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WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE
I. At your meeting in February Mr.MI. Helms discussed
the question of intelligence warning of the Tet
Offensive. His presentation was of necessityneceSSity
brief and tentative. After that meeting General
Taylor wrote to Ml::.ME. Helms on behalf of the Board
asking that a deeper:.:.lookdeeperllook be taken.
A. More specifically, General Taylor asked us
to examine both the intelligence available
and what was done with it.
B. Did warning reach the policy-makerspolicy~makerin in
-fiWashingtonashington and the commanders in the field?
How well were they able to respond?
II. These questions::re.quii.;e.dquestions reqdieedrzdetailed a detailed investigation
beyond our cu6_comarycustomary ~•post-mortem"Vpost-mortem" procedures.
A..a-: This was .. a big-casketsmessagesbig cask,· Messages and.andrreports reports
run perhaps into the hundreds of thousands.
Literally thousandsthOusands of commanders and intelliintelli—
gence officers played a direct role. Moreover,
these people are all still engaged in fighting
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the war in Vietnam or in producing intelli-intelli
gence here in WashingtonHashington on the war. WeWE
therefore had to compromise between our
desire for absolute thoroughness and
over-ridingover—riding operationalOperational requirements. Wewe
could not see everyone we wanted to. Wewe
were forced instead to sample the documendocumen-
tation. We think we got the answers, but
we do not pretend to have pursued every
thread. I
B. A formal working group was formed under
myself as Chairman with representatives
fromfrom.State State (Fred Green), JCS (General Depgyi,Dega31£
DIA.(GeneralDIA (General Glass), and NSA (Milton Zaslow).Zaslow)i
This group {steered·.steered · the enterprise and examined
intelligence production at the Washingtonwashington end.end;
' C. The group in turn sent a delegation to Saigon
under (sanitized) from CIA, with General ti; ] " Glass from DIA,BIA, OolonelGolonel Vineyviney from JCS, and
observers from CINCPAC to interview senior
'commanderscommanders and their intelligence officers
and collect documents.docnments.
- D. The Delegation~Delegation!
1,1. On0n the US side interviewed Bunker,
Westmoreland, Abrams, Komer, Cushman,
Rosson, Peers,Peers. Eckhardt, (IV Corps
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..... Senior Adviser) J-2Jw2 MACV, allall'GwZ's G-2 1 s and G-2 advisers at Field Force/CorpsForce/Corpsfp level, DIDI.7th 7th AF,AF,'
(sanitized)
2. ._0nOn the Vietnamese side, talked to
Comm&ndingCommanding Generals of I ai;:'1and IIIl Corps,Corps ,
J-2 of JGS and Deputy Director of National
Police. 3.3.. Visited Phu Bai, Da Nang, Pleiku,Pleiku;
Camp Enari, Nha T,.Trlng, ,ng, Bien Hoa,Hoe, Long
Binh, Can Tho. e.E. Upon return, the working group prepared a (Sic)
interim report, which the DCI sent to ---, which the DUI sent to I I ' General\TaylorGeneralHTaylor last week. After further review, we
fibelievebelieve this report is a .goodgood .summarysummary of our.odrz.¢
findings, and we are confident we cannot 1' E
improve it except perhaps to add some dede—
tails, if desired. Our agenci~sagencies will continue
to study the materials, of course, to digest
the lessons we have learned.
F. Wewe have a mass of back—upback-up material. We have
included a selection of these studies, sumsum“
mari,es,maries. and documents in a supplementary
book which I am now delivering to the Board.
weWe can, of course, provide additional copies
if you wish them. RETYPE
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III. Our findings essentially confirme:confirms what Mr,Mr. Helms
Itoldtold you in February,February.
A. There was convincing evidence, both in
WashingtonwaShington and in Saigon, that the enemyenemy_was was_
preparing for a series of coordinated attacks,attacks,-
probably on a larger scale than everever.before. before.
B. This intelligence hag‘had been analyzed and
had been made available to commanders.
In general, we found that US units were
on higher state of alert than normalnormal‘
and that some unit redispositions had been made.
