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Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 72–82 doi: 10.1002/app5.111 Special Issue

The New in

Edward Aspinall*

Abstract 1. Introduction

A new nationalist mood is visible in Indonesia, Over the last decade, as Indonesia has recov- expressed in increasingly bellicose rejection of ered from the blows of the 1997–98 Asian alleged foreign interference in Indonesia’s financial crisis, resumed economic growth and affairs and in demands for greater interna- stabilised as a successful democracy, a mood of tional recognition of Indonesia’s power and assertive nationalism has entered the country’s status. This new mood has been visible for public discourse and domestic politics. Politi- several years, but became particularly marked cians, intellectuals, journalists, leaders of during the 2014 presidential election and religious and social organisations, and many under the new administration. ordinary citizens frequently state publicly that This article analyses Indonesia’s new - foreign countries habitually insult, exploit and alism, especially as manifested in economic, mistreat Indonesia, and do not accord it the cultural and territorial spheres, noting both respect it deserves as a great nation. From time continuities with past episodes, and novel fea- to time, there are angry eruptions of public tures. A chief novelty is contemporary nation- protest and media condemnation of other coun- alism’s markedly non-ideological and non- tries—usually neighbours, such as Malaysia or intellectual form; continuity is visible in its —in response to alleged insults that discursive style, with many contemporary they or their leaders have directed in Indone- nationalists anachronistically reproducing sia’s direction. Candidates for political office tropes rooted in earlier periods. The article increasingly draw upon nationalist themes, and concludes by identifying forces driving the political leaders are increasingly moulding contemporary resurgence of nationalism, public policy to match the nationalist mood, notably the effects of democratisation as well with a host of measures to protect sectors of the as deeper feelings of insecurity about Indone- Indonesian economy and restrict activities by sia’s achievements. foreigners. Though nationalist discourse and policy-making have featured in all post- Key words: nationalism, foreign relations, Soeharto governments, they are becoming even Indonesian politics, democratisation, eco- more prominent under President Joko Widodo, nomic nationalism sworn into office in October 2014. This article sketches out core features of this new nationalism, analyses its historical roots, * Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Canberra, and identifies the factors driving its contempo- Australian Capital Territory 0200 Australia; email rary manifestation. A first section introduces Ͻ[email protected]Ͼ. The author the new nationalism, noting three key arenas of thanks Paul Kenny and Eve Warburton for their nationalist mobilisation: territorial, economic feedback on an earlier version of this article. and cultural. A second section explains the

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. Aspinall: New Nationalism in Indonesia 73 historical sweep of Indonesian nationalism, and intellect, its advocates often pay little heed both in order to identify roots of the contem- to the logical consistency or implications of porary phenomenon and to identify its novel their positions. Nationalism is also highly fun- characteristics. The next sections focus on two gible, with nationalists able to combine differ- features that define the contemporary nation- ent aspects of nationalist thinking, and overlay alism: first, a sense of suspicion, sometimes them on other political philosophies and ideas, bordering on paranoia, about allegedly hostile with almost infinite variation. Accordingly, intents harboured by foreign countries; though the piece discusses contemporary Indo- second, an obsession with insults allegedly nesian nationalism in rather sweeping terms, directed at Indonesia, and an overwhelming we should remember that there is in practice concern to defend Indonesia’s ‘national considerable variety in how dignity’. articulate, combine and act upon nationalist The final part of the article considers ideas. Many individuals disagree with the dis- factors driving the new nationalism. Indone- courses outlined below, or aspects of them. sia’s post-1998 democratisation, and the Even so, the nationalist mood described here absence of strong policy or ideological differ- represents a widely shared and distinctive ences between its major parties, provides a feature of Indonesia’s contemporary political domestic political context strongly conducive landscape. to nationalist outbidding. The new nationalism is also moulded by current insecurities about 2. The 2014 Election, Jokowi and the Indonesia’s place in the world. The emphasis New Nationalism on national dignity, for example, derives largely from anxieties that attend Indonesia’s One sign that assertive nationalism was transformation from a relatively poor and re-emerging at the centre of Indonesian politics underdeveloped nation into a more successful came with the presidential election campaign of economic player, but one that still lags behind 2014. One of the two contestants, Prabowo neighbouring countries. Subianto, a retired military general, who had Before we proceed with the argument, let us played a leading role in Soeharto’s note two caveats. The first is that the primary (1966-98) regime, built his campaign appeal focus of this article is Indonesian nationalism almost exclusively on a nationalist platform. with regard to the country’s external relations. Though all mainstream politicians in Indone- Nationalism is always Janus faced, looking sia, as in other countries, are nationalist to one simultaneously outward, to assert a place for degree or another, the vehemence of Prabowo’s the nation within the international community nationalist message, and the passion with of nation-states, and inward, to identify and which it was delivered, was distinctive. In his define the critical features of stump speeches, Prabowo frequently con- to which citizens should owe their loyalty and demned the foreign actors who were conspir- (often) to punish those who deviate. These two ing—in concert with (unnamed) domestic sides are interconnected, but this essay focuses traitors—to drain Indonesia’s national wealth, on the outward orientation. Accordingly, we with the consequence that Indonesia had do not discuss much Indonesian nationalism’s become a ‘nation of slaves’ (bangsa kacung). achievements with regard to the creation of an Foreigners were sneering at Indonesia, he inclusionary national identity in which ethnic repeatedly stated, and it was time for Indonesia and religious minorities are accommodated, to assert itself as a dignified and great nation. nor the difficulties which have attended this In large part, this meant throwing off the shack- process. Second, it should be stressed that les of foreign economic exploitation and limit- nationalism involves notably amorphous ideas ing the role of foreign companies—especially and dispositions. Because nationalism is typi- in the natural resources sector—but it also cally linked to structures of feeling and meant asserting Indonesia’s greatness in fields emotion more than to the world of rationality ranging from military power to culture.

