DOCSLIB.ORG

Ketter, Chief Justice John Marshall's Judicial Statesmanship

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ketter, Chief Justice John Marshall's Judicial Statesmanship UIC John Marshall Law Review Volume 53 Issue 4 Article 3 2021 Chief Justice John Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship Amid In Re Burr: A Pragmatic Political Balancing Against President Jefferson Over Treason, 53 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 789 (2021) Christian Ketter Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview Part of the Legal History Commons Recommended Citation Christian Ketter, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship Amid In Re Burr: A Pragmatic Political Balancing Against President Jefferson Over Treason, 53 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 789 (2021) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol53/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL’S JUDICIAL STATESMANSHIP AMID IN RE BURR: A PRAGMATIC POLITICAL BALANCING AGAINST PRESIDENT JEFFERSON OVER TREASON CHRISTIAN KETTER* I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 791 A. Premise ..................................................................... 794 B. Judicial Statesmanship ........................................... 797 1. Defined ............................................................... 797 2. The Risks of Judicial Statesmanship: Marshall’s Successor Roger B. Taney. ................................ 801 C. John Marshall as a Judicial Statesman ................. 803 II. BACKGROUND ................................................................. 808 A. Relationships at play in In Re Burr ........................ 809 1. Thomas Jefferson vs. John Marshall: Bitter Cousins and American Rivals ........................... 809 2. Judiciary vs. Executive ..................................... 816 B. Judiciary and the People ......................................... 821 1. Jefferson vs. Burr .............................................. 823 2. The Chief Justice and the Marshall Court ...... 825 C. Bollman/Burr Cases ................................................. 828 1. The Incident: Treason? ...................................... 828 2. Ex Parte Bollman: Marshall’s first step ........... 832 3. Burr’s Treason Trial .......................................... 835 a. The Grand Jury is Sworn: May 22, 1807 837 b. The District Court vs. The Executive ...... 841 c. The Grand Jury Indicted Burr ................ 851 d. Bollman versus Burr: A problem in precedent .................................................. 853 e. Burr’s Trial: Public and Political Pressure .................................................... 855 * Professor Ketter is an Adjunct Professor of Criminal Procedure at Morton College. B.A, Communications & Media Studies, cum laude, DePaul University; J.D., cum laude, Dean’s Scholar, The John Marshall Law School. Mr. Ketter is an Associate Attorney with Hervas, Condon & Bersani, P.C., practicing federal civil rights litigation and state tort litigation. He is a former Cook County criminal prosecutor in Chicago, Illinois, having worked as an Assistant State’s Attorney in the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office’s Criminal Prosecutions Bureau. Prior to this Mr. Ketter served in an internship as a judicial clerk at the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit under the Honorable Judge William J. Bauer. He has guest-lectured at Northwestern State University of Louisiana and Morton College respectively on the issues of the career risks for performing artists, rules of evidence and criminal law. Mr. Ketter has written on the subject of constitutional law and gun legislation, first amendment rights, voting rights, administrative law, the Roberts Court, and labor reform. His work has been published in The University of Toledo Law Review, Wayne Law Review, The Arizona State Sports and Entertainment Law Journal, Florida Coastal Law Review, and Cleveland State Law Review. Professor Ketter greatly appreciates the invaluable assistance of Mr. Polatip Subanajouy and Ms. Allison R. Trendle. 789 790 UIC John Marshall Law Review [53:705 f. Final Arguments: August 20-29, 1807 .... 867 III. IN RE BURR: A PRAGMATIC DECISION OF JUDICIAL STATESMANSHIP ............................................................. 872 A. Marshall’s Originalism and Historical Analysis .... 874 B. Marshall’s Textualism: English Jurists and American Judges ....................................................................... 879 C. Marshall’s Structuralism ........................................ 884 D. Marshall’s Common-Law Constitutionalism to Backtrack Bollman. ................................................. 886 E. Marshall’s Living Constitutionalism, Redefining “Treason” in Burr ..................................................... 889 F. Marshall’s judicial statesmanship and public policy concerns .................................................................... 893 1. In the wake of In Re Burr ................................. 898 G. A Political Epilogue: Another Prosecution and Jefferson’s Reprise ................................................... 