Turbulent Skies an AEI STUDY on the US AIR FORCE’S CONTRIBUTION to INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Home , 67th Missile Squadron, Kadena Air Base

Turbulent Skies AN AEI STUDY ON THE US AIR FORCE’S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

T. Michael Moseley, Phillip Lohaus, Gary J. Schmitt, and Giselle Donnelly MARCH 2019

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Turbulent Skies

AN AEI STUDY ON THE US AIR FORCE’S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

T. Michael Moseley, Phillip Lohaus, Gary J. Schmitt, and Giselle Donnelly

MARCH 2019

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Cover image: F-15C Eagles from the 67th Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Japan, are refueled by a KC-135R Stratotanker from the 909th Air Refueling Squadron. US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Angelique Perez.

© 2019 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents

Executive Summary ...... 1

I. The Study ...... 3 Two Air Forces ...... 4 Game Design...... 6 Study Objectives...... 7

II. Core Findings...... 8 Issue One: The Demands of International Competition...... 8 Issue Two: Not Enough Tankers, Not Enough Lift...... 9 Issue Three: Vulnerabilities in Outer Space and Cyberspace...... 9 Issue Four: Inadequate Force Posture...... 10 Issue Five: Funding Challenges...... 11

III. Scenario Summaries...... 12 The World in 2024...... 12 Scenario I: Is the FYDP Air Force Ready to Compete Against Nation-States Short of Combat?...... 14 Scenario II: Can the FYDP Air Force Compete in Multiple Theaters at Once? How Might Electronic Warfare Vulnerabilities Affect Its Ability to Do So?...... 18 Scenario III: What Impact Do Vulnerabilities in Space Have on the Decision-Making Process? How Does Increased Forward Presence Affect Operations in Other Areas of Responsibility?...... 24

IV. A New Way Forward: Player Deliberations on Improvements to the FYDP Air Force...... 32 Scenario IV: What Modifications over the FYDP Would Enhance Performance Across Prior Scenarios?...... 32

V. Recommendations...... 43 Air Force Posture ...... 43 Readiness and Structure...... 44 Increase Command and Control Redundancies...... 45 Increase Firepower...... 46 Sharpening Capabilities and Expanding Capacities by 2024...... 47

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VI. Conclusions ...... 49

VII. Appendixes...... 50 Appendix A. Participants ...... 50 Appendix B. Aircraft Unit Costs: Sources and Explanations...... 51 Appendix C. Blue Order of Battle...... 59 Appendix D. Red Order of Battle...... 60

Notes...... 61

About the Authors ...... 65

Acknowledgments ...... 66

iv Executive Summary

n the summer of 2018, the American Enterprise its efforts to undermine NATO unity and European I Institute’s defense scholars held a two-day table- stability through political warfare, opportunistic mil- top exercise to explore the United States Air Force’s itary engagements, and leveraging its influence in the ability to respond to multiple contingencies in a timely Middle East to burnish its great power bona fides and and effective way. The National Security Strategy and to further pressure Europe. Finally, we assumed Iran National Defense Strategy were used to guide deci- would continue its drive toward regional hegemony sions about force employment and the 2019 Future in an increasingly fractured Middle East. It would Years Defense Program (FYDP) to determine service do so following its habit of sectarian rabble-rousing, capacity and capability. The final step in the exercise sponsorship of proxies, and development of ballis- was to use the results of the employment scenarios to tic and other missile systems (as well as preserving a determine what investment the Air Force might make path toward rapid nuclearization). But also, Iran, see- in the near term to preserve American preeminence in ing an opportunity in US withdrawal from the region, the skies, space, and cyberspace. would include a modest program of conventional More than two dozen former senior military and modernization. civilian officials participated in the exercises, which We also maintained a traditional American under- we set in 2024, which is as far into the future as cur- standing that each region engaged vital US national rent defense planning can realistically project. The security interests, even where the quality and nature exercise tested simultaneous and ongoing challenges of potential adversaries and the regional and global in multiple theaters of operation from America’s competition for power differed. Thus, we assumed strategic competitors. In establishing the scenarios, that the Air Force, while preserving some overseas bas- we hewed closely to the consensus analysis of the ing structure and a global force posture, would rely on US intelligence community and filtered through our the long-standing Air Expeditionary Force concept as own assessments to be sure of the plausibility of the its principal means of organizing for deployment. We scenarios. Moreover, none of the scenarios involved were also alert to the metastasizing challenge of oper- open conflict; we were more interested in ascertain- ating in such a manner with an aging fleet of legacy ing the Air Force’s ability to preserve deterrence than equipment; we wished to understand potential effects in doing a deep dive into whether and how the Air of past postponed modernization and deferred main- Force might or might not prevail in combat. tenance and the limits of current munitions stocks. Following current, formal US strategy statements, In sum, we wished to better know what was clearly we assumed China would continue to follow its knowable and to avoid speculating about potential provocative and expansive ways, particularly but not discontinuities, either for better or worse. We thus exclusively in maritime East Asia. We also accepted presented the players with three scenarios set within that the People’s Liberation Army would continue a single calendar year, scenarios that would likely to modernize, expand its weaponry, gain operational demand an Air Force response. In each case, we pre- expertise, and seek to exploit new technologies such sented the decision makers with choices, but in the as quantum computing and artificial intelligence context of managing the Air Force’s global responsibil- to become more qualitatively competitive with US ities. It would have been difficult to focus exclusively forces. Likewise, we assumed Russia would continue on a single challenge or theater in any of the moves.

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And, as has been the nature of US military experience shortfalls and unpredictability have resulted in Air in the past two decades, none of the crises was imme- Force investments being seriously stretched among diately resolved. The final step in the exercise process maintaining qualitative technological advantages, was a “lessons-learned” discussion designed to dis- sustaining legacy systems, and providing sufficient cover specific capacities and capabilities that could infrastructure to ensure robust, redundant, and effec- be fielded roughly within the time frame of the FYDP tive command and control networks for itself and its and that would likely have improved outcomes and sister services. the Air Force’s ability to respond. We identified five Fourth, over multiple administrations, the deci- major issues. sions to retreat from overseas forward postures of First, current Air Force levels of equipment and the past severely complicate the Air Force’s abil- personnel fall well short of the requirements of multi- ity to deploy in a timely and sustainable fashion in ple contingencies short of combat. To begin with, this moments of crisis. Our exercise found that these is the result of budget and resourcing reductions since problems shaped every response in every theater, the early 1990s. The net result is smaller inventories let alone a requirement to deploy to multiple places of aging aircraft and equipment and increasing short- simultaneously. The problem was greatest in the huge ages of personnel, including pilots and squadron-level Indo-Pacific theater but even shaped responses to units. In the context of three decades of constant com- challenges in Europe. The availability of some crucial bat deployments of smaller force packages, the air ser- nodes—our exercise determined Turkey was one— vice finds itself unprepared for the large air campaigns can complicate deployments in several theaters. for which it was designed or would be required by Fifth, current Air Force budgets and the result- strategies to deter the great powers of the 21st century. ing Air Force investments and operations and main- Yet even if these issues are addressed, the problems tenance programs are insufficient to address these of aging equipment—and insufficient sustainment many and varied shortfalls in operations short of war, stocks—are cascading. The skies and the near-Earth let alone serious or sustained air campaigns. The fis- space that were once the exclusive purview of the Air cal year 2019 program barely maintains current capa- Force are increasingly contested domains. Current bilities while doing almost nothing to address the lack and programmed resources are insufficient to pre- of modernizing capabilities or required global capac- serve preeminence in these realms—which would also ities. The failure to address both the loss of force size have dangerous consequences for joint, surface naval, and the loss of decisive technology advantages not and land forces. only jeopardizes air, space, and cyber preeminence Second, Air Force tankers and cargo aircraft are the but also threatens to cripple the entire US military principal enablers for all global operations, not only and the ability of even our best and most capable for the Air Force itself but also for the other US ser- allies to defend our common interests. vices and America’s partners. In the exercise, players These five findings shaped our discussion about were frequently frustrated in their plans to deploy what investments could most rapidly and effectively fighters and bombers to spots of crisis for lack of remedy the Air Force’s needs. (See Table 6.) That dis- airlift and refueling aircraft. Even though Air Force cussion was shaped by strategic necessity rather than inventories of such planes appear substantial, the budgetary convenience, but we also limited the discus- joint and combined dependency and effects of unan- sion to what was technologically, programmatically, ticipated rates of use of these aging aircraft represent and industrially possible. The discussion also rein- the Air Force’s operational Achilles’ heel. forced the close relationship among forward posture, Third, the situation with space and cyber forces is enhanced readiness, structural reforms, command nearly as dire. In this case, the driving factor is the and control redundancies, and improved firepower. steady and accelerating progress of adversaries, par- No one remedy can be a cure-all for sustaining the “air ticularly but hardly exclusively the Chinese. Budget power” that is a distinctive American way of war.

2 I. The Study

he National Security Strategy and National Air Force leaders simultaneously came to realize TDefense Strategy of 2017–18 describe a future the importance of recalibrating the force to better security landscape characterized by increased global address great power adversaries, the attrition of disorder, revived great power competition, continued the senior pilots charged with commanding squad- instability caused by rogue regimes and terror groups, rons had become all the more pressing.1 By fall of and a weakened liberal international order. Of course, 2018, senior Air Force leadership presented the “Air the United States must use all the tools at its disposal, Force We Need” plan, which proposed to increase including diplomatic, informational, economic, and the number of viable squadrons across the force military ones. But the military is key to creating an from 312 to 386. According to Todd Harrison of the environment in which the other tools are used most Center for Strategic and International Studies, the effectively. Absent American military preeminence, in Air Force spends approximately $5.2 billion per year particular the advantages conveyed by superior air- on 40,000 airmen. An increase of 24 percent of the power, American statecraft will be hard-pressed to ful- force would thus require an additional $13 billion per fill the goals of the country’s security strategy. year in aircraft operations, training, and recruiting.2 In the summer of 2018, the American Enterprise The Air Force faced mounting challenges even Institute held a two-day tabletop exercise to explore before the release of the revamped National Secu- the ability of the Air Force of 2024 to respond to mul- rity Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Previ- tiple challenges short of combat. The exercise was ously, many in the Air Force thought that increased designed to assess the Air Force’s capacity to dissuade pressure on personnel and equipment could be par- and deter adversaries from taking more provocative tially mitigated by increased command and control action and do so in a timely and sustainable way. In efficiencies gained through the networking of sys- short, the exercise was a stress test for determin- tems and people, now commonly known as the “com- ing whether the Air Force, as currently programmed bat cloud.”3 For all its merits, the concept relied on and resourced, is up to meeting an essential baseline the viability of communications systems that were requirement of the National Security Strategy and aging and increasingly vulnerable to adversarial cor- National Defense Strategy. It also served as a vehicle ruption. Space-based command, control, communi- to assess investment priorities that would most likely, cations, and surveillance assets were threatened by and most rapidly, remedy identified shortfalls. rapid advancements in adversary anti-satellite and At the time of the exercise, the Air Force was cyberwarfare capabilities, and terrestrial assets were still grappling with how to accomplish an expanded similarly susceptible to jamming, electronic warfare, number of missions while inventory and hardware and other countermeasures. Although existing tech- increased and squadrons and pilots decreased. nologies hold promise to mitigate these weaknesses, According to Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wil- their practicality and reliability remained unclear. son, the number of active Air Force fighter squad- As national leadership began to recognize the need rons shrank from 134 in 1991 to just 55 today; this to adapt the force to better compete against near-peer combined with a smaller pool of pilots—pilot counts adversaries, the gap between expectations and real- were 2,000 below the target of 20,000 as of Novem- ity became all the more acute. For one, air supremacy ber 2017—threatened to “break the force.” As senior could no longer be assumed: Near-peer competitors

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had developed means to challenge the Air Force’s experience to bear—then considered which near-term long-unquestioned ability to command the skies options would best sustain the Air Force’s air and (along with tactics, techniques, and procedures space superiority into the foreseeable future. When designed for permissive environments). Secondly, the strained American forces and new adversarial tendency of Air Force leaders to borrow individual approaches meet, the challenges are amplified. In airframes and airmen from home-based squadrons— Syria, for example, adversarial air defense capabilities due to capacity constraints—would add friction to any necessitated the use of fifth-generation fighters and contest that required deployments en masse; assem- full complements of escorts for missions that other- bling a “pick up team” in the face of a confrontation wise would not have required stealth aircraft. with a capable, numerous, and increasingly sophisti- Although the study was completed before Secre- cated adversary would present myriad execution chal- tary Wilson’s announcement of what the Air Force lenges. Third, the cost of long-delayed capacity and will require to support the National Security Strat- capability enhancements was becoming increasingly egy and National Defense Strategy, our topline con- evident as the qualitative edge long enjoyed by the Air clusions largely track with those of current service Force gave way to the reality of aging airframes and leaders. Perhaps because our exercise was focused constraints on resources and readiness. on operational responses, some of our findings are Perhaps more than any other service, technical more pessimistic than those of Secretary Wilson. For means drive the combat efficacy of the Air Force. example, we found significant gaps in the projected Technological progress does not stop in times of bud- capacity of the Air Force to provide airlift and tanker get austerity, and the effects of neglecting to update support for a multi-theater crisis, and we found that capabilities and operational concepts quickly com- the precise makeup of an increased number of squad- pound. In addition to under-resourcing current capac- rons is as important as their quantity. ities, the Budget Control Act also wreaked havoc on We both found that a shift in mindset will be the Defense Department’s ability to reliably resource required to successfully adapt the Air Force to suc- pending and future capabilities. Although Russia’s and ceed in an era of international great power compe- China’s ability to fully modernize and reform their tition; concerns over access and redundancy will armed services is sometimes overstated, even modest become more important than they were in the past. gains on their part threaten to close a qualitative gap This strongly suggests the need for increased overseas with the United States, which relies on a bomber fleet basing options, even if not on a permanent basis. Cur- whose average age is over 50, trainers whose average rent resourcing will not support such plans nor the age is over 40, and fighters whose average age is over increased readiness and selective procurement that 30. In other words, America’s adversaries have needed our study identified as necessary to continue Amer- to make only incremental investments to erode Amer- ican preeminence in the skies and in space. Quite ica’s air and space supremacy. simply, without a major shift in how the Air Force is With these developments in mind, AEI sought to resourced, the United States is and will continue to be test the Air Force’s ability to affect strategic results ill prepared to address the challenges outlined in the short of combat and then to consider what discrete National Security Strategy. capabilities would expand the number of options available to senior decision makers. The participants soon discovered that deployments for even routine Two Air Forces presence missions under relatively benign conditions placed a heavy burden on aircraft, personnel, Fortunately, the Air Force has many off-the-shelf and operations and maintenance budgets. From a list options available to mitigate somewhat its current devised by a panel of AEI-sponsored experts, the play- shortcomings. With this in mind, our exercise pre- ers—many of whom brought decades of operational sented players with two states of the world: one which

4 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

presented the Air Force in 2024 as described in the 2019 constellation. Some options, such as deployable air Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and another base systems, touched off broader discussions about that reflected the additions that players thought would the ideal force posture of 2024, while others, such enhance the Air Force’s ability to compete against a as the development of an MQ-25 unmanned tanker near-peer competitor and sustain other missions more capacity for the Air Force, were dismissed as out of efficiently and effectively. Although the options -pre touch with the service’s needs. Whether lauded or sented were personnel neutral, we asked players to derided in the press or halls of the Pentagon, the sys- allow the budget to inform their considerations rather tems we presented were selected to elicit strategic than guide them. Our primary purpose was to consider thinking from our players and to force them to con- improvements that could be achieved in a timely way. sider the number of options available to the force over However promising longer-term technological and the next five years. other payoffs may be, we proceeded from the obser- Much of the Air Force’s legacy equipment, partic- vation that a continuation of “strategic atrophy”—to ularly for airlift and tanking, will face even more seri- use the words of the National Defense Strategy— ous maintenance issues by the end of the FYDP than would be a mistake. Many of the options chosen were they presently face. In addition to testing the abil- practical, inexpensive, and available today. Some of ity of senior leaders to respond to the future chal- the options were more expensive, but players lev- lenges, these limitations were integrated into the first eraged economies of scale to achieve per unit cost iteration of the exercise. Subsequently, we provided savings. Many reflected changes to ways rather than possible solutions for mitigating these concerns. means or stemmed from reimagining previously aban- For example, we provided a pathway to accelerate doned acquisition plans that, though unsuited to an KC-46 production and to replace the KC-10. We also operations tempo driven by close air support, could took note of proposals players mentioned that we find new life in competition against a more capable had not considered—such as an increase to expedi- adversary. tionary assets to make up for the airlift deficit that We aimed to present a menu of realistic options, an increased forward presence would create or an available in the 2019 FYDP, that players might find increase in spare parts inventories to accelerate air- useful in improving the operational efficacy of the frame maintenance. Air Force of 2024. Some of the options presented Pressing though they are, the equipment issues the have strong constituencies of support in the Penta- Air Force faces will be moot without also solving the gon; many do not. Our aim was to debate the strategic service’s personnel issues. Thus, while we designed merit of each choice rather than to provide the most the menu of options with personnel neutrality in budget-friendly or popular choices alone. Thus, in mind, we also provided the players an opportunity to addition to increased procurement and delivery rates discuss the pilot shortfall, the continued relevance of for F-35As, we also discussed options to immediately the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) “force deployment begin the “midlife upgrades” on the existing F-22 model” structure, and the challenges that the force inventory and examined the potential of a restart to would encounter should it decide to strengthen its the F-22 production line or “buying in” to the design permanently deployed forward posture. and build of an F-22 derivative to accelerate the field- It was no surprise that the additional resources ing of the F-3 (a fifth-generation fighter currently provided to players after the first iteration of the under early development in Japan). game enhanced their operational options, their flex- Likewise, we provided options to not only create ibility, and their willingness to take informed and microsatellites and satellite repair capabilities but calculated risks. What may be more surprising is the also acquire licensed access to as much of the high extent to which the options selected are affordable, frequency (HF) spectrum as is available and ways to practical, and attainable with only modest increases improve the Advanced Extremely High Frequency in the Air Force budget. Even without the additional

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resources, however, many players believed that inter- Reflecting not only recent Air Force emphasis on nal Air Force reforms were as important as topline the importance of squadrons but also the difficulty increases. of simulating the deployment of individual airframes and airmen, the game used the squadron, as nested in AEFs, as the base unit of deployment. AEI staff devel- Game Design oped a force laydown reflecting changes to the structure forecasted by the 2019 FYDP. (See Appendix A The game was designed to test operational and national for a full enumeration of the force.) decision-maker responses to a series of competitive The structure made several optimistic assump- provocations under two paradigms: the Air Force of tions about units such as the OA-X, whose procure- 2024 according to the 2019 FYDP and an augmented ment status by 2024 remains unclear. We did this to Air Force of 2024 as designed by the players. During test how, and in what circumstances, players would gameplay, the players were divided into four cells use such airframes and to maximize the number of roughly corresponding to realistic decision-making potential operational approaches. To cast an accurate echelons. One group consisted of national decision picture of the actual assets available for deployment, makers, including the national security adviser and we developed a “tax” system consistent with mainte- secretaries of defense and state. Another hosted Pen- nance and training cycles for individual airframes and tagon leadership, including the Air Force chief of staff constrained deployment decisions by requiring play- and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another ers to pull from a finite amount of logistical and sup- served as the home base for functional command- port squadrons to support any deployed combat units. ers, including the chief of Cyber Command and the This system allowed the players to realistically model commanders of the Air Force Reserve Command, Air the construction of AEFs throughout gameplay. Force Space Command, and Air Mobility Command. To simulate Air Force reliance and dependency Yet another collocated regional commanders, includ- on satellite-based communications (SATCOM) ing the commanders of Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), infrastructure for command and control, we also Indo-Pacific Air Forces (INDOPACOM), Air Forces subjected player decisions to three contrasting com- Central Command (CENTCOM) (dual-hatted as mand and control “conditions.” These conditions— chief of Air Combat Command), and their foreign steady state, degraded, and denied—accounted for policy advisers. the effects of diminished theater and global commu- The game was divided into three scenarios, con- nications capacity by decreasing force effectiveness. sisting of consecutive two-month periods. After an In a state of “degraded” communications, for exam- initial briefing that apprised players of an envisioned ple, the sortie rate of forces deployed in the affected state of the world in 2024, each scenario consisted of theater was reduced by one-third, which would force a briefing on recent global developments, a period for players to commensurately increase their deploy- discussion at player tables, and a moderated discus- ments of a particular asset to achieve the same sion in which deployment and political decisions were effect. Additionally, we subjected affected players made. Also, the players evaluated injects in the form to communications restrictions, which limited their of “breaking news” events that game organizers would ability to coordinate decisions with higher levels of provide periodically throughout the game. A centrally command. In this way, AEI staff could simulate the located map of the world provided a standard operat- effects of a cyberattack or an anti-satellite weapon ing picture for all players and a visual representation or a request to provide communications capacity to of the assets available and deployed during each sce- allies or coalition partners. nario. The force laydown figures included through- For simplicity, we did not directly simulate inter- out this report represent a reproduction of this vital national partner forces or adversary forces and sim- visual aid. ulated only a minimal number of joint assets. The

6 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

exceptions to this rule were when specific scenarios 2. What are the implications of Air Force reliance called for it, such as in Scenario II when Israel con- and dependency on primarily space-based sup- ducted air strikes in Syria or in Scenarios I and II port for theater and global connectivity and when Russia conducted joint exercises with Iran. command and control? What are the implica- That said, players were provided with extensive tions of the “combat cloud” when competing combined, joint, and adversary orders of battle in against a near-peer adversary? advance of the game and were instructed to take these capabilities into account when formulating 3. What kind of adversarial actions would impose their recommendations. undue costs on the Air Force or otherwise narrow room for operational maneuver and how?

Study Objectives 4. How do Air Force leaders weigh threats from Russia, China, and Iran? To what extent do We designed the exercise to test the Air Force’s abil- challenges from these actors affect the efficacy ity to engage in a variety of missions short of com- of Air Force responsibilities in other areas of bat in 2024. We chose the year not only because it responsibility, including US Northern Com- allowed us to reflect changes to the force as outlined mand, US Southern Command, and close air in the 2019 US FYDP, but also because it would allow support–centric missions? for a solid estimate of adversary force modernization and development plans. The following key questions 5. What role does the Air Force play in dissuading guided this study. or deterring adversarial behavior? What force allocations and capabilities most constrain the 1. How do readiness, deployment cycles, and adversary’s strategic options? the AEF deployment model affect Air Force responsiveness to challenges below the thresh- 6. Which capability and capacity deficits constrain old of combat? the strategic options available to the Air Force?

