselves and also addresses major security conflicts of in- provide common requirements for Galileo. terest, creating a specific entity to deal with This would provide the programme with a the security-related issues. Since this scenario powerful structure aggregating the high level scheme, like the second one, assumes an im- requirements of the different communities of portant evolution of the governance scheme, users, following a supranational and sectoral it requires the taking of a strong decision re- approach. The GSA could also host other garding the main orientation the programme transversal working groups in order to deal is aiming at. with specific issues related to international co- operation, the evolution of the programme, or
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Figure 3: Scenario scheme 3 based on a “GNSS Administration”
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6. Conclusion
Considering the challenges faced by Galileo initial services, the years to come with a 2020 and the complexity of its environment, in the deadline must be used to resolve those pre- coming years the governance of Galileo will liminary issues. continue to have a strong influence on the When taking this necessary step, the different subsequent successes of the programme. As scenario schemes can be considered. The first mentioned above, it is undisputed that the one is especially conservative, as it consists of programme has made big progress over the keeping the scheme defined by the GNSS reg- last two years, and one might consider that ulation, but making some corrections to limit the last GNSS regulation and its implementa- the effects of the identified issues. It would tion allowed the deployment phase to reach a thus require relatively little political will, but as satisfying “cruising speed”, illustrated by the it would not resolve the roots of the acknowl- latest successful launches. However, those ac- edged problems, it remains a suboptimal gov- complishments do not mean that the govern- ernance scheme in our view. The second sce- ance scheme it provides is optimal, nor that it nario scheme, dubbed “single common roof” is is fully adapted to the next steps of the pro- more innovative, though it relies on the exam- gramme. As a matter of fact, in this report we ples of previous similar successful European have identified several issues, inherent to the programmes and in particular EUMETSAT. It organizational architecture provided by the consists of the simplification of the general currently applicable regulations and related to governance by the creation of a single entity the different aspects of the governance, which filling most of the tasks now attributed to the could impede the achievement of the political, GSA and ESA, in order to limit the number of economic and technical objectives of the pro- actors and the interfaces between them. This gramme. way, such a scheme could resolve many of the In order to limit these negative effects, this re- pinpointed issues of the current governance, port provides recommendations, with three al- but at the expense of a higher political cost. ternative schemes of governance. Bearing in The last scenario scheme is the most pioneer- mind the central role that is devoted from now ing – in particular in the field of GNSS – as it on to the GSA in terms of security manage- proposes a stronger role for the private sector, ment and a privileged interface for interna- together with highly user-driven governance. tional relations, especially with the other It would be, in a way, a return to a strongly GNSS/RNSS providers, to ensure that global commercial oriented conception of the pro- governance between these PNT systems is in- gramme based on a concession, but being es- deed sustainable. These scenario schemes tablished later, after the deployment of the have their own strengths and weaknesses, and constellation. they require diverse political will to be imple- All the proposed scenario schemes are primar- mented. However, their relevance also signifi- ily based on the redefinition of the role of the cantly depends on the guidance the member GSA within the governance, successively en- states want to give to the programme. Indeed, visaged as a “standard GSA”, a “Super GSA”, while the initial services were declared on 15 or a “GNSS Administration”. This agency is in- December 2016, important decisions having deed a more recent institutional actor, and major influence on the programme and thus thus the most “malleable” of the stakeholders, on its appropriate governance are still pend- which can still be significantly modified. For ing. Should military uses of Galileo be author- this reason, the choice of one of the scenario ized? To what extent should the commercial schemes should also take into account the fu- dimension of the programme be a driver as ture role that could be given to this agency compared to the sovereignty and strategic in- outside of the Galileo programme, or the dependence aspects? What responsibilities do model of agency it could become for other European public entities want to leave to the space programmes managed by the EU. One private sector? Answering those questions is of those long-term possibilities is to take ad- thus a precondition to making the institutional vantage of the expertise the SAB has acquired choices necessary to establish efficient and de- in security accreditation to extend its preroga- finitive governance for the programme. Fol- tives to other programmes. Should the SAB re- lowing the previous period that was mainly fo- main in the GSA (as suggested in scenario cused on the preparation of the declaration of
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scheme 1), the GSA could become a “Global in this field for the EU. An alternative corre- Security Agency”, placed under Council gov- sponding to scenario schemes 2 or 3 could be ernance and nonetheless accrediting Galileo, to transform the SAB into a dedicated space but also Copernicus or the future Govsatcom security agency under the purview of the initiative as a start. Monitoring activities for Council of the EU, providing such a service on Galileo and eventually for other programmes request of the GSA. Those evolutions would be could also remain associated with this new in line with the ambition announced in the GSA: the agency would play the role of “Devil’s Space Strategy for Europe to consider the ex- advocate” for the security of future European tension of GSA security related responsibilities space programmes and be a pole of expertise to other EU space activities108.
108 European Commission. Space Strategy for Europe. COM (2016) 705 final of 26 October 2016. Brussels: Euro- pean Union. 12.