899 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 905 Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered.1 -Chief Justice John Marshall In Re Burr (1807) It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is . If courts are to regard the Constitution . [as] superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.2 -Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison (1803) While Burr’s case is depending before the court, I will trouble you, from time to time, with what occurs to me . the case of Marbury v. Madison has been cited, and I think it material to stop . citing that case as authority, and to have it denied to be law . I have long wished for a proper occasion to have the gratuitous opinion in Marbury v. Madison brought before the public, & denounced as not law; & I think the present a fortunate one, because it occupies such a place in the public attention . [its] reverse will be the rule of action with the executive.3 -President Thomas Jefferson 1. In re Burr, 8 U.S. 470 (1807) (hereinafter) United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803). 3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 2, 1907), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IN TWELVE VOLUMES 396 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Federal ed. 1905). 2020] A Pragmatic Political Balancing 791 I. INTRODUCTION The effects of Chief Justice John Marshall’s tenure on the Supreme Court from 1801-1835 are still visible today.4 Marshall’s written opinions instruct on American governance, history, law, and politics. The nuances and historical context of those opinions demonstrate that his role on the Court was far more than merely presiding thereover. Marshall shaped modern judicial review.5 As Chief Justice, he quintessentially brought the authority of a political branch, the dignity of statesmanship, and the appearance of total impartiality to the Supreme Court.6 His efforts have been continually minimized, enlarged, and misunderstood by scholars, and yet, there are aspects of his career still to be revealed.7 This Article focuses upon John Marshall’s judicial statesmanship within the case of In Re Burr. Aaron Burr’s treason trial has its notable place in history due to the political climate during the case and the figures involved in the case both in and outside of the courtroom.8 Chief Justice Marshall and the Court felt immense political pressure from President Thomas Jefferson and the public. Marshall’s diplomacy as a judicial statesman, driven by forces facing the Judiciary in Burr, however, necessitate the scrupulous analysis given to other cases in which the Marshall Court averted disabling political pressure.9 At the time of Burr, 4. G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 790 (2000) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall wrote 547 opinions of the Court’s total 574). 5. See Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 403 (2004) (writing that Marshall is incorrectly attributed to have created judicial review. In reality, Marshall enhanced constitutional powers already present). 6. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 12, 15 (3d ed. 2007) (“Consequently[,] under Marshall's guidance[,] the Court became not only an increasingly important force in national politics but also a source of pride and inspiration to the men appointed to its bench.”). 7. Olken, supra note 5, at 403. 8. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 1 (2006), www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/burrtrial.pdf [perma.cc/XXU5-ALVK]. 9. See Id. (“Momentous legal issues were involved, including the scope of executive privilege and the constitutional and common law definitions of treason. The trial’s political dimensions were equally significant: at stake was the reach of Thomas Jefferson’s influence over the federal courts and the power of John Marshall to limit Jefferson’s influence.”); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-1835, at 232 (1991) (writing that In Re Burr “was the cause célébre of the early Marshall
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments
    A Compliant Court: The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments Lauren Paige Joyce Judson Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of: Master of Arts In Political Science Jason P. Kelly, Chair Wayne D. Moore Karen M. Hult August 7, 2014 Blacksburg, Virginia Keywords: Judicial Politics, Electoral Realignment, Alteration to the Supreme Court Copyright 2014, Lauren J. Judson A Compliant Court: The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments Lauren J. Judson ABSTRACT During periods of turmoil when ideological preferences between the federal branches of government fail to align, the relationship between the three quickly turns tumultuous. Electoral realignments especially have the potential to increase tension between the branches. When a new party replaces the “old order” in both the legislature and the executive branches, the possibility for conflict emerges with the Court. Justices who make decisions based on old regime preferences of the party that had appointed them to the bench will likely clash with the new ideological preferences of the incoming party. In these circumstances, the president or Congress may seek to weaken the influence of the Court through court-curbing methods. One example Congress may utilize is changing the actual size of the Supreme The size of the Supreme Court has increased four times in United States history, and three out of the four alterations happened after an electoral realignment. Through analysis of Supreme Court cases, this thesis seeks to determine if, after an electoral realignment, holdings of the Court on issues of policy were more congruent with the new party in power after the change in composition as well to examine any change in individual vote tallies of the justices driven by the voting behavior of the newly appointed justice(s).