7 II. Core Findings

ased on player responses to the four scenarios, we air- and space-domain superiority cannot be assumed B drew five major conclusions about the Air Force’s and access cannot be taken for granted. ability to contribute to America’s international com- That alone will require a broader understand- petitive stance. ing of the applicability of military power before crises occur and a more careful consideration of the Issue One: The Demands of International trade-offs of particular deployments. The recent focus Competition on squadron-level leadership is an important step to injecting operational ideas upward toward decision The recent National Security Strategy and National makers, but the current pilot shortage raises ques- Defense Strategy herald a return to the era of great tions about the Air Force’s ability to develop, train, and power competition. America’s military, and the Air retain a leadership cadre of sufficient size and talent to Force specifically, cannot bear the entire burden of usher the force into an era of multipolar challenges.5 protecting America’s interests, particularly not those Other internal issues related to officer promotion and short of combat. Yet America’s competitors will morale add further friction to an already inadequate undoubtedly take the state of America’s military into talent identification and development system.6 account when making strategic decisions. They will Regarding equipment, the Air Force of 2024 will consider capabilities and capacities, readiness, cred- come to resemble an old car whose owners have been ibility, and posture. Simply stated, the Air Force of forced by decades-long budgetary constraints and 2024, as forecasted in the 2019 FYDP, will be inade- competing priorities to upgrade the vehicle’s trim in quately equipped and postured to tip the competitive lieu of maintaining the increasingly fragile frame on scales decisively in America’s favor. which it rests. In the Air Force of 2024, pilots will be What we now call “competition,” at least short able to communicate with one another, and unmanned of combat, is reminiscent to the Cold War concepts vehicles will have replaced some legacy systems. But of persuasion, dissuasion, and deterrence. As schol- the force will continue to struggle with an obsolete the- ars of that era described in detail, the strength of a ater fighter capability (first delivered during the Carter nation’s military plays an essential if implicit role in administration), a rapidly aging theater airlift capabil- setting the terms of diplomatic and economic nego- ity, and an aging fleet of bombers and tankers (almost tiations, constraining adversarial behavior, and max- all of which, save stealth bombers, were first delivered imizing the number of strategic options available to during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations). decision makers.4 In the context of the Air Force, an In an internationally competitive environment, we unquestioned superiority in the skies and in space should expect adversaries to test and prod these weak- has for decades allowed America to reap the bene- nesses. Current Air Force leadership should thus con- fits of military preeminence. The next generation of tinue to focus on mitigating foundational weaknesses Air Force leaders will face a far less permissive oper- in addition to maintaining America’s qualitative edge ating environment, one in which existing notions of in the sky.

8 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Issue Two: Not Enough Tankers, Not fielding and protecting a constellation of systems that Enough Lift undergird military, government, and civilian communications. For decades, American dominance in space When positioning forces to counter and deter adversar- was unquestioned. Without the United States, many ial decisions, exercise participants gravitated primarily of the satellite-supported technologies that we now toward combat units. Our anticipation of this response take for granted, such as the global positioning sys- drove our decision to structure gameplay around tem and international telecommunications, would the existing AEF deployment model. The simulated not exist. Yet in recent years, space has become an grounding of KC-135 airframes at the end of the first increasingly crowded and contested domain. turn forced players to more carefully consider the cen- Already militarized, the question of whether space tral importance of mobility assets to achieving deter- will become weaponized is one of if, not when. A wide rence through the forward positioning of combat assets. body of literature details China’s recognition of the The grounding of the KC-135s immediately lim- importance of information dominance and the cen- ited the strategic options available to participants trality of the concept to American assumptions about and challenged their impulse to counter adversarial superiority in the skies and space.7 In addition to its moves with more forward presence. Even if partici- superior capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum pants could move units into position, the deterrent and cyberwarfare capabilities, Russia has begun to effect of these moves was minimized by a dearth of develop a mobile system designed to destroy satellites tanking ability. Even once KC-135s were reintroduced in space.8 Although its space capabilities are imma- as deployable assets, it was unclear whether the num- ture, Iran’s network of “patriotic hackers” and intelli- ber of available tankers could support the level of gence operatives regularly conducts cyberattacks and forward deployments that the participants deemed espionage on American and allied critical infrastruc- necessary. Later in the game, players rejected the ture, corporations, and government interests.9 procurement of an MQ-25 unmanned aerial tanker None of these countries currently match Amer- (deeming it insufficient for the amount of capacity ican capabilities in the strategic commons of cyber- required by Air Force combat units) but recognized space or outer space, but this may not much matter. the need to both accelerate the production of KC-46s As a recent Government Accountability Office report and acquire a KC-10 replacement. details, many military weapons and communications Less discussed but as important, cargo capac- systems display acute and multilayered vulnerabilities ity also constrained player decisions. By the end of to cyber hacking and manipulation.10 American reli- turn three, players were left with inadequate capac- ance on existing networked or satellite-based com- ity to support additional Air Force deployments, to munications may represent an Achilles’ heel that, say nothing of supporting joint operations. Earlier in if exploited, would render its superior capabilities the exercise, when players decided to relocate Amer- moot. As one exercise participant put it, internet- and ican assets located at Inçirlik Air Base to Cyprus, the space-based technologies have become so integral to dearth of cargo aircraft forced a difficult decision the American way of life that potential attacks against between executing national leadership intentions them may constitute an “existential threat” on par elsewhere in Europe and completing the drawdown with precision-targeted nuclear weapons. in a politically acceptable time frame. The direct threat these capabilities pose represents just one layer of challenges. Even if Ameri- Issue Three: Vulnerabilities in Outer can and allied interests in space and the cyber realm Space and Cyberspace were not directly targeted, the very potential for a crippling attack could result in an enormous appli- As overseer of many of America’s military satellites, cation of resources to reduce the vulnerabilities of the United States Air Force plays a central role in current systems. Although their discussions on the

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matter were limited to the unclassified level, partici- for power projection capabilities into the North East pants recognized the value of creating redundancies Asia region, their distance from other parts of East in space that would allow for alternative modes of Asia constrained American access to such crisis-prone communication in the event of system failures. With locales as the East China Sea, the Straits of Taiwan, respect to the cyber realm, many infrastructural and the Straits of Malacca. Access problems also arose redundancies already exist—but players recognized in Europe. Despite player decisions to relocate Inçir- that different access levels within the Air Force, in lik Airbase to Cyprus in one turn, relocating all the the wider Defense Department, and among allies functionality of this base would in fact take months could stymie the effective flow of communication if not years. should individual systems become compromised. Players also assumed the full cooperation of More generally, they called for a more assertive NATO allies when deciding to move American assets posture in cyberspace that would deter malign closer to Russia—a best-case outlook that sidesteps behavior through a demonstration of America’s the often sluggish nature of NATO decision-making capabilities and its willingness to act decisively to processes. In later selecting deployable air base sys- protect its interests.11 tems as a top choice for further investment, players One overriding conclusion to be drawn from the recognized the pressing need to ensure Air Force exercise was that the Air Force will need to carefully access to adequate facilities in times of crisis. Cur- balance maintaining its qualitative edge, maintaining rent Air Force leadership may also wish to consider legacy systems, and creating multiple layers of infra- basing agreements with additional countries to ame- structure to support its command and control needs. liorate the problem. Although space and cyber capabilities are some of the Overseas access was not the only constraint on most expensive capabilities to develop and deploy, the adequate posture. Because America’s adversaries are American military’s increased reliance on networked increasingly pursuing power projection capabilities, communications for operational effectiveness pre- force posture at home also requires review. Exercise cludes further neglect. Continued American superior- participants were naturally quick to deploy resources ity in space and cyberspace will require investments based in the continental US (CONUS) to dissuade and in related capacity and capabilities and, as impor- deter at the first indication of a foreign crisis, which tantly, a coherent strategy for America’s posture and strained the operational capacities of US Northern approach to each. Command. At the end of the exercise, we highlighted these vulnerabilities by simulating the establishment of a Russian capability to continually penetrate US Issue Four: Inadequate Force Posture territorial airspace off the coast of Alaska. Rather than focusing primarily on saving money, future Base Arguably the nimblest and most agile of the services, Realignment and Closure initiatives should concen- the Air Force faces fewer peacetime constraints on trate on whether the current disposition of Air Force logistics than do force elements that primarily navi- bases matches the strategic environment that the gate the seas or transit on land. Yet the United States United States currently faces. maintains relatively few forward bases for its air- Too often, posture is thought of in terms of geogra- craft—particularly in East Asia. When crises erupted, phy alone. Our exercise, however, also demonstrated exercise participants funneled their deployments into the logistical constraints on adequate posture. Fight- Anderson Air Force Base on Guam, Kadena Air Base ers and bombers do not present much of a deterrent on Okinawa, and multiple main operating bases on the threat without an adequate number of tankers, cargo home islands of Japan due to the decades-long devel- vehicles, and support elements. Although the consis- opment of the infrastructure and the existing capac- tent player deployment of combat assets to dissuade ities of these facilities. While these facilities allowed and deter reflects an understandable focus on true

10 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

combat power, it also demonstrates the dire state of forecasted in the 2019 FYDP, another optimistic sce- enabler fleets. Without adequate, deployable combat nario that may not come to pass. support, combat aircraft simply cannot meet their Although the exercise made clear that the Air Force assigned tasks. must have overall increases in budget authority and resourcing to effectively contribute to America’s competition with other powers, the ways that such fund- Issue Five: Funding Challenges ing might be allocated were as important. In the final phase of the exercise, participants recognized this in Although remedying the above issues will require their selection of additional capabilities and capaci- smart investments and changes to operational ties. Although participant recommendations were approaches, they will also demand more money than guided by strategic concerns more than budgetary is currently available to the Air Force. As we have ones, that their solutions were already technically fea- detailed in other reports, the cumulative effects of sible minimized potential research and development defense cuts in the 1990s, the focus on counterin- costs, and several solutions promised savings across surgency and counterterrorism campaigns in the the force. Middle East and Afghanistan, and the combination Although the current competitive landscape may of sequestration and decreased spending on defense be characterized as one between “great powers,” that characterized the Obama years have reduced exercise participants recognized that competition capacities and the effectiveness of conventional short of combat often takes place in realms—such as capabilities across the US military. The Air Force is command and control—where even modest invest- no exception.12 ments would make a decisive difference. Only a sus- The fiscal year (FY) 2019 FYDP, which guided tained and increased commitment to investments in the exercise’s force assumptions, barely maintains a variety of technologies and capabilities will ensure current capabilities while doing little to address that America can maintain its superiority in space capacity issues. The exercise demonstrated the and the skies. A broader understanding of returns inadequacy of the current FYDP: Enabler units on investment, which would take into consider- were stretched to the brink, and current command ation off-the-shelf commercial solutions and econo- and control vulnerabilities were exacerbated while mies of scale, may mitigate some of these costs. Our enemies gained ground on and, in some cases, sur- exercise demonstrated, however, that a sustained passed America’s qualitative edge. All this occurred and increased investment commitment—one that without the outbreak of new combat operations— exceeds any saving that could be gained from pro- an optimistic assumption that is out of step with curement or process reforms—will be required to America’s involvement in conflicts over the past sev- ensure that the force is positioned to win against any eral decades. Moreover, our force assumptions pre- combination of adversaries across competitive and sumed that spending levels would indeed remain as combative domains.

11 III. Scenario Summaries

ollowing a brief that detailed the state of the taking into account changes prescribed in the 2019 Fworld in 2024, exercise participants explored four FYDP). The Air Force still supported close air sup- sequential scenarios. port missions in Syria, for example, and the US presence in South Korea and Japan remain unchanged. • Scenario I. Is the FYDP Air Force ready to com- We foresaw an increase in rotational deployments to pete against nation-states short of combat? each region and Europe, consistent with the current US aims to deter great power ambitions and assure • Scenario II. Can the FYDP Air Force compete allies, but we did not provide for a significant change in multiple theaters at once? How might vulner- in the permanent, forward-stationed posture of the abilities in space affect its ability to do so? Air Force. (See Figure 1 for an overview of initial force disposition.) • Scenario III. How does increased forward We similarly foresaw that the strategic calculus of presence affect responsibilities in other areas of each of America’s “great power” adversaries would responsibility? remain similar in 2024 to that of the present day. We presented the players with adversarial decisions that • Scenario IV. What modifications over the were consistent with their current strategic outlooks FYDP would enhance performance across prior and that, though perhaps less likely today, may not be scenarios? in six years’ time. By country:

• China. We judged that China would continue The World in 2024 to seek to erode America’s posture in the Pacific through a variety of diplomatic, informational, The world of 2024 that we presented to players economic, and military means. As for its mili- reflected a conservative, linear progression from cur- tary, we assessed that China would continue to rent trends. Our projections needed to be both believ- modernize its fighter, bomber, early-warning, able and reasonable enough to not distract from the and tanker capabilities; expand its air defenses; scenarios. Thus, while we held the Air Force to its invest in cyber, anti-satellite, electronic war- current force structure of 10 AEFs, we also warned fare, and hypersonic technologies; and prior- players that long-neglected maintenance issues, par- itize research into the military applications ticularly with legacy airlift and cargo airframes, had of artificial intelligence and quantum encryp- begun to hinder some operations. tion. We positioned its blue-water naval capa- Posture-wise, we envisioned that the Air Force of bilities as second only to those of the United 2024 would respond to similar pacing threats that it States and foresaw its forward posture as having faces today: Iran in CENTCOM, Russia in US Euro- expanded in Africa and into Sri Lanka and Paki- pean Command (EUCOM), and China in INDOPA- stan. We also forecasted the militarization of its COM. We thus set the baseline posture of US forces man-made islands in the South China Sea as a in each region as resembling those of today (after fait accompli.

12 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

FigureSteady 1. StaSteadyte 20 State24 2024

Deployed Forces

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3

Fighters: 29 Squadrons Fighters: 6 Squadrons Fighters: 6 Squadrons Fighters: 9 Squadrons F-15 8 F-15 2 F-15 1 F-15 1 F-16 7 F-16 2 F-16 3 F-16 4 F-22 3 F-22 0 F-22 1 F-22 2 F-35 11 F-35 2 F-35 1 F-35 2

Bombers: 8 Squadrons Bombers: 0 Squadrons Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 0 Squadrons B-1 2 B-1 0 B-1 1 B-1 0 B-2 2 B-2 0 B-2 0 B-2 0 B-52 4 B-52 0 B-52 0 B-52 0

Tankers: 37 Squadrons Tankers: 1 Squadron Tankers: 4 Squadrons Tankers: 1 Squadron KC-46 8 KC-46 0 KC-46 1 KC-46 1 KC-135 29 KC-135 1 KC-135 3 KC-135 0

Cargo: 40 Squadrons Cargo: 1 Squadron Cargo: 3 Squadrons Cargo: 3 Squadrons C-5 5 C-5 0 C-5 0 C-5 0 C-17 15 C-17 0 C-17 3 C-17 2 C-130 20 C-130 1 C-130 0 C-130 1

CSAR: 10 Squadrons CSAR: 1 Squadron CSAR: 4 Squadrons CSAR: 1 Squadron HH-60 5 HH-60 1 HH-60 4 HH-60 1 HC-130 5 HC-130 0 HC-130 0 HC-130 0

ISR UAV: 24 Squadrons ISR UAV: 3 Squadrons ISR UAV: 9 Squadrons ISR UAV: 4 Squadrons MQ-9 21 MQ-9 0 MQ-9 4 MQ-9 0 RQ-4 1 RQ-4 0 RQ-4 1 RQ-4 0 RQ-170 2 RQ-170 0 RQ-170 0 RQ-170 0 MC-130 1 MC-130 1 MC-130 2 U-2 1 U-2 1 U-2 1 RC-135V/W 1 RC-135V/W 1 RC-135V/W 1 E-8 1

Source: Authors.

• Russia. Despite (or perhaps because of) declin- and that it would have sought out new levels of ing economic prospects, we determined that cooperation with Turkey and Iran. Russian revanchism would continue. More specifically, we saw Russian attempts to undermine • Iran. We assessed that the Islamic Repub- NATO unity and opportunistic bouts of milita- lic would still stand and that its leaders would rism aimed at its near abroad were patterns that continue to employ a variety of strategies in an would hold in 2024. We assessed that Moscow attempt to regain regional hegemony. We judged would have achieved modest success with its that the range of its ballistic missile capabilities modernization plans—yielding a modernized would have expanded to threaten Europe and fleet of fighters and bombers and increasingly that it would have developed many low-cost capable artillery and rocket artillery systems— unmanned aerial vehicles. We also assessed that and progressed toward the weaponization Iran would have acquired a brigade’s worth of of artificial intelligence. We judged that Rus- T-90 tanks, at least a squadron’s worth of Su-35 sia would continue to combine its increasingly fourth-generation fighters, and S-300/S-400- assertive military posture with political warfare class surface-to-air missiles from Russia. The aimed at Europe and the United States, that it status of its nuclear program remained unclear, would have tightened its leverage over Belarus, but we assessed that its program would have

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covertly progressed from the baseline set before innovative operational concepts, and continued sup- the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We port to allies and partners.13 We assessed that this envisioned an Iran that continued to employ strategy would remain relevant in 2024, even if global proxies throughout the Middle East, primarily events necessitated a shift in focus. but not always under the guidance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, and that its naval capa- Scenario Overview. Following the briefing about bilities had improved enough to enable regular the state of the world at the beginning of 2024, patrols through the Red Sea. Scenario I opens with two distinct and concerning developments in Asia and Europe during January In addition to adversary posture, we updated play- and February. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army ers on developments relevant to the United States and (PLA) announces exercises in the South China Sea, its partners. Although we remained agnostic regarding which incorporate the deployment of surface-to-air the dynamics of the 2024 election, we asked players to missiles and fighter aircraft to the Paracel and Sprat- calibrate their decisions to reflect the political consid- ley islands. The joint exercises include combat air erations that generally permeate strategic thinking in patrols and both airborne and amphibious assault election years. We foresaw an America that remained training. At the conclusion of the exercise, some the world’s sole superpower but that only reluctantly PLA–Air Force assets remain on the islands, and held that mantle. We also forecasted an increased role China announces the creation of a new Air Defense for the US military in defending the homeland, partic- Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the entirety of the ularly along the nation’s southern border. South China Sea. America’s allies and partners retained a relation- Meanwhile in Europe, Russia leverages improved ship with the United States that largely resembled relations with Belarus and stations fighter jets there. those of the present day. Few countries were able to It uses this foothold to run air patrol missions increase defense expenditures, though a notable few, along the borders of the Baltic States, who claim such as Japan, Israel, and the Nordic nations, had that Russia has violated their airspace in the pro- helped advance the combined military posture with cess. In mid-January, Russia announces that it will technological breakthroughs in cybersecurity and hold joint naval exercises with Turkey in February. stealth technology. The exercises will primarily take place in the Black In sum, we endeavored to cast the world in a Sea, although joint maneuvers will occur through mold that would be familiar to present-day observ- the Bosporus. In a move that many in the West con- ers. Thus, the scenarios are largely steady state, sider a condition placed on Turkey by Russia, Turk- avoiding the introduction of “black swan” or other ish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announces that paradigm-shifting events to keep our conclusions rel- NATO and US air operations from Inçirlik Air Base evant to current military and political leaders. must halt for the duration of the exercises—which effectively precludes the base from supporting mis- Scenario I: Is the FYDP Air Force Ready to sions in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. In Compete Against Nation-States Short of early February, Russia conducts unannounced com- Combat? bined air patrols with Iran near the Turkish border. Russia cites the need to provide Su-35 training to Ira- The purpose of this scenario was to test the ability of nian pilots as the reason for the patrols. the Air Force of 2024 to support the guidance provided in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. This strat- Participant Deliberations. Before meeting for egy was provided to players for reference and called exercise-wide deliberations, players were asked to for an increasingly forward posture, a more dynamic discuss the implications of scenario developments at approach to force employment, the development of their respective tables.

14 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Regional Table. Specific developments sparked lengthy limitations that current reform measures might discussion at the regional table, though the overall impose on their ability to respond rapidly to the planned response was decidedly cautious. When con- events presented in the scenario. Specifically, one sidering the implications of China’s activities in the player mentioned that the transition of the 24th and South China Sea, for example, the commander of 25th Air Force from Cyber Command to Air Combat Pacific Air Forces found little concern with the decla- Command would hinder the ability to rapidly pro- ration of an ADIZ, as it was predictable and unlikely to vide certain intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance elicit an escalatory response from the United States. (ISR) and electronic warfare capabilities to regional The best course of action, he found, was to increase commanders on demand. surveillance of China, communicate displeasure with its behavior by deploying bomber assets into Ander- Pentagon Table. Players generally took a more aggres- son Air Force Base on Guam, and openly discuss the sive posture than their regional subordinates. With potential of deploying long-range bombers to suitable respect to China, for example, they called for “force bases in Vietnam. Others at the table were less concil- demonstration” bomber overflights of the South iatory about China’s behavior and suggested that clear China Sea in addition to the employment of electronic communication of displeasure, rather than signaling jamming capabilities and an electromagnetic pulse alone, would be necessary to deter Chinese behavior. weapon, if available, from Guam. They expressed a Still others called to pressure allies and partners to preference for working with the Philippines or Thai- increase their patrols of China in the South China Sea land over Vietnam to create an effective deterrent in and beyond. the South China Sea and called for all forces currently Players were more unified in their proposed pos- present in East Asia to remain on alert. ture toward Russia, seeing a multilateral diplomatic Concerning Turkey, players at the Pentagon table response as the best solution to calm the nerves of echoed the conclusions of their functional subordi- the Baltic States and communicate to Russia poten- nates in calling for relocation of US and NATO assets tial consequences for continued aggressive behav- from Inçirlik to Cyprus. (Israel was also discussed ior. On the military front, players sought to increase as an alternative.) Their opinions on Europe aligned NATO air presence, perhaps in Poland. Regarding with the ideas presented at other tables, though they Turkey, players again identified diplomatic pressure specifically called for the deployment of an American as the best tool to convince Erdogan to rethink his F-15 squadron to Poland. position. Militarily, the conversation centered on where and how to move US assets if negotiations National Table. The national table appropriately took with Erdogan failed. a broader, strategic view of the developments outlined in the scenario. With respect to China, they Functional Table. The functional table was primarily affirmed that the declaration of a South China Sea concerned with anticipating the logistical and com- ADIZ was not a “red line” that would lead to war, but munications demands that the scenario develop- one that nonetheless required an American response. ments would create. The commanders of Air Mobility Specifically, they proposed airborne freedom of navi- Command and US Cyber Command postulated about gation operations and considered the deployment of which assets would likely be called on by senior leader- medium, land-based surface-to-air missiles to neu- ship. Increased communications bandwidth was fore- tralize China’s “asymmetric advantages.” seen as a definite requirement for Pacific Command. To signal Washington’s displeasure, players also Concerning EUCOM, players agreed that mov- considered the option and timing of providing Taiwan ing the assets currently based at Inçirlik to Cyprus with additional weaponry and coordinated responses presented the only sensible option for dealing with in each of the diplomatic, informational, military, and Turkey’s demands. The players also discussed the economic spheres of national power. Concerning

