The - Defence and Security Relationship: Past, Present and Future

by

Peter J McDermott AM, CSC, BSc, MSSM, Grad Dip Business Administration, Dip App Sci Air Navigation, Dip App Sci Aero-systems, Dip Admin Studies

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Deakin University April 2021

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have been supervised and advised by a dedicated and experienced panel who encouraged me, set high standards, improved my writing, and provided continual support. Principal supervisor, Professor Baogang He, Alfred Deakin Professor and Personal Chair in International Relations, guided me in a field new to me and challenged my assumptions. Associate Professor Bob Breen, as a military academic and author greatly assisted my thesis presentation and helped me draw out military arguments. Associate Professor Chengxin Pan set me on a security practitioner reporting path.

I thank the 94 security practitioners who allowed me to record their experiences and insights into the defence and security relationship between Japan and Australia. Everyone considered that this relationship was important to improve mutual security, and to all, I owe a debt of gratitude. Their testimony gave credibility and authenticity to my research, and I offer this present thesis as a record of their places in Australian and Japanese security and military history.

iv CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Research requires the contribution of a collaborative team. The contribution of the following is gratefully acknowledged.

• Deakin Supervisory team: Professor Baogang He, Associate Professor Bob Breen, and Associate Professor Chengxin Pan professionally provided welcome and valued direction, assistance, encouragement, and constructive criticism.

• Examination Team: The examiners providing valuable input that made a material difference to the final thesis.

• Deakin University: HDR academic and administrative staff provided outstanding support throughout the research journey.

• Partner Institutions: o The Australian Defence Department and the provided ethics approval and access to defence and other government officials for interviews. The Australian Defence College provided broad sponsorship for the PhD by Portfolio Program conducted by Deakin for Defence. Defence did not grant access to any defence or other government documents not in the public domain. o The Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense provided access to interviewees and support. Their archives were a valuable source. o The Australian National Archives provided outstanding support in clearing and providing access to archived historical material allowing for the publication of previously unseen original material. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives section was a valuable source. o The Japanese Embassy in Canberra and the Australian Embassy in Tokyo provided access to government officials and excellent support. o The Japanese National Institute of Defense Studies in Tokyo provided valued access and support. o The Australian National Library provided excellent support in finding documents. o The CEOs and staff of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Center for Independent Strategic Analysis, Center for Budgetary and Strategic Analysis provided encouragement and access to interviewees.

• Other collaborations: over 90 national security practitioners provided insights and recall of experiences generating a large database of original research. A small number of them reviewed sections of this thesis for accuracy in their specific fields.

ETHICS APPROVAL FOR HUMAN RESEARCH

Ethics Approval 069-18 was granted by the Defence/Department of Veterans’ Affairs Human Research Ethics Committee on 12 November 2018 and later endorsed by the Deakin Human Research Ethics Committee.

v ABSTRACT

This thesis is a critical examination of the foundation and possible trajectory of the Australia-Japan defence and security relationship (A-JDSR). The thesis is timely. Since its early beginnings in the 1960s, but especially since 1992, the A-JDSR has assumed increasing mutual importance. Both countries have made separate and joint declarations about the need to work together for regional and global security. A process of preparing protocols and agreements for acting together in regional security contingencies is underway, and both have recently increased their exchanges of Defence attaché staff. There are increasing levels of dialogue and combined exercising, bilaterally and with the United States. Recent challenges to their security are prompting Australia and Japan and like-minded countries, especially the United States and the ASEAN nations, to consider developing a more structured security framework. The revitalised Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a good example of such a framework. The thesis proposes a framework that may add to Asia-Pacific regional security by meeting the challenge of a rising China, an authoritarian state seeking more global and regional influence. All countries in the region need to address China’s competition with the United States as this inextricably puts stress on Australia and Japan because of their respective separate security alliances with the United States.

A ‘virtual alliance’ defence and security relationship already exists, supplementing defence and security dialogue and cooperation. A risk is that China can interpret closer A-JDSR ties as attempting to restrict it from taking its rightful place in the global order. This thesis posits an option for the future of the A-JDSR that: mitigates this risk; hedges formal alliances; and bolsters resilience as the rules-based global order comes under pressure from authoritarian power.

The thesis draws on the candidate’s experience as a security practitioner, military diplomat, and policymaker. It collects empirical data in the form of primary sources: recently declassified archived Government files; interviews with other practitioners; and secondary sources. The candidate’s interviews with politicians, academics, diplomats, commentators, military commanders and staff, policymakers, and practitioners in the national security communities of Australia, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States supplement personal experience and examination of other sources.

vi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS A-J Australia-Japan A-J-US Australia-Japan-United States A-JDSR Australia-Japan Defence and Security Relations(hip) ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and US ANU Australian National University AP Asia-Pacific ARA Australian Regular Army ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute AUSMIN Australia-US Ministerial Consultations CCP Chinese Communist Party CDF Chief of Defence Force (Australia—new) CDFS Chief of Defence Force Staff (Australia—old) CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) CJSC Chairman, Joint Staff Council (Japan—new) COSJS Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Japan—old) DASA Defence and Armed Services Attaché (Australia) DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) DIHQ Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Japan) DIO Defence Intelligence Organization (Australia) DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific FVEY Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US) GSOMIA General Security of Military Information Agreement HA/DR Humanitarian aid and Disaster Response HADS Head, Australian Defence Staff HNS Host Nation Support (between US and Japan) IP Indo-Pacific JASDF Japanese Air Self Defense Force JDA Japan Defense Agency (until 9 January 2007) JDSC Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation ((Japan-Australia) JGSDF Japanese Ground Self Defense Force

vii JMOD Japanese Ministry of Defense (after 9 January 2007) JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force JSDF Japanese Self Defense Force L-NP Liberal-National Party (Australia) LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) NAA National Archives of Australia NARA Nippon-Australia Relations Agreement NDPG National Defense Program Guidelines (Japan) NEA Northeast Asia NGO Non-Governmental Organisation ONA Office of National Assessments (Australia -old) ONI Office of National Intelligence (Australia - new) PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) PLA-AF People’s Liberation Army—Air Force (China) PLA-N People’s Liberation Army—Navy (China) PRC People’s Republic of China QUAD Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan, US) RAA Reciprocal Access Agreement RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAN RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership RIPS Research Institute for Peace & Security (Japan) ROK Republic of Korea RUSIDSS-A Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia SDSC Strategic Defence Studies Centre (ANU) SEA Southeast Asia SOFA Status of Forces Agreement TSD Trilateral Strategic Dialogue UN United Nations USN United States Navy UNC United Nations Command UNC (Rear) United Nations Command (Rear) US-JMST US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty

viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... i

Table of Contents ...... ix

Portfolio of Professional Experience and Writings ...... 1 0.1 Introduction… ...... 1 0.2 Professional History ...... 3 0.3 Publications and writings ...... 7

Chapter One: The Australia-Japan defence and security relationship ...... 14 1.1 Situations ...... 14 1.2 Overarching Problem and Context ...... 20 1.3 Literature Review ...... 23 1.4 Significance of Research ...... 29 1.5 Theoretical Concepts ...... 30 1.6 Research Methodology...... 38 1.7 Thesis Structure ...... 42

Chapter Two: A-JDSR History—political and security perspectives ...... 44 2.1 Introduction… ...... 44 2.2 Beginnings ...... 47 2.3 Burgeoning of the Relationship… ...... 57 2.4 Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation ...... 72 2.5 Building on the Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation ...... 74 2.6 Multilateralism and the A-JDSR ...... 83 2.7 Summary… ...... 87

Chapter Three: A-JDSR History—defence and military perspectives ...... 89 3.1 Introduction… ...... 89 3.2 Beginnings ...... 90 3.3 Burgeoning of the Relationship ...... 104 3.4 Defence Intelligence relationship… ...... 115 3.5 United Nations Command (Rear)-–its utility in the relationship...... 120 3.6 Submarine proposal – a missed strategic opportunity...... 129 3.7 Summary… ...... 139

Chapter Four: Imperatives of Australian and Japanese Strategic Postures & Defence Priorities ...... 141 4.1 Introduction… ...... 141 4.2 Australia’s view of its region and its security ...... 142 4.3 Japan’s view of its region and its security...... 154 4.4 Future US Strategic Posture ...... 168 4.4 Indo-Pacific Regional Tensions ...... 169 4.5 Re-interpreting the Japanese Constitution… ...... 176 4.6 Summary… ...... 186

ix Chapter Five: Research Findings on the A-JDSR ...... 188 5.1 Introduction ...... 188 5.2 Analyses of Research Findings ...... 191 5.3. Conceptualisation of Nature of the A-JDSR ...... 214 5.4. Future A-JDSR development ...... 220

