MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1974-1 975 Introduction the Period 1974-1 975 Was Characterized by Khmer Comnunist Forces Continually Mainta

CHAPTER N INE MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1974-1 975 Introduction The period 1974-1 975 was characterized by Khmer Comnunist forces continually maintaining pressure on GKR forces protecting Phnom Penh and periodically mounted major assaults against it. The second major attack on Phnom Penh in January 1974, dwarfed the first offensive against the capital in August 1973; in that more artillery, rockets and ground troops were utilized in multiple, although relatively uncoordinated, assaults. Subsequent to major offensives against the capital, the enemy mounted selective attacks on major provincial capitals in order to maintain the initiative, tie down potential reserves, and keep psychological and military pressure on the GKR. Simul- taneously and progressively, the KC either permanently interdicted or intermittently cut all GKR land lines of communication, particularly the roads into Phnom Penh. By early 1974, Phnom Penh's only reliable source of adequate resupply was the lower Mekong River LOC. Curing the 1974 Wet Season, FANK pursued a major operation in the Bassac area southeast of Phnom Penh. FANK was also forced to respond continually to KC provincial initiatives at a level of combat intensity which did not as in previous wet seasons abate appreciably. As a result, FANK did not retain and refit as in previous wet seasons and was not pre- pared for the major KC assault which was launched on 1 January 1975 with 139 two objectives: complete interdiction of the Mekong LOC and seizure of Phnom Penh. This chapter will discuss the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia during the period 1974-1975. As did chapters five and seven, it will focus on the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC). Brigadier General William W. Palmer was Chief, MEDTC during this period. His End of Tour Report is the basis for all information con- tained in this chapter. Specific data and information is referenced to footnotes to direct the reader to the appropriate section of General Palmer's report. 140 In order to fully analyze United States Military Assistance to Cambodia during this period, it is necessary to renew the following events and activities: . MAP/CRA Funding . MEDTC Reorganization . Transportation and LOC's . The Ammunition Program . Aerial Resupply MPA/CRA iundi ng Initially, FY 75 MAP-CB was programmed to obligate as early as possible during the fiscal year for longer lead-time investment items so as to secure much-needed delivery as soon as possible. The incre- mental (Continuing Resolution Authority) funding of the program quickly obviated this approach, driving all available funds into operations and maintenance lines, particularly ammunition. By December, 1974, when Congress finally authorized New Obligational Authority for FY 75, MEDTC had been spending at a rate ($70 million per quarter) for nearly one- half of the fiscal year which unfortunately turned out to be forty per- cent in excess of the amount finally authorized ($200 million for FY 75). Management philosophy radically shifted to sever retrenchment and an eventual request for supplemental funding. In order to provide a modicum of continuity to the program in spite of the funding constraints, and assuming that absolutely essential ammunition would be made available, the decision was made in late December to maintain all non-ammunition 1 ines at the bare minimums 141 required to get through until 30 June 1975, expressing the entire remaining program shortfall in days of ammunition supply. Since the ammunition pipe- line was full and 60 days' stocks preposition in Thailand, last-minute funding decisions could best be accommodated in ammunition lines. However, by 7 February, with notification that all funds under the authorized CB-MAP ceiling of $2791 were exhausted, this philosophy had clearly been overtaken by the following events. First, the severe restrictions placed on the use of Section 506 draw down authority granted by the President reduced its flexibility to the point where available funds could not be applied to the lines in which they were most needed. Second, the FY 75 authorization legislation directed a series of hereto- fore undeducted charges to MAP-CB. The final blow was the enemy's suc- cessful interdiction of the Lower Mekong. The initial and very expensive failures to break the blockade, followed by total reliance on civilian contract airlanded resupply from Phnom Penh and on airdrop for most enclaves, resulted in massive added PCH&T costs chargeable to MAP-CB. To finance these sizeable unprogrammed aerial delivery costs, a drastic overall reassessment of the remaining MAP-CB open lines was immediately conducted, and continued throughout the Team's last two months of in-country operation. Generally, this day-by-day reprogramming effort involved cancellation of all longer lead time items in favor of basic operational commodities, transportation assets, and any critically needed attritionlinvestment