    [Show full text]
  • Justice Under Law William F
    College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Popular Media Faculty and Deans 1977 Justice Under Law William F. Swindler William & Mary Law School Repository Citation Swindler, William F., "Justice Under Law" (1977). Popular Media. 264. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/264 Copyright c 1977 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media INL Chief Justice John Marshall, portrayed by Edward Holmes, is the star of the P.B.S. "Equal Justice under Law" series. By William F. Swindler T HEBuilding-"Equal MOTTO on the Justice facade under of-the Law"-is Supreme also Court the title of a series of five films that will have their pre- mieres next month on the Public Broadcasting Service network. Commissioned by the Bicentennial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States and produced for public television by the P.B.S. national production center at WQED, Pittsburgh, the films are intended to inform the general public, as well as educational and professional audiences, on the American constitutional heritage as exemplified in the major decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall. ABOVE: Marshall confers with Justice Joseph Story (left) and Jus- Four constitutional cases are dramatized in the tice Bushrod Washington (right). BELOW: Aaron Burr is escorted to series-including the renowned judicial review issue jail. in Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the definition of "nec- essary and proper" powers of national government in the "bank case" (McCulloch v.
    [Show full text]
  • Justice William Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 10 Issue 2 Issue 2 - February 1957 Article 9 2-1957 Justice William Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power F. William O'Brien S.J. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation F. William O'Brien S.J., Justice William Cushing and the Treaty-Making Power, 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 351 (1957) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol10/iss2/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JUSTICE WILLIAM CUSHING AND THE TREATY-MAKING POWER F. WILLIAM O'BRIEN, S.J.* Washington's First Appointees Although the work of the Supreme Court during the first few years was not great if measured in the number of cases handled, it would be a mistake to conclude that the six men who sat on the Bench during this formative period made no significant contribution to the develop- ment of American constitutional law. The Justices had few if any precedents to use as guides, and therefore their judicial work, limited though it was in volume, must be considered as stamped with the significance which attaches to all pioneer activity. Moreover, most of this work was done while on circuit duty in the different districts, and therefore from Vermont to Georgia the Supreme Court Justices were emissaries of good will for the new Constitution and the recently established general government.
    [Show full text]
  • Not the King's Bench Edward A
    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Constitutional Commentary 2003 Not the King's Bench Edward A. Hartnett Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Hartnett, Edward A., "Not the King's Bench" (2003). Constitutional Commentary. 303. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/303 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOT THE KING'S BENCH Edward A. Hartnett* Speaking at a public birthday party for an icon, even if the honoree is one or two hundred years old, can be a surprisingly tricky business. Short of turning the party into a roast, it seems rude to criticize the birthday boy too harshly. On the other hand, it is at least as important to avoid unwarranted and exaggerated praise.1 The difficult task, then, is to try to say something re­ motely new or interesting while navigating that strait. The conference organizers did make it easier for me in one respect: My assignment does not involve those ideas for which Marbury is invoked as an icon. It is for others to wrestle in well­ worn trenches with exalted arguments about judicial review and its overgrown descendent judicial supremacy, while trying to avoid unseemly criticism or fawning praise. I, on the other hand, am to address more technical issues involving section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its provision granting the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus.
    [Show full text]
  • Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punishment
    Florida State University Law Review Volume 22 Issue 3 Article 1 1995 Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment Michael Mello [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 591 (1995) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol22/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ADHERING TO OUR VIEWS: BRENNAN AND MARSHALL AND THE RELENTLESS DISSENT TO DEATH AS A PUNISHMENT Michael Mello VOLUME 22 WINTER 1995 NUMBER 3 Recommended citation: Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (1995). ADHERING TO OUR VIEWS: JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL AND THE RELENTLESS DISSENT TO DEATH AS A PUNISHMENT MICHAEL MELLO* I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 592 A. Capital Punishmentand the Modern Court: An Overview ..................................................... 593 B. The Evolving Law of Death: "The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course" .............................. 598 II. LEGITIMACY IN HISTORY ......................................... 606 A. The Supreme Court: "Nine Scorpions in a Bottle" .................... .................................. 606 B. Early History of Dissent ................................. 607 1. Seriatim Opinions..................................... 607 2. Early "Opinions of the Court"--andEarly Dissents ................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Keep Reading Wilson As a Justice
    Wilson as a Justice MAEVA MARCUS* ABSTRACT James Wilson, a founding father of great intellect and promise, never ful®lled his potential as a Justice. This paper explores his experience on the Supreme Court and the reasons that led to his failure to achieve the distinction that was expected of him. James Wilson very much wanted to be the ®rst Chief Justice.1 But when George Washington denied him that honor and nominated him to be an Associate Justice, he accepted and threw himself into the work with characteristic industry.2 Other than a title and $500 more in annual salary3 (Wilson probably wanted this more than anything else), Wilson lost little. Life as an Associate Justice would be no different from life as the Chief. A Justice occupied one of the most exalted positions in the new government and was paid more than any other federal em- ployee, except the President and the Vice-President.4 Nominations were the sub- ject of ®erce competition.5 But in 1789 no one knew exactly what that job would entail. This paper gives the reader some idea of what a Justice, and speci®cally James Wilson, did in the 1790s.6 Wilson spent more of his time on the bench of circuit courts than he did on the Supreme Court bench; thus, this paper will focus signi®- cantly on his circuit court activities.7 And Wilson performed his circuit court * Currently Director of the Institute for Constitutional History at the New-York Historical Society and Research Professor at the George Washington University Law School and General Editor of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Maeva Marcus previously edited The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, an eight-volume series completed in 2006.