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Annex
nature. Under the new U.S. GPS Policy, the Department of Transportation was associated with management of the programme, though A.1 Other Components of the the DoD kept a privileged place as the main “System of Systems” funder. Following this new orientation, selec- tive availability was discontinued on 2 May 2000 on the direction of President Clinton. The A.1.1 Other GNSS current GPS policy is the U.S. Space-Based Po- sitioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Policy, GPS established in 2004111. This policy consolidates the orientation provided by the U.S. GPS pol- GPS is the GNSS system owned by the United icy, emphasizing the primarily military nature States, occupying the leading position in this of the system, but also the need to maintain field. It was the first GNSS programme, the U.S. leadership in civilian uses of GNSS. It 109 started in 1973 and it reached fully opera- also points out the security dimension of such 110 tional capability in 1995 . Together with the a programme and underlines that it belongs to Russian GLONASS, GPS is currently one of the the components of the “U.S. Critical Infra- two fully operational GNSS, but it maintains a structure”, providing the programme with a special status because of its performances and special status, particularly regarding its fund- the incomparable spread of its uses and appli- ing under U.S. law. The Space-Based PNT Pol- cations. Today, it is dubbed as the “golden icy also introduced the institutional changes standard” among the GNSS. needed to take into account the new complex- Like the other GNSS apart from Galileo, GPS is ity of the programme associated with its larger a national infrastructure under military control objectives. In particular, a Space-based PNT as it is operated by the U.S. Air Force. None- Executive Committee, co-chaired by the DoD theless, GPS policy regarding civil users has and the DoT (see Annex A.7), took over man- evolved over time. In 1991, the U.S. formally agement responsibility and associated U.S. committed to the provision of a Standard Po- government Department and Agency custom- sitioning Service (SPS), free of charge and ers of GPS in its governance. Last but not open to everybody, but intended to keep an least, the Space-Based PNT Policy also embed- edge for military uses through “Selective ded in the larger Federal Radionavigation Plan, Availability”, a voluntary degradation of the a document providing a general strategy re- signal that limited the accuracy of SPS to 100 garding radio navigation, which is updated on metres, while the Precise Positioning Service a regular basis – the last version was adopted 112 (PPS), which was only open to users author- in 2014 . ized by the Department of Defense, provided From a technical point of view, the current GPS an accuracy of 10m. In 1996, a Presidential delivers different kinds of signals, each asso- Decision Directive defined a new strategy for ciated with specific purposes (see Annex A.6). U.S. GPS policy, promoting the peaceful civil Three signals are for civil uses: to the legacy use of GPS to establish it as an international C/A signal (on the L1 frequency), moderniza- standard and take advantage of the commer- tion programmes added the L2C signal (L2 fre- cial and political fallout of this positioning. This quency) designed to meet commercial needs, dual dimension remains the reference for and the L5 code signal for safety of life appli- GNSS systems that Galileo intends to chal- cations113, both in a pre-operational state. One lenge with its commercial, a priori non-military signal is currently dedicated to military uses:
109 Misra, Pratap and Enge, Per. Global Positiong System - 111 National Security Presidential Directive. U.S. Space- Signals, Measurements, and Performance. Revised Based PNT Policy. NSPD-39 of December 15, 2004. Second Washington. Edition. Ganga-Jamuna Press, 2011. 112 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 110 Zarchan, Paul. Global Positioning System: Theory and Security, and Department of Transportation. 2014 Federal Applications Volume 1. American Institute of Aeronautics Radionavigation Plan. Springfield, Virginia. and Astronautics, Inc., 1996. 113 “New Civil Signals.” Global Positioning System 19 De- cember 2016
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P(Y) code (L1 and L2 frequencies). All these maintain fair trade conditions in GNSS mar- signals provide an equivalent accuracy but the kets. To that end, the agreement created four last takes advantage of features that enhance working groups: Compatibility and Interoper- its security (robustness, resistance to spoofing ability, Trade and Civil Applications, Coopera- etc.). tion for the next generation GNSS, and Secu- rity. In doing so, it avoided numerous potential The GPS programme is also on the eve of an legal claims and paved the way for further rap- important evolution based on two compo- prochements, giving to both constellations a nents: the imminent launch of third generation privileged place in the future GNSS “system of satellites (the first generation was experi- systems”. The agreement also solved the issue mental, and the system is now fully composed raised by the European attempt to use for the of second generation satellites), in parallel PRS the same frequencies as the GPS M-code with the deployment of a modernized ground signal, strongly opposed by the U.S.120,121. Af- system segment (OCX). GPS III will provide ter the placement of PRS on another part of two new signals: L1C (L1 frequency) for civil- the spectrum, the U.S. Department of Defense ian purposes, and has been developed to- began to consider PRS as an interesting com- gether with Europe to enable interoperability plement; negotiations for U.S. access to PRS with Galileo, QZSS and BeiDou, and the M- is now the main topic of EU-US possible coop- code for military purposes (L1 and L2 frequen- eration on GNSS122. Future negotiations could cies)114. The M-code signal is more resistant to address the development of a dual mode jamming than Y-code signals and takes ad- PRS/M-code, but this will require demonstrat- vantage of its relative isolation (see Annex ing that the security level of PRS is comparable A.6), making possible the denial of civil signals to GPS. A main concern for the U.S. is the co- without affecting the military). Selective Avail- existence of military and civil users for these ability is absent in GPS III, making the May services. 2000 political decision technically definitive115. These new features, in particular the use of double frequencies, should allow GPS to de- GLONASS liver performances comparable to those ex- Together with GPS, GLONASS is the only fully pected from Galileo. GPS III first satellites deployed GNSS. It is also an old system, with should be launched from 2017, but ensuring respect to GNSS history: the Soviet Union those performances will require the full de- started its deployment in 1982 and the system ployment of OCX, which is currently suffering was brought into full operational capability in technical delays116. 1995, the same year as GPS123. Similar to the The close cooperation between Galileo and American GNSS, the system is under military GPS is based on an agreement signed in 2004 control, also offering a free of charge, non-dis- by the European Union and the United States. criminatorily accessible worldwide service. The agreement harmonized the technical fea- While the system was at one point more at- tures of the two GNSS in order to ensure their tractive to civil users than a GPS still degraded compatibility and foster their interoperability by Selective availability (it was removed in at non-military level117. For this purpose, one 1999 for GLONASS), the lack of resources due frequency and the related signals structure to the economic difficulties in Russia led to its used by both constellations were decided abrupt decline, down to only 6 fully operational 124 jointly, while both parties agreed to bring satellites in 2001 . From 2006, the Russian closer their geodetic coordinate reference GNSS was resurrected and, strongly sup- frames and to transmit continuously the time ported by the government, it again reached 125 offset between the two constellations118,119. full operational capability in 2011 . The pro- Another objective of the agreement was to gramme is now implemented through the
