Technical Report TR-01-03 Integrated account of method, site selection and programme prior to the site investigation phase Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB December 2000 Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co Box 5864 SE-102 40 Stockholm Sweden Tel 08-459 84 00 +46 8 459 84 00 Fax 08-661 57 19 +46 8 661 57 19 Integrated account of method, site selection and programme prior to the site investigation phase Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB December 2000 Preface The purpose of the ongoing siting process is to find a site on which it is possible to build a deep repository for encapsulated spent nuclear fuel that will be safe in the long term. This report summarizes the material SKB has gathered as a basis for the decisions that need to be made in order for SKB to commence site investigations for a deep repository. SKB’s plan is that the investigations, which include test drilling, shall be initiated in 2002. The report contains the supplementary accounts which the Government request- ed in its decision on RD&D-Programme 98 regarding alternative methods, FUD material for site selection, and programme for the site investigations. Research, Development and SKB considers it urgent that the competent authorities and the Government Demonstration clarify in connection with their critical review whether the background material we present here can serve as a basis for: 1. adhering to the KBS-3 method as the most suitable alternative for Sweden and thereby a fundamental premise for the work in the site investigation phase, 2. proceeding with investigations and consultations on the selected sites in the manner proposed by SKB. After critical review by the regulatory authorities and the Government’s decision, the concerned municipalities have to make a decision on whether or not to continue their participation in order that the nuclear waste programme can proceed to the next phase. We believe it is important to take this step in order to get on with implementing a safe disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. Stockholm, December 2000 Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company Peter Nygårds Claes Thegerström President Executive Vice President in charge of Siting Reading instructions Structure of this report Integrated account of method, site selection The report presents SKB’s method and site selection as well as a propos- and programme prior to the site investigation ed programme for the next phase of the siting process. The background phase material in the form of SKB reports and other references is extensive. This report is therefore of a summarizing character. For access to the Main references complete body of material, the reader is referred to the main references. Method The report is divided into four parts: • Comparative system analysis Part I – Background which describes the need for waste management, • Zero alternative what remains to be done in SKB’s programme, and which laws and • International survey • RD&D-programme for conditions govern the programme. very deep boreholes • KBS-3-method Part II – Method which contains an analysis of alternative strategies and systems for disposal of spent nuclear fuel. This part also includes an Site updated system analysis for the main alternative KBS-3 and summarizes •SR 97 • Feasibility study reports SR 97, the most recent assessment of the long-term safety of the deep • Geoscientific repository. background material Part III – Site which summarizes and evaluates a large body of siting Programme data and describes and justifies SKB’s choice of sites for further investi- • Requirements and criteria gations. • Geoscientific site investigation programme Part IV – Programme which describes the plans for SKB’s activities and the EIA procedure in the site investigation phase. An account of the consultation which SKB has carried out with con- cerned municipalities, county administrative boards and regulatory authorities is given in the Appendix. Content Summary 11 Part I – Backgrund 1 Waste 27 1.1 Where does the waste come from? 27 1.2 Waste types and volumes 28 1.3 Spent nuclear fuel 29 1.4 How dangerous is spent nuclear fuel? 31 1.4.1 Radiotoxicity 31 1.4.2 Accessibility 32 2 Facilities and programme 33 2.1 Existing and planned facilities 33 2.1.1 Short-lived LILW 34 2.1.2 Spent nuclear fuel 34 2.1.3 Long-lived LILW 34 2.1.4 Transportation system 35 2.1.5 Siting35 2.2 Programme for encapsulation and deep disposal 35 3 Regulatory framework for nuclear fuel management 39 3.1 Laws and regulations 40 3.1.1 Responsibility 40 3.1.2 Financing41 3.1.3 Rules for licensing41 3.1.4 Regulations concerning safety and radiation protection 42 3.2 Government conditions and SKB’s accounts 43 Part II – Method 4 Strategies 47 4.1 Requirements on