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 74 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016

Presumably to underline the seriousness of his alleged external aggression and internal sepa- nationalist message, Prabowo even styled ratism. Indeed, in the minds of most national- himself on Indonesia’s founding father Presi- ists, these threats are inextricably linked, for dent Sukarno, wearing a black peci cap and an reasons touched upon below. Nationalist dis- old-fashioned military-cum-safari suit mod- course on this issue reached a fever pitch elled like those worn by Sukarno in his heyday during and immediately after the 1999 (Aspinall 2015). Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor. Although Prabowo’s rival, the ultimately Despite the fact that this intervention occurred victorious Joko Widodo (often called Jokowi) on Indonesia’s invitation, after an Indonesian- had a less strident approach (Mietzner 2015), initiated referendum process, which was fol- he also promoted a fundamentally nationalist lowed by widespread Indonesian military platform, promoting a threefold emphasis on abuses, most mainstream Indonesian politi- political sovereignty, economic autarchy and cians blame the ‘loss’ of East Timor on the cultural renaissance. When Prabowo tried to intervention and do not concede that the outflank him on nationalist issues in the tele- history of Indonesian military occupation and vised debates, Jokowi responded effectively: human rights violations in the province was for example when Prabowo implied Jokowi responsible. was weak on national security by asking him Similar themes still feature in mainstream what he would do if a foreign country claimed discourse on other trouble spots. Military and occupied Indonesian territory (a live issue leaders, national parliamentarians and other because of disputes with Malaysia), Jokowi politicians, for example, routinely state that responded that he would first negotiate but political unrest and pro-independence senti- after that: ‘If it is clearly our possession then ment in Papua are linked to foreign plans to we would have to do anything, if it concerns destabilise Indonesia and access Papua’s our sovereignty, yeah, we’ll make trouble [kita mineral wealth. In October 2014, for example, buat ramai]. Don’t think I can’t be tough. I am Jokowi’s new internal affairs minister, when tough and bold in making decisions and taking justifying a policy to split up the provinces of risks!’ (Tribunnews.com 2014). After his inau- Papua and West Papua, claimed that the policy guration, Jokowi’s government adopted a host was necessary to prevent increasing foreign of new nationalist measures. These included intervention in Papua (Republika 2014). It new import restrictions, such as a ban on the need hardly be stated that this attitude does not import of rice alongside a proclaimed goal of help to guide policy-makers to accurately diag- achieving complete food self-sufficiency, but nose the roots of political conflict in these also covering such acts as the much publicised provinces and to design appropriate responses. burning of foreign fishing boats captured in Unresolved territorial disputes with Indonesian waters and the execution of neighbours, especially Malaysia, have also persons, mostly foreigners, convicted of nar- caused tension. In 2002, the International cotics crimes. Court of Justice ruled in favour of Malaysian Stepping back from the immediate context claims over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, of Jokowi’s new government and surveying located off Borneo, causing great angst and the years since the fall of Soeharto, we can contributing to a widespread belief that Indo- identify three main arenas in which nationalist nesia’s maritime regions and outlying islands mobilisation and policy-making have played are vulnerable to predation. Several near out. clashes between Malaysian and vessels in the disputed oil-rich Ambalat 2.1 Territorial Nationalism bloc, also near Borneo, have prompted out- pourings of public hostility towards Malaysia A consistent concern of nationalists in the involving, among other things, demonstrations post-Soeharto era has been maintaining Indo- at which protestors threw human excrement at nesia’s territorial integrity in the face of the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta and called