C. The intelligence available did not,
howeYer,however, pinpoint the time of attack, oror:
give a full pictnrepicture of the extent and
intensity of the enemy offensive.~offensive. .
IV. Wewe believe this reflects a considerable achieveachieve— ll “ - mentmeat for the US intelligence apparatus in Vietnam,Vietnam;-
Problems:
A. The dual US-VietnameseUS—Vietnamese intelligence systems,
_rangingranging in parallel down from Saigon to
Corps to Province to District, are most ; Wfiflag...fi ,: ,
complex-, .The itoluine·:·of low:c,leveLhuman-source complex:_,The ifOlginevoiz' lonelevelnhnman—source reports is immense.
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... ' .4 ME“: 1. TheTheJClegisenitieed)‘receiuesm CIA'(sanitized) recei"es_
1?_ I (sanitized) I up to 200 reports
a day.
2. MACV's Combined Intelligence Center rere-
ceivesceives-lehout. about 600600a a day from military
co.llec-tiO~~----·collectinn22€QIJ
B. The natu~enatfiéefgéie of _thefie; fiware§ means that many of
these will be low-levelleiwlevel rer,ortsreports ofof_impending impending
attacks. Some are received every daynay for a
variety of cities. Resisting the t-~tationtemetation
to cry wolfwolf' every day requires judgment and
di!'i!ip.linediscipline; ., 3 - .
C. Enemy security measures before the offensiveoffensive:
were extremely stringent.stringent.l -
1. General Westmorelandwestmoreland said the enemy
sacrificed coordination to security.security.'
This showed up when enemy unitss in .MR-5flR—Sé
. . attacked 24 hours early (on the night of
:Q " 29-30 January).,January).' l? I 2. The enemy'senemy’s plans were compartmented.
Probably nono-Conmnnist Cozmnunist officer below
"front" level knew the full extent of
offensive.
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3. Attack orders were not disseminated
until the last possible time, 24 to
72 hours before attack.
D.
(sanitized)
V. A samplesamfile of the kinds of warning provided:
A. ·.“.icoyirg COMUSMACVfigegym' (20 January)
-"The"The enemy is presently developing a
threatening posture inin.several .several areas in
order to seek victories essential to
'T”“ achieving prestige and bargaining power.
He may exercise his initiatives prior to,
during, or after Tet.Tet."11
B.
(sanitized)
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C. State (27 January)
"Communist forces have significantly improved
their capability to launch major offensives
simultaneously or alternatively in several -
areas in South Vietnam."
D. CIA (28 January)
"Within the past week (sanitized) intelliintelli-
gence has provided evidence of a widespread
coordinated series of attacks to be launched
by the Co1111DUnistsCommunists in the near future. Although
the bulk of this evidence indicates the most
critical areas to be in:theingthe northern section
of South Vietnam, there are strong indicationsindications?
that key Co1111DUnistCommunist military·military“ units throughout
most of the country may also be involved. It
is not yet possible to determine if the enemy :
is indeed planning an all-out, country-wide
offensive during, or just following, the Tet
holiday period." I
E. DIABIA (29 January)
"Reports of a forthcoming 'N-Day''NeDay' have been
received from enemy units in all corps areas;
they may indicate an increase in activity
only or could mark the beginning of coordinated
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attacks against allied installations and bases.
throughout the'country.the country. If the latter is
the case, it would~"Ould be the first such coordinated
campaign the enemy has attempted. Indica-Indica—
tions point to N-DayNFDay being scheduled in
the Tet -period,period, but it still seems likely
that the Communists would wait un\nudtil after
the holiday to carry out a plan." 3?
VI. The timing was the key question.
A. Although there were some indications that the
attackattach might come in Tet,most analysts thought
lthethe Tet holiday too meaningful for the VC to
take advantage ofof-it. it.
1. Westmoreland believed the enemyenemj would
attack just beforebeforeaor ..:or just after Tet.
B. By attacking during the holiday the enemy
. could expect two things.
