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Warning of the Tet Offensive

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' __ ._ _ _ . h f" (30001688 A o - rowed for Release: 2019l01l17 u l 'I I" d" .' -. 1. ‘n " .. .-.'r 1|- |-' r I 1!: ;. ,r' -: _,* '- r v 1 . ‘ pproved for Release: 2019!01/17000016882 - . _. WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE I. At your meeting in February Mr.MI. Helms discussed the question of intelligence warning of the Tet Offensive. His presentation was of necessityneceSSity brief and tentative. After that meeting General Taylor wrote to Ml::.ME. Helms on behalf of the Board asking that a deeper:.:.lookdeeperllook be taken. A. More specifically, General Taylor asked us to examine both the intelligence available and what was done with it. B. Did warning reach the policy-makerspolicy~makerin in -fiWashingtonashington and the commanders in the field? How well were they able to respond? II. These questions::re.quii.;e.dquestions reqdieedrzdetailed a detailed investigation beyond our cu6_comarycustomary ~•post-mortem"Vpost-mortem" procedures. A..a-: This was .. a big-casketsmessagesbig cask,· Messages and.andrreports reports run perhaps into the hundreds of thousands. Literally thousandsthOusands of commanders and intelli­intelli— gence officers played a direct role. Moreover, these people are all still engaged in fighting SC$0 No. 07250/68 -l:-—l— Copy No. 4 of 11 RETYPE RETYPE Ac oroved for Release: 20’] 9’01 {1 7 (300016882 .' .r ,"i 1: «1' . «- IF ._ q. ,“" ‘W " Approvedfer Release: 201 9:01:1 7 (300016882 p... ' , .~ the war in Vietnam or in producing intelli-intelli­ gence here in WashingtonHashington on the war. WeWE therefore had to compromise between our desire for absolute thoroughness and over-ridingover—riding operationalOperational requirements. Wewe could not see everyone we wanted to. Wewe were forced instead to sample the documen­documen- tation. We think we got the answers, but we do not pretend to have pursued every thread. I B. A formal working group was formed under myself as Chairman with representatives fromfrom.State State (Fred Green), JCS (General Depgyi,Dega31£ DIA.(GeneralDIA (General Glass), and NSA (Milton Zaslow).Zaslow)i This group {steered·.steered · the enterprise and examined intelligence production at the Washingtonwashington end.end; ' C. The group in turn sent a delegation to Saigon under (sanitized) from CIA, with General ti; ] " Glass from DIA,BIA, OolonelGolonel Vineyviney from JCS, and observers from CINCPAC to interview senior 'commanderscommanders and their intelligence officers and collect documents.docnments. - D. The Delegation~Delegation! 1,1. On0n the US side interviewed Bunker, Westmoreland, Abrams, Komer, Cushman, Rosson, Peers,Peers. Eckhardt, (IV Corps ' -_ ._ -2-a2- RETYPE ' roved for Release: 2019/01/172019:01r17 C00016882(300016882 .r “I "' . 31.!" Ina- . I.“ *' Approved for Release:Release 2019/01/17201 QIO1/1 C000168.82(300016382 ..... Senior Adviser) J-2Jw2 MACV, allall'GwZ's G-2 1 s and G-2 advisers at Field Force/CorpsForce/Corpsfp level, DIDI.7th 7th AF,'AF, (sanitized) 2. ._0nOn the Vietnamese side, talked to Comm&ndingCommanding Generals of I ai;:'1and IIIl Corps,Corps , J-2 of JGS and Deputy Director of National Police. 3.3.. Visited Phu Bai, Da Nang, Pleiku,Pleiku; Camp Enari, Nha T,.Trlng, ,ng, Bien Hoa,Hoe, Long Binh, Can Tho. e.E. Upon return, the working group prepared a (Sic) interim report, which the DCI sent to ---, which the DUI sent to I I ' General\TaylorGeneralHTaylor last week. After further review, we fibelievebelieve this report is a .goodgood .summarysummary of our.odrz.