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Russia, players concluded that responses to Mos- support—preferring instead to rebalance forces cow’s actions were of lesser priority than responding already in theater—the national-level leaders over- to those undertaken by Beijing. They also expressed ruled his advice and sent a squadron of F-15Cs to a strategic rationale for their reticence. One player Poland to “distract” the Russians from the Baltic summed up their thinking by stating that “modest States. (The F-15Cs were deployed as a direct result action [toward Russia] may look weaker than doing of a lack of F-22As in the current Air Force inventory.) nothing at all.” Players also decided to boost both airborne and satellite surveillance of the area, both to reassure allies Discussion and Decisions. The exercise-wide dis- and to gather more information about Russia’s basing cussions primarily mirrored those conducted at the posture in Belarus. With respect to Turkey, players individual tables, but the synthesis of multiple view- agreed that the move from Inçirlik to Cyprus would points resulted in a final strategy that, while marked by finally force Turkey to “choose a side [between NATO its caution, was also designed to send specific signals and Russia].” The Air Combat Commander expressed to allies and adversaries about the limitations of Amer- concern about his ability to orchestrate the move in ican patience and the depth of its resolve. (See Figure such a short time frame, but national and Pentagon 2 and Table 1 for overviews of player decisions for Sce- leadership were undeterred. This echelon regarded nario I.) By region, the main discussion and decision the move as a trial balloon for potentially permanently points for this scenario included the following. relocating the assets based at Inçirlik to Cyprus (or possibly to Aviano Air Base in Italy or Spangdahlem INDOPACOM. While the regional commander ini- Air Base in Germany). tially advocated for repositioning assets within theater in lieu of redeploying CONUS-based assets, a CENTCOM. Much of the group’s discussion of the more hawkish, yet still cautious, national-level leader- Middle East centered on the situation at Inçirlik and ship team ultimately overruled him. Thus, in addition its implications for US operations in CENTCOM. to positioning the carrier strike group nearer to the Russia’s purported training activity with Iran received South China Sea, an F-35A squadron was sent from little attention, though some expressed an intention the US mainland to both Vietnam and the Philippines. to ask Israel for additional information. Additional assets were sent to these two countries— with both receiving a KC-135 detachment and the Inject. Following the decision-making phase, play- Philippines also receiving two C-17 squadrons and a ers learned of internal Air Force reports indicating C-130 squadron. A B-2 bomber detachment was also severe structural problems with the KC-135 airframe. deployed to Guam to conduct flyovers of the South Because of these reports, the Air Force decided China Sea. Lastly, additional suitable aerial-delivered to ground all KC-135s—including those recently munitions were also forward deployed. deployed to Europe and Asia. The players expressed The secretary of defense expressed concern over frustration with this development but, given the age the lack of reaction among other players to China’s of the inventory, viewed a grounding of KC-135s due declaration of an ADIZ. Other players explained that to maintenance issues as entirely reasonable, particu- the ADIZ barely affected America’s ability to operate larly if the United States continues to depend on this in the area. Nevertheless, the players also decided to legacy fleet. explore additional basing options in Southeast Asia, should their moves in this turn not be sufficient to Analysis. Given that the objective of the scenario deter Chinese expansionism. was to test the FYDP Air Force’s ability to respond to short-of-war challenges, the decisions the players EUCOM. While the regional commander was made lead us to several conclusions. First, players similarly modest in his request for additional were, not surprisingly, more comfortable responding

16 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

MOVE 1 FigureDeployment 2. Scenario of US I SummaryForces Map

Lakenheath to Poland F-15E Germany to Poland F-35A Poland 1 AEW: F-15, C-17, C-130, KC-135 Elmendorf to Japan F-22A Incirlik to Cyprus Patriot Battery, F-15E, KC-135, MQ-9

Guam B-2

SQNs Deployable in CONUS Philippines Fighter: 9 Squadrons C-130 | C-17: 2 F-35: 5 | F-22: 1 | F-15: 3 F-35A: 1 | KC-135: 1 Bomber: 2 Squadrons Vietnam B-1: 0 | B-2: 0 | B-52: 2 F-35A: 1 | KC-135: 1 Tanker: 23 Squadrons KC-46: 5 | KC-135: 18 Cargo: 23 Squadrons C-5: 4 | C-17: 8 | C-130: 11

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Status of US Deployed Forces

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3

Fighters: 20 Squadrons Fighters: 7 Squadrons Fighters: 6 Squadrons Fighters: 12 Squadrons F-15 8 5 F-15 2 3 F-15 1 1 F-15 1 1 F-16 7 6 F-16 2 2 F-16 3 3 F-16 4 4 F-22 3 2 F-22 0 0 F-22 1 1 F-22 2 3 F-35 11 7 F-35 2 2 F-35 1 1 F-35 2 4

Bombers: 2 Squadrons Bombers: 0 Squadrons Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 1 Squadron B-1 2 0 B-1 0 0 B-1 1 1 B-1 0 0 B-2 2 0 B-2 0 0 B-2 0 0 B-2 0 1 B-52 4 2 B-52 0 0 B-52 0 0 B-52 0 0

Tankers: 31 Squadrons Tankers: 2 Squadrons Tankers: 4 Squadrons Tankers: 3 Squadrons KC-46 8 7 KC-46 0 0 KC-46 1 1 KC-46 1 1 KC-135 29 24 KC-135 1 2 KC-135 3 3 KC-135 0 2

Cargo: 29 Squadrons Cargo: 3 Squadrons Cargo: 3 Squadrons Cargo: 6 Squadrons C-5 5 5 C-5 0 0 C-5 0 0 C-5 0 0 C-17 15 10 C-17 0 1 C-17 3 3 C-17 2 4 C-130 20 14 C-130 1 2 C-130 0 0 C-130 1 2

CSAR: 8 Squadrons CSAR: 1 Squadron CSAR: 4 Squadrons CSAR: 1 Squadron HH-60 5 3 HH-60 1 1 HH-60 4 4 HH-60 1 1 HC-130 5 5 HC-130 0 0 HC-130 0 0 HC-130 0 0

ISR UAV: 23 Squadrons ISR UAV: 3 Squadrons ISR UAV: 9 Squadrons ISR UAV: 4 Squadrons MQ-9 21 20 MQ-9 0 0 MQ-9 4 4 MQ-9 0 0 RQ-4 1 1 RQ-4 0 0 RQ-4 1 1 RQ-4 0 0 RQ-170 2 2 RQ-170 0 0 RQ-170 0 0 RQ-170 0 0 MC-130 1 1 MC-130 1 1 MC-130 2 2 U-2 1 1 U-2 1 1 U-2 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 E-8 1 1

Source: Authors.

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decisively to challenges involving weaker powers, sends a crucial message about American resolve and such as Turkey, than to near-peer challengers, such as capabilities, other assets must also be relied on to Russia and China. Turkey’s decision to ground NATO communicate the comprehensiveness of America’s and US operations at Inçirlik was designed to provoke suite of capabilities. Although airlift assets would be conversation about how to address Turkey’s flirta- vital in any direct conflict with anear-peer adversary, tions with Russia—a tendency that was already evi- they were thought of as only a function and enabler of dent at the time of our exercise.14 the game’s AEF structure rather than as part of a stra- Exercise participants were far more unified and tegic approach to a particular theater. assertive in response to countering Erdogan’s pos- America’s posture in space, cyber, and informa- turing, which contrasted with their tendencies to tional realms were also more of a footnote than a resort first to diplomacy with matters involving main feature of the discussion. That the game was China and Russia. Although both China and Russia held at the unclassified level would explain a lack of have employed political warfare against the US and detail in related discussions, but not the absence of Western interests for years, players still preferred to them. To be clear, the deployment of fifth-generation counter adversarial posturing incrementally and in aircraft will send a clear signal to an adversary. For- kind rather than risk escalating situations to a point going a discussion of other tiers of deterrence, how- that conflict might become more likely. Because these ever, overlooks the multifaceted way that near-peer types of challenges are often designed to test will and competitors have approached competition with the resolve, the National Command Authority, with Air United States. Force inputs, should consider how to manage esca- In sum, the Air Force of 2024 will possess a wide lation dynamics while still employing the force in a suite of tools to compete outside of warfare. A larger manner that deters unwelcome adversarial behavior. problem appears to be the reluctance to deploy addi- Second, given several decades of continual com- tional assets assertively without a clear mission bat deployments, regional and functional command- or end state and a lack of clarity regarding how to ers were highly reticent to employ additional assets, employ various systems to de-escalate potential flash- which in turn further stressed overall force generation points. Even if America maintains a qualitative edge capacities. At first, given ongoing combat operations in air power (an edge that will have eroded signifi- and commitments, the expectation was that a mere cantly by 2024), adversaries will likely have developed reshuffling ofin-theater assets would suffice; it was selected countermeasures in electronic warfare and only when national leadership overruled them that perhaps counter-stealth that may render that edge they agreed to a more assertive response. Although less operationally significant. If not addressed, these our sample size was small and reflective of leadership deficiencies could enable an erosion of American air under past conditions, not present or future ones, supremacy, even if it technically maintains an edge in the frequently stated expectation among participants fighter power. that the United States would “do nothing” to counter many of China’s and Russia’s moves in the scenario, Scenario II: Can the FYDP Air Force rather than acting with greater firmness and decisive- Compete in Multiple Theaters at ness, was nonetheless striking. Once? How Might Electronic Warfare Third, those players who did seek to respond to Vulnerabilities Affect Its Ability to Do So? China and Russia did so primarily through the deployment of high-end assets such as the F-35A and the Scenario II built on the competitive dynamics F-22A. Intelligence and surveillance assets, though explored in the prior one and tested the limits of provided in great volume, were more of an after- the Air Force to respond to multiple crises occurring thought than a primary tool. Although the deployment around the globe simultaneously. Given the reliance of fifth-generation fighters, particularly en masse, of the US military on inter-airframe communications

18 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

networks (i.e., the “combat cloud”), Table 1. Scenario I Summary Table we also sought to test how service and Theater Airframe From Deployed to senior leaders would respond to chal- EUCOM F-15C CONUS Poland lenges that drew the viability of electronic and counter-radar capabilities EUCOM C-17 CONUS Poland into question. The move takes place in EUCOM C-130 CONUS Poland March and April 2024. EUCOM KC-135 CONUS Poland EUCOM F-15E Lakenheath Poland Scenario Overview. Following EUCOM F-35A Germany Poland the inject announcing the indefinite Deployment EUCOM RC-135V/W Greece grounding of KC-135s, Scenario II begins Error with an appraisal of developments from Patriot Battery EUCOM Inçirlik Cyprus March through late April 2024. Ten- (Army) sions over the Senkaku Islands escalate EUCOM F-15E Inçirlik Cyprus when Chinese Maritime Militia vessels EUCOM KC-135 Inçirlik Cyprus skirmish with Japanese Coast Guard vessels. As a result, Japan declares an EUCOM MQ-9 Inçirlik Cyprus air exclusion zone within 25 miles of the INDOPACOM B-2 CONUS Guam Senkaku Islands—an area that overlaps Vietnam and INDOPACOM Two F-35A CONUS with China’s ADIZ. Philippines China responds by stating its inten- Vietnam and INDOPACOM Two KC-135 CONUS tion to enforce its East China Sea ADIZ Philippines and that it will view any Japanese air INDOPACOM C-130 CONUS Philippines patrols in this area as “acts of aggres- INDOPACOM 2 C-17 CONUS Philippines sion.” Taiwan reports an increase in INDOPACOM F-22A Elmendorf Kadena (Japan) Chinese fighter aircraft patrol activity To Be Assumed beyond the median line of the Taiwan INDOPACOM B-52 Starting Error We Have a B-52 Strait, and a Japanese military com- in Guam munications satellite malfunctions, Source: Authors. prompting Tokyo to request the use of US military satellite communications to overcome its bandwidth deficit. Mean- while, China reaches an agreement with Sri Lanka now at the smaller Chigli Air Base. He also states that to expand its presence at the Port of Hambantota to all remaining US and NATO assets must be removed include an airfield and the emplacement of military from Inçirlik within six months. air and naval assets. China begins conducting recon- Russia conducts regimental-sized air assault exer- naissance missions over the Andaman Sea, prompting cises in Belarus but invites NATO observers to the exer- India to request an increase in American naval pres- cise in what some view as a fig leaf resulting from the ence in the area. recent deployment of an American F-35As to Poland. In Europe, the Turkish-Russian joint exercises However, Russia’s simultaneous actions in the Mid- conclude, but a Russian surface action group remains dle East undermine this viewpoint. Russia announces in the Sea of Marmara to conduct “interoperability” a basing agreement with Iran, in which Russia would exercises with the Turkish Navy. In response to the gain access to airbases in Tabriz, Mashad, and Esfa- movement of assets out of Inçirlik Air Base, Erdogan han. The two also announce combined interoperabil- offers to host US and NATO forces once again, but ity exercises, slated for May. In late April, Lithuania

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observes an uptick in tourist motor coach traffic from how the Kaliningrad exclave may factor into Russia’s Belarus; the tourists claim to be survivalists out for a future plans and called for the deployment of addi- camping trip in the forest outside Vilnius. tional bomber squadrons to the United Kingdom to In April, intelligence reports indicate that Iran, help mitigate any future threat. He also noted that through the Revolutionary Guard, has employed Rus- any increased pressure placed on Russia would likely sian military contractors to transfer a battalion of its come at the expense of US operations in US Africa T-90 brigade and ballistic missiles to southwest Syria. Command (AFRICOM), which receives its tanker and Israel reports that Hezbollah has repositioned its supply support from Europe. Concerning the Middle artillery assets near the Israeli border town of Met- East, players viewed Russia’s increased engagement ula; preemptive Israeli strikes into Syria and Lebanon with Iran through the lens of the former’s activities in are likely. Europe, which is to say that they did not think that it was a development that itself was worth countering. Participant Deliberations. Before meeting for Iran and Hezbollah’s movements in the Levant were exercise-wide discussion, players were asked to con- viewed as a situation worth monitoring but one that sider the implications of scenario developments at they were comfortable letting Israel handle, given the their respective tables. many other competing priorities on resources.

Regional Table. In response to the escalating situa- Functional Table. Players at this table primarily tion in East Asia, the commander of Pacific Air Forces focused on the Japanese request to use US military sought to minimize escalation and thus did not plan SATCOM bandwidth in the aftermath of their satellite to request additional fighters or bombers from the malfunction. Players asked for clarification about the continental United States. He and others, however, nature of the malfunction and were told that although saw a need to “prioritize open air and sea access,” attribution of the cause was unknown, sabotage could increase ISR sorties, and request KC-46s to make up not be ruled out. The commander of Air Force Space for the capacity lost by the KC-135 groundings. He Command firmly opposed allowing the Japanese to expressed confusion at the decisions of national lead- use American military satellites and suggested that ership in the prior move, saying that “China was the they use commercial capabilities instead. The com- real threat” but that its “incremental moves” had led mander of US Cyber Command echoed these sugges- others to respond similarly, whereas they were will- tions and was reluctant to allow even a close ally to ing to respond more aggressively to Russian provoca- access “America’s most treasured capability.” tions. The commander of USAFE, on the other hand, saw the situation in reverse: He thought that Russia’s Pentagon Table. Leaders at the Pentagon table provocations were not met with a strong enough hand expressed frustration that their previous moves and that the developments in East Asia in Scenario II did not deter further Chinese aggression. They dis- would once again diminish the priority that his the- agreed as to whether they should escalate the situ- ater would receive. ation or continue with an incremental approach. Unlike national leadership, the players thought They viewed any additional cooperation with Japan that the United States should accept the Turkish in this instance as a question better addressed by the proposal to relocate the assets located at Inçirlik to secretary of state, but they agreed that the US must Chigli. Although not ideal, they found merit in main- demonstrate a willingness to fully support Japanese taining a large presence in Turkey due to the coun- policy decisions relative to Chinese aggression and try’s central importance for NATO’s missile defense. the Senkaku Islands. (They also recognized, however, that nuclear capabil- Regarding the expansion of Chinese capacities in ities would not be supported at Chigli.) The USAFE Sri Lanka, the players weighed the need to deter Chi- commander also expressed growing concern about nese behavior and support India with the need for a

20 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

more significant presence in the Middle East, South respect to Russia, players agreed that the recent dis- Asia, and the Indian Ocean. They decided that mov- agreements over Inçirlik made NATO look weak, ing a carrier strike group to the Indian Ocean would necessitating a stronger response to Russian provoca- contribute to these missions. With respect to Iran’s tions than may otherwise have been required. Players movements in the Levant, however, the players at the national table agreed with the Pentagon table agreed that Israel would be more than capable of han- that moving a carrier strike group into the Indian dling the situation on its own. They posited the idea Ocean would alleviate pressure in both CENTCOM of encouraging the Israeli prime minister to engage and INDOPACOM. with Vladimir Putin to achieve greater clarity on Rus- sia’s involvement in recent developments in the Mid- Injects. After the players discussed their initial reac- dle East but stop short of seeing any role for the US tions to the scenario at their respective tables, three military in deterring Iran’s behavior. injects were provided to challenge their decision- The conversation quickly moved to Russia’s behav- making process further. ior, which resulted in a joint meeting with national leadership. Together, the players concluded that the Directed Energy Demonstration. The players were Baltic States should be encouraged, through NATO previously briefed on Russia’s invitation of NATO channels, to hold a border and customs “exercise” observer forces for its exercises in Belarus. While to check the passports and visas and provide legiti- there, the guidance and navigation system of an macy of vehicle inspections of anyone who enters or unmanned NATO aircraft suddenly became inoper- has recently entered the country. Concerning Turkey, able, resulting in a crash and total loss of the asset. the players advocated for the removal of Turkey from While Russia blames the crash on NATO incompe- NATO but deferred to national leadership for the ulti- tence, NATO post-incident damage assessments indi- mate decision on the matter. Players at the table both cate that a directed energy attack may have caused the affirmed an intention to support Europe in the face of system malfunctions that led to the incident. Russian aggression but demurred from making specific decisions that would do so. Loss of Electromagnetic Spectrum Overmatch. In Syria, Russia intercepts American cruise missiles National Table. Players primarily focused on East Asia. that had been launched as part of ongoing counter- The secretary of state floated a number of possible extremist operations. The interception took US plan- responses to communicate solidarity with regional ners by surprise. They concluded that some Russian allies and partners. He categorically rejected the Chi- electronic warfare and radar capabilities might super- nese ADIZ and underscored the importance of sup- sede the ability of NATO and US forces to counter porting Japan—with additional US early warning them in combat. and electronic warfare assets and standoff missiles if requested by Tokyo. He also mentioned the central Update on KC-135 Situation. Players were informed importance of Taiwan in placing pressure on China of the results of the Pentagon’s preliminary inves- and called for the announcement of an official pol- tigation into the KC-135 airframe issue. A cost and icy that the United States would extend the missile repair time frame estimate indicates that 30 per- ranges of its allies and partners. He also sought to cent of KC-135s will require a major rework over the challenge the legality of China’s claims through public next four years. In effect, this returned 70 percent diplomacy and to use China’s expansion in Sri Lanka of KC-135s to gameplay. However, the nature of the as a pretext for establishing a formalized force rota- problem required further investigation of all 707 air- tion presence, if not a permanent base in India. frames owned by the Air Force to head off poten- Players all agreed on the need to balance de- tial future problems with a wide array of ISR and escalation and the demonstration of resolve. With early-warning platforms.

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Discussion and Decisions. Despite the provision EUCOM. Players sought to reassure and bolster the of the above injects during the game-wide discussion capacities of European allies, signal to Russia Amer- phase of this move, players remained focused on the ica’s willingness to protect its interests both through developments discussed at their respective tables. and apart from NATO, and attain more information Although they expressed concern about the techno- about the recent movements of Russia’s military. The logical precedents set by Russia in Syria and Belarus, commander of USAFE led most deployment deci- the only action precipitated by the injects involved the sions, as the national leadership remained distracted employment of newly available KC-135 airframes. (See by developments in Asia. He asked for CONUS to pro- Figure 3 and Table 2 for overviews of player decisions vide an additional squadron of B-52 bombers for Royal for Scenario II.) By region, the main discussion and Air Force Fairford Airbase in the United Kingdom and decision points for this scenario included the following. decided to move fighter squadrons F-15E( and F-35A) forward to Poland from the United Kingdom. INDOPACOM of East Asia. The group identified In addition, he sent combat CSAR assets to Italy deterring Chinese aggression in the East China Sea and deployed a Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehi- as its top priority. The national table decided to pos- cle (UAV) detachment to monitor Russia in the Black ture in a manner that would communicate US resolve Sea. Although he argued for the United States to con- to follow through on the requirements of its defense sider remaining in Turkey at Chigli Air Base, national treaty with Japan—which included the deployment leadership overruled him. He requested C-17 support of combat search and rescue (CSAR) platforms to from CONUS to begin the shipment of US and NATO Kadena Air Base. The national table advocated for assets from Inçirlik to Cyprus. What would be done simultaneous diplomatic efforts aimed at cooling ten- with the ballistic missile defense assets in Turkey sions between China and Japan, including the poten- remained unclear; the commander suggested that, if tial deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the area, and the secretary of state were able to convince Turkey discussed ways that Taiwan might be used to limit to relinquish these assets, they could be relocated to China’s strategic options. Romania. Regarding the Baltics, the Pentagon table Others in the room brought up the utility of plac- approved requests to support a NATO-led border cus- ing economic pressure on China and the possibility of toms and inspection exercise. evacuating US citizens from the region. (All eventually agreed that this measure would be a step too far, CENTCOM. Of the three theaters discussed in the at least for the time being.) Players agreed, however, scenarios, the developments in CENTCOM received that they could not allow the Japanese to use Ameri- the least attention. The commander of the Air Combat can military satellite bandwidth. Command (ACC), who also played the commander of CENTCOM for the simulation, noted that the air- INDOPACOM of Indian Ocean. Players agreed that the lift and cargo requirements emanating from EUCOM US should seize the opportunity created by India’s and INDOPACOM would limit the amount of support prior requests for support by establishing a formal- that the Air Force could provide other theaters in the ized force rotational or exercise schedule and deploy- event of an emergency. Rather than deploy additional ing a squadron of fighters there. Players also agreed assets to CENTCOM, players requested national that increasing America’s presence at Diego Garcia intelligence assets to more closely monitor the region. would help deter any additional westward Chinese expansionist behavior. The Pacific Air Force (PACAF) Analysis. The national table spent most of its time commander thus requested and received approval for thinking through escalation dynamics with respect the redeployment of CONUS-based fighter, airlift, and to China. Perhaps because they judged their deci- tanker assets to India under the exercise template and sions in the first move as insufficient to deter Chinese additional tanker and bomber assets to Diego Garcia. expansion, they broadened their strategic aperture to

22 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

MOVE 2 FigureDeployment 3. Scenario of US II F oSummaryrces Map

United Kingdom B-52, KC-46 Lakenheath to Poland F-15E | F-35A

Black Sea RQ-4 Japan 1 CSAR: HH-60 | HC-130 Turkey Italy C-17: 2 KC-46, CSAR: HH-60, HC-130

Vietnam to Philippines F-35A: 1 | KC-135: 1 SQNs Deployable in CONUS

Fighter: 8 Squadrons F-35: 4 | F-22: 1 | F-15: 3 India Bomber: 1 Squadron 1 AEW: F-35A | C-17 | C-130 | KC-135 B-1: 0 | B-2: 0 | B-52: 1 Tanker: 17 Squadrons Diego Garcia B-52 | KC-46 KC-46: 2 | KC-135: 15 Cargo: 19 Squadrons C-5: 4 | C-17: 5 | C-130: 10 CSAR: 2 Squadrons HH-60: 0 | HC-130: 2 CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Status of US Deployed Forces

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3

Fighters: 19 Squadrons Fighters: 7 Squadrons Fighters: 6 Squadrons Fighters: 13 Squadrons F-15 8 5 5 F-15 2 3 3 F-15 1 1 1 F-15 1 1 1 F-16 7 6 6 F-16 2 2 2 F-16 3 3 3 F-16 4 4 4 F-22 3 2 2 F-22 0 0 0 F-22 1 1 1 F-22 2 3 3 F-35 11 7 6 F-35 2 2 2 F-35 1 1 1 F-35 2 4 5

Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 2 Squadrons B-1 2 0 0 B-1 0 0 0 B-1 1 1 1 B-1 0 0 0 B-2 2 0 0 B-2 0 0 0 B-2 0 0 0 B-2 0 1 1 B-52 4 2 1 B-52 0 0 1 B-52 0 0 0 B-52 0 0 1

Tankers: 23 Squadrons Tankers: 4 Squadrons Tankers: 4 Squadrons Tankers: 5 Squadrons KC-46 8 7 3 KC-46 0 0 2 KC-46 1 1 1 KC-46 1 1 2 KC-135 29 24 20 KC-135 1 2 2 KC-135 3 3 3 KC-135 0 2 3

Cargo: 24 Squadrons Cargo: 5 Squadrons Cargo: 3 Squadrons Cargo: 8 Squadrons C-5 5 5 5 C-5 0 0 0 C-5 0 0 0 C-5 0 0 0 C-17 15 10 6 C-17 0 1 3 C-17 3 3 3 C-17 2 4 5 C-130 20 14 13 C-130 1 2 2 C-130 0 0 0 C-130 1 2 3

CSAR: 3 Squadrons CSAR: 3 Squadrons CSAR: 4 Squadrons CSAR: 3 Squadrons HH-60 5 3 1 HH-60 1 1 2 HH-60 4 4 4 HH-60 1 1 2 HC-130 5 5 2 HC-130 0 0 1 HC-130 0 0 0 HC-130 0 0 1

ISR UAV: 23 Squadrons ISR UAV: 4 Squadrons ISR UAV: 9 Squadrons ISR UAV: 4 Squadrons MQ-9 21 20 20 MQ-9 0 0 0 MQ-9 4 4 4 MQ-9 0 0 0 RQ-4 1 1 1 RQ-4 0 0 1 RQ-4 1 1 1 RQ-4 0 0 0 RQ-170 2 2 2 RQ-170 0 0 0 RQ-170 0 0 0 RQ-170 0 0 0 MC-130 1 1 1 MC-130 1 1 1 MC-130 2 2 2 U-2 1 1 1 U-2 1 1 1 U-2 1 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 1 E-8 1 1 1

Source: Authors.