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Aspinall: New Nationalism in Indonesia 75 for volunteer forces to participate in a new actively compete in the domestic market and version of the ‘ganyang Malaysia’ (‘crush so prevent ‘foreign businesspeople’ from Malaysia’) campaign of the 1960s. These ‘occupying’ (menduduki—a word usually issues, alongside cultural and other tensions associated with military conquest) the Indo- discussed below, have combined to make nesian market (MetroTVnews.com 2015). Malaysia the leading target of nationalist ire in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto period (Clark & 2.3 Pietsch 2014). The cultural arena has also become an increas- 2.2 ingly important arena of nationalist mobilisa- tion, in part prompted by the spread of modern Nationalist policies designed to protect domes- communication technologies, especially the tic producers or markets against foreign com- Internet and social media. The most visible petition have a long history in Indonesia, but manifestation of this new trend has been the country was forced to open large segments a series of disputes with Indonesia’s of the economy to foreign investment and trade neighbours, especially Malaysia, which Indo- under International Monetary Fund rescue nesians have accused of engaging in cultural packages after the 1997–98 financial collapse. theft by laying claim to various Indonesian After Indonesia paid off its debts and began to traditions—dances, songs, culinary products enjoy the fruits of the international commodity and the like—in their own promotional and boom, a return to economic nationalist policies marketing activities. Thus, for example, when became visible, starting around the beginning the Discovery Channel featured footage of the of Yudhoyono’s second term in 2009–2010. A distinctive Balinese pendet dance in advertise- raft of new import restrictions have been ments promoting a series on Malaysia, there imposed, typically with the express purpose of was an eruption of condemnation of Malaysia protecting vulnerable industries from foreign by political leaders and in the media and competition and, especially, supporting agri- online, as well as angry demonstrations and cultural producers. Minerals have been a target calls to ‘crush Malaysia’. The Tourism and of a new ‘’, with new Culture Minister sent an official letter accus- regulations imposing limits on foreign owner- ing Malaysia of a violation of ethics; parlia- ship and banning the export of unprocessed mentarians called on the government to ores (Warburton 2014). Yudhoyono’s govern- withdraw the ambassador. Similar anger has ment also for a time stopped the import of rice, arisen in response to alleged Malaysian appro- immediately leading to an increase in the price priation of, among other things, a famous of the commodity and bumping up the poverty Ambonese song, a Batak dance, the distinctive rate (rice eats up a large part of the daily reog masked dance from East Java and even a expenditure of poor people). Some of these particular variety of spring roll. Though such policies have been driven by vested interests incidents may seem trivial, along with the ter- and rent seekers, others (such as the rice ban) ritorial disputes and other tensions between by public pressure, including mobilisations by the two countries, they have contributed to farmers and other producer groups. great popular hostility towards Malaysia. One striking aspect of this economic nationalist turn has been how politicians have framed it in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 3. Historical Roots terms: the fevered nature of Prabowo’s denunciations of foreign control over Indone- In many respects, the new nationalism in Indo- sia’s natural wealth has already been men- nesia is not particularly new. As numerous tioned; Jokowi, too, frequently slips into theorists of nationalism have pointed out similar language. For example, recently the (a classic statement is Anderson 1983), nation- president urged young entrepreneurs to more alism always functions to connect individual