1. ARVN forces would behe off-guard and many
would be on holiday leave. I i» I _ 2. The presence of large numbers of VC in
H _thethe cities wou.ldwould not cause alarm.
t VII. Next to timing, the most serious question was the
basic one of enamyenemy capabilities.
A. MostHost commanders and intelligence officers did
I not beliebelie;,·;:,.fie;the the enemy could do what his propapropae
ganda about the _ "winterwinterespring"..... spring" offensive and
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the "general uprisingll:said--inuprising";said--in general
terms--heterms——he would do.
B. Prevailing estimates of attrition, infilinfil—
tration and recruitment, reports of low
:/ morale, and a long series of defeats had
degraded our image of the enemy.
C. As a result, we did not expect the enemy:
1. To attack on the ggalgscale he did or withWith.EEE the
coordination he showed (although we gave
him the capability of attacking individually
almost all the targets he hit). -
2. To aim for the cities, andand_specificallyf specifically
the civilian::commandcivilian command and control apparatus.
(We(we did not think he would attempt aad -.
general uprising because we did not thinkthidk
he could bring it off: in thisthis-we we were I
right.) I
_____ VIII. Although the full scope of enemy intentions waswasinot not
.known,known, as early as 10 January General WestmorelandWastmoreland
canceled certain QP.:.e.xati'onsagorati'ons in Northern I Corps
and ordered General WeyandHeyand to reposition forces
nearer to Saigon.
A. -InIn subsequent days he issued warnings to USUd
and Vietnamese commanders··,:commanders; and to the US Mission.
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On 15 January, he discussed with PresidentPresident-
Thieu the possibility of canceling the Tet
truce, and on 25 January hehe:andand Ambassador
Bunker succeeded in having the truce
canceled for I Corps.
B. Westmorelandweetmoreland recegnizedrecogni~ed the significance of
the enemY'senemy's premature attacks in MR-5MRr5 and on
'8; 30 January placed all his units on full alert. if 1.1; This measure"measare " saved Tan SonSen Nhut,Nhnt,"11 accordaccord—
W. - ding to 7th7th.AF, AF, and may-haVemay have savedSaved otherother'
bases as wellwell. .. 2.2.. When attacksattacks'did did not occur before Tet,Tetgi
the JGS had allowedallowed'SO 50 percent leavesleaves‘
for ARFN.ARVN. .Thus-onThus· on the 30th it was tootoo;
late to testorerestore ARVN.unitsARVN units to full Z
st~rength.strength.'
IX.lX.' Wewe sense·thatSense that in the day or so befbrebefore the attack
the·"adrenalinthe "adrenalin level" in Saigon was a little '
higher·higher than in washingtonaWashington.
E; A. That is, the senseSenSe ofOf urgentyurgency felt in
h Saigon does not fully come through in thethe"
'werdswords receivedreceived'in in washingtonWashington by thethe'Washington Washington
agencies.ageneies. Atmosphere is not transmitted well
over a teletype,teletype.
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B. This is a subjective judgment, and one which 8'
had no effect on the outcome of the battle,
b1.1tbut it:it does help explain why there was more
of a sense of being 0"takentaken by surprise" in
Washingtonwashington than in Saigon. x.X. Within:::Within; th.isthis general picture, there were notable
differences among the four Corps Tactical Zonesaccess. .. :
A. I Corps was in ~hethe best shape.
1. III Marinemarine Amphibious Force expectedexpedted
attacks on Khe Sanh and Quang Tri, and
(sanitized)
but did not have a date for
this attack.
2. General Cushman expected to be attacked
during Tet.
3. With the truce canceled, most ARVN units
were at full strength and all units were
on a high state of alert.
4. The e~tentextent and coordination of the enemy's
attacks, and his focusing on the cities,
was not expected.
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B. In II Corps, warning was better in t.heithe
=cac highlands than on the coast.coast.-
'lc“1·... On0n the coast attacks ~~rewere launched
by MR-5MR—S a day early. US units were __ h _ I_ W V _- IH-::H
on alert, but primarilyfirinarily against
ceasefire violation$,vialations; ratherratier than
city attacks, and the enemy achieved
some initial successes. - “
3 °. 2. In the highlands, thetoe intelligence .