114 Ibid.
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GLONASS Federal Programme 2012-2020, whose first launch is expected by 2025, should which also defines the national PNT policy. The utilise three new open signals ensuring in- priority for this period is accuracy, expected to teroperability with other GNSS: L1OCM, simi- be improved four-fold through the implemen- lar to the modernized GPS L1C/Galileo E1/Bei- tation of this programme. It should be noted Dou B1; L5OCM to the GPS "Safety of Life" that the spread of the system is supported L5/Galileo E5a/BeiDou B2a; and L3OCM to through its mandatory use by all the public or- Galileo E5b/BeiDou B2b (see Annex A.6). ganizations of the Russian Federation and the In 2006, the EU and the Russian Federation obligation to sell GLONASS compatible established a space dialogue through the sig- smartphones in Russia126,127. nature of an agreement. One of the main ob- As a GPS, GLONASS provides two services: the jectives of the intended partnership was to en- Channel of Standard Accuracy, transmitted on sure compatibility and interoperability be- the L1, L2 and more recently on the L3 fre- tween Galileo and GLONASS. But the degrada- quencies, is a service similar to the GPS open tion of political relations since 2014 has slowed service, while the Channel of High Accuracy, down cooperation in this field. broadcast on the L1 and L2 frequencies, is open to authenticated users, notably for mili- BeiDou tary purposes. It should be mentioned that the access to this signal has been granted to India The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) as part of an agreement in 2010128. Regarding is the Chinese GNSS military programme. It is performances, they have dramatically im- sometime called BeiDou-2 to distinguish it proved since the revival of the programme in from the first step of the programme, which 2006, but remain inferior to the GPS in most corresponded to a Regional Navigation Satel- of the cases, in particular in terms of accuracy lite System (RNSS) composed of three GEO and stability129. Furthermore, the past tribula- satellites delivering services only in China and tions of the programme and its potential insta- neighbouring areas. Like Galileo, BeiDou has bility still hinder wide use of GLONASS, pre- not yet reached Full Operation Capability, venting its establishment as a standard to- which is expected in 2020, but that could hap- gether with the GPS. Rebuilding this credibility pen earlier. The first BeiDou-2 satellite was will require demonstrating a capacity to en- put into its working orbit in 2007 and between sure good performances over the time. In this 2010 and 2012, the deployment went on at a regard, Russian launching activity has never rapid pace (14 satellites). After a break, this been as low as now and this clearly endangers steady rate of deployment resumed in 2015, the programme, which needs satellite replen- with 7 new satellites, including new generation ishment. As at the end of November 2016, less satellites, as of December 2016. Thus, in De- than 23 satellites were active, and the service cember 2016, 21 satellites are in orbit and op- thus provides suboptimal performances130. Af- erational, while the nominal constellation will ter successive delays, three satellites should be composed of 35 satellites: 5 GEO, 3 IGSO 133 be sent in the first quarter of 2017131. One of and 27 MEO satellites . The initial services the main evolutions of the system in the next were declared as early as 2011 and rapid pro- years will be the shift to the CDMA technique gress has been made in terms of performances for satellite identification. Currently, GLONASS since then. In July 2016, China released a is the only GNSS using the FDMA technique for White Paper outlining Chinese ambitions and this purpose132. Progressively shifting to CDMA plans in terms of programme development, with the deployment of the third generation satellites (GLONASS–K) will improve accuracy and facilitate interoperability with other GNSS. In the longer run, GLONASS–KM satellites,
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applications and industrial development, and party announced that the frequency coordina- international cooperation134. tion between BeiDou and Galileo had been completed, and cooperation mechanisms in BeiDou will deliver two global services: an the field of compatibility and interoperability open service similar to those provided by other were under discussion139. GNSS and an authorized service ensuring en- hanced reliability, accuracy and other fea- tures, only accessible to authorized (mainly A.1.2 RNSS military) users, but little information has been disclosed so far. Regional services include a Regional Navigation Satellite Systems are wide area differential service designed to en- based on the same principle as GNSS, though hance accuracy (<1 m for positioning com- they deliver services to a limited area. A priori, pared to <10 m to open service without aug- RNSS can be similar to GNSS services, but be- mentation), and a short message service al- cause of their limited area of effect, some ap- lowing users to exchange short messages with plications are de facto less appropriate: long BeiDou stations. BeiDou services are broad- aircraft routes and vessel navigation for in- cast on three frequencies: in the upper L band, stance. As BeiDou is evolving into a GNSS sys- B1 (which overlays the Galileo E1 and GPS L1 tem, there are currently two RNSS: the Indian frequencies), and in the lower L band, B2 and Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS B3 (the latter overlays Galileo E6). The open or Navic) and the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Sat- service use signals located on B1 and B2, ellite System (QZSS). whereas the authorized service signals are in The IRNSS project was approved in 2006 and the B1, B2 and B3 bands (see Annex A.6). the constellation, composed of 3 geostationary Cooperation between Galileo and BeiDou has and 4 geosynchronous satellites, was com- been complicated by past ups and downs in pleted in 2016. Like GPS, GLONASS and Bei- EU-China relations in the field of GNSS. In Dou, IRNSS is a military programme, devel- 2003, while Galileo was still envisaged as a oped to ensure access to a Navigation Satellite PPP programme, a cooperation agreement System within the territory of India and its im- signed between the EU and China provided for mediate neighbourhood in case of hostile situ- the association of China with the European ations and to monitor Indian borders for miti- programme. The Chinese National Remote gation of terrorism and infiltration. Navic is Sensing Centre (NRSCC) became a member of fully autonomous, providing its own two ser- the Galileo Joint Undertaking, and China com- vices: a Standard Positioning Service and a mitted to contributing € 200 million to Galileo. Precision Service, both using the L5 and S But, as noted by the European Court of Audi- bands. tors, the liquidation of the GJU and the trans- QZSS is the Japanese RNSS programme, of- fer of this agreement to the European GNSS fering services in the east of Asia and Oceania, Supervisory Authority tarnished relations with especially adapted to the densely mountainous the Chinese party, which was not satisfied with and urbanized Japanese geography. The pro- the secondary status it would get in the new gramme started in 2010, and should reach full 135 structure . As a consequence, in 2006 China operational capability in 2023. Unlike IRNSS, decided to independently start its own GNSS QZSS partially depends on the GPS, that it 136 programme, BeiDou-2 . Chinese-European complements (adding extra satellites to the relations in this field have been poisoned by constellation) and augments (providing aug- 137 this poor start . In particular, the Europeans mentation signals improving GPS positioning have not managed to prevent China from us- accuracy). From an American point of view, ing the same spectrum location chosen by the this system will also be a potential back-up in Europeans to broadcast PRS signals to trans- case of partial GPS failure in this strategic mit their own BeiDou services. This could sig- area. nificantly limit interest in PRS for security or military purposes, since it would be more com- Until 2018, the system will be based on three plicated to jam non-PRS signals without jam- satellites placed on a highly elliptical orbit and ming PRS138. Nevertheless, the signature of an one geostationary satellite, and will provide a “EU-China Cooperation on Space Elements of limited accuracy of its own. After 2023, the Consensus” in 2012 revived the EU-China dia- constellation will count 7 satellites, 4 of which logue in the GNSS field. In 2016, the Chinese will be geostationary, and positioning will be