Chapter Six: The Future of the A-JDSR in Regional Security Frameworks ...... 229 6.1 A New Security Framework based on the A-JDSR ...... 229 6.2 A-JDSR and Alignments, Alliances and Multinational Organisations .... 230 6.4 Pragmatic Proposal ...... 242 6.5 Summary ...... 246 6.6 Conclusion...... 250

Bibliography ...... 251

Interviews ...... 264

Research questions ...... 272

List of Tables

Table 3.1 – Frequency of defence dialogue in 1990s ...... 101 Table 4.1 - Wordcount analysis of mentions of various countries in white papers ...... 142 Table 5.1 – Analysis of responses to question of further A-JDSR formalisation… .... 193 Table 5.2 – Indicative responses by interviewees from transcripts ...... 207

x Portfolio of Professional Experience and Writing

0.1 Introduction

This thesis was written to record the importance of the Australia-Japan Defence and Security Relationship (A-JDSR), as well as examining its present significance and possible optimal future. In 2021, Australia does more militarily with Japan than any other country except the United States.1 Japan has almost unnoticed, been building security ties with other partners, in the process reducing the centrality of the US in Japan’s security.’2 This thesis chronicles and analyses this important relationship and explains the reason for this increase in activity, and some possibilities for the future. There is a gap, perhaps a gulf between those who write on security (and less who write on military) and those who actually manage defence and security matters—the security practitioners. The thesis attempts to bridge the gap for the A-JDSR, pointing out how and why it achieved its current state and where it may go. For this reason, this partly autoethnographic thesis focuses less on theory and more on description and analysis, hoping to make a modest step in helping the theoretical security academic understand the pragmatic security practitioner and vice versa.

My professional experience as a policy and security practitioner in the A-JDSR and my writings about it inform this thesis. It records the contributions of many, past and present, who have worked to build this vital link. The discipline of reflective writing 'for the record' is part of a senior military officer's responsibilities. Past Chief of Defence Force Staff, Synnott said:

It is not enough for senior officers of the three Services to be highly skilled and knowledgeable practitioners in the military field. They need to be able to give military advice and to contribute constructively to the defence policy development within the broad context of strategic, international and resource policies; policies which will impinge on and sometimes conflict with considerations based purely on military requirements.3

1 , General, Commander, Joint Operations, Australian Defence Force, private interview. Canberra, 30 November 2020. 2 Midford, Paul, and Wilhelm Vosse, eds. New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-US Centric Evolution. Routledge, 2020. 3 Desmond Ball, ‘Foreword’ in Strategy & Defence—Australian Essays. ed. Sir Anthony Synott (Allen & Unwin , 1982). p. ii. 1 I use a security practitioner approach in this thesis based on 40 years professional service in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as a commander, operational aviator, capability developer, defence diplomat, military strategist, and defence academic. I completed the RAAF Academy with a degree in Physics. 4 During the aviation part of my career, I completed a Master of Science in Systems Management, which helped me produce the first analyses of capability development for Air Force Headquarters. Later, formal civilian qualifications in Project Management assisted my work in capability development. I completed fulltime overseas study years in the United States and Japan, where I created two major papers in capability development and military strategy. As a defence academic, I was the Founding Commandant of the Australian Command and Staff College with its focus on Strategic Studies and Defence International Engagement.5 After retirement from full-time service, I continued my defence and security work as an Adjunct Professor of Defence Management for six years.6

I was directly and centrally involved as a practitioner in the A-JDSR for three years as Australian Defence and Armed Services Attaché (DASA) in Japan. Before taking up that post, I undertook a year-long intensive Japanese language course, and then completed another year of full-time study in Japanese at the National Institute of Defence Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo. Since leaving Japan, I have maintained my relationship with senior Japanese defence and military officers by correspondence and by acting as Australian Escort Officer for various senior officers making formal Government-sponsored visits to Australia. For this thesis, I have interviewed military, diplomatic, and national security colleagues in Japan, Australia and elsewhere on their past roles and current engagement in the A-JDSR.

I base this thesis on my engagement within Japan and other security practitioners' work in this area. There are many people engaged in and reporting on the A-JDSR. Apart from the officials in the Australian and Japanese department of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and related agencies of governments, there are many commentators in academia, research institutions and other organisations commented on the A-JDSR. People interviewed for original

4 On graduation from the RAAF Academy the Academy Warden informed the candidate that ‘this was just the beginning; you need to upgrade your degree every 10 years’. 5 This college provides middle ranking ADF officers with education in capability development and strategic study and awards selected officers with a master’s degree in strategic studies. 6 In this capacity I headed the Defence Management Studies Unit at the University of Canberra delivering academic services to the College I had founded. 2 research in this thesis are or have been engaged closely in the A-JDSR and this research is better for their insights. They are a representative sample of what is called in this thesis ‘security practitioners’, noting this this includes military, defence and the broader security community. During the years addressed in this thesis, many have moved from Government to academia and the research institutions. Prime among those interviewed in Australia are the following. In Australia, Government leaders: Prime Minister , and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Other leaders: Ambassadors, Secretaries of Defence, and leaders of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence organisations; Ric Smith, Peter Varghese, Michael Thawley, Murray McLean, John McCarthy; Chiefs of Defence Forces: , Sir , and ; Deputy or Associate Secretaries of Defence: Paul Dibb, Hugh White, and Brendan Sergeant. In Japan, senior academics: senior members of the Defense and Foreign Affairs departments. Military leaders such as General Shigeru Iwasaki,7 Vice-Admiral Yoji Koda are only two of many Japanese senior SDF officers who have actively contributed to and written on the A-JDSR. Australian academics commenting on the A-JDSR include Rikki Kersten, Purnendra Jain, and William Tow. Japanese commentators in the area include Masashi Nishihara, Yūichi Hosoya, Tomohiko Satake, and Canadian Stephen Nagy. I have worked with many of these and am privileged to have been able to add their insights and stories to this thesis. My own academic work includes a body of publications, published externally and internally to the RAAF and Defence. This work, combined with engagement in fields of military endeavour, also informs this thesis and allows me to claim membership of the community of national security practitioners. I seek to provide a useful document of a critical part of Australia's strategic engagement with Japan and the region and offer insights into the future of the A-JDSR.

0.2 Professional experience – Japan connections

0.2.1. Early connections to Japan

Misawa 1980. My earliest direct connection with Japan was when I was on flying instructor exchange duty with the US Navy's west-coast P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft training squadron in 1979-81. In 1980, I travelled as Mission Commander to the JSDF

7 The thesis uses, for consistency, all names written in the western convention of given name first, then family name. It also uses the convention of writing the name in full in its first iteration, then truncating the name to family name only, unless there is ambiguity. 3 airbase at Misawa in northern Honshu, Japan where the USAF 5th Air Force was based, equipped with F-16 aircraft preparing for strike operations over North Korea, and a deployed USN P3C squadron. The commitment the US provided at the time to the defence of its alliance partners Japan and the Republic of South Korea (ROK) astonished me and sparked my interest in understanding how this commitment affects Australia's security.

Chief of Air Force Visit to ASDF/MSDF. In 1984, the then-Chief of Staff, Air Force, Air Marshal David Evans considered the RAAF should build connections with Asian air forces, including the JASDF. Evans tasked a RAAF P3C to visit Japan for a goodwill visit. I was part of the crew that flew him to a Japanese commercial airport to call on the JSDF during 7-15 May 1984. The RAAF managed the deployment as a bilateral 'goodwill visit'. It was so far in advance of such engagement that the aircraft had to go through the charade of landing as a 'supposed civil aircraft' at a commercial airport in Nagoya, then taxying to a small military enclave. Our arrival was my first experience of 'doing without saying directly' (honne to tatemae), what one believes and what one may say standing in front of you. Evan's visit to Japan was the first by a single service chief since the Korean War.