23 TURBULENT SKIES

include the role that allies and partners could play in positions in the game, but in the end, this did not reducing China’s ability and willingness to maneu- suffice to force a necessary discussion about how ver. Although this was a welcome development and communications and “national-level” satellite assets in line with the incremental and long-term strate- would be prioritized in the event of a multi-theater gic approach employed by China, it happened at the crisis scenario. Although it was apparent how valu- expense of continued focus on the challenges present able these assets are for understanding competitive in other theaters. dynamics short of combat, players either did not feel The USAFE commander succeeded in drawing equipped to discuss the matter in an unclassified set- resources from CONUS and repositioning the forces ting or felt that conventional assets would make a available to him to increase pressure on Russia, but bigger difference to America’s competitive stance. CENTCOM—despite holding more American forces Either way, the exercise made clear that the best time than any other theater—once again received rela- to develop a strategic and competitive posture for tively little attention. This pattern of decision-making intelligence assets is before the outbreak of a crisis, should be familiar to anyone who has served in gov- as adversarial posturing distracts from these details ernment—the US has long tended to direct resources once crises begin to unfold. to one area while neglecting another—with the To cite INDOPACOM once again, Air Force leaders resource delta between America’s simultaneous may wish to consider expanding basing options in not efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan being a case in point. only Guam, Thailand, and the Philippines (as play- This all-or-nothing approach to crisis management, ers did in Scenario I) but also Vietnam and possibly coupled with ongoing declines in Air Force capacities, Taiwan. The problems presented by a lack of access modernization, and recapitalization, presents oppor- would also be exacerbated should the US draw down tunities for adversaries to test American capabilities elsewhere in theater—although we assumed in this while its leaders are focused on one theater, or one game that US posture in Korea remained unchanged problem, as was the case in our scenario. in 2024. Changing this assumption would reduce Both in INDOPACOM and in theaters that American access to China’s northern half. received less attention, leaders frequently requested “additional surveillance” or “increased monitor- Scenario III: What Impact Do ing”—to gather more information and gain additional Vulnerabilities in Space Have on situational awareness before making a prioritization the Decision-Making Process? How decision. Yet the careful attention paid to resource Does Increased Forward Presence allocation of conventional military equipment was Affect Operations in Other Areas of not mirrored in player discussions about how to Responsibility? prioritize intelligence and communications assets. Reluctance to share military SATCOM capacity with Scenario III tested decision-maker responses to the Japanese because of the crucial role that these a reduction in space-based communications and capabilities play in orchestrating American military exposed the vulnerabilities created by stretching the operations was also matched with frustration in bal- FYDP Air Force thin with an aggressive forward pos- ancing national-level satellite assets with the emerg- ture. Players also found that their countermeasures ing theater demands. Theater leaders, however, were deterred some specific behaviors but also created also slow to employ the many new tactical ISR air- opportunities for near-peer actors to act in realms frames made available to them in the game. of competition that had been overlooked. The move We had attempted to mitigate an expected lack of takes place in May and June of 2024. expertise about technical specifics with some players by creating a number of command, control, com- Scenario Overview. The scenario opens with an munications, computers, and intelligence–related unattributed cyberattack that results in a significant

24 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

degradation of space-based and Table 2. Scenario II Summary Table internet protocol communications Theater Airframe From Deployed to capacity in the INDOPACOM area Global Two KC-135 CONUS Unspecified of responsibility. Consequentially, the INDOPACOM commander’s EUCOM Two C-17 CONUS Turkey ability to communicate with other EUCOM B-52 CONUS Fairford UK command entities is significantly UK (B-52) and EUCOM Two KC-46 CONUS degraded as he contemplates reac- Italy tions to the scenario, and the effec- EUCOM RQ-4 CONUS Black Sea tiveness of in-theater assets is CSAR Package— EUCOM HH-60 Italy reduced by 30 percent. Meanwhile, CONUS China declares an air and sur- CSAR Package— EUCOM HC-130 Italy face exclusion zone over the Sec- CONUS ond Thomas Shoal, prompting the EUCOM F-15E Lakenheath Poland Philippines to consider invoking EUCOM F-35A Lakenheath Poland its defense treaty with the United INDOPACOM KC-46 CONUS Diego Garcia States. INDOPACOM B-52 CONUS Diego Garcia In the East China Sea, a Japa- nese fighter and a PLA Air Force INDOPACOM F-35A CONUS India aircraft collide over the Senkaku INDOPACOM KC-135 CONUS India Islands. Both countries vow to step INDOPACOM C-130 CONUS India up “self-defense” operations; ten- INDOPACOM C-17 CONUS India sions remain high as both coun- CSAR Package— INDOPACOM HH-60 Kadena, Japan tries conduct concurrent search CONUS and rescue operations. In the CSAR Package— INDOPACOM HC-130 Kadena, Japan Indian Ocean, China begins con- CONUS ducting intelligence and reconnais- Note: *Players considered the KC-135 airframes as part of their deployable pool but did sance missions over the Andaman not specify the location of each airframe’s deployment. Sea from its activated airfield near Source: Authors. Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In Europe, the border customs and inspection exercise called for in previous moves protesters exchange fire with police in a bout of civil results in Latvia and Lithuania reexamining recent unrest in Riga. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pro- entry and exit statistics from Belarus; they find evi- vide concrete evidence of Russian involvement; local dence of a significant level of infiltration by Russian media outlets support a petition to invoke NATO’s paramilitary forces disguised as tourists. At the bor- collective defense mechanism (Article V). der itself, agents notice an uptick in the discovery of In the Middle East, Israel launches a strike on attempted small arms and explosives smuggling. It Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah is unclear how long, or to what extent, such smug- assets in Syria. Several aircraft are shot down by Rus- gling has taken place in the past as the discover- sian and Syrian air defense systems. News reports ies likely resulted from increasing the stringency of indicate that Russians were killed at the Iranian Rev- border checks after the recent exercises. Meanwhile, olutionary Guard Corps base targeted by the Israeli Russian-language media throughout the Baltic States strike. Subsequently, Iran presents a reformulated intensify rhetoric about the plight of the Russian pop- version of the now-defunct Joint Comprehensive ulation in the Baltic States. Several weeks later, armed Plan of Action. This version, negotiated in secret

25 TURBULENT SKIES

with European countries, Qatar, and the United Arab of CENTCOM, called for an independent investiga- Emirates (UAE), would require the United States tion into the disappearance of Americans in Bagh- to remove all assets amassed into the region since dad. Some players considered whether Russia was to March—including those at bases in Qatar and the blame for the disappearance, an idea that the ACC UAE—in exchange for reformulated “guarantees” commander dismissed as paranoid. Although some regarding Iran’s nuclear program. players pushed for a more aggressive response to Hez- Saudi Arabia offers its bases as an alternative bollah and Iran’s moves in Syria, the ACC commander location for American assets, but it is unclear if this preferred a more cautious approach that entailed option would satisfy the terms of the new agreement. watching to see how Russia and Israel respond before In Iraq, five American trainers working with the Iraqi taking action. Iran’s proposal was quickly dismissed military in Baghdad mysteriously disappear. The Iraqi as unserious. government promises to investigate but also restricts the movement of remaining American personnel, Functional Table. The cyberattack on American com- which limits the ability to conduct an independent mand, control, and communications systems drove investigation. most of the conversation at the functional table. Although some were quick to suspect China of the Participant Deliberations. Before meeting for attack, others pointed to the difficulty of attribut- exercise-wide discussion, players were asked to con- ing such attacks rapidly and with certainty and that, sider the implications of scenario developments at without more information, the attack could have their respective tables. come from Iran or Russia. The commander of the Air Force Space Command suggested augmenting mil- Regional Table. Regarding Asia, the INDOPACOM itary communications capabilities with commercial commander expressed serious concern about the deg- satellites and bandwidth; doing so would discourage radation of theater command, control, and commu- further attacks because “many actors rely upon the nications capacity, likening attacks in cyberspace to same systems for their communications.” Players dis- the existential threat nuclear weapons pose. Although cussed presidential authorities to seize commercial he was prevented from doing so himself at this stage bandwidth in the event of a national emergency and of the game, he planned to coordinate options with discussed the possibility of switching critical commu- the national security adviser and commander of nications to the HF Network. All agreed that this attack Cyber Command during the general discussion. would cause more harm to the United States than if a With respect to Europe, the USAFE commander saw similar one was conducted against other actors, due de-escalation as the best strategy to avoid the invo- to America’s heavy reliance on space-based assets for cation of NATO Articles IV or V. In addition to calm- command and control. ing the Baltic States on the diplomatic front, players planned to respond to Russia’s behavior by coordi- Pentagon Table. Players at this table began by prior- nating with Frontex Border Security (an organ of the itizing responses to the numerous threats emerging European Union), deploying American and NATO around the globe. They viewed the cyberattack on the special operations forces (SOF) trained in unconven- United States with high concern but felt that taking tional warfare to the region, and potentially launching action without evidence of attribution could back- an asymmetric response to Russia’s position in the fire. Their regional concern in INDOPACOM cen- Black Sea. tered more on China’s declaration of an air exclusion The players, however, also recognized the diffi- zone over the Second Thomas Shoal. Various propos- culty of coordinating a rapid response in NATO and als were discussed to handle this situation, including thus also considered unilateral options. In the Middle deploying additional American forces to the Philip- East, the commander of the ACC, acting as overseer pines, installing the counter-electronics high-powered

26 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

microwave advanced missile project electromagnetic American airspace, has established an airborne strike pulse system, or moving a carrier strike group to the station in the Arctic Sea, and has deployed fighter and Philippines. other theater assets to this base. This facility could The players disagreed, however, on how seriously directly threaten US assets in Alaska. China’s action should be taken in escalatory terms— and what it should mean for larger questions about America First. Two senators lead an effort to block America’s posture in the Pacific. Both considered the funds necessary to redeploy Air Force assets away whether, for example, and to what extent, the United from CONUS. “Why are we sacrificing our security Nations should be involved in any retaliatory mea- for those half a world away,” they ask. sures aimed at deterring China. In Europe, players recognized that their actions thus far had been insuf- Russian Base in Yemen. Russia signs an agreement with ficient to deter Russian aggression. They discussed the Yemen government to expand its legacy facilities calling an emergency meeting of NATO signatories on Socotra Island to include a naval installation and and agreed with a suggestion from the national table an airbase. The new bases provide Russia with direct to conduct a widespread cyberattack against all par- access to the Gulf of Aden. ties that plausibly could have conducted the attack. Sino-Russian Cooperation. An intelligence report National Table. In addition to the above-mentioned reveals the establishment of a permanent coordi- cyberattack against Iran, Russia, and China, the nation center for combined Arctic operations, evi- national table shared the sense of urgency other play- dencing further Sino-Russian command and control ers expressed concerning the situation in the Philip- integration. pines. Although all agreed that China’s move created an opportunity to renew and reinvigorate cooperation The 707 Airframe Inspection Results. The 707 airframe with the Philippines, players disagreed about how inspection concludes with the discovery of similar that opportunity should be used, citing different per- airframe problems that plagued KC-135s. As a result, spectives about the escalatory dynamics at play. The 25 percent of E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control secretary of defense summarized the difficult deci- systems (AWACS) are grounded. sion facing the players: “Either engage in conflict in unfavorable conditions or keep losing small slices [to Discussion and Decisions. The main decision China].” All agreed that the secretary of state should points of the move involved the cyberattack and the take the lead on negotiations with the Philippines; Chinese announcement about the Second Thomas he mentioned that he would also negotiate for the Shoal. Many of the other developments, in the words deployment of SOF and land-based anti-ship missiles. of the national security adviser, were “just noise”—a Discussion of these matters overshadowed any men- distraction from the two main threats. Unlike prior tion of the Middle East. moves in the game, different levels of comfort with risk-taking marked the discussion in Scenario III. Injects. After the players discussed their ini- (See Figure 4 and Table 3 for overviews of player tial reactions to the scenario at their respective decisions for this scenario.) By region, the main tables, five injects were provided to challenge their discussion and decision points for this scenario decision-making process further and provoke reflec- included the following. tion about the second-order effects of their previous decisions. INDOPACOM. While deferring to national leadership about retaliatory steps for the cyberattack, the PACAF Threat to the Homeland. Intelligence reports indicate commander requested additional ISR assets (receiv- that Russia has allowed its fighter jets to penetrate ing approval for an additional squadron of U-2s from

27 TURBULENT SKIES

CONUS) and advocated for a cautious approach to commander’s request, players agreed to dedicate an any military movements in Alaska or in INDOPA- RQ-170 to Afghanistan to monitor developments in COM in light of recent Chinese and Russian actions. Iran and agreed that support for Israel should be This caution was driven as much by risk aversion as expressed through public diplomacy channels. the practical reality that the Air Force had spread its resources thinly across the globe. The commander Global and Cyberattack. Although the national security thus advocated for national leadership to provide adviser presented a bold plan to conduct a cyberattack specific and narrowly defined objectives before giving against the command and control nodes of Russia, any additional advice on force posture. National lead- China, Iran, and Syria in response to the unattributed ership defined its regional objectives as “containing attack on an American system, the commander of China and ensuring access to all domains.” The sec- US Cyber Command rebutted with concerns about retary of state suggested that, in addition to bolster- how each actor might retaliate against the United ing America’s relationship with the Philippines, the States and how difficult it would be to contain such deployment of a reconnaissance aircraft and resupply a wide-reaching offensive. In the end, players all rec- of the Philippine military—both efforts to “revital- ognized the need to gather more information, but ize” the American-Filipino mutual defense treaty— indecision prevented them from directing a timely would also support the optimal diplomatic narrative response to the crisis at hand. of “ensuring access,” vice seeking war with China. Analysis. We designed this move to test player EUCOM. Despite the USAFE commander’s initial decision-making as crises began to boil over, with concerns that his theater would receive little atten- the added complication of degraded communication in the wake of the cyberattack affecting East Asia, tions infrastructure. Because players had already players decided to send a number of units to Europe employed much of their CONUS-based capacity in both to reassure European allies and in an attempt the two prior moves, we also hoped to force a con- to further deter Russia. For example, F-22A, KC-135, versation about capacity constraints. While we suc- C-130, and C-17 squadrons were sent to Romania, ceeded in creating an environment where players in addition to European Union customs units and faced difficult strategic trade-offs, they tended to NATO SOFs. To increase intelligence knowledge of respond similarly to previous moves—that is, with Russia’s behavior in the Black Sea, players also sent an increased deployments to Europe, careful position- RQ-170 to Sicily and an MQ-9 to the Baltics. Players ing in INDOPACOM, ambivalence toward the Middle also sent a special tactics squadron to Poland. They East, indecision with respect to cyber and commu- seemingly viewed the continued deployment of assets nications, and little analysis of the second-order to Europe as a way to pressure the Russians into back- effects on homeland posture created by a scattered ing down in the Arctic but did not deploy any addi- approach to creating presence forward. tional assets to Alaska (or redeploy existing ones) to Concerning Europe, the players continued to directly counter the threat. Realizing that their bank pursue a strategy of creating pressure points along of CONUS-based deployable units was rapidly dimin- Russia’s frontier away from the Baltics. While this ishing, players began discussions about readiness lev- strategy would likely give Putin pause, the players els in the Air National Guard and the Reserves. may have overlooked the main thrust of the scenario: that Russian political warfare and modern- CENTCOM. Players unanimously recognized that ization plans could be used to undermine NATO crises in the Middle East would remain a lesser pri- unity and confidence in the event of a crisis. Rather ority in this move, though the secretary of defense than approach Russia’s maneuvering in the Baltics stated that the region represented a “low-level infec- head-on, the players attempted to divert attention tion that will need to be dealt with soon.” At the ACC elsewhere.

28 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

MOVE 3 FigureDeployment 4. Scenario of US III F oSummaryrces Map

Black Sea MQ-9 Poland STS Romania 1 AEW: F-2A2 | KC-135 | C-130 | C-17 Israel Experts from US weapons school Japan Sicily U-2 RQ-170 Afghanistan RQ-170 | MQ-9

SQNs Deployable in CONUS

Status of US Deployed Forces

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3

Fighters: 19 Squadrons Fighters: 8 Squadrons Fighters: 6 Squadrons Fighters: 13 Squadrons F-15 8 5 5 5 F-15 2 3 3 3 F-15 1 1 1 1 F-15 1 1 1 1 F-16 7 6 6 6 F-16 2 2 2 2 F-16 3 3 3 3 F-16 4 4 4 4 F-22 3 2 2 2 F-22 0 0 0 1 F-22 1 1 1 1 F-22 2 3 3 3 F-35 11 7 6 6 F-35 2 2 2 2 F-35 1 1 1 1 F-35 2 4 5 5

Bombers: 0 Squadrons Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 1 Squadron Bombers: 2 Squadrons B-1 2 0 0 0 B-1 0 0 0 0 B-1 1 1 1 1 B-1 0 0 0 0 B-2 2 0 0 0 B-2 0 0 0 0 B-2 0 0 0 0 B-2 0 1 1 1 B-52 4 2 1 0 B-52 0 0 1 1 B-52 0 0 0 0 B-52 0 0 1 1

Tankers: 21 Squadrons Tankers: 5 Squadrons Tankers: 4 Squadrons Tankers: 5 Squadrons KC-46 8 7 3 3 KC-46 0 0 2 2 KC-46 1 1 1 1 KC-46 1 1 2 2 KC-135 29 24 20 18 KC-135 1 2 2 3 KC-135 3 3 3 3 KC-135 0 2 3 3

Cargo: 22 Squadrons Cargo: 7 Squadrons Cargo: 3 Squadrons Cargo: 8 Squadrons C-5 5 5 5 5 C-5 0 0 0 0 C-5 0 0 0 0 C-5 0 0 0 0 C-17 15 10 6 5 C-17 0 1 3 4 C-17 3 3 3 3 C-17 2 4 5 5 C-130 20 14 13 12 C-130 1 2 2 3 C-130 0 0 0 0 C-130 0 0 1 3

CSAR: 3 Squadrons CSAR: 3 Squadrons CSAR: 4 Squadrons CSAR: 3 Squadrons HH-60 5 3 1 1 HH-60 1 1 2 2 HH-60 4 4 4 4 HH-60 1 1 2 2 HC-130 5 5 2 2 HC-130 0 0 1 1 HC-130 0 0 0 0 HC-130 0 0 1 1

ISR UAV: 18 Squadrons ISR UAV: 6 Squadrons ISR UAV: 10 Squadrons ISR UAV: 7 Squadrons MQ-9 21 20 20 17 MQ-9 0 0 0 1 MQ-9 4 4 4 5 MQ-9 0 0 0 0 RQ-4 1 1 1 1 RQ-4 0 0 1 1 RQ-4 1 1 1 1 RQ-4 0 0 0 0 RQ-170 2 2 2 0 RQ-170 0 0 0 1 RQ-170 0 0 0 0 RQ-170 0 0 0 1 MC-130 1 1 1 1 MC-130 1 1 1 1 MC-130 2 2 2 2 U-2 1 1 1 1 U-2 1 1 1 1 U-2 1 1 1 2 RC-135V/W 1 1 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 1 1 RC-135V/W 1 1 1 2 E-8 1 1 1 1

Source: Authors.

29 TURBULENT SKIES

Table 3. Scenario III Summary Table conducted incremental moves in legal, psychological, and informa- Theater Airframe From Deployed to tional warfare in the South China EUCOM F-22A CONUS Romania Sea, players responded convention- EUCOM KC-135 CONUS Romania ally, but when China found itself EUCOM C-130 CONUS Romania engaged in a conventional confron- EUCOM C-17 CONUS Romania tation, players seemed reluctant to EUCOM STS CONUS Poland engage. As in Scenario II, players EUCOM MQ-9 CONUS Baltics requested “more information” but seemed hesitant to request the addi- EUCOM RQ-170 CONUS Sicily tional assets necessary to obtain it, CENTCOM MQ-9 CONUS Afghanistan especially given the degraded state INDOPACOM RQ-170 CONUS SCS of communications in the INDOPA- INDOPACOM RC-135V/W CONUS SCS or Philippines COM area of responsibility. INDOPACOM U-2 CONUS ECS or Japan In a move that surprised many, Additional Israel the national security adviser posited Assets* the bold idea of launching a coordinated attack against all adversaries Note: *US Air Force Weapons School experts are sent to Israel to study the ramifications that had used cyber means against of Russian overmatch regarding anti-access and area denial capabilities. Source: Authors. the United States in the recent past. The suggestion was rooted in an intention to demonstrate Ameri- Players did not consider the message that this can willingness to strike back when provoked and to might send to the Baltics, NATO allies, and Russia showcase the vast ability of American offensive cyber about America’s lack of willingness to take action capabilities to deter future attacks. The commander against Russian meddling in a NATO signatory state. of Cyber Command’s call for prudence and restraint The player’s muted reaction to Russia’s push in the mirrored the attitude that players had about most Arctic was also curious. The expansionist and con- developments in the game. Although they were more frontational message sent by Moscow in this instance than willing to deploy American assets, whether ISR was clear—yet players seemed preoccupied with or combat units, they approached each provocation responding tit for tat to Moscow’s maneuvering that with the utmost caution and demurred from mak- appeared to miss the broader implications of Russia’s ing decisions that would impose costs on America’s global actions. Even as they focused on tactical rather adversaries out of a concern that a crisis might esca- than strategic-level details, however, the reality of the late in a manner over which they would have little Air Force’s diminished capacities manifested in player or no control. It is telling that the national security consideration of their potential responses. adviser also initiated the one exception to this trend, The reactive and operational approach taken by the movement out of Inçirlik. the players in Europe mirrored their approach to Thus, at the end of Scenario III, America’s adver- INDOPACOM. In the South China Sea, China’s moves saries had made significant gains in driving multiple were symbolically provocative but did not present an US military deployments, which further stretched actual security threat. Players were transfixed by the the limited availability of both hardware and per- symbolism of China’s legalistic claims over the Sec- sonnel. On the one hand, their decisions effectively ond Thomas Shoal—to the point that they began to left the US homeland more vulnerable; on the other minimize the genuine possibility of a shooting war they successfully avoided making trade-offs that breaking out over the Senkaku Islands. While China would prevent them from continuing their respective

30 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

campaigns. In contrast to the minimalist approaches and partners and reassurances to its enemies. It will to expansion and provocation taken by its adversar- have reached the limits of its ability to deter, with lit- ies, the United States will have expended consider- tle overall effect. In the next turn of the game, play- able resources deploying its assets across the globe. ers considered options available within the next five It will have had its dominance in space and the skies years that could increase their options in competing challenged, sending negative signals to all its allies against multiple adversaries short of combat.