134 The State Council Information Office of the People's 137 Gutierrez, Peter. "Brussels View: Remembrance of Republic of China. China's BeiDou Navigation Satellite Things Past." Inside GNSS August 2012. System. June 2016. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. 138 Gibbons, G., Divis, D. A. and Gutierrez, P. "The GNSS 135 Inside GNSS. "Compass: And China’s GNSS Makes Quartet." Inside GNSS February 2013. Four." Inside GNSS December 2006. 139 Jiaqing, Ma. “The Progress of BeiDou Navigation Satel- 136 Marks, Paul. "China’s satellite navigation plans threaten lite System.” Presentation. 59th session of COPUOS. Galileo." New Scientist 8 November 2006. United Nation, Vienna, Austria. 9 June 2016.
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possible in most areas without relying on range of frequencies to be used by the differ- GPS140. QZSS will use L1-C/A, L1C, L2C and L5 ent GNSS. It also provides a framework to dis- frequencies to increase the availability of GPS, cuss bilateral issues between GNSS providers, L1-SAIF for the augmentation of GPS, and the like coordination to ensure radiofrequency LEX frequency for high precision, compatible compatibility, as well as multilateral questions, with the Galileo E6 signal (see Annex A.6). such as the opportunity to extend the bands used by navigation satellite systems. Frequency compatibility between Galileo and QZSS, and Galileo and IRNSS has been achieved in recent years under the auspices of The International Committee on Global Naviga- the International Telecommunication Union141. tion Satellite Systems The compatibility and interoperability issues A.1.3 International Organisations between GNSS can hardly be reduced to bilat- eral negotiations, because of the existence of Several international organisations offer mul- other systems in the concerned bands. As a tilateral platforms to foster coordination and consequence, the will to establish a framework cooperation endeavours between different for discussions and interaction mainly between stakeholders, as well as with other actors hav- GNSS providers was identified as early as ing an influence on the functioning of the 1999, at Unispace III143, and led in 2005 to the GNSS and RNSS systems. creation of the International Committee on GNSS (ICG), under the UN umbrella144. The International Telecommunication Union The members of the ICG are the GNSS and The International Telecommunication Union RNSS providers (U.S., EU, Russia, China, In- (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency dia, Japan), but also UN Member States “with for information and communication technolo- a programme to actively promote GNSS appli- gies. This is the only UN agency composed of cations and services” (Italy, Malaysia, United public actors (193 Member States, national Arab Emirates) and current or future GNSS regulators, academic institutions) and private augmentation system providers. Associate companies (more than 700). The main task of members include “international and regional the ITU is to allocate radio-spectrum to the dif- organisations and associations dealing with ferent services and allot them, as well as sat- GNSS services and applications” while some ellite orbits and position slots, to states and international organisations and institutes are companies wishing to develop activities re- present as observers. quiring those resources, GNSS in particular. The ICG aims mainly at promoting the use of The ITU also develops standards in the field of GNSS as well as encouraging compatibility and information and communication technologies interoperability between space navigation sys- in order to frame the coexistence of related tems. The ICG is also a platform to exchange systems and foster interconnectivity between information on systems and their services. To 142 the associated communities worldwide . fulfil its tasks, the Committee has established The spectrum frequencies and satellite orbit a Provider’s forum, composed only of the six allocations and allotments are regulated GNSS and RNSS providers. This is a privileged through the ITU Radio regulations and plans of place to discuss compatibility and interopera- allotment, which are reviewed every three or bility matters and common issues like the pro- four years during the World Radiocommunica- tection of GNSS spectrum, interference detec- tion Conference (WRC). The WRC is also the tion and mitigation, jamming, spoofing, and opportunity to discuss rising and urgent global other matters related to space weather for in- radiocommunication issues. Though the WRC stance. To support discussions and propose addresses issues much broader than solely recommendations, the ICG has set up four GNSS or even space focused issues, it plays a working groups: “System, Signals and Ser- major role in the interactions of those sys- vices”, “Enhancement of GNSS Performance, tems, given the critical importance of spec- New Services and Capabilities”, “Information trum allocation. It is the ITU that defined the Dissemination and Capacity Building”, “Refer- ence Frames, Timing and Applications”. The
140 Kozuka, Souichirou. "The Emerging Legal Debates the result of one of the “action teams” created at this mo- Around Japan's QZSS." Inside GNSS August 2016. ment. 141 GPS World. "Directions 2016: Galileo — strategic tool 144 Aliberti, Marco and Krasner, Stephen D. “Governance in for European autonomy." GPS World 18 December 2015. Space.” Yearbook on Space Policy 2014: The Governance 142 “Overview.” International Telecommunication Union 19 of Space. Eds. Cenan Al-Ekabi, Blandina Baranes, Peter December 2016 Hulsroj and Arne Lahcen. Vienna: SpringerWienNewYork,