First constructive military visit - CDF to Japan 1989. In 1989 after returning from studying at the USAF Air War College where I had specialised in national security issues, I joined the personal staff of the Australian Chief of Defence Force (CDF) responsible for operational liaison between the CDF and his Headquarters. I learned that the CDF had recently cancelled a planned visit to Beijing due to the Tiananmen Square massacre. Knowing that the International Policy (IP) Division in Defence was keen to engage militarily with Japan, I suggested to the CDF, General Peter Gration that the visit be re- directed to Tokyo. I argued that such a visit, the second by a CDF to Japan would represent a substantial extension to Australia's regional engagement. He agreed and obtained visit approval from Minister Beazley.8 The subsequent visit to Tokyo in late 1989 was mostly ceremonial, but Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) Chief of Joint Staff Council, General Ishii and other Japanese hosts showed interest in engaging militarily with Australia. On return to Australia, with Beazley’s support, Gration directed that Defence Deputy Secretary Strategy, Paul Dibb and Vice-Chief of Defence Force, Vice-Admiral Alan Beaumont visit

8 I planned for and accompanied the CDF on this visit. The first visit to Japan by a senior ADF officer had been one by a previous Chief of Defence Force Staff, who had visited in the 1970’s accompanied by Gration who had held the same staff post as the candidate did 15 years later. 4 Japan to commence the first-ever strategic level military talks by Australia with Japan. I resolved then to work towards becoming the Australian Defence representative in Japan.

Attendance at NIDS 1994-95. During his visit to Japan, Gration decided that every incoming Australian Defence and Services Attaché (DASA) to Japan would attend the senior (Colonel-level) course at the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). This course provided promising JSDF officers with the education needed to prepare for the most senior military posts in the JSDF. Four years after travelling to Japan with CDF Gration, I was selected as DASA Tokyo. After undertaking intensive Japanese language training, I attended the NIDS course. My work as a defence attaché was later made easier by the personal contacts I made at NIDS. Indeed, one NIDS colleague, Shigeru Iwasaki, later became the Chief of Staff, JASDF and then Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japanese Defense Agency9 (JDA)10. My CDF staff experience had given me privileged exposure to international relations through attendance at Australia-US Ministerial discussions, ARF conferences and similar fora. This experience enabled me to share Australian and regional strategic thinking with my NIDS colleagues. I wrote my final assessment paper on the relationship between national security, military power, capability development, regional security architecture and A-J cooperation. My paper was well-received by NIDS and was published (in Japanese) in 1995 as a model for Japan's military engagement with countries like Australia. The paper rested on a recent Australian- led ASEAN proceedings meeting that defined regional security cooperation. 11

0.2.2. Defence and Armed Services Attaché

Having achieved this long-held personal military career objective, I commenced duty at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo in August 1995 when Japan was starting to reach out to regional military partners. With only one staff member, a major-level assistant DASA, and with full encouragement from the Ambassador and other staff and taskmasters in Defence in Canberra, I embarked on a planned program to build the A-JDSR from nascency to one that would be of benefit to Australia. The Ambassador for most of my tenure was Dr Ashton Calvert who had a long record developing security linkages with

9 Australian Chief of Defence Force equivalent. 10 The Japan Defense Agency become the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMOD) on 9 January 2007. This thesis uses historical referencing for the JDA/JMOD. 11 ‘Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region’ commissioned by the 1993 Post-Ministerial Conference Senior Officials’ Meeting, with contributions by Professor Paul Dibb. DFAT. April 1994. 5 Japan. Defence staff engagement was with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (日本外務省, Gaimushō), the Japanese Defense agency (日本防衛庁, Bōeichō) which become in 2007 the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMOD) (日本防衛省, Nihon Bōeishō), and the JSDF (日本自衛隊, Nihon Jieitai).

I used my NIDS paper, together with Defence direction from Canberra as the planning basis for developing the A-JDSR at the Embassy once I became the DASA. My program sought to encourage the JSDF to engage in Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) activities in concert or cooperation with Australia. I wanted to emphasise defence and military activities, especially those that Japan could implement consonant with Japanese priorities and sensitivities. The modus operandi was four-fold. First, to build on the military talks that had started in earnest in 1994. Second, to work closely with the Japanese defence organisation including the three service headquarters, and later the then-nascent Joint Staff Office to identify areas where Australia and Japan could agree on taking cooperative action. Third, to seek support through reporting to Australia for new initiatives. Four, to progress initiatives that both countries could advance through single service-service links, and as the process matured, though formal agreement at senior officials’ meetings and later, through Ministerial dialogue.

An action plan agreed in 1995 at military-military between Australian and Japanese Defence officials talks included: strengthening the intelligence relationship, including assistance from the Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) as Japan built its defence intelligence headquarters (DIHQ); cooperation on peacekeeping including combined peacekeeping exercising; maritime exercising; RAAF P-3C aircraft visits under the more politically sensitive bilateral arrangements rather than through 'below-the-radar' United Nations Command (Rear) (UNC(Rear)) channels; offers at training institutions in Australia. Over the next three years, all planned activities came to fruition as Japan started to reach out beyond its traditional singular reliance on the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (US-JMST).

Responsibility for directing the priorities of the Australian Embassy Defence staff lay with the Vice-Chief of Defence Force, and the Assistant Secretary, International Policy Division. Engagement priorities came from the Defence International Engagement Plan, a bureaucratic document that set out desired outcomes, allocated resources and named 6 those responsible for achieving policy achievements. In the case of the A-JDSR, a new beginning was possible. Defence’s strategic policymaker in the early 1990s was Allan Behm who held a philosophical underpinning of the policy outcomes. His view was that the real Australian purpose for the A-JDSR at that time had been ‘to maintain that economic and community security was deeply anchored in both countries’. Behm added that ‘The heart of any military relationship such as between Japan (and others) and Australia should be based not on common threats, but shared values and aligned national interest’.12 He considered that Japan’s move to a normal country required it to recognise the value of its defence and military capabilities to the benefit of own and regional security and that Australia should play a role in this maturation. Behm summarised: ‘This was what it was all about: the integration of the military into society’ Defence staff in Tokyo closely carried out Behm’s policy direction, recognising that future cooperation with the JSDF was contingent on the acceptance by the JSDF and the people of Japan that normalisation of the JSDF was a necessary precursor to allowing Japan to build its security policies and posture.

Building closer societal linkages became a personal priority. My first action as DASA was to participate in opening the first memorial by a Japanese community to the excesses of Japanese actions in the Second World War. The people of Nōetsu were about to establish a memorial park on the site of a former POW camp in their town in Northern Honshu where 300 Australian soldiers captured at the fall of Singapore has been taken as POWs. The camp had treated the POWs very harshly. The Nōetsu monument is the only public monument in Japan to Australia's service in the Second World War people and reflects Japanese acknowledgement of the humanitarian manner their POWs had been treated by Australia at the interned camp in Cowra. As I stood at the opening of this Japanese memorial, I heard one of the Australian ex-POWs forgive their former captors and listened to the testimony of a widow of a guard executed as a war criminal. After 50 years of being shunned by her community, the widow said she could now 'live in the community because the Australians had provided their forgiveness'. This was an example of military duty in bringing communities together and healing the tragedy of war.

12 Alan Behm, former Assistant Secretary International Policy, Defence, private interview. Canberra. 19 January 2019. 7 I earned the Conspicuous Service Cross (the highest ADF peacetime military honour) for my work on the A-JDSR.13

0.3 Publications and writings

I include two published papers in my portfolio with relevance to, and informing the thesis. These papers were the culminating graduation requirements required by two overseas professional military development institutions I attended while in military service. While this thesis is part of a corpus for consideration in the PhD by Portfolio program, I have written it in the format of a stand-alone traditional-length thesis. This was agreed at my colloquium to allow me to do justice to the chosen topic. These previously published papers are described below.

0.3.1. 1989 Air War College Paper—Defence Capability defined from National Strategy

The Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal , tasked me in 1988 to write a paper defining future RAAF Force Structure from first principles when I was on the year-long USAF Air War College course. My paper was completed in 1989 and was published by the USAF.14 My tasking had come just after the release of the seminal 1986 Dibb Report and subsequent 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper which had made significant changes in Australian defence posture. My paper sought to inject a rational planning process in developing Defence policy and correct a deficiency in long-term planning for the ADF. There was at that time, no authoritative and unifying long-range planning and guidance for ADF or RAAF force development. The then-extant process of force development was single Service-focused and weapon platform-based. The three Services were effectively in conflict with each other and with Defence's force structure development process. My paper drew on then-unpublished work by the RAND Corporation.15 It defined fundamental national security principles that described the necessary defence outputs that met national security goals.16 The paper defined a theoretical model of hierarchically linked relationships between overarching defence objectives and subordinate components and

13 A DASA successor, Colonel Time Gellel, also won the Conspicuous Service Cross for his work on the A-JDSR. 14 Peter McDermott, ‘Definition of a Process for Determining an Appropriate Force Structure for the Air Element of the ADF.’ USAF Air University Press. August 1989. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA217267 15 The theoretical basis was first defined in 1989 in: Edward Warner et al., ‘The USAF in Support of U.S. National Security: Linking Strategy, Tasks, and Programs,’ WD-3575-1-AF. Prepared for USAF by RAND Corporation. 16 An example of a military output at an operational level would be ‘to defeat enemy air attack’. 8 used these to define a rational force structure. The weapon-system-agnostic process later became embedded in Australian defence policy purposes as the 'Capability Development' process.17 My 1989 paper was the first academic paper18 that linked force structure to national security needs through the capability development process.19

0.3.2. 1995 NIDS Paper–-Asia-Pacific Security Frameworks

I wrote a paper on Asia-Pacific Security Frameworks as the culmination of my NIDS study. The Japanese Government used it to inform their new process for military-to-military engagement with countries other than the United States. 20 It provided a template for developing the A-JDSR by defining a concept of regional security architecture based on using confidence-building measures to support a military power and security engagement model. There were three parts: the contribution of military power to national security; a proposal for a regional security architecture; and cooperative opportunities for Japan and Australia to build a stronger A-JDSR. This paper formed my first iteration of a theoretical basis for describing the development of the A-JDSR and merits exposition here as part of this later thesis. It first expounded my conceptual model of a regional security structure for the region. My NIDS paper is a foundational and integral part of my current thesis.

