Is the USAF Flying Force Large Enough? Assessing Capacity Demands in Four Alternative Futures

Home , 34th Fighter Squadron, Calayan Island, Desert Commander, Hurricane Greta (1956), Iraqi Air Force, Operation Deny Flight

C O R P O R A T I O N

Alan J. Vick, Paul Dreyer, John Speed Meyers For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2500

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www.rand.org Preface

The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Department of Defense to conduct a systematic review of U.S. defense needs every four years. The first of these Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) was conducted in 1997, followed by four others in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014. By 2016, congressional leaders viewed the QDR as a costly “watered- down, consensus-driven product” of relatively little value.1 As a result, the 2017 NDAA scrapped the QDR, replacing it with two strategy documents. By 2017, this had evolved into a requirement for a single review of the National Military Strategy. Recognizing that some kind of defense strategy review would occur in 2017–2018, the Director, Strategy, Concepts and Assessments, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (USAF), commissioned a fiscal year 2017 RAND Project AIR FORCE study. The USAF sought help developing a force planning and sizing construct that would address two competing demands: (1) Deter (and, if necessary, win) a future conflict with a major power and (2) meet recurring and often enduring combatant commander demands for forces today. These are in tension because the current force is neither sized nor resourced to meet the demands of current operations, maintain a large force in high readiness for major conflict, and fund needed modernization to counter emerging challenges. To address these and related policy issues, the study was organized around five research questions: (1) Do defense reviews matter, and, if so, how can the USAF participate most effectively? (2) What programs should the USAF prioritize to deter/defeat peer threats? (3) How do military operations become prolonged?2 (4) What types of force demands have been placed on the USAF since the end of World War II? and (5) What impact do steady-state demands, prolonged military operations, and other contingencies have on USAF force structure? This report addresses the last two questions. Specifically, the purposes of this report are to quantify historical demands placed on the Air Force and to use that historical evidence to help identify future potential capacity shortfalls, indicate which aircraft platforms might or might not be placed in short supply under different scenarios, suggest where capacity increases could enhance force robustness, and inform force planning more generally. The report does not address specific causes of stress in the current force other than to note the role of prolonged operations in creating excessive demand relative to the fiscal year 2017 force. For documentation of our analysis on the other questions, see Raphael S. Cohen, The History and Politics of Defense Reviews, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2278-AF, 2018;

1 Joe Gould, “QDR Dead in 2017 Defense Policy Bill,” Defense News, April 25, 2016. 2 We define “prolonged” operations as those lasting more than a year.

iii and David Ochmanek, Restoring U.S. Power Projection Capabilities: Responding to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-260-AF, 2018. The research described in this report was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.

RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf. This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on July 13, 2017. The draft report, issued on September 22, 2017, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts.

iv Contents

Preface ...... iii Figures ...... vii

Tables ...... viii

Summary ...... x

Acknowledgments ...... xviii

Abbreviations ...... xix

Chapter One: Introduction ...... 1 Background ...... 1 The Policy Problem ...... 2 Purpose of This Report ...... 2 Organization ...... 3 Chapter Two: An Overview of Joint Operations: 1946–2016 ...... 4

Introduction ...... 4 Descriptive Statistics, 1946–2016 ...... 6 Prolonged Operations ...... 9 Prolonged Operations by Mission Type ...... 9 Length of Prolonged Operations by Mission Type ...... 10 Simultaneity and Prolonged Operations ...... 11 Prolonged Operations by Presidential Administration ...... 12 Are Operations Becoming Longer? ...... 13 Chapter Three: Analytical Approach ...... 15

Derivation of Future Decremented Supply ...... 15 Total Supply ...... 15 Fixed Demand ...... 16 Decremented Supply ...... 19 Estimation of Future Variable Demands ...... 19 Futures 1 and 2: New Cold War ...... 20 Future 3: Peace Enforcement ...... 22 Future 4: Global Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Operations ...... 23 Construction of Representative Force Packages ...... 25 Prediction of Operational Durations ...... 28 Translation of Aircraft Demands into Squadron Demands ...... 29 Accommodation of Key Scheduling Constraints ...... 30 Chapter Four: Force Structure Implications of Alternative Futures ...... 33

Base Case ...... 33 Analytical Excursions ...... 36

v Contingencies Capped at One Year ...... 36 Trade-Offs Between Steady-State and Contingency Demands ...... 39 Impact of Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints on Contingency Shortfalls ...... 40 Summary of Alternative Futures Analysis ...... 42 Chapter Five: Findings and Recommendations ...... 43

Findings ...... 43 The USAF FY17 Force Experiences Capacity Shortfalls in All Four Futures ...... 43 No Class of Aircraft Is Robust Across All Four Futures ...... 44 Prolonged Operations Have a Disproportionate Impact on Contingency Demands ...... 44 Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints Are Not Responsible for Contingency Shortfalls ...... 45 Recommendations ...... 46 Final Thoughts ...... 47

Appendix A: Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation (AF-FESS) Model Description ...... 49 Appendix B: Notes on the Joint Operations Dataset, 1946–2016 ...... 56

Appendix C: Prolonged Joint Operations, 1946–2016 ...... 58

Appendix D: Joint Operations Chronology, 1946–2016 ...... 59

Appendix E: Force Packages Used in AF-FESS ...... 76

Appendix F: MDS-Level Simulation Results ...... 79

Appendix G: Estimating a Vietnam War–Level Demand on the USAF FY17 Force ...... 80

Bibliography ...... 83

vi Figures

Figure S.1. Prolonged Operations, by Presidential Administration ...... xiv Figure 2.1. Count of Prolonged U.S. Military Operations, by Operation Type, 1946–2016 ...... 10

Figure 2.2. Average Length of Prolonged Operations, by Operation Type, 1946–2016 ...... 11

Figure 2.3. All Prolonged U.S. Military Operations, 1946–2016 ...... 11

Figure 2.4. Prolonged Operations Initiated and Inherited, by Presidential Administration ...... 13

Figure 2.5. Comparison of the Length of Pre–Cold War and Post–Cold War Operations ...... 13

Figure 3.1. Illustration of Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation Scheduling

Logic ...... 31 Figure 4.1. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force: Prolonged Versus Shorter

Contingencies ...... 38 Figure 4.2. Trade-Offs Between Steady-State and Contingency Demands for C3ISR/BM

Aircraft (All Futures) ...... 40 Figure 4.3. Impact of Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints on Availability of C3ISR/BM Aircraft

(Peace Enforcement Future) ...... 41 Figure A.1. AF-FESS Model Structure ...... 49

Figure A.2. Notional Future from CT/COIN Era ...... 53

Figure A.3. KC-135 Demand from Notional Future ...... 54

Figure A.4. MC-130 Demand from Notional Future ...... 55

vii Tables

Table S.1. Percentage of Demands Met by Aircraft Class (FY17 Force) ...... xii Table 2.1. Frequency, Duration, and USAF Participation in Joint Operations, 1946–2016 ...... 7

Table 2.2. Count of Operations, by Type for Four Time Periods ...... 8

Table 2.3. Years Between Events (Normalized Frequency), by Operation Type for Four

Time Periods ...... 9 Table 2.4. Count of Prolonged Operations and All Operations, by Major Time Periods ...... 12

Table 3.1. Total USAF FY17 Supply, by Major Aircraft Type ...... 16

Table 3.2. Fixed Demand Assumptions, by Future ...... 18

Table 3.3. Mapping Policymaker Concerns to Historical Periods and Alternative Futures ...... 20

Table 3.4. Variable Demands During the Cold War (1946–1989) ...... 21

Table 3.5. Variable Demands During the Peace Enforcement Era (1990–2000) ...... 23

Table 3.6. Variable Demands During the Counterterrorism/Counterinsurgency Era

(2001–2016) ...... 25 Table 3.7. Historical Basis for Force Packages for Each Demand Class and Each Future ...... 26

Table 3.8. Sources of Operational Duration Inputs for Alternative Futures ...... 28

Table 3.9. Total Historical Supply and Demand in Aircraft and Squadron Equivalents ...... 30

Table 4.1. Percentage of Demands Met, by Aircraft Class (FY17 Force) ...... 34

Table 4.2. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force (by Aircraft Type) ...... 36

Table 4.3. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force (Contingencies Are Capped at

365 Days) ...... 37 Table A.1. Categorized List of MDS ...... 50

Table C.1. Joint Operations That Lasted 365 Days or Longer, 1946–2016 ...... 58

Table D.1. Joint Operations Starting Between 1946 and 1951 ...... 59

Table D.2. Joint Operations Starting Between 1952 and 1955 ...... 60

Table D.3. Joint Operations Starting Between 1956 and 1959 ...... 61

Table D.4. Joint Operations Starting Between 1960 and 1962 ...... 62

Table D.5. Joint Operations Starting Between 1963 and 1964 ...... 63

Table D.6. Joint Operations Starting Between 1965 and 1967 ...... 64

Table D.7. Joint Operations Starting Between 1968 and 1971 ...... 65

Table D.8. Joint Operations Starting Between 1972 and 1975 ...... 66

Table D.9. Joint Operations Starting Between 1976 and 1979 ...... 67

Table D.10. Joint Operations Starting Between 1980 and 1982 ...... 68

Table D.11. Joint Operations Starting Between 1983 and 1985 ...... 69

Table D.12. Joint Operations Starting Between 1986 and 1988 ...... 70

Table D.13. Joint Operations Starting Between 1989 and 1991 ...... 71

viii Table D.14. Joint Operations Starting Between 1992 and 1994 ...... 72 Table D.15. Joint Operations Starting Between 1995 and 1997 ...... 73

Table D.16. Joint Operations Starting Between 1998 and 2003 ...... 74

Table D.17. Joint Operations Starting Between 2004 and 2016 ...... 75

Table E.1. Force Packages in Number of Aircraft, by Class of Demand ...... 77

Table E.2. Force Packages in Squadron Equivalents, by Class of Demand ...... 78

Table F.1. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force When Contingencies Are Capped

at 365 Days ...... 79 Table G.1. Vietnam War Order of Battle as a Percentage of the USAF Total Force, 1969 ...... 81

Table G.2. Vietnam War–Scale Demand on FY17 Force (by Aircraft Class) ...... 81

Table G.3. Vietnam War and OIF Demands as Percentage of USAF Total Force in 1969

and 2017 ...... 82

ix Summary

Background The U.S. military has operated at a high operational tempo for most of the post–Cold War era. Although the demand for forces has ebbed and flowed, peaking during major combat operations, such as Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “ebb” periods never quite returned to the low levels taken for granted during much of the Cold War. This high operational tempo required some adaptations but initially seemed manageable. U.S. conventional military dominance allowed for some risks to be taken in force readiness and capability requirements for conflict with a major power. That unipolar era is rapidly coming to an end as both Russia and China field increasingly capable forces and become more willing to use force to pursue foreign policy goals. Today, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) must meet combatant commander demands and simultaneously improve its capabilities to defeat major powers. It is hardly news to the USAF that small continuous rotations are demanding. USAF leaders invented the Air Expeditionary Force construct two decades ago to better manage these demands.1 Similarly, the other services have adapted their force presentation models in response to this new reality, and the Global Force Management system has evolved to better support Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense decisionmaking processes. These adaptations (along with the willingness of American service members to make the personal sacrifices associated with frequent deployments) have mitigated or postponed the worst effects of constant deployments. These measures were, however, never meant to be anything other than temporary fixes. Although service leaders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been increasingly candid and direct about the readiness and retention problems caused by overtasking and underresourcing of the military, as of May 2018 there appears to be no significant reduction in demand on the horizon.2 In this study, we sought to help the USAF develop planning tools to test the robustness of the flying force against a range of possible future demands. We used four distinct, empirically derived futures to model future force demands. In particular, this study is the first to quantify the degree to which the open-ended and prolonged operations (those lasting more than one year)

1 For an introduction to the Air Expeditionary Force, see Richard G. Davis, Anatomy of A Reform: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museum Program, 2003. 2 For an overview of recent readiness problems across the military branches, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Missions Challenges, Washington, D.C., June 2017.

x mentioned above increase demands on USAF force structure. Our hope is that this research will provide additional analytical evidence of the gap between the demands of U.S. national security strategy and the resources that the services have to meet these demands. Although this study focused on the USAF, a similar analysis could be done for the other services using our joint operations database and appropriate service-specific scheduling models. In this study, we did not attempt to identify solutions to the capacity shortfalls beyond the obvious one (increase the size of the force where it is most stressed).

Analytical Approach Our analysis contains six phases: (1) derivation of future decremented supply, (2) estimation of future variable demands, (3) construction of representative force packages, (4) prediction of operational durations, (5) translation of aircraft demands into squadron demands, and (6) accommodation of key scheduling constraints. The first phase could be reduced to a simple equation. From the total supply of Air Force capacity in fiscal year 2017 (FY17), we subtract the fixed demand for capacity that will likely be required to meet open-ended and enduring requirements, such as homeland air defense. (We worked closely with the study sponsor to ensure that we neither understated nor overstated this fixed demand.) The remaining capacity is the future decremented supply, or the amount that would be available to meet future variable demands. Our estimates of future decremented supply assume that the total supply of Air Force capacity will remain at the level of FY17. The most complex phase of our analysis is the estimation of future variable demands. To produce these estimates, we rely on historical precedents (1946–2016) that portend very different future worlds. The hypothetical futures are thus extensions of recent historical eras. For each of four alternative futures, our model estimates the amount of Air Force capacity that would be required to satisfy the future variable demands above and beyond the future fixed demand. The model estimates the future variable demands for eight classes of aircraft across the four posited futures. The purpose of this critical phase of the analysis is to show whether the four historically based projections of variable demand could be met by their respective decremented supplies. Our model, called the Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation (AF-FESS), can help identify potential capacity shortfalls, indicate which aircraft platforms might or might not be placed in short supply under different scenarios, suggest where capacity increases could enhance force robustness, and inform force planning more generally. The four remaining phases of our analysis are all attempts to modify specific inputs to the AF-FESS model so that it can generate results that reflect the future Air Force capacities, capabilities, and constraints as realistically as possible. The various model inputs have to do with force packages, operational durations, squadron demands, and scheduling constraints.

xi Findings

The USAF FY17 Force Experiences Capacity Shortfalls in All Four Futures Whether the future bears similarities to the Cold War years, to the 1990s era of peace enforcement operations, or to the counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) demands of today, the USAF FY17 flying force faces force structure shortfalls. These are displayed in Table S.1. The color coding is broadly construed and intended to highlight shortfalls: green indicates that 80–100 percent of demands are met, yellow indicates 51–79 percent met, and red indicates 0–50 percent met.

Table S.1. Percentage of Demands Met by Aircraft Class (FY17 Force)

Cold War Cold War Peace (with long (with short CT/COIN Enforcement regional conflict) regional conflict) Airlift 65% 67% 97% 99% Attack 62% 100% 53% 92% Bomber 73% 72% 46% 76% C3ISR/BM 50% 84% 29% 63% Fighter 93% 100% 64% 98% Other 91% 91% 40% 66% SOF 53% 98% 40% 54% Tanker 92% 92% 32% 90%

NOTES: No limits to contingency length. Deploy-to-dwell constraints: active component: 1:2, reserve components: 1:5, 180-day max unit deployments. Green = 80–100 percent of demands are met, yellow = 51–79 percent met, and red = 0–50 percent met. C3ISR/BM = command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/battle management; SOF = Special Operations Forces.

We assess two cold war futures. The first (left column above) uses historical demands, including long regional conflicts, such as the Vietnam and Korean Wars. In this future, the USAF experiences shortfalls in five of the eight aircraft classes, with unmet demands as high as 50 percent (for C3ISR/BM platforms). In contrast, the second cold war has no proxy wars like Vietnam, only short regional conflicts, such as Operation Desert Storm. In this case, the USAF can meet 84 percent to 100 percent of demands for six classes of aircraft. It faces shortfalls for airlift and bomber aircraft, however, meeting only 67 percent and 72 percent of their respective demands. Perhaps the most surprising result is that a future characterized by peace enforcement operations (third column above) is most stressful to capacity. This is because that period was characterized by prolonged no-fly zones in the Balkans and Middle East, which required continuous rotations of fighter, tanker, and C3ISR/BM platforms.3 Airlift is the only class of

3 We define “prolonged” operations as those lasting more than a year.

xii aircraft without shortfalls, meeting 97 percent of demand. The other classes face massive shortfalls. Five classes meet only 29 percent to 46 percent of demands; another two meet 53 percent to 64 percent of demands. A future characterized by CT/COIN operations (far right column above) presents a mixed story. Four aircraft classes meet over 90 percent of contingency demands, but the other four classes can meet only between 54 percent and 76 percent of demands.

No Class of Aircraft Is Robust Across All Four Futures Force planners seeking to create resilience in the face of inevitable uncertainties about the future will want to know how robust a force is across futures. For example, if bomber aircraft as a class perform well across all the futures, that would suggest that bomber capacity is robust. Alternatively, if an aircraft class performs well in only one or two of the futures, that is worrisome. From this perspective, Table S.1 illustrates that no USAF aircraft class in the FY17 force can be considered robust across all four futures. There is no formal threshold for robustness, but it seems reasonable to expect the force to meet at least 80 percent of demands in every future (green in our charts). No aircraft class did that. Fighter aircraft came the closest, meeting 93 percent or more of demands in three futures and 64 percent in the remaining. C3ISR/BM platforms, reflecting their small fleets and high demand, are the least robust across the four futures, meeting 84 percent of demands in one future but only 29 percent to 63 percent in the others. Tanker aircraft are particularly interesting, because they were highly robust (90 percent or more demands met) across three of the futures but met only 32 percent of the demands for the Peace Enforcement future.

Prolonged Operations Have a Disproportionate Impact on Contingency Demands Since 1946, the USAF has participated in 46 prolonged operations that lasted longer than one year. Every U.S. president from Truman to Obama inherited and initiated at least one prolonged operation.4 These are illustrated in Figure S.1.

4 President Trump also inherited prolonged operations in multiple locations. As of June 2018, there are no named operations initiated by the Trump Administration that have lasted more than a year.

xiii Figure S.1. Prolonged Operations, by Presidential Administration

16 Number of prolonged ops inherited

14 Number of prolonged ops initiated

0 '45-'53 '53-'61 '61-'63 '63-'69 '69-'74 '74-'77 '77-'81 '81-'89 '89-'93 '93-'01 '01-'09 '09-'17 Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan H.W. Bush Clinton W. Bush Obama NOTE: Prolonged operations are defined as those that last more than 365 days.

Operations that last more than a year place great demands on force structure. This is worrisome because, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, the average length of operations has grown since the end of the Cold War. In the analytical excursions in which we limited contingencies to no more than one year in duration, we found large improvements in the percentage of contingency demands met. With contingencies capped, the USAF FY17 force was able to meet 80 percent or more of demands in 25 of the 32 cases that we examined (8 classes of aircraft × 4 futures), and there were no cases in which it met fewer than 68 percent of demands. Finally, with contingencies capped at one year, there were eight cases in which the force met 100 percent of demands. In contrast, when contingencies were not capped, there were only 14 cases in which the FY17 force met 80 percent or more of demands and only one case in which 100 percent of demands were met. The other 18 cases had significant, and at times extreme, deficiencies. (See Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1.) This analysis suggests that prolonged operations are driving contemporary capacity shortfalls, at least as measured by aircraft availability. This study did not, however, assess training, manpower, maintenance, supply, or retention shortfalls. The stresses experienced most profoundly in 2017 at the squadron and wing level are likely the product of some combination of these various factors. We suspect that prolonged operations are, at minimum, contributing to these other problems, but measuring their impact was beyond the scope of this study. As to why prolonged operations are so stressing to the force, one must consider other factors beyond just the sheer lengths of deployments. The preferred dwell time for forces following a prolonged operation is two to five times as long as the deployment itself, depending on whether active or reserve forces are sent. Similarly, the likelihood that a unit is deployed up to its allowed maximum (and therefore takes the maximum amount of time to recover) increases as the number

xiv of prolonged operations increase. Of the 888 historical contingencies in our study, only 51 (5.7 percent) of the contingencies lasted a year or longer, but they were responsible for 84,895 of the 111,060 days of demand (76.4 percent). When we ran excursions in which we capped contingency lengths at a year, we (unsurprisingly) saw considerable increases in the percentage of contingency demands met, as a one-year deployment would require, at most, two unit elements of supply per unit element of demand and would thus remove, at most, 36 unit element- months from the available supply of forces to meet contingencies. The United States rarely enters into military operations expecting them to go on indefinitely. Indeed, the opposite is more typically the case. Operations become prolonged because objectives change, because objectives turn out to be more difficult to achieve than initially anticipated, or because of adversary actions. USAF leaders have little, if any, control over these factors. That said, armed with this evidence that prolonged operations are a driver of capacity shortfalls, USAF leaders can advocate for more force structure, develop alternative force presentation models that may more efficiently use existing forces, and, perhaps, nudge National Security Council principals and the President to be more aware of the risks and costs of prolonged operations.

Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints Are Not Responsible for Contingency Shortfalls To mitigate the worst effects of continuous rotations over extended periods, the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed policy guidance on deploy-to-dwell (D2D) ratios. These stipulate minimum periods at home station before a unit can deploy again. For example, a 1:2 D2D ratio requires that the unit remain at home station for twice as long as the time that it spent deployed (e.g., a six-month long deployment abroad must be followed by a year at home station). The policy establishes goals for both the active and reserve components, as well as thresholds that cannot be crossed without approval by the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, USAF policy sets 180 days as a maximum rotational deployment. One question we considered in this analysis is whether these constraints are significant drivers of capacity shortfalls. If they were relaxed or increased, would the capacity shortfalls substantially improve or worsen? Our analysis of C3ISR/BM aircraft in the Peace Enforcement future suggests that current policy constraints are not driving capacity shortfalls. For example, if D2D constraints were substantially loosened so that active component forces spent as much time deployed as at home (1:1 D2D ratio) and deployed for 12 months at a time, C3ISR/BM aircraft would meet roughly 42 percent of demands, as opposed to 29 percent of demands. This is a big percentage improvement but still leaves the majority of demands unmet. It also would place extreme and likely unsustainable burdens on units, personnel, and families. It is hard to imagine service or U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) leaders recommending such a policy change. More modest (and presumably realistic) reductions in the constraints would yield equally modest improvements in aircraft availability.

xv What if constraints were increased? Would that drastically reduce aircraft availability? This might happen if ongoing analyses demonstrate that longer dwell periods are necessary to achieve readiness and retention goals. We found that a shift to longer dwell periods (1:3 for the active component; 1:6 for the reserve components) would worsen shortfalls for C3ISR/BM platforms (from 29 percent of demands met to 23 percent). This is almost a 20 percent reduction, but it is hard to assess how much it would matter, given the dismal starting point. This assessment suggests that aircraft availability shortfalls cannot easily be corrected through changes to D2D policies.

Recommendations This research leads to two recommendations regarding the force planning process. For USAF and DoD leaders and force planners: • Supplement DoD and service force planning processes with historically based simulations of alternative futures. DoD has well-honed processes to identify the force capabilities and capacities necessary to accomplish U.S. national security objectives across the spectrum of conflict. These processes are sophisticated but also complex and time-consuming. As one might expect, these processes focus on the highest-priority national security objectives, particularly (1) maintaining a credible and survivable nuclear deterrent force and (2) deterring (and, if necessary, defeating) aggression by a small number of potential nation-state adversaries. (Counterterror operations are also a national priority but are not a primary consideration in developing general-purpose force structure.) Scenario-based analysis and wargaming are used to support these force planning processes. Some scenario-based analysis and wargaming efforts explore a wide range of possibilities (e.g., “wild cards”), but most of these activities are deep explorations of potential conflicts within the priority planning areas. As a result, force planning tends to be strongest when identifying forces required for the major challenges, including the possible overlap of large contingencies. The force planning process does not, however, fully account for all the demands placed on the force during “peacetime”— the period when it is supposed to be training and preparing to deter or prosecute wars. Of particular concern is the impact of open-ended and prolonged contingency operations on force structure, readiness, and retention. The historical-based simulation technique developed for this study complements other planning techniques by quantifying the day- to-day capacity demands placed on DoD during distinct and diverse historical periods and using these to model alternative futures. Shortfalls in capacity can then be identified by capability class (e.g., aircraft or ship type, light or heavy brigade) and by future. None of these prior experiences are predictive of the future, but the alternative futures explored in this report help quantify the unique demands that flow from changes in national strategy priorities and, especially, the disproportionate effect of prolonged commitments. For USAF leaders and force planners: • Develop metrics that more clearly illustrate the force structure consequences for the USAF of prolonged operations. Although USAF leaders have limited autonomy regarding whether and how long to deploy forces abroad, they are key participants in

xvi many of the decisionmaking processes. U.S. national objectives and the particulars of a given crisis will dominate such decisions, but resource constraints and long-term consequences deserve more visibility and consideration than current processes allow. Insufficient consideration of long-term consequences is in part—perhaps in large part—a product of cognitive biases and limitations associated with crisis decisionmaking processes.5 Better metrics cannot entirely overcome these biases, but more objective, quantitative measures of the force structure implications of prolonged operations would help USAF leaders contribute to force deployment deliberations. Better metrics would also help USAF leaders make the case for more force structure in interactions with DoD leadership, Congress, the media, and the public.

5 These points are developed more fully in Alan J. Vick, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Meagan L. Smith, Sean M. Zeigler, Daniel Tremblay, and Phillip Johnson, Continuity and Contingency in USAF Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1471-AF, 2016, pp. 1–4 and pp. 31–32.

xvii Acknowledgments

We thank study sponsor, Maj Gen Brian Killough, Director, Strategy, Concepts and Assessments, for commissioning this study and for his guidance and comments. Nancy Dolan, Deputy Director, Strategy, Concepts and Assessments, generously met with study team members throughout the course of the study. Her insights, guidance, and feedback contributed significantly to the success of this analysis. Scott Wheeler in HAF/A5SS provided critical support and direction as the project monitor. We also thank Col Tyrell Chamberlain and Kristine Schenck in HAF/A5SS for their helpful comments on various interim products. Col Michael Pietrucha (HAF/A5SG) shared his expertise on light attack aircraft options. Project members Raphael Cohen, Caitlin Lee, and David Ochmanek offered valuable suggestions throughout the course of the study. USAF RAND Fellow Lt Col Brian Ballew contributed to the force structure analysis. We also thank RAND colleagues Paula Thornhill, Anthony Rosello, and Michael Mazarr for helpful suggestions on interim briefings and David Thaler for sharing his expertise on security cooperation activities. The RAND Project AIR FORCE interactive review team (chair: Chaitra Hardison; reviewers: Jeff Hagen, Murarrem Mane, and Andrew Radin) offered constructive criticism and valuable ideas on how to improve our aircraft scheduling simulation. Report reviewers Jeff Hagen, Andrew Radin, and Christopher Bowie all offered detailed and constructive suggestions that significantly improved the manuscript. This analysis would not have been possible without access to the large joint operations database that RAND colleagues Stacie Pettyjohn and Meagan Smith built for a USAF-sponsored fiscal year 2016 study titled “Future Force Presentation and Planned Readiness for the Air Force.” Finally, we thank editor James Torr for sharpening the narrative, communication analyst John Godges for his assistance restructuring Chapter Three, and Rosa Meza for preparing the manuscript.

xviii Abbreviations

AF-FESS Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and C3ISR/BM reconnaissance/battle management COIN counterinsurgency CT counterterrorism D2D deploy-to-dwell (ratio) DoD U.S. Department of Defense HA/DR humanitarian assistance/disaster relief IFOR Implementation Force (Bosnia peacekeeping) ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance MDS mission design series OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense PMAI Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory POW prisoner of war RRE Relief, Rescue, and Evacuation SOF Special Operations Forces SORTS Status of Resources and Training System TSP theater security package USAF U.S. Air Force

xix

Chapter One: Introduction

Background The U.S. military has operated at a high tempo for so long that it is no longer considered odd or noteworthy, despite the stresses on personnel, readiness,1 and equipment reported by all the military branches as early as the 1990s.2 U.S. Air Force (USAF) leaders created the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in the 1990s to better meet enduring operational demands while minimizing disruptions to training and readiness for other contingencies.3 Although the AEF has proven to be a flexible tool to accomplish these objectives, force management adaptations are only a partial remedy when operational demands exceed the supply of forces. As a June 2017 U.S. Government Accountability Office report notes, USAF “readiness has steadily declined due to continuous operations and a smaller inventory of aircraft,” which has led to “overall readiness . . . at historically low levels.”4 The deleterious effects of these enduring demands have also been reported by USAF and other service leaders repeatedly over the past two decades. For example, General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, the recently retired commander of Air Combat Command, observed in spring 2017 that “the best we have done is [to] stop the decline” in readiness.5 With no end in sight to operational demands in the Middle East and South Asia and growing concerns about the changing military balance in Europe and Asia, the USAF must continue to provide forces to meet combatant commander requirements while training and equipping the force to meet rapidly evolving conventional threats. These dual challenges stress both the capacity and capability of USAF force structure.