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ICG holds an annual meeting where results individuals consumers, is the second most lu- from the different working groups are pre- crative after LBS services, with close to 40% sented together with programming relevant of GNSS chipsets revenue expected to come workshops that will help achieve the objectives from these applications until 2023148. Most of set by the ICG for the next years. the GNSS applications in this field are related to smart mobility, and aim at improving the efficiency, productivity, and environment friendliness of road transportation, but also to A.2 Galileo Uses and Com- save money and time through improvements munities of Users in navigation, fleet management and traffic monitoring. GNSS are also used for safety- critical applications for connected vehicles and A.2.1 Location-Based Services hazardous goods tracking as well as liability applications such as GNSS-based tolling oper- Strictly speaking, Location-Based Services ations and traceability of transport of goods. (LBS) include applications based on the provi- The last types of GNSS uses in this field are sion of services or information relevant to the the regulated applications: recent examples location of the users. Concretely, this term include the European e-Call, a service sending mainly refers to personal uses linked with web an emergency call in case of accidents in Eu- applications available on smartphones or tab- ropean countries149, and digital tachographs to lets (about 90% of LBS devices are support road enforcement. smartphones)145. This includes personal road navigation, map creation, geo-marketing and This market is changing, as some applications location based advertising, emergency loca- are converging with LBS applications, leading tion, work performance-oriented applications, to the decrease of personal dedicated devices sport assistance, games, augmented reality sales, replaced by smartphones. On the other applications and social networking. LBS al- hand, this phenomenon is being mitigated by ready constitute one of the most lucrative a strong increase in In-Vehicle Systems sales, types of GNSS applications and they will keep supported by new connected vehicles func- this status in the mid-term: until 2023, more tions, as well as regulated applications that will than 50% of GNSS chipset revenues should in- continue to drive growth in the future. In the volve LBS applications146. long run, the spread of autonomous cars, in which GNSS play a key role, presents huge The LBS category covers very different appli- business possibilities for Galileo, but will also cations, while mass market by definition in- cause a huge increase in GNSS criticality and cludes numerous actors, thus complicating the liability issues. These developments will ne- identification of general requirements. How- cessitate the creation of new standards and ever, chipset and device manufacturers are certifications in the coming years, given their very reactive to demand and can relay the ag- potential consequences, notably in terms of glomerated needs of mass market consumers. safety. Usually, they pay attention to the availability (especially in challenging environments like All GNSS road applications benefit from better dense cities), the time to first fix, and the ac- availability and accuracy, whereas liability- curacy of GNSS. A clear trend is the increase critical applications requirements focus on of LBS multi-constellations chipsets (more continuity and authentication functions. As for than 60% in 2015), including Galileo with the LBS, most of these applications could be based first Galileo compatible smartphones released on OS and CS, the latter being especially in July 2016147. In terms of opportunities for adapted to deal with the liability aspect. Gali- Galileo, OS and CS are the services most leo SAR, with its innovative return link, is es- adapted to the requirements of LBS applica- pecially suited for safety-critical applications. tions. A.2.3 Aviation A.2.2 Road Applications Though aviation applications are expected to Road transportation related GNSS applications generate only about 1% of GNSS core reve- were the first mass market uses of GNSS. This nues for the 2013-2023 period, since the be- market, which gathers both professionals and ginning of the programme this community of
145 “Location Based Services.” 18 September 2014. Euro- cember 2016
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users has been a main target of Galileo150. Regarding the opportunities for Galileo ser- GNSS aviation applications are regulated to vices, the aviation community is interested in some extent. The regulated part concerns the OS, eventually with an adequate augmen- commercial (including business flights in pri- tation system, and in the SAR. Later, the in- vate planes) and regional flights. International tegrity monitoring service will also mainly tar- requirements and standards are defined by get this industry. the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a UN specialized agency. Among those applications, Performance-Based Navigation A.2.4 Rail (PNB) is steadily increasing: an increasing GNSS applications for rail include assistance in number of procedures regarding different train command and control, timing and syn- phases of the flight are being designed taking chronization of on-board equipment, train lo- into account the use of GNSS. PNB is expected calization, asset management and passenger to provide important environmental and cost information. GNSS non-safety applications are improvements. As recommended by ICAO, already widespread and the safety applica- GNSS are also increasingly used for Search tions, which are the most important, are now and Rescue purposes. Air Surveillance too pro- developing. They could eventually lead to im- gressively relies more on GNSS to automati- portant savings by replacing railway signalling cally report locations to air traffic controllers. and associated on-board equipment, but Those developments are tending to make GNSS applications are also considered as a GNSS an increasingly critical infrastructure for backup solution, or part of a hybrid solution. aviation. To foster the development of innovative GNSS With very few exceptions, GPS (with or with- applications leading to cost reductions, many out SBAS augmentation) is the only GNSS regional initiatives have been created. In the used in this field, and future developments will U.S, the Positive Control Legislation fostered focus on two, maybe three constellations- the development of satellite navigation in this based solutions. The expected integrity, accu- field. In Europe, the European Rail Traffic Man- racy and continuity of service improvements agement System (ERTMS) initiative explores are especially important in this field where the possibility of GNSS as a complementing 152 most of the applications are safety-critical. system for safety operations . The European They will notably allow the development of Joint Undertaking Shift2Rail intends to accel- new GNSS-based procedures for airport ap- erate technologies integration, including GNSS proaches and ground manoeuvres, and even- solutions. The adoption of GNSS for safety-re- tually generate savings through improved traf- lated applications in this domain will neverthe- 153 fic management and advanced navigation. less need to undergo regulation . However, the main milestone will be the re- In any scenario, shipment of GNSS devices will placement of costly current ground based sys- strongly increase in the coming years154. Multi tems, but this will require reaching better per- constellation solutions will also be favoured, formances than those they are currently up especially as they will further enhance posi- 151 to . The major risk for stakeholders is eco- tioning performances, and, for the safety-re- nomic, as aviation lifespan engages invest- lated applications, they will enable meeting ments in the long run, meaning the sustaina- the high level of integrity and accuracy re- bility of GNSS will be a main criteria driving quirements. Therefore, Galileo’s OS and CS, the choice of GNSS complementing GPS. As a together with the future integrity monitoring general rule, the development of new applica- services, are those elements corresponding to tions will involve the setting up of certifications requirements in the rail domain. complying with safety requirements and inter- national standards. A.2.5 Maritime Unregulated applications mostly concern rec- reational aviation, and include navigation as- In the maritime field, the use of GNSS is reg- sistance, infringement alarms, situational ulated by the International Maritime Organiza- awareness of other aircraft and search and tion (IMO), which defines requirements for rescue applications. In this field, the expecta- tions are close to those of mass market con- sumers, as described above.