The contribution of military power to national security. Military power is one component of national security policy. It is the most important guarantor of security when other policy components have failed to achieve national goals. The purpose of military power is to allow the State to provide for its defence. My NIDS paper's statement addressed military power's functions or modes, defining three elements: Deterrence, Compellance and Reassurance.21 Deterrence is the potential application of military power that serves to deter others who oppose a nation's (or nations') interests. Compellance is the actual employment of military power to force hostile states to cease or change their actions. Reassurance uses military power to engage others through peacetime military activities such as humanitarian

17 The USAF adopted the ‘Strategies to Tasks’ concept in its planning process in 1993 as part of its Modernization Planning Conference. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR300.pdf. 18 Publication was in hard copy to selected institutions. This was pre-internet days so it was posted by USAF in 2021. 19 Advised to me in 1999 by the Director-General Capability Planning when the ADF established Capability Development Division. 20 Said by JDA Defense Counsellor Hiroshi Ishizuki in 1997. The Chinese and Russian Defence Attaché s also told me that their countries had used my published paper as a basis for their building of their own defence relations with Japan. 21 Construct of renowned military strategist, Sir Michael Howard, as quoted by Admiral Macke, CINCPAC, Royal United Services Institute National Seminar ‘Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific Towards 2001’, Canberra, 21 September 1994. RUSI National Seminar Proceedings, Vol 15, No 1, November 1994, p. 47. 9 assistance and response, high-level dialogue, and a wide range of other confidence-building measures.

Model—international regimes and military power. My 1995 NIDS paper proposed a three- tiered model for regional security architecture. Harding had previously proposed this tiered model a year before, but of differing structure. He had considered in his model that the best approach to build what Howard called Reassurance was to use various channels for discussion of region-wide issues in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. In my 1995 model, I argued dialogue and military engagement could continue at a pace suitable to regional nations by building a three-tiered regional security framework.22 Using the terminology of the time, these tiers would be: the formal alliances and associated diplomatic, political, trade and economic underpinnings; regional security fora and cooperative security action; and a more comprehensive collective institutionalised framework of alignments between participants in this proposed three-level regional security architecture.

My paper resonated with the contemporary US Defence Department's East Asia Security Review,23 which reaffirmed US commitment to Japan and the strength of the 'hub and spokes' alliance system.24 My model suggested that the US Pacific alliances would form a base foundation upon which a second and third tier could be built to supplement, but not replace, the foundational 'hub-and-spoke' alliance base. The middle tier could be the linkages (bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral) that act as braces between the spokes. The top tier would be multilateral security institutions promoting confidence and security-building measures and norms for resolving disputes through peaceful means. An expectation was that this would result in establishing an inclusive organisation promoting transparency in policy and action.25 This model, modified to match changes in the security environment since 1995, allied with military power theory, informs my conclusions for a proposed regional security framework advanced in Chapter 6.2.

22 H. Harding. ‘Prospects for Cooperative security Arrangements for the Asia-Pacific Region’. Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIII, No.3, Fall 1994. 23 Joseph S Nye Jr., Office of the Secretary for Defense, US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1995. Nye was then US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs. 24 Tako Sabata, ‘Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007.’ University Press of America, 5 June 2010, p. 264. 25 Stuart Woodman, ‘Waiting for Godot? The Challenge of Asia-Pacific Security in the 1990s’, p. 10. ‘National concerns over sovereignty must be addressed when proposing transparency. Even exchanges of surveillance and intelligence information may be seen as tantamount to spying on each other.’ 10 Collaborative A-JDSR opportunities. My NIDS paper proposed specific cooperative action that Australia and Japan could take under my proposed three-tiered model for mutual and regional benefit. Extending beyond the list of practical activities described above these were: the establishment of a joint Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) study and education centre; the sharing of image-based intelligence; Japan's use of Australian defence weapons ranges; joint maritime and air operations, 26 the development of maritime safety databases;27 and joint Defence Industry Cooperation.28 My 1995 paper called for Japan and Australia to work on this initiatives in conjunction with their shared alliance partner, the United States, presaging the introduction of the A-J-US Trilateral Strategic dialogue (TSD). The paper suggested the web of alliances radiating from a point centred on the United States would become more robust by cross reinforcing the spokes of the Pacific Alliance Wheel and further bolstering it through inclusive multilateral dialogue and consultation. My paper’s triangular relationship proposal—as the first cross-spoke in the foundational layer was an example of the second tier of my proposed regional security framework. The third layer was formed by dialogue in then-extant regional security dialogues.

0.3.3. 1999-2000 Director Strategic Planning and Military Strategy – Writings

I have also provided Deakin with a representative example of professional academic documents I wrote in the course of my military staff work. I initially wrote these documents in classified format for the senior Defence decision-making committee in Defence, the Chief of Defence Force Committee. For my portfolio I used redacted unclassified versions of this work, supplemented by contemporaneous notes. The Australian Military Strategy of 2000 I wrote for Defence drew on the models of military power mentioned previously. This year 2000 document resonates in contemporary Defence White Papers and still has broad utility for understanding ADF strategic principles. The 2000 Defence White Paper Strategy described these employment outcomes as: defeating attacks on Australia; defending Australia's regional interests; defending Australia's global interests; protecting national interests; and shaping the strategic environment.29 There are parallels between

26 The SDF has participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercises since 1976, stating that their participation in combined cooperative training is bilateral exercising with US forces concurrent with US forces exercising with regional allied forces. This political tactic is still used to describe JSDF participation in exercises with Australia. 27 Ball, op cit., pp.58-66. 28 Australian Government, ‘Defence Policy and Industry’, Report to the Minister of Defence, November 1992. p. 35. 29 Department of Defence, 2000 Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, Canberra. https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/wpaper2000.pdf 11 elements of the 2000 Australian Military Strategy I wrote and the military power concepts of Deterrence, Compellance, and Reassurance. As mentioned, these resonate with the extant policy as listed in the 2016 Defence White Paper and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update.

The Defeating Attacks on Australia strategy described how the ADF would defeat attacks on Australia. By elucidating its ability to do so, it reflects the use of deterrence and compellance postures for military forces.

The Defending Regional Interests strategy was also a compellance and deterrent posture acknowledging that in most cases Australia would operate in with its allies and other regional nations in defence of mutual interests–-the 'shared interest' basis of the current A-JDSR.

Australia would achieve its Defending Global Interests strategy by supporting international deterrence and positive leadership roles of the United Nations and the United States and its allies and partners in preserving international peace and security. If supports re-assurance, deterrence and compellance modes of military power.

The Protecting National Interests strategy embraced a range of military support operations and activities short of war that must be carried out by the ADF to support other Government departments and agencies and protect Australian territory, resources, and citizens. This strategy includes humanitarian activities and contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

The fundamental concept of Defence's strategy for Shaping the Strategic Environment emphasised that Australia sought to be a secure nation within a secure region based on shared interests with our regional neighbours and other friends. The strategy was the primary shaping tool of the AMS and reflected the Australian Military's reassurant nature. The history of the A-JDSR since 1989 is an exemplar of this activity as it seeks to achieve security through shaping.