    [Show full text]
  • Morris-Jumel Mansion and the American Colonial Revival
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 2014 Morris-Jumel Mansion and the American Colonial Revival Ken Moss CUNY City College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/258 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Morris-Jumel Mansion and the American Colonial Revival Kenneth Moss Advisor – Professor Gregory Downs May 1, 2011 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts of the City College of the City University of New York. Table of Contents List of Illustrations i Introduction 1 Motivations and the Proprietary Model 18 Objects and Structures 52 Conclusion 72 Bibliography 79 i List of Illustrations Figure 1: Morris-Jumel Mansion, First Floor Hall, 1886. Photograph. Morris-Jumel Mansion, Gladys Brooks Commemorative Archive Figure 2: Washington's Bedroom, circa 1916. Postcard. Morris-Jumel Mansion, Gladys Brooks Commemorative Archive. Figure 3: Jumel Mansion, Dining Room, Circa 1910. Photograph. Morris-Jumel Mansion, Gladys Brooks Commemorative Archive. Introduction On November 19, 1904 an unlikely face-off occurred at the headquarters of the New York City Parks Department, the Arsenal, in Central Park. It was the latest volley in a battle that had raged in government and in the press for more than a year. The decision at hand was so grave it had deadlocked in the New York State legislature with each house supporting a different protagonist.
    [Show full text]
  • The Marshall Court As Institution
    Herbert A. Johnson. The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall: 1801-1835. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997. xii + 317 pp. $39.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-57003-121-2. Reviewed by Sanford Levinson Published on H-Law (December, 1997) Herbert A. Johnson, who with the late George perhaps the general political atmosphere that L. Haskins co-authored the Holmes Devise volume helped to explain the particular appointments to Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 the Court that made the achievement of Mar‐ (1981), here turns his attention to Marshall's over‐ shall's political and jurisprudential goals easier or all tenure of office. Indeed, the book under review harder. is part of a series, of which Johnson is the general This is a book written for a scholarly audi‐ editor, on "Chief Justiceships of the United States ence, and I dare say that most of its readers will Supreme Court," of which four books have ap‐ already have their own views about such classic peared so far. (The others are William B. Casto on Marshall chestnuts as Marbury v. Madison, Mc‐ Marshall's predecessors Jay and Ellsworth; James Culloch v. Maryland, Gibbons v. Ogden, and the W. Ely, Jr. on Melville W. Fuller; and Melvin I. like. Although Johnson discusses these cases, as he Urofksy on Harlan Fiske Stone and Fred M. Vin‐ must, he does not spend an inordinate amount of son.) One could easily question the value of peri‐ space on them, and the great value of this book odizing the Supreme Court history through its lies in his emphasis on facets of the Court, includ‐ chief justices; but it probably makes more sense ing cases, of which many scholars (or at least I to do so in regard to the formidable Marshall than myself) may not be so aware.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 2 the Marshall Court and the Early Republic
    Chapter 2 The Marshall Court and the Early Republic I. The Supreme Court in Its Initial Years: 1 78918O11 The Supreme Court of the United States was a relatively insignificant institution during the first decade of the new Republic. Presidents Washington and Adams had some difficulty attracting people to serve, and the rate of turnover was high. Three men were appointed chiefjustice during the first 12 years.JohnJay resigned after six years to serve as New York’s governor, which he presumably deemed the more important office (and during his tenure he sailed to England to serve as the princi pal negotiator of what became known as the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, which, together with his co-authorship of the Federalist Papers, remains his primary claim to fame for most historians) . His successor, John Rutledge, had been appointed as an Associate in 1 789 but had resigned in 1 791 , without ever sitting, to go to the more prestigious South Carolina Supreme Court. He was nominated to become Chief Justice ofthe U.S. Supreme Court in 1795 but failed to receive Senate confirmation. Thereafter, Oliver Ellsworth was nominated and confirmed in 1796; he served until 1800, when he resigned while overseas on a diplomatic mission to France. One source of discontent was the onerous duty of “riding circuit,” which required eachJustice to travel twice a year to sit in the federal circuit court districts. (There were no “circuit courts” in the modern sense; instead, they consisted of districtjudges sitting together with a Supreme Courtjustice as a “circuit court.”) The trips were strenuous and time-consuming.