150 European GNSS Agency. GNSS Market Report – Issue 152 Gutierrez, Peter. “European Rail Industry Perspective 4. March 2015. 10. on GNSS: Francesco Rispoli.” Inside GNSS July 31 2016. 151 This is a main difficulty, in particular for the reliability, 153 Ibid. since it will be required to have less than one failure for 154 European GNSS Agency. GNSS Market Report – Issue 10^9 hours. Currently, even GPS+WAAS does not deliver 4. March 2015. 44. good enough performances allowing all the procedures to rely only on it.
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GNSS applications standards155. In particular, and improved monitoring (biomass, soil condi- in May 2016 it recognised Galileo as part of tion, yield, livestock tracking). This also in- World Wide Radio-Navigation System156. The cludes agro-logistic applications such as asset IMO identifies two kinds of GNSS applications management, enhanced food traceability and for maritime activities: navigation and posi- field delineation. Those solutions are rarely tioning. Navigation covers the processes of only GNSS based, but their enablement gen- planning, recording, and controlling the move- erally requires an extremely high accuracy ments of a vessel sailing from one point to an- level. GNSS based applications for precision other, ensuring safety, expediency and envi- agriculture are growing at a steady rate and ronmental protection during the transport. For will be driven by multi-constellation GNSS SOLAS vessels (larger than a certain tonnage), (this is currently the case for more than 80% navigation already strongly relies on GNSS, of devices), and the integration of GNSS solu- and for smaller vessels, GNSS systems are tions in larger, multi-sensor capacities. These widespread. The important criteria for the use requirements for added value on GNSS capac- of GNSS depend on the phases of navigation ities are particularly in line with Galileo’s CS, but include identifying the area of coverage, as defined. availability, integrity, as well as accuracy (navigation in restricted waters, port ap- proaches). A.2.7 Surveying Positioning applications are much diversified, This field includes GNSS based cadastral sur- including traffic management and surveil- veying (for fiscal purposes especially), GNSS- lance, fishing vessel control, port operations, assisted construction (including machine con- hydrographical surveying, marine engineering trol), mapping, mining and surveys for scien- and Search and Rescue applications. Most of tific purposes (in particular, geodesy), as well them require high accuracy, as well as suffi- as the maritime surveying activities men- cient availability to provide added value. tioned above. GNSS technologies bring time and capital savings, as well as a qualitative im- In general, the spread of GNSS applications for provement in these activities. The market of maritime activities is expected to bring safety related GNSS devices is growing, mainly and productivity gains. It could also be trans- driven by construction activities. lated into important savings if the develop- ment of GNSS applications allows the removal These activities are the most demanding in of costly maritime beacons. Given the mari- terms of accuracy (down to the centimetre for time requirements at large, multi-constellation construction), and they are also of greatest GNSS applications are also especially promis- benefit if high availability (especially in harsh ing in this field (75% of the devices are already environments like cities) and a fast Time to more than two constellations compatible). The First Fix are guaranteed. This is thus a privi- Search and Rescue applications are expected leged market for the CS of Galileo. to further drive the growth of GNSS uses in this field. This implies that besides the OS and A.2.8 Timing and Synchronization the CS, Galileo’s SAR will enable numerous ap- plications. Numerous infrastructures, some of them being critical, need to be provided with accurate time or to synchronize its different subcomponents A.2.6 Agriculture on a regular basis. GNSS give direct access to Together with other technologies (including Coordinated Universal Time, as well as the Earth observation and other optical systems), possibility to synchronize receivers at distant GNSS enables new applications increasing locations. In the telecommunication field (90% farming efficiency and productivity, reducing overall GNSS device shipments) for instance, environmental impact and benefiting the con- GNSS are used for synchronization between sumer. In some areas, productivity gains are distant ground based stations or event log- necessary to better tackle issues such as pop- ging. GNSS are also used in the energy indus- ulation increase, urbanization and land or wa- try where accurate timing within the network ter shortage. is used to optimize power transmission. Last but not least, GNSS timing functions are used Precision agriculture, as it is called, relies on in finance and banking, as precise timing is machinery guidance (including automatic necessary to trace financial operations and to steering), enhanced agrichemical distribution synchronize financial computer systems. The
155 International Maritime Organization. Revised maritime 156 International Maritime Organization. IMO Maritime policy and requirements for a future Global Navigation Sat- Safety Committee Ninety Sixth Session Summary Report. ellite System (GNSS). Resolution A.915 (22) Adopted on 11-20 May 2016. London: United Nations. 9. 29 November 2001. London: United Nations.