_:I .
picture was thetfie best in Vietnam, withwith.
...-...... ____
all sources combining to warnearn of several _._
'_-.-'._- enemyeneny attacks.attacks.. The defense ofof-Pleiku Pleiku
.__|,-_ _
.. w~swas the ~ostmost successful US operationoperation- ..'-._.
____. during the offensive. _....
__I 3.3.l ARVN divisionscommandersdivisionucommanders in the highlandshighlandsif
I
I!" 5
__.- ”canceledcanceled leaves onOn their own~own,. . NeverthelesS_;Neverthelessjf flfa
. I._. in some units, strength was far belo~ normal.
"-"-. in some units, strength was far belofiiacrmal, .
I___ C. III Corps had good strategic warning. Ll “
. 1. A :reo'L"ganizationreorganization of MR-4MR—4 .. iri.in {thethe fall had
pointed to an attack on sai~9n.saigonf5, fl' .".'_"'"--+.-'-.T'""'"'."'.-"=. _ 2. .OtherOther indicators (sanitized) ..ledled to
a move of US units closer tOto-the'cityt the city. I 9‘ .-ff; g
3. A11All units were alerted on the 30th, but
% most ARHNARVN units were in their normal Tet
posture nonetheless.
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I.
4. During the 30th II Field Force received
specific information from prisoners that
Saigon, Tan Son Shut;Nhut, etc, were to be
I --cethe target.target.. Tet, and the responsibility
of ARYNARVN for defense of Saigon proper, led
.W_toto the enemy'.senemy‘s initial successes in that
‘fcity.· city.
D. ·In.*ln_I _IVfi Corps .thethe enemy'seneny's attacks werewere_almost almost
i-Vtotall?.totany unexpected.unexpected •
lie7.)_; The VCVC'nere ~ere known tobetojbe inin‘the the cities in
large numbers,numbexs, l>ti.t83£*tges.ees 'this was traditional ‘large .~- c-,,...',;
..... during Tet.fete. p‘ ‘ ““ ‘
E I ‘ ”“'2,2. General Eckhardt,·SeniorEcknardt, Senior Adviser, saidsaid'theé“ the
i-""
:- ' _ -'__-_ .. only '.-'." warning hE:.reCEived was Ggfierai l g i
.""
- only warning bee· received was Geheral
-
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'."."""-.:-'-5-. .. _- .Westmoreland'sWestmo.reland' s alerting·alerting message of ."30 7- f 810
.-
='--._:.-._...-.-:'-=_-;.-
1
..
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.-7'.--._..'-.'= "-.-:-'_- 3. He had no 68US maneuver battalimnbattall E:=.". hi3- .':-'-':_ _. .__ :-.--':'- ._ - conmµmd;command; he tried to ab,:-talerEZARVN ,ARVN units, but _ -' "-=‘:* . ' "NH-H- J i p * ” was unable in the time available to resto,:-erestore -_."-"-'—' /. -_..'.--. .'-. their readiness. .I"."-—'-'—"'-'*—~' . .-.‘.':'.-:-. _ _xi;7XI. These tthenfien are our general.findings:·general findingS:l fiA.e •. ‘Senior'officialsSenior officials in Washingtonweeniegeee and Saigon were .,,_,·. '. . and,• Saigon.were given a high deg:<~edegtee_of‘generel cif'general warning.·warning."”TheyJP They - - , '. ·"xgnere.... were led,led_to to expect thatenide¥spreadthat .wide-spread coordinated 3_ attacks were imminent.