    [Show full text]
  • The Marshall Court and Property Rights: a Reappraisal, 33 J
    UIC Law Review Volume 33 Issue 4 Article 14 Summer 2000 The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023 (2000) James W. Ely Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation James W. Ely Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023 (2000) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss4/14 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE MARSHALL COURT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: A REAPPRAISAL JAMES W. ELY, JR.* INTRODUCTION Historians have long stressed the affinity between the jurisprudence of John Marshall and the protection of property rights. "Two fixed conceptions which dominated Marshall during his long career on the bench," Vernon L. Parrington observed, "were the sovereignty of the federal state and the sanctity of private property."1 Famous cases involving property rights and contractual stability figured prominently in the work of the Marshall Court. The property-conscious tenets of Marshall's constitutionalism helped lay the legal foundation for a market economy and had a lasting impact on the American polity. Beginning with the Progressive movement, and continuing through the New Deal Era, the rights of property owners were often disparaged as impediments to economic regulation and the welfare state.
    [Show full text]
  • Spring/Summer 2018
    TIMELINE SPRING/SUMMER 2018 Stories of Loss A Landscape of Landmarks Fashion Agency and Survival As we continue to engage in meaningful Kristen Stewart, Nathalie L. Klaus Curator conversations, David Voelkel, Elise H. Wright of Costume and Textiles, explores Pretty Meg Hughes, Curator of Archives, highlights Curator of General Collections, discusses Powerful: Fashion and Virginia Women, some of what visitors will see in the timely the relevance of the upcoming exhibition her new show examining fashion as an exhibition . Pandemic: Richmond Monumental: Richmond Monuments (1607–2018). instigator of social change. 1 5 6 A B C D A A The Valentine’s new exhibition Pandemic: Richmond traces the B to serve as a turning place for city’s encounters with seven contagious diseases: smallpox, boats and barges and as a source tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid fever, polio, the 1918–1919 of water for mills, its standing influenza and HIV/AIDS. These diseases shaped Richmond’s water and sewage contaminants history, changing where and how people lived and prompting life- made it a perfect environment saving advances in health care. for cholera. Here is a closer look at Richmond’s experience with cholera, just Richmonders waited in fear as one of the diseases featured in this timely exhibition: cholera broke out in U.S. cities, finally reaching Tidewater by Cholera first appeared in pandemic form in the early-19th century, August 1832. In September, the with at least seven major global outbreaks between 1817 and the city saw its first case, caught present. This terrifying new disease produced severe vomiting by an 11-year-old enslaved and diarrhea that could lead to coma and death within hours.
    [Show full text]
  • The Amenability of the President to Suit Laura Krugman Ray Widener University
    Kentucky Law Journal Volume 80 | Issue 3 Article 6 1992 From Prerogative to Accountability: The Amenability of the President to Suit Laura Krugman Ray Widener University Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Part of the President/Executive Department Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Ray, Laura Krugman (1992) "From Prerogative to Accountability: The Amenability of the President to Suit," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 80 : Iss. 3 , Article 6. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol80/iss3/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. From Prerogative to AcCountability: The Amenability of the President to Suit By LAURA KRUGMAN RAY* INTRODUCTION When in the fall of 1990 President George Bush announced a shift in his Persian Gulf strategy from a defensive to an offensive posture, a number of lawsuits were filed against the President questioning his power to commence military operations against Iraq without congressional approval.' In the controversy surround- ing the President's policy, little attention was paid to the form of this protest, and yet the filing of these lawsuits represents a quiet revolution in presidential accountability under the rule of law. From the end of the Civil War until the final days of the Watergate drama, legal gospel held that the President of the United States enjoyed immunity from suit.
    [Show full text]