1 Although often treated as a binary variable (i.e., the force is ready or not), measuring readiness is a complex and often controversial process that rarely offers simple answers. Although the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has tracked particular aspects of readiness through the Joint Staff’s Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), it is not particularly well suited as a means to inform senior policymakers or members of Congress regarding overall force readiness. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details on Deficiencies and Solutions, Washington, D.C., March 1998. 2 Perhaps the first detailed analysis of the impact of no-fly zone enforcement on fighter crew readiness is John Stillion’s 1999 Ph.D. dissertation (John Stillion, Blunting the Talons: The Impact of Peace Operations Deployments on USAF Fighter Crew Combat Skills, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RGSD-147, 1999). 3 See Richard G. Davis, Immediate Reach, Immediate Power: The Air Expeditionary Force and American Power Projection in the Post Cold War Era, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998; Richard G. Davis, Anatomy of a Reform: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003. 4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges, Washington, D.C., June 2017, p. 9. 5 Quoted in John A. Tirpak, “Combat Forces in Peril,” Air Force Magazine, July 2017. The same issue includes two other articles chronicling other force shortfalls: Wilson Brissett, “ISR Explosion,” Air Force Magazine, July 2017; and Brian Everstine, “Meeting the Massive Demand for Refueling and Airlift in the Middle East, Air Force Magazine, July 2017.

1 The Policy Problem The USAF and DoD conduct sophisticated analyses to identify the capacity and capability requirements necessary to achieve U.S. objectives in major wars (e.g., in numbered operational plans [OPLANS]). Scenario analysis is used primarily to gain a deeper understanding of the demands of the highest-priority challenges and, to a lesser degree, to test the robustness of the force against a wider range of problems.6 Acquisition programs and future force planning are driven primarily by the requirements associated with the most demanding contingencies (along with DoD guidance regarding the number of simultaneous or overlapping conflicts the force must be able to wage). In contrast, there are no comparable analytical tools for identifying the force requirements associated with ongoing, and often prolonged, operations. Additionally, there are no systematic efforts within DoD to collect data on the nature of operational demands over time, particularly with respect to operations that in many cases last not just years, but decades. At best, planners extrapolate force demands from high-profile current operations. Thus, planners are left with a force planning process that is imbalanced, capturing the demands of large wars with considerable detail but offering little empirical foundation to guide decisions regarding total force capacity to meet the full range of steady-state, contingency, and major conflict demands.

Purpose of This Report This report is intended to help correct the imbalance in force planning analytical tools. It offers USAF planners a means to explore the force capacity demands associated with four alternative futures. Planners can choose among these to focus on the futures that they find particularly worrisome or most likely, and to look across the futures to identify commonalities and differences in demands. Using a RAND Project AIR FORCE database of 888 joint operations occurring between 1946 and 2016, we created four alternative futures: two versions of a future cold war with Russia or China based on operations conducted between 1946 and 1989, a “peace enforcement” future based on the demands experienced between 1990 and 2000, and a “CT/COIN” future based on the demands of 2001–2016. The use of these past periods is not intended to be predictive but rather to use history to help the USAF gain insight into the nature of future demands by quantifying the type, frequency, duration, and forces associated with the full spectrum of demands placed on the U.S. military between 1946 and 2016.7 We created an aircraft scheduling

6 For a thoughtful exploration of the risks associated with the use of scenarios to generate requirements, see Carl H. Builder, Toward a Calculus of Scenarios, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, N-1855-DNA, 1983. 7 The use of historical data to understand future challenges has a precedent in the work of military historian Trevor N. Dupuy. Dupuy sought to predict battle outcomes by using key variables (e.g., weapon rate of fire, effective range) from past combat. Dupuy’s work was highly influential in the advance of combat modeling and simulation methods. See T. N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1979.

2 simulation to test the capacity of the USAF fiscal year 2017 (FY17) force to meet the unique demands of these futures. We identified force shortfalls by future and by aircraft type, providing planners a series of visual presentations that make clear which classes of aircraft are most stressed and which futures are most problematic for the force.8 This simulation could also be used to examine stresses associated with a wide range of alternative futures, not just those based on historical experience.

Organization Chapter Two presents an overview of joint operations conducted between 1946 and 2016, including frequency, duration, and class of activity; discusses prolonged operations (those lasting more than a year); and provides basic descriptive statistics for those operations. Chapter Three describes the analytical approach, assumptions, and model inputs. It also introduces the four alternative futures and the historical periods they draw on. Chapter Four presents the results from the analysis, including several analytical excursions. Chapter Five presents study conclusions and recommendations. Appendix A describes the Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation (AF-FESS) used in our force structure analysis. Appendix B offers some additional details about the joint operations dataset, as well as some caveats regarding its limitations. Appendix C lists the 54 joint operations that lasted 365 days or longer (1946–2016). Appendix D consists of 17 tables that list chronologically the 888 operations in our dataset. These tables provides basic descriptive data, including name, location, class of activity, start date, end date, duration in days, and whether the USAF participated. Appendix E provides data on the force packages used in this analysis (both number of aircraft and squadron equivalents). Appendix F provides mission design series (MDS)–level model results for the analytical excursions. Appendix G provides additional details on the method used to calculate the number of aircraft required to meet a Vietnam War–scale demand in 2017.

8 This analysis does not assess the demands of a conflict with a major power. No such conflicts occurred in the period (1946–2016) that our database covers. More significantly, war with Russia or China (the only peer or near- peer opponents on the horizon) would be of such consequence, scale, and risk that it would take precedence over other operations and commitments. A scheduling simulation such as AF-FESS is not the best tool to consider capacity requirements associated with such a war.

3 Chapter Two: An Overview of Joint Operations: 1946–2016

Introduction Since 1946, the U.S. military has conducted at least 888 joint operations; the USAF participated in 745 of these operations (84 percent).1 In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of these operations, including their type, frequency, and duration. To better understand the historical demand (and make it useful for our simulation of future demands), we organize these operations into nine separate classes. Although this (or any other) typology of historical events is inherently subjective (particularly the placement of individual events into bins), our classification system should be reasonably intuitive to most military and defense community audiences because we use common terms, such as conventional combat, for our labels. In one case, that of “Relief, Rescue, and Evacuation,” we departed from the more common humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) terminology because the demands of HA/DR on the USAF (typically airlift) were similar to those of rescue and evacuation missions. This allowed us to keep the number of classes limited to the following nine: • Conventional Combat with Regional Opponent. These are combat operations against a capable adversary. There are five operations of this type in the dataset: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force, and the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). • Limited Strikes. These operations include relatively circumscribed joint air and missile operations for coercive purposes. Operations in the category include Operation Desert Fox (1998 bombing of Iraq) and Operation Odyssey Lightning (the 2016 effort to support the government of Libya against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] militants in that country). • Military Assistance. The United States provides assistance to partner-nation militaries via Defense Trade and Arms Transfers (including Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing), International Education and Training (including but not limited to International Military Education and Training), and Defense Institution Building. This is a vast enterprise. For example, in FY15 and FY16, U.S. military training teams conducted training in at least 44 countries.2 That said, most of these activities do not

1 This dataset is drawn mainly from a joint operations history database that RAND colleagues Stacie Pettyjohn and Meagan Smith built for a RAND Project AIR FORCE FY16 study. We added some more-recent operations, combined others that were sub-operations within a larger military campaign, and deleted some operations that lacked sufficient detail to be used in our analysis. We also added the classification scheme described below. 2 For an introduction to security cooperation, see Jennifer Moroney Joe Hogler, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, and Stephanie Pezard, Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning: An Analytic Primer, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-974-AF, 2011. For details on USAF and DoD programs, see Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, United States Air Force Security Cooperation Flight Plan, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, June 2016; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, website, undated; U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years, 2015 and 2016,

4 generate heavy demands on general-purpose forces. For that reason, this dataset only includes activities large enough to generate demands for airlift or other operational support—a tiny fraction of all security assistance activities. Operation Earnest Will, the 1986–1987 effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian attack, is an example of military assistance. • No-Fly Zone. This post–Cold War operation type denotes the use of American airpower to preclude an adversary’s unmolested use of airspace. There are four no-fly zones in this dataset: Deny Flight, Operation Southern Watch, Operation Northern Watch, and Operation Odyssey Dawn (the U.S. name for the 2011 NATO operation against Libya). • Nuclear Alert. This rare type of operation involves increasing the DEFCON level of nuclear forces during a crisis. There are only two such instances: the DEFCON 2 alert during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)3 and the DEFCON 3 alert during the Yom Kippur War (1973).4 • Raid. We define raids as high-priority, long-range air assault missions of short duration that require substantial fixed-wing support to the assaulting helicopter force. There are two in the dataset: the 1970 attempt to rescue U.S. prisoners at the Son Tay prisoner of war (POW) camp during the Vietnam War and Operation Eagle Claw, the 1980 mission to rescue American hostages in Iran. The 2011 raid that killed Osama Bin Laden might also have been included, given the national-level priority. We chose to exclude it because of the relatively shorter distance and more limited fixed-wing support required. We also exclude the large number of tactical-level helicopter-borne raids by U.S. special forces conducted against high-value terrorist and insurgent targets between 2001 and 2017, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. To the extent that these missions place demands on USAF force capacity, we capture that demand in the force packages assigned to OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). • Rescue, Relief, and Evacuation. This broad category includes operations typically defined as HA/DR, but also noncombatant evacuation operations and rescues (e.g., of sailors at sea). For modeling purposes, we have subdivided these operations by length: Short operations are those that last from 1 to 31 days; medium operations last from 32 to 365 days; and all other rescue, relief, and evacuation operations are deemed long. • Show of Force. These are instances in which U.S. military forces were deployed to demonstrate resolve or military capability. One of the largest examples (Operation Combat Fox, Korea, 1968) involved close to 200 aircraft. In contrast, the more common

Joint Report to Congress, Vols. I and II, Washington, D.C., 2016; Congressional Research Service, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, Washington, D.C., December 8, 2014; Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment, Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, August 2015. 3 Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2006. 4 Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume II, 1950– 1997, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997, pp. 387–388; Walter J. Boyne, The Two O’Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel, New York: St Martin’s Press, 2002, pp. 253–254.

5 small shows of force (e.g., a B-2 flyover in Korea in 2013) typically involved fewer than ten aircraft.5 • Stability Operations. This type of operation includes military activities meant to restore and preserve order in a foreign country. Operations sometimes labeled peacekeeping operations have been included in this category. This category includes, among other operations, the counterinsurgency (COIN) phase of OIF and also OEF.

Descriptive Statistics, 1946–2016 Table 2.1 presents basic statistics for each of the nine classes of operations. Rescue, relief, and evacuation operations were the most common, accounting for 626 events, approximately 70 percent of the total. In contrast, nuclear alerts and raids were rare, with just two occurrences of each in the 70 years covered by the dataset. The mean duration data reveal that different types of operations have different expected lengths. The four no-fly zones have an average length of more than 2,000 days, or nearly 5.5 years. Military assistance operations, on the other hand, have an average length of 173 days, or nearly six months. The Air Force was involved in 84 percent of all operations. Its level of participation varied from a low of 47 percent of show-of-force contingencies to a high of 100 percent of contingencies in the following categories: conventional combat with regional opponent, no-fly zone, nuclear alert, and raid.

5 Other examples of shows of force for the years 1946–1977 can be found in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978. For a more conceptual treatment, see Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

6 Table 2.1. Frequency, Duration, and USAF Participation in Joint Operations, 1946–2016

Operations % of Operations All Mean Length Type of Operation involving Involving the Operations (in Days) the USAF USAF Conventional Combat 5 5 100% 890 with Regional Opponent Limited strikes 10 8 80% 24

Military Assistance 49 47 96% 173

No-Fly Zone 4 4 100% 2087

Nuclear Alert 2 2 100% 40

Raids 2 2 100% 5

RRE—Long 15 12 80% 1093

RRE—Medium 104 90 87% 89

RRE—Short 507 476 94% 7

Show of Force 162 76 47% 233

Stability Operations 28 23 82% 815

NOTE: RRE = Relief, Rescue, and Evacuation.

Table 2.2 displays the number of operations occurring for each class for four time periods: the entire post–World War II era (1946–2016), the Cold War era (1946–1989),6 the Peace Enforcement era (1990–2000), and the Counterterrorism (CT)/COIN era (2001–2016).

6 The Cold War end date is more typically identified as December 1991, the date when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. For our purposes, however, 1989 (the date when the Berlin Wall fell) more accurately reflects the end of most Cold War operational demands. Similarly, 1990 (when Operation Desert Shield occurred) is a better start date for the decade of peace enforcement operations.

7 Table 2.2. Count of Operations, by Type for Four Time Periods

1946– 1946– 1990– 2001– Type of Operation 2016 1989 2000 2016 Conventional Combat 5 2 2 1 with Regional Opponent Limited strikes 10 4 5 1 Military Assistance 49 37 9 3 No-Fly Zone 4 - 3 1 Nuclear Alert 2 2 - - Raids 2 2 - - RRE—Long 15 11 4 - RRE—Medium 104 64 30 10 RRE—Short 507 377 113 17 Show of Force 162 138 20 4 Stability Operations 28 8 15 5

The number of years in each period varies, which makes comparisons across periods challenging. One method of normalizing the table above is to find the average time in years between two operations within an operation type. For instance, there were five stability operations in the period 2001 to 2016, a period of 16 years. If these operations were evenly spaced temporally, one would expect one stability operation every 3.2 years. Table 2.3 provides normalized frequency data for each operation type by period. The normalized frequency table reveals that the frequency of an operation type can vary dramatically between periods. Short rescue, relief, and evacuation operations occur approximately every 0.1 years in the Cold War periods and during the 1990s, but far less often—about once a year—in the post-9/11 period.

8 Table 2.3. Years Between Events (Normalized Frequency), by Operation Type for Four Time Periods

Type of Operation 1946–2016 1946–1989 1990–2000 2001–2016 Conventional Combat with 14.20 22.00 5.50 16.00 Regional Opponent Limited strikes 7.10 11.00 2.20 16.00 Military Assistance 1.45 1.19 1.22 5.33 No-Fly Zone 17.75 - 3.67 16.00 Nuclear Alert 35.50 22.00 - - Raids 35.50 22.00 - - RRE—Long 4.73 4.00 2.75 - RRE—Medium 0.68 0.69 0.37 1.60 RRE—Short 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.94 Show of Force 0.44 0.32 0.55 4.00 Stability Operations 2.54 5.50 0.73 3.20 NOTE: !"#$%& !" !"#$% !" !"#$ !"#$%& ! 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = !"#$%& !" !"#$%&'()* !" !"#$ ! !"#$%& !"#$ !"#$%& !. Prolonged Operations Between 1946 and 2016, there were 54 joint operations that lasted a year or longer.7 The USAF participated in 44 of these operations. The subsections below provide further information on prolonged operations: the types of operations that are prolonged, the average length of prolonged operations by operation type, the simultaneity of these operations, the number of prolonged operations inherited and initiated by presidential administration, and an analysis of whether U.S. military operations in general have become longer after the end of the Cold War.

Prolonged Operations by Mission Type Forty-eight out of the 54 prolonged operations that we document in this study fall into one of four categories: rescue, relief, and evacuation operations; stability operations; shows of force; and military assistance. The six other operations are either a no-fly zone, conventional combat

7 The dataset employed for analysis in this section differs slightly from that used for AF-FESS model inputs. We excluded several prolonged CT operations from model inputs because (as will be discussed in Chapter Three) we handle CT as a steady-state demand. This section reintroduces three prolonged CT operations to ensure that our list of prolonged operations is as comprehensive as possible: Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, OEF- Philippines, and Operation Inherent Resolve.

9 with a regional opponent, or limited strikes. Figure 2.1 displays prolonged U.S. military operations by operation type in order of decreasing frequency.

Figure 2.1. Count of Prolonged U.S. Military Operations, by Operation Type, 1946–2016

Length of Prolonged Operations by Mission Type The length of prolonged operations varies by operation type. The three prolonged no-fly zone operations have an average length of over seven years. In contrast, prolonged rescue, relief, and evacuation operations and limited strikes are much shorter, with an average length of three years. That prolonged shows of force last over six years, on average, can be partially accounted for by the unusually long duration of the Taiwan Patrol Force, which lasted from 1950 to 1979. Figure 2.2 displays the average length of prolonged operations by operation type in descending average length.

10 Figure 2.2. Average Length of Prolonged Operations, by Operation Type, 1946–2016

Simultaneity and Prolonged Operations Many of the prolonged operations overlapped. Figure 2.3 provides a quick visual reference for assessing the intensity of simultaneity. Each row is an operation (in chronological order based on the start year), and each column is a year. The concentration of black in the lower-right quadrant of the figure, which indicates ongoing operations, does suggest that the 1990s and 2000s were marked to an unusual degree by simultaneous prolonged operations.

Figure 2.3. All Prolonged U.S. Military Operations, 1946–2016

1946 1989 2000

NOTE: Operations arranged by start year.

11 Finally, Table 2.4 tabulates simultaneous prolonged operations by the major time periods employed in AF-FESS. The 1990s, again, appear as an era characterized by many prolonged operations.

Table 2.4. Count of Prolonged Operations and All Operations, by Major Time Periods

Prolonged Operations All Operations Period (Count) (Count) 1946-1989 27 645 1990-2000 19 201 2001-2016 8 42 1946-2016 54 888

Prolonged Operations by Presidential Administration Prolonged operations are not limited to particular presidential administrations or time periods. Although most common under Presidents Harry Truman, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, every administration since Truman’s inherited and initiated at least one prolonged operation. The results are depicted in Figure 2.4.8 President George H. W. Bush initiated the highest number of prolonged operations (11), and, unsurprisingly, President Clinton inherited the most. President Clinton also initiated another eight operations, for a total of 19. In contrast, President Jimmy Carter had the smallest number of prolonged operations, inheriting only one and initiating just two. President Donald Trump inherited five ongoing military operations: OEF-Philippines (initiated 2002), Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (initiated 2002), Uganda train and advise (initiated 2011), Operation Inherent Resolve (initiated 2014), and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (as of 2015, the name for U.S. military activities in support of the government of Afghanistan). As of June 2018, his administration has not initiated an operation that has lasted more than a year.

8 The analysis for Figure 2.5 includes 1945—the first year that Truman was President. As a result, World War II is included as an inherited prolonged operation. The analysis in the rest of this report is limited to the years that our database covers (1946–2016) and, therefore, does not include World War II.

12 Figure 2.4. Prolonged Operations Initiated and Inherited, by Presidential Administration

16 Number of prolonged ops inherited

14 Number of prolonged ops initiated

0 '45-'53 '53-'61 '61-'63 '63-'69 '69-'74 '74-'77 '77-'81 '81-'89 '89-'93 '93-'01 '01-'09 '09-'17

Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan H.W. Bush Clinton W. Bush Obama

Are Operations Becoming Longer? We also conducted a related but separate analysis of all 888 operations, investigating whether operations have generally become longer since the end of the Cold War. Figure 2.5 displays a simple statistical test of significance (a t-test) that found that that post–Cold War (i.e., 1990 and afterward) operations are statistically significantly longer, on average, compared with Cold War operations. Post–Cold War operations tend to last approximately eight months, while Cold War operations generally lasted three months.

Figure 2.5. Comparison of the Length of Pre–Cold War and Post–Cold War Operations

This chapter offered a brief overview of the historical demands on the joint force. We found that many operations last longer than a year, with no-fly zones the most enduring. We also found that operations have gotten longer, on average, since the end of the Cold War, a problem that we

13 will return to in Chapter Four. In the next chapter, we describe four alternative futures, each corresponding to a historical era, that provide insights into how future demands on USAF force capacity might vary.

14 Chapter Three: Analytical Approach

This chapter describes the analytical approach used in this study—specifically, six phases of the analysis: (1) derivation of future decremented supply, (2) estimation of future variable demands, (3) construction of representative force packages, (4) prediction of operational durations, (5) translation of aircraft demands into squadron demands, and (6) accommodation of key scheduling constraints. When warranted, we refer to the AF-FESS model design, the model inputs, and the assumptions embedded within the model. However, this chapter is intended primarily to provide enough background for planners and policymakers to understand how we arrived at the research results discussed in the next chapter without having to delve into levels of methodological detail of interest only to analysts and modelers. Appendix A provides additional details on AF-FESS for those readers interested in more specifics about the model.

Derivation of Future Decremented Supply The first phase of our analysis can be reduced to a simple equation: Total aircraft supply-fixed demand for aircraft = Decremented supply. From the total supply of Air Force capacity in FY17, we subtract the fixed (or continuous) demand for capacity that will likely be required to meet enduring demands (e.g., air defense of the U.S. homeland) in the future. (We worked closely with the study sponsor to ensure that we neither understated nor overstated this fixed demand, which represents the portion of the force that would be unavailable for “discretionary” purposes.) The remaining capacity is the future decremented supply, or the amount that would be available to meet future variable demands. Our estimates of future decremented supply assume that the total supply of Air Force capacity will remain at the level of FY17.

Total Supply We measure total supply using the FY17 USAF force structure for 25 separate aircraft types, or mission design series (MDSs). As seen in Table 3.1, the 25 aircraft MDSs represent all eight classes of aircraft in the USAF: attack; bomber; cargo; command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/battle management (C3ISR/BM); fighter, Special Operations Forces (SOF); tanker; and other. Table 3.1 displays each MDS by aircraft quantity (Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory [PMAI]), aircraft per squadron, and squadron equivalents.1

1 Readers who closely follow the F-35A aircraft program may wonder why it is missing from Table 3.1. It was excluded because there is only one operational F-35A squadron in the USAF. The inclusion of this one squadron would have made no difference in our model outcomes. As of June 21, 2017, the 34th Fighter Squadron at Hill Air

15 Table 3.1. Total USAF FY17 Supply, by Major Aircraft Type

Aircraft Aircraft FY 17 Force Number of Aircraft Per FY 17 Force in Class MDS (PMAI Aircraft) Squadron (PMAI) Squadron Equivalents Attack A-10 171 18 10 SOF AC-130 20 8 3 Bomber B-1 36 12 3 Bomber B-2 16 8 2 Bomber B-52 44 11 4 Airlift C-5 39 8 5 Airlift C-17 155 16 10 Airlift C-130 244 8 31 SOF CV-22 30 8 4 C3ISR/BM E-3 23 2 12 C3ISR/BM E-8 11 5 2 C3ISR/BM EC-130 10 5 2 Fighter F-15C 156 18 9 Fighter F-15E 138 24 6 Fighter F-16 537 18 30 Fighter F-22 123 21 6 Other HC-130 25 4 6 Other HH-60 72 7 10 Tanker KC-10 41 16 3 Tanker KC-135 277 12 23 SOF MC-130 50 8 6 C3ISR/BM MQ-9 144 8 18 C3ISR/BM RC-135 17 4 4 C3ISR/BM RQ-4 31 16 2 C3ISR/BM U-2 24 6 4 SOURCES: FY17 Combat Air Force inventory estimated using Air Combat Command, Combat Air Force FSW And AFGSC Bomber Addendum for FY15, Langley Air Force Base, Va., July 15, 2015. Other inventories calculated from total aircraft inventory (TAI) data in Air Force Association, The Air Force in Facts and Figures: 2016 USAF Almanac, May 2016, p. 33. NOTES: PMAI per squadron assumptions based on CAF FSW FY15 spreadsheet (Air Combat Command, 2015) and unit websites for Mobility Air Force aircraft. Most common PMAI assignment used for aircraft types where PMAI varies across squadrons (e.g., A-10s).

Fixed Demand Fixed demand captures ongoing force demands not related to any specific contingency.2 Our model identifies eight such demand categories, ranging from global CT to Operation Noble Eagle (the air defense of the United States), and specifies the futures in which they would likely appear. We developed the specific input assumptions with the assistance of staff in the

Force Base received its 23rd and 24th combat-coded aircraft, giving it the full complement of operational aircraft. See Donovan K. Potter, 388th Fighter Wing, “First Operational F-35A Squadron Receives Final Aircraft,” Hill Air Force Base News, June 28, 2017. 2 Working with the sponsor, we tried to capture the major fixed demands, but our treatment is not meant to capture every possible fixed demand. For example, we did not assess demands of very-important-person (VIP) travel, which primarily affect specialized VIP aircraft.

16 sponsoring office (HAF/A5SS) and a RAND USAF Fellow.3 Forces required to meet fixed demands are subtracted from the total supply. We arrived at these fixed demands through an iterative process working with the study sponsor. The fixed demands represent unclassified estimates of current demands, which admittedly could change in the future. That said, other than Global CT—which is relatively new—all the fixed demands reflect U.S. military practices (e.g., global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]) that date back to the early days of the Cold War. In fact, we rely on U.S. and USAF history since the onset of the Cold War to estimate both the fixed and variable demands of the future. The post–World War II operational experience of the U.S. military divides conveniently into three eras, each representing a unique strategic and operational environment: (1) the Cold War, lasting roughly from 1946 to 1989,4 (2) the period of intensive peace enforcement operations between 1990 and 2000, and (3) the CT/COIN era, lasting from 2001 to the writing of this report in the summer of 2017 (and likely beyond).5 Therefore, we use data from these periods as demand inputs for our scheduling simulation to model future demands.6 (See Appendix A for a detailed description of the AF-FESS model.) The AF-FESS simulation assesses the capacity of the USAF FY17 force to meet demands in futures dominated by one of the four following strategic or operational challenges: (1) a new cold war with Russia or China, with long conventional regional conflicts like the Korean War, (2) a new cold war with Russia or China, with short conventional regional conflicts similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), (3) renewed peace enforcement commitments, and (4) global CT/COIN. We include two versions of a future cold war because force capacity demands would be much greater if the future cold war included prolonged and large conventional conflicts like the Korea and Vietnam wars, as opposed to shorter operations, like as the conventional phase of OIF (which lasted 43 days). Table 3.2 cross-references the eight categories of historically fixed demands with the four alternative futures. For example, the fixed demand for global CT operations occurs only in the CT/COIN future (in the top row of the table). Because of the sensitivity and ubiquity of global CT operations, we model their demand on the USAF as a fixed reduction in the available supply

3 We ran model excursions to ensure that capacity shortfalls were not determined by fixed demand assumptions. Our excursions confirmed that fixed demands were not the primary cause of capacity shortfalls. See Figure 4.2 in Chapter Four and associated discussion for details. 4 As noted in Chapter Two, we use 1989 rather than 1991 as the Cold War end date because most Cold War operational demands ended in 1989. Similarly, 1990 (when Operation Desert Shield occurred) is a better start date for the decade of peace enforcement operations. 5 Our data for this period end in 2016, so this future is modeled based on operations occurring between 2001 and 2016. 6 Our demand function is composed of historical contingency operations and steady-state activities (or fixed demand). We define steady-state as current ongoing activities likely to persist in the future. These include the Continuous Bomber Presence in Guam, Operation Noble Eagle (the air defense of the United States), and a host of other day-to-day activities. Full details are provided later in this chapter.

