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Steht Später Die Headline C O U N T R Y R E PORT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. SYRIA/IRAQ NILS WÖRMER Iraq after the Election: Transfor- HANNES PICHLER mation of the Political Landscape May 2018 IRAQI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SURPRISES WITH UNEXPECTED ELECTION RESULTS AND LOW VOTER TURNOUT www.kas.de www.kas.de/syrien-irak For the first time after the military defeat result was adjusted in order to (1) guaran- of the Islamic State (ISIL), national par- tee the legitimacy of the newly elected par- liamentary elections were held in Iraq. liament, and (2) secure the reputation of Around 7,000 candidates, organized on 88 IHEC as the official election committee. Ac- party lists, competed for 329 parliament cording to government sources, the an- seats in the election on May 12, 2018. nounced 44.5 percent refers only to the When results are official, the new parlia- pre-registered 11.7 million voters but not to ment will be appointed to form a new Ira- the actual number of 24.5 million eligible qi government. Iraqi voters. Low Voter Turnout This extremely low turnout can be traced back to the Iraqi youth’s wide-spread disap- 24.5 million Iraqis were eligible to vote in pointment with the country’s political insti- any one of the 8,000 constituencies across tutions and officials in Baghdad. Many Iraqis the country. Extra polling stations were in- did not believe that their vote would make stalled in the refugee camps that hold any difference in such a political landscape, around 2.5 million internally displaced peo- dominated by nine sect-oriented political ple (IDP’s). This year’s elections marked the parties. This argument is further supported first year in which electrical voting cards by the common perception that IHEC is not that needed to be applied for in advance politically neutral, but instead controlled by were introduced. This reform was imple- said nine groups. In the run-up to the elec- mented to speed up the election process tions, IHEC made little effort to try to edu- and to minimize election fraud. It was also cate Iraqi citizens on the new election pro- the first time that Iraqis abroad were able cess or to raise their awareness about the to take part in the elections. upcoming elections. According to Iraqi ex- perts, international campaigns on the rele- On Election Day, polling stations were open vance of the democratic process did not from seven in the morning until six in the reach the population. Within the Shiite evening. Only members of the Armed Forc- community, it is said that it was mainly es and the affiliated Popular Mobilization government officials who voted, while turn- Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) were allowed to out among the rural Shiite population was cast their vote two days ahead of the official very low. date, which they did with a turnout of 79 percent. Nationally, however, the turnout Additionally, organizational and technical was considerably lower and only amounted failures, before and during the elections, to 44.5 percent, as the first official calcula- impacted the turnout. It was reported that tions of the Independent High Electoral only 76 percent of the requested voter Commission (IHEC) state. This result indi- cards had been handed out prior to Election cates that fewer Iraqis are exercising their Day. Iraqi IDP’s are especially said to have right to vote than before (2014: 62 percent, had problems registering and voting. On 2010: 62.4 percent and 2005: 79.6 per- Election Day itself, a temporary curfew, as cent). well as a temporary driving ban kept many voters from reaching the polls. The an- Iraqi experts assume that the turnout is in nounced threat of the Islamic State target- fact even lower and suggest that the official ing the election process is another likely 2 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. reason why voters preferred to keep their Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal with distance from polling stations. Iran COUNTRY NILS WÖRMER After five years of civil war and the fight The USA’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal HANNES PICHLER against ISIL, this result symbolizes a major with Iran (JCPOA) did not significantly affect setback for Iraqi democracy. Exactly fifteen the Iraqis’ voting behavior. The regional May 2018 years after the fall of the Saddam regime, it power struggles and the international inter- seems as if large parts of the Iraqi popula- ferences in Baghdad might, on the other www.kas.de tion have turned their backs on their coun- hand, play a bigger role. The acting Prime www.kas.de/syrien-irak try’s political institutions and officials in Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, is known to be a Baghdad. In light of the low turnout, the proponent of the international (military) en- parliament and government’s legitimacy gagement in Iraq, having so far been