31 IV. A New Way Forward

PLAYER DELIBERATIONS ON IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FYDP AIR FORCE

y the end of Scenario III, players had become although we discouraged players from allowing cost B frustrated by the limitations of the forecasted Air to drive their decisions, we did ask them to consider Force capabilities and capacities of 2024. Whereas Sce- the possible opportunity costs for choosing particular narios I–III had participants employing the Air Force options over others. We also asked players to consider of 2024 as forecasted by the 2019 FYDP, Scenario IV the development plans underway in China, Russia, provided players with the opportunity to amend the and Iran (Appendix B), regardless of how “realistic” force to better position it for the expected interna- these plans may be. The result is an Air Force with tional competition. increased options for deployment, expanded capacities, and filled capability gaps that will prolong the Scenario IV: What Modifications over US military’s qualitative edge in the skies and space in the FYDP Would Enhance Performance 2024 and beyond. Across Prior Scenarios? Discussion and Decisions. We endeavored to pro- In Scenario IV, players considered a menu of acqui- duce a list of options that were attainable by 2024 and sition and personnel-enhancing options for possible which, as options, represented a wide variety of opin- implementation between now and 2024. Following ions regarding the Air Force’s future direction. Players their discussion about the relative merits and draw- were apprised of the effect that adopting each option backs of each option, they provided input as to how would have on gameplay. Both the effect and how the their reactions to the game’s culminating develop- players employed new capabilities and capacities are ments (i.e., those in Scenario III) would differ under included below. Player discussions, by system and the new conditions they selected. capacity, included the following.

Scenario Overview. For the sake of brevity, and 3-D Printing of Spare Parts on Base. Currently, the Air because it represented a cumulative progression from Force is waiting up to a year for replacement parts that the previous two scenarios, players were only asked it could otherwise 3-D print. Twelve Air Force instal- to consider how new capacities and capabilities might lations worldwide are outfitted with 3-D printers. improve their responses to Scenario III. We thus Spending on this line of effort would purchase more “reverted” the world to May 2024, which reflected the printers and establish a working capital fund to pur- end of Scenario II, and asked players to consider the chase the rights to reprint parts as needed from the condition of the Air Force at that time when discussing patent holders. It would also foster innovation chal- each of the options presented. Although we designed lenges among airmen to better use this technology.15 these options to be personnel neutral, certain com- binations of new acquisitions would be impossible Effect. This option would bring F-22A, F-35A, and to undertake without an expanded force, particu- KC-46 up to legacy readiness levels. Deployment ratio larly pilots. Each option would come with a cost, and changes from 3-2 to 4-3.

32 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Player reaction. Players agreed that this idea, Effect. One squadron of 747 Cruise Missile Carrier which in some respects is already underway, should Aircraft added to gameplay. Each aircraft is outfitted be expanded to include the production of (certifiable with 72 AGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles. and viable) spare parts. Player reaction. Players vehemently rejected this Employment. By approving this option, players proposal, calling it a “nonstarter,” characterizing its were able to deploy one additional Air Expedition- marginal utility and survivability as “questionable” ary Wing, consisting of one squadron each of F-35As, compared to additional F-35A purchases and prob- KC-46s, C-130s, and C-17s to Thailand. lematic due to the age of the 747 airframes. One player mentioned that a similar capability could be obtained T-X Acceleration.16 This proposal would enhance by deploying a submarine or destroyer outfitted with Air Force pilot training to accelerate delivery of T-X cruise missiles. trainers. Players discussed how each initiative would affect Air Force readiness. (While this option does Employment. This is not applicable, as players not directly affect the ongoing theater scenarios pre- rejected the system. sented in the simulation, it does begin to address the overall readiness and foundational training require- Advanced Battle Management System. The Air Force ments needed by 2024.) budget request for 2019 proposed canceling the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Effect. Pilot training pipelines remain predictable (JSTARS) recapitalization program and transferring and on schedule. funding to the Advanced Battle Management System, which would distribute the mission to unmanned col- Player reaction. Players agreed that this capacity lectors and air battle managers aboard E-3 AWACS was inexpensive and would be imperative for replac- aircraft. While JSTARS will not be fully retired within ing the T-38A/C Talon trainers, which are on average the time frame of the game, the Senate version of the 50 years old. Half of noncombat crashes in 2018 were National Defense Authorization Act would acceler- attributable to the T-38 Talon, and players widely rec- ate Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) ognized that the Air Force is one sortie away from research to bring the capability online sooner to sup- having to ground the entire fleet ofT-38s .17 plement JSTARS before replacing it.19 To reflect this approach, this line item would either: Employment. Acceleration of T-X deliveries would replace existing T-38Cs at current Air Force • Provide one to two squadrons of upgraded MQ-9 training bases within CONUS. and a converted squadron of E-3 aircraft capable of performing both air-to-air and air-to-ground 747 Cruise Missile Carrier Aircraft. In the 1980s, Boe- battle management or ing developed a plan to modify existing 747 airliners into Cruise Missile Carrier aircraft, each outfitted • Accelerate acquisition of Global Hawk Block 40 with 72 air-launched cruise missiles (a capacity equiv- (which contains ground moving target indicator alent to 75 percent of a Navy destroyer or 3.6 B-52 and synthetic aperture radar sensor capabilities). bombers). This line item would keep the production line based in Everett, Washington, active by retool- Effect. If MQ-9 or E-3 is selected, one existing ing it to produce a new generation of arsenal planes. E-3 squadron and one MQ-9 squadron are converted Alternatively, retiring passenger liners could be pur- to reflect above capabilities. They must be deployed chased and refitted.18 together. If Global Hawk Block 40 is selected, it would receive two additional squadrons.

33 TURBULENT SKIES

Player reaction. Players expressed skepticism to already-scheduled improvements, support that the ABMS would effectively “replace” JSTARS expanded purchases of HF spectrum for use but supported creating a capability to link air- and by the military and a follow-on program of ground-based system communications together, smaller satellites geared specifically for tac- an objective that ABMS would theoretically tical communications to complicate enemy achieve. Many believed that smaller steps, such as targeting.21 a system-to-system rather than enterprise-wide approach, was more realistic, especially in the short • Blackjack Micro-Communications Satel- term. Because the capacity is a needed one, play- lites. The Blackjack program run by Defense ers chose to proceed with this option, but many felt Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) like it was reflective of “old thinking” for a “new will develop small, secure, and affordable mil- problem.” itary satellites that will operate in low-Earth orbit and leverage modern commercial satellite Employment. Players decided that replacing an technology. These vehicles accomplish similar E-8 squadron in CENTCOM with a new ABMS plat- missions to today’s geosynchronous communi- form would provide adequate testing for the system’s cations satellites, but at a fraction of the cost, viability in other theaters. bolstering constellation resiliency and modu- larity. Eventually, the Blackjack-derived con- Communications Constellation Upgrades. We allowed stellation may reach 60–200 satellites, and players to assume the successful completion of some payload data processing will take place on combination of the following initiatives since 2018. orbit without the need for ground station data processing.22 • HF Spectrum Global Buyout. The HF spectrum has been overlooked in recent years in • Repair Satellite Program Launch. DARPA, in favor of other “more advanced” communica- collaboration with NASA, is investing in a new tions technologies. The United States has the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites opportunity to assert dominance in the HF initiative, expecting to launch its first refuel- spectrum through contracted access to signifi- ing craft in 2019. Regularization of this experi- cantly more bandwidth vis-à-vis commercial ment, coupled with increased production and and international actors. If pursued, this option launches, could field a small constellation of sat- would also comprise updates to HF capabilities ellites capable of repairing friendly assets and to allow for increasingly distributed commu- disabling hostile ones by 2024. This could allow nications and conversion to digital HF, and it players to regenerate space capability without would add increased abilities to process latent the pitfalls of turning to the commercial net- HF radar.20 work; however, it could also significantly affect the balance of power in space.23 • Advanced Extremely High Frequency System Improvements. With 10 times the Effect. Additional layers of systems enhance con- capacity of the Milstar communications sys- stellation resiliency and mitigate communications tem, the series of six Advanced Extremely capacity degradation. Capacity may be considered in High Frequency satellites will provide strate- a permanent state of “green” for the second round of gic and tactical secure communications to the gameplay. United States military and select international partners. Owing to the security and fidelity of Player reaction. Players, including the com- HF systems, this line item would, in addition mander of US Cyber Command, generally supported

34 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

each of the above initiatives and agreed with our Employment. The B-52 deployed to the United assessment that at least one of them will have been Kingdom moved to CENTCOM and was replaced by pursued by 2024. The HF spectrum “buyout” plan a B-21. The B-1 in CENTCOM was returned to main- received the most attention, particularly because of tenance in CONUS. its attractive cost-benefit ratio. This proposal also received praise because HF is “not jammable” and Deployable Air Base System Purchases. The Senate ver- because it is currently the main communications sion of the National Defense Authorization Act pro- medium for Russian operations in the Arctic. Field- vides funding for seven deployable air base systems, ing microsatellites was viewed as more realistic by prepositioned or expeditionary equipment sets nec- 2024 than achieving a reliable repair satellite pro- essary for converting a civilian field into a temporary gram; some pointed out that inexpensive microsat- airbase. These are intended to provide the Air Force ellites that could be readily replaced would obviate with further dispersed runway options in the event of the need for repair satellites. Players stressed the a contingency. This line item would expand purchases need to focus less on particular systems and more of deployable air base systems sets, fund their prep- on capabilities that could be applied across the ositioning in the territory of major overseas allies, force to augment currently fielded equipment. and potentially widen the sets to include runway construction equipment to enable the establishment of Employment. The completion of one or more entirely new fields.25 of these initiatives would mitigate the effects of the cyberattack in Scenario III. As players agreed that this Effect. Grounding of NATO assets at Inçirlik Air would be the case (even without changing funding or Base no longer precludes EUCOM assets from sup- acquisition plans), we returned the communications porting CENTCOM. Players will discuss where else capacity scale to its “steady state.” this capability might be useful.

B-21 Program Acceleration. The B-21 program is Player response. Player responses to this ini- expected to deliver its first operational aircraft in tiative were overwhelmingly positive; many refer- the mid-2020s. This item assumes accelerated fund- enced past uses of this capability and regretted that, ing could pull the initial operating capability date a while focused in recent decades on continual combat year or two to the left, enabling a squadron of the air- deployments, the Air Force had allowed it to “atro- craft to be operational by 2024. These aircraft may phy.” In addition to EUCOM, players also saw partic- have limited capabilities compared to follow-on pro- ular use for this capability in Southeast Asia and in duction units. For example, they may not be capa- AFRICOM. ble of unmanned operations or lack nuclear mission certification.24 Employment. Based on player discussions, we distributed eight systems across the globe (Table 4). Effect. Convert the B-1 squadrons to a B-21. Table 4. Scenario IV Air Base System Deployments Player response. Players saw value in accelerating the B-21 program, especially if it could possess a INDOPACOM EUCOM nuclear weapons capability. Because the B-1 no longer Phuket Baltics has a nuclear capability, they eventually agreed that a India Romania more rapid acquisition of B-21 would be worth losing Vietnam Poland one B-1 squadron. Philippines Mali

Source: Authors.

35 TURBULENT SKIES

Capability Upgrades for Select Fourth-Generation Employment. The receipt of three additional Fighters or Purchase of Additional Fourth-Generation squadrons of F-35As allows for the creation and Fighters. This line would fund upgrades to select deployment of three Air Expeditionary Wings. Play- legacy airframes to enable survivable operations in ers deploy all new F-35A squadrons forward: two in contested environments. One example is the Eagle Romania, along with KC-46, C-5, and C-130 squad- Passive Active Warning Survivability System, intended rons, and one in the UAE, which is accompanied by to upgrade roughly 200 F-15E and 200 F-15C by 2023. KC-46, C-5, and C-17 squadrons. Analogous programs for the F-16 include digital radar warning receivers, MIDS-JTRS, and a missile warn- Fighter Production Restarts and New Starts. Play- ing system. The goal of this program is not to update ers were presented with several options to enhance every legacy squadron, but rather a select number for fighter capacities. sensitive missions to supplement fifth-generation aircraft.26 Players were also provided the option of pur- • F-22A Midlife Upgrades. System designers chasing additional fourth-generation fighters. took the need for midlife upgrades into account while the F-22A was still in the planning stages. Effect. There was none (introduced only to assess Accelerating the adoption of these improve- player reaction). ments would allow for the F-22A to maintain its qualitative warfighting and sensing edge over Player reaction. Players rejected these proposals many adversarial systems.28 on the grounds that purchasing more fifth-generation aircraft to attain economies of scale would have qual- Effect. This option increases the qualitative edge itative and, potentially, cost advantages. of existing F-22A systems and increases readiness rate. Employment. This was not applicable. Players may also choose to pursue one of the following. (Each would serve in place of retired F-15C F-35A Production Acceleration. The order of battle in squadrons.) the base scenario assumes that F-35A production continues at the rate programmed in the FYDP. This line • F-22 Production Restart. This line would item would accelerate it to the rate proposed by the restart production of the F-22 to double the 2019 House Appropriations Committee draft of the number of aircraft in service over a nine-year defense budget, funding three further combat-coded production run, averaging 21 aircraft per year. squadrons of F-35A (and their associated non-coded However, deliveries would likely not be feasible auxiliaries) by 2024. In the current plan, these F-35As until the mid-to-late-2020s, making it implau- would replace F-15E, A-10, and F-16 units. This option sible that more than two squadrons would be would also reduce the cost of the F-35A through the available for operations in the 2024 time frame creation of economies of scale.27 of the game.

Effect. Participants would receive three squad- • Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-3 Coopera- rons of upgraded F-35As. tion. The F-3 program is an emerging Japanese program to replace the Japan Air Self-Defense Player reaction. Players unanimously agree to Force F-15C inventory. One option under con- pursue this proposal and believe that it should be sideration is a union of the F-22A airframe with done while still maintaining the current rate of for- developments to propulsion, software, and eign sales. sensor fusion included in the F-35A platform. In addition to Japan, this program has attracted

36 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

the interest of other allies such as Israel and • New KC-10 Replacement Request for Infor- Australia, whose participation would likely off- mation (KC-Z). We inform the players that, in set some of the investment needed to bring late 2018, an RFI is issued for a specific KC-10 it online.29 replacement. This system would enter production alongside the KC-46, which would continue Effect. They could choose two F-22 squadrons or to replace the KC-135. one F-3 squadron and retire a commensurate number of F-15C squadrons. Effects. Players may plus up their aerial tanker squadron count by four, using a combination of Player reaction. Players recognized the neces- KC-46s or KC-Zs or all of one and none of the other. sity of pursuing midlife upgrades for the F-22A and suggested pursuing foreign sales to offset costs. (Oth- Player reaction. In discussing the presented ers suggested that a choice not to pursue this option options, players also mentioned the possibility of pur- would be tantamount to choosing to retire the sys- chasing the MQ-25, a refueling drone currently being tem.) In addition to the upgrades, players opted to acquired by the US Navy. However, players unani- restart the F-22A production line with a total buy of mously rejected the idea of an MQ-25 role for the Air around 400 new aircraft but only foresaw the produc- Force, characterizing it as a nonstarter for theater tion of one squadron’s worth of aircraft by 2024. Play- operations due to its inadequate fuel capacity. Par- ers doubted that the F-3 would be ready by 2024 but ticipants were more divided on the choice between a nonetheless found merit in supporting Japanese pro- KC-46 acceleration or the acquisition of an as-yet-un- duction of the system. known KC-Z.

Employment. Players prioritize the midlife Employment. Although there was no clear con- upgrades to existing F-22As and retain the new F-22 sensus over the KC-46 replacement method, play- squadron in CONUS to maintain a credible reserve ers recognized the need to do something to improve of fifth-generation fighters while the deliveries of the tanker capacity. We thus assumed that one option “derivative F-22” begin to enter squadron service. would eventually be chosen and provided four KC-46 squadrons as placeholders. Three of these squadrons Aerial Tanker Plus Up. The base game assumes the were used to support the new F-35A Air Expeditionary retirement of KC-10s, which were replaced by six Wings; the remaining squadron deployed to Guam. squadrons of KC-46s. In addition to that, four KC-135 squadrons were replaced by KC-46s. However, the Low-Cost Attritable Aircraft (Combat). Debate remains United States could also achieve higher replacement about whether the Air Force should pursue a new numbers for the KC-135 if it chose to prioritize this. build to fulfill this requirement or repurpose retiring Debate remains about whether the Air Force should combat aircraft (i.e., the MQ-16). The combat options accelerate the production of the KC-46 or pursue an are as follows. entirely new system. The options are as follows. • Low-Cost Attritable Aircraft: New Build. • KC-46 (Production Acceleration). This pro- Largely a reaction to the loss of an RQ-170 over posal would accelerate KC-46 production in line Iran, the low-cost attritable aircraft technology with industrially feasible targets, enabling the (LCAAT) program is an effort to create a dispos- conversion of a further four squadrons from able, penetrating, unmanned aircraft intended KC-135 to KC-46 within the time frame of the for either ISR or strike missions in denied air- game.30 space. With a unit cost averaging between $2 and $3 million (about one-tenth the cost of an

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F-16), these could be used as swarming assets to Overall, however, the players expressed a strong pref- ensure that some payloads are effective no mat- erence for a combat-ready MQ-16 over an LCAAT. ter the severity of enemy air defenses.31 Payload is small, constrained at just 500 pounds (equiv- Employment. Per participant feedback indicat- alent to two small diameter bombs or limited ing doubt about the availability of either system by surveillance or jamming equipment), but the 2024, we did not provide any LCAAT or combat-ready aircraft has low-observable characteristics if not MQ-16 for deployment. materials. They are vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) and do not require runways. This line Low-Cost Attritable Aircraft (Sensor). Although it item would give players several squadrons of the remains unclear whether or how the Air Force will aircraft to see how they employ them (for exam- pursue a sensor-focused LCAAT, players may assume ple, if they attempt recovery or instead choose the following course of action. to use them as disposable assets). • Marine Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) • MQ-16 Combat Role. The Air Force has been Role for the Air Force. The Marine Corps is converting retired F-16 into target drones for investing in its MUX program, a series of large, years, but the recent Loyal Wingman program high-endurance UAVs that do not require sig- has demonstrated how these target drones can nificant runways or dedicated launch facili- be militarized into strike aircraft. So far, these ties. (They will be VTOL.) After investigating aircraft have only been used in air-to-ground their strike role, the US Marine Corps decided roles, but they have maintained formation with to pivot and develop the system as a substitute other manned aircraft and cooperated with them for the E-2D Hawkeye to identify and cue sur- to execute their missions. Instead of retiring air- face and aerial targets. Air Force investment craft displaced by the F-35A in manned fighter into this program could produce a survivable, units, this line item would convert the obso- low-risk alternative to battle management plat- lete craft into Loyal Wingmen for use as dispos- forms such as JSTARS and the E-3. These assets able strike assets with manned fifth-generation could also be deployed much closer to the front craft.32 lines, or even inside the enemy’s rear areas, to improve air battle management and complicate Effects. Players may add four LCAAT units to adversary targeting. This line item would pro- play, using a combination of new builds and MQ-16s vide players with a squadron or two of MUX or all of one and none of the other. These count as drones to test this capability.33 ordnance. Effect. Players may convert two EC-130 squad- Player reaction. Players expressed ambivalence rons into MUX squadrons. about the LCAAT new build and were skeptical that it would be ready by 2024. Some drew analogies to Player reaction. Despite a general lack of enthu- the use of Predator drones in Iraq and said that this siasm about this option, players could foresee a role equipment could save money, but others said that for the platform if it were mounted with an electronic cavalier use of expensive assets reflected a problem warfare sensor. with training and culture rather than a requirement for new, cheaper equipment. Still others suggested Employment. No MUX squadrons were pro- that funds would be better directed toward develop- vided, as participants doubted it would be ready for ing ordnance with a greater range, rather than toward deployment by 2024. the creation of yet another aircraft to deliver them.

38 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Improved Missile Capabilities. Players were provided Employment. As the players appeared to value a with two options to improve the Air Force’s surface general munitions buy more than the increased acqui- attack missile capabilities. sition of specialized munitions (or investments in the creation of new ones), we did not make any related • More Strike Missiles. The current acquisition changes to their portfolio of available resources. plan for advanced capability weapons such as JASSM or CHAMP are thin and slow. Moreover, Other Proposals. Players were provided with other current buy plans do not adequately account for proposals that had less specific costs but that would the possibility of joint missile operations. majorly affect force projection capabilities.

• Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ALBMs) More Forward Presence. As the Air Force moves to a and Ballistic-Boosted Hypersonic Weap- post–Afghanistan/Iraq deployment template, players ons. Using air-launched ballistic rockets to boost were asked to consider whether decoupling combat payloads is a long-proven capability. Not pursu- deployments from the AEF model would enable addi- ing this as a combat option to strike targets from tional combat deployments to theaters of interest. sanctuary or deliver hypersonic payloads limits Players expressed satisfaction with the status quo, the employability of the Air Force in support of meaning that even though the Air Force has “evolved major operations. An accelerated crash program beyond and refined” the AEF model for operations, it could provide two bomber (or transport) squad- is still useful from a planning and resourcing stand- rons with external load ballistic booster capabil- point. Many participants referenced pre-AEF days ity within the time frame of the game. when Air Force deployments and logistics were con- siderably more chaotic. Effects. Players decide which, if any, munitions acquisitions should be increased. If they choose to Increased Manpower. Although the options above are increase JASSM or CHAMP acquisitions, they are manpower neutral, the Air Force could also increase provided with six “special capability” pieces to aug- its manpower to achieve a higher number of available ment existing deployments. If they choose ALBMs or squadrons. Players observed that many of the capac- hypersonic missiles, they are provided two “special ity and capability additions mentioned throughout capability” augmentation pieces for 1,000 nm range this section would be unusable at current manpower ballistic missile strikes or for hypersonic payloads. rates. In other words, manpower currently acts as the constraint on capabilities and capacities in the Air Player reaction. Players expressed mixed reac- Force, not the other way around. tions to these options. For example, rather than Participants also discussed the optimal ways to increasing JASSM or CHAMP acquisitions, they pre- augment active duty components with the Air Force ferred to increase global munitions more generally, Reserve and National Guard. Several challenges citing a lack of available firepower. Players all recog- were identified, including differing deployment time nized the value of hypersonic missiles, especially for frames for each component, the erosion of talent in use in denied environments. ALBMs proved more active and reserve components due to attrition to controversial: Some viewed these as a waste of money the National Guard, and the funding limitations that and redundant to the existing nuclear triad, whereas have forced the use of National Guard and Reserve others, citing the pursuit of these weapons with con- units in situations that would optimally fall under ventional warheads by Russia and China, saw them as the jurisdiction of active units alone. A summary of a useful tool to enhance America’s deterrent strate- player choices in Scenario IV is provided in Figure 5 gies against its adversaries. and Table 5.