17 of Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft and MQ-9s. We postulate that roughly 20 percent of the force would be required for these missions on an ongoing basis, but this fixed demand would occur only in the CT/COIN future, according to our model. Nuclear force demands vary across the modeled futures (across the second row of the table). For the cold war futures, we model a return to nuclear alert practices associated with the period from 1957 to 1991, when roughly a third of the flying force was on strip alert around the clock, ready to launch in a few minutes. Our two cold war futures thus stipulate that 25 percent of the force would remain at this level of alert. For the other two futures, we stipulate that just 10 percent of the bomber and tanker force would be withheld for nuclear missions.7

Table 3.2. Fixed Demand Assumptions, by Future

Steady State Cold War Cold War Peace Enforcement CT/COIN Demands/ (with long regional (with short Alternative conflict) regional conflict) Futures Global Counter None None None 16 MQ-9, 5 AC-130 Terror 12 MC-130, 7 CV- 22s Nuclear 25% ground alert 25% ground alert 10% withhold 10% withhold alert/withhold (2 B-2,4 B-52, (2 B-2,4 B-52, 12 KC-135) 12 KC-135) Operation Noble 48 fighters, 48 fighters, 48 fighters, 48 fighters, Eagle 8 tankers, 2 E-3 8 tankers, 2 E-3 8 tankers, 2 E-3 8 tankers, 2 E-3 CBP 8 bombers, 8 bombers, 8 bombers, 8 bombers, (Guam) 4 tankers 4 tankers 4 tankers 4 tankers Theater 2 fighter squadrons, 2 fighter squadrons, 2 fighter squadrons, 2 fighter squadrons, Security 1 tanker squadron 1 tanker squadron 1 tanker squadron 1 tanker squadron Packages & Exercises Global ISR 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 PACOM ISR 1 RC-135, 1 E-8, 1 RC-135, 1 E-8, 1 RC-135, 1 E-8, 1 RC-135, 1 E-8, 1 U-2 1 U-2 1 U-2 1 U-2 CENTCOM ISR 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 RC-135, 1 E-3, 1 E-8, 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 1 E-8, 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 1 E-8, 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2 1 E-8, 1 RQ-4, 1 U-2

In our model, the remaining six categories of fixed demand are invariable across the four futures. Operation Noble Eagle, in the third row of Table 3.2, is the post-9/11 mission to defend U.S. airspace. Although this particular manifestation of homeland air defense dates back only to 2001, the USAF has been responsible for homeland air defense since its founding in 1947. This mission is, therefore, likely to endure. Similarly, the small Continuous Bomber Presence in Guam might go away if U.S.-China relations improve, although some version of it is likely to persist in other theaters or elsewhere in the Pacific. Rotations in support of theater security packages (TSPs) and related exercises have increased in recent years, in part to conduct missions once accomplished by USAF forces based abroad. TSP and exercise deployments are generally

7 For more on USAF nuclear alert operations, see USAF, Strategic Air Command, Office of the Historian, Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command: 1957–1991, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., 1991.

18 viewed by U.S. leaders and planners as a cost-effective means to engage partner nations in support of broader U.S. foreign and defense policy goals. In our judgment, these deployments also are likely to continue at the postulated level, and perhaps grow. Finally, the three postulated ISR commitments (global, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Central Command) reflect longstanding U.S. military practices that date back to the earliest days of the Cold War. This estimate captures the broad demands associated with these missions. The particular platforms and locations will evolve, but the level of demand is unlikely to shrink, short of a fundamental change in U.S. grand strategy.

Decremented Supply When the fixed demands from Table 3.2 are subtracted from the total supply of 25 aircraft MDSs as shown in Table 3.1, the model produces three different estimates of decremented supply. As noted above, the decrements are constant across the four futures except that (1) CT/COIN decrements occur only in the CT/COIN future and (2) nuclear decrements are 25 percent of the bomber and tanker forces on ground alert for the two Cold War futures and 10 percent of the bomber and tanker forces withheld from operations (but not on alert) for the Peace Enforcement and CT/COIN futures. We translate this decremented supply in individual aircraft into decrements in unit equivalents available to meet contingency demands.

Estimation of Future Variable Demands The estimation of future variable demands is the most complex phase of our analysis. To produce these estimates, we rely on recent historical precedents that portend very different future worlds. The hypothetical futures are thus extensions of recent historical eras. For each of the alternative futures, the model estimates the amount of Air Force capacity that would be required to satisfy the future variable demands—above and beyond the future fixed demand. The model estimates the future variable demands for eight classes of aircraft across the four posited futures. Although the model posits just four futures to estimate the future variable demands, the model actually runs a total of 4,000 scenarios. For each of the four futures, the model runs 1,000 plausible futures of variable demand. Each model run covers a hypothetical span of 20 years. Each modeled world thus represents the average of 1,000 model runs covering a 20-year time horizon. The purpose of this phase of the analysis is to show whether the four historically based projections of variable demand could be met by their respective decremented supplies (in unit equivalents). The AF-FESS model thus can help identify potential capacity shortfalls, indicate which aircraft platforms might or might not be placed in short supply under different scenarios, suggest where capacity increases could enhance force robustness, and inform force planning more generally. This method is also intended to help policymakers and planners explore the force structure implications of the futures that they view as most likely or important.

19 Table 3.3 maps prominent policymaker concerns onto the four alternative futures. The next three sections describe the variable demands associated with each alternative future.

Table 3.3. Mapping Policymaker Concerns to Historical Periods and Alternative Futures

“I think the force will be most Relevant Alternative Future stressed by… Historical Period …a new Cold War with Russia or China” 1946-1989 New Cold War (long regional conflicts)

…a new Cold War with Russia or China” 1946-1989 New Cold War (short regional conflicts)

…open ended No Fly Zones & peace 1990-2000 Peace Enforcement enforcement ops.”

…enduring global CT/COIN operations.” 2001-2016 CT/COIN

Futures 1 and 2: New Cold War The Cold War is rightly remembered as a dangerous and demanding era that saw superpower proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam and severe crises over Berlin and Cuba. Any of these conflicts or crises could have escalated into direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, ironically, the Cold War did not stress USAF capacity as much as more-recent periods. The force was large, and substantial elements were forward deployed in Europe and Asia. As a result, day-to-day alert and routine operations could be handled without creating personnel tempo or readiness problems. Also, although the Korean and Vietnam wars together lasted roughly 12 years, the other 31 years of the Cold War were free of major conflicts. Moreover, the force was sufficiently large that even the Vietnam War demanded the deployment of a relatively small percentage of the total USAF. For example, in 1969, 523 USAF fighter aircraft were deployed to Vietnam or Thailand, only 14 percent of the 3,838 fighters in the USAF inventory that year.8 Although the deployments involved only a small percentage of the total force, the long duration of the Vietnam War did greatly multiply the force-wide impacts of the deployments, a point we return to in the next chapter. In summary, though, the Cold War demands on USAF force capacity, which would have been extremely high if a war with the Soviet Union had come to pass, were, on average, modest by today’s standards.

8 According to USAF data, the USAF force committed to the Vietnam War in 1969 was exceeded only by the 1968 force commitment—by 11 aircraft (1,761 versus 1,772). For the USAF order of battle in Vietnam and Thailand in 1969, see USAF, Southeast Asia Review: Calendar Years 1961–1973, Washington, D.C.: Directorate of Management Analysis, Department of the Air Force, February 28, 1974 (declassified by USAF Office of History in 1994). For USAF total force data for 1969, see USAF, United States Air Force Statistical Digest, Fiscal Year 1969, Washington, D.C.: Comptroller of the Air Force, February 2, 1970.

20 Table 3.4 provides an overview of joint operations during the Cold War for each of the nine classes of variable demand that were introduced in Chapter Two. The most common operations during the Cold War were relief, rescue, and evacuation operations, with 452 such operations, each lasting an average of 41 days. A prominent example of this class of demand (although much longer than the norm) was the Berlin Airlift of 1948–1949. Shows of force were the next most common, with 138 operations. Although most were small, Combat Fox, an operation associated with the 1968 Pueblo incident in Korea, involved more than 180 aircraft.9 Military assistance activities were the next most common, including Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. protection of Kuwaiti-owned tankers from Iranian attacks in 1987 and 1988 (during the Iran-Iraq War).

Table 3.4. Variable Demands During the Cold War (1946–1989)

Demand Class Number of Mean Examples Operations Length (days) Relief, Rescue & 452 41 Berlin Airlift, 1948-49 Evacuation Show of Force 138 175 Combat Fox, Korea, 1968 MilitaryAssistance 37 159 Operation Earnest Will, 1987-88 Stability Operations 8 226 Dominican Republic, 1965-66 Limited Strikes 4 23 Operation Eldorado Canyon, 1986 Conventional Combat 2 2143 Vietnam War, 1965-73 w/ regional foe No Fly Zone 0 NA NA Raids 2 5 Son Tay, Vietnam, 1970 Nuclear Alert 2 40 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The other six classes of variable demand were less common, all in the single digits. Notable examples of these include the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, a relatively rare Cold War stability operation; Operation Eldorado Canyon, the 1986 USAF and U.S. Navy strike against Libya; the Son Tay Raid, a 1970 attempt to rescue U.S. POWs in North Vietnam; and the 1962 nuclear alert during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which saw almost 2,500 USAF bombers and tankers on alert along with almost 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles.10 Note that no-fly zone enforcement did not occur until after the Cold War ended, so this class of demand has zero entries.

9 John A. Okonski, Operation Combat Fox—The USAF Response, Osan Air Base webpage, January 17, 2012. 10 Bernard Nalty, The Air Force Role in Five Crises: 1958–1965, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, June 1968, declassified, p. 43.

21 As mentioned earlier, we model two versions of a future cold war, one characterized by regional conflicts of the size and prolonged duration of the Korean and Vietnam wars, and another characterized by OIF to reflect the possibility that the conventional combat phase in future regional conflicts will be short-lived.

Future 3: Peace Enforcement The Peace Enforcement era differed greatly from the Cold War. This period is best characterized as one in which the supply of available forces shrank while operational demands grew. On the supply side, the end of the Cold War led to reductions in U.S. military force structure, including the withdrawal of most forces in Europe and the closure and consolidation of associated bases. Despite the expectation of and desire for a “peace dividend” that would allow a shift of resources and attention to domestic problems, U.S. leaders were instead confronted by a host of international problems necessitating military action. Thus, rather than shrink, the military experienced both unusual contingency demands and new steady-state demands unlike any it had experienced during the Cold War. This period began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Iraqi aggression triggered a massive and rapid deployment of U.S. and coalition forces to the Persian Gulf under Operation Desert Shield, which was followed five months later by Operation Desert Storm. Following an intensive air campaign that struck every element of Iraqi power, a short ground campaign led by U.S. forces evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The air and ground campaigns decimated the Iraqi Air Force and Army. Although the Iraqi military was defeated rapidly and at much lower cost than expected, no one in 1991 imagined that peace enforcement commitments related to that war (in the form of no-fly zones) would persist for another 12 years. The conflict with Iraq was followed in 1993 by peace operations gone awry in Somalia, particularly the October “Battle of Mogadishu” that saw the deaths of 18 U.S. commandos. Also by 1992, the post–Cold War unraveling of Yugoslavia had turned into a destructive civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This led to multiple NATO and U.S. peace operations that included no-fly zones, coercive bombing campaigns, and, by 1999, war with Serbia. The combination of smaller force structure and the surprising number and diversity of demands on the USAF and U.S. military more broadly led to readiness challenges, aircraft carrier “gaps,” and a recognition that organizational innovation was called for to meet the demands of recurring rotations to the Middle East and the Balkans. It was during this period that USAF leaders created the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) to better manage these rotations and mitigate their impacts on readiness, personnel tempo, and retention. In brief, the AEF is a force generation and force management system that draws on the entire USAF to meet rotational demands for capabilities of all types.11 This Peace

11 For more on the structure and history of the AEF, see the previously cited USAF historical program papers by Richard Davis (1998 and 2003).

22 Enforcement era, therefore, represents a distinct set of operational demands, offering an empirical basis for a third alternative future. Table 3.5 presents summary statistics of variable demand from the Peace Enforcement period. As during the Cold War, the most common variable demands were relief, rescue, and evacuation operations, followed by shows of force. In contrast to the Cold War, however, stability operations were much more frequent, with 15 in a single decade. This period also saw more frequent, albeit shorter, regional wars. Some notable examples across the variable demand classes include Operation Desert Shield, a show of force that was also preparation for offensive operations; military assistance in the form of the 1995 airlift of peacekeepers to Haiti; stability operations in Bosnia conducted by the International Force (IFOR) in 1995–1996; Operation Desert Storm, a large joint operation designed to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait; and Operation Deny Flight, one of three no-fly zones conducted during this period.

Table 3.5. Variable Demands During the Peace Enforcement Era (1990–2000)

Demand Class Number of Mean Example Operations Length (days) Relief, Rescue & 147 66 Philippine Earthquake,1990 Evacuation Show of Force 20 664 Operation Desert Shield, 1990 MilitaryAssistance 9 21 Airlift UN peacekeepers to Haiti, 1995 Stability Operations 15 842 IFOR, 1995-96 Limited Strikes 5 2 Operation Desert Fox, 1998 Conventional Combat 2 61 Operation Desert Storm, 1991 w/ regional foe No Fly Zone 3 2710 Operation Deny Flight,1993-98 Raids 0 NA NA Nuclear Alert 0 NA NA

Future 4: Global Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Operations The third and final historical era, that of CT and COIN operations, began on September 11, 2001, with the al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. homeland. This era has yet to end.12 This era has been dominated by prolonged COIN activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and global CT operations. (As

12 For the purposes of this analysis, we characterize the demands of the CT/COIN future based on operational data from 2001 through 2016. Because CT operations are usually small and highly sensitive, we estimate the demands of CT on the USAF in the model rather than attempt to document the hundreds of discrete small unit actions that make up the bulk of global CT activity.

23 noted in Chapter Two, our database does not include most CT operations, which are sensitive and too numerous to count. Instead, we measure the CT demand on the USAF in our steady-state assumptions.) There also have been three operations (Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Odyssey Dawn) that have involved conventional air operations for a limited period. In addition to ongoing COIN and CT operations in Afghanistan, the USAF has, since 2014, been flying daily combat sorties in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria. This era has also seen a significant increase in CT-related activities in Africa and Yemen.13 As of the summer of 2017, there is talk of increasing force levels in Afghanistan. This era differs from the other two in its commitments to prolonged (and ongoing) COIN in the Middle East and South Asia as well as the global nature (and nearly constant combat) associated with global CT. These dissimilar demands provide yet another perspective on force capacity stresses that the USAF may face in the future. Table 3.6 presents an overview of variable demands during the CT/COIN era. As in the previous eras, the most common variable demands have been relief, rescue, and evacuation operations, which have been the only operation type in double digits since 2001. Stability operations have been the next most common, followed by shows of force. Although there have been fewer total operations in this period (at least in our dataset), Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have more than made up for that with their sheer length and size. Other notable examples of operations from this period include a flight of B-2 bombers to Korea in 2013 as a show of force; an extended period of military assistance to the Ugandan Army between 2011 and 2016; Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, the stability operation successor to OEF in Afghanistan; the conventional phase of OIF in 2003; and the one example of a no-fly zone, Operation Odyssey Dawn, in 2011.

13 DoD Press Release NR-083-17, Statement by Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on U.S. Strikes Against AQAP in Yemen, March 2, 2017; DoD Press Release NR-219-17, Pentagon Statement on Somalia Strike, June 11, 2017; DoD Press Release NR-286-16, Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on U.S. Air Strike in Libya, August 1, 2016.

24 Table 3.6. Variable Demands During the Counterterrorism/Counterinsurgency Era (2001–2016)

Demand Class Number of Mean Example Operations Length (days) Relief, Rescue & 27 34 Operation Unified Assistance, 2004 Evacuation Show of Force 4 69 B-2s to Korea, 2013 MilitaryAssistance 3 797 Support to Uganda Army against LRA, 2011-16 Stability Operations 5 1679 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, 2015-present Limited Strikes 1 140 Operation Odyssey Lightning, 2016 Conventional Combat 1 43 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 w/ regional foe No Fly Zone 1 218 Operation Odyssey Dawn, 2011 Raids 0 NA NA Nuclear Alert 0 NA NA

NOTE: Our dataset for this period ends in 2016. The Counterterrorism/Counterinsurgency era may continue for many more years.

Construction of Representative Force Packages The four remaining phases of our analysis are all attempts to modify specific inputs to the AF- FESS model so that it can generate results that reflect the future Air Force capacities, capabilities, and constraints as realistically as possible. The various model inputs have to do with force packages, operational durations, squadron demands, and scheduling constraints. In an ideal world, for instance, our dataset for estimating future variable demands would include detailed descriptions of the force packages involved in each of the historical operations. The model could then randomly pull all of its demand inputs from specific events rather than from generic classes of events.14 In most cases, however, our sources did not specify aircraft quantities and types, although the order of battle information was available for some operations. Even when the order of battle data were available, however, there often were aircraft types used (e.g., C-141s during Operation Desert Storm) that are no longer in the USAF. Thus, to model future capacity demand, we have had to postulate (or modify) the force packages for each capacity class.15 The historical basis for our force packages for each demand class and for each future are shown in Table 3.7.

14 The AF-FESS model does this random pull for duration inputs. See Appendix A. 15 For more additional detail on our postulated force packages, see Appendix E.

25 Table 3.7. Historical Basis for Force Packages for Each Demand Class and Each Future

Class of Demand/ Cold War Cold War Peace CT/COIN Alternative Futures (with long regional (with short Enforcement conflict) regional conflict) Relief, Rescue & Postulated based on Postulated based Postulated based Postulated based Evacuation 1947-1996 data on 1947-1996 data on 1947-1996 data on 1947-1996 data Show of Force Large and small, 1:4 Large and small, Large and small, Large and small, ratio 1:4 ratio 1:4 ratio 1:4 ratio No Fly Zone NA NA Deny Flight Deny Flight Military Assistance Early Call Early Call Early Call Early Call

Limited Strikes Desert Strike Desert Strike Desert Strike Desert Strike Raids Eagle Claw Eagle Claw NA NA Stability Operations Dominican Republic Dominican IFOR OEF 1965 Republic 1965

Conventional Vietnam OIF (Mar-April 03) OAF OIF (Mar-April 03) Combat w/regional opponent

Nuclear Crisis Alert Cuba 1962 Cuba 1962 NA NA

For example, we postulate a force package demand of two C-17s, two C-130s, and two MC- 130s for relief, rescue, and evacuation operations. This package captures the range of airlifters typically used in such operations, the increase in the role of SOF aircraft in HA/DR-type missions, and the historical experience, in which 82 percent of such operations involved six or fewer aircraft.16 For shows of force, we use both large and small packages in a ratio of 1:4. The large package is an updated force of 162 aircraft based on Combat Fox, the 1968 deployment to Korea. The small package is based on the 2013 use of two B-2s and supporting tankers to signal North Korea during a 2013 period of tensions.17 For no-fly zones, we base our calculations on the Deny Flight (Balkans 1993–1998) order of battle. No-fly zones do not apply to the cold war futures.18 Military assistance demands are based on Early Call, a 1983 mission to support Egypt during a time of tension with Libya. In this mission, the USAF flew E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to monitor Libyan flight operations. The operation involved one C-5,

16 This calculation is based on data for 1947–1996 found in Alan Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky, and John Stillion, Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1997, MR-842-AF, Table A.1. 17 The aircraft flew round-trip from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to Korea. The number of tankers used in that mission was not publicly available, but a similar 2017 B-2 mission against ISIS (also round-trip from Whiteman) used ten KC-135s and five KC-10s. Thus, our postulated small show of force package is two B-2s, ten KC-135s, and five KC-10s. For more on the 2013 mission, see CBS News, “U.S. Flies B-2 Stealth Bombers to South Korea in Extended Deterrence Mission Aimed at North,” April 5, 2013, online. For details of the 2017 mission, see David Cenciotti, “Everything We Know (and No One Has Said So Far) About the First Waves of Air Strikes on Syria,” The Aviationist, April 14, 2018. 18 Deny Flight order of battle from Kurt F. Miller, Deny Flight and Deliberate Force: An Effective Use of Airpower? master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1997, p. 36.

26 one C-141 (replaced by one C-17 in our package), four E-3s, and three KC-10s.19 To represent the limited strike category, we rely on Operation Desert Strike, a 1996 coercive air strike against Iraq. This operation involved two B-52, one C-5, and nine KC-10 aircraft.20 Raids are represented in our model by Eagle Claw, the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt. Raids apply only to the cold war futures.21 For stability operations, we vary the force packages across the futures, drawing from each historical era for its own representative demands. For both cold war futures, we use Operation Power Pack, the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, as the representative stability operation.22 For the Peace Enforcement future, we use IFOR in Bosnia as the representative operation. For the CT/COIN future, we use OEF in Afghanistan. We also vary the force packages for conventional combats with regional opponents. For the cold war future with a long regional conflict, we use the USAF 1969 order of battle from the Vietnam War to calculate comparable percentages for each class of combat aircraft (e.g., attack, fighter, tanker).23 For the cold war future with a short regional conflict and also for the CT/COIN future, we use the conventional phase of OIF (March–April 2003) as representative of regional combat demands. For the Peace Enforcement future, we use Operation Allied Force in Kosovo as representative of these demands.24 Finally, for nuclear crisis alerts, we use the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to calculate representative force demands for the two cold war futures only.25

19 Vick et al., 1997. 20 Vick et al., 1997. 21 James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try, New York: Orion Books, 1990, pp. 205–212; A. Timothy Warnock, Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2000, pp. 125–134. 22 See Nalty, 1968, pp. 50–56; Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988, pp. 68–70; Vick et al., 1997, Table B1. 23 We organize the USAF order of battle (1969) for Vietnam by aircraft class (e.g., fighter, attack), then divide this by the total USAF force structure (1969) to determine the percentage of each aircraft class assigned to Vietnam. We then use these percentages to identify the number of USAF FY17 aircraft by class required for a Vietnam-like conflict. Sources for USAF Vietnam order of battle and overall force structure are USAF 1970 and USAF 1974 (see references). 24 See Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1365-AF, 1999, Figure 6.4; William J. Begert, “Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility,” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1999, pp. 11–21. 25 These were calculated by taking the percentage of the 1962 bomber, tanker, and ICBM forces on crisis alert on November 4 and applying that to the USAF FY17 force to identify comparable demands. See Norman Polmar, Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, and Missiles, Annapolis, Md.: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979, pp. 79–81; Polmar and D. Gresham, 2006, pp. 1 and 16; Nalty, 1968, pp. 42–43; James C. Ruehrmund Jr. and Christopher J. Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory, 1960–2009, Arlington, Va.: Mitchell Institute Press, 2010.

27 Prediction of Operational Durations The length of a given operation is a critical variable in our model, because our opening hypothesis is that prolonged operations (which we define as lasting 365 days or longer) impose unique stresses on force structure. Therefore, as we generated a number of futures stochastically to represent future variable demands, we needed to specify distributions for both the frequency and duration of contingencies for each historical era. Once again, we derived both distributions directly from the historical frequencies and durations of the contingencies for each relevant era. Table 3.8 describes in detail how we arrived at the duration inputs for the four alternative futures. For each class of variable demand and for each future, the table identifies the number of historical contingencies used to generate the modeled duration, the average duration, and, in cases with few historical examples, the names of the operations used as inputs.

Table 3.8. Sources of Operational Duration Inputs for Alternative Futures

Class of Demand \ Cold War Cold War Peace Enforcement CT/COIN Futures (with long regional conflict) (with short regional conflict) Show of Force Drawn from 138 Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 20 contingencies Drawn from 4 contingencies (average contingencies (average (average duration 664 days) duration 69 days) duration 176 days) Limited strikes Drawn from 4 contingencies Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 5 contingencies Operation Odyssey Lightning (140 days) (average duration 23 days) (average duration 3 days)

Military Assistance Drawn from 37 contingencies Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 9 contingencies Drawn from 3 contingencies: Airlift (average duration 160 days) (average duration 21 days) Peacekeepers to Darfur (14 days), Operation New Dawn (470 days), Search for Lord’s Resistance Army (1907 days) No-Fly Zone Drawn from 3 contingencies: Deny Operation Odyssey Dawn Unified Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Protector (218 days) Guard/Deliberate Forge (1923 days), ONW (2266 days), OSW (3942 days) Nuclear Alert Drawn from 2 contingencies: Same as Cold War (w proxy) Cuban Missile Crisis (38 days) and Yom Kippur War Show of Force (42 days) Raids Drawn from 2 contingencies: Same as Cold War (w proxy) Son Tay Raid (1 day) and Operation Eagle Claw (9 days) RRE Short Drawn from 375 Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 113 contingencies Drawn from 17 contingencies (average contingencies (average (average duration 8 days) duration 6 days) duration 7 days) RRE Med Drawn from 63 contingencies Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 30 contingencies Drawn from 10 contingencies (average (average duration 78 days) (average duration 115 days) duration 81 days)

RRE Long Drawn from 11 contingencies Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 4 contingencies (average duration 1003 days) (average duration 1342 days)

Conventional Drawn from 2 contingencies: 2003 OIF duration (43 days) Drawn from 2 contingencies: Desert 2003 OIF duration (43 days) Combat w/ Regional Korean War (1128 days) and Storm (43 days) and OAF (78 days) Opponent Vietnam War (3158 days) Stability Ops Drawn from 8 contingencies Same as Cold War (w proxy) Drawn from 15 contingencies Drawn from 5 contingencies (average (average duration 226 days) (average duration 843 days) duration 1679 days)

To illustrate our approach, consider the far-right column in Table 3.8, which describes duration inputs for the CT/COIN future. The inputs are drawn from operations that occurred between 2001 and 2016. For instance, there were three military assistance contingencies in this

28 timeframe: airlifting peacekeepers to Darfur (14 days), Operation New Dawn (470 days), and the search for Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa (1,907 days). Thus, the frequency of military assistance contingencies for this era was three per 16 years, or 0.1875 contingencies per year. When such a contingency was included in a notional future as a random stochastic possibility, its duration was equally likely to be either 14, 470, or 1,907 days. The cold war futures (columns one and two) differ with each other only in the assumption regarding the length of conventional combat with a regional opponent. For the Cold War future with a long regional conflict, the model includes equally likely durations of 1,128 days or 3,158 days, reflecting the Korean and Vietnam War lengths, respectively. For the cold war future with a short regional conflict, the model includes just one benchmark: the 2003 OIF (43 days). We assess the impact of prolonged operations on variable force demands by running excursions in which no operation is allowed to be longer than 365 days. Thus, for those analytical cases in which we truncate contingency demand length, all drawn durations that are greater than 365 days are reduced to 365 days.

Translation of Aircraft Demands into Squadron Demands The model assesses the capacity of the USAF FY17 force to meet demands measured in squadron equivalents.26 However, the most precise data on historical demands and current supply are presented in terms of quantity of aircraft by MDS (e.g., 12 A-10 aircraft). Thus, before running the model, we had to translate aircraft quantities into squadrons. (These translations into squadron equivalents apply to both the fixed and variable demand calculations in the model.) Table 3.9 illustrates how we convert aircraft quantities into squadron equivalents. Consider the first row—i.e., for A-10 aircraft. First, we use Air Combat Command data for FY15 to estimate the total supply of 171 A-10s in the FY17 force. Since the PMAI varies by squadron, we use the most common PMAI number (18) for the A-10.27 Dividing 171 aircraft by 18 per squadron produces 9.5 equivalent squadrons, which we round up to a supply of 10 A-10 squadron equivalents.28 On the demand side, our data for a regional conventional conflict (Operation Allied Force) show a historical demand of 40 aircraft, which is 2.2 squadron equivalents. In the final column, we round this up to a requirement of 3 squadron equivalents. As previously indicated, rounding up helps capture the negative consequences of partial unit deployments. This final number is the demand input for the model for this one contingency. Similar calculations are made for all 25 MDS modeled in our simulation.