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 76 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 citizens to a wider national narrative and birth After the Army emerged victorious from myth. In the Indonesian case, the birth myth this conflict, Soeharto’s New Order regime focuses on the struggle against Dutch colonial turned Indonesian nationalism to the purposes exploitation and subjugation. Through seven of regime maintenance and authoritarian decades of independent statehood, Indonesian legitimation. Regime leaders were not inter- nationalism has consistently oriented to this ested in highlighting the revolutionary content early anti-colonial struggle for its myths, of Indonesia’s nationalist history even as they symbols and idiom. Contemporary national- kept alive its iconography and terminology. ists, as in earlier periods, draw heavily on the Instead, they promoted a version of national- terminology and symbols of the anti-colonial ism that stressed an Indonesian national ‘per- struggle. Every Indonesian school child learns sonality’ founded on harmony and group about the epochal moments in Indonesia’s interests rather than conflict and individual national awakening, the various officially des- rights. In stark contrast to the Guided Democ- ignated ‘national heroes’ who led anti-colonial racy period, when Sukarno had harboured resistance, and how to sing the ‘struggle grand ambitions about mobilising the world’s songs’ of that era. They all become intimately New Emerging Forces (NEFOs) against impe- familiar—through re-enactments, dioramas, rialism, Soeharto’s government was inward public monuments, movies and other cultural looking and conservative in its international productions—with the iconic image of the relations. However, as the government came long-haired, head-banded and heavily muscled under increasing pressure for political reform revolutionary youth (pemuda) holding aloft a in its final decade, and as the international sharpened length of bamboo. Much is made of environment after the collapse of the Soviet the ‘struggle spirit’ (semangat perjuangan)of Union became less supportive, regime leaders the early nationalists and how this spirit should began to revive nationalism in order to buttress guide contemporary Indonesians. the regime against internal and external ideo- Despite a consistent orientation to the myth logical threats. Senior military officers often of the anti-Dutch struggle, Indonesian nation- accused persons who sought political reform alism has also had distinctive features in differ- of deviating from Indonesia’s national person- ent periods, and it has been shaped by changing ality and as being ‘national traitors’. Under political imperatives. In the first two decades of Soeharto, nationalism was above all a tool in Indonesian independence, especially during the hands of a highly conservative military- the period of Guided Democracy under Presi- bureaucratic caste. dent Sukarno (1957–1966), nationalism was Indonesia’s contemporary nationalism is generally leftist in orientation and focused on still shaped by its historical roots. For the unfinished anti-colonial mission of the example, the belief that political unrest on revolution (notably, nationalisation of foreign Indonesia’s periphery arises from a fusion of enterprises and ‘liberation’ of Papua). In the separatism and foreign intervention is directly final years of his rule, Sukarno tried to focus traceable to the years of the revolution, when Indonesia’s revolutionary energies outwards, the Dutch sponsored a federal Republic of the including through a policy of Konfrontasi of Indonesia as part of their strat- (Confrontation) with the newly formed Federa- egy to defeat the nationalists, and to the 1950s tion of Malaysia which he described as a when the United States supported regional neo-colonial dagger aimed at the heart of Indo- rebels and contemplated splitting Indonesia nesia. He did so, most analysts agreed, as a into two or more states (Kahin & Kahin 1995). product of domestic politics: Sukarno was Many other aspects of contemporary Indone- trying to hold together a political spectrum sian nationalism—for instance the militant undergoing rapid polarisation between sup- anti-colonial language in which opposition to porters of the Indonesian Communist Party on foreign investment is often expressed—are the left and the Army, Islamic forces and their also linked to this historical legacy. Indeed, it allies on the right. should be stressed that the three key arenas of