able and authority might not have enough sup- to balance the interest of Tehran, Riyadh port to implement urgently needed econom- and Washington. His strongest competitors, ic, administrative and security reforms. Hadi Al-Ameri and Nuri Al-Maliki, on the other hand, are considered to be advocates Security Situation on Election Day of the Iranian interest and opposed to a long-term engagement of the USA. Consid- Apart from a few incidents, the Election Day ering these different political positions and went relatively peacefully, with no major the currently escalating tension between the events with debilitating repercussions for USA and Iran, the formation of a unified the most part. The few incidents that did government appears difficult at this time. occur included shootings at a number of Between 2004 and 2008, the Shiite cleric polling stations in the provinces of Basrah, Muqtada Al-Sadr – whose political move- Salah Al-Din and Diyala, and a rocket fired ment seems to be the winner of the elec- at one station in the province of Anbar. In tions, given the preliminary results – was Najaf, the religious center of the Iraqi Shiite fighting the US forces in Iraq with his mili- community, a polling station was closed tia, the Mahdi brigade. Most recently, how- down due to quarrels. Still, none of these ever, he and his Sairon list opened up to incidents led to serious consequences or ef- the USA and Saudi Arabia, which could turn fects on the election process. In the Kirkuk the list into a balanced consensus party. If province, however, an explosion on Election it comes to a conflict between Iran and the Day resulted in six fatalities. USA after withdrawing from the JCPOA and fighting ISIL, it will be difficult for Iraq es- Due to the security situation, all Iraqi air- pecially, to not be drawn into it. ports and their flight operations were shut down on Election Day. Across the country, Irregularities only vehicles authorized by IHEC were al- lowed on the streets. These restrictions It has been reported that incidents of fraud were then lifted during the day, as the se- that likely influenced the election outcome curity situation was assessed as stable. and might delay the government formation process took place across the country. In Despite announcements prior to the elec- Baghdad and the southern provinces, armed tion, no ISIL attacks targeting the polling militiamen are said to have directly exerted stations were reported on Election Day. One influence on the decision of voters in polling year after the retake of ISIL’s stronghold stations through their presence near voters Mosul by the Iraqi forces, this lack of action at the stations. shows the terror group’s limited capacity to carry out complex operations. Also, it high- Other cases report exchanges of ballot pa- lights the achievements of the Iraqi security pers for others after the election, causing a forces, who were able to establish a stable different result. Especially in the multi- security regime. Especially in the border re- ethnic city of Kirkuk, many such incidences gion to Syria and the areas surrounding Kir- have been reported. Voters all across the kuk and Mosul, many ISIL-terror cells re- country have already submitted complaints main present and pose a future threat to against the preliminary results, even though the country. Prime Minister Al-Abadi has called on them 3 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. to accept the votes and respect the new Preliminary Results power balance. Up until now, it is unclear COUNTRY when the revision of all complaints will be IHEC has published the preliminary election NILS WÖRMER completed to announce the final results. results on May 19. According to these re- HANNES PICHLER The Iraqi constitution does not define a sults, Prime Minister Al-Abadi did not win deadline after which no more complaints any of the crucial constituencies, while Al- May 2018 may be turned in. Sadr’s Sairoun Movement and Al-Ameri’s Conquest Alliance were successful in signifi- www.kas.de Formation of a New Government cant parts of the country. In predominantly www.kas.de/syrien-irak Shiite Iraq, experts consider the Shiite Only after the final results are announced provinces of the south to be the most im- by IHEC and confirmed by the Supreme portant for the final outcome of the election. Court can a new government begin to form. In these areas, Al-Sadr and Al-Ameri took It is currently assumed that the complaint the first ranks. Al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance procedure will not be completed before the only won in the predominantly Sunni prov- end of the fasting month of Ramadan (June ince of Ninawa that was destroyed by ISIL. 15, 2018), which means the ratification of On a national level, however, the current the results by the Supreme Court can only Prime Minister lags behind Al-Sadr and Al- be initiated in the second half of the year.
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