26 AF-FESS actually models supply and demand as “unit elements.” For fighter and attack aircraft, these are synonymous with squadrons; but for larger aircraft that routinely deploy and employ individually or in pairs, we stipulate smaller unit elements for modeling. 27 Seven A-10 squadrons have 18 PMAI, one has 21 PMAI, and one has 24 PMAI. See Air Combat Command, 2015. 28 Note that the supply calculations round up or down for squadron equivalents.

29 Table 3.9. Total Historical Supply and Demand in Aircraft and Squadron Equivalents

Conventional Combat Number of Aircraft FY 17 Force in Conventional Combat Conventional Combat w w regional opponent Per Squadron Squadron w regional opponent regional opponent in squadrons (rounded Aircraft FY 17 Force (PMAI) Equivalents (OAF) (aircraft) (fractions of squadrons) up) A-10 171 18 10 40 2 3 AC-130 20 8 3 2 0 1 B-1 36 12 3 5 0 1 B-2 16 8 2 6 1 1 B-52 44 11 4 18 2 2 C-5 39 8 5 0 0 0 C-17 155 16 10 12 1 1 C-130 244 8 31 31 4 4 CV-22 30 8 4 8 1 1 E-3 23 2 12 4 2 2 E-8 11 5 2 2 0 1 EC-130 10 5 2 2 0 1 F-15C 156 18 9 18 1 1 F-15E 138 24 6 32 1 2 F-16 537 18 30 99 6 6 F-22 123 21 6 21 1 1 HC-130 25 4 6 0 0 0 HH-60 72 7 10 2 0 1 KC-10 41 16 3 24 2 2 KC-135 277 12 23 151 13 13 MC-130 50 8 6 3 0 1 MQ-9 144 8 18 4 1 1 RC-135 17 4 4 5 1 2 RQ-4 31 16 2 0 0 0 U-2 24 6 4 5 1 1

Accommodation of Key Scheduling Constraints Two further complications in estimating both the fixed and variable demands for Air Force squadron equivalents are the two key scheduling constraints placed on squadrons by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the USAF. The first of these constraints is OSD’s “deploy-to-dwell” (D2D) policy guidance. The second is the USAF deployment length, as stipulated in USAF personnel deployment policies. For our baseline calculations in the model, we use the D2D guidance found in the November 1, 2013, OSD policy memo. This memo states the Secretary of Defense’s goals for both the active and reserve components. For the active component, the D2D ratio is 1:2 or greater. The memo states that “Secretary of Defense approval is required to deploy a unit, detachment or individual with a 1:1 ratio or less . . .” For the reserve components, the mobilization-to-dwell

30 goal is 1:5 or greater.29 For our baseline calculations of maximum deployment length, meanwhile, we use 180 days, the USAF standard for rotations.30 Figure 3.1 illustrates how the model handles these scheduling demands and constraints. The horizontal axis (at top) is deployment time measured in months. The upper panel shows contingency demands in red; the lower panel shows force rotations in green (for ready to deploy), dark blue (deployed), and light blue (recovering from deployment).

Figure 3.1. Illustration of Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation Scheduling Logic

Time (months) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

No Fly Zone

Regional Conflict Contingencies

Stabilization operation

Deploy-to-Dwell (D-to-D) Ratio of 1:2, 12-Month Deployment Cap Unit 1 Deployed Unit 1 Recovering Unit 1 Ready Unit 1 Deployed

Forces Unit 2 Ready Unit 2 Deployed Unit 2 Recovering Unit 2 Ready

Unit 3 Ready Unit 3 Deployed Unit 3 Recovering NOTES: Red = contingency demand; green = ready to deploy; dark blue = deployed; light blue = recovering from deployment.

In other words, Figure 3.1 describes a notional future that experiences three contingencies over a period of 36 months: the establishment of a no-fly zone in months 2–8, a regional conflict in months 7–14, and a stabilization operation in months 16–36. Assuming that all contingencies require a single unit to fulfill demands, a minimum of three (active component) units are necessary under the constraints of a notional 12-month maximum deployment and a minimum D2D ratio of 1:2. One unit deploys to fulfill the no-fly zone requirement for seven months, at which point it dwells/recovers for a minimum of 14 months. A second unit fulfills the regional conflict demand for eight months, recovering for a minimum of 16 months. When the stabilization operation begins in month 16, neither of the first two units is available, so a third is required. However, it has a maximum deployment length of 12 months, so it finishes at the end of month 27, requiring a different unit to take its place. Unit 1 is available, so it replaces Unit 3 while it recovers for a minimum of 24 months. If the minimum D2D ratio was, at most, 1:1 (allowed only with approval from the Secretary of Defense), two units would be sufficient

29 Jessica Wright, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Deployment-to-Dwell, Mobilization-to-Dwell Policy Revision, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 1, 2013. 30 Air Force Association, 2016, p. 24.

31 (because Unit 1 would be ready starting in month 16). Thus, the model takes these scheduling constraints into account when determining how much Air Force capacity could be made available to meet either fixed or variable demands. The next chapter presents analytical results for the four alternative futures.

32 Chapter Four: Force Structure Implications of Alternative Futures

This chapter presents and discusses the results of our simulation of four alternative futures: two versions of a future cold war, a future where peace enforcement operations dominate, and a CT/COIN future. For each future, we measure the percentage of demands that can be met by the USAF FY17 force as represented by the 25 MDSs introduced in the previous chapter. We first discuss the results from the base case analysis, then explore the impact of changes in a key input assumption: whether prolonged operations (those exceeding 365 days in length) occur during this period. We also assess (1) the effect of steady-state demands on the ability of the force to fulfill contingency demands and (2) the impact of changes to D2D constraints on the ability of the force to fulfill contingency demands.

Base Case Our base case for all four futures (1) allows contingencies to extend beyond one year, (2) uses OSD D2D constraints of 1:2 for the active component and 1:5 for the reserve component,1 and (3) limits USAF units (per policy) to 180 day deployments.2 Table 4.1 presents model results by aircraft class for the base case. The color coding is broadly construed and intended to highlight shortfalls: Green indicates that 80–100 percent of demands are met, yellow indicates 51–79 percent met, and red indicates 0–50 percent met.

1 D2D policies, waivers, and practice vary across MDSs and units in the USAF. To make the analysis manageable, we differentiate only between active and reserve force D2D constraints. 2 Although contingency length is not limited in our base case, individual units may only deploy for 180 days (per DoD policy).

33 Table 4.1. Percentage of Demands Met, by Aircraft Class (FY17 Force)

NOTES: No limits to contingency length. D2D constraints: active component: 1:2, reserve components1:5, 180-day max unit deployments. Green = 80–100 percent of demands are met, yellow = 51–79 percent met, red = 0–50 percent met.

The left column in Table 4.1 lists the eight aircraft classes assessed in the model. The top row lists the four alternative futures. By way of illustration, consider the Peace Enforcement future. This future creates the most capacity demands on the force, with five cells coded red, two coded yellow, and only one coded green. In contrast, the Cold War with Short Regional Conflict future meets the most demands, with six green cells and two yellow. Why would a future characterized by peace enforcement operations be so much more stressful and a new cold war the least? The answer lies in the historical demands associated with these futures. Contingency demands during the Peace Enforcement future reflect the experience between 1990 and 1999, when no-fly zones in the Middle East and Balkans required prolonged deployments of fighter, tanker, and C3ISR/BM platforms. Operation Allied Force occurred during this period, creating additional demands for force structure. In contrast, there were no prolonged operational deployments during the Cold War other than the two wars in Korea and Vietnam. The Cold War with Short Regional Conflict future uses data from 1946 to 1989 for all classes of demand except regional conflicts. In this future, we consider the possibility that a future cold war would be similar to the historical data, but without the long proxy wars like those in Korea and Vietnam. For the regional conflict variable, this future uses the short conventional phase of OIF (lasting only 43 days) to reflect a different demand set. We take no position on whether a new cold war would be characterized by Korea/Vietnam War–like demands, OIF-like demands, or perhaps something altogether different. We include both futures to explore the impact that long regional wars have on force demands. If a future cold war includes conflicts as large and long as the Korean and Vietnam wars, it greatly increases force demands for attack, C3ISR/BM, and SOF platforms. This analysis also helps identify which aircraft classes are most stressed or robust across the futures. For example, bomber and C3ISR/BM aircraft are relatively few in number but in high

34 demand. These two classes of aircraft have the greatest capacity shortfalls across all futures. The simulation found that the FY17 fighter force was the most robust across the four futures, stressed only in the Peace Enforcement future. The relatively high capacity of the fighter force seems at odds with a widely held view that this force is as stressed or more stressed than other parts of the USAF. One possible explanation has to do with the location of the stress. The model output suggests that there are enough aircraft to meet demands associated with three of the four futures. The simulation does not explicitly model readiness, retention, pilot shortages, or personnel tempo problems. It simply measures whether there are enough unit elements in the FY17 force to meet the steady-state and contingency demands described in Chapter Three, using OSD and USAF D2D and maximum deployment constraints as caps. The model assumes that when a unit has fulfilled the OSD- determined dwell requirement, it is in fact fully ready to deploy. This may not be the case. Also, a unit may be ready to deploy for CT/COIN and similar missions but not be fully ready for combat against the most-capable adversaries. Finally, a unit may have sufficient aircraft to meet demands but be undermanned (as is reportedly often the case). AF-FESS results, like any model findings, need to be taken in context. They provide insights into the number of aircraft and units required to meet a wide range of demands but offer no direct measure of the other factors that determine unit health and readiness. Table 4.2 presents the same model results by aircraft type rather than class of aircraft. This provides additional details regarding challenges associated with specific aircraft. There are, however, limits to MDS-level model results. First, the force packages used in the model were primarily drawn from historical experience, some of it quite old. In those cases, the particular aircraft used are no longer in the fleet. For example, there are no perfect analogues in the FY17 force for the F-105, F-4, or F-100 aircraft that played such large roles in the Vietnam War. We had to make judgments about substitutions, and these were typically made at the aircraft class level. For example, if an operation used a wing of attack aircraft, we typically modeled the future version of the conflict using a similar force. For large conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, we calculated the percentage of USAF total force (by aircraft class) devoted to the conflict, then used the same percentage of the USAF FY17 force (by aircraft class) to model a future Vietnam War–class conflict.3 Since the model operates at the level of MDS, we then had to translate these demands by class into the actual aircraft in the force today. Where aircraft in a class have overlapping capabilities (e.g., F-16s and F-15Es), we had to develop substitution rules that may over or understate real-world demands on a specific MDS. Additional MDS-level model outputs are found in Appendix F.

3 See Appendix G for more details on how we estimate the demands of Vietnam War–scale conflict.

35 Table 4.2. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force (by Aircraft Type)

Cold War Cold War Peace MDS\Future CT/COIN (with long regional conflict) (with short regional conflict) Enforcement

A-10 62% 100% 53% 92% AC-130 52% 94% 21% 38% B-1 100% 99% 97% 76% B-2 62% 62% 30% 100% B-52 99% 98% 94% 58% C-130 51% 52% 100% 99% C-17 81% 99% 96% 100% C-5 100% 100% 100% 100% CV-22 46% 98% 43% 56% E-3 58% 87% 25% 78% E-8 59% 72% 19% 38% EC-130 73% 72% 13% 38% F-15C 100% 100% 100% 100% F-15E 92% 100% 81% 99% F-16 94% 100% 42% 97% F-22 99% 99% 91% 100% HC-130 99% 99% 49% 100% HH-60 100% 100% 71% 95% KC-10 97% 98% 67% 96% KC-135 87% 89% 14% 85% MC-130 57% 100% 97% 99% MQ-9 41% 100% 100% 100% RC-135 54% 88% 70% 55% RQ-4 63% 90% 81% 70% U-2 32% 67% 43% 24%

NOTES: No limits to contingency length. D2D constraints: active component: 1:2, reserve components: 1:5, 180- day max unit deployments.

Analytical Excursions To complement the base case analysis, we also explored three excursions: (1) Operations are capped at 12 months, (2) steady-state demands (handled as decrements to available forces) are varied from 100 percent met (the base case) to 0 percent met, and (3) D2D and maximum deployment constraints are increased or lessened.

Contingencies Capped at One Year As noted earlier in the report, this study sought to better understand the role of prolonged operations (those lasting more than a year) in generating force structure demands. Our entering hypothesis was that the growth in prolonged operations since the end of the Cold War was the

36 primary driver of force capacity shortfalls. Table 4.3 presents results for model runs when no contingency is allowed to extend beyond 365 days. If we compare these results with those in Table 4.1 (where contingency duration was based on historical data, including many multiyear operations), we find striking differences. The greatest improvement in percentage of demand met was in the Peace Enforcement future, which went from five red, two yellow, and only one green cell, to zero red, four yellow, and four green. More generally, we see improvements in all futures. Where there were six cells coded red in Table 4.1, there are none in Table 4.3. There were 12 cells coded yellow in Table 4.1 but only seven in Table 4.3. Similarly, where the earlier table had 14 green cells, Table 4.3 displays 25 green cells. Finally, in Table 4.1, there was only one case where 100 percent of demands were met; in Table 4.3, there are eight such cases.

Table 4.3. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force (Contingencies Are Capped at 365 Days)

Cold War Cold War Peace (with long (with short CT/COIN Enforcement regional conflict) regional conflict) Airlift 74% 73% 100% 100% Attack 98% 100% 98% 100% Bomber 84% 84% 79% 99% C3ISR/BM 80% 93% 68% 90% Fighter 100% 100% 100% 100% Other 96% 96% 74% 89% SOF 82% 99% 75% 88% Tanker 95% 94% 85% 99%

To better visualize the impact of prolonged operations on force structure, Figure 4.1 compares the percentage of demands met by the FY17 force by aircraft class for the Peace Enforcement future.

37 Figure 4.1. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force: Prolonged Versus Shorter Contingencies

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Airlift Attack Bomber C3ISR/BM Fighter Other SOF Tanker

No Cap on Contingency Length (Peace Enforcement Future)

Contingencies Capped at 1 Year In Length (Peace Enforcement Future)

The blue bars display model results when contingency duration comes from historical data, including many operations exceeding one year in length. The red bars display model results when contingencies are capped at 365 days. Substantial improvements are visible for all stressed classes of aircraft. For example, fighter aircraft go from meeting 64 percent to 100 percent of demands. That said, despite significant improvements, bomber, C3ISR/BM, and SOF platforms still face significant shortfalls. These model results suggest that prolonged operations are a significant driver of capacity shortfalls. As to why prolonged operations are so stressing to the force, one must consider other factors beyond just the sheer lengths of deployments. The preferred dwell time for forces following a prolonged operation is two to five times as long as the deployment itself, depending on whether active or reserve forces are sent. Similarly, the likelihood that a unit is deployed up to its allowed maximum (and therefore takes the maximum amount of time to recover) increases as the number of prolonged operations increase. Of the 888 historical contingencies in our study, only 51 (5.7 percent) of the contingencies lasted a year or longer, but they were responsible for 84,895 of the 111,060 days of demand (76.4 percent). When we ran excursions in which we capped contingency lengths at a year, we (unsurprisingly) saw considerable increases in the percentage of contingency demands met, because a one-year deployment would require, at most, two unit elements of supply per unit element of demand and would thus remove, at most, 36 unit element- months from the available supply of forces to meet contingencies. The United States rarely enters into military operations expecting them to go on indefinitely. Indeed, the opposite is more typically the case. Operations become prolonged because objectives change, because objectives turn out to be more difficult to achieve than initially anticipated, or

38 because of adversary actions. USAF leaders have little, if any, control over these factors. That said, armed with this evidence that prolonged operations are a driver of capacity shortfalls, USAF leaders can advocate for more force structure, develop alternative force presentation models that may more efficiently used existing forces, and, perhaps, nudge National Security Council principals and the President to be more aware of the risks and costs of prolonged operations.

Trade-Offs Between Steady-State and Contingency Demands In the previous chapter, we noted that demand inputs come from two sources: contingencies (drawn from historical experience) and steady-state demands. We described the steady-state assumptions and provided specific force demands by future. One concern we mentioned (likely shared by some readers) was that the contingency shortfalls found in modeling results might be the result of the steady-state demands that were postulated as opposed to historically derived. To investigate that possibility, we varied the percentage of steady-state demands met from the base case level (100 percent) all the way to 0 percent. This is not just a modeling excursion; planners might choose to reduce resources committed to steady-state demands in order to better meet contingency requirements. Figure 4.2 displays the trade-offs between steady-state and contingency demands for C3ISR/BM platforms, the most stressed class of aircraft. The percentage of contingency demands met is displayed on the vertical axis; the percentage of steady-state demands met is displayed on the horizontal axis. For example, the lowest line shows the Peace Enforcement future. The far right of that line represents the base case; 100 percent of steady-state demands are met, while only 29 percent of contingency demands are met. If steady-state demands were driving contingency shortfalls, one would see a significant improvement as one follows the line to the left. The modest slope of the line tells the story: Steady-state demands are not responsible for the contingency shortfalls. Even at the far left point on the line (where there are zero steady- state demands being met), C3ISR/BM platforms would meet less than 40 percent of the contingency demands. The other futures tell similar stories: All fare somewhat better if steady- state demands are reduced to zero, but the improvements are all under 10 percentage points. This is an underwhelming outcome. It is hard to imagine circumstances in which national leaders would walk away from these steady-state missions (most high-priority) to achieve minor reductions in contingency shortfalls.

39 Figure 4.2. Trade-Offs Between Steady-State and Contingency Demands for C3ISR/BM Aircraft (All Futures)

Peace Enforcement Cold War w/ Long RC CT/COIN Cold War w/ Short RC

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

% Contingency Requirements Met 20%

10%

0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% % Steady State Requirements Met

NOTE: Assumes D2D ratio of 1:2 for active component, 1:5 for reserve components, 180-day max unit deployment per rotation.

Impact of Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints on Contingency Shortfalls As noted in Chapter Three, the base case used OSD D2D constraints of 1:2 for the active component and 1:5 for the reserve component and USAF 180-day deployment caps. To what extent are these constraints driving shortfalls? We consider three cases: the base case described in the previous sentence, a less constrained case (D2D ratios of 1:1 [active component] and 1:2 ([reserve component]; 365-day deployment caps), and a more constrained case (D2D ratios of 1:3 [active component] and 1:6 [reserve component]; 180-day deployment caps). Neither of these alternative cases is recommended as a policy option. They simply are used to illustrate the impact of D2D constraints. Figure 4.3 illustrates the impact of these D2D assumptions for C3ISR/BM platforms in the Peace Enforcement future, with the blue line representing the base case, green the least constrained, and red the most constrained.

40 Figure 4.3. Impact of Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints on Availability of C3ISR/BM Aircraft (Peace Enforcement Future)

Legend

Green AC: 1:1, 12 month cap RC: 1:2, 12 month cap

Blue (Baseline) AC: 1:2, 6 month cap RC: 1:5, 6 month cap

Red AC: 1:3, 6 month cap RC: 1:6, 6 month cap

The less constrained green line reduces contingency shortfalls between 12 and 14 percentage points. Few readers are likely to view these D2D and deployment caps as realistic. At the other extreme, the more constrained red line may be a more realistic policy option if readiness or retention problems worsen. This more constrained case would, of course, reduce the number of available forces to meet contingency demands. For C3ISR/BM platforms in the Peace Enforcement future, the more constrained case would worsen the already dismal picture by 7 to 8 percentage points. This analysis suggests that although D2D constraints have some impact on contingency shortfalls, the assumptions used in this simulation are not causing contingency shortfalls. Indeed, even fairly radical changes (such as moving to a 1:1 D2D ratio for the active component) do not greatly reduce contingency shortfalls. More modest options that policymakers would consider realistic and practical presumably fall between the red and green lines in Figure 4.3, offering equally modest benefits. If steady-state demands were reduced to zero and D2D constraints were reduced simultaneously to those on the green line, a roughly 20 percentage point improvement from the base case would be achieved for C3ISR/BM platforms. That improvement, although significant in percentage points, would not change the bottom line: A little over 50 percent of contingency demands are met even after these draconian changes. Thus, half of demands still go unfilled, at the cost of dropping all steady-state missions and placing rotational demands on the force that are extreme and likely infeasible.

41 Summary of Alternative Futures Analysis This chapter presented the findings from our analysis of four alternative futures. Each future is empirically grounded in an operationally unique prior period. We used AF-FESS, a RAND- created aircraft scheduling model, to determine what percentage of demands could be met with the USAF FY17 force. Several research findings are important for force planners and policymakers: • Every aircraft class experiences significant shortfalls in at least one future. • Every future faces significant capacity shortfalls in at least two aircraft classes. • Prolonged operations (those lasting more than a year) have a disproportionate impact on capacity demands. • When contingencies are capped at 365 days, the percentage of demands met by the FY17 force soars. • Steady-state demands postulated in this analysis have little impact on contingency shortfalls. • OSD D2D and USAF deployment duration constraints are not drivers of shortfalls. In the next, and final, chapter of the report, we discuss these findings in greater depth, consider their policy implications, and offer recommendations for USAF leaders and force planners.

42 Chapter Five: Findings and Recommendations

The U.S. military has operated at a high operational tempo for most of the post–Cold War era. Although the demand for forces ebbed and flowed, peaking during large combat operations such as Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force, and OIF, the “ebb” periods never quite returned to the low levels taken for granted during much of the Cold War. It is hardly news to the USAF that small continuous rotations are demanding. USAF leaders invented the Air Expeditionary Force construct two decades ago to better manage these demands. Similarly, the other services have adapted their force presentation models in response to this new reality, and the Global Force Management system has evolved to better support Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense decisionmaking processes. These adaptations (along with the willingness of American service members to make the personal sacrifices associated with frequent deployments) have mitigated or postponed the worst effects of constant deployments. These measures were, however, never meant to be anything other than temporary fixes. Although service leaders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been increasingly candid and direct about the readiness and retention problems caused by overtasking and underresourcing of the military, as of May 2018 there appears to be no significant reduction in demand on the horizon. This study sought to help the USAF understand the implications for aircraft force structure of four distinct, empirically derived futures. In particular, this study is the first to quantify the degree to which the open-ended and prolonged operations mentioned above increase demands on USAF force structure. Our hope is that this research will provide additional analytical evidence of the gap between the demands of U.S. national security strategy and the resources that the services have to meet these demands. Although this study focused on the USAF, a similar analysis could be done for the other services using our joint operations database and appropriate service-specific scheduling models. In this final chapter, we present research findings, make recommendations for USAF leaders and planners, and offer some final thoughts.

Findings

The USAF FY17 Force Experiences Capacity Shortfalls in All Four Futures Whether the future bears similarities to the Cold War years, to the 1990s era of peace enforcement operations, or to the CT and COIN demands of today, the USAF FY17 flying force faces force structure shortfalls. Ironically, the best case in terms of capacity requirements would

43 be a new cold war—but only if the new cold war experienced operational demands similar to the historical cold war except with respect to regional conflicts. This version of a new cold war would not see proxy wars like those in Vietnam and Korea but rather more limited and short regional conflicts. Operation Allied Force or the conventional phase (March–April 2003) of OIF are models for this type of regional conflict. In this case, the USAF FY17 force can meet between 84 percent and 100 percent of demands for six classes of aircraft. It faces shortfalls for airlift and bomber aircraft, for which it can only meet 67 percent and 72 percent of demands, respectively. In contrast, a new cold war that included long regional conflicts like the Vietnam or Korean wars would face shortfalls in five of the eight aircraft classes, with unmet demands as high as 50 percent (for C3ISR/BM platforms). Perhaps the most surprising result is that a future characterized by peace enforcement operations is most stressful to capacity. This is because that period was characterized by prolonged no-fly zones in the Balkans and Middle East, which required continuous rotations of fighter, tanker, and C3ISR/BM platforms. Airlift is the only class of aircraft without significant shortfalls, meeting 97 percent of demand. The other classes face massive shortfalls. Five classes meet only 29 percent to 46 percent of demands; another two meet 53 percent to 64 percent of demands. A future characterized by CT/COIN operations presents a mixed story. Four aircraft classes meet over 90 percent of contingency demands, but the other four classes can meet only between 54 percent and 76 percent of demands.

No Class of Aircraft Is Robust Across All Four Futures A second critical issue for planners is the robustness of the force across futures. For example, if bomber aircraft as a class perform well across all the futures, that would suggest that bomber capacity is robust. Alternatively, if an aircraft class performs well in only one or two of the futures, that is worrisome. From this perspective, no USAF aircraft class in the FY17 force can be considered robust across all four futures. There is no formal threshold for robustness, but it seems reasonable to expect the force to meet at least 80 percent of demands in every future (green in our charts). No aircraft class did that. Fighter aircraft came the closest, meeting 93 percent or more of demands in three futures and 64 percent in the remaining. C3ISR/BM platforms, reflecting their small fleets and high demand, are the least robust across the four futures, meeting 84 percent of demands in one future but only 29 percent to 63 percent in the others. Tanker aircraft are particularly interesting, because they were highly robust (90 percent or more demands met) across three of the futures but met only 32 percent of the demands for the Peace Enforcement future.

Prolonged Operations Have a Disproportionate Impact on Contingency Demands Operations that last more than a year place great demands on force structure. This is worrisome because, as discussed in Chapter Two, the average length of operations has grown since the end of the Cold War. In the analytical excursions in which we limited contingencies to no more than

44 one year of duration, we found large improvements in the percentage of contingency demands met. With contingencies capped, the USAF FY17 force was able to meet 80 percent or more of demands in 25 of the 32 cases that we examined (8 classes of aircraft × 4 futures), and there were no cases where it met fewer than 68 percent of demands. Finally, with contingencies capped at one year, there are eight cases where the force meets 100 percent of demands. In contrast, when contingencies are not capped, there are only 14 cases in which the FY17 force meets 80 percent or more of demands and only one case in which 100 percent of demands are met. The other 18 cases have significant, and at times extreme, deficiencies. (See Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1.) This analysis suggests that prolonged operations are driving contemporary capacity shortfalls, at least as measured by aircraft availability. We did not, however, assess training, manpower, maintenance, supply, or retention shortfalls. The stresses experienced most profoundly in 2017 at the squadron and wing level are likely the product of some combination of these various factors. We suspect that prolonged operations are, at minimum, contributing to these other problems, but measuring their impact was beyond the scope of this study. As to why prolonged operations are so stressing to the force, one must consider other factors beyond just the sheer lengths of deployments. The preferred dwell time for forces following a prolonged operation is two to five times as long as the deployment itself, depending on whether active or reserve forces are sent. Similarly, the likelihood that a unit is deployed up to its allowed maximum (and, therefore, takes the maximum amount of time to recover) increases as the number of prolonged operations increase. Of the 888 historical contingencies in our study, only 51 (5.7 percent) of the contingencies lasted a year or longer, but they were responsible for 84,895 of the 111,060 days of demand (76.4 percent). When we ran excursions in which we capped contingency lengths at a year, we (unsurprisingly) saw considerable increases in the percentage of contingency demands met, because a one-year deployment would require, at most, two unit elements of supply per unit element of demand and would thus remove, at most, 36 unit element- months from the available supply of forces to meet contingencies. The United States rarely enters into military operations expecting them to go on indefinitely. Indeed, the opposite is more typically the case. Operations become prolonged because objectives change, because objectives turn out to be more difficult to achieve than initially anticipated, or because of adversary actions. USAF leaders have little, if any, control over these factors. That said, armed with this evidence that prolonged operations are a driver of capacity shortfalls, USAF leaders can advocate for more force structure, develop alternative force presentation models that may more efficiently use existing forces, and, perhaps, nudge National Security Council principals and the President to be more aware of the risks and costs of prolonged operations

Deploy-to-Dwell Constraints Are Not Responsible for Contingency Shortfalls To mitigate the worst effects of continuous rotations over extended periods, OSD developed policy guidance on D2D ratios. The policy establishes goals for both the active and reserve

45 components, as well as thresholds that cannot be crossed without approval by the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, USAF policy sets 180 days as a maximum rotational deployment. One question we considered in this analysis is whether these constraints are significant drivers of capacity shortfalls. If they were relaxed or increased, would the capacity shortfalls substantially improve or worsen? Our analysis (see Figure 4.3) of C3ISR/BM aircraft in the Peace Enforcement future suggests that current policy constraints are not driving capacity shortfalls. For example, if these constraints were substantially loosened so that active component forces spent as much time deployed as at home (1:1 D2D ratio) and deployed for 12 months at a time, C3ISR/BM aircraft would meet roughly 42 percent of demands, as opposed to 29 percent of demands. This is a big percentage improvement but still leaves the majority of demands unmet. It also would place extreme and likely unsustainable burdens on units, personnel, and families. It is hard to imagine service or DoD leaders recommending such a policy change. More modest (and presumably realistic) reductions in the constraints would yield equally modest improvements in aircraft availability. What if constraints were increased? Would that drastically reduce aircraft availability? This might happen if ongoing analyses demonstrate that longer dwell periods are necessary to achieve readiness and retention goals. We found that a shift to longer dwell periods (1:3 for the active component; 1:6 for the reserve components) would worsen shortfalls for C3ISR/BM platforms (from 29 percent of demands met to 23 percent). This is almost a 20 percent reduction, but it is hard to assess how much it would matter, given the dismal starting point. This assessment suggests that aircraft availability shortfalls cannot easily be corrected through changes to D2D policies.