¢ findings, and we are confident we cannot 1' E improve it except perhaps to add some de­de— tails, if desired. Our agenci~sagencies will continue to study the materials, of course, to digest the lessons we have learned. F. Wewe have a mass of back—upback-up material. We have included a selection of these studies, sum­sum“ mari,es,maries. and documents in a supplementary book which I am now delivering to the Board. Wewe can, of course, provide additional copies if you wish them. RETYPE -~-...3__ H - .1 ' AroedA roved for ReleaseRelease: 2019/01/172019011117 C00016882(3001682 , 1' ""._I I. Ill ••• '. h.|.---._ . Approved fr Release: 2019:0111? CQOO’I_6§82H____-,_.,,.,5; __.I . ./ . III. Our findings essentially confirme:confirms what Mr,Mr. Helms Itoldtold you in February,February. A. There was convincing evidence, both in WashingtonwaShington and in Saigon, that the enemyenemy_was was_ preparing for a series of coordinated attacks,attacks,- probably on a larger scale than everever.before. before. B. This intelligence hag‘had been analyzed and had been made available to commanders. In general, we found that US units were on higher state of alert than normalnormal‘ and that some unit redispositions had been made. C. The intelligence available did not, howeYer,however, pinpoint the time of attack, oror: give a full pictnrepicture of the extent and intensity of the enemy offensive.~offensive. IV. Wewe believe this reflects a considerable achieve­achieve— ll “ - mentmeat for the US intelligence apparatus in Vietnam,Vietnam;- Problems: A. The dual US-VietnameseUS—Vietnamese intelligence systems, _rangingranging in parallel down from Saigon to Corps to Province to District, are most ; Wfiflag...fi ,: , complex-, .The itoluine·:·of low:c,leveLhuman-source complex:_,The ifOlginevoiz' lonelevelnhnman—source reports is immense. -.4- RETYPE RETYPE AnA orovedroved for ReleaseRelease: 2019/01/17201QIO’IH 7 C00016882(300016882 .... -,.--- Ill ••• ... ' .4 ME“: 1. TheTheJClegisenitieed)‘receiuesm CIA'(sanitized) recei"es_ 1?_ I (sanitized) I up to 200 reports a day. 2. MACV's Combined Intelligence Center re­re- ceivesceives-lehout. about 600600a a day from military co.llec-tiO~~----·collectinn22€QIJ B. The natu~enatfiéefgéie of _thefie; fiware§ means that many of these will be low-levelleiwlevel rer,ortsreports ofof_impending impending attacks. Some are received every daynay for a variety of cities. Resisting the t-~tationtemetation to cry wolfwolf' every day requires judgment and di!'i!ip.linediscipline; ., 3 - . C. Enemy security measures before the offensiveoffensive: were extremely stringent.stringent.l - 1. General Westmorelandwestmoreland said the enemy sacrificed coordination to security.security.' This showed up when enemy unitss in .MR-5flR—Sé . attacked 24 hours early (on the night of :Q " 29-30 January).,January).' l? I 2. The enemy'senemy’s plans were compartmented. Probably nono-Conmnnist Cozmnunist officer below "front" level knew the full extent of offensive. RETYPE RETYPE ' AnA orovedroved for ReleaseRelease: 2019/01/17201QIO’IH 7 C00016882(300016882 .97 _ Approyed.... -,.---for Release: 201QIO’II’I 7 C_QQO’I__6_8_82Ill ••• _ 3. Attack orders were not disseminated until the last possible time, 24 to 72 hours before attack. D. (sanitized) V. A samplesamfile of the kinds of warning provided: A. ·.“.icoyirg COMUSMACVfigegym' (20 January) -"The"The enemy is presently developing a threatening posture inin.several .several areas in order to seek victories essential to 'T”“ achieving prestige and bargaining power.
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