In traditional military theory, there is a trade-off between 'warning time', the amount of time needed to prepare for war and the level of preparedness at any given time. Military theory also addresses a continuum of threats and therefore, responses. Nations meet high-

12 level existential threats with a 'kinetic warfare' response involving the full and violent use of a nation's defence forces. States meet lesser threats with lesser responses, some not involving violence, and some by para-military agencies. More recently, 'gray-zone' warfare, involving cyber-attacks and the spreading of malicious disinformation has extended the warfare spectrum away from direct engagement. The ADF's framework of three military warfighting strategies acknowledges that across Australia's potential conflict continuum the amount of associated warning and the discretion of response varies. The building of possible collective security action in the A-JDSR is a long lead process that must be pursued with vigour if the current downturn in the global security decreases the warning time for national and coalition force preparedness. There is an inverse relationship between preparation and warning time. Building a strategic relationship takes time. In a crisis, with little warning time, it may be too late to build strategic relationships to the point where they provide genuine mutual security. The mutual building of capacity and capability within the A-JDSR will take time, especially where caution and mistrust exist.

The following chapters draw on the thoughts in this chapter and the work already published. As described above, the model of military power and the early description of a model for a regional security framework will be analysed through a historical perspective and drawn together for further development of A-JDSR.

13 Chapter One

Reconsidering the Australia-Japan defence and security relationship

1.0 Situation

Escalating competition has ended the post-Cold War (PCW) unipolar era of pax Americana and threatens the post-Second World War rules-based global order. A significant downturn in Northeast Asia's security poses new challenges for Indo-Pacific.30 This thesis explains the history behind, and discusses the evolution, of the A-JDSR and its utility in a PCW world. It will argue for a new framework that could enhance Australian and Japanese security and contribute to the stability in the Indo-Pacific region. It aligns with thinking by current Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) 31 Director, Peter Jennings, that Australia and Japan are the two ‘significant democratic countries in the region’ who can take the lead in developing a supplementary regional security framework.32 The proposed framework will be informal, pragmatic, and include like-minded nations committed to a goal of peace and stability.

The regional security status quo is marked by an economic, security, military, and ideological struggle between a resident superpower and a rising power. As examples, China’s ally, the DPRK is threatening Japan, the United States, and the region with existential threats of nuclear weapons; Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the pandemic infuriated China. Reacting to this inquiry call and other grievances, China took trade action against Australia. By the end of 2020, China had placed prohibitive import duties on, or restricted Australian sales to China of a range of imports from Australia. Industry Sectoral losses to Australia are predicted to be up to A$20 billion per year,

30 Karen Middleton. ‘Why Australia needs a Southeast Asia Step-up’. Australian Foreign Affairs, October 2020. Since 2013, Australia has been using the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in place of ‘Asia-Pacific’ reflecting a wider area of strategic interest. The term was re-defined by Minister Stephen Smith and DFAT Secretary Peter Varghese. https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/afa/blind-spot/2537. 31 ASPI is ranked 12th in the world amongst defence and international security think tanks. See ASPI TACTICs #1 2017, citing University of Pennsylvania's Global Go to Think Tank Index for 2016, released January 2017 32Peter Jennings, CEO, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Private interview, 31 December 2019. 14 although overall aggregate trade is little changed.33 Australia and other states are concerned about Chinese challenges to regional security and lack of adherence to a rule-based global world order.

Colonial and federated Australia has relied on the security assurances in alliances and other commitments for its sovereign security. From colonial beginnings in the late 18th Century to the Second World War Australians looked to ‘the Mother Country’, Great Britain. The Australian Government sought strategic protection from the United States only after the British military collapse in Southeast Asia in 1942 and in the face of the Japanese military thrust into the Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War in 1972 ended almost 100 years of Australian involvement in British and American military campaigns until further participation in the US-led Gulf War in 1991. Even before the end of the Vietnam campaign, Australia’s forward defence posture had begun a transition to ‘defence-in-depth’ of the Australian mainland. The withdrawal of the British east of Suez, the end of the volatile Sukarno era in Indonesia in 1965, the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in Guam in 1969 and a relatively benign near region after the end of the Vietnam War contributed by the early 1970s to a shift away from military engagement in the region. However, both the Whitlam and Fraser governments enhanced other elements of regional engagement with Asia.

By the mid-1980s Australia’s strategic posture shifted back to engagement with its region. Australian strategist, Alan Dupont, observed that ‘Australia has traditionally defined its security interests in terms of military threats to the nation’s territorial integrity and sovereignty’. He noted that after the 1986 Dibb Report, Review of Australia’ Defence Capabilities,34 Australian had accepted Southeast Asia and the South Pacific as its sphere of primary strategic interest’. He also emphasised that Northeast Asia (NEA) was also critical to Australia’s security.35 In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a quickening of interest in Australia for Japan's closer engagement. Simultaneously, while relying on the post- Second World War US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (US-JMST). Japan started to engage

33 Jane Golley, ‘Australia-China Relations: The Great Debate’, The Diplomat, 1 April 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/australia-china-relations-the-great-debate/ 34 Australian Government. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. ‘Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities.’ Parliamentary Paper No. 163/1986. 3 June 1986. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tabledpapers/HPP032016004265/upload_pdf/HPP032016 004265.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22publications/tabledpapers/HPP032016004265%22 35 Alan Dupont. ‘Australia's security interests in Northeast Asia’, Policy paper. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 84, (1991). 15 with regional neighbours, such as Australia, to hedge its security.36

This thesis discusses the rise of China and Australia’s changing strategic posture in response. Does China's rise constitute a threat to Australia’s security? This thesis will discuss how concern over possible US disengagement from region will create implications for Australia and Japan. These recent challenges shaped the Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, the second most recent, although the Morrison Government issued a Strategic Update in mid-2020. Dibb argues that Australia again faces the prospect for the first time in generations of the rise of a ‘dominant power adversary with whom we do not share fundamental values, operating in our neighbourhood and capable of threatening us with high-intensity conflict.’ Such a prospect means that Australia must plan to expand the ADF and its capability and capacity to engage, if necessary, in sustained high-intensity conflict.37 Former Director-General of the Office of National Assessment, Allan Gyngell observes that the two previous global systems ended in war. This one, he says, ‘seems to be draining away, as its core components led by the United States lose confidence in its purpose, and

38 emerging powers see opportunities to assert their interests.’

Australian strategic commentators have offered a range of views about the implications of the rise of China. China’s emergence as a hegemon is changing the nature of power balance in Australia’s region. Director of the Australian National Security College, Rory Medcalf argued in 2020 that there is no longer a necessity to accept China's inevitable imposition of dominance over Australia. He asserts, ‘Australia wants Chinese regional dominance prevented, but not in ways that bring a war or economic breakdown.’39 In 2018, prominent strategist and former Defence Deputy Secretary Paul Dibb considered China's rise in the context of international competition. He said: ‘The [Trump] White House is undermining the international order, has started a trade war with China and the EU, and is threatening the unity of NATO. At the same time, China and Russia are becoming increasingly assertive.40

36 Minxin Pei, Director, Keck Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, USA. Asia Society conference, 1 November 2018. https://asiasociety.org/xi-jinping, 37 Paul Dibb, ‘Why we need a radically new defence policy’, The Strategist, ASPI, 29 September 2018. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-we-need-a-radically-new-defence-policy/ 38 Allan Gyngell. 'Fear of Abandonment: Australia’s Response to Changing Global Orders'. RUSI-UK Presentation, 28 June 2018. https://www.rusi.org/event/gallipoli-memorial-lecture-fear-abandonment-australia’s-response-changing- global-orders 39 Rory Medcalf, Contest for the IP: why China won’t map the future, Latrobe University Press, 2020. p. 158. 40 Paul Dibb, ‘New security reality demands new Australian policy’, The Strategist, ASPI, 23 July 2018. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-security-reality-demands-new-australian-policy/ 16 In January 2018, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis proclaimed that interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, was now the primary concern for US national security. He said the central challenge to US prosperity and security was the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by China and Russia's revisionist powers, which want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian models.41

American disengagement from the Indo-Pacific region is improbable. The new Biden administration has flagged that it will work to rebuild its strategic partnerships and alliance42 Commentators are urging the White House to replace the Trump administration’s focus on regional burden-sharing with an emphasis on ‘joint force planning’ with regional nations to build a cooperative mix of deterrence and military capability that the United States and its security partners need.43 Australia recognises this, with the 2017 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) White Paper saying that: ‘An important part of the Government’s strategy is to continue to strengthen our alliance with the US as well as our other regional and international partnerships, to meet shared security challenges such as the pervasive threat of terrorism.’44

Japan has also reacted dramatically to changed power balances and ominous strategic circumstances in the 21st Century. In Japan, long accustomed to relying on the US-JMST, a more assertive defence policy stance has emerged. In 2015 in his second term as Prime Minister Shinzō Abe crafted a new security policy for Japan that included re-interpreting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. This re-interpretation and amendment empowered the JSDF to re-structure to meet new strategic threats.45 However, his successor Yoshihide Suga may find that building a majority in both houses of the Diet to change the Japanese Constitution more fundamentally for Japanese self-defence may be a ‘bridge too far’.46 But