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Aspinall: New Nationalism in Indonesia 77 nationalist mobilisation discussed above— the images of the pendet dance, some Indone- territorial, economic and cultural—have been sians in Jakarta carried sharpened bamboo major foci of Indonesian nationalist debate and spears and head bands as they set about trying mobilisation since the early years of indepen- to ‘sweep’ the streets and capture Malaysian dence. citizens (Koran Tempo 2009). In short, there In fact, to say that contemporary Indonesian often seems to be a mismatch between the nationalism is influenced by its history is a tenor of current nationalist rhetoric and the significant understatement. In many ways, it seriousness of the underlying issues. seems trapped by it, with much current nation- Setting aside such instances of discursive alist discourse sounding very anachronistic, as and symbolic fossilisation, we still need to if ripped straight from an earlier era and trans- identify the defining features and underlying planted unmodified into the present. What, for political motivations of the new nationalism.As example, are we to make of otherwise barely noted above, Sukarno-era nationalism was inexplicable statements such as that of Tentara politically leftist, and shaped by Sukarno’s Nasional Indonesia (TNI) (Indonesian National desire to manage domestic political conflict. Military) commander Moeldoko at a February Soeharto-era nationalism was politically con- 2015 meeting with members of Banser, the servative and functioned primarily to justify security group linked to the mass Islamic authoritarian rule. Both versions, in their own organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama: ‘Other coun- ways, were highly ideological: Sukarno talked tries are really terrified if they find out that TNI at great length about NEFOs and OLDEFOs and Banser are in synergy’, he told the meeting (Old Established Forces), borrowed freely from (Detik 2015). In the context of Indonesia’s con- political philosophers of various stripes, and temporary international relations, this state- coined a plethora of acronyms and slogans to ment makes no sense: What country would care encapsulate his grandiose concepts and ambi- in the slightest to learn that the Indonesian tions. Under Soeharto, there was equally arcane military was cooperating with a ramshackle ideological production, though of a more organisation of village youths whose regular leaden variety, with regime-approved intellec- security function consists of little more than tuals producing a huge volume of turgid tracts providing honour guards for respected kyai,or about the official ‘ ideology’. religious scholars, in their communities? In the In contrast, contemporary nationalism is context of mainstream readings of Indonesia’s strikingly un-ideological and un-theorised. national history, the statement is more compre- Indonesian nationalism today has few ideo- hensible, invoking as it does myths of a national logues but many recyclers of old tropes and struggle in which military units fought side by promoters of base emotional appeals. But what side with popular organisations to drive out the are those appeals? Dutch. The statement also expresses Indone- sian military doctrine concerning the mobilisa- tion of popular militias in the event of external 4. Foreign Threats aggression, and reflects the TNI’s perception of itself as a people’s army. One distinctive feature of the contemporary It is easy to find similar examples in almost nationalism is its preoccupation with the any contemporary nationalist controversy. On notion that various (usually unnamed) foreign social media, it is common for individuals to powers harbour nefarious and hostile designs jump from a discussion of, say, whether a par- on Indonesia. The most articulate spokesper- ticular form of spring roll should be considered son of this view in recent times was Prabowo part of Indonesian or Malaysian cuisine to during his 2014 presidential campaign. He fre- invocations of massacres by Dutch troops quently claimed that foreigners were sucking in Sulawesi in the 1940s, or the 1960s ‘Crush Indonesia dry of its natural wealth. However, Malaysia’ campaign. And, as mentioned statements along similar lines are unremark- above, when the Discovery Channel broadcast able in contemporary Indonesia, and are made