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Table 5. Scenario IV Summary Table Player Procurement Option Effect Decision 3-D Printing of Spare Parts on Base Yes One AEW deployed to Thailand; F-35A, KC-46, C-130, and C-17 T-X Acceleration Yes Increased number of pilots available 747 Cruise Missile Carrier Aircraft No Not available Advanced Battle Management Yes Replace E-8 in CENTCOM System Communication Constellation Yes Improve satellite degradation back to “green” level Upgrades B-52 moved from the UK to CENTCOM and was replaced by a B-21 Program Acceleration Yes B-21. The B-1 in CENTCOM returns to maintenance in CONUS. INDOPACOM: Phuket, India, Vietnam, and Philippines; Deployable Air Base Systems Yes EUCOM: Baltics, Romania, Poland, and Mali Capability Upgrades for Select No Not available Fourth-Generation Fighters F-35A Procurement Acceleration Yes Three F-35 AEWs: Two in Romania and one in the UAE Restart F-22 Production Yes One F-22A squadron in Virginia (within 2024 timeline) Four squadrons of KC-46 or KC-Z, one placed in Guam, the Aerial Tanker Plus Up Yes others incorporated in eighth option Low-Cost Attributable Aircraft Maybe Not discussed (Sensors) Low-Cost Attributable Aircraft Maybe Players may add four LCAAT units to play. (Aircraft) OA-X Yes Two squadrons in Mali More Forward Presence Yes Expanded deployment footprint Improved Missile Capabilities Yes Global munitions plus up rather than six new JASSM counters Increased Manpower Yes Recognized as a need

Note: Effects sourcing is listed throughout the text. Source: Authors.

Analysis. At the beginning of Scenario IV, players could then be used to improve the global posture of were asked to consider systems and other improve- the Air Force. ments that would enhance the contribution of Judged by this metric, the players succeeded in the Air Force to American competitiveness short providing leaders of 2024 with additional tools to of combat. Rather than first taking budgets into enhance the force’s deterrent ability, improve its account and then trying to fit a strategy into it, they resiliency, and strengthen its communications infra- were instructed to consider strategy first and then structure. They favored increasing the purchase rate consider whether each improvement was worth the of current airframes over patching capability gaps associated costs. We designed the game effects to with novel munitions, reformatted legacy systems, translate these decisions into tangible benefits that or untested platforms. Although they placed value on

40 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

MOVE 4 FigureDeployment 5. Scenario of US IV F oSummaryrces + iAir Mapforce

EUCOM • B-52 replaced by B-21 • Baltics, Romania, Poland, and Mali received Romania Deployable Air Base F-35: 2 | F-22 | KC-135 | C-130 | C-17 Systems as well UAE Phuket, India, Vietnam, F-35A | KC-46 | C-130 | C-17 and Philippines Deployable Air Base System Mali (1 each) 2 OA-X squadrons in Mali INDOPACOM CONUS • B-1 returns from CENTCOM CENTCOM • Gains 1 F-22 squadron • Replace E-8 squadrons • Gains new training squadron with ABMS • Gains 1 B-52 Sqn. B-1 Thailand returns to CONUS F-35A AEW | F-35A: 1 | KC-46: 1 • Gains F-35A AEW C-130: 1 | C-17: 1 (KC-46, C-130, C-5) • 2 OA-X squadrons in Mali

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Status of US Deployed Forces

CONUS EUCOM CENTCOM INDOPACOM

Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3 Move SS 1 2 3

CSAR: 3 Squadrons CSAR: 3 Squadrons CSAR: 4 Squadrons CSAR: 3 Squadrons HH-60 5 3 1 1 HH-60 1 1 2 2 HH-60 4 4 4 4 HH-60 1 1 2 2 HC-130 5 5 2 2 HC-130 0 0 1 1 HC-130 0 0 0 0 HC-130 0 0 1 1

Source: Authors.

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new capabilities such as increased 3-D printing, hyper- deterrence. Particularly as the United States govern- sonic munitions, and microsatellite programs, they ment examines the feasibility of various nuclear mod- expressed skepticism of most UAV programs (partic- ernization options, by establishing a nuclear “quad” ularly those from other services) and instead empha- instead of a “triad,” this system could fill the deter- sized firepower andin-theater access. Although their rence gap created by aging systems in the submarine choices reflected an appreciation for the value of fleet, land-launched missiles, and strategic bombers. forward-deployed forces, they also recognized the Similarly, obtaining access to significantly more of constraints that current manpower levels would the HF spectrum—though not a one-for-one replace- place on achieving a more aggressive posture and on ment of space-based communications—could none- the employment of the new capabilities they sought theless increase the number of command and control to acquire. options in the event of a satellite failure. And while Without question, the force the players designed current leaders naturally focus on costs, some of the will increase the number of options available to senior proposals accepted by the players—such as enhanced Air Force leaders. Few of the options they selected 3-D printing capabilities, microsatellites, and an will be of much use if the current pilot shortage is increased F-35A production rate—would create sav- not rectified and if funding is not made available to ings over time. pursue additional acquisitions. Ramping up recruit- Posture-wise, the players possessed a strong incli- ing efforts and budget numbers are the most obvi- nation to field as many of the newly available resources ous solutions to these problems. Alternatively, the Air as possible. Many of the forces were used to upgrade Force could also seek a middle path that better uses previously deployed squadrons to include more the Reserve and National Guard components and in highly capable equipment or to add firepower. Player which certain systems discussed in the 2019 FYDP are choices enabled the deployment of a B-21 squadron bypassed for other perhaps more essential purchases. to the United Kingdom, for example, and the addi- Absent a significant increase in funding, however, nei- tion of an AEW to Thailand. In other cases, players ther the recruitment targets nor the acquisition plans were able to fill gaps opened by their previous deploy- discussed in the current FYDP—much less those pro- ments. For example, newly minted F-22As were kept posed by exercise participants—will be attainable. in CONUS to mitigate the forward deployment of Many of the proposed options actually fill sim- other fifth-generation aircraft, CENTCOM received a ilar gaps, and Air Force leaders should think strate- number of units freed up by squadron upgrades else- gically and pragmatically about which capabilities to where, and deployable air base systems were sent not pursue others. For example, we were surprised that just to places that held player attention throughout the air-launched ballistic missile system was not the game but also to previously overlooked locales, viewed more squarely through the lens of improved such as the Sahel.

42 V. Recommendations

fter several days of discussion, it became clear with the most strategic acumen. While America must A that the Air Force should consider several course maintain its qualitative edge, it must also devise ways corrections to optimize its contributions to Ameri- to shape an adversaries’ behavior in a way that mit- can competitiveness in the international arena. Some igates risk to the US and its allies and must develop of the recommendations are related to ends, but the systems and approaches that cement the ability of the most important ones are related to ways. The dual United States to win in any contingency, whether it themes of increasing access and capability redundancy involves combat or not. The changes outlined in the arose time and again as players considered their rec- 2018 posture statement are necessary but insufficient ommendations for the near-future force. to affect this shift. To perform more effectively across the competitive landscape, we recommend that the Air Force Air Force Posture change its approach to posture by using the themes of access and redundancy as a guide. Concerning In their March 2018 posture statement, Secretary Wil- access, our players recognized the importance of son and Chief of Staff General David Goldfein outlined increasing the number of accessible air bases with the five core missions of the Air Force: superiority their decision to acquire deployable air base systems, in air and space; global strike; rapid global mobility; which would increase access at civilian airfields. ISR; and command and control.34 They then sought Although the technical aspects of finding suitable to reframe each foundational theme to better support facilities to house American assets are important, the international competitive environment currently they represent only one component of the ability facing the United States. In doing so, they detailed to achieve access across domains. For one, access- a long list of laudable accomplishments achieved by ing rights in foreign lands is a political decision, the Air Force over the past budget year. Although they requiring support and input from the US Depart- recognized the eroding ability of the United States ment of State. Although political recommendations Air Force to achieve its missions in increasingly con- are largely outside the scope of this report, we rec- tested spaces, their list of accomplishments reflected ommend that Air Force leadership conduct a review an increase in pace rather than a paradigm shift to of America’s international posture to ensure that its address a fundamentally changed operating environ- current levels of access optimally reduce adversarial ment. Even the efforts directly targeted at improving incentives to act against America’s interests. Air Force efficacy in contested environments, such as These conversations should take the contributions space, reflected an impulse to enhance the defenses of of allies and partners into account, along with the current systems rather than to change the operating signaling and deterrent effects that particular basing calculus of the adversary. arrangements may create. For example, reconsidering Our exercise demonstrated that this approach, the stationing of American forces in the Philippines, in isolation, would do more to complicate Ameri- Vietnam, or Taiwan would send a message to China ca’s decision-making than that of its enemies. In a that America is unwilling to cede the East China Sea competition, it is not necessarily the strongest actor to Chinese interests. Increasing basing options in who prevails, but the one who employs his resources Europe and the Middle East would similarly reduce

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the leverage of Russia, Turkey, and Islamic extrem- that actual leadership deployment decisions are ad ist groups. Access must also be thought of in terms of hoc and highly specific to individual threat environ- logistics, as the capacities and capabilities inherent to ments. This approach has benefits and drawbacks. each facility will impede or amplify the signal sent by Reducing the predictability of deployments com- America’s access to them. plicates an adversary’s attempts to thwart them, for Not all these bases would need to be occupied by example, but it also imposes a burden on personnel American forces at all times. But when a decision is when they must remain ready for deployments at the made to deploy American systems, increased access unit or individual levels with minimal notice. It allows facilitates efforts to improve redundancy. Time and for the customization of capabilities and capacities again in our exercise, players would deploy the most but either increases costs (due to decreased effi- exquisite combat systems to the same small island ciency) or decreases readiness. air bases or NATO facilities. Expanded access would Finding a balance between flexibility and pre- allow for a more diluted concentration of American paredness has long challenged Air Force leadership. forces across a theater, forcing adversaries to con- As noted earlier in this report and underscored in tend with the American threat from multiple angles. recent comments by Air Force leadership, the shift Diluting the concentration of deployed units also away from close air support missions to ones of makes sense from a force protection standpoint: great power competition has precipitated a new the less concentrated the force, the more difficult it emphasis on the importance of the squadron.36 Mass becomes to attack or otherwise mitigate the threat deployments of the kind necessary to deter or fight that it poses. near-peer adversaries will necessarily require a dif- The term “redundancy” may at first glance read ferent force structure than one designed to thwart as a call to increase acquisitions in general. In some relatively small and incapable bands of extremist cases, such as with the F-35A and the C-130J, exercise groups. Yet the very officers that would lead squad- participants opted for increasing the number of units rons—pilots—continue to exit service faster than procured between now and 2024. The Air Force may the Air Force can replace them.37 also achieve redundancy through other means. The Although this crisis may be cyclical, it is highly art of denial and deception, practiced extensively by influenced by morale—which has dropped along with Russia and China, has, since the end of World War II, the training hours spent by pilots in the skies and the largely fallen out of favor in the United States mili- lack of modernized, next-generation aircraft. As the tary.35 This should change: The clever use of sophis- force is asked to do more with less, readiness suffers; ticated decoys can often achieve the same effects as as readiness suffers, so too does the composition of the deployment of real systems while reducing costs the force. As our former colleague James Cunning- and risk to personnel. Low-cost, attritable aircraft— ham found, the Air Force is struggling to meet current discussed by our exercise participants—represent readiness targets, ones that do not include the wider another economical way to increase redundancy, variety of threats that a near-peer adversary would as do 3-D printing capabilities for certified parts. By pose.38 The choice between flexibility and prepared- complicating the adversary’s decision-making pro- ness is thus a false one: Without readiness, flexibility cess, increased redundancy would enhance American is an illusion. We thus recommend that the Air Force power while also reducing overall costs. concentrate its efforts on increasing the overall readiness of the force and judge any structural changes by whether it improves this metric. Readiness and Structure Updating the substance and manner of training is as important as increasing the number of flight hours. Although the Air Force uses the AEF as a force deploy- In terms of substance, Air Force units should increase ment organizing structure, our exercise demonstrated their training on suboptimal conditions—that is, in

44 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY conditions where some capabilities have either been Increase Command and Control compromised or rendered moot by enemy defenses. Redundancies Pilots should be prepared to switch seamlessly between communication methods and to manually The Air Force FY2019 posture guide provides an operate aspects of their airframes that are typically excellent overview of the service’s investments in automated. In concert with the renewed emphasis on space and communications technologies. In addi- squadrons, tactics, techniques, and procedures rel- tion to increasing research, development, and testing evant to air-to-air combat and operations in denied budgets by a rate of 33 percent, the service also com- environments should be honed. To aid this process, mitted to “build more jam-resistant GPS satellites,” our participants chose to accelerate the T-X trainer keep JSTARS operational through the mid-2020s, program, which would provide additional founda- and increase funding for the resiliency of space-based tional training platforms to pilots. Accelerating invest- communications platforms and anti-jam, anti-spoof, ments in 3-D printing could also have the same effect and anti-tamper technologies to protect them.40 Each and could provide additional equipment to increase initiative represents a step in the right direction and readiness outside of the pilot ranks. recognition of the growing capabilities of America’s Despite their overall approval of the AEF approach, adversaries. Yet the question of whether these invest- exercise participants found the integration of ments successfully thwart adversaries from impeding National Guard and Reserve components into opera- on America’s interests remains unanswered. What tional deployments—that is, total force integration— if these systems fail? Are the benefits of perpetually as an area of particular concern. A truly integrated investing in the hardening of current systems worth force, whether it was composed of administratively the costs? separate units or not, should act as a force multiplier. For the most part, our participants thought that Yet in practice, differences in governance, culture, they were. But they also recognized the folly in blindly and administration have often impeded the ability of allowing adversarial capabilities to drive acquisition the components to integrate.39 Despite recent strides decisions. In addition to diversifying the sources on made toward remedying this problem, the state of which military command, control, and intelligence total force integration would be put to an even more interests rely (for example, into the commercial and difficult test should the United States encounter a international partner realms), participants identified near-peer competitor. two other areas worthy of investment. Conversely, many skills exist within the Reserve First, they saw an opportunity to create command and Air National Guard components that would be and control redundancies by leveraging a communica- highly useful in competition short of combat—air- tive modality available to the Department of Defense men with civilian experience in technology, psy- for decades: the HF spectrum. Currently, the HF spec- chology, business, and law all have important trum is shared by both US government and other par- contributions to America’s competitive stance that ties and fell out of favor with the advent of Advanced would complement and enhance the expertise resi- Extremely High Frequency.41 However, when one of dent in the active force. While the Air Force has his- the communications satellites was compromised in torically enjoyed the most success of the services our exercise, participants quickly shifted their vital relative to the integration of its reserve components, communications to the HF spectrum. Acquiring con- an increased focus on total force integration will be tracted access and employments rights to commu- essential to ensuring readiness not only of pilots but nicate in this realm would enhance its appeal as an also of the force to succeed in competing across a alternative to space-based systems in the event of a host of domains. crisis and would deny adversaries the legal use of a significant portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.

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Second, they underscored the importance of Increase Firepower investing in both satellite repair capabilities and microsatellites. The former would, theoretically, Although our exercise focused primarily on strategy, extend the life of satellites in the current constella- participants underscored the depleted munitions tion and provide a crisis response mechanism in the stores of the US military as a potential hindrance to event of an enemy attack. (It would also complicate crisis response and as a drain on the deterrent value adversarial decisions to attack satellites in the first of forward presence. After waging a war of attrition place, as such systems would likely be interpreted as against hostile groups for much of the past three dual use.) The latter would provide lower-cost, more decades, the available supply of munitions—espe- flexible alternatives to current systems and would cially precision-guided munitions—had reached a allow for a segmentation of the military’s command “critical shortage” by 2017.44 The Air Force should and control systems that would enhance resiliency. continue efforts already underway to replenish its Taken together, advances in satellite technology, supply of these munitions, as they have become particularly when pursued with the commercial central to the way that the United States conducts space and deployed in a rapid and strategic manner, warfare. Short of combat operations, the availabil- could confound adversarial ambitions against this ity of munitions has a direct effect on deterrence: Achilles’ heel of America’s infrastructure. The presence of a bomber or a fighter squadron is The unclassified nature of exercise discussions less concerning to America’s adversaries if those precluded a more in-depth discussion of potential units are not perceived as having adequate fire- solutions in this realm, but participants also iden- power. A 2017 article on the topic in the Russian tified two other important areas for investment: government-funded online news outlet Sputnik ground stations and “big data” processing capa- demonstrates that America’s competitors monitor bilities. In a 2017 hearing on space vulnerabilities, its munitions supplies with interest.45 retired Commander of the Air Force Space Com- In addition to precision munitions, current Air mand William Shelton noted the lack of attention Force leaders may wish to reconsider their mix of that the Air Force has paid to hardening its ground ballistic missile capabilities as well. Our participants stations.42 But our participants also saw opportu- engaged in a long conversation about ALBMs, ones nities to increase the number of ground stations that would be Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces to reduce the effectiveness of a successful attack Treaty–compliant but that could also be repurposed against any particular one. With respect to big data to host a strategic weapon if required. Although processing, effectively making sense of all the infor- some initially saw these munitions as redundant to mation drawn into the service each day has become other capabilities, such as the nuclear triad, others an increasingly difficult task, one that could be ame- pointed out the inability of America’s adversaries to liorated by investments in technologies such as effectively counter such munitions. Furthermore, automated feature extraction, artificial intelligence, as the warning time for an ALBM is far lower than and machine learning.43 Although some may regard for a similar weapon launched from land, they may using such technologies as the realm of the distant be thought of as a complement to the triad rather future or of DARPA, such technologies are not only than a replacement for any one component. In the advancing in maturity but are also being targeted short term, however, ALBMS could also be thought by China and Russia for integration into their com- of as a measure to mitigate the ongoing issues asso- mand and control systems. ciated with the Columbia-class nuclear submarine program.46 Both China and Russia are currently developing similar programs.47

46 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Table 6. Proposed Near-Term Acquisitions Estimated Cost (Table in Millions) Total Cost FY2019 National Additional Cost per for Units Additional Defense Authori- Total Cost Airframe Units Unit 2018 2018 Factors 2018 zation Act 2024

F-35A 48 $89.00 $4,272.00 $8,160.00 $4,424.95 $8,964.40

F-22A 12 $221.60 $2,659.20 $10,110.90 $0.00 $14,296.90

KC-46A 48 $229.10 $10,996.80 Not Available $2,360.02 $9,669.40

OA-X 24 $18.00 $432.00 Not Available $300.00 $147.80

MQ-16 4 $1.40 $5.60 Not Available $0.00 $6.30

Not Not Not Not Not Not KC-Z Available Available Available Available Available Available

T-X 350 Unknown $16,000.00 Not Available $0.00 $17,912.90

Deployable Air Base 8 $22.40 $179.20 Not Available $142.40 $41.20 Systems

3-D Printing 16 $1.10 $17.60 $16.40 $0.00 $38.10

B-21 12 $583.30 $6,999.60 Not Available $0.00 $7,836.50 Acceleration

Advanced Extremely 2 $1,300.00 $2,600.00 Not Available $181.34 $2,707.90 High Frequency

DARPA 140 $6.00 $840.00 Not Available $110.00 $817.30 Blackjack

DARPA Sat- Not Not $650.00 Not Available $0.00 $727.80 ellite Repair Available Available

Note: See Appendix C for a whole list of sources. Source: Authors.

Sharpening Capabilities and Expanding on the Air Force’s ability to compete short of com- Capacities by 2024 bat. The final budget for the entire suite of capabilities that they recommended—nearly $63 billion—will In using strategy rather than budget as a guide, our undoubtedly raise some eyebrows in Washington. participants were free to judge each of the propos- Yet their recommendations should be judged in light als we suggested by the impact that they would have of the investments necessary to bring a force long

47 TURBULENT SKIES

subjected to budget austerity to an optimal level. If With those caveats in mind, we recommend that two of the main cost drivers are removed—an accel- the Air Force carefully consider each of the proposals erated T-X program and the F-22A “restart”—the cost listed above and weigh the costs and benefits of each of the program decreases by half. (Of course, choos- judged by current requirements and metrics. Some of ing not to fund such initiatives, however, comes with the items, such as those related to the aging KC-135 accepting even greater risk for pilot training and inventory, are imperative to avoid a future disaster, reduced combat ability in denied environments.) and others, such as 3-D printing or increasing the Although their decisions were driven by the themes number of F-35As acquired, would realize cost sav- of increasing access and redundancy, many other ini- ings down the road. Some items may also be ripe for tiatives not included here would also address our allied or partner development. For example, Japanese themes—namely, those that cross into the political developments in satellite technology position them as realm or require closer collaboration with the private an important partner for enhancing combined com- sector. The conclusions reached by our participants mand, control, and intelligence capabilities, and the are meant to inject strategically driven thought into need for deployable air bases may decrease if Euro- the acquisition decision-making process rather than pean allies succeed at increasing their budget toplines. serve as a prescription for the Air Force of 2024.

48 VI. Conclusions

t bears repeating that our recommendations In the period following the exercise, Air Force lead- I reflect abest-case scenario rather than a worst ership has indicated that they understand the breadth one. The cost of bringing readiness and manpower of the challenge that the service will face in the future. levels up to optimal levels, though addressed in the It will be called on to continue to provide close air sections above, is not explicitly addressed in Table 6. support while also serving as an enabling and deter- Moreover, our scenario tested the ability of the Air rent force. These considerations help explain not only Force to compete outside of war; costs would likely the proposal to increase the service’s manpower and increase dramatically should it be called on to con- squadron count but also investments in new trainers. duct combat operations. As our colleague Macken- It is less clear, however, that national leadership has zie Eaglen observed, it remains unclear just how the fully grasped the extent to which America’s superior- Air Force would perform if such a situation were to ity in the skies and space are currently under threat or occur in the near term.48 how many other aspects of national security rest on The Air Force cannot shoulder the burden of Amer- the access and technical edge enjoyed over the past ica’s international competition on its own, nor can the several decades. larger Department of Defense. Each of the services Budget hawks may view our findings with skepti- and departments possesses a number of tools that are cism. We would counter with two points. First, our par- ideally employed together in a concerted and strate- ticipants were budget informed but strategically driven gic manner. Whether the US government can trans- in devising their ideal future force. Second, skepticism late operations into strategy in this way is beyond about spending often masks an unwillingness to grap- the scope of this report. Our players demonstrated, ple with the far more difficult task of setting a strategic however, that the addition of certain new capabili- course. It is worth noting the extent to which America’s ties expands the number of strategic options available adversaries have challenged prevailing assumptions to senior leaders for a cost that is a fraction of that about continued American supremacy of the skies and associated with combat engagement. Improving the space while spending far less than the United States resiliency, deterrent effect, and responsiveness of the does on national security. Constrained resources are an Air Force will also create efficiency gains in the other insufficient excuse for a lack of creative thinking about services, provide a stronger starting point for inter- American competitiveness and the Air Force’s contri- national negotiations, and challenge adversaries to bution to it. Our exercise demonstrated that strategi- spend increasingly unsustainable amounts to narrow cally sound decisions driven by access and redundancy the qualitative gap between their military and that of considerations will maximize the ability of the Air the United States. Force to retain its position relative to America’s adversaries in 2024 and beyond.