41 US 2018 National Defense Strategy of the USA: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. November 2017. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf 42 Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World. White House release. 4 February 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas- place-in-the-world/ 43 The Biden Transition and Reshaping U.S. Strategy: Replacing ‘Burden Sharing’ with Meaningful Force Planning. Centre for Strategic Studies and International Studies. 11 January 202. Anthony H. Cordesman. https://www.csis.org/analysis/biden-transition-and-reshaping-us-strategy-replacing-burden-sharing-meaningful-force 44 DFAT White Paper, op. cit. p. 9. 45 Shigeru Iwasaki, General, Chairman Joint Staff Council, JSDF 2012-14, private interview. 12 December 2018. Iwasaki was personal adviser to Prime Minister Abe on shaping public opinion on changing article 9. He has long been involved in the A-JDSR and was made an Officer in the Order of Australia on 26 March 2015 in recognition of his work on the A- JDSR. https://honours.pmc.gov.au/honours/awards/1154570 46 See Chapter 5. 17 there is no doubt a significant change in defence and security posture has occurred: representing increased acceptance of JSDF legitimacy.47

Australia and Japan now face questions about their organising security principles due to the rise of China and the possible weakening of United States resolve to act as a global security provider. A question for the thesis is: how have these Australia and Japan come together since the 1960s and how might the strengthening of defence and security relations continue in the future?

There are other regional challenges from other nations: Russia and North Korea are prime among them. The threat from North Korea is existential from a Japanese perspective and threatening from the perspectives of other regional nations. The resurgence of Russia may also be a threat to regional stability. These threats will be addressed briefly in this thesis, but Chinese ascendancy and the disruption this forebodes will be the major issue affecting future of the A-JDSR.

1.1.1 Thesis structure overview.

The thesis complies with the PhD by Portfolio structure. It takes the form of a Portfolio that consists of two elements: a selection of reports, papers, and publications in media appropriate for the professional context (Chapter 2), and a substantial thesis informed by original research and the other folios. Although the program requires a only a supportive original thesis, the candidate, with Deakin’s approval, is submitting a traditional full-length thesis. The thesis component presents and develops research questions and argues several connected hypotheses supported by literature, empirical study, and ethnographic research. The folio is a coherent selection of work carried out by the candidate, not merely a collection of unrelated pieces. It includes original evidence, a critical account of methodology, a selective and critical review of relevant published research, and evidence of relevance to international defence and security relationships. It consists of a selection of research products that establish the candidate's claim to have researched at doctoral standard. A commentary in the Introduction integrates the folio components by explaining the connection between the folio and the thesis. Indeed, the folio constitutes unique

47 Iwasaki, op.cit. Abe tasked Iwasaki on his retirement from the JASDF to garner public support for changing Article 9 of the Constitution. 18 professional experience and original research related to the thesis topic where no other empirical data, or literature exist. This thesis focuses on the links between the politico/security and military/defence aspects of Australia and Japan's relationship, touching on economic and political issues only to explain backgrounds for security and military/defence history and analysis.

Military study relates to the use of military power in pursuit of the interests of the state. Security study relates to the policy issues that may result in the use of military force.48 The terms are not synonymous. Although this thesis describes the defence and security relationship, it draws distinctions between the two as security developments do not always result in military action, and vice versa.

The thesis discusses the extant literature on the A-JDSR in the context of a theoretical discussion on alliances, strategic dialogue, and the notion of alignment. Partially using personal experiences of self and other security practitioners, supplemented by a traditional literature review, the thesis component provides an history of the A-JDSR drawing on empirical evidence, discussion of extant literature and interviews. The ethnographic approach allows the candidate to pursue the reflexive practice being both a ‘subject and object of inquiry’.49 Partially using this approach, the candidate examines the strategic environment as it affects both Japan and Australia. History and strategic assessment chapters present the empirical bases of this thesis. These chapters are, in turn, the basis for developing a new concept of alignment between Australia and Japan compared to traditional alliance. This thesis concludes with a hypothesis on the future direction of the A-JDSR and the proposal of a regional security framework.

Governments rely on a range of measures, political, economic, military power, diplomacy, and other soft power to safeguard the nation-state's security. They may also act to build security conditions regionally and internationally by reducing transnational causes of insecurity, such as climate change, economic inequality, transmigration, political exclusion, and nuclear proliferation. This thesis considers that implementing national security includes all soft and hard elements of national power: diplomacy; social influence;

48 See: : Occasional Paper 001, Nick Bosio, April 2018. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/understanding_wars_theory.pdf 49 Brigg Morgan, and Roland Bleiker. ‘Autoethnographic International Relations: Exploring the Self as a Source of Knowledge.’ Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 3, 2010, pp. 779–798. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40783296?seq=1 19 industry; human capacity and potential; alliance and sub-alliance relationships; foreign aid and assistance; political strength; and national resources.

The candidate has been in a unique position to record the contribution of the A-JDSR to Australia’s and Japan’s security. He has held senior positions in strategic policy positions in the ADF and helped build A-JDSR foundations in Tokyo in the mid-1990s. A portfolio of works is presented separately that summarises the author’s professional experience and writings. This folio component represents advances in the ontology and epistemology of defence and security matters related to the A-JDSR. Their publication broke new ground in their respective military capability development areas and covered epistemological gaps in the definition of regional security architecture at the time of their publication.

1.2 Overarching problem and Context

This thesis argues that 20th Century security frameworks no longer accommodate new global challenges of the 21st Century. A middle power like Australia, long accustomed to the protection offered by the Australian New Zealand United States (ANZUS) security treaty, needs to comprehend these seismic shifts in great power relationships and bolster arrangements for its national security and economic survival. Defence Minister Linda Reynolds stated in 2019 that ‘Defence underestimated the speed at which the strategic outlook was changing across the Indo-Pacific’. She warned that a ‘dynamic, unpredictable mix of circumstances was posing fresh challenges’ noting that Defence was ensuring the ADF had the capability to meet new threats, amid the changing relationship between the United States and China, and the rapid development of new military technology, strategies

.50 and policies

It is possible that the United States and China can accept each other’s role and position in global economic matters, if not their ideological positions. But Australia must consider what this means for its economic prosperity and national security. The 2017 DFAT White Paper states: ‘Economic growth in Asia continues to re-shape our strategic landscape.’51

50 Ben Packham. ‘Statement by Linda Reynolds, Defence Minister at Pacific 2019 Maritime Expo in Sydney.’ The Australian, 7 October 2019. 51 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2017 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper, 2017. p. 27. 20 Australian strategist Hugh White believes that our region faces a significant threat saying: ‘The US-led order is fading, and China has become ever more powerful.’52

Michael Shoebridge considers that the United States will not ‘accept the costs and risks of trying to prevent China from dominating East Asia’ because ‘America’s security does not depend on this’. He added: ‘America does not have the resolve to fight a war with China that might involve nuclear weapons, while China’s leaders do [have that resolve].’ Shoebridge argues further that the risks to Australia are real. Australia must not acquiesce to a view shared in the region where cognoscenti in Southeast Asia believe China wants to be the dominant power in Asia. 53 Only nine per cent of opinionmakers in Southeast Asia think that China would be a ‘benign hegemon’. The level of regard for China in Australia has also fallen significantly. The 2020 annual poll of attitudes by the Lowy Institute poll shows that less than 25 per cent of adult Australians trust China either ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to act responsibly in the world–compared with a little over one-half in 2018, with the same lower figure expressing confidence that President Xi Jinping will do ‘the right thing’ in world affairs. 54 Australians’ view of the US indicates that about one-half trust the US to act responsibly globally, but this figure is still 30 per cent lower than the Obama-induced high of 2009.