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 78 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 on virtually a daily basis in national political and foreign (especially Western) cultural influ- debate. ence. Moreover, such concerns cross the politi- Let us take an example involving another cal spectrum—it is easy to find remarkably senior military officer. From late 2014, the similar statements about foreign threats to Army Chief of Staff, General Indonesia’s sovereignty and culture from (since promoted to Armed Forces commander) Islamist groups on the one hand through to received much media coverage when he secular–nationalist groups on the other. appeared in a series of speaking engagements at Over the last five years or so, various gov- campuses. His purposes, he said, was to warn ernment policies have been reshaped to deal Indonesian youth about the danger of ‘proxy with such foreign dangers. As well as military war’in Indonesia. He described proxy war as ‘a redeployments to areas that are seen as vulner- confrontation between two major powers able (such as remote islands and parts of the using proxy actors so as to avoid direct confron- maritime border with Malaysia), there has tation’. The proxies of choice were usually been a tightening of regulations governing for- small states but could also be non-state actors eigners within the country. For example, in such as non-governmental organisations, social 2010 the Minister of the Interior issued a new organisations, community groups and individu- ‘Guidelines for the Monitoring of Foreigners als. Proxy war was already threatening Indone- and Foreign Organisations in the Regions’ sia, he insisted, as manifested by the occurrence (Regulation 29 of 2010) mandating increased of separatist movements, mass demonstrations surveillance of non-citizens. There have also and inter-group clashes, though he presented no been new requirements for Indonesian lan- evidence or elaboration to explain how such guage competence for expatriate workers and phenomena were instances of proxy war tighter government control over both govern- (Tribun Jogja 2014). In one speech, the general mental and non-governmental aid programs. explained that the growing narcotics problem in Of course, at one level, the concern with Indonesia was another sign of the proxy war foreign threats is not surprising: nationalists because ‘This condition happens in order to always define the identity of their nation in damage the Indonesian young generation [. . .]. opposition to some foreign Other, whether Through an international conspiracy, Indone- explicitly or implicitly. There is, however, a sian younger generation can unknowingly be notable disproportionality about current Indo- destroyed, without having to use armed force’ nesian discourse. The regional security context (Liputan6.com 2014). Though General Gatot in which Indonesia finds itself is benign, and no clearly believed proxy war was already being country has expressed hostile intent towards waged on Indonesia, in none of these speeches Indonesia. Yet much contemporary discourses did he identify the country that was the culprit. represent Indonesia as being already under This is a particularly elaborate example, but assault. It is hard to avoid concluding that this casual references to Indonesia being the target discourse in fact points towards deep insecuri- of foreign conspiracies, economic or political ties about Indonesia’s identity and place in the subjugation, moral or political subversion and world, a point we return to below. the like are all part of mainstream debate in Indonesia and rarely raise an eyebrow when 5. National Dignity uttered even by ministers or members of par- liament. The belief that foreign countries rep- A second repeated theme of the contemporary resent a territorial, physical or security threat is nationalism is a preoccupation with Indone- often intertwined with more general moral sia’s ‘national dignity’ or martabat bangsa. panic about cultural and social change. Public This is a key phrase that recurs constantly in figures frequently state that social ills such as political debate. Contemporary political sexual promiscuity, drug use, prostitution, leaders demonstrate a sometimes overwhelm- sexually transmitted diseases, pornography ing obsession with insults, denigration, and and the like are attributable to globalisation devaluing of Indonesia by foreigners, and

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Aspinall: New Nationalism in Indonesia 79 repeatedly assert that Indonesia needs to stand Why on earth should we be wearing the used up to foreign more strongly in assert- bras and underwear of other nations?’ (Tempo ing its own interests. For example, when 2015). Despite the fact that such clothes are various foreign governments appealed to eagerly bought up by poor consumers in Indo- Jokowi not to execute their nationals for drugs nesia, who like both their cheapness and their crimes in early 2015, there was a chorus of quality, the minister (one of Indonesia’s public commentary from ministers down that wealthiest men) did not like the image the the president should resist such pressures in trade projected. Indonesians, too, especially order to preserve ‘national dignity’. Indeed, poor ones are thus called upon to regulate their politicians and public commentators represent own behaviour in the service of national virtually any instance of problematic relations dignity. with other countries in this way: as a test of Indonesia’s ability to assert and defend its 6. Explaining the New Nationalism dignity. A striking feature of the national dignity What then explains this new nationalist mood? discourse is that it is also directed at One source is political. It is possible to see remoulding the behaviours of Indonesians political manipulation at play in most if not all themselves in ways that policy-makers believe of the new expressions of nationalism. Efforts will improve Indonesia’s image in the eyes of by TNI officers to trumpet Indonesia’s vulner- both citizens and others. Thus for example, in abilities reflect efforts by the military to reas- February 2015, Jokowi announced that he sert itself and regain a domestic security role. wanted to stop the export of household domes- Likewise, the strongly nationalist tenor of the tic workers from Indonesia, saying that this Jokowi government’s first months expressed was a matter of ‘dignity and self respect’. He the new president’s attempt to demonstrate complained that ‘Worldwide there are only toughness at a time when his handling of three countries that supply foreign domestic domestic issues—notably an assault by corrupt workers, two in Asia and one in Africa [a officers within the national police on the Cor- patently incorrect statement]. One of the Asian ruption Eradication Commission—showed ones is Indonesia. This is a matter of our that he could easily be pushed around by pow- dignity. When we have bilateral dealings with erful interest groups. Malaysia, we are really ashamed’ ( More deeply, the emergence of the new 2015a). Around the same time, the Agriculture nationalism is a product of the democratisation Minister announced a ban on the import of of Indonesian political life that has occurred offal—an important ingredient in many Indo- since 1998. To be sure, at first sight the new nesian dishes—because it was used as dog and nationalist mood seems out of kilter with the cat food in exporting countries. ‘I wish our tenor of Indonesia’s generally stable demo- republic to be respected by other nations’, the cratic politics. Nationalism no longer serves minister explained, saying that he was willing the purpose of overcoming ideological to weather a negative response from exporting polarisation, as was the case in the 1960s when countries ‘If we are attacked it doesn’t matter. Sukarno mobilised nationalist sentiment in I’m willing to do anything for the Republic of order to allow him to bridge the widening gulf Indonesia’ (Kompas 2015b). Not to be between left and right. On the contrary, con- outdone, the Trade Minister announced a ban temporary Indonesian politics is marked pre- on the import of second hand clothes. He said cisely by the absence of divisive ideological such goods were often contaminated by fungal cleavages (Mietzner 2008), with all the major spores and bacteria (he initially also said they parties relying on basically similar clientelist posed a risk of HIV transmission, but later strategies to mobilise electoral support apologised for this statement) and believed the (Aspinall 2014). But in fact, the very thinness ban was a matter of national dignity: ‘Let’s and fungibility of nationalism makes it a useful maintain our dignity and honour as a nation. tool for politicians seeking to build popular