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GNSS requirements depend on the applica- combat search and rescue purposes. More tions, but authentication capacity is especially specifically, hard military uses of GNSS include relevant. Furthermore, some telecommunica- precision guidance of munitions to dramati- tions, such as satellite communications, need cally improve strike effectiveness and avoid very high timing accuracy (in the order of na- friendly fire, and unmanned aerial vehicles noseconds) for TDMA (Time Division Multiple navigation. Access) timing on the satellite links and ter- Should military uses be accepted for Galileo, it restrial links. would involve specific needs. Security require- Timing & synchronization applications also ments and signal resilience would need to be benefit from the shift to multi-constellation significantly higher, increasing the overall GNSS, as this increases resilience stability and complexity of the system. For instance, the thus reliance on those systems for critical in- risk of spoofing and jamming from hostile en- frastructures. In 2015, more than 85% of the tities are far higher and potentially far more receivers used for these purposes were al- harmful for military applications. Integrity is ready compatible with at least two constella- also a critical criterion, while some uses neces- tions. The high accuracy of Galileo clocks and sitate a very high level of accuracy and conti- its unique authentication mechanism should nuity of service. Given the time constant of give it a competitive edge in this field. military programmes, the long term continua- tion of the programme and thus the commit- ment of the GNSS provider to ensuring a qual- A.2.9 Potential Military Uses ity service over the long term is also a major Although Galileo is a civilian system which has requirement. The use of Galileo by potential neither been conceived for military uses nor enemies is possible, and further complexity funded by the military, it is also an intrinsic emerges from the need to allow friendly forces dual system, at least because some military to be able to deny the use of Galileo, by jam- activities involving navigation are similar to ci- ming for instance, while themselves still being vilian applications. The clear frontier of the ap- able to use it. plications that will be authorized has not yet Considering the specific military requirements, been defined, but various military uses are al- PRS offers a sound technical basis for these ready envisaged. The most common use is the kinds of applications. The military are also in- positioning of forces (at borders or during op- terested in the uses of other services such as erations), their navigation, and the harmoni- the OS, for less sensitive purposes. sation of their movements. GNSS can also be used for precision delivery of cargos and for
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A.3 Location of the Different Galileo Centres
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A.4 Galileo Architectural Overview
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A.5 GSA Headcount As defined in 2013:
As provided by the GSA Annual Work Programme 2016:
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A.6 Signals Broadcasted by Galileo and the other Navigation Sat- ellite Systems
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A.7 U.S. Organisational Structure for GPS Governance 157
157 “U.S. organisational structure for GPS governance.” Global Positioning System 19 December 2016
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A.8 List of Interviewees and Contacted Persons List of Interviewees Inter- Institution Name Position/Former Position view date Former Principal Advisor for Space and Secu- 15/09/16, EEAS Frank ASBECK rity Policy 16/09/16 Giuilio Former ESA representative at the Brussels of- ESA BARBOLANI DI 07/09/16 fice (relations with the EU) MONTAUTO 21/09/16, Javier ESA Galileo Project Manager 12/10/16, BENEDICTO 14/12/16 GSA Jeremy BLYTH Security Accreditation Board Chairman 15/09/16 EEAS Carine CLAEYS Head of the Space Task Force 14/10/16 Carlo DES GSA Executive Director 24/10/16 DORIDES Project Officer Guidance, Navigation and Con- EDA Marco DETRATTI 13/10/16 trol at EDA /Former PRS Officer at GSA Davide DI EDA Project Officer for Space Programmes 13/10/16 DOMIZIO Former Director of the Galileo Programme and ESA Didier FAIVRE 27/07/16 Navigation-related Activities GSA Patrick HAMILTON Head of Project Control Department 19/08/16 Former Head of Unit Galileo and EGNOS — Le- Ekaterini gal and institutional aspects/Head of Unit Gali- EC 21/09/16 KAVVADA leo and EGNOS —Applications, security, inter- national cooperation EASA Patrick KY Executive Director 09/12/16 Deputy Head of Unit Galileo and EGNOS — Le- EC Leopold Mantl 21/09/16 gal and institutional aspects Member of the European Parliament, Member Marian-Jean EP of Committee on Industry, Research and En- 01/12/16 MARINESCU ergy Florent Former Policy officer at ESA/Policy officer at EDA 13/10/16 MAZURELLE EDA Head of the Strategy and Programme Departe- ESA Philippe MICHEL ment of the Galileo Programme and Naviga- 17/10/16 tion-related Activities Director of the Space Policy Institute at the El- G.Washington Scott PACE liott School of International Affairs, George 04/11/16 University Washington University, Washington DC ESSP (bidder Thierry RACAUD Chief Executive Officer 29/07/16 GSOp) EDA Denis ROGER Director of European Synergies and Innovation 13/10/16 French Civil Aviation Au- Benoit ROTURIER Director of the Satellite Navigation Programme 31/08/16 thority (DGAC) Director of the Galileo Programme and Naviga- ESA Paul VERHOEF 11/08/16 tion-related Activities Former European Commission EGNOS Project GSA Charles VILLIE 24/10/16 Manager – GSA PRS manager Paul GSA WEISSENBERG Senior Advisor to the Executive Director 19/08/16
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List of Contacted Persons This list includes people ESPI contacted but with whom – because of the potential interviewee’s timetable – interviews unfortunately did not take place.