Japan and Australia have separate alliance arrangements with the United States. The formalisation of the third leg of a triangle, with the United States, Australia, and Japan at the vertices, can only strengthen extant alliances. The strengthening can be more substantial if Australia and Japan supplement this triangle with new, reliable, and effective multi-national frameworks. Japanese scholar Eiichi Katahara55 views Australia and Japan as two key ‘maritime spokes’ that will buttress an American alliance system otherwise increasingly pressed by rapid and comprehensive power shifts in Asia.’56

The trajectory of the A-JDSR indicates that Japan and Australia are putting in place some, but not yet all elements of a traditional alliance. These elements: are political statements of

52 Hugh White, Without America—Australia in the New Asia: ANU Quarterly Essay 68 (November 2017). 53 Michael Shoebridge, senior analyst, Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI), China can’t discount America’s resolve in Asia. The Strategist, 6 July 2019. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/michael-shoebridge/ 54 The Lowy Institute’s poll of 2,448 Australian adults, Social Research Centre, (March 2020). https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/files/lowyinsitutepoll-2020.pdf 55 In accordance with 2020 GOJ guidelines, Japanese names are written with family name last. Chinese names follow the Asian tradition of family names first. 56 Katahara, Eiichi. 2012. In ‘Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: pp. 128-144. 21 mutual security interests; identification of shared values and interests; military exercises; a treaty-level agreement (the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)); and operational arrangements at the tactical level.57 The A-JDSR could be transformed into a stronger relationship with the characteristics of an alliance, given the necessary political will.

In early 2021, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) (comprising Australia, Japan, India, and the United States) was revitalised. The Biden administration gave strong emphasis to the QUAD as a demonstration of American resolve to return to a leadership role in the Indo-Pacific.58 The United may be back in the Indo-Pacific, and the QUAD might form part of a new regional security architecture.

The thesis aims to answer this main research question:

Can Australia and Japan better provide for their security by developing the A-JDSR into a pragmatic and more formalised security framework for their mutual benefit and to contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific region?

Elaborating on this, the thesis looks at the history of the relationship and examines how it has grown to be Australia’s second-busiest military relationship. It then looks to the future, noting security challenges and the adequacy of inter-nation agreements that may be needed if Australia and Japan are required to act collaboratively to defence national interests. A pragmatic view, based on realistic alliance theory, is used to define what degree of formalisation and institutionalisation is proposed that will allow for such action. A military power model is used as the basis for defining what a future A-JDSR can provide for regional security. The thesis concludes by making a pragmatic proposal for a regional security framework, separate from, but not dissociated from the US alliance network using the model of the A-JDSR.

The thesis tests this hypothesis through an analysis of historical development of the A- JSDR, including the evolving relationship between the JSDF and the ADF, and examines

57 ‘Reciprocal access agreement’ Media Statement by Prime Minister Morrison, 17 November 2020. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/reciprocal-access-agreement 58 White House Press Release, 12 March 2021. Remarks by President Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Modi of India, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Suga of Japan in the Virtual Quad Leaders’ Summit. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/12/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister- modi-of-india-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-suga-of-japan-in-virtual-meeting-of-the-quad/ 22 possibilities for future closer collaboration. This history of the A-JDSR describes how this laid the foundations for both countries and their defence forces to work with each other and their respective allies to promote regional and global security. This may include the possibility of future military action in pursuit of these objectives. The other test of the thesis is the collective wisdom of 94 senior Australian and Japanese security practitioners all of whom had, or currently exert, some influence over the A-JDSR.

Developments in the A-JDSR in the first three decades of the 21st Century support a positive response to the research question. Australia and Japan have made separate and joint declarations about the need to work together for regional security. The thesis validates an answer to the question by arguing for enhancement of these informal arrangements to formalised defence and security arrangements.

The thesis also finds that the United Nations Command (UNC) in Japan has close links with the A-JDSR. This finding is relevant because the UNC is likely to be involved in the conduct, or support of armed conflict in Northeast Asia. There is a connection between the UNC as a mechanism for Australia and Japan to conduct combined joint military operations in Northeast Asia to protect their sovereign security interests.

Looking to the future, the thesis tests the hypothesis further by exploring the need for practicality, risk mitigation, and examining options for enhancing the A-JDSR. It reviews the challenges for realizing this future and identifies obstacles such as: a need to review Japan’s Constitution or vary its interpretation; political and ideological opposition in Japan and Australia; the long-term impact of a revised US foreign policy; tensions between Japan, China, Australia, the United States and other regional countries; and American and Chinese responses to closer defence and security relations between Australia and Japan.

1.3 Literature Review

There is a great deal of published scholarly material on security aspects of the A-JDSR, and much more on the politico-security relationships between these two countries and others in the region. No-one has written a comprehensive work on the linkages between the political and security issues in the relationship between Australia and Japan and the parallel development of the military and defence relationship. NIDS academic Tomohiko

23 Satake, separately, and in conjunction with another academic, John Hemmings59 has made a valuable contribution to the literature in describing the politico/security aspects of A- JDSR. Hemmings’ literature search for his 2017 thesis on the trilateral nature of the A- JDSR and the United States also adds much to the literature.60 An important adjunct to the bilateral A-JDSR has been the development of a Trilateral Strategic dialogue (TSD), the US-Japan-Australia trilateral. This is also well covered in the literature: to name a few, Purnendra Jain61, Aurelia George Mulgan62, Takashi Terada63, and Nina Silove64. These are all important contributions to the security relationship between Australia and Japan. But there is another history to be recorded and brought to light—the defence and military history. In terms of contemporaneity, much has happened in Indo-Pacific since those valuable contributions were made, and the update on strategic issues this thesis makes is relevant.

Further, there are gaps in the material published on pure defence and military aspects of the A-JDSR. For example, Satake said that he was unable to find in his research what caused CDF Gration to visit Tokyo in 1989.65 Commentators have also asked whether there was a link between the 2007 declaration on security cooperation, and preceding events. Does that 2007 declaration reflect what is now going on in military cooperation in the A- JDSR? Why did the development of defence and security relationship lag long behind a rapid buildup in economic linkages? Why did Australia offer to provide force protection to the JSDF when on peace-keeping operations? This thesis answers these questions from the point of view of those who made these decisions and participated in carrying them out.

Traditionally, scholarly writing on security focuses on political aspects and governmental roles in state security development. When security issues are addressed in the defence

59 Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings. ‘Japan–Australia security cooperation in the bilateral and multilateral contexts’, International affairs Vol. 4, (Oxford University Press 2018). 60 John Hemmings Quasi-Alliances, Managing the Rise of China, and Domestic Politics: The US-Japan-Australia Trilateral—1991-2015. PhD Thesis, London School of Economics. London, January 2017. 61 Purnendra Jain and John Bruni, ‘Japan, Australia, and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2004), pp.265-285; Purendra Jain, ‘Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its Challenges,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 4, (2006), pp.521-535. 62Aurelia Mulgan, ‘Breaking the Mould: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism, ‘Contemporary SEA, Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 30, Number 1, April 2008, pp.52-72. 63 Inoguchi in ‘Evolution of the Australia- Japan Security Partnership: Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance with the United States?’ ed. Takashi Terada, ((New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) pp.217-232. 64 Nina Silove. ‘The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia, International Security, Vol.40, No.4 (Spring 2016). 65 Tomohiko Satake, private interview, Tokyo, 28 February 2019. 24 literature, there is a focus on the processes leading to military action. 66 In short, as Clausewitz said, ‘the exercise of military power is determined by a state’s security policy, and ultimately by political policy’.67

The thesis is deliberately not based on theory or theoretical concepts: it draws its credibility from direct observation, original sources, and insights by practitioners—those involved in the process of building the A-JDSR and therefore best placed to explain what happened, and why? The candidate does accept that some theory is necessary to demonstrate competence and to explain conclusions drawn, but this is subordinated to recording and analysis of primary sources. This thesis looks at the question of whether the A-JDSR may develop into some form of an alliance, so the bases for alignment and alliances are examined from a range of literature, predominantly by Walt, Cha, and Wilkins. It is important to look at theoretical bases of a possible alliance because there is a division in the national security community on this issue. Jain and Bruni said in 2004, reflecting likely Chinese criticism, that ‘there is ‘genuine concern by the Japanese, Australian, and United States governments not to be seen to be developing any formalised and open alliance.’68 Conversely, Thomas Wilkins, argues that the US-Japan- Australia trilateral is a ‘virtual alliance’ as suggests we rethink views of traditional alliances.69 The thesis addresses the concept of a virtual alliance and similar alignments in detail in Chapter 6.