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 80 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 support in such a denuded ideological land- Nationalism is a distorted reflection of these scape. In conditions such as those in contem- failings. porary Indonesia, in which the major parties Economically, Indonesia has been trans- and aspirants to executive office differ very forming itself from being a poor, largely agrar- little in policy and programmatic terms, ian society that was a major recipient of nationalism is a useful legitimating device by foreign aid to becoming a middle-income which such actors can try to distinguish them- country that is far more modern and economi- selves from rivals and court public support. In cally successful. However, it still exhibits other words, both the shallowness and the many signs of poverty (almost half the popu- vehemence of the new nationalism are reflec- lation live on $2 a day), and lags visibly behind tions of the absence of other salient cleavages many of its neighbours. The new nationalism in Indonesian politics—such as a clear right– can thus be read partly as a displaced reaction left split on economic policy. Indeed, nation- to the continuing problem of social inequality alist outbidding is common in newly and poverty. Anger about foreign exploitation democratic countries, often leading to the tar- of Indonesia’s natural resources and the geting of ethnic minorities (Snyder 2000). related lament that Indonesia has become a Indonesia went through a period of violent ‘nation of slaves’ are expressions of disap- ethnic mobilisation of this sort in the immedi- pointment about Indonesia’s continuing reli- ate post-Soeharto years (Bertrand 2004), but ance on commodities rather than modern since that time domestic politics have sectors, and about its inability to generate stabilised and the search for a threatening firms that can compete effectively against the Other against which politicians can focus foreign resource giants. Moreover, growing public attention has led them to emphasise regional economic integration heightens rather foreign dangers. than diminishes awareness of the gap between We should also seek explanations for the Indonesia and its neighbours. The mass export new nationalism in broader economic, social of Indonesian labour to and Malay- and cultural dynamics. One explanation for the sia deserves particular mention. This migrant tenor of the new nationalism is simply that it labour outflow has become a painful reminder reflects the hyper reality of the internet age, in for many Indonesians of their country’s rela- which a media image of a Malaysian advertise- tive underdevelopment. Malaysian, Singapor- ment appropriating an Indonesian cultural ean and other employers often mistreat and artefact, or a misjudged statement by an Aus- humiliate these workers, whose suffering is tralian Prime Minister, can instantly be dis- exposed in horrifying detail in the Indonesian seminated, reproduced, memed, mocked, and media, in ways that justifiably anger many reinterpreted among millions of people in Indonesians but also undercut claims that their ways that can give rise to sudden eruptions of country is a great nation, at least economically. nationalist feeling, only to dissipate just as This dynamic helps also to explain a striking rapidly. feature of the new nationalism: its tendency to More deeply, however, the new nationalist target Indonesia’s closest neighbours and mood points to deep insecurities among both natural allies, notably Malaysia and Australia the Indonesian elite and public about Indone- (and Singapore to a lesser extent) rather than sia’s own record of achievement and its place countries that might be considered as posing in the world at this particular historical junc- greater long-term military or cultural threats, ture. Many of the calls to uphold national such as China or the United States. Certainly, strength and dignity point to an underlying border issues play a role in producing this belief that Indonesia is in fact sadly lacking in outcome, but another factor is that Indonesia’s both qualities. Certainly, Indonesia for the past more intense engagement with these countries two decades has been undergoing changes that creates greater opportunities to look at the bear great promise but which have exposed Other, as it were, through an unflattering many systemic economic and political failings. mirror. The popular hostility to Malaysia—a