49 VII. Appendixes

Appendix A. Participants

Civilian Roles

• National Security Adviser: Dr. Kenneth Pollack

• Foreign Policy Adviser to C/USAFE: Dr. Jorge Benitiz

• Foreign Policy Adviser to C/PACAF: Lt. Col. Brad Orgeron

• Secretary of the Air Force: Dr. Lani Kass

• Foreign Policy Adviser to C/Air Combat Command: Mr. Maseh Zarif

• Secretary of State: Dr. Patrick Cronin

• Secretary of Defense: Sen. Jim Talent (R-MO)

Military Roles

• Chief of Staff, Air Force: Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula (ret.)

• Commander, PACAF: Lt. Gen. Burt Field (ret.)

• Commander, USAFE: Lt. Gen. Tom Jones (ret.)

• Commander, Global Strike Command: Lt. Gen. Chris Miller (ret.)

• Commander, Air Force Cyber Command: Lt. Gen. Harry Raduege (ret.)

• Commander, Air Force Reserve Command: Maj. Gen. Bowen Ballard (ret.)

• Commander, Air Force Space Command: Maj. Gen. Gary Dylewski (ret.)

• Commander, Air Mobility Command: Maj. Gen. Duane Jones (ret.)

• Commander, Air Combat Command: Maj. Gen. Bentley Rayburn (ret.)

50 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Appendix B. Aircraft Unit Costs: Sources and Explanations

Cost estimates for the iAirForce acquisition options F-22 were gathered from government publications and open-source reporting. Estimated cost is $206–$216 million per unit, assuming the higher price (2017 source). Additional costs could include $9.9 billion estimated for restart (2017 source). Inflation Calculator • Travis Tritten, “The Air Force Has No Plans This was used to calculate inflation for costs, first to Restart the F-22 After a Report Found Big from the original source dates to the current year and Costs,” Washington Examiner, June 21, 2017, then projecting those costs to 2024, assuming a con- https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-air- stant or fixed inflation rate equal to the current rate of force-has-no-plans-to-restart-the-f-22-after- 2018 (1.9 percent). An independent inflation calcula- a-report-found-big-costs/article/2626637. tor was sought, due to the fact that the one provided online by the Bureau of Labor Statistics did not allow • Oriana Pawlyk, “The F-22 Fighter Jet Restart Is for amounts larger than $10 million. The calculator Dead: Study,” Military.com, accessed January was also used to adjust costs from sources that were 7, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/ before 2018 up to 2018 costs. 2017/06/21/the-f22-fighter-jet-restart-dead- study.html#.WUrbexObV40.twitter. • Calculator.net, “Inflation Calculator with U.S. CPI Data,” https://www.calculator.net/ • Tyler Rogoway, “Study on Restarting F-22 Pro- inflation-calculator.html?cstartingamount1=12 duction Has Finally Arrived, Here’s The Ver- %2C500%2C000%2C000.00&cinyear1=2017& dict,” Drive, accessed January 7, 2019, http:// coutyear1=2018&calctype=1&x=105&y=15. www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/11728/study- on-restarting-f-22-production-has-finally- National Defense Authorization Act arrived-heres-the-verdict. Fiscal Year 2019 • Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick, “Here’s This was examined to find and eliminate fiscal year the F-22 Production Restart Study the USAF 2019 allocated funding for specific programs or plat- Has Kept Secret for over a Year,” Drive, forms outlined in the simulation to produce an accu- accessed January 7, 2019, http://www.thedrive. rate estimate for cost speculation. com/the-war-zone/20633/exclusive-heres-the- f-22-production-restart-study-the-usaf-has- • John S. McCain National Defense Authoriza- kept-secret-for-over-a-year. tion Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/ • Gillian Rich, “This Is How Much Lockheed’s BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf. F-22 Would Cost If Production Restarted,” Inves- tor’s Business Daily, June 21, 2017, https://www. investors.com/news/heres-the-biggest-facto r-holding-back-a-f-22-restart/.

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F-35 • Valerie Insinna, “New F-35 Modernization Plan Could Come with Hefty $16B Price Tag,” Defense It would cost $89 million per unit (2018 source). News, March 9, 2018, https://www.defensenews. Additional costs could include a modernization pro- com/air/2018/03/08/new-f-35-modernization- gram through 2024 estimated at $16 billion for the plan-could-come-with-hefty-16b-price-tag/. entire program, accounting for more than 270 F-35s currently being used. Within the modernization pro- • Mike Stone, “Exclusive: Lockheed F-35 Jet cess, it is broken down to $10.8 billion for software Price Falls 6 Percent to Below $90,” Reu- development and $5.4 billion for procurement and ters, July 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ update deployment costs. The US share of the soft- article/us-britain-airshow-f35/exclusive- ware development will come to $7.2 billion, with the lockheed-f-35-jet-price-falls-6-percent-to- rest being spread among other international custom- below-90-million-sources-idUSKBN1K50D3. ers in the program. Most of the updates that will be applied are software related, so the total costs for • Anthony Capaccio, “Lockheed F-35 Cost Stabi- the software development should be applied (2018 lizes at $406 Billion, Pentagon Says,” Bloomberg, source). March 13, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/ The procurement of $5.4 billion assumes that the news/articles/2018-03-13/lockheed-f-35-cost- US wants to upgrade all F-35s. Under this assump- stabilizes-at-406-billion-pentagon-says. tion, and the assumption that the total number of US F-35s is 270, the procurement cost would be roughly • Winslow Wheeler, “How Much Does an F-35 $20 million per unit. Thus, the total modernization Actually Cost?,” War Is Boring, July 27, 2014, costs would be the software costs and procurement https://warisboring.com/how-much-does-an- for 48 units, which totals $8.16 billion. f-35-actually-cost/.

• Mike Stone, “U.S. F-35 Fighter Modernization • F-35 Lightning II, “Agreement Reached on Low- Could Cost $16 Billion Through 2024,” Reu- est Priced F-35s in Program History,” Febru- ters, March 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ ary 3, 2017, https://www.f35.com/news/detail/ article/us-usa-lockheed-f35/u-s-f-35-fighter- agreement-reached-on-lowest-priced-f-35s- modernization-could-cost-16-billion-through- in-program-history. 2024-idUSKCN1GK02M.

• Michael Larkin, “Lockheed Martin F-35 Bulk Buy KC-46A Plan Due as Modernization Bill Seen at $16 Bil- lion,” Investor’s Business Daily, March 8, 2018, The costs included $221.523 million per unit esti- https://www.investors.com/news/f35-block- mated for 2016 (2017 source). Regarding additional buy-plan-due-as-modernization-cost-seen- costs, the KC-46A has hit several issues during test- at-16-billion/. ing and is projected to be delayed in its release. How- ever, as the program has continued, individual unit • Robert Brooks, “F-35 Modernization Costs costs for acquisition have decreased since the ini- Cloud Lockheed, DoD Negotiations,” Amer- tial estimate by almost 14 percent. Furthermore, the ican Machinist, March 8, 2018, https://www. contract with Boeing for the platform is fixed price, americanmachinist.com/news/f-35- meaning that the company is responsible for any cost modernization-costs-cloud-lockheed-dod- overruns, which so far have totaled $3.4 billion in negotiations. pretax fees since December 2017. Since the contractor has responsibility for overrun costs, there is no

52 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

need to allocate additional cost funding for the KC-46 • Air Force, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year platform. (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates,” February 2018, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/ • Valerie Insinna, “Boeing’s KC-46 Penalties Now documents/FY19/Proc/Air%20Force%20 up to $3.4B Thanks to New $426M Charge,” Aircraft%20Procurement%20Vol%20I%20 Defense News, July 26, 2018, https://www. FY19.pdf?ver=2018-02-13-093541-153. defensenews.com/air/2018/07/26/ boeings-kc- 46-penalties- now-u p-to-34b-thanks-to-new-426m-charge/. Deployable Air Base System

• Jim Hammerand, “Boeing KC-46 Aerial Tanker It would cost $157 million (for seven units), or Schedule ‘Unlikely to Be Executed’ on Time (Pho- $22.4 million per unit. For war game addition, we tos),” Puget Sound Business Journal, January 23, would divide 157 by 7 and then multiply by 8, with a 2017, https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/ total cost of $179.4 (2018 source). 2017/01/23/boeing-kc-46-aerial-tanker-schedule- dod.html. • Robbin Laird, “Carriers Aren’t the Only Big Tar- gets: The Challenges of Mobile Basing,” Breaking • Oriana Pawlyk, “KC-46 Tanker Delivery Will Defense, June 8, 2018, https://breakingdefense. Be Delayed, Air Force Confirms,” Military. com/2018/06/carriers-arent-the-only-big-targets- com, March 8, 2018, https://www.military.com/ the-challenges-of-mobile-basing/. dodbuzz/2018/03/07/kc-46-tanker-delivery- will-be-delayed-air-force-confirms.html. • John S. McCain National Defense Authoriza- tion Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, • Department of Defense, “Selected Acquisition https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/ Report (SAR), KC-46A Tanker Modernization house-bill/5515/text. (KC-46A),” KC-46A Program Office, December 2016, https://fas.org/man/eprint/KC-46-2018.pdf. • John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, S. 2987, 115th Cong., • US Government Accountability Office,KC-46 “ 2nd sess., § 439, https://www.congress.gov/bill/ Tanker Modernization: Program Cost Is Stable, 115th-congress/senate-bill/2987/text?q=%7B%- but Schedule May Be Further Delayed,” April 22search%22%3A%5B%22Armed+Services 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691327.pdf. %22%5D%7D&r=2.

• Christopher Woody, “Boeing and the Air Force Have Reached an Agreement on the Long-Delayed T-X KC-46 Tanker, but Congress Is Already Eye- ing the Next Thing,” Business Insider, accessed It would cost $16 billion total for 350 units (2018 January 7, 2019, https://www.businessinsider. source). The contract has not been awarded yet, but com/boeing-air-force-settle-kc46-delivery-as- some money has been allotted. The program total for congress-eyes-unmanned-tanker-2018-6. cost per units is thus assumed to be the best estimate. It is assumed that the goal would be to have all units • Tyler Rogoway, “The KC-46 Pegasus Tanker Pro- ready by 2024, so the entire program’s costs were gram Is Still a Mess,” Drive, March 16, 2018, http:// incorporated in forecasting. www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19332/the- kc-46-pegasus-tanker-program-is-still-a-mess.

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• Jeremiah Gertler, “Advanced Pilot Training (T-X) Science, September 20, 2016, https://www.pop- Program,” Congressional Research Service, sci.com/air-force-commander-dreams- October 1, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/ stealth-tankers. R44856.pdf.

• Combat Aircraft, “USAF T-X Trainer Compe- MQ-16 tition—the Winning Factors,” March 14, 2018, https://combataircraft.keypublishing.com/2018/ It would cost $1.32 million per unit (2016 source). 03/14/usaf-t-x-trainer-competition-the- The technology upgrade cost is the only cost neces- winning-factors/. sary, as F-16s are already procured and ready to transition over. • Valerie Insinna, “Another Air Force Aircraft Contract Got Delayed. Here Are the Details,” • Alex Lockie, “The Air Force Just Demonstrated Defense News, May 30, 2018, https://www. an Autonomous F-16 That Can Fly and Take out defensenews.com/air/2018/05/30/another-air- a Target All by Itself,” Business Insider, accessed force-aircraft-contract-just-got-delayed-here- January 7, 2019, https://www.businessinsider. are-the-details/. com/f-16-drone-have-raider-ii-loyal-wingman- f-35-lockheed-martin-2017-4.

KC-Z • Lockheed Martin, “U.S. Air Force, Lockheed Martin Demonstrate Manned/Unmanned No cost data were available. Science and technology Teaming,” April 10, 2017, https://news.lock- funding was partially covered by KC-46 development. heedmartin.com/2017-04-10-U-S-Air-Force-Lockheed- Planned procurement is for 2035, pushing procure- Martin-Demonstrate-Manned-Unmanned- ment up 11 years. Our best guess would be far beyond Teaming. the alternative KC-46A, so the KC-Z option should not be factored as a possibility. • Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Turned an F-16 Fighter into a Drone,” Popular Mechanics, April • Leigh Giangreco, “USAF Commander Wants 11, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics.com/ Technological ‘Leap’ to KC-Z Tanker,” Flight- military/research/a26028/f-16-drone-have- global, September 20, 2016, https://www. raider-ii/. flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-commander- wants-technological-leap-to-kc-z-ta-429534/. • Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Is Turn- ing Old F-16 Fighters into Drones,” Popu- • Tyler Rogoway, “The Air Force Desperately Needs lar Mechanics, October 19, 2016, https://www. a Stealth Tanker,” Drive, January 18, 2017, http:// popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/ www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/7012/the- a23451/turning-the-f-16-fighter-into-a-drone/. air-force-desperately-needs-a-stealth-tanker. • StrategyPage, “Warplanes: The Robotic • GlobalSecurity.com, “KC-Y—KC-10 Replace- Loyal Wingman,” June 6, 2017, https://www. ment,” December 19, 2018, https://www.globalse- strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/ curity.org/military/systems/aircraft/kc-y.htm. 20170606.aspx.

• Kelsey D. Atherton, “Air Force Commander • Ryan Maass, “U.S. Air Force Buys Additional Adds Stealth Tankers to Wish List,” Popular Boeing QF-16 Targets,” UPI, March 23, 2017,

54 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/03/23/ • Associated Press, “After Emerging from Bank- US-Air-Force-buys-additional-Boeing-QF-16- ruptcy, Beechcraft to Be Acquired by Textron,” targets/5491490274747/. New York Times, October 19, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2013/12/27/business/after-emerging- • Woodrow Bellamy III, “How Boeing Converts from-bankruptcy-beechcraft-to-be-acquired- F-16s to Unmanned Configuration,” Avionics, by-textron.html. October 14, 2016, https://www.aviationtoday.com/ 2016/10/14/how-boeing-converts-f-16s-to- • Air Force, “T-6A Texan II,” March 28, 2003, unmanned-configuration/. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/ Display/Article/104548/t-6a-texan-ii/. • David Axe, “2018: The Year U.S. Fighter Pilots Could Get Drone Wingmen,” War Is Boring, April • Leigh Giangreco, “Latest Afghan Super Tucanos 12, 2016, https://warisboring.com/2018-the-year- Cost $174.5 Million,” Flightglobal.com, Novem- u-s-fighter-pilots-could-get-drone-wingmen/. ber 1, 2017, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ articles/latest-afghan-super-tucanos-cost-1745- • David Axe, “Commentary: Drones, Fighter Jets million-442786/. and the Future U.S. Air Force,” Reuters, July 5, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us- • Bryan Bayley, “Light Attack,” Marine Corps military-airforce-commentary- Gazette 101, no. 5 (May 2017), https://www.mca- idUSKCN0ZL0FH. marines.org/gazette/2017/05/light-attack.

• Franz-Stefan Gady, “Afghan Air Force Takes OA-X Delivery of 2 A-29 Light Attack Aircraft,” Diplomat, May 8, 2018, https://thediplomat. It would cost $18 million per unit (2018 source). The com/2018/05/afghan-air-force-takes-delivery-of- A-29 Super Tucano is the only option listing a definite 2-a-29-light-attack-aircraft/. unit price. The AT-6 Wolverine has only speculative pricing based on its training model that is used by the • Alex Hempel, “Embraer’s Super Tucano Bal- Air Force. However, it claims that it will be less expen- ances Cost and Capability for Export Success,” sive than the A-29, so the higher cost for the A-29 is WhiteFleet.Net, December 13, 2017, https:// assumed for cost speculation. Additionally, despite a whitefleet.net/2017/12/13/embraers-super-tucano- probable preference for an American manufacturer capabilities-and-recent-export-successes/. over a foreign manufacturer, the American company behind the A-T-6 has had to declare bankruptcy in the past. The Brazilian company Embraer, behind the B-21 Acceleration A-29, is a largely successful company, and the A-29 has undergone more combat experience in South Amer- It would cost $564 million per unit (in 2016 dollars). ica and the Middle East (not by US forces). Regarding additional costs, a recent report indicated that the B-21 could be testing sooner than expected, • Sebastien Roblin, “Duel of the Light Attack which would mean the potential for no additional Planes: Tucano vs. Texan vs. Scorpion,” costs for program acceleration would be ready by National Interest, July 10, 2017, https:// 2024. There have been a few delays, but the Air Force nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/duel-the- is still confident that these are minor and will not light-attack-planes-tucano-vs-texan-vs- affect the planned delivery timeline. Acceleration of scorpion-21470?page=0%2C1. the program is difficult to determine, but given the

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aggressive schedule with relatively few delays, and the https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/07/ beginning of testing soon, it can be assumed that the some-hiccups-with-engine-design-but- cost for minor acceleration to 2024 from the planned b-21-on-track-wittman-says/. 2025 readiness would be minimal and not justified in adding significant additional spending. 3-D Printing • Christian Davenport, “How Much Does the Pentagon’s Secretive Bomber Really Cost? It would cost $1 million per unit (2017 source). We (and Should You Be Allowed to Know?),” assume higher cost for the type of system. For deploy- Washington Post, July 20, 2016, https://www. ment, bases with current wings of F-22s and F-35s washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/ were chosen—a total of four bases from the order wp/2016/07/20/how-much-does-the-pentagons- of battle document. We also assumed that each base secretive-bomber- really-cost-and- would have four 3-D printers. should-you-be-allowed-to-know/?utm_ Regarding additional costs, the need for addi- term=.f66ff7075e3f. tional testing and certification of3-D printed parts as safe for use in air platforms is necessary, as is set- • Jeremiah Gertler, “Air Force B-21 Raider ting parameters for input material and the param- Long-Range Strike Bomber,” Congressional eters for machine and process control, monitoring, Research Service, October 12, 2018, https://fas. and changes. No reliable estimate of certification org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44463.pdf. processes for this technology area is available at the moment, as it is a new technology that is not widely • Air Force, “The Air Force Awarded an Engineer- used or standardized. Assuming that testing and cer- ing and Manufacturing Development and Early tification of aircraft parts follows an already stan- Production Contract for the Long Range Strike dardized process within the Air Force, the best guess Bomber to Northrop Grumman Corporation on would be to match the cost of the 3-D printing units 27 October 2015,” https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/ ($16 million) to create a total cost of $32 million. documents/af%20events/FINAL%20LRS-B%20 Contract%20Award%20One%20Sheet_27%20 • US Government Accountability Office, “3D Print- Oct.pdf. ing: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Impli- cations of Additive Manufacturing,” June 2015, • Ben Brimelow, “The Secretive B-21 Stealth https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670960.pdf. Bomber Could Be Tested Sooner Than Expected,” Business Insider, February 7, 2018, • Mike Anderson and Erin Goff, “Hill Air Force https://www.businessinsider.com/b-21-stealth- Base Airmen Use 3D Printing for F-35 Parts,” July bomber-testing-edwards-2018-3. 23, 2018, https://www.ksl.com/article/46365301/ hill-air- force-base- airmen-use-3d- • Tyler Rogoway, “B-21 Raider Officially Heading printing-for-f-35-parts. to Edwards Air Force Base for Testing,” Drive, March 5, 2018, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war- • B. A. Cowles, “Summary Report: Joint Federal zone/18997/b-21-raider-officially-heading- Aviation Administration–Air Force Workshop to-edwards-air-force-base-for-testing. on Qualification/Certification of Additively Manufactured Parts,” Federal Aviation Admin- • Aaron Mehta and Valerie Insinna, “Some ‘Hic- istration, June 2016, http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/ cups’ with Engine Design, but B-21 on Track, worldpac/techrpt/tc16-15.pdf. Wittman Says,” Defense News, February 7, 2018,

56 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

• Defense Technical Information Center, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/ “The Future of Additive Manufacturing in Air print/volume-29/issue-6/news/news/darpa- Force Acquisition,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/ blackjack-to- develop-small-secure- fulltext/u2/1038118.pdf. military-satellites-for-low-earth-orbit.html.

• 3D Systems, “3D Systems Announces Availabil- • Mike Wall, “US Military Aims to Launch ity of Figure 4TM, the Industry’s First Modular, Cheap New ‘Blackjack’ Spy Satellites in 2021,” Scalable, Fully-Integrated Additive Manufactur- Space.com, accessed January 7, 2019, https:// ing Platform,” November 7, 2017, https://www. www.space.com/41639-darpa-cheap-spy- 3dsystems.com/press-releases/3d-systems- satellites-2021-launch.html. announces-availability- figure-4- industry-s-first-modular-scalable-fully. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Repair Satellite Program • Marcus Weisgerber, “Air Force Is Waiting a Year for Parts That It Could 3D-Print,” Defense One, This was based on the fiscal year 2019 request for May 29, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/busi- $109 million (2018 source). We assume that costs ness/2018/05/us-air-force-waiting-year-parts- will be constant to 2024, so we assume it would cost it-could-3d-print/148565/. approximately $654 million total.

• National Research Council, 3D Printing in • Messier Doug, “DARPA Requests Quarter Billion Space (Washington, DC: National Academies for Space Development Programs—Parabolic Press, 2014), https://www.nap.edu/read/18871/ Arc,” Parabolic Arc, March 9, 2018, http://www. chapter/7#80. parabolicarc.com/2018/03/09/darpa-requests- quarter-billion-space-development-programs/. • Michael Petch, “3D Systems Figure 4 Selected for Air Force Research,” 3D Printing Industry, April Advanced Extremely High Frequency 26, 2018, https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/ System 3d-systems-figure-4-selected-us-air- force-research-132777/. It would cost $1.3 billion per unit. Two units were left in for six total. Price has decreased since the previous • Clare Scott, “Air Force Uses 3D Printing to Save satellites in the system (2018 source). Thousands of Dollars . . . on Cups,” 3DPrint. Regarding additional costs, it should be taken into com, July 6, 2018, https://3dprint.com/218699/ account that the Advanced Extremely High Frequency air-force-3d-printing-cups/. program was initially projected at $6.9 billion but has since grown to the current cost of $15 billion to cover Defense Advanced Research Projects all six satellites. However, despite this propensity for Agency Blackjack high cost growth, the individual prices of the past two satellites left to launch for the system decreased to It would cost $6 million per satellite unit, with 60–200 the current $1.3 billion, down from $1.7 billion. Fur- satellites in the constellation (2018 source). Assume thermore, it has been suggested that the bulk of the 140 satellite units for 2024. program’s extra costs can be attributed to the development and production costs of the first four satel- • John Keller, “DARPA Blackjack to Develop lites, thus implying along with the reduced costs of Small, Secure Military Satellites for Low-Earth the past two satellites that any additional unexpected Orbit,” Military and Aerospace, June 1, 2018, costs will be unlikely for the program.

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• Sandra Erwin, “Is the Cost of Military Space www.americaspace.com/2018/10/17/atlas-v- Programs Going Up or Down? Depends on How 551-heavylifter-back-in-business-for-long- You Count,” SpaceNews.com, March 19, 2018, delayed-aehf-4-launch-for-air-force/. https://spacenews.com/is-the-cost-of-military- space-programs-going-up-or-down-depends- • Cristina T. Chaplain, “Space Acquisitions: DOD on-how-you-count/. Continues to Face Challenges of Delayed Deliv- ery of Critical Space Capabilities and Fragmented • Ben Evans, “Atlas V 551 Heavylifter Back in Busi- Leadership,” US Government Accountability ness for Long-Delayed AEHF-4 Launch for Air Office, May 17, 2017, https://www.gao.gov/assets/ Force,” AmericaSpace, October 17, 2018, https:// 690/684664.pdf.