46 overlap of large contingencies. The force planning process does not, however, fully account for all the demands placed on the force during “peacetime”—the period when it is supposed to be training and preparing to deter or prosecute wars. Of particular concern is the impact of open-ended and prolonged contingency operations on force structure, readiness, and retention. The historical-based simulation technique developed for this study complements other planning techniques by quantifying the day-to-day capacity demands placed on DoD during distinct and diverse historical periods and using these to model alternative futures. Shortfalls in capacity can then be identified by capability class (e.g., aircraft or ship type, light or heavy brigade) and by future. None of these prior experiences are predictive of the future, but the alternative futures explored in this report help quantify the unique demands that flow from changes in national strategy priorities and, especially, the disproportionate effect of prolonged commitments. For USAF leaders and force planners: • Develop metrics that more clearly illustrate the force structure consequences for the USAF of prolonged operations. Although USAF leaders have limited autonomy regarding whether and how long to deploy forces abroad, they are key participants in many of the decisionmaking processes. U.S. national objectives and the particulars of a given crisis will dominate such decisions, but resource constraints and long-term consequences deserve more visibility and consideration than current processes allow. Insufficient consideration of long-term consequences is in part—perhaps in large part—a product of cognitive biases and limitations associated with crisis decisionmaking processes.1 Better metrics cannot entirely overcome these biases, but more objective, quantitative measures of the force structure implications of prolonged operations would help USAF leaders contribute to force deployment deliberations. Better metrics would also help USAF leaders make the case for more force structure in interactions with DoD leadership, Congress, the media, and the public.

Final Thoughts Since the 1990s, when the post–Cold War force drawdown began, the U.S. military has operated at a tempo more akin to war than peace. This was initially viewed as temporary and related to anomalous demands (i.e., peace enforcement operations) in the Middle East and Balkans. It was expected that these would soon pass, ushering in a period of U.S. dominance and modest defense spending. Events have proven otherwise. A much smaller military, based primarily on U.S. territory, has been asked to support continuous rotations abroad and fight several small wars along the way. The demands of ongoing global CT and COIN operations are now compounded by growing tensions with capable nation-states. The latter require new capabilities, reinvigorated alliances, expanded forward basing, and, as important, the time and resources to train for the unique and difficult demands of operations in anti-access, area denial environments.

1 These points are developed more fully in Alan J. Vick, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Meagan L. Smith, Sean M. Zeigler, Daniel Tremblay, and Phillip Johnson, Continuity and Contingency in USAF Force Planning, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1471-AF, 2016, pp. 1–4 and pp. 31–32.

47 In the face of this growing gap between the demands of U.S. strategy (or at least the choices of multiple administrations) and the resources DoD has to execute that strategy, the American people face a choice. They can advocate for a less ambitious strategy, they can support funding increases necessary to execute the current strategy, or they can support some combination of the two. As the country wrestles with these choices, the costs and consequences of prolonged military commitments need to be better understood, quantified, and integrated into programmatic and budgetary deliberations and decisions. It is our hope that this analysis can contribute to these deliberations by quantifying the unintended consequences of long-duration contingencies.

48 Appendix A: Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation (AF-FESS) Model Description

Introduction The Air Force Future Environment Scheduling Simulation (AF-FESS) is a model that takes as inputs (1) the current status of the USAF programmed force (plus possible modifications), (2) constraints regarding maximum deployment times and D2D ratios, and (3) assumptions about the frequencies of various types of contingencies, along with their durations and force demands. Using these inputs, the model generates a large number of potential futures and determines how often the programmed force (plus modifications) is able to address all future contingencies without exceeding force availability or scheduling constraints. The model was originally implemented in Microsoft Excel, but now only the data management for a set of runs is handled by Excel. Simulation files are then output and used with an AF-FESS executable written in VB.NET. This appendix will describe the inputs and outputs of the model and the underlying logic of the scheduler. The structure of the model is shown in Figure A.1, and each model element is described in detail below.

Figure A.1. AF-FESS Model Structure

Inputs: Programmed Force The programmed force is composed of units of different types. For each unit type, forces will be broken down into the smallest deployable size for that unit type, called a unit element. Typically,

49 this unit element is a squadron, but for certain classes of aircraft it was appropriate to drop to a smaller set of aircraft. Each unit element will have the following parameters.

Unit ID: Self-explanatory, and is distinct for each unit element.

Unit Type(UType): Each element of the programmed force will be some type of unit or mission design series (MDS). The MDS of aircraft and their categories are shown in Table A.1. It should be noted that future aircraft types, such as the OA-X and B-21, can also be added into the model easily.

Table A.1. Categorized List of MDS

Airlift Attack Bomber C3ISR/BM Fighter Other SOF Tanker C-130 A-10 B-1 E-3 F-15C EC-130 AC-130 KC-10 C-17 B-2 E-8 F-15E HC-130 CV-22 KC-135

C-5 B-52 MQ-9 F-16 HH-60 MC-130

RC-135 F-22

RQ-4 F-35

U-2

DepOrDwell: The unit element’s current state at the beginning of the simulation, either deployed or dwelling (returned from deployment).

DepTimeTot: If the unit element is currently deployed, the total length of the deployment. This is used to set the length of the dwell time following the initial deployment upon its completion. The time unit used in AF-FESS is flexible and can represent anything from days to years.2 The run time of the model is inversely proportional to the size of the time unit.

DepTimeRem: If the unit element is currently deployed, the amount of time remaining in its deployment. This parameter is used to set the time at which the unit element returns from its initial deployment.

2 In the model runs in this appendix, we assume a time unit of length 7.5 days. So, for example, the maximum deployment length is 24 time units (24 × 7.5 = 180 days). All contingency lengths are rounded up to the nearest time unit. In tests comparing runs in which the time units were 1 day versus 7.5 days, the result differences were negligible, so we chose this time unit to speed up model runs.

50 DwellTimeRem: If the unit element is currently dwelling, the amount of time until it can be deployed again. This parameter is used to set the time at which the unit element is first available for deployment.

MaxDeploy: The maximum time that a unit element can be deployed to a contingency. For the model runs in this appendix, all deployments are capped at 180 days.

MaxDtoD: Maximum D2D ratio: after a deployment of T time units, a unit element cannot deploy for another T / MaxDtoD time units. For the baseline runs in the model, a maximum 1:2 ratio was used for active component forces, while a 1:5 ratio was used for reserve component forces.

For simplicity, the final two parameters are constant for all unit elements of a given type.

Inputs: Steady-State Demands

AF-FESS handles two types of demands: steady-state and contingency. Steady-state demands reflect ongoing demands on the forces, such as Operation Noble Eagle, or holdouts for nuclear alerts, theater security packages (TSP), or Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) in the Pacific Air Forces. These are treated as fixed reductions from the available forces to apply to contingencies. Forces assigned to handle steady-state demands cannot be reallocated to handle contingency demands.

Inputs: Contingency Demands

Contingency Type(CType): Self-explanatory: one of show of force, no-fly zone, limited strikes, nuclear alerts, raids, military assistance, relief/rescue/evacuation, conventional combat with regional opponent, and stability operations. The type of contingency sets the composition of the forces that respond to it.

Frequency(CType): How often contingencies of this CType are expected to occur. This frequency is used in a Poisson distribution, which gives the amount of time between successive contingencies of that type.

Duration(CType): How long contingencies of this CType are expected to last. This value can be entered as a fixed value (representing the mean or median of already observed contingencies, for example), or can be represented by a probabilistic distribution. In our runs, we randomly drew durations from historical contingency lengths in each era of interest.

51 ForceReq(CType,UType): Number of each unit element of type UType required for a CType contingency in this Region. It is assumed that units are entered into the model such that the force demands are integer multiples of the unit element size.

Subst(UType1, UType2): Forces of certain types can be substituted to fulfill demands (e.g., F- 35s for F-15s, but not vice versa). The Subst table gives an ordered priority list of which unit types can be used to fulfill a demand requirement.

Model Structure and Outputs

There are two main pieces to the model: (1) generating the contingencies in potential futures and (2) scheduling forces to fulfill as many contingencies as possible. Generating futures (within a given window of time from t = 0 to t = T) is straightforward:

1. Let n(CType) denote the time of the next contingency of type CType. Initialize all values n(CType) = Poisson(Frequency(CType)), that is, draw a Poisson random variable for each contingency type to note the time of the first instance of a contingency of that type. 2. Find the contingency type for which n(CType) is minimized, say CType*. 3. Add a contingency of type CType* to the future that occurs at time n(CType*) rounded to the nearest time unit. 4. Increment n(CType*) by Poisson(Frequency(CType)) to generate the time of the next contingency of this type. 5. Repeat Steps 2–4 until n(CType) > T for all contingency types.

This process is repeated for every potential future. For each given future, the model steps through time, and, as demands appear in a notional future, available unit elements will be assigned to fulfill those demands until all unit elements are assigned or all new demands are satisfied. Additionally, if no unit elements of a particular type are available, AF-FESS will attempt to assign unit elements of substitute unit types as allowed. Contingencies are prioritized by start time, and contingencies with identical start times are prioritized by a user-selected ordering of the contingency types. Additionally, once a unit element is assigned to a contingency it cannot be reassigned, so it continues to fulfill that demand until either the contingency is over or the unit element’s maximum deployment time is reached. In either case, the unit element then reverts to dwelling (unable to deploy) for a period of time depending on its deployment length and minimum D2D ratio. If a unit element reaches its maximum deployment times but the contingency is unfinished, the model will attempt to assign new a unit element to take its place. The main metric to be gathered for each unit type for each future is the fraction of contingency demands fulfilled by the available forces. These can then be aggregated into

52 distributions over all futures into the percentage of futures for which all demands are fulfilled, or the average fraction of contingencies fulfilled, both for individual aircraft types and aircraft categories (such as bomber and fighter). A notional future covering 20 years (240 months) showing demands (in number of squadrons) across all MDSs is shown in Figure A.2. The contingency frequencies were derived from the 2001–2016 CT/COIN era, and, for simplicity, all contingencies are assumed to have identical durations equal to the average duration for each contingency type.

Figure A.2. Notional Future from CT/COIN Era

Figure A.3 focuses on the KC-135 MDS demand in this notional future. There are 29 squadrons of KC-135s available, and 1 squadron is demanded for each no-fly zone and stability operations contingency. Each squadron is tracked through its deployments (green) and dwell/recovery time (in red, which is twice the length of each squadron’s deployment). Because the maximum simultaneous KC-135 demand is 3 squadrons (as seen in the demand chart at the bottom in tan), there are more than enough KC-135s available to fulfill all demands. In addition, there are sufficient aircraft available to substitute in for other tanker demands (shown at the bottom of Figure A.3 in blue).

53 Figure A.3. KC-135 Demand from Notional Future

Figure A.4 shows a partially filled demand example for the MC-130. There were 3.75 squadrons available, and a demand of one-quarter of a squadron for each relief, rescue, and evacuation and 1 squadron for each stability operations contingency. Accordingly, each unit element consisted of one-quarter of an MC-130 squadron. Although the maximum MC-130 demand in this future is 3.5 squadrons (14 unit elements), because of the time needed for units to recover after deployments, there are times where not all demands can be fulfilled. In total, 58 percent of MC-130 demands were fulfilled in this notional future.

54 Figure A.4. MC-130 Demand from Notional Future

55 Appendix B: Notes on the Joint Operations Dataset, 1946–2016

The type, frequency, and duration of operational demands placed on the Air Force are key inputs for this analysis. To provide an empirical basis for this assessment, we used a dataset of U.S. joint operations occurring between 1946 and 2016. The dataset was created for an FY16 RAND Project AIR FORCE study on force presentation constructs and modified for this analysis.1 This appendix describes the dataset and notes some of its limitations, both empirical and conceptual.

Description of Modified Joint Operations Dataset The 888 operations in this dataset represent U.S. military activities from 1946 to 2016. (See Appendix D for a chronological listing and some basic statistics for these operations.) Defining discrete operations is, of course, difficult, but the project has created a list that future researchers can modify and improve should deficiencies be identified. The original dataset included variables on operation location, region, start and end dates, participation by each military service, and forces involved. Collecting data on many of these variables is difficult, given the spottiness of historical records, but there is sufficient information available for description of several basic variables, described in the next section. The modified list of operations does differ from the original list. Operations associated with terrorism or minesweeping or containing incomplete source information were dropped.2 The revised dataset also omits operations that were solely ISR operations because the AF-FESS model treats ISR operations as a steady-state demand. The modified dataset also contains some additional operations not included in the original list, and some of the operations in the original dataset were subdivided to better represent the actual nature of operations. Admittedly, many operations possess characteristics of more than one operation type. The Vietnam War, for instance, had both a COIN component in South Vietnam and an intense conventional war component, both on the ground and in the air. This dataset codes the Vietnam War, as mentioned earlier, as conventional combat with a regional opponent. We hope that the transparency of our coding decisions will allow future analysts to change the coding or classification system as they deem appropriate for future scholarly or policy purposes.

1 The database was created by RAND colleagues Stacie Pettyjohn and Meagan Smith. 2 Terrorism operations are represented in the model as a steady-state demand. Because minesweeping operations have no direct role for the Air Force and because AF-FESS is intended to represent demands on the Air Force, minesweeping operations are excluded from the dataset.

56 Limitations of the Modified Joint Operations Dataset Although this dataset contains a large number of events, we are under no illusion that it captures every operation conducted by the U.S. military during this period. Indeed, as explained elsewhere, we deliberately excluded CT and ISR operations from the dataset. Even for the categories that we do include, information on some operations is not publicly available; other operations were so small that they were not documented in source materials. Furthermore, operations often segue into others; whether they should be counted separately or as one is a subjective choice. Finally, other researchers might classify operations differently. We do not believe that any of these limitations biased the research. On the other hand, one data limitation suggests that we proceed with caution in drawing conclusions regarding trends over time. Most of the operations listed in the dataset come from just four documents, one of which was published in 1991, a second that only covered events up to 2003, a third that covered events up to 2007, and a fourth that was published in 2015 but was limited to U.S. Marine Corps operations. Thus, the dataset may undercount operations after 1990, especially those occurring between 2004 and 2016. Because this last period was focused on CT and COIN and we account for CT elsewhere, we believe that the limitation has minimal impact on our model.3 Perhaps the largest limitation is not empirical but theoretical. One might argue that the nature of military operations has changed in recent decades. Operations are no longer discrete and bounded temporally and spatially. The rise of terrorism and the use of special forces has been a key element of this change. Defining an operation is therefore no simple endeavor. Partly in recognition of this change in the nature of military operations, we therefore created a steady-state demand in the AF-FESS model to represent CT operations. All terrorism-related operations are excluded from the dataset. ISR operations are similar in that they have become nearly continuous. As a result, we also treat ISR operations as a steady-state demand. Additionally, long-term U.S. military deployments to Europe, South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere are not treated as operations in this dataset.

3 The four sources are Adam B. Siegel, The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990, Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1991; Daniel L. Haulman, Wings of Hope: The U.S. Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2007 edition; W. Eugene Cobble, H. H. Gaffney, and Dmitry Gorenburg, For the Record: All U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970–2000 (with additions covering 2000–2003), Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2005; and Annette D. Amerman, The Marines Have Landed: Eighty Years of Marine Corps Landings, 1935–2015, Quantico, Va.: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2016.

57 Appendix C: Prolonged Joint Operations, 1946–2016

Table C.1. Joint Operations That Lasted 365 Days or Longer, 1946–2016

Length Start Operation Operation Type (Days) Year China Civil War/Marines in Northern China Post-WWII 1348 Military Assistance 1946 (Operation Beleaguer)* Greek Civil War* 412 Show of Force 1947 Security of Turkey 396 Show of Force 1947 Berlin Airlift (Operation Vittles)* 493 RRE--Long 1948 Arab-Israeli War 466 RRE--Long 1948 Taiwan Patrol Force (Korean War Formosa Straits) 10415 Show of Force 1950 Conventional Combat Korean War* 1128 1950 with Regional Opponent Security of Yugoslavia 962 Show of Force 1951 Operation Spray Gun* 853 RRE--Long 1951 Tachen Islands Evacuation* 398 RRE--Long 1954 Cuban Civil War 435 RRE--Long 1956 Operation Sahara/ New Tape* 1453 RRE--Long 1960 Transport equipment to Peru* 1096 RRE--Long 1961 Advisory Assistance Vietnam* 1096 Military Assistance 1961 Conventional Combat Vietnam War* 3158 1964 with Regional Opponent Dominican Republic/Operation Power Pack* 515 Stability Operations 1965 Fly Swatter* 2054 RRE--Long 1966 Commando Domino/F-4Cs to Taiwan* 940 Military Assistance 1972 Project Scoot* 736 RRE--Long 1973 Lebanon Civil War 367 RRE--Long 1975 Afghanistan/Iran Hostage Crisis* 472 Show of Force 1979 Iran-Iraq War Elf One* 3119 Show of Force 1980 U.S. Military Support Element Grenada* 586 Stability Operations 1983 Lebanon Peacekeeping Force 419 Stability Operations 1983 Afghan Refugees* 2679 RRE--Long 1986 Operation Earnest Will* 484 Military Assistance 1987 Reinforcements to Panama* 628 Show of Force 1988 Iraq MIO 3423 Show of Force 1990 Desert Falcon/Desert Vigilance 2206 Show of Force 1991 Operation Provide Comfort* 2101 RRE--Long 1991 Sharp Guard/Decisive Enhancement/Maritime Monitor* 1999 Show of Force 1991 Provide Comfort II* 1987 Show of Force 1991 Haitian Refugees* 1035 RRE--Long 1991 No-Fly Zone Over Southern Iraq (Operation Southern 3942 No-Fly Zone 1992 Watch)* Operation Provide Promise* 1286 RRE--Long 1992 Provide Hope* 943 RRE--Long 1992 Operation Restore Hope/Continue Hope* 820 Stability Operations 1992 Operation Restore Hope II* 474 Stability Operations 1992 Deny Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Guard/Deliberate 1923 No-Fly Zone 1993 forge* Operation Safe Border* 1333 Stability Operations 1995 UNMIH 381 Stability Operations 1995 IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavor)* 365 Stability Operations 1995 SFOR (Operations Joint Guard, Joint Forge NATO, 2904 Stability Operations 1996 Deliberate Guard, Deliberate Forge)* Deterrent Presence Kuwait (Operations Intrinsic Action 2378 Show of Force 1996 and Desert Spring)* Operation Northern Watch* 2266 No-Fly Zone 1997 Joint guardian/ KFOR (Task Force Falcon)* 5401 Stability Operations 1999 War in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom)* 4833 Stability Operations 2001 CJTF Horn Of Africa* 5238+ Military Assistance 2002 OEF Phillipines* 4788 Military Assistance 2002 OIF COIN* 2680 Stability Operations 2003 New Dawn* 470 Military Assistance 2010 Search for Lord's Resistance Army* 2012+ Military Assistance 2011 Operation Inherent Resolve* 1005+ Limited Strikes 2014 Freedom's Sentinel* 835+ Stability Operations 2015 + denotes that operation is ongoing The length of ongoing operations was calculated as of 4/15/2017 * Indicates USAF was involved

58 Appendix D: Joint Operations Chronology, 1946–2016

This appendix provides a chronological listing of the joint operations used in our analysis. For each operation, the following characteristics are presented: operation name, location, type, start and end dates, duration (in days), and USAF participation (yes or no).

Table D.1. Joint Operations Starting Between 1946 and 1951

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Coup in Haiti Haiti Show of Force 1/12/46 1/14/46 2 Y Security of Turkey Turkey Show of Force 3/22/46 4/10/46 19 Y China Civil War China Military Assistance 4/1/46 12/9/49 1348 Y Greece, Pol. Conflict Greece Show of Force 4/10/46 4/15/46 5 N Security of Trieste Italy Show of Force 6/3/46 8/7/46 65 Y Security of Trieste Italy Show of Force 6/3/46 8/7/46 65 Y Security of Trieste Italy Show of Force 6/3/46 8/7/46 65 Y Turkish Strait Crisis Mediterranean Show of Force 8/7/46 10/26/46 80 N Albania Albania RRE--Medium 10/1/46 11/16/46 46 N Chilean Inauguration Chile Show of Force 11/1/46 11/7/46 6 N Lebanon Lebanon Show of Force 12/1/46 12/5/46 4 N Lebanon Lebanon Show of Force 12/1/46 12/5/46 4 N Uruguayan Inauguration Uruguay Show of Force 2/22/47 3/3/47 9 Y Greek Civil War Greece Show of Force 4/16/47 6/1/48 412 Y Security of Turkey Turkey Show of Force 5/2/47 6/1/48 396 N Cuban Sup, Anti-Truj. Cuba Show of Force 7/31/47 9/29/47 60 N Egyptian Cholera Epidemic Egypt RRE--Short 9/1/47 10/1/47 30 Y Elections in Italy Italy Show of Force 11/2/47 2/4/48 94 N Arab-Israeli War Israel RRE--Long 1/5/48 4/15/49 466 N Makkovik Fire Canada RRE--Short 1/31/48 1/31/48 1 Y Security of Norway Norway Show of Force 4/29/48 5/3/48 4 N Operation Vittles Germany RRE--Long 6/24/48 10/30/49 493 Y Relations w/Argentina Argentina Show of Force 11/1/48 11/8/48 7 N Panamanian Yellow Fever Outbreak Panama RRE--Short 1/16/49 1/16/49 1 Y Ecuadoran Earthquake Ecuador RRE--Short 8/10/49 8/19/49 9 Y Gov Change, China China Show of Force 12/9/49 1/16/50 38 N Conventional Combat w Korean War Korea 6/25/50 7/27/53 1128 Y regional opponent Taiwan Patrol Force Taiwan Show of Force 6/27/50 1/1/79 10415 N Himalayan Earthquake India RRE--Medium 8/1/50 10/30/50 90 Y Lebanon Lebanon Show of Force 8/14/50 8/15/50 1 N Christmas Kidlift South Korea RRE--Short 12/20/50 12/21/50 1 Y Security of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Show of Force 3/15/51 11/1/53 962 N Operation Spray Gun South Korea RRE--Long 6/1/51 10/1/53 853 Y Indian Pestilence India RRE--Short 7/1/51 July 1951 1 Y Costa Rican Yellow Fever Epidemic Costa Rica RRE--Short 9/7/51 9/25/51 18 Y Po River Valley Flood Italy RRE--Short 11/1/51 11/1/51 1 Y Camiguin Island Volcano Philippines RRE--Short 12/1/51 12/1/51 1 Y

59 Table D.2. Joint Operations Starting Between 1952 and 1955

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Lebanese Food Airlift Lebanon RRE--Short 3/1/52 3/1/52 1 Y Operation Warm Clothes Japan RRE--Short 3/1/52 3/1/52 1 Y Operation Ricelift Japan RRE--Short 3/27/52 3/28/52 1 Y British Airliner Crash Mediterranean RRE--Short 7/27/52 7/27/52 1 Y Operation Magic Carpet/Hajji Baba Lebanon and Saudi RRE--Short 8/24/52 8/29/52 5 Y Typhoon Olive Wake Island RRE--Short 9/1/52 9/1/52 1 Y Dutch Flood Relief (Operation Netherlands RRE--Short 2/2/53 2/17/53 15 Y Humanity) Japanese Shipwreck Tori Shima RRE--Short 3/18/53 3/18/53 1 Y Turkish Earthquake Turkey RRE--Short 3/21/53 3/22/53 1 Y Ecuadoran Flood Ecuador RRE--Short 3/28/53 4/14/53 17 Y Kyushu Flood Relief Japan RRE--Short 7/1/53 7/3/53 2 Y Operation Foodlift South Korea RRE--Short 7/1/53 8/1/53 31 Y Wakayama Flood Japan RRE--Short 7/1/53 7/1/53 1 Y Mediterranean Airplane Crash Gulf of Sidra RRE--Short 7/22/53 7/23/53 1 Y Ionian Isles Earthquake Relief Ionian Isles, Greece RRE--Short 8/1/53 8/17/53 16 Y Austrian Avalanches Austria RRE--Short 1/13/54 1/16/54 3 Y Tachen Islands Evacuation Tachen Islands RRE--Long 1/26/54 2/28/55 398 Y Juist Island Airlift Germany RRE--Short 2/12/54 2/17/54 5 Y Dien Bien Phu Vietnam Military Assistance 3/13/54 7/12/54 121 Y Iraqi and Syrian Floods Iraq and Syria RRE--Short 4/2/54 4/16/54 14 Y Casablanca Shipwreck French Morocco RRE--Short 4/3/54 4/4/54 1 Y Thessalian Earthquake Greece RRE--Short 5/14/54 5/22/54 8 Y Triton Island, South China Chinese Shipwreck RRE--Short 5/16/54 5/17/54 1 Y Sea Honduras-Guatemala Honduras Show of Force 5/20/54 6/29/54 40 Y Rio Grande Floods Mexico RRE--Short 6/27/54 7/1/54 4 Y Central European Floods Germany and Austria RRE--Short 7/8/54 7/15/54 7 Y PRC Shootdown Philippines Show of Force 7/24/54 7/30/54 6 N Evacuation from Vietnam (Passage to Vietnam RRE--Medium 8/1/54 6/2/55 305 Y Freedom) Operation Mercy India and Pakistan RRE--Short 8/1/54 9/1/54 31 Y Algerian Earthquake Algeria RRE--Short 9/11/54 9/17/54 6 Y Operation Salud (Honduran Flood) Honduras RRE--Short 9/29/54 10/7/54 8 Y Honduran Elections Honduras Show of Force 10/1/54 10/12/54 11 Y Hurricane Hazel Haiti and Bahamas RRE--Short 10/1/54 10/2/54 1 Y Accord on Trieste Italy Show of Force 10/7/54 10/27/54 20 N Nagoya Fire Japan RRE--Short 10/16/54 10/17/54 1 Y Mindanao Earthquake Philippines RRE--Short 4/3/55 4/4/55 1 Y Volos Earthquakes Greece RRE--Short 4/30/55 5/1/55 1 Y Hiroshima Maidens Japan RRE--Short 5/5/55 5/8/55 3 Y Shizunai Flood Japan RRE--Short 7/4/55 7/5/55 1 Y Hokkaido Pestilence Japan RRE--Short 7/21/55 8/13/55 23 Y Lyons Hailstorm France RRE--Short 8/31/55 9/1/55 1 Y Indian and Pakistani Flood India and East Pakistan RRE--Short 9/1/55 9/2/55 1 Y Tampico Flood Relief Mexico RRE--Medium 9/20/55 10/28/55 38 Y Typhoon Louise Relief Iwo Jima RRE--Short 9/26/55 10/1/55 5 Y Costa Rican Flood Costa Rica RRE--Short 10/15/55 10/16/55 1 Y Magdalena River Flood Colombia RRE--Short 11/30/55 12/6/55 6 Y Tanada Maru Shipwreck Japan RRE--Short 12/27/55 12/28/55 1 Y

