Turbulent Skies an AEI STUDY on the US AIR FORCE’S CONTRIBUTION to INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
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Turbulent Skies AN AEI STUDY ON THE US AIR FORCE’S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION T. Michael Moseley, Phillip Lohaus, Gary J. Schmitt, and Giselle Donnelly MARCH 2019 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Turbulent Skies AN AEI STUDY ON THE US AIR FORCE’S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION T. Michael Moseley, Phillip Lohaus, Gary J. Schmitt, and Giselle Donnelly MARCH 2019 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Cover image: F-15C Eagles from the 67th Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Japan, are refueled by a KC-135R Stratotanker from the 909th Air Refueling Squadron. US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Angelique Perez. © 2019 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary ........................................................................................ 1 I. The Study ............................................................................................... 3 Two Air Forces ................................................................................................................................................................ 4 Game Design..................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Study Objectives .............................................................................................................................................................. 7 II. Core Findings .......................................................................................... 8 Issue One: The Demands of International Competition ........................................................................................ 8 Issue Two: Not Enough Tankers, Not Enough Lift .................................................................................................. 9 Issue Three: Vulnerabilities in Outer Space and Cyberspace ................................................................................. 9 Issue Four: Inadequate Force Posture ....................................................................................................................... 10 Issue Five: Funding Challenges ................................................................................................................................... 11 III. Scenario Summaries ................................................................................ 12 The World in 2024 ......................................................................................................................................................... 12 Scenario I: Is the FYDP Air Force Ready to Compete Against Nation-States Short of Combat?.................. 14 Scenario II: Can the FYDP Air Force Compete in Multiple Theaters at Once? How Might Electronic Warfare Vulnerabilities Affect Its Ability to Do So? ........................................................................... 18 Scenario III: What Impact Do Vulnerabilities in Space Have on the Decision-Making Process? How Does Increased Forward Presence Affect Operations in Other Areas of Responsibility? .................... 24 IV. A New Way Forward: Player Deliberations on Improvements to the FYDP Air Force ....................................................................................... 32 Scenario IV: What Modifications over the FYDP Would Enhance Performance Across Prior Scenarios? ........................................................................................................................................................................ 32 V. Recommendations ................................................................................. 43 Air Force Posture .......................................................................................................................................................... 43 Readiness and Structure ............................................................................................................................................... 44 Increase Command and Control Redundancies ..................................................................................................... 45 Increase Firepower ........................................................................................................................................................ 46 Sharpening Capabilities and Expanding Capacities by 2024 ................................................................................ 47 iii TURBULENT SKIES VI. Conclusions .......................................................................................... 49 VII. Appendixes .......................................................................................... 50 Appendix A. Participants ............................................................................................................................................. 50 Appendix B. Aircraft Unit Costs: Sources and Explanations ................................................................................. 51 Appendix C. Blue Order of Battle ............................................................................................................................... 59 Appendix D. Red Order of Battle ............................................................................................................................... 60 Notes .......................................................................................................... 61 About the Authors ....................................................................................... 65 Acknowledgments ....................................................................................... 66 iv Executive Summary n the summer of 2018, the American Enterprise its efforts to undermine NATO unity and European I Institute’s defense scholars held a two-day table- stability through political warfare, opportunistic mil- top exercise to explore the United States Air Force’s itary engagements, and leveraging its influence in the ability to respond to multiple contingencies in a timely Middle East to burnish its great power bona fides and and effective way. The National Security Strategy and to further pressure Europe. Finally, we assumed Iran National Defense Strategy were used to guide deci- would continue its drive toward regional hegemony sions about force employment and the 2019 Future in an increasingly fractured Middle East. It would Years Defense Program (FYDP) to determine service do so following its habit of sectarian rabble-rousing, capacity and capability. The final step in the exercise sponsorship of proxies, and development of ballis- was to use the results of the employment scenarios to tic and other missile systems (as well as preserving a determine what investment the Air Force might make path toward rapid nuclearization). But also, Iran, see- in the near term to preserve American preeminence in ing an opportunity in US withdrawal from the region, the skies, space, and cyberspace. would include a modest program of conventional More than two dozen former senior military and modernization. civilian officials participated in the exercises, which We also maintained a traditional American under- we set in 2024, which is as far into the future as cur- standing that each region engaged vital US national rent defense planning can realistically project. The security interests, even where the quality and nature exercise tested simultaneous and ongoing challenges of potential adversaries and the regional and global in multiple theaters of operation from America’s competition for power differed. Thus, we assumed strategic competitors. In establishing the scenarios, that the Air Force, while preserving some overseas bas- we hewed closely to the consensus analysis of the ing structure and a global force posture, would rely on US intelligence community and filtered through our the long-standing Air Expeditionary Force concept as own assessments to be sure of the plausibility of the its principal means of organizing for deployment. We scenarios. Moreover, none of the scenarios involved were also alert to the metastasizing challenge of oper- open conflict; we were more interested in ascertain- ating in such a manner with an aging fleet of legacy ing the Air Force’s ability to preserve deterrence than equipment; we wished to understand potential effects in doing a deep dive into whether and how the Air of past postponed modernization and deferred main- Force might or might not prevail in combat. tenance and the limits of current munitions stocks. Following current, formal US strategy statements, In sum, we wished to better know what was clearly we assumed China would continue to follow its knowable and to avoid speculating about potential provocative and expansive ways, particularly but not discontinuities, either for better or worse. We thus exclusively in maritime East Asia. We also accepted presented the players with three scenarios set within that the People’s Liberation Army would continue a single calendar year, scenarios that would likely to modernize, expand its weaponry, gain operational demand an Air Force response. In each case, we pre- expertise, and seek to exploit new technologies such sented the decision makers with choices, but in the as quantum computing and artificial intelligence