system for management of spent nuclear fuel 48 4.2 Overview of possible strategies and systems 49 4.3 Reprocessing and transmutation 50 4.3.1 Reprocessing and recycling of uranium and plutonium 51 4.3.2 Transmutation as a complement to recycling of uranium and plutonium 52 4.3.3 Transmutation without purification of plutonium 53 4.3.4 Evaluation of reprocessing and transmutation 53 4.4 Supervised storage 54 4.4.1 Wet storage 54 4.4.2 Dry storage 54 4.4.3 The DRD concept 55 4.4.4 Evaluation of supervised storage 56 4.5 Geological disposal 56 4.5.1 Evaluation of geological disposal 57 4.6 Overall assessment 58 4.7 The zero alternative 59 4.7.1 Prolonged storage in CLAB 59 4.7.2 Abandonment of CLAB 60 4.7.3 Consequences of the zero alternative 60 4.8 International overview 61 4.8.1 Reprocessing62 4.8.2 Transmutation 62 4.8.3 Geological disposal 62 4.8.5 An international repository? 65 Content 7 5 Methods for geological disposal 67 5.1 Requirements on system for geological disposal 67 5.1.1 Overall requirements 68 5.1.2 Environmental requirements 68 5.1.3 Safety requirements 68 5.1.4 Radiation protection requirements 68 5.1.5 Requirements on non-proliferation of nuclear material and nuclear waste 69 5.2 Systems for geological disposal 69 5.2.1 KBS-3 70 5.2.2 Very Long Holes – VLH 71 5.2.3 WP-Cave 72 5.2.4 Very Deep Holes – VDH 73 5.3 Evaluation against requirements 74 5.3.1 Compliance with overall requirements 74 5.3.2 Environmental impact 74 5.3.3 Safety 75 5.3.4 Radiation protection 76 5.3.5 Non-proliferation of nuclear material and nuclear waste 77 5.3.6 Costs 77 5.3.7 Overall assessment 78 5.4 Research and development programme for VDH 79 5.4.1 Content of the programme 79 5.4.2 Overview of premises 80 5.4.3 Time and costs 80 5.4.4 SKB’s assessment 80 6 Deep disposal system based on KBS-3 81 6.1 System description 82 6.1.1 Interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel 82 6.1.2 Encapsulation plant 82 6.1.3 Canister factory 83 6.1.4 Deep repository 84 6.1.5 Transportation 85 6.2 Environmental impact 86 6.3 Safety and radiation protection 86 6.4 Freedom of choice for execution 88 6.4.1 Repository design 88 6.4.2 Barriers 89 6.4.3 Siting89 6.5 Timetable 90 6.6 Retrieval of deposited canisters 90 6.7 Conclusions 90 7 Long-term safety 91 7.1 Premises for SR 97 91 7.1.1 Purposes and delimitations 91 7.1.2 Safety principles 92 7.1.3 Timescale 92 7.1.4 Three sites 93 7.1.5 Methodology 94 7.1.6 Choice of scenarios 94 8 Content 7.2 Results and conclusions in SR 97 95 7.2.1 Base scenario 95 7.2.2 Canister defect scenario 95 7.2.3 Climate scenario 96 7.2.4 Earthquake scenario 97 7.2.5 Intrusion scenario 98 7.2.6 Safety of the KBS-3 method in Swedish bedrock 98 7.2.7 Methodology for safety assessment 99 7.2.8 SR 97 as a basis for site investigations, system design and research programmes 99 7.2.9 Summary 99 7.3 International expert review 100 7.3.1 Conclusions of the IRT 100 7.4 Swedish regulatory review 102 7.4.1 Conclusions of Swedish regulatory review 102 7.5 SKB’s comments on the review results 103 Part III – Site 8 Siting process 107 8.1 Progress so far 107 8.2 Premises for the continued work 110 8.2.1 Division of responsibilities and requirements on SKB 110 8.2.2 Information, dialogue and consultation 111 8.2.3 Municipalities 112 8.2.4 County administrative boards, regional consultations 113 8.2.5 Regulatory authorities and ministry 113 8.3 Points of departure for the site investigation phase 114 9 Geoscientific data 119 9.1 State of knowledge 119 9.2 Research in underground laboratories 121 9.3 Study sites 122 9.4 General siting studies and feasibility studies 123 9.5 Safety assessments 126 9.6 Finnish site investigations and safety assessments 128 10 Siting factors 131 10.1 Requirements and preferences 131 10.2 Bedrock 132 10.3 Industrial establishment 138 10.4 Societal aspects 142 11 Siting alternatives from feasibility studies 149 11.1 Feasibility studies 149 11.2 Application of siting factors 151 11.3 Northern Uppland – Östhammar, Tierp and Älvkarleby 154 11.3.1 General prospects for a repository in the region 154 11.3.2 Geological prospects for a repository in the region 156 11.3.3 Siting alternatives 157 11.3.4 Forsmark 159 11.3.5 Hargshamn 161 11.3.6 Tierp north/Skutskär 163 11.4 Södermanland – Nyköping165 11.4.1 General prospects for a repository in the region 165 11.4.2 Geological prospects for a repository in the region 166 11.4.3 Siting alternatives 168 11.4.4 Studsvik/Björksund 168 11.4.5 Skavsta/Fjällveden 170 Content 9 11.5 Småland – Oskarshamn and Hultsfred 172 11.5.1 General prospects for a repository in the region 174 11.5.2 Geological prospects for a repository in the region 174 11.5.3 Siting alternatives 175 11.5.4 Simpevarp 177 11.5.5 Oskarshamn south 179 11.5.6 Hultsfred east 180 12 Selection of siting alternatives for