60 Table D.3. Joint Operations Starting Between 1956 and 1959

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Red Sea Patrols Red Sea Show of Force 2/1/56 8/2/56 183 N Operation Snowbound (Italian Italy and Greece RRE--Short 2/12/56 2/19/56 7 Y Blizzards) Jordan Crisis Jordan Show of Force 3/1/56 5/2/56 62 N Argentinean Polio Epidemic Argentina RRE--Short 3/6/56 3/17/56 11 Y Operation Butterball Turkey RRE--Short 3/11/56 3/21/56 10 Y Suez Crisis show of force Egypt Show of Force 7/26/56 10/9/56 75 Y Iranian Floods Iran RRE--Short 8/1/56 8/2/56 1 Y Suez War Noncombatant Evacuation Egypt and Israel RRE--Medium 10/1/56 11/7/56 37 Y Evacuation Cuban Civil War Cuba RRE--Short 10/23/56 10/30/56 7 Y Hungarian Refugee Supplies Central Europe RRE--Short 11/1/56 12/1/56 30 Y Post-Suez Crisis with USSR Egypt RRE--Medium 11/6/56 12/14/56 38 N Port Lyautey/French-Moroccan Morocco Show of Force 11/29/56 2/7/57 70 Y Tensions Cuban Civil War Cuba RRE--Long 12/1/56 2/9/58 435 N Safe Haven I and II Central Europe RRE--Medium 12/11/56 6/30/57 201 Y Project Gohan Japan RRE--Short 12/22/56 12/23/56 1 Y Jordan Unrest Jordan RRE--Short 4/25/57 5/4/57 9 Y Haiti Coup Haiti Show of Force 6/14/57 7/2/57 18 N Operation Locust Insecticide I Northwestern Africa RRE--Short 6/27/57 6/30/57 3 Y PRC-ROC Tension Taiwan Show of Force 7/1/57 9/30/57 91 N Kyushu Flood Japan RRE--Short 7/28/57 8/4/57 7 Y Syrian Crisis Syria Show of Force 8/18/57 12/17/57 121 Y Flood Relief in Valencia Spain RRE--Short 10/1/57 10/21/57 20 Y Operation Locust Insecticide II Morocco RRE--Short 11/22/57 11/24/57 2 Y Ceylon Flood Relief Ceylon (Sri Lanka) RRE--Short 12/1/57 1/1/58 31 N Indonesian Uprisings Indonesia RRE--Medium 12/10/57 6/2/58 174 N West Iranian Earthquakes Iran RRE--Short 12/19/57 12/20/57 1 Y Venezuelan Revolution Venezuela Show of Force 1/21/58 1/23/58 2 N Morocco Earthquake Morocco RRE--Short 4/1/58 4/2/58 1 N Venezuela Attack Nixon Motorcade Venezuela Show of Force 5/13/58 5/16/58 3 Y Lebanon Lebanon Show of Force 5/15/58 7/2/58 48 N Thai Cholera Epidemic Thailand RRE--Short 6/1/58 6/2/58 1 Y Operation Blue Bat Lebanon Show of Force 7/1/58 10/23/58 114 Y Quemoy Taiwan Show of Force 8/1/58 10/7/58 67 Y Hirosaki Flood Japan RRE--Short 8/11/58 8/12/58 1 Y 2nd Taiwan Strait Crisis Taiwan Show of Force 8/28/58 12/18/58 112 Y Santa Maria Island, Arnel Shipwreck Rescue RRE--Short 9/19/58 9/20/58 1 Y Azores Typhoon Ida Japan RRE--Short 9/27/58 10/4/58 7 Y Ceylon Flood Relief Ceylon RRE--Short 12/1/58 1/1/59 31 N Moroccan Flood Morocco RRE--Short 12/25/58 12/26/58 1 Y Panama incursion Panama Show of Force 4/30/59 5/5/59 5 N Guatemalan Polio Epidemic Guatemala RRE--Short 6/21/59 6/22/59 1 Y Operation Hotfoot Laos Military Assistance 7/1/59 10/12/59 103 Y PRC-ROC Taiwan Show of Force 7/5/59 7/11/59 6 N Panama Panama Show of Force 8/1/59 11/2/59 93 N Panama Panama Show of Force 8/1/59 11/2/59 93 N Typhoon Vera Japan RRE--Medium 9/1/59 2/1/60 153 Y Moroccan Food Poisoning Morocco RRE--Short 11/1/59 12/1/59 30 Y French Dam Collapse France RRE--Short 12/1/59 12/2/59 1 Y

61 Table D.4. Joint Operations Starting Between 1960 and 1962

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Arequipa Earthquake Peru RRE--Short 1/15/60 1/16/60 1 Y Agadir Earthquake Morocco RRE--Medium 3/1/60 6/23/60 114 Y Brazilian Floods Brazil RRE--Short 3/31/60 4/30/60 30 Y Amigos Airlift Chile RRE--Short 5/23/60 6/23/60 31 Y Yamanashi Relief Japan RRE--Medium 6/1/60 12/1/60 183 Y Operation Sahara/ New Tape Congo RRE--Long 7/8/60 6/30/64 1453 Y Congolese Mercy Airlift Republic of the Congo RRE--Medium 7/15/60 10/3/60 80 Y Hokkaido Polio Epidemic Japan RRE--Short 8/21/60 8/28/60 7 Y Luzon Flood Philippines RRE--Short 9/1/60 9/2/60 1 Y East Pakistan East Pakistani Cyclone Relief RRE--Short 11/1/60 11/2/60 1 Y (Bangladesh) Guatemala and Nicaragua Unrest Guatemala and Show of Force 11/14/60 12/11/60 27 N 1961 Laos Crisis Laos Show of Force 1/1/61 11/1/61 304 Y Famine relief in Congo Congo RRE--Short 1/1/61 1/2/61 1 N Korean Orphanage Airlift South Korea RRE--Short 1/1/61 1/2/61 1 Y Niigata Blizzard Japan RRE--Short 1/1/61 1/2/61 1 Y Yemeni Fire Yemen RRE--Short 1/1/61 1/2/61 1 Y SS Santa Maria Brazil RRE--Short 1/23/61 1/31/61 8 N Bakwanga Famine Relief Republic of the Congo RRE--Short 1/26/61 2/9/61 14 Y Evacuation in Congo/Gulf of Guinea- Congo RRE--Medium 2/1/61 3/8/61 35 N Congo Jordanian Relief Jordan RRE--Short 2/4/61 2/5/61 1 Y Benghazi Flood Libya RRE--Short 2/9/61 2/10/61 1 Y Transport equipment to Peru Peru RRE--Long 3/1/61 3/1/64 1096 Y Laos Laos Show of Force 3/21/61 6/14/61 85 N SS Western Union Cuba RRE--Short 3/31/61 4/1/61 1 N Bay of Pigs Cuba Show of Force 4/1/61 6/2/61 62 Y Earthquake relief in Turkey Turkey RRE--Short 5/1/61 5/2/61 1 N Trujillo Assassination Dominican Republic Show of Force 5/30/61 6/10/61 11 Y Zanzibar Zanzibar Show of Force 6/1/61 7/2/61 31 N Kuwait Crisis Kuwait Show of Force 7/4/61 7/8/61 4 N Big Truck Exercise Taiwan Show of Force 8/1/61 9/30/61 60 Y Advisory Assistance Vietnam Vietnam Military Assistance 8/5/61 8/5/64 1096 Y Egyptian Pestilence United Arab Republic RRE--Short 8/12/61 8/14/61 2 Y Federal Republic of Berlin Crisis Show of Force 8/13/61 7/1/62 322 Y Germany Thai Flood Thailand RRE--Short 9/5/61 9/6/61 1 Y Cambodian Flood Cambodia RRE--Short 10/4/61 10/13/61 9 Y Elizabethville Refugee Relief Republic of the Congo RRE--Short 11/1/61 11/2/61 1 Y Hurricane Hattie Relief British Honduras RRE--Short 11/1/61 11/14/61 13 Y Kenyan Flood and Famine Kenya RRE--Medium 11/12/61 12/19/61 37 Y Dominican Republic Crisis Dominican Republic Show of Force 11/18/61 12/20/61 32 N Somali Flood Relief Somalia RRE--Medium 11/18/61 1/15/62 58 Y South Vietnam South Vietnam Military Assistance 12/1/61 8/2/62 244 Y Mindanao Flood Philippines RRE--Short 2/8/62 2/23/62 15 Y North German Flood Relief Germany RRE--Short 2/18/62 2/20/62 2 Y Guatemala Riots Guatemala Show of Force 3/1/62 4/1/62 31 N Tanganyikan Flood Relief Tanganyika RRE--Medium 4/25/62 6/6/62 42 Y Nam Tha Crisis Laos Show of Force 5/6/62 6/12/62 37 Y Mideast Locust Plague Iran and Afghanistan RRE--Short 5/10/62 6/1/62 22 Y Support for Thai Government Thailand Military Assistance 5/10/62 8/8/62 90 N Guantanamo Harassment Cuba Show of Force 7/25/62 7/28/62 3 N Haiti Civil Disorder Haiti Show of Force 8/1/62 8/15/62 14 N Taiwanese Cholera Epidemic Taiwan RRE--Short 8/8/62 8/15/62 7 Y Colombian Flood and Famine Colombia RRE--Short 8/20/62 9/15/62 26 Y Yemen Revolution Yemen Show of Force 9/1/62 4/15/63 226 N Operation IDA Iran RRE--Medium 9/3/62 11/12/62 70 Y Congolese Food Airlift Congo RRE--Short 10/11/62 10/12/62 1 Y Cuban Missile Crisis Cuba Nuclear Alert 10/14/62 11/21/62 38 Y Marcus Island Typhoon Pacific Ocean RRE--Short 10/15/62 10/16/62 1 Y Typhoon Karen Relief Guam RRE--Short 11/1/62 11/30/62 29 Y Operation Long Skip India Military Assistance 11/2/62 8/31/63 302 Y

62 Table D.5. Joint Operations Starting Between 1963 and 1964

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Moroccan Flood (Clear Lens) Morocco RRE--Short 1/9/63 1/15/63 6 Y Honduran Medical Lift Honduras RRE--Short 1/26/63 1/27/63 1 Y Japanese Blizzard Japan RRE--Short 2/3/63 2/4/63 1 Y Indonesian Flood Indonesia RRE--Short 2/7/63 2/17/63 10 Y Cheju Do Island Relief Cheju Do Island RRE--Short 2/8/63 2/9/63 1 Y SS Anzoatequi Dominican Republic Show of Force 2/12/63 2/21/63 9 N Spanish Flood Spain RRE--Short 2/17/63 2/18/63 1 Y Libyan Earthquake Libya RRE--Short 2/21/63 2/28/63 7 Y Turkish Flood Turkey RRE--Short 2/23/63 2/24/63 1 Y Santa Maria Island, Santa Maria Island Food Drop RRE--Short 3/15/63 3/16/63 1 Y Azores Indonesian Food Airlift Indonesia RRE--Short 4/1/63 4/2/63 1 Y Laos Laos Show of Force 4/1/63 5/6/63 35 N Operation Lifeline Republic of Vietnam RRE--Medium 4/1/63 9/1/63 153 Y Haitian Unrest Haiti RRE--Medium 4/26/63 6/3/63 38 N Saigon Fire Republic of Vietnam RRE--Medium 5/1/63 7/1/63 61 Y Alazan Famine Mexico RRE--Short 5/3/63 5/4/63 1 Y Laotian Medical Airlift Laos RRE--Short 7/1/63 7/2/63 1 Y Blue Boy (Yugoslavian Earthquake) Yugoslavia RRE--Short 7/27/63 8/8/63 12 Y Haiti Civil War Haiti Show of Force 8/6/63 8/23/63 17 N Midori Maru Disaster Ryukyu Islands RRE--Short 8/17/63 8/20/63 3 Y Vietnam Civil Disorder Vietnam Show of Force 8/25/63 11/26/63 93 N Locust Infestation Thailand RRE--Short 8/31/63 9/16/63 16 Y Parana Fires Brazil RRE--Short 9/10/63 9/12/63 2 Y PRC-ROC Taiwan Show of Force 9/20/63 9/26/63 6 N Typhoon Gloria Taiwan RRE--Medium 9/20/63 10/24/63 34 Y Korean Cholera South Korea RRE--Short 9/28/63 9/29/63 1 Y Haiti Floods Haiti RRE--Short 10/1/63 10/2/63 1 N Indonesia-Malaysia Singapore Show of Force 10/1/63 12/18/63 78 N Hurricane Flora Trinidad and Tobago RRE--Short 10/9/63 10/10/63 1 Y Lakonia Rescue Atlantic Ocean, Portugal RRE--Short 12/23/63 12/24/63 1 Y Operation Kunsan South Korea RRE--Short 1/1/64 1/2/64 1 Y Panama Panama Show of Force 1/1/64 4/11/64 101 Y Thai Medical Airlift Thailand RRE--Short 1/1/64 1/2/64 1 Y Costa Rican Volcano Costa Rica RRE--Short 1/2/64 1/9/64 7 Y Costa Rican Volcano Costa Rica RRE--Short 1/2/64 1/9/64 7 Y Zanzibar Coup Zanzibar RRE--Short 1/12/64 1/14/64 2 Y Carib. Surveillance Caribbean Islands Show of Force 1/15/64 4/16/64 92 N Vietnamese Cholera Epidemic Republic of Vietnam RRE--Short 1/19/64 2/6/64 18 Y Tanganyika Tanganyika RRE--Short 1/20/64 1/27/64 7 N Cyprus Cyprus Show of Force 1/22/64 10/17/64 269 N Bahia Flood Brazil RRE--Short 1/23/64 2/4/64 12 Y Nicaraguan Medical Lift Nicaragua RRE--Short 2/12/64 2/13/64 1 Y São Jorge Earthquakes Azores RRE--Medium 3/19/64 8/3/64 137 Y Brazil Brazil Show of Force 3/31/64 4/4/64 4 N Cyprus Peacekeepers Cyprus Military Assistance 4/3/64 6/13/64 71 Y Panamanian Forest Fires Panama RRE--Short 4/4/64 4/5/64 1 Y Laos Laos Limited strikes 4/21/64 6/2/64 42 Y Guantanamo Harassment Cuba Show of Force 5/1/64 5/8/64 7 Y Bolivian Epidemic Bolivia RRE--Short 6/1/64 7/1/64 30 Y Niigata Earthquake Japan RRE--Short 6/16/64 6/19/64 3 Y Pakistani Flood Pakistan RRE--Short 6/26/64 7/24/64 28 Y Conventional Combat w Vietnam War Vietnam 8/5/64 3/29/73 3158 Y regional opponent Hurricane Cleo West Indies RRE--Short 8/26/64 8/27/64 1 Y Bocas del Toro Storm Response Panama RRE--Short 9/14/64 9/15/64 1 Y Yugoslavian Flood Yugoslavia RRE--Short 10/29/64 11/14/64 16 Y South Vietnamese Flood Republic of Vietnam RRE--Medium 11/11/64 1/1/65 51 Y Operation Dragon Rouge DRC RRE--Short 11/19/64 12/2/64 13 Y Tunisian Bridge Collapse Tunisia RRE--Short 11/25/64 11/29/64 4 Y Operation Warmth South Korea RRE--Short 12/1/64 12/2/64 1 Y Hospital Ship Hope Guinea RRE--Short 12/3/64 12/4/64 1 Y Somalian Famine Relief Somalia RRE--Short 12/31/64 1/13/65 13 Y

63 Table D.6. Joint Operations Starting Between 1965 and 1967

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Venezuela-Colombia Caribbean Islands Show of Force 1/1/65 4/2/65 91 N Tunisian Flood Tunisia RRE--Short 1/7/65 1/8/65 1 Y Tunisian Flood Tunisia RRE--Short 1/7/65 1/8/65 1 Y Tanzania Tanzania RRE--Short 1/17/65 1/18/65 1 N Dependent Evacuation Republic of Vietnam RRE--Short 2/9/65 3/9/65 28 Y Airlift for Danish UN Peacekeepers Cyprus Military Assistance 3/30/65 5/23/65 54 Y British Guiana Guiana RRE--Short 4/1/65 4/12/65 11 N Operation Barrel Bottom Dominican Republic RRE--Medium 4/1/65 5/31/65 60 N Central Chilean Earthquake Chile RRE--Short 4/2/65 4/13/65 11 Y Operation Power Pack Dominican Republic Stability Operations 4/24/65 9/21/66 515 Y El Salvadoran Earthquake El Salvador RRE--Short 5/5/65 5/13/65 8 Y Muroran Ship Fire Japan RRE--Short 5/24/65 5/26/65 2 Y Ryukyus Rescue Ryukyu Islands RRE--Short 5/26/65 5/27/65 1 Y South Korean Drought South Korea RRE--Short 6/30/65 7/2/65 2 Y Anthrax Epidemic Japan RRE--Short 8/1/65 8/2/65 1 Y Food Airlift Republic of Vietnam RRE--Short 8/1/65 8/2/65 1 Y Leper Airlift Okinawa, Japan, Taiwan RRE--Short 8/1/65 8/2/65 1 Y Vietnamese Orphan Airlift Republic of Vietnam RRE--Short 8/1/65 8/2/65 1 Y Cyprus Cyprus Show of Force 8/3/65 9/2/65 30 N Typhoon Lucy Ryukyu Islands RRE--Short 8/26/65 8/27/65 1 Y Italian Flood Rescue Italy RRE--Short 9/1/65 9/2/65 1 Y Indo-Pakistani War Evacuation Pakistan RRE--Short 9/11/65 10/6/65 25 Y Honduran Flood Honduras RRE--Short 9/28/65 9/29/65 1 Y Taal Eruption Philippines RRE--Short 10/1/65 10/2/65 1 Y Indonesia Indonesia Show of Force 10/2/65 10/10/65 8 Y Project Refugee Republic of Vietnam RRE--Medium 10/19/65 11/25/65 37 Y Operation Paraplegic Republic of Vietnam RRE--Short 11/8/65 11/9/65 1 Y Korat Fire Thailand RRE--Short 12/12/65 12/31/65 19 Y Moroccan Flood Morocco RRE--Short 12/30/65 12/31/65 1 Y Misawa Fire Japan RRE--Short 1/11/66 1/12/66 1 Y Samoan Typhoon American Samoa RRE--Short 2/1/66 2/3/66 2 Y Ghanaian Milk Run Ghana RRE--Short 3/29/66 3/30/66 1 Y Sudanese Cholera Threat Sudan RRE--Short 4/5/66 4/6/66 1 Y Orphan Evacuation South Vietnam RRE--Short 5/24/66 5/25/66 1 Y Turkish Earthquake Turkey RRE--Short 8/20/66 8/25/66 5 Y Brisk Cargo (Chadian Famine Relief) Chad RRE--Short 8/29/66 9/21/66 23 Y Laotian Flood Laos RRE--Short 9/1/66 9/2/66 1 Y Hurricane Inez Dominican Republic RRE--Short 10/10/66 10/12/66 2 Y Bold Party Mexico RRE--Short 10/14/66 10/18/66 4 Y Fly Swatter South Vietnam RRE--Long 10/17/66 6/1/72 2054 Y Peruvian Earthquake Peru RRE--Short 10/20/66 10/21/66 1 Y Quibdó Fire Colombia RRE--Short 10/27/66 10/28/66 1 Y Panamanian Flood Panama RRE--Short 11/4/66 11/6/66 2 Y Northern Italian Floods Italy RRE--Short 11/11/66 11/12/66 1 Y Bao Loc Milk Run South Vietnam RRE--Short 11/17/66 11/18/66 1 Y Greek Coup Greece Show of Force 4/21/67 5/14/67 23 N Creek Haven Libya RRE--Short 6/6/67 6/10/67 4 Y Six Day War Sinai Border RRE--Short 6/6/67 6/12/67 6 Y Creek Dipper Jordan RRE--Short 6/10/67 6/11/67 1 Y Venezuelan Earthquake Venezuela RRE--Short 7/31/67 8/4/67 4 Y Typhoon Sarah Wake Island RRE--Short 9/17/67 9/26/67 9 Y Bonny Date Mexico RRE--Short 9/29/67 10/7/67 8 Y DD Eilat Sinking Egypt Show of Force 10/21/67 11/2/67 12 N Cyprus Cyprus RRE--Short 11/15/67 12/9/67 24 N Refugee and Orphan Aid South Vietnam RRE--Short 12/1/67 12/2/67 1 Y Pleiku Orphan Relief South Vietnam RRE--Short 12/10/67 12/11/67 1 Y

64 Table D.7. Joint Operations Starting Between 1968 and 1971

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Savage Fly RRE--Medium 1/15/68 3/31/68 76 Y Panama Sicilian Earthquakes Italy RRE--Short 1/16/68 1/27/68 11 Y USS Pueblo/Operation Combat Fox Korea Show of Force 1/23/68 12/23/68 335 Y Bolivian Floods Bolivia RRE--Short 2/26/68 2/29/68 3 Y Typhoon Jean Mariana Islands RRE--Short 4/1/68 4/2/68 1 Y Philippine Shipwreck Philippines RRE--Short 4/10/68 4/11/68 1 Y Ecuadoran Drought Ecuador RRE--Short 4/26/68 4/27/68 1 Y Ethiopian Flood Ethiopia RRE--Short 5/15/68 5/17/68 2 Y Tokachi-Oki Earthquake Japan RRE--Short 5/16/68 5/20/68 4 Y Nigerian Civil War Nigeria RRE--Short 6/7/68 6/9/68 2 Y Mount Arenal Eruption Costa Rica RRE--Short 7/30/68 8/1/68 2 Y Manila Earthquake Philippines RRE--Short 8/4/68 8/12/68 8 Y Nicaraguan Flood Nicaragua RRE--Short 8/21/68 8/26/68 5 Y Minami Daito Airlift Okinawa RRE--Short 9/6/68 9/7/68 1 Y Iranian Earthquake Iran RRE--Short 9/9/68 10/10/68 31 Y Typhoon Della Ryukyu Islands RRE--Short 9/25/68 9/26/68 1 Y Combat Locust Saudi Arabia RRE--Medium 2/27/69 4/23/69 55 Y Search and Rescue Shot Down EC- North Korea RRE--Short 4/14/69 5/10/69 26 Y Combat Mosquito Ecuador RRE--Short 5/14/69 5/30/69 16 Y Curacao Civil Unrest Curacao RRE--Short 5/31/69 6/1/69 1 N Honduran Refugees Honduras RRE--Medium 7/20/69 9/5/69 47 Y Hurricane Francelia Guatemala RRE--Short 9/10/69 9/12/69 2 Y Tunisian Flood Relief Tunisia RRE--Medium 9/30/69 11/4/69 35 Y Operation Chad Chad RRE--Short 10/9/69 10/21/69 12 Y Lebanon-Libya Ops Lebanon Show of Force 10/26/69 10/31/69 5 N Central American Floods Panama and Costa Rica RRE--Short 1/10/70 1/11/70 1 Y Moroccan Flooding Morocco RRE--Short 1/20/70 1/21/70 1 Y Nigerian Relief Airlift Nigeria RRE--Short 1/27/70 2/10/70 14 Y Trinidad mutiny Trinidad RRE--Short 4/21/70 4/28/70 7 Y Peruvian Earthquake Peru RRE--Medium 6/1/70 7/3/70 32 Y Jordan Hostages/PFLP Hijacking Jordan RRE--Short 6/9/70 6/18/70 9 Y Manila Floods Philippines RRE--Short 8/30/70 9/7/70 8 Y Typhoon Georgia Philippines RRE--Short 9/1/70 9/2/70 1 N Black September (Jordan Crisis) Jordan Show of Force 9/2/70 11/1/70 60 Y Fig Hill Jordan RRE--Short 9/27/70 10/28/70 31 Y Typhoons Joan and Kate Philippines RRE--Short 10/1/70 10/27/70 26 Y Batan Island Earthquake Philippines RRE--Short 10/8/70 10/9/70 1 Y Genoa Flash Flood Italy RRE--Short 10/18/70 10/19/70 1 Y Tong Lam Shipwreck Philippines RRE--Short 10/27/70 10/28/70 1 Y Colombian Flood Colombia RRE--Short 11/16/70 11/24/70 8 Y East Pakistan East Pakistani Cyclone RRE--Short 11/18/70 12/16/70 28 Y (Bangladesh) Son Tay Raid in Vietnam Vietnam Raids 11/20/70 11/20/70 1 Y Typhoon Patsy Philippines RRE--Short 11/21/70 11/24/70 3 Y Costa Rican Flood Relief Costa Rica RRE--Short 12/5/70 12/15/70 10 Y Ecuadoran Earthquake Ecuador RRE--Short 12/11/70 12/20/70 9 Y Malaysian Floods Malaysia RRE--Short 1/7/71 1/11/71 4 Y Bolivian Flood Bolivia RRE--Short 2/13/71 2/28/71 15 Y Hostage Evac Uruguay RRE--Short 3/1/71 3/2/71 1 Y Typhoon Yolling Ryukyu Islands RRE--Short 3/4/71 3/5/71 1 Y Project Volcan Nicaragua RRE--Short 3/18/71 3/28/71 10 Y Haiti Succession Haiti Show of Force 4/22/71 5/29/71 37 N Bingol Earthquake Turkey RRE--Short 5/25/71 5/26/71 1 Y Bonny Jack India RRE--Short 6/17/71 7/17/71 30 Y Chilean Double Disaster Chile RRE--Short 7/1/71 7/21/71 20 Y Mexican Flash Flood Mexico RRE--Short 7/1/71 7/2/71 1 Y Chadian Cholera Epidemic Chad RRE--Short 7/7/71 7/11/71 4 Y Hurricane Edith Republic of Nicaragua RRE--Short 9/12/71 9/17/71 5 Y Tropical Storm Fern Mexico RRE--Short 9/15/71 9/16/71 1 Y Kee Lung Shipwreck Philippines RRE--Short 10/7/71 10/8/71 1 Y Scarborough Shoal Shipwrecks South China Sea RRE--Short 11/30/71 12/1/71 1 Y Yakal Shipwreck Pacific Ocean RRE--Short 11/30/71 12/2/71 2 Y Indo-Pakistani War Bangladesh RRE--Short 12/10/71 1/9/72 30 N Bahama Lines Bahamas/Cuba Show of Force 12/15/71 2/5/72 52 N