items which could be made available and delivered in the short term. Even this management effort was continually frustrated by a practice analogous to a run on a failing bank. The total amount of funds remaining was drained at both ends, as the various 142 DOD agencies, from which MAP-CB had acquired goods or services since 1971, scrutinized their accounts and submitted their belated, but none- theless valid, claims against the rapidly dwindling dollar amounts available. Program lines could not be drawn down to zero balance in view of possible delayed billings and resultant over-obligations. The effect of these factors, coupled with the inherent lag time between a MEDTC line manager's obligation or program change action and its final posting at the military departments, was to frustrate the very day-by-day program management made necessary by the dearth of funds. Quite clearly, the MAP/PPBS was not designed for, nor was it completely adaptable to, an operational combat environment. MEDTC Reorganization MEDTC was originally organized along functional lines with a Plans and Programs Division, a Management Assurance Division and a Logis- tics Division. This organization scheme had proven an effective vehicle for discharging earlier MECTC missions of delivering massive amounts of major equipment items to the Khmer Armed Forces. By August 1974, however, sustaining an existing force structure in hostilities of ever-increasing intensity and service-oriented sophistication became the norm. For that reason, a MEDTC reorganization along component service lines (Army, Navy, Air Force Divisions) was direc.ted and implemented. Because of the singu- lar importance of ammunition, POL and related services a separate, hybrid division was provided as a hold-over from the functional organization, as well as a small overall interservice coordination agency for planning and programming in the Office of the Special Assistance to the Chief, MEDTC (SACSA) . 143 The new organization almost immediately resulted in much closer coordination between MEDTC and the respective Khmer Armed Forces, one of MEDTC's major responsibilities. It did not, per se, further the growth of a true joint staff apparatus in FANK, which although strongly urged by CHMEDTC, met with initial service reluctance, if not resistance on the Khmer side. The dangers of clientism and incomplete coordination were anticipated, but presented no major problems. Without doubt, the new organization was more responsive to MEDTC's overall needs during the reporting period than its predecessor would have been. A description of MEDTC's new organization is enclosed in Annex M. Transportation and LOC's The movement of MAP-CB cargo into GKR ports of entry was accomplished by designating a mode of delivery based on required delivery dates and then assuring that MAP-CB cargo delivery was made to the desired port of entry once cargo arrived in the theater. The MEDTC Transportation Section maintained liaison with Military Sea-Lift Command, Thailand and USARSUPTHAI to coordinate desired surface mode of transport and appropriate destination within the Khmer Republic of cargo transshipped from Thailand. The Transportation Section coordinated surface movement of cargo transshipped at Vung Tau, Republic of Vietnam, by coordinating with Military Sea-Lift Command, Saigon. Aerial movement by MAP-CB cargo into the Khmer Republic was accomplished through coordination with PATMA Thai U-Tapao RTNAB, Thailand. Internal movement within the GKR from ports of entry to the deposits was a function of the FANK J-4. To accomplish this mission, the J-4 had a Joint Trans- portation Board which met to allocate transportation assets of each mode. 144 The JTB consisted of members of Army, Navy, and Air Force who committed portions of their respective assets to accomplish the cargo movements. The actual movement order was then accompl ished by the Director of Transportation acting for the JTB and 5-4. The Director of Transporta- tion issued orders to all modes to move cargo within the guidance of the JTB and priorities established by the FANK J-3. Although the execution of transportation missions assigned to a single service improved during the period 1974-1975, the smooth flow of passengers and cargo from one mode to another was rarely realized. Carao and passengers would often wait excessive periods of time due to FANK's inability to coordinate the entire movement with all service comnanders and staff sections. Frequently, a sound tactical maneuver would become ineffective due to the untimely arrival of MNK river transportation or the non-arrival of truck or aircraft transportation. In February 1975, the concept of a Transportation Movement Control Center was proposed to the FANK. The idea to have a single point of contact for the movement of personnel and cargo was warmly received; however, it was never fully implemented. (1) Highway Movement of Cargo Highway movement of cargo was used to deliver ammunition via Route 5 from Thailand to Battambang. Ammuniton was moved by Thai contractors (ETO) per United States-Thai agreement.

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