58 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Appendix C. Blue Order of Battle - B-1 B-2 C-5 E-3 E-4 E-8 U-2 STS E-11 F-16 F-22 F-35 A-10 B-52 C-40 C-17 U-28 RQ-4 UH-1 F-15C F-15E OA-X C-130 C-146 CV-22 KC-46 MQ-9 HH-60 LC-130 AC-130 KC-135 EC-130J HC-130 MC-130 OC-135 RQ-170 WC-130 WC-135 RC-135S RC-135U OVERALL EC-130H Airframe Airframe RED HORSE RED RC-135V/W - 2 4 9 3 5 4 8 4 7 9 7 5 2 2 2 8 4 8 5 7 2 14 10 13 12 10 12 17 14 12 14 16 12 23 20 25 25 26 22 24 24 None None Aircraft per Piece Game InformationGame Aircraft per Counter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 2 3 2 4 5 5 2 3 8 3 6 6 6 5 8 2 2 5 2 5 3 4 2 16 16 10 11 10 10 30 20 33 25 289 Total Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 3 3 3 4 4 43 CENTCOM* CENTCOM* 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 24 PACOM PACOM Deployed 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 16 USAFE USAFE 1 6 3 2 CIA CIA 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 14 SOF SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 3 2 7 2 31 USAFR USAFR 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 2 3 2 2 2 4 12 16 10 79 ANG ANG CONUS 1 2 3 7 4 6 23 AMC AMC 1 2 2 4 3 12 GSC GSC 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 3 2 5 2 2 6 2 2 2 3 41 ACC ACC Description Ground Attack Gunship Bomber Purpose — Penetrating Bomber Penetrating Purpose Bomber StrategicAirlift TacticalAirlift PersonnelAirlift SOFTransport Airlift PsychologicalOperations SAR/SOF AWACS/Air Battle Management Nuclear C4 ElectronicWarfare Fighter StrikeFighter Ground Surveillance BattlefieldCommunications Multirole Fighter Fifth-GenerationFighter Fifth-GenerationMultirole SAR/Tanker Tanker Tanker SOF,SAR, Tanking SAR Arctic Airlift Strike and ISR RPV ISR and Strike Ground Attack Open Skies Verification BallisticMissile Intelligence Counter-Radar SIGINT ISR and SIGINT Collector Long-Loiter ISR RPV ISR Long-Loiter RPV ISR Penetrating Manned High-Altitude ISR SOF ISR SOF Transport/ICBMSecurity Airlift and Weather Forecast Nuclear Detonation Detection SOF, SAR SOF, Engineers, Runway Construction Runway Engineers, A-10 AC-130 B-1 Airframe OVERALL B-2 Airframe B-52 C-5 C-130 C-40 C-146 C-17 EC-130J CV-22 E-3 E-4 EC-130H F-15C F-15E E-8 E-11 F-16 F-22 F-35 HC-130 KC-46 KC-135 MC-130 HH-60 LC-130 MQ-9 OA-X OC-135 RC-135S RC-135U RC-135V/W RQ-4 RQ-170 U-2 U-28 UH-1 WC-130 WC-135 STS RED HORSE RED Table C1. Air Force Combat Coded Squadrons, 2024 Squadrons, Coded Combat C1. Air Force Table drawn on a rotating basis from expeditionary squadrons by resourced is position. *CENTCOM steady state reflects the in this table The disposition reflected Note: of Joint Air-to-Surface large concentrations representing counters ordnance command. **Two labeled per their parent other major commands. These units are unde deemed were RC-26Bs and NC-135Ws, E-9As, and trainers ***All aircraft. combat manned of squadron any to assignment for available are Missiles Standoff ployable for the purposes of this game. Authors. Source:

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Appendix D. Red Order of Battle

Table D1. Red Force Order of Battle Combat Aircraft China Iran Russia Frontline Aircraft 1,871 236 1,004 Bomber 162 0 139 Attack 240 39 265 Third-Generation Fighter/Fighter Ground Attack 528 185 0 Fourth-Generation Fighter/Fighter Ground Attack 935 0 600 Fifth-Generation Fighter/Fighter Ground Attack 6 (in Test) 12 0 Support Aircraft 429 131 593 Transport 342 117 428 Tanker 13 3 15 Electronic Warfare, Electronic Intelligence 17 0 35 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 51 6 87 Airborn Early Warning and Control, Command and Control 15 5 28 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 15 Unknown Yes Total Combat Aircraft 2,315 367 1,597 Surface-to-Air Missiles China Iran Russia Fixed 300 55 0 Long Range (50+ Miles) 0 10 0 Medium Range (25–50 Miles) 300 45 0 Short Range (5–25 Miles) 0 0 0 Point Defense (0–5 Miles) 0 0 0 Mobile 644 491 2,162 Long Range (50+ Miles) 192 32 490 Medium Range (25–50 Miles) 114 150 430 Short Range (5–25 Miles) 338 279 162 Point Defense (0–5 Miles) 0 30 1,080 Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems Yes 0 5 Types Ballistic Missile Defense/Cruise Missile Defense No Yes Yes Total Surface-to-Air Missiles 944 556 2,162 Munitions China Iran Russia Air-to-Air Missiles Yes Short Range (0–30 Miles) Yes Yes Yes Beyond Visual Range (30–100 Miles) Yes Yes Yes Long Range (100+ Miles) No Yes Yes Air-to-Surface Missiles Yes Short Range (0–30 Miles) Yes Yes Yes Beyond Visual Range (30–100 Miles) Yes Yes Yes Long Range (100+ Miles) No Yes No Nuclear No Yes Yes Percision-Guided Munitions Yes Yes Yes Source: Authors.

60 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Notes

1. Stephen Losey, “Air Force Leaders: ‘We’re Going to Break the Force,’” Air Force Times, November 9, 2017, https://www. airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2017/11/09/air-force-leaders-were-going-to-break-the-force/; Stephen Losey, “Air Force Revamps Squadrons as It Prepares for the Next Big Fight,” Air Force Times, July 30, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your- air-force/2018/07/31/air-force-revamps-squadrons-as-it-prepares-for-the-next-big-fight/; and Amy McCullough, “USAF Has Too Many Missions and Not Enough Airmen,” Air Force Magazine, accessed November 26, 2018, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/ Pages/2018/February%202018/USAF-Has-Too-Many-Missions-and-Not-Enough-Airmen.aspx. 2. Stephen Losey, “Air Force Calls for 74 More Squadrons to Prepare for Possibility of War Against Major Power,” Air Force Times, September 17, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/09/17/air-force-calls-for-74-more-squadrons-to-prepare- for-possibility-of-war-against-major-power/; and Loren Thompson, “U.S. Air Force Seeks 24% Increase in Force Size to Support Trump Defense Strategy,” Forbes, September 17, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/09/17/u-s-air-force-leaders-seek-24- increase-in-force-size-to-support-trump-defense-strategy/. 3. David Deptula, “Evolving Technologies and Warfare in the 21st Century: Introducing the ‘Combat Cloud,’” Mitchell Institute, September 2016, http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_73faf7274e9c4e4ca605004dc6628a88.pdf; Mike Wynn et al., “21st Century War- fare: The Combat Cloud,” September 15, 2014, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/af%20events/Speeches/15SEP2014-AFA- CombatCloud-Carlisle-Hostage-UrrutiaVarhall-Fahrenkrug.pdf; and Robbin Laird and David Deptula, “Why Air Force Needs Lots of F-35s: Gen. Hostage on the ‘Combat Cloud,’” AOL Defense, January 10, 2013, http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/10/why-the-air-force-needs- a-lot-of-f-35s-gen-hostage-on-the-com/. 4. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); and Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1978). 5. Losey, “Air Force Revamps Squadrons as It Prepares for the Next Big Fight”; and David Axe, “What’s Driving the U.S. Air Force Pilot Shortage?,” Foreign Policy, May 4, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/04/whats-driving-the-u-s-air-force-pilot-shortage/. 6. See recent columns, written under a pseudonym, which discuss this issue further: Col. Ned Stark [pseud.], “Wanted: Leaders We Can Believe in,” Air Force Times, June 14, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2018/06/14/commentary-wanted- leaders-we-can-believe-in/; and Col. Ned Stark [pseud.], “A Call for Senior Officer Reform in the Air Force: An Insider’s Perspective,” War on the Rocks, May 14, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/a-call-for-senior-officer-reform-in-the-air-force-an-insiders- perspective/. 7. For examples, see Stefan Halper, “China: The Three Warfares,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, May 2012, https://cryptome.org/2014/06/prc-three-wars.pdf; Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Charac- teristics,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (August 2010): 483–504; Liang Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999); Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013, https://www.project2049.net/ documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf; and Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 162, 165. 8. See Caitlin Patterson, “Russia’s Surging Electronic Warfare Capabilities,” Diplomat, April 19, 2016, http://thediplomat. com/2016/04/russias-surging-electronic-warfare-capabilities/; Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015); and Stephanie Nebehay, “U.S. Warns on Russia’s New Space Weapons,” Reuters, August 14, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-space/u-s-warns-on-russias-new- space-weapons-idUSKBN1KZ0T1. 9. See, for example, Peter Apps, “Analysis: Iran ‘Attack’ Points to Rising Cyber Warfare Risk,” Reuters, September 24, 2010, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-security-cyber-warfare/analysis-iran-attack-points-to-rising-cyber-warfare-risk-

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idUSTRE68N45Q20100924; Katie Benner and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Charges 9 Iranians in Huge Theft of Intellectual Property,” New York Times, July 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/us/politics/iranians-hacking-scheme-irgc.html; Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/04/iran-s-cyber-threat-espionage-sabotage-and-revenge-pub-75134; and Nicole Perlroth, “Without Nuclear Deal, U.S. Expects Resurgence in Iranian Cyberattacks,” New York Times, May 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/05/11/technology/iranian-hackers-united-states.html. 10. Christina Chaplain, “Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DoD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities,” US Govern- ment Accountability Office, October 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694913.pdf. 11. Player positions largely mirrored those outlined in the recent White House National Cyber Strategy. See Donald Trump, “National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America,” White House, September 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf. 12. Giselle Donnelly and Phillip Lohaus, Mass and Supremacy: A Comprehensive Case for the F-35, American Enterprise Institute, Jan- uary 23, 2013, http://www.aei.org/publication/mass-and-supremacy-a-comprehensive-case-for-the-f-35/; Marilyn Ware Center for Secu- rity Studies, To Rebuild America’s Military, American Enterprise Institute, October 2015, http://www.aei.org/publication/to- rebuild-americas-military/; and Mackenzie Eaglen, Repair and Rebuild: Balancing New Military Spending for a Three-Theater Strategy, American Enterprise Institute, October 16, 2017, http://www.aei.org/publication/repair-and-rebuild-balancing-new-military-spending- for-a-three-theater-strategy/. 13. See Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening America’s Compet- itive Edge,” US Department of Defense, January 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense- Strategy-Summary.pdf. 14. Suzan Fraser and Ayse Wieting, “Turkey, Russia Deepen Ties amid Troubled Relations with West,” Associated Press, April 2, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/842a6cf015304eb5b01029569e336050; and Serkan Demirtas, “Turkey-Russia Ties Move Beyond Tactical,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 4, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/serkan-demirtas/turkey-russia-ties-move-beyond- tactical-129740. For background, see Pavel Baev and Kirisci Kemal, “An Ambiguous Partnership: The Serpentine Trajectory of Turkish- Russian Relations in the Era of Erdogan and Putin,” Brookings Institution, September 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2017/09/pavel-and-kirisci-turkey-and-russia.pdf. 15. Daniel Cebul, “Marines 3-D Print Replacement Parts for F-35, Unmanned Ground Vehicle,” Defense News, April 25, 2018, https:// www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2018/04/25/marines-3-d-print-replacement-parts-for-f-35-unmanned-ground-vehicle/; Seth Robson, “Yokota Airmen Improve Gas Mask with 3D Printer, Potentially Saving Air Force $8 Million or More,” Stars and Stripes, June 7, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/yokota-airmen-improve-gas-mask-with-3d-printer-potentially-saving-air-force-8-million- or-more-1.531504; and Marcus Weisgerber, “US Air Force Is Waiting a Year for Parts That It Could 3D-Print,” Defense One, May 29, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2018/05/us-air-force-waiting-year-parts-it-could-3d-print/148565/. 16. Note to the reader: These discussions took place before the US Air Force awarded a $9 billion contract for the development of its next training jet. For further information, see Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force Awards $9B Contract to Boeing for Next Training Jet,” Defense News, September 27 2017. 17. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “US Air Force T-38 Talon Jet Trainer Crashed into a Field in Oklahoma,” Drive, August 17, 2018, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22988/us-air-force-t-38-talon-jet-trainer-crashed-into-a-field-in-oklahoma. 18. Tyler Rogoway, “Why Boeing’s Design for a 747 Full of Cruise Missiles Makes Total Sense,” Foxtrot Alpha, accessed August 17, 2018, https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-boeings-design-for-a-747-full-of-cruise-missiles-ma-1605150371; Ellie Zolfagharifard, “Plan to Turn a 747 into a Missile Launcher Revealed,” Daily Mail, January 21, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article- 3410999/Plan-turn-747-missile-launcher-revealed-Design-70-cruise-missiles-body-Boeing-aircraft.html; and Kyle Mizokami, “That Time a Defense Contractor Wanted to Load up 747s with ICBMs,” Popular Mechanics, August 4, 2016, https://www.popularmechanics. com/military/research/a22197/icbms-on-747s-plan/. 19. Valerie Insinna, “Here’s What We Know About the Air Force’s Alternative to the JSTARS Recap,” Defense News, April 20, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/02/22/heres-what-we-know-about-the-air-forces-alternative-to-the-jstars-recap/; and Daniel

62 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

Cebul, “What Survived in the Senate’s Defense Policy Bill?,” C4ISRNET, June 21, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/ defense-budget/2018/06/21/what-survived-in-the-senates-defense-policy-bill/. 20. For more information on the high frequency spectrum, see US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategic Spec- trum Plan,” February 2008, 24–26, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/dod_strategic_spectrum_plan_nov2007.pdf. 21. See US Air Force, “United States Air Force Acquisition: Annual Report FY 2017,” US Department of Defense, 2017, 48–49; and Mike Gruss, “What’s the Frequency, Kendall?,” SpaceNews Magazine, July 4, 2016, http://www.spacenewsmag.com/milspace-briefing/ whats-the-frequency-kendall/. 22. See John Keller, “DARPA Blackjack to Develop Small, Secure Military Satellites for Low-Earth Orbit,” Military and Aerospace Electronics, June 1, 2018, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-29/issue-6/news/news/darpa-blackjack-to-develop- small-secure-military-satellites-for-low-earth-orbit.html. 23. US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Budget Estimates,” February 2018, 4–6; Kyle Mizokami, “DARPA and NASA Team up to Design Refueling Satellites,” Popular Mechanics, December 27, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics. com/military/a14506288/darpa-and-nasa-team-up-to-design-refueling-satellites/; David Axe and Brian Anderson, “DARPA’s New Repair Satellite Has a Dangerous Downside,” Motherboard, January 8, 2018, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xw4vwk/darpa- repair-satellite-rsgs; and Kyle Rempfer, “Russia Warns of a ‘Tough Response’ to Creation of US Space Force,” Air Force Times, June 22, 2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2018/06/21/russia-warns-of-a-tough-response-to-creation-of-us-space-force/. 24. US Air Force, “United States Air Force Acquisition: Annual Report FY 2017,” 17. 25. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, “European Reassurance Initiative: Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2018,” US Department of Defense, May 2017, 12, 16, 23, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/ fy2018_ERI_J-Book.pdf; and Joop Berghuizen, “NATO Deployable Airbase Activation Modules—Paving the Way Towards a NATO Deployable Airbase,” Joint Air Power Competence Centre, January 27, 2017, https://www.japcc.org/nato-deployable-airbase- activation-modules-paving-way-towards-nato-deployable-airbase/. 26. Marc Selinger, “Air Force’s New F-15 Self-Defense System Nears Flight Tests,” Defense Daily, May 29, 2018, http://www.defensedaily.com/air-forces-new-f-15-self-defense-system-nears-flight-tests/?marketo_id=23163807&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTldFNE5HSmhOelE1T- kdObCIsInQiOiJIZzROb1V1czU4dlkzeFRUb2JZb2p5MENjXC8zRW9aMGh5M2pha3lUVm1LU3B5NUE0ZWVRd2ZwNUd1MH- FOREE2N3hkcDU1ZXRBVzRnTHZNSStNb05GVG1maHk3SU1KNmNCNFU4dnlxQ3pwalRweGtVNitPcndIZm8yS0tKRmx6c- 3MifQ%3D%3D; and Eaglen, Repair and Rebuild, 74–94. 27. See Marc Selinger, “House Appropriations Bill Boosts F-35 Buy, Backs New JSTARS,” Defense Daily, June 6, 2018, http://www. defensedaily.com/house-appropriations-bill-boosts-f-35-buy-backs-new-jstars/. 28. See, for example, Kyle Mizokami, “How the Air Force Could Fly the F-22 Raptor Until 2060,” Popular Mechanics, February 5, 2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a16574286/how-the-air-force-could-fly-the-f-22-raptor-until-2060/. 29. Jay Bennett, “Japan Wants Lockheed Martin to Make an F-22/F-35 Hybrid,” Popular Mechanics, April 20, 2018, https://www. popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a19871450/japan-lockheed-martin-f-22-f-35-hybrid/. 30. See Eaglen, Repair and Rebuild, 74–94. 31. Tyler Rogoway, “USAF Research Lab Has Released This Image of Its Low-Cost, Stealthy Drone,” Drive, May 19, 2017, http://www. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/10475/usaf-research-lab-has-released-this-image-of-its-low-cost-stealthy-drone. 32. Darrell Etherington, “U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Demonstrate Autonomous F-16 Strike Capabilities,” TechCrunch, April 11, 2017, http://social.techcrunch.com/2017/04/11/u-s-air-force-and-lockheed-demonstrate-autonomous-f-16-strike-capabilities/; Karla Lant, “The Military Just Demoed an F-16 That Flies and Executes Strikes by Itself,” Futurism, April 14, 2017, https://futurism.com/ the-military-just-demoed-an-f-16-that-flies-and-executes-strikes-by-itself/; and James Drew, “Pentagon Touts ‘Loyal Wingman’ for Combat Jets,” FlightGlobal, March 20, 2016, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pentagon-touts-loyal-wingman-for-combat- jets-423682/. 33. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Won’t Need a Carrier for High-End Fight with MUX Unmanned System,” USNI News, June 6, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/06/06/marines-wont-need-carrier-high-end-fight-mux-unmanned-system. 34. Heather Wilson and David Goldfein, “USAF Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2019,” US House of Representatives, Committee on

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Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, March 14, 2018, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/1/FY19_AF_POSTURE_ STATEMENT_HIGH_RES.PDF. 35. See Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” Trends in Organized Crime 6, no. 1 (September 1, 2000): 5–16, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-000-1002-2. 36. Losey, “Air Force Calls for 74 More Squadrons to Prepare for Possibility of War Against Major Power.” 37. Axe, “What’s Driving the U.S. Air Force Pilot Shortage?” 38. See James Cunningham, “Readiness Tracker, Volume 2: On an Unsustainable Path,” American Enterprise Institute, May 4, 2016, http://www.aei.org/publication/readiness-tracker-volume-2-unsustainable-path/; and James Cunningham, “Readiness Tracker, Volume 3: Aviation Readiness,” American Enterprise Institute, April 30, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/readiness-tracker-volume-3- aviation-readiness/. 39. For the perspective of a National Guard officer on this matter, see Kevin Dailey, “Air National Guard Structure for the Twenty- First Century: The Multimission Framework for Total Force Integration,” Maxwell Papers, December 4, 2017, https://media.defense. gov/2017/Dec/04/2001852025/-1/-1/0/MP_0043_DAILEY_NATIONAL_GUARD_STRUCTURE.PDF. 40. See Wilson and Goldfein, “USAF Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2019.” 41. US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategic Spectrum Plan,” 24–25. 42. See John Grady, “Experts Warn House Panel of U.S. Satellite Network Vulnerabilities,” USNI News, March 29, 2017, https://news. usni.org/2017/03/29/panel-tells-house-satellite-network-vulnerabilities. 43. The USAF FY2019 posture statement noted provided a number of statistics detailing the voluminous intelligence collection program overseen by the service. Whether the service is gathering the right intelligence, or can discern useful from useless information, was not directly addressed. See Wilson and Goldfein, “USAF Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2019.” 44. US Air Force, “United States Air Force Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Overview,” US Department of Defense, May 10, 2017, 14, https:// www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY2018%20Air%20Force%20Budget%20Overview%20Book%20(updated%20June). pdf?ver=2017-07-03-114127-010. 45. Sputnik, “US Air Force Faces Precision Munitions Shortage Due to High Demand in Iraq,” accessed September 15, 2018, https:// sputniknews.com/us/201707191055670639-us-air-force-munitions-shortage/. 46. See Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Con- gress,” Congressional Research Service, August 7, 2018. 47. Ankit Panda, “Revealed: China’s Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Diplomat, April 10, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/04/revealed-chinas-nuclear-capable-air-launched-ballistic-missile/; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Test Fires ‘Kinzhal’ Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Diplomat, July 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/russia-test-fires-kinzhal- nuclear-capable-air-launched-ballistic-missile/. 48. See Eaglen, Repair and Rebuild.

64 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, PHILLIP LOHAUS, GARY J. SCHMITT, AND GISELLE DONNELLY

About the Authors

T. Michael Moseley served as the 18th chief of staff Gary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar in strategic of the United States Air Force. An accomplished pilot studies at the American Enterprise Institute, where he with over 3,000 flight hours, Gen. Moseley com- focuses on longer-term security issues. He is the coau- manded the 9th Air Force and US Central Com- thor and contributing editor of many works, including mand Air Forces during Operation Southern Watch, Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China, and Iran (AEI Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Press, 2018) and A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing Freedom. He retired from the Air Force in 2008 and the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security remains involved in matters related to Air Force Partners (Strategic Studies Institute, 2015). reform and modernization. Giselle Donnelly is a resident fellow in defense and Phillip Lohaus is a visiting fellow at the American national security at the American Enterprise Insti- Enterprise Institute. A former intelligence analyst, tute, where she focuses on military strategy, opera- he is the author of numerous articles and reports on tions, and programs. She is the author of numerous the nature of international competition, including a defense studies, including To Rebuild America’s Mili- forthcoming book on the topic. He is the coauthor, tary (AEI, 2015) and Of Men and Material: The Crisis in along with Giselle Donnelly, of Mass and Supremacy: Military Resources (AEI Press, 2007), and is currently A Comprehensive Case for the F-35. working on “Empire for Liberty: The British Origins of American Strategy.”

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following indi- the scenarios and providing valuable edits and viduals for their efforts in supporting this study. feedback to the report, as well as AEI’s editing and Research assistants Zack Austin and Taylor Clau- design teams for helping translate our findings into sen constructed the order of battle, graphics, and a finished product. Finally, this exercise would not tables and coordinated much of the day-to-day work have been possible without the participants gen- throughout the exercise. Larry Johnson expertly erously giving up their time to work through the facilitated game discussion and contributed signifi- various scenarios. Their insights, earned through cantly to the development of structural mechan- decades of collective service, were instrumental in ics and rules of play. We would also like to thank the development of the report’s core findings and research assistant Charlotte Kearney for recording recommendations.