65 Table D.8. Joint Operations Starting Between 1972 and 1975

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Peruvian Floods and Earthquake Peru RRE--Short 3/25/72 4/3/72 9 Y Pleiku Evacuation South Vietnam RRE--Short 4/1/72 4/30/72 29 Y Typhoon Relief in Luzon Philippines RRE--Short 7/1/72 7/2/72 1 N Operation Saklolo Philippines RRE--Short 7/21/72 8/15/72 25 Y Typhoon Celeste Johnston Island RRE--Short 8/17/72 8/29/72 12 Y Han River Flood South Korea RRE--Short 8/19/72 8/20/72 1 Y Commando Domino/F-4Cs to Taiwan Taiwan Military Assistance 11/1/72 5/30/75 940 Y Managua Earthquake Nicaragua RRE--Medium 12/23/72 1/30/73 38 Y Icelandic Volcano Iceland RRE--Medium 1/23/73 3/27/73 63 Y Operation Homecoming Vietnam RRE--Short 2/12/73 2/28/73 16 Y Sudan Hostage Crisis Sudan RRE--Short 3/1/73 3/2/73 1 Y Eagle Pull Alert Cambodia RRE--Medium 4/1/73 5/31/73 60 N Lebanon Stability Operation Lebanon Stability Operations 4/1/73 4/2/73 1 N Nicaraguan Medfly Nicaragua RRE--Medium 4/2/73 5/19/73 47 Y Project Scoot Cambodia RRE--Long 4/11/73 4/17/75 736 Y Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Short 5/3/73 5/10/73 7 N Mali, Chad and Authentic Assistance RRE--Medium 5/15/73 11/10/73 179 Y Mauritania Guatemalan Flood Guatemala RRE--Short 6/29/73 6/30/73 1 Y Panamanian Encephalomyelitis Panama RRE--Short 7/14/73 7/26/73 12 Y Outbreak Pakistani Flood Pakistan RRE--Medium 8/20/73 9/22/73 33 Y Cambodian Rice Airlift Cambodia RRE--Medium 10/1/73 12/1/73 61 Y Capiz Province Flood Philippines RRE--Short 10/1/73 10/2/73 1 Y Yom Kippur War Show of Force Israel Nuclear Alert 10/6/73 11/17/73 42 Y Colombian Flood Colombia RRE--Short 10/12/73 10/20/73 8 Y Resupply of Israel Operation Nickel Syria/Mediterranean Military Assistance 10/14/73 11/14/73 31 Y Grass Middle East Force Red Sea Escort Red Sea/Yemen Show of Force 10/24/73 11/15/73 22 N Night Reach Sinai Military Assistance 11/2/73 12/30/73 58 Y Western Panamanian Flood Panama RRE--Short 11/19/73 11/21/73 2 Y Tunisian Flood Relief Tunisia RRE--Short 12/1/73 12/2/73 1 N Australian Flood Australia RRE--Short 2/1/74 3/1/74 28 Y Bolivian Flood Bolivia RRE--Short 2/9/74 2/10/74 1 Y Mali, Mauritania, and King Grain RRE--Medium 6/13/74 10/21/74 130 Y Chad Response to Cyprus Crisis Cyprus RRE--Medium 7/1/74 8/23/74 53 N Chilean Flood Chile RRE--Short 7/3/74 7/6/74 3 Y Colombian Mud Slides Colombia RRE--Short 7/10/74 7/31/74 21 Y Bangladeshi Flood and Famine Bangladesh RRE--Medium 8/1/74 12/1/74 122 Y Typhoon Nadine Relief Philippines RRE--Short 8/1/74 8/2/74 1 N Cypriot Refugees Cyprus RRE--Short 8/7/74 9/1/74 25 Y Burmese Flood Burma RRE--Short 8/26/74 8/27/74 1 Y Hurricane Fifi Honduras RRE--Short 9/19/74 10/15/74 26 Y Cyclone Tracy Australia RRE--Short 12/26/74 1/3/75 8 Y Thai Flood Thailand RRE--Short 1/12/75 1/27/75 15 Y Singaporean Oil Spill Strait of Malacca RRE--Short 1/14/75 1/16/75 2 Y Cyprus Unrest/ Show of Force Cyprus Show of Force 1/18/75 1/22/75 4 N Eagle Pull, Cambodia Cambodia RRE--Medium 2/1/75 4/12/75 70 Y Ethiopia Civil War Ethiopia RRE--Short 2/3/75 2/7/75 4 N Mauritian Cyclone Western Indian Ocean RRE--Short 2/13/75 2/14/75 1 Y South Vietnam, Thailand, Frequent Wind/Vietnamese Evacuation Philippines, Guam, and RRE--Medium 4/4/75 9/16/75 165 Y Wake Mayaguez Rescue Cambodia RRE--Short 5/12/75 5/15/75 3 Y Dengue Vector Control Guam RRE--Short 5/13/75 6/1/75 19 Y Recife Flood Brazil RRE--Short 7/26/75 7/29/75 3 Y Lebanon Civil War Lebanon RRE--Long 8/1/75 8/2/76 367 N Romanian Flood Romania RRE--Short 8/7/75 8/8/75 1 Y Angolan War of Independence Angola RRE--Medium 9/7/75 11/3/75 57 Y Evacuation

66 Table D.9. Joint Operations Starting Between 1976 and 1979

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Jamaican Unrest Jamaica RRE--Short 1/1/76 1/2/76 1 Y Soviet Support for Polisario Rebels Morocco Show of Force 1/5/76 1/23/76 18 Y Kingston Homeless Jamaica RRE--Short 1/26/76 1/27/76 1 Y Operation Earthquake Guatemala RRE--Medium 2/4/76 6/30/76 147 Y Italian Earthquake Italy RRE--Short 5/11/76 5/13/76 2 Y Typhoon Pamela Guam RRE--Short 5/23/76 6/9/76 17 Y Typhoon Olga Philippines RRE--Short 5/26/76 5/31/76 5 Y Ontario Forest Fire Canada RRE--Short 6/1/76 6/2/76 1 Y Lebanon Evacuation Lebanon RRE--Medium 6/20/76 7/27/76 37 Y Kenya-Uganda Post Entebbe Raid Mombassa, Kenya; Show of Force 7/8/76 7/28/76 20 Y Tension Uganda Balinese Earthquake Indonesia RRE--Short 7/21/76 7/26/76 5 Y Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Short 7/27/76 7/28/76 1 N Libya-Tunisia Libya, Tunisia Show of Force 7/27/76 8/21/76 25 N Paul Bunyan South Korea Show of Force 8/18/76 9/9/76 22 Y Bolivian Airplane Crash Bolivia RRE--Short 10/15/76 10/21/76 6 Y Turkish Earthquake Turkey RRE--Medium 11/26/76 1/22/77 57 Y Uganda Uganda Show of Force 2/25/77 3/3/77 6 N Romanian Earthquake Romania RRE--Short 3/7/77 3/8/77 1 Y Tenerife Airliner Disaster Canary Islands RRE--Short 3/27/77 3/30/77 3 Y Ethiopia Evacuation Ethiopia RRE--Short 4/23/77 4/29/77 6 Y Djibouti Relief Djibouti RRE--Short 10/14/77 10/15/77 1 Y Eniwetok Evacuation Marshall Islands RRE--Short 12/26/77 12/29/77 3 Y Ogaden War Somalia Show of Force 2/1/78 3/23/78 50 N Zaire I and Zaire II/Shaba II Zaire Military Assistance 5/16/78 6/16/78 31 Y Sea of Okhotsk/Sea of Japan Sea of Japan Show of Force 6/15/78 6/25/78 10 N Afghanistan Unrest Afghanistan Show of Force 7/1/78 8/1/78 31 N Airlift UN Mission to Namibia Namibia Military Assistance 8/1/78 8/8/78 7 Y Sudanese Flood Sudan RRE--Short 8/2/78 8/16/78 14 Y Hurricane Greta Honduras and Belize RRE--Short 9/24/78 10/5/78 11 Y Costa Rican Flood Costa Rica RRE--Short 10/23/78 10/24/78 1 Y Guyanese Disaster Guyana RRE--Medium 11/19/78 12/22/78 33 Y Sri Lankan Cyclone Sri Lanka RRE--Short 11/27/78 11/29/78 2 Y Iranian Revolution Iran RRE--Medium 12/6/78 3/2/79 86 Y Operation Prize Eagle Saudi Arabia Show of Force 1/1/79 1/30/79 29 Y Tropical Storm Alice Marshall Islands RRE--Short 1/1/79 1/2/79 1 Y PRC Invasion of Vietnam South China Sea Show of Force 2/25/79 3/15/79 18 Y Operation Flying Star Saudi Arabia Show of Force 3/1/79 6/6/79 97 Y Yemen Conflict Yemen Show of Force 3/6/79 6/7/79 93 Y Ta Lai Shipwreck Yellow Sea RRE--Short 3/30/79 3/31/79 1 Y Typhoon Meli Fiji RRE--Short 4/3/79 4/6/79 3 Y Zairean Famine Zaire RRE--Short 4/9/79 4/12/79 3 Y Saint Vincent Volcano Saint Vincent RRE--Short 4/14/79 4/22/79 8 Y Liberian Riots Liberia RRE--Short 4/18/79 4/19/79 1 Y Yugoslavian Earthquake Yugoslavia RRE--Short 4/18/79 4/20/79 2 Y Strait of Hormuz Patrol Persian Gulf Show of Force 6/9/79 6/28/79 19 N Nicaraguan Evacuation Nicaragua RRE--Medium 7/1/79 8/31/79 61 Y Zaire airlift Zaire Military Assistance 8/8/79 8/17/79 9 Y Dominica, Hispaniola, Jamaica, Barbados, Caribbean Storms RRE--Medium 8/31/79 11/21/79 82 Y Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Puerto Rico Soviet Troops in Cuba Cuba Show of Force 10/2/79 11/17/79 46 Y Afghanistan/Iran Hostage Crisis Iran Show of Force 10/9/79 1/23/81 472 Y Park-Chung Hee Assassination South Korea Show of Force 10/26/79 12/26/79 61 Y Bolivian Civil Unrest and Evacuation Bolivia RRE--Short 11/7/79 11/8/79 1 Y Panamanian Flood Panama RRE--Short 11/15/79 11/17/79 2 Y Project Valentine Assist Marshall Islands RRE--Short 12/2/79 12/28/79 26 Y Cambodian Famine Relief Singapore RRE--Short 12/3/79 12/9/79 6 Y Colombian Earthquake Colombia RRE--Short 12/14/79 12/17/79 3 Y Nicaraguan Flood Nicaragua RRE--Medium 12/16/79 3/12/80 87 Y Belizean Flood Belize RRE--Short 12/19/79 12/20/79 1 Y Zimbabwe Ceasefire/Election Zimbabwe Stability Operations 12/19/79 12/27/79 8 Y Monitoring

67 Table D.10. Joint Operations Starting Between 1980 and 1982

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Azores Earthquake Terceira Island, Azores RRE--Short 1/2/80 1/4/80 2 Y Cyclone Claudette Mauritius RRE--Short 1/10/80 1/11/80 1 Y Soviet Intercept Philippines Show of Force 2/25/80 2/28/80 3 Y Airlift UN Peacekeepers From Zimbabwe Military Assistance 3/5/80 3/7/80 2 Y Operation Eagle Claw Iran Raids 4/15/80 4/24/80 9 Y Post Kwangju Korean Unrest/Korean South Korea Show of Force 5/25/80 6/28/80 34 Y Air Hurricane Allen Haiti and Saint Lucia RRE--Short 8/7/80 8/16/80 9 Y Saudi Arabia, Persian Iran-Iraq War Elf One Show of Force 9/30/80 4/15/89 3119 Y Gulf; Indian Ocean; Iraq Algerian Earthquake Relief Algeria RRE--Short 10/1/80 10/23/80 22 Y Coco River Flood Nicaragua RRE--Short 10/20/80 10/23/80 3 Y Italian Earthquake Italy RRE--Short 11/26/80 12/2/80 6 Y Polish Solidarity Crisis (Operation Poland and West Show of Force 12/9/80 5/1/81 143 Y Creek Sentry) Germany Airlift Military Supplies to El Salvador El Salvador Military Assistance 1/1/81 1/2/81 1 Y Iranian hostages Algeria RRE--Short 1/20/81 1/25/81 5 Y Morocco show of force Morocco Show of Force 1/29/81 2/8/81 10 Y Greek Earthquakes Greece RRE--Short 3/6/81 3/7/81 1 Y Liberia Deployment Liberia Show of Force 4/1/81 5/10/81 39 Y Tito dies, Yugoslav unrest FRY Show of Force 4/5/81 4/11/81 6 N Egypt request Egypt Show of Force 5/1/81 5/2/81 1 Y Syrian-Israeli Bekaa Crisis Syria Show of Force 5/3/81 9/15/81 135 N Peruvian Earthquake Peru RRE--Short 7/14/81 7/15/81 1 Y Gulf of Sidra FONOPs Libya Show of Force 8/1/81 8/21/81 20 N Gambian Unrest and Evacuation Gambia RRE--Short 8/8/81 8/9/81 1 Y Philippine Shipwreck Calayan Island RRE--Short 9/22/81 9/23/81 1 Y Elf Sentry 1 Egypt Show of Force 10/6/81 10/31/81 25 Y Sadat Assassination Sudan RRE--Short 10/7/81 10/31/81 24 Y Rebel shipments to El Salvador El Salvador and Show of Force 10/16/81 12/2/81 47 N Chad Civil War Chad Military Assistance 11/16/81 6/7/82 203 Y DPRK Mobilization Crisis Korea Show of Force 12/1/81 12/2/81 1 Y Elf Sentry 2 Egypt Show of Force 3/19/82 12/31/82 287 Y Project ELSA/Resupply El Salvador El Salvador Military Assistance 3/31/82 5/31/82 61 Y Peace Rapid/Falklands War Argentina Military Assistance 5/1/82 6/1/82 31 Y Panamanian Bridge Collapse Panama RRE--Short 5/21/82 5/26/82 5 Y Lebanon Evacuation Lebanon RRE--Short 6/1/82 6/2/82 1 Y Israeli invasion of Lebanon Israel RRE--Medium 6/8/82 7/23/82 45 N Resupply El Salvador El Salvador Military Assistance 6/21/82 8/1/82 41 Y Chad Withdrawal Chad Military Assistance 6/23/82 7/2/82 9 Y Somalia Somalia Military Assistance 7/2/82 8/30/82 59 Y Chadian Flood Airlift Chad RRE--Short 7/6/82 7/14/82 8 Y Evacuation of PLO from Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Medium 8/1/82 9/9/82 39 N Sinai Peacekeeping Operation Egypt Military Assistance 8/6/82 9/5/82 30 Y Lebanese Refugee Relief Lebanon RRE--Short 8/23/82 8/24/82 1 Y Multinational Force in Lebanon Lebanon Stability Operations 9/22/82 2/11/83 142 N Southern Arabian Yemeni Earthquake RRE--Short 12/17/82 12/26/82 9 Y peninsula

68 Table D.11. Joint Operations Starting Between 1983 and 1985

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Nigerian Fire Nigeria RRE--Short 2/1/83 2/2/83 1 Y Libya threatens Sudan Libya Show of Force 2/14/83 2/28/83 14 Y Lebaonon Peacekeeping Force Israel Stability Operations 2/15/83 4/9/84 419 N Burmese invasion/Airlift Supplies to Thailand Military Assistance 4/1/83 4/2/83 1 Y Thailand Popayan Earthquake Colombia RRE--Short 4/1/83 4/8/83 7 Y US embassy bombing Lebanon RRE--Short 4/18/83 4/19/83 1 Y Operation Bat Caribbean Military Assistance 5/1/83 5/2/83 1 Y Turks Bahamas Military Assistance 5/1/83 5/2/83 1 Y Honduras-Nicaragua Honduras Show of Force 6/14/83 10/23/83 131 N Peruvian Flood Peru RRE--Short 6/26/83 7/1/83 5 Y Ecuadoran Flood Ecuador RRE--Short 7/24/83 8/10/83 17 Y Assistance to Chad and Sudan Chad and Sudan Military Assistance 7/25/83 12/31/83 159 Y KAL Flight 007 Sea of Japan Show of Force 9/1/83 11/6/83 66 Y Airlift to Support Lebanese Lebanon Military Assistance 9/3/83 9/25/83 22 Y Peacekeepers Airlift Supplies to El Salvador El Salvador Military Assistance 10/1/83 10/2/83 1 Y Urgent Fury Grenada Stability Operations 10/1/83 12/14/83 74 Y Iran-Iraq War Iran/Iraq Show of Force 10/8/83 1/8/84 92 N Korea-Burma North Korea Show of Force 10/11/83 10/14/83 3 Y Beirut Bombing medevac Lebanon RRE--Medium 10/23/83 12/9/83 47 Y Turkish Earthquake Turkey RRE--Short 11/1/83 11/5/83 4 Y U.S. Military Support Element Grenada Grenada Stability Operations 11/3/83 6/11/85 586 Y Antiaircraft Fire Syria Syria/Lebanon Limited strikes 12/3/83 1/9/84 37 N Withdrawal of US Forces from Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Medium 2/21/84 4/26/84 65 Y Tense Elections in El Salvador El Salvador/Nicaragua Show of Force 3/13/84 12/2/84 264 Y Airlift to Egypt (Operation Eagle Lift) Egypt Show of Force 3/19/84 4/9/84 21 Y Persian Gulf Persian Gulf Show of Force 4/1/84 12/2/84 245 N Additional Deployments to Saudi Saudi Arabia Show of Force 6/1/84 6/2/84 1 Y Typhoon Keli Johnston Island RRE--Short 8/19/84 8/20/84 1 Y Korean Flood South Korea RRE--Short 9/2/84 9/3/84 1 Y Heightened Alert at US Embassy in Lebanon Show of Force 9/21/84 11/1/84 41 Y Beirut Pines Hotel Fire Philippines RRE--Short 10/23/84 10/24/84 1 Y Saudi Hijacking Arabian Sea Show of Force 11/6/84 11/7/84 1 N Rescue of US vessel off coast of Cuba Cuba RRE--Short 11/30/84 12/1/84 1 Y Kuwait Kuwait RRE--Short 12/11/84 12/12/84 1 Y African Famine Relief Sudan, Niger, Mali RRE--Medium 12/22/84 3/9/85 77 Y Typhoon Eric Fiji RRE--Short 1/19/85 1/21/85 2 Y Sung Bock Oh Sinking Yellow Sea RRE--Short 1/28/85 1/29/85 1 Y Mozambican Relief Mozambique RRE--Short 2/1/85 2/2/85 1 Y Argentinean Earthquake Argentina RRE--Short 2/3/85 2/4/85 1 Y Embassy Evacuation in Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Medium 3/1/85 4/2/85 32 Y Chilean Earthquake Chile RRE--Short 3/15/85 3/18/85 3 Y Bahamas/Caribbean Drug Interdiction Bahamas Military Assistance 4/5/85 4/20/85 15 Y Project Raft Mali RRE--Short 5/1/85 5/2/85 1 Y Sudanese Famine Relief Sudan RRE--Short 8/12/85 8/15/85 3 Y Persian Gulf Escorts Persian Gulf Show of Force 9/13/85 10/2/85 19 N Mexican Earthquakes Mexico RRE--Short 9/19/85 9/30/85 11 Y Puerto Rican Mudslides Relief Puerto Rico RRE--Short 10/9/85 10/16/85 7 Y Marcos Faberes Shipwreck Pacific Ocean RRE--Short 10/16/85 10/17/85 1 Y Colombian Volcano Colombia RRE--Short 11/15/85 11/28/85 13 Y Asunción Cinco Shipwreck South China Sea RRE--Short 12/18/85 12/20/85 2 Y

69 Table D.12. Joint Operations Starting Between 1986 and 1988

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Yemen Civil War Yemen RRE--Medium 1/1/86 2/2/86 32 Y Persian Gulf Escort Persian Gulf Show of Force 1/12/86 6/2/86 141 N Freedom of Navigation Gulf of Sidra II Gulf of Sidra Show of Force 1/26/86 4/28/86 92 N Afghan Refugees Pakistan RRE--Long 3/1/86 7/1/93 2679 Y Lebanon Hostages Lebanon RRE--Short 3/1/86 3/2/86 1 N Osan Fire South Korea RRE--Short 4/5/86 4/6/86 1 Y El Dorado Canyon Libya Limited strikes 4/9/86 4/19/86 10 Y Guadalcanal Typhoon Solomon Islands RRE--Short 5/1/86 5/2/86 1 Y Jamaican Flood Jamaica RRE--Short 6/8/86 6/10/86 2 Y Operation Blast Furnace Bolivia Military Assistance 7/1/86 11/15/86 137 Y Syria Syria RRE--Short 7/27/86 7/28/86 1 Y Cameroonian Lake Disaster Cameroon RRE--Short 8/27/86 8/29/86 2 Y Pakistan Hijacking and Evacuation Pakistan RRE--Short 9/1/86 9/6/86 5 Y Philippine Airlift Philippines RRE--Short 9/18/86 9/23/86 5 Y Show of Force in Korea during Asian Korea Show of Force 9/20/86 10/5/86 15 Y Games El Salvadoran Earthquake El Salvador RRE--Short 10/10/86 11/7/86 28 Y Typhoon Kim Mariana Islands RRE--Short 12/7/86 12/8/86 1 Y Persian Gulf Escorts pre Earnest Will Persian Gulf Show of Force 1/1/87 7/21/87 201 N Hostages in Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Short 2/1/87 3/2/87 29 N Typhoon Uma Vanuatu RRE--Short 2/13/87 2/15/87 2 Y Ecuadoran Earthquakes Ecuador RRE--Short 3/8/87 3/13/87 5 Y Response to Attack on USS Stark Saudi Arabia RRE--Short 5/26/87 5/27/87 1 Y Operation Earnest Will Persian Gulf Military Assistance 7/22/87 11/17/88 484 Y Philippines and Typhoon Nina RRE--Short 12/5/87 1/1/88 27 Y Federated States of Haiti unrest Haiti Show of Force 1/1/88 1/31/88 30 Y Jittery Prop El Salvador Show of Force 1/8/88 12/14/88 341 Y Philippine Medical Airlift Philippines RRE--Short 1/25/88 1/28/88 3 Y Typhoon Roy Marshall Islands RRE--Short 2/19/88 2/22/88 3 Y Golden Pheasant Honduras Show of Force 3/17/88 3/31/88 14 Y Issue Forth Pakistan Military Assistance 4/1/88 4/30/88 29 Y Reinforcements to Panama Panama Show of Force 4/1/88 12/20/89 628 Y Valiant Boom Panama Show of Force 4/5/88 4/11/88 6 Y USS Roberts mine strike Bahrain RRE--Short 4/8/88 4/9/88 1 Y Operation Praying Mantis Iran Limited strikes 4/18/88 4/19/88 1 Y Sudanese Airlift Sudan RRE--Medium 6/1/88 8/1/88 61 Y Transport UNIMOG Iran/Iraq Military Assistance 8/10/88 8/25/88 15 Y Somalian Medical Relief Somalia RRE--Short 8/25/88 8/31/88 6 Y São Tomé Medical Airlift Sao Tome and Principe RRE--Short 8/28/88 9/3/88 6 Y Burma Unrest Burma Show of Force 9/1/88 10/2/88 31 N Summer Olympics South Korea Show of Force 9/1/88 10/2/88 31 Y Bangladeshi Flood Relief Bangladesh RRE--Short 9/10/88 9/15/88 5 Y Hurricane Gilbert Jamaica and Haiti RRE--Medium 9/13/88 2/7/89 147 Y Operation Strong Support Central America RRE--Short 10/1/88 11/1/88 31 Y Hostage Release Damascus RRE--Short 10/3/88 10/4/88 1 Y Typhoon Ruby Philippines RRE--Short 10/25/88 10/26/88 1 Y Central African Medical Airlift Cameroon and Chad RRE--Short 11/1/88 11/2/88 1 Y Nigerois Medical Airlift Niger RRE--Short 11/9/88 11/10/88 1 Y Senegalese Locust Plague Northwestern Africa RRE--Medium 11/16/88 2/1/89 77 Y Maldives Coup Maldives Show of Force 11/17/88 11/18/88 1 N Sudanese Refugee Relief Kenya RRE--Short 12/1/88 12/2/88 1 Y Armenian Earthquake Armenia RRE--Medium 12/9/88 2/9/89 62 Y Selina Shipwreck Pacific Ocean RRE--Short 12/12/88 12/13/88 1 Y

70 Table D.13. Joint Operations Starting Between 1989 and 1991

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Medflag, '89 Liberia RRE--Short 1/7/89 1/20/89 13 Y Lebanese Civil War Lebanon Show of Force 2/1/89 3/18/89 45 N UN Airlift to Namibia/Election district Namibia, Angola Military Assistance 3/5/89 5/31/89 87 Y The Gambia, Equatorial Africa I RRE--Short 4/1/89 4/2/89 1 Y Guinea, and Chad Panama Elections/Blade Jewel Panama RRE--Medium 5/11/89 6/29/89 49 Y China Civil Unrest China Show of Force 6/1/89 7/2/89 31 N Soviet Rail Disaster USSR RRE--Short 6/9/89 6/11/89 2 Y Hostages in Lebanon/Higgins Killed Lebanon RRE--Medium 7/30/89 9/2/89 34 N Colombia transport Colombia Military Assistance 9/1/89 9/2/89 1 Y Sierra Leone, Liberia, Africa II RRE--Short 9/29/89 10/15/89 16 Y Niger, Cameroon, Chad Operation Classic Resolve Philippines Show of Force 12/1/89 12/9/89 8 Y Operation Just Cause Panama Stability Operations 12/15/89 2/14/90 61 Y Romanian Medical Airlift Romania RRE--Short 12/29/89 12/31/89 2 Y Liberian War Refugees Liberia RRE--Short 2/1/90 2/2/90 1 Y Western Samoa and Typhoon Ofa RRE--Short 2/6/90 3/1/90 23 Y American Samoa Medflag Senegal ’90 Senegal RRE--Short 2/23/90 3/6/90 11 Y Lebanon Syria Leb/Syria RRE--Short 4/1/90 4/2/90 1 Y Operation Sharp Edge Liberia RRE--Medium 4/28/90 1/9/91 256 N Philippine Earthquake Philippines RRE--Short 7/17/90 8/1/90 15 Y Iraqi Pressure on Kuwait Persian Gulf Show of Force 7/24/90 8/2/90 9 N Operations Desert Shield Persian Gulf Show of Force 8/2/90 1/16/91 167 Y Iraq MIO Iraq Show of Force 8/17/90 12/31/99 3423 N Jordan NEO Jordan RRE--Short 9/1/90 9/2/90 1 Y Kuwaiti Invasion Refugees Jordan RRE--Short 9/18/90 9/28/90 10 Y Panamanian Shipwreck Yellow Sea RRE--Short 12/1/90 12/2/90 1 Y Operation Eastern Exit Somalia RRE--Short 1/1/91 1/11/91 10 Y Sudan NEO Sudan RRE--Short 1/1/91 1/2/91 1 Y Patriot Defender Israel Military Assistance 1/15/91 2/28/91 44 N Conventional Combat w Operation Desert Storm Iraq 1/17/91 3/1/91 43 Y regional opponent Sierra Leonean Airlifts Sierra Leone RRE--Medium 2/21/91 11/14/91 266 Y Kuwaiti Reconstruction Kuwait RRE--Medium 3/1/91 7/1/91 122 Y Romanian Relief Romania RRE--Medium 3/1/91 12/1/91 275 Y Operation Provide Comfort Turkey/Northern Iraq RRE--Long 4/1/91 12/31/96 2101 Y Peruvian Cholera Epidemic Peru RRE--Short 4/1/91 4/7/91 6 Y Operation Sea Angel Bangladesh RRE--Short 5/1/91 6/1/91 31 Y Ethiopian Drought Ethiopia RRE--Medium 6/1/91 9/1/91 92 Y Operation Fiery Vigil Philippines RRE--Short 6/1/91 7/2/91 31 Y Kenyan Food Airlift Kenya RRE--Short 6/25/91 6/26/91 1 Y Albanian Relief Albania RRE--Short 7/1/91 8/1/91 31 Y Sharp Guard Yugoslavia Show of Force 7/1/91 12/20/96 1999 Y Chadian Relief Chad RRE--Short 7/7/91 7/8/91 1 Y Mongolian Medical Mission Mongolia RRE--Short 7/22/91 7/23/91 1 Y Provide Comfort II Iraq Show of Force 7/24/91 12/31/96 1987 Y Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Medium 8/1/91 12/1/91 122 Y Chinese Flood Relief China RRE--Short 8/6/91 8/9/91 3 Y Desert Falcon/Desert Vigilance Saudi Arabia Show of Force 9/1/91 9/15/97 2206 N Quick Lift Central Africa RRE--Short 9/27/91 10/3/91 6 Y Angolan Airlift Angola RRE--Short 10/1/91 11/1/91 31 Y Evacuation of Haiti (Operation Victor Haiti RRE--Medium 10/2/91 11/11/91 40 Y Squared) Mongolian Medical Airlift Mongolia RRE--Short 10/2/91 10/3/91 1 Y Ukrainian Relief Ukraine RRE--Short 10/23/91 10/24/91 1 Y Arctic Crash Greenland RRE--Short 11/1/91 11/2/91 1 Y Cuba, Jamaica, and the Haitian Refugees RRE--Long 11/1/91 9/1/94 1035 Y Bahamas Tropical Storm Zelda Marshall Islands RRE--Short 12/1/91 12/2/91 1 Y American Samoa and Typhoon Val RRE--Short 12/1/91 1/1/92 31 Y Western Samoa Russia, Byelorussia, and Soviet Shortages RRE--Short 12/17/91 12/22/91 5 Y Armenia