Institution Name Position/Former Position GSA Mark BACON Deputy Chairman of the GSA Administrative Board Former Member of the European Parliament, rappor- Etelka BARSI- teur of the reports for a regulation on the implemen- EP PATAKY tation of European satellite radionavigation pro- grammes SGDSN Philippe BERTRAND Task Officer GSA / German Min- Former chairwoman of the GSA Administrative Board istry of Transport Sabine DANNELKE and Head of Division Telematics in Transport at the and Digital Infra- Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure structure Member of the European Parliament, Chair of the Sky EP Monica HOHLMEIER and Space Intergroup Head of Unit Galileo and EGNOS — Legal and institu- tional aspects/ Former Head of Unit Galileo and EC Philippe JEAN EGNOS — Applications, Security, International Coop- eration Lawyer SES and SESAR at EDA/ Former Senior Legal EDA/ex Eurocon- Caroline MANTL Expert at Eurocontrol/Former Legal Expert at Galileo trol/Ex GJU Joint Undertaking German Ministry of Transport and Digi- Tobias MIETHANER Head of the Department Digital Society tal Infrastructure Head of the EU Satellite Navigation Programmes Di- EC Matthias PETSCHKE rectorate
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List of Acronyms
Acronym Explanation BDS BeiDou Navigation Satellite System CDA Crypto Distribution Authority CDMA Code division multiple access CEPT European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CMS Common Minimum Standards CNES Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales - French Centre for Space Studies COMSEC Communication Security Cosmicheskaya Sistyema Poiska Avariynich Sudow (Space System for the COSPAS-SARSAT Search of Vessels in Distress) - Search And Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking CPA Competent PRS Authorities CS Commercial Service DG AGRI Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development DG CONNECT Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content & Technology DG GROW Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs DG HOME Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs DG MOVE Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft - German Aerospace Centre DoD U.S Department of Defense DoT U.S Department of Transportation EAAS European External Action Service EASA European Aviation Safety Agency EC European Commission EDA European Defence Agency EEAS European External Action Service EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System ESA European Space Agency ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute EU European Union EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access FOC Full Operational Capability
ESPI Report 62 68 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
Acronym Explanation Seventh Framework Programme, European Union research and development FP7 funding programme GAGAN GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation GCC Galileo Control Centres GCS Galileo Control Segment GDDN Galileo Data Dissemination Network GDP Gross Domestic Product GJU Galileo Joint Undertaking Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistyema - Global Navigation Sat- GLONASS ellite System GMS Galileo Mission Segment GMSC Galileo Security Monitoring Centre GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System GPS Global Positioning System GRC Galileo Reference Centre GRSP Geodetic Reference Service Providers GSA European GNSS Agency (formerly European GNSS Supervisory Authority) GSAP Galileo Security Accreditation Panel GSC European GNSS Service Centre GSMC Galileo Security Monitoring Centre GSOp Galileo Service Operator GSS Galileo Sensor Stations GTRA GNSS Threat Response Architecture HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICG International Committee on GNSS IMO the International Maritime Organization IOV In-Orbit Validation IRNSS Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System ITU International Telecommunication Union KPI Key Performance Indicators LBS Location-Based Services MCC SAR Mission Control Centre MFF Multiannual Financial Framework MSAS MTSAT (Multi-Functional Transport Satellite) Satellite Augmentation System NOTAM Notice to airmen NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NRSCC National Remote Sensing Center of China OCX (Next Generation) Operational Control System OS Open Service
ESPI Report 62 69 January 2017
Acronym Explanation PNB Performance-Based Navigation PNT Positioning, Navigation and Timing PPP Public-Private Partnership PPS Precise Positioning Service PRS Public Regulated Service QZSS Quasi-Zenith Satellite System RCC SAR Rescue Control Centre RNSS Regional Navigation Satellite System SAB Security Accreditation Board SAR Search and Rescue Service SBAS Satellite-based augmentation systems SDCM System for Differential Corrections and Monitoring SNAS Satellite Navigation Augmentation System SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea SPS Standard Positioning Service SSRS System-specific Security Requirements Statement TDMA Time Division Multiple Access TEN Trans-European Networks Frame TSP Time Service Providers TTC Telemetry Tracking and Control ULS Up-Link Stations UN United Nations WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System WAGE Wide Area GPS Enhancement WRC World Radiocommunication Conference
ESPI Report 62 70 January 2017 The Governance of Galileo
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the many stake- them. We appreciate indeed that our research holders that accepted to be interviewed and significantly benefited from the openness of provided substantial information for this re- our interlocutors. Finally, the authors would port. A special mention goes to the high level like to thank the supportive and hard-working managers of the three main actors involved in ESPI team, and particularly the Director, Galileo governance – the European Commis- throughout this six-month study. sion, ESA and the GSA - for the frank and fruit- ful exchanges of ideas and views we had with
About the Authors
enna posting, he served as Counselor for sci- Amiel Sitruk ence & technology at the French Embassy in Amiel Sitruk holds a Master of General Engi- London, succeeding a three-year term as the neering from École des Mines de Saint-Etienne founding Secretary General / CEO of ESPI. and a Bachelor of Economics from Université After obtaining a doctorate in nuclear physics Jean Monnet. He is now completing a Master from Université d’Orsay, he conducted re- of International Security at Sciences Po Paris. search at the French Atomic Energy Commis- At the European Space Policy Institute, he has sion (CEA) and in the United States. He later been conducting research on the governance turned to scientific diplomacy, working for the of European GNSS programmes. Previously he French Ministry of Foreign affairs in Paris, as worked in the local CEA (Alternative Energies well as in New Delhi, Tokyo and Washington and Atomic Energy Commission) representa- DC. In 1998, he joined CNES as Director of In- tion at the French Embassy in Moscow, where ternational Relations. his analysis mainly focused on the Russian nu- clear industry. He has been Vice-Chair of the International Relations Committee of ESA, and French Del- Serge Plattard egate at the Council of the European Southern Observatory (ESO). Serge Plattard is Senior Resident Fellow at ESPI, seconded from CNES, and Honorary Pro- Serge Plattard taught at Université d’Orsay, fessor of University College London (UCL) Université Paris-Dauphine and at the French where he lectures. He has worked lately on Business School ESSEC. space governance and is in charge now of He is a founding member of Euroscience and space security studies at the institute. In Oc- member of the International Academy of As- tober 2015, he was elected Chair of the IAF tronautics (IAA). Committee on Space Security. Prior to his Vi-
ESPI Report 62 71 January 2017
Mission Statement of ESPI
The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) provides decision-makers with an informed view on mid- to long-term issues relevant to Europe’s space activi- ties. In this context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing po- sitions and strategies.
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