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Aspinall: New Nationalism in Indonesia 81 country that shares great cultural commonali- Democracy 25(4), 96–110. ties with Indonesia—is particularly revealing Aspinall E (2015) Oligarchic Populism: in this regard. Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indone- The economic disappointments are part of a sian Democracy. Indonesia 99, 1–28. broader pattern. Indonesia has been experienc- Bertrand J (2004) Nationalism and Ethnic ing a period of difficult democratic transition Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge University for the last decade and a half, prompting Press, Cambridge. painful awareness among many Indonesians of Clark M, Pietsch J (2014) Indonesia-Malaysia their country’s weaknesses in law enforce- Relations: Cultural Heritage, Politics and ment, corruption, educational achievement and Labour Migration. Routledge, New York. other areas. Many persons who are virulently Detik (2015) Panglima: Negara Lain Ngeri nationalist when it comes to discussing Indo- Kalau TNI-Bansor Bersinergi, viewed Feb- nesia’s relations with other countries also ruary 2015 Ͻhttp://news.detik.com/read/ excoriate national performance in such fields, 2015/02/23/125609/2840028/10/panglima and can switch freely from berating Malaysia -tni-negara-lain-ngeri-kalau-tni-banser about cultural theft, say, to bewailing the per- -bersinergi?nd772204btr>. fidies of Indonesia’s elite or its political Kahin A, Kahin G (1995) Subversion as system. Likewise, the very elite who trumpet Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Indonesian self-resilience are at the same time Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New Press, avid consumers of prestigious international New York. brands and are likely to seek medical treatment Kompas (2015a) Jokowi Akan Stop Pengiriman in Singaporean hospitals and deposit their TKI, viewed February 2015 Ͻhttp://regional wealth in Singaporean bank accounts. To make .kompas.com/read/2015/02/14/03274001/ matters worse, for the last several decades Jokowi.akan.Stop.Pengiriman.TKI>. Indonesia has had a poorly performing diplo- Kompas (2015b) Mentan: Jeroan Itu Makanan matic corps and few notable successes on the Anjing, Impor Saya Tutup, viewed January international stage. Even the Indonesian 2015 Ͻhttp://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/ military—the pride and joy of many read/2015/01/27/100132626/Mentan.Jeroan nationalists—is repeatedly exposed in the .Itu.Makanan.Anjing.Impor.Saya.Tutup>. domestic media as being a hopelessly ram- Koran Tempo (2009) Razia Warga Malaysia shackle organisation wracked by poor disci- Dinilai Tak Beradab, 10 September pline and corruption and burdened with 2009. outdated and inadequate equipment. Liputan6.com (2014) KSAD: Penyalahgunaan Most ardent Indonesians nationalists are Narkoba Miliki Keterkaitan “Proxy War”, deeply aware of such failings, and it is hard to viewed October 2014 Ͻhttp://news.liputan6 avoid seeing a subtext of frustration in the .com/read/2117518/ksad-penyalahgunaan overweening confidence they articulate. Read -narkoba-miliki-keterkaitan-proxy-war>. this way, the increasing assertiveness of Indo- MetroTVnews.com (2015) Jokowi Puji Anak nesian nationalism is not in fact a sign of Jaman Sekarang Lebih Kreatif Baca growing self-confidence, but rather its reverse. Peluang, viewed March 2015 Ͻhttp:// ekonomi.metrotvnews.com/read/2015/03/ September 2015. 12/370224/jokowi-puji-anak-jaman -sekarang-lebih-kreatif-baca-peluang>. References Mietzner M (2008) Comparing Indonesia’s Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post- Anderson B (1983) Imagined Communities: Suharto Era: From Centrifugal to Centrip- Reflections on the Origin and Spread of etal Inter-Party Competition. Journal of Nationalism. Verso, London. Southeast Asian Studies 39(3), 431–54. Aspinall E (2014) Indonesia’s 2014 Elections: Mietzner M (2015) Reinventing Asian Popu- Parliament and Patronage. Journal of lism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy, and Politi-

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 82 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016

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