71 Table D.14. Joint Operations Starting Between 1992 and 1994

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Mongolian Medical Relief Mongolia RRE--Medium 1/20/92 9/17/92 241 Y Promote Liberty Panama Stability Operations 2/1/92 3/1/92 29 Y Provide Hope CIS RRE--Long 2/1/92 9/1/94 943 Y Snow Eagle Turkey RRE--Short 2/1/92 2/2/92 1 Y Lithuanian Relief Lithuania RRE--Short 2/6/92 2/7/92 1 Y Turkish Earthquake Turkey RRE--Short 3/1/92 4/1/92 31 Y Operation Hot Rock Italy RRE--Short 4/1/92 4/2/92 1 N Uzbekistan Oil Fires Uzbekistan RRE--Short 4/1/92 4/2/92 1 Y Sarajevo Relief Bosnia-Herzegovina RRE--Short 4/16/92 5/16/92 30 Y Bolivian Epidemic Bolivia RRE--Short 4/21/92 4/24/92 3 Y Operation Silver Anvil Sierra Leone RRE--Short 5/3/92 5/4/92 1 Y Operation Provide Promise Bosnia-Herzegovina RRE--Long 7/2/92 1/9/96 1286 Y Operation Southern Watch Iraq No-Fly Zone 8/2/92 5/19/03 3942 Y Provide Transition Angola Stability Operations 8/12/92 10/9/92 58 Y Provide Relief/Restore Hope I Somalia and Kenya RRE--Medium 8/14/92 12/8/92 116 Y Lithuanian Medical Airlift Lithuania RRE--Short 8/26/92 8/29/92 3 Y Typhoon Omar Guam RRE--Short 8/29/92 9/25/92 27 Y Belarus Children Belarus RRE--Short 8/31/92 9/1/92 1 Y Operation Impressive Lift I Somalia RRE--Short 9/12/92 10/2/92 20 Y Operation Silver Compass Liberia RRE--Short 10/23/92 10/25/92 2 Y Evacuation from Tajikistan Tajikistan RRE--Short 10/25/92 10/26/92 1 Y Georgian Medical Relief Georgia RRE--Short 10/26/92 10/28/92 2 Y Armenian Flour Airlift Armenia RRE--Short 11/1/92 11/11/92 10 Y Operation Restore Hope/Continue Somalia Stability Operations 12/1/92 3/1/95 820 Y Hope Pakistani Flood Pakistan RRE--Short 12/6/92 12/20/92 14 Y Operation Restore Hope II Somalia Stability Operations 12/8/92 3/27/94 474 Y Panamanian Orphan Relief Panama RRE--Short 12/12/92 12/13/92 1 Y Nicaraguan Airlift Nicaragua RRE--Short 1/1/93 1/2/93 1 Y Strikes Against Iraqi targets Iraq Limited strikes 1/13/93 1/17/93 4 Y Provide Refuge Marshall Islands RRE--Short 2/13/93 3/9/93 24 Y Deny Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Yugoslavia No-Fly Zone 4/12/93 7/18/98 1923 Y Guard/Deliberate forge ISR Ecuador Ecuador Military Assistance 4/19/93 4/24/93 5 Y Operation Continue Hope Somalia Stability Operations 5/4/93 3/23/94 323 Y UN Monitors to Cambodia Cambodia Military Assistance 5/17/93 5/29/93 12 Y Bolivia Bolivia RRE--Short 5/26/93 5/30/93 4 Y TLAM Strikes Against Iraq Iraq Limited Strikes 6/26/93 6/27/93 1 N Operation Support Democracy Haiti Show of Force 7/1/93 8/1/93 31 N Operation Able Sentry Macedonia Stability Operations 7/5/93 7/12/93 7 Y Nepalese Flood Nepal RRE--Short 8/11/93 8/15/93 4 Y Indian Earthquake India RRE--Short 10/2/93 10/4/93 2 Y Guatemalan Airlift Guatemala RRE--Short 11/1/93 11/2/93 1 Y Operation Distant Runner Rwanda, Burundi RRE--Short 4/1/94 4/16/94 15 Y Indian Airlift India RRE--Short 5/1/94 5/2/94 1 Y Liberia Liberia RRE--Short 5/1/94 5/2/94 1 Y Yemeni Evacuation Southern Arabian penn. RRE--Short 5/7/94 5/9/94 2 Y Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire, Provide Assistance, Support Hope RRE--Medium 5/11/94 9/1/94 113 Y Kenya, and Uganda Korea Tensions N. Korea Show of Force 6/1/94 7/31/94 60 Y Uganda/Transport UN Peacekeepers Uganda Military Assistance 6/22/94 6/30/94 8 Y Operation Support Hope DRC RRE--Medium 7/22/94 10/1/94 71 Y Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Show of Force 8/7/94 10/23/94 77 Y Distant Haven Surinam RRE--Medium 8/19/94 10/31/94 73 N Uphold/Restore Democracy Haiti Stability Operations 9/8/94 4/17/95 221 Y Operation Safe Haven Panama RRE--Medium 9/10/94 3/3/95 174 Y Operation Vigilant Warrior Kuwait Show of Force 10/7/94 12/31/94 85 Y Siberian Flood Russia RRE--Short 10/30/94 10/31/94 1 Y Egyptian Flood Egypt RRE--Short 11/6/94 11/8/94 2 Y Project Sapphire Kazakhstan RRE--Short 11/21/94 11/23/94 2 Y Albanian Relief Albania RRE--Short 12/1/94 12/2/94 1 Y

72 Table D.15. Joint Operations Starting Between 1995 and 1997

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Operation United Shield Somalia RRE--Medium 1/7/95 3/25/95 77 Y Earthquake at Kobe Japan RRE--Short 1/19/95 1/20/95 1 Y Operation Safe Passage Panama RRE--Short 2/1/95 2/20/95 19 Y Airlift UN Peacekeepers to Haiti Nepal, Haiti Military Assistance 2/3/95 2/10/95 7 Y Operation Safe Border Ecuador, Peru Stability Operations 3/1/95 10/24/98 1333 Y UNMIH Haiti Stability Operations 3/31/95 4/15/96 381 N N. Korea reactor negotiations N. Korea Show of Force 4/1/95 4/30/95 29 Y Relief supplies to Paraguay Paraguay RRE--Short 4/1/95 4/2/95 1 Y Iceland Blizzard Iceland RRE--Short 4/3/95 4/4/95 1 Y Ebola virus epidemic in Zaire Zaire RRE--Short 5/10/95 5/17/95 7 Y Bosnia airstrikes Bosnia Limited strikes 5/25/95 5/26/95 1 Y Eritrea/Ethiopia Eritrea and Ethiopia RRE--Medium 5/30/95 9/30/95 123 Y Vladivostok Relief Operation Russia RRE--Medium 6/13/95 10/17/95 126 Y Operation Quick Lift Bosnia Stability Operations 6/30/95 8/10/95 41 Y Operation Prompt Return Wake Island RRE--Short 7/21/95 8/10/95 20 Y Medical Supplies to Belarus Belarus RRE--Short 7/23/95 7/24/95 1 Y Operation Vigilant Sentinel Iraq Show of Force 8/1/95 3/22/96 234 Y Relief supplies to war victims in Croatia Croatia RRE--Short 8/20/95 8/21/95 1 Y Deliberate Force/Strikes Against Bosnia Stability Operations 8/29/95 12/20/95 113 Y Vietnam Medical Supply Airlift Vietnam RRE--Short 9/1/95 9/2/95 1 Y Hurricane Marilyn Response Caribbean Islands RRE--Medium 9/16/95 10/31/95 45 Y Typhoon Angela Philippines RRE--Short 10/1/95 11/1/95 31 Y Hurricane Roxanne Response Gulf of Mexico RRE--Short 10/16/95 10/17/95 1 Y MEDFLAG 95 Zimbabwe RRE--Short 12/1/95 12/2/95 1 Y IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavor) FRY Stability Operations 12/21/95 12/20/96 365 Y Costa Rica Flood Response Costa Rica RRE--Short 2/1/96 2/2/96 1 Y Operation Sentinel Lifeguard Cuba Show of Force 2/1/96 3/1/96 29 Y Taiwan Strait Crisis Taiwan Show of Force 3/1/96 4/17/96 47 N Airlift to Israel Israel RRE--Short 3/5/96 3/6/96 1 Y Operation Assured Response Liberia RRE--Medium 4/8/96 8/3/96 117 Y Operation Quick Response Central African Republic RRE--Medium 5/1/96 6/22/96 52 Y NAVCENT security Bahrain Show of Force 7/3/96 12/15/96 165 N Desert Strike Iraq Limited strikes 9/3/96 9/4/96 1 Y Evacuation of Burundi Burundi RRE--Short 9/4/96 9/5/96 1 Y Operations Intrinsic Action and Desert Kuwait Show of Force 9/12/96 3/18/03 2378 Y Spring Evacuation of Kurdish Refugees Iraq, Guam RRE--Medium 9/15/96 4/30/97 227 Y Operation Marathon Pacific Wake Island RRE--Medium 10/10/96 11/21/96 42 Y Operation Quick Transit II Iraq RRE--Short 10/15/96 10/22/96 7 Y Operation Guardian Assistance Rwanda, Zaire RRE--Medium 11/14/96 12/27/96 43 Y SFOR FRY Stability Operations 12/20/96 12/2/04 2904 Y Humanitarian Cargo to Cancun, Mexico Mexico RRE--Short 1/1/97 1/2/97 1 Y Operation Northern Watch Iraq No-Fly Zone 1/1/97 3/17/03 2266 Y Airlift to Warsaw Poland RRE--Short 1/29/97 1/30/97 1 Y Lift Peacekeepers to Liberia Liberia Military Assistance 2/18/97 3/3/97 13 Y Operation Monitor Cuba Show of Force 2/24/97 2/25/97 1 N Operation Guardian Retrieval Zaire RRE--Medium 3/1/97 5/1/97 61 Y Operation Silver Wake Albania RRE--Medium 3/1/97 7/1/97 122 Y Operation Noble Obelisk Sierra Leone RRE--Short 5/27/97 6/5/97 9 Y Operation Firm Response Congo Brazzaville RRE--Short 6/8/97 6/18/97 10 Y Operation Bevel Edge Cambodia RRE--Short 7/1/97 7/31/97 30 Y Response to Cuban Flotillas Cuba RRE--Short 7/1/97 7/31/97 30 Y Operation High Flight Namibia RRE--Short 9/15/97 9/17/97 2 Y Italian Earthquake Relief Italy RRE--Short 9/26/97 9/27/97 1 Y Operation Desert Thunder Iraq Show of Force 10/1/97 5/27/98 238 Y Medical Relief for Bulgaria Bulgaria RRE--Short 10/3/97 10/4/97 1 Y Indonesia Forest Fires Response Indonesia RRE--Medium 10/12/97 12/4/97 53 Y Operation Silent Assurance Qatar Military Assistance 11/4/97 11/17/97 13 Y Typhoon Linda Response Vietnam RRE--Short 11/12/97 11/13/97 1 Y Typhoon Paka Response Guam RRE--Short 12/27/97 1/4/98 8 Y Merchant Patriot Rescue UK RRE--Short 12/30/97 12/31/97 1 Y

73 Table D.16. Joint Operations Starting Between 1998 and 2003

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Chinese Earthquake Relief China RRE--Short 1/1/98 1/2/98 1 Y Operation Noble Safeguard Israel Military Assistance 2/16/98 4/13/98 56 Y Conventional combat w Operation Allied Force Kosovo 3/24/98 6/10/98 78 Y regional opponent Flood and Landslide Response Ecuador RRE--Short 5/1/98 5/2/98 1 Y Operation Bevil Incline Indonesia RRE--Short 5/15/98 5/24/98 9 N Operation Safe Departure Eritrea RRE--Short 6/6/98 6/17/98 11 Y Shepherd Venture Guinea-Bissau RRE--Short 6/10/98 6/17/98 7 Y Tsunami Response Papua New Guinea RRE--Short 7/1/98 7/2/98 1 Y Flood Relief South Korea RRE--Medium 8/1/98 9/6/98 36 Y Operation Determined Kenya and Tanzania RRE--Medium 8/7/98 10/18/98 72 Y Response/Resolute Response Flood Relief China RRE--Short 8/8/98 8/10/98 2 Y Operation Autumn Shelter DRC RRE--Short 8/9/98 8/16/98 7 Y Operation Silver Knight Albania RRE--Short 8/14/98 8/23/98 9 Y Resolve Resolute Albania Show of Force 8/17/98 11/15/98 90 N Hurricane Georges Caribbean Islands RRE--Short 9/1/98 10/1/98 30 Y Operation Keiko Lift Iceland RRE--Short 9/9/98 9/10/98 1 Y Operation Shadow Express Liberia RRE--Short 9/24/98 10/13/98 19 Y Flood Relief South Korea RRE--Short 10/1/98 10/2/98 1 Y Operation Strong Support Central America RRE--Short 10/1/98 11/1/98 31 Y Eritrea NEO Eritrea RRE--Short 11/3/98 11/19/98 16 N Operation Desert Viper/Desert Thunder Iraq Show of Force 11/4/98 11/19/98 15 Y Operation Shining Presence Israel Military Assistance 12/10/98 1/6/99 27 Y Operation Desert Fox Iraq Limited strikes 12/16/98 12/20/98 4 Y Evacuation of Christmas Island Christmas Island RRE--Short 1/9/99 1/10/99 1 Y Albania, Macedonia, Operation Shining Hope RRE--Medium 4/3/99 6/1/99 59 Y Montenegro Joint guardian/ KFOR (TF Falcon) Kosovo Stability Operations 6/4/99 3/18/14 5401 Y Operation Avid Response Turkey RRE--Short 8/18/99 9/10/99 23 Y Operation Stabilise East Timor Stability Operations 9/20/99 2/28/00 161 Y Evacuation of Antartica Antarctica RRE--Short 10/16/99 10/17/99 1 Y Operation Balkan Calm II Kosovo RRE--Medium 10/16/99 11/18/99 33 Y Flood Relief Vietnam RRE--Short 11/11/99 11/12/99 1 Y Flood Relief Venezuela RRE--Short 12/1/99 1/1/00 31 Y Earthquake Response India RRE--Short 1/31/00 2/1/00 1 Y Operation Allied Response Mozambique RRE--Short 3/1/00 3/2/00 1 Y Operation Fiery Relief Philippines RRE--Short 3/1/00 3/2/00 1 Y Operation Valiant Return China RRE--Short 4/12/00 4/13/00 1 Y Sierra Leone Sierra Leone RRE--Short 5/12/00 5/13/00 1 Y Bold Samaritan Indonesia/East Timor RRE--Medium 8/14/00 2/13/01 183 N Japan medevac Japan RRE--Short 8/19/00 8/20/00 1 Y USS Cole Response Yemen RRE--Short 10/12/00 10/15/00 3 Y Afghanistan Food Drop Afghanistan RRE--Medium 10/7/01 5/31/02 236 Y Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan Stability Operations 10/7/01 12/31/14 4833 Y Ivorian Civil War Ivory Coast RRE--Short 9/25/02 10/4/02 9 Y Conventional Combat w OIF - Invasion Iraq 3/20/03 5/2/03 43 Y regional opponent North Korea Nuclear Crisis North Korea Show of Force 5/1/03 11/1/03 184 N OIF COIN Iraq Stability Operations 5/1/03 9/1/10 2680 Y Algerian Earthquake Relief Algeria RRE--Short 5/31/03 6/5/03 5 Y Operation Shining Express Liberia RRE--Medium 6/1/03 9/30/03 121 Y Operation Sheltering Sky Liberia RRE--Medium 7/1/03 10/1/03 92 Y Iranian Earthquake Relief Iran RRE--Short 12/1/03 1/1/04 31 Y

74 Table D.17. Joint Operations Starting Between 2004 and 2016

Duration USAF Operation Name Location Type Start Date End Date (days) Participation Operation Secure Tomorrow Haiti Stability Operations 2/1/04 6/1/04 121 Y Morocco Earthquake Response Morocco RRE--Short 2/28/04 2/29/04 1 Y Typhoon Sudal Response Yap Islands RRE--Short 4/11/04 4/16/04 5 Y Elementary School Siege Relief Russia RRE--Short 9/6/04 9/7/04 1 Y Airlift Peacekeepers to Darfur Sudan Military Assistance 10/22/04 11/5/04 14 Y Operation Unified Assistance Indonesia, Thailand RRE--Medium 12/31/04 2/1/05 32 Y Sea Horse Iraq Stability Operations 7/1/05 8/1/05 31 N Hurricane Stan Response Central America RRE--Short 10/1/05 10/2/05 1 Y Pakistan Earthquake Response Pakistan RRE--Medium 10/9/05 12/2/05 54 Y Leyte Mudslides Response Philippines RRE--Short 2/17/06 2/25/06 8 Y Indonesia Earthquake Response Indonesia RRE--Short 6/1/06 6/2/06 1 Y Evacuation from Lebanon Lebanon RRE--Medium 6/14/06 8/22/06 69 Y Ethiopia Flood Relief Ethiopia RRE--Short 11/1/06 11/2/06 1 Y Stennis and Eisenhower South Korea Show of Force 3/28/07 6/26/07 90 N Operation Sea Angel II Bangladesh RRE--Short 11/19/07 12/6/07 17 N Operation Caring Response Myanmar RRE--Short 5/1/08 5/2/08 1 N Georgian Relief/Assured Delivery Georgia RRE--Medium 8/13/08 9/15/08 33 Y Airlift to Darfur (Operation Nimble Star) Sudan RRE--Short 1/14/09 1/17/09 3 Y Sumatra Earthquake Relief Indonesia RRE--Short 10/1/09 10/2/09 1 N Tropical Storm Ketsana and Typhoon Philippines RRE--Short 10/1/09 10/2/09 1 N Parma Relief Operation Unified Response Haiti RRE--Medium 1/1/10 3/1/10 59 Y Pakistan Floods Pakistan RRE--Medium 8/1/10 10/1/10 61 Y New Dawn Iraq Military Assistance 9/1/10 12/15/11 470 Y Typhoon Megi Relief Philippines RRE--Short 10/21/10 10/23/10 2 N Operation Tomodachi Japan RRE--Medium 3/12/11 5/4/11 53 Y Operation Odyssey Dawn Unified Libya No-Fly Zone 3/19/11 10/23/11 218 Y Protector Abidjan Ivory Coast Embassy Ivory Coast RRE--Short 4/2/11 4/3/11 1 Y Evacuation Uganda, South Sudan, Search for Lord's Resistance Army Military Assistance 10/12/11 Ongoing Ongoing Y CAR B-2 to ROK South Korea Show of Force 3/28/13 3/29/13 1 Y Freedom's Sentinel Afghanistan Stability Operations 1/1/15 Ongoing Ongoing Y Operation Odyssey Lightning Libya Limited strikes 8/1/16 12/19/16 140 Y B-1 to ROK South Korea Show of Force 9/13/16 9/14/16 1 Y

75 Appendix E: Force Packages Used in AF-FESS

This appendix provides additional information about the forces packages used in the model, including numbers of aircraft and squadron equivalents by MDS for each class of demands. Table E.1 displays the number of aircraft by MDS for each demand. In cases where the historical demand used an aircraft no longer in the USAF inventory (e.g., C-141 transport aircraft), a comparable aircraft (e.g., C-17) was substituted. See Chapter Three for additional details regarding the historical cases and sources. Table E.2 displays the force packages in equivalent squadrons by MDS for each class of demand.

76 Table E.1. Force Packages in Number of Aircraft, by Class of Demand

Aircraft Relief, Small show Large show No-Fly Military Limited Raids Stability Ops Stability Ops Stability Ops Conventional Conventional Conventional Crisis Cold War Rescue & of force of force Zone Assistance strikes (for Cold (for Peace (for Combat w Combat w Combat w Nuclear Day to Day Evacuation War future) Enforcemen CT/COIN regional regional peer Alert Nuclear t future) future) opponent opponent Alert (OAF) (OIF) A-10 12 12 12 40 60 0 AC-130 2 4 2 3 2 2 8 0 B-1 11 5 11 15 B-2 2 4 0 6 4 16 12 5 B-52 8 2 0 18 28 37 33 13 C-5 1 1 2 0 0 43 C-17 2 20 1 8 28 6 12 7 176 C-130 2 204 12 31 124 240 CV-22 8 2 8 2 8 0 13 E-3 4 8 4 1 2 1 4 19 9 E-8 4 2 1 2 7 9 EC-130 4 5 3 2 2 2 8 9 F-15C 12 0 18 42 60 F-15E 48 8 8 20 32 48 150 F-16 18 12 18 12 13 99 60 90 F-22 21 0 21 0 125 HC-130 2 2 0 0 8 7 HH-60 4 3 5 2 16 31 KC-10 5 10 5 3 9 0 5 9 24 33 51 41 12 KC-135 10 10 10 0 0 11 4 10 9 151 149 206 277 83 MC-130 2 7 2 2 3 26 0 MQ-9 4 8 4 0 0 RC-135 1 2 5 9 10 RQ-4 2 2 2 0 1 5 U-2 2 2 5 15 8 Totals 6 17 162 62 9 12 41 279 69 123 494 683 1310 364 114

77 Table E.2. Force Packages in Squadron Equivalents, by Class of Demand

78 Appendix F: MDS-Level Simulation Results

This appendix provides MDS-level model outputs for analytical excursions.

Table F.1. Percentage of Demands Met by FY17 Force When Contingencies Are Capped at 365 Days

Cold War Cold War Peace MDS\Future (with long regional (with short regional CT/COIN Enforcement conflict) conflict)

A-10 98% 100% 98% 100% AC-130 81% 97% 58% 79% B-1 100% 99% 99% 99% B-2 79% 79% 71% 100% B-52 100% 99% 99% 94% C-130 62% 63% 100% 100% C-17 99% 100% 100% 100% C-5 100% 100% 100% 100% CV-22 75% 100% 80% 93% E-3 86% 94% 72% 93% E-8 85% 87% 45% 80% EC-130 89% 87% 39% 78% F-15C 100% 100% 100% 100% F-15E 100% 100% 100% 100% F-16 100% 100% 99% 100% F-22 100% 100% 100% 100% HC-130 100% 100% 93% 100% HH-60 100% 100% 100% 100% KC-10 99% 99% 94% 100% KC-135 92% 91% 80% 99% MC-130 87% 100% 100% 100% MQ-9 69% 100% 100% 100% RC-135 82% 94% 91% 90% RQ-4 85% 95% 95% 93% U-2 67% 85% 87% 80%

79 Appendix G: Estimating a Vietnam War–Level Demand on the USAF FY17 Force

This appendix describes how we estimate the demands of a Vietnam War–scale conflict on the FY17 force. Many of the platforms used during the Vietnam War are no longer in the USAF inventory, but the various classes of aircraft (e.g., attack, fighter, bomber) remain in the force. Thus, we estimate demands using these classes of aircraft rather than individual aircraft type. No one knows how the United States would fight a Vietnam War–like conflict in 2017. For our comparison, we stipulate that the USAF would use the same percentage of each aircraft class. Thus, if 5 percent of the bomber force was used in Vietnam, that is the percentage of the FY17 force we commit. We have no reason to believe that this would be the case, but it is the only objective way we have to assess the impact of a Vietnam War–scale conflict on the FY17 force without detailed combat modeling (i.e., refighting the war with modern weapons). This approach gives a rough approximation of the demand but makes no attempt to account for differences in capability between the two forces, changes in operational concepts, and other factors. We note, however, that although the FY17 force is vastly superior on most dimensions, the FY 1969 force did have some advantages. For example, the FY 1969 force included 302 attack aircraft, a capability particularly well suited to the demands of the ground war in South Vietnam. Table G.1 displays the FY 1969 USAF order of battle in Vietnam by class of aircraft, the USAF total force by class of aircraft, and the percentage of the total force committed to the conflict. Although the conflict placed heavy demands on some parts of the force, such as SOF, the demands on the tanker and bomber fleets were quite small, certainly compared with modern operations.

80 Table G.1. Vietnam War Order of Battle as a Percentage of the USAF Total Force, 1969

Total Force % of Total Vietnam 1969 June 30 1969 Force Attack 137 302 45% Fighter 523 3838 14% Bomber 39 774 5% Airlift 262 2287 11% Tanker 37 687 5% C3ISR/BM 636 1093 58% SOF 41 60 68%

Total 1675 9041 SOURCES: RAND calculations based on data from USAF, 1970; USAF, 1974.

Table G.2 displays our calculations using Vietnam War demands to estimate a similar demand on the FY17 force. For example, 45 percent of attack aircraft were deployed to Southeast Asia in 1969. A similar percentage of the USAF FY17 force (171 A-10s) yields 78 aircraft.

Table G.2. Vietnam War–Scale Demand on FY17 Force (by Aircraft Class)

Vietnam war demand on total FY 17 force Modern VN war USAF by aircraft by class of demand on FY 17 Class class (1969) aircraft force (# of ac) Attack 0.45 171 78 Fighter 0.14 954 130 Bomber 0.05 96 5 Airlift 0.11 438 50 Tanker 0.05 318 17 C3ISR/BM 0.58 310 180 SOF 0.68 100 68 Totals 528 SOURCES: RAND calculations based on data from USAF, 1970; USAF, 1974.

The Cold War with Long Regional Conflict future uses the Vietnam War order of battle (as a percentage of the FY17 force) for the regional conflict demand. In contrast, the Cold War with Short Regional Conflict future uses the OIF order of battle from the 43 days of conventional combat for its regional conflict demand. Table G.3 compares the Vietnam War and OIF demands.

81 Table G.3. Vietnam War and OIF Demands as Percentage of USAF Total Force in 1969 and 2017

Vietnam war demand on total USAF by OIF demand aircraft class as % of total Class (1969) FY 17 force Attack 45% 35% Fighter 14% 15% Bomber 5% 45% Airlift 11% 30% Tanker 5% 57% C3ISR/BM 58% 23% SOF 68% 48%

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89 The U.S. military has mostly operated at a high operational tempo since the end of the Cold War, and there appears to be no significant reduction in demand on the horizon. However, the U.S. military has few analytical tools for identifying the force requirements associated with ongoing operations, and there are no systematic efforts within the Department of Defense to collect data on the nature of operational demands over time. This report is intended to help address this imbalance.

Drawing on a dataset of U.S. military operations since 1946, the authors quantify historical demands placed on the U.S. Air Force (USAF). They then use this historical evidence to estimate demands on the USAF flying force in four possible futures: two futures in which the United States enters a new cold war with Russia or China; one in which United States renews peace enforcement commitments like those between 1990 and 2000; and one in which U.S. military operations are dominated by global counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, as they have been since 2001.

The authors find that the current USAF force experiences capacity shortfalls in all four futures, and that no class of aircraft performs well across all four futures. The analysis suggests that prolonged operations are particularly stressing to the force, which is significant given that the average length of operations has been increasing since the end of the Cold War. The authors also find that the identified shortfalls cannot easily be corrected through changes to deploy-to-dwell policies and policies that set a maximum deployment length. Drawing on these findings, the authors provide recommendations for USAF and Department of Defense leaders and force planners.

PROJECT AIR FORCE

www.rand.org $34.50

ISBN-10 1-9774-0072-8 ISBN-13 978-1-9774-0072-7 53450

RR-2500-AF 9 781977 400727