·inminent.’ '1.“ 'I- Mr" -13~"13+_ “REM;RETVP; A rovedrowed for Release: 2019/01/1720191101111 7 C00016882(300016882 Approved.... -,.---for_Release: 201QIO’II’I 7 (300016382Ill ••• 1’3 B. They were not given a picture of the extent and intensity of the attacks, or of the precise timing. An attackattack.during during Tet was thought less likely than one befo~ebefore or after. C. Field commanders were specifically warned of a number of individual attacks, and were warned of a wide-spreadwide—spread enemy offensive. They too were not warned of the timing. D. This intelligence was sufficient for alerting measures to be taken throughout Vietnam, although these measures were not too effective in certain areas and units. E. As a result, intelligence considerably·considerably? rere- _ducedduced the impact of the enemy offensive. This map shows thosethese cities attacked, and indicates those from which the enemy was easily thrown back with heavy.heavy.1osses, losses .. rm -14-“1““ . ' RETYPERETYPE RETYPE 0·1 :,,' t:i:::'.: :,< '. AnA orovedroved for ReleaseRelease: 2019/01/17201QIO’IH 7 C00016882(300016882 r(.'i:,: ·\·) 1" .‘I ""- Approved for Release: 2019:0111? (300015582 . ' . _ ‘ i .._MimiQChijpiiifiliiiEELDIURJEfiJHxElELQEEEiiSM' '\ . . "x ' ““7" . ' ' I ‘Hoi An' Cities attacked i'\_ angina.» i" . _ ~ _ tiiBi'lt 01’ 29‘3”I 33"I D: t' Cities: attacked . night bf 30 -31 "Jan K and later - where attack was unit”? and _,_I." _£?tm:htmnd‘ Zorn? 9 Cities , Quin" Tri . effectively beaten “ff '- I ‘II‘ . 1315331.! Lat: F I -- -l‘ 'FIJ-‘- '.. \ l ._ f“ cw ,. \—-...._.rr-_,.r'; “93.533118 ( _':'.-‘.".N5 :h-tm'is'ifin5‘.-‘ 1 n .• TH.-\11..-\:SD “a ‘ 3h" ' ' L. 9:035:13 Hgai._."..- l . _. ..___-..._ _ _'."';"'3 ‘_ -._. _ _. ;_'_. i - ' -' Tancénh wv‘x ' ' -' " .. ‘I-. KGNTUM ' ' ”'12.: 1.. '- .s ,'-. .1 ‘ . II- I a. ... - ; ”-53- -- :‘L; 1 h f Kenn-179‘ - } :._._ - ‘ 1 ' . . _ . "i - “- - N ‘ _ ‘ 4" _ I ‘ _ _‘_ I - Pieiitufi 3iNfl_‘DEN!-§-':. J'.‘...:-',;-. ‘ ‘t.c“....' Quifihapéifi: 0 Sign 5327-:t . Kain-H“! * .3 . - ' tum.' o'-.._?"I aa- . . 4 . L Q-ligha‘t'ranz b ‘I . ..r'. tan-a.J. - ' . - ' Lg-h'- ...'.J'J"-'’ I - .1 . _ ' flfifilfiq ’3' 5'“ 31h“ ‘ .. i K. 3- “I TU:v . .Fu-xl - .. _ . . _ 'I. I'}"""..r:\. (v' I I . lug-i '2” H03 ' fflm$nfi~f¥fi “"1" 1'53“ Q ‘ -'/tan This»: ‘ '- ._ 'than!) if; i. "turn.“ act, Sill-BO}!- _ . . - — "z-ta-u Ez'":"‘lu51~lal‘:‘fl -3»?- Tr; _ . .:_,---_.- uclcahiahfi. _ —. \‘l. r ‘i\='_h%"h " ix\ awn J"??? $21.33;- 34"}? _ .._;a\1 “a, . Fr-*5..- ~.‘h.—n{\-.I.-l...'afi'f‘F-‘Uni'K‘. int“.fiiimlifi -, 'm-ch mm '= 1: ;_.-=.;m;~:.~ur.... Ik'nhfln .§_:' "3"?“ t . _ .. "H'Jhfl: - q. a .- . -i.' . . .I (IN-'5 "fflac'liau ‘ .:_ .- '. . . - I- _‘ ‘ “‘:_', H. ., g... '-' x-..." Q-II~‘-":- ' '- '* .SOUTHVIETNAMa”. ... I‘-‘ h 11-. ' mu 4.5-: cu. ., . 1 ' RET¥PE......