This chapter looks at the International Relations view of alliances in the literature. Alliances are part of a spectrum of aligning relationships between states. While acknowledging that traditional alliances often identify threats, all forms of alignments have a general deterrent effect because they (usually) formally and publicly state how partners share the interests and expectations of each other, allowing inferences to be drawn they may be prepared to act to defend shared values and interests. Only a traditional alliance with declarations of an identified threat and assured mutual obligation is fully normative in a formal sense. Notably, there have been no new traditional alliances with mutual reciprocity since the Sino-DPRK pact was struck in 1961.70 Few formal alliances are extant with expressions of mutual reciprocity. 71 Traditional alliances tend to focus solely on the military dimension of

66 ‘Harvey M Sapolsky, Caitlin Talmadge, US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy, p. 9. 67 ‘Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Peter Paret, Michael Howard (Princeton University Press, 1984). 68 Brad Williams, Andrew Newman in Japan, Australia, and Asia Pacific Security, eds. Purnendra Jain and John Bruni. Chapter; American Acolytes. (Routledge, 2006) p. 96. 69 Thomas S. Wilkins, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (2011), pp.115-155. 70 Does China’s Alliance Treaty With North Korea Still Matter? The Diplomat, July 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/does-chinas-alliance-treaty-with-north-korea-still-matter/ 71 The ANZUS alliance is an example of a treaty without formal expression of mutual reciprocity. The US-JMST is another as it obliges only one party (the United States) to defend the other (Japan). 25 international politics. The A-JDSR and similar alignments are wider and encompass political, economic, military, and security connections.

In this thesis, the terms ‘strategic partnership’, ‘quasi alliance’, ‘latent alliance’ and virtual alliance’ are used. The preceding terms need to be defined for this thesis before we can adequately define the locus of the A-JDSR and possible future formalization. The term ‘quasi alliance’ is used in Japan to define ‘almost an alliance’ without specifying what needs to be taken further. Some Australian interviewees did not like the term as it implies that there is an almost-complete alliance in the traditional form. The term ‘latent alliance’ has a similar connotation of being a conventional alliance-in-progressing. No matter how phrased, both terms are likely to be seen by China as threatening or at least indicative of some form of containment. ‘Virtual alliance’ has a strong pragmatic ring to it, with a similar meaning describing what may be said to be virtually an alliance without stating so.

The strategic partnership that is the A-JDSR is a new form of alignment fitting within: Wilkins’ spectrum of alignments; Cossa’s criterion for a strategic alignment; and Tow’s criterion for a virtual alliance’. All those definitions are representative of contemporary pragmatic arrangements of middle powers hedging against a possible loss of security guarantees from a mutual ally. Nagy describes it as a construct of neo-middle-power diplomacy using foreign policy to shape the region by collective capabilities and capacities. He says that the new approach focuses on normative or issue-based advocacy such as maritime security, surveillance, HA/DR, and joint transits.72

Satake states that fears in Japan and Australia over the potential decline of United States regional dominance caused both countries to consider a need for a ‘redefinition of the US- Japan and US-Australia alliances.’ These fears have caused both countries to review their alliances due to a ‘systemic change in nature and role from a traditional bilateral defence arrangement to one that focuses on addressing regional and global security problems.’73 Mulgan and others consider that the Australia and Japan security relationship is a real change in Japanese security policymaking given its security reliance on the United States.

72 Stephen R Nagy. Maritime Cooperation between Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific, (working paper, Pacific Forum, March 2020): pp. 1–6. 73 Tomohiko Satake, ‘The Origins of Trilateralism? The US-Japan-Australia Security Relations in the 1990s,’ International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 11, (2015), pp.1-28. 26 This study is important for those engaged in proposing security frameworks for regional stability. It examines the history behind the current state of relations between Australia and its second-most important military partner. It provides a basis for understanding the past and future locus of the A-JDSR in the context of creating new policy, new structures, and new activities to provide for mutual, regional, and global security.

1.3.1. Networked Security – led by the United States

In 2016, US government officials endorsed a ‘networked security’ concept for American alliances in Asia. Touted most prominently by then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and reported by Heazle and O’Neil, the approach involved efforts by the United States to encourage ties among the partners with whom it already shares security treaty commitments. In the face of China’s rise and challenge to US primacy, defined as an unrivalled political, economic and military influence, this was an effort to multilateralise the existing hub and spokes alliance system in Asia. The Obama administration’s networked security concept was an acknowledgement that this alliance structure called for some twenty-first-century renovations by the United States and its partners, given that China was starting to match their collective capabilities. The thesis discusses similarities between the concepts of ‘networked security’ and ’containment’. 74

1.3.2. Beginnings of the end of Hub-and-spoke

Japanese security analyst Sahashi argued in 2009 that a new conceptualisation of regional security arrangements was necessary. He described a three-tier approach that adjudicates between the limitations inherently grounded in bilateral strategic interactions (the 1st tier), weak region-wide and global arrangements (the 3rd tier). This process would lead to an increase of 2nd tier needs-based functional security arrangements in contemporary Asia- Pacific security politics. 75 The candidate proposed a similar construct 14 years previously in 1995 in a NIDS article.76

74 Mira Rapp-Hooper in ‘China's Rise and Australia-Japan-US Relations: Primacy and Leadership in East Asia’ Michael Heazle and Andrew O'Neil eds. (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2018). p89. 75 Ryo Sahashi, ‘Conceptualising the Three-Tier Approach to Analyse the Security Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific’. ANU, 2009. http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/1869/conceptualising-three-tier-approach-analyse- security 76 Peter McDermott. ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Security Framework: Cooperative Opportunities for Japan and Australia’. The Journal of National Defense, Tokyo., Vol 23, No 3, January 1996. 27

Regional institutions have not functioned well in the Asia-Pacific security realm. The Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping founded in 1989, ARF (formed in 1994) and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS) formed in 2005 have not achieved notable outcomes in satisfying emerging security imperatives in the region77.

A core problem in Asia-Pacific multilateral security politics in the past was a lack of leadership underwriting its development. Neither China nor any other member of ASEAN is ready to assume strong leadership on regional multilateralism. China still equates multilateral security politics with the promotion of doctrine that emphasises the marginalisation of American, and, by extension, Japanese, power in East Asia. To overcome this lack of regional security leadership, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed establishing in 2008 an Asia Pacific Community initiative. He observed a ‘brittleness in a foreign policy based only on bilateral relations.’ Rudd envisaged an alternative institution, including the United States, Japan, China India, Indonesia, and the other states of the region for ‘better engaging in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation, and economic and political matters and future challenges.’78 Following strong opposition from ASEAN countries, the project did not eventuate.

Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic cooperation provides an example of multilateral needs-based security cooperation. The Japanese and Australian Governments have enhanced their bilateral security cooperation through their shared peace-building experiences in Cambodia and East Timor, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and Iraq. In March 2007, they signed a formal declaration for bilateral security cooperation and upgraded their collaboration through the TSD mentioned above. This thesis examines the interplay between bilateral inter-national relations, trilateral arrangements, multilateral organisation, and multiple, pragmatics, ad hoc arrangements that enable states to build alignments with others to achieve mutual security. The next sections describe how these concepts are used as a basis to define a model of collaborative cooperative action.

https://www.academia.edu/36898894/ASIA_PACIFIC_REGIONAL_SECURITY_FRAMEWORKS 77 This is expanded up on in Chapter 5.4.1 78 Australian Government. Parliamentary Library. Research Paper ‘Australia’s proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community: issues and prospects’ Frank Frost, Canberra, 1 December 2009. https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2009- 10/10rp13.pdf. 28 1.4 Significance of Research

This thesis contributes to scholarly research by the addition of context in the form of recording hitherto unpublished documents and insights. These were drawn by the candidate from original and unpublished records of transcripts of people engaged in developing the A-JDSR. This thesis contributes to the body of public knowledge by filling an epistemological gap in the published knowledge of the A-JDSR. By examining public and non-public primary source documents, the candidate gives an analysis of the historical nature of the relationship from an insider’s perspective.

The thesis shows how developing a robust and dependable military relationship with Japan adds to Australia’s national security. The A-JDSR strengthens regional security and the defence of mutual interests by the deterrence it offers and the mutual trust it engenders as it positively shapes the region. It provides an opportunity to develop the interoperability for mutual military preparedness that would allow them to cooperate militarily for peaceful preparedness and conflict despite current impediments.

The construct of relating national security principles to military power in the context of the A-JDSR is touched on in the literature as written by security commentators. This relationship between security and military action described under a military power model is mostly absent from the literature. This thesis aims to fill that gap.

This thesis contributes two areas of novation: the analysis of (previously classified) formal correspondence between Canberra and the Australian Embassy in Tokyo (from after the Second World War to 2000)79 ; and the recollection and insights of practitioners and policymakers in the A-JDSR. This thesis’ recording of A-JDSR history provides security practitioners interviewed with due recognition of their work.

79 Australian government documents were released to the public in mid-2020 at the candidate’s request under the ‘20- year rule’. These addressed the formal government record as maintained by DFAT from 29 1.5 Theoretical Concepts

The thesis uses these theoretical concepts: great power relationships and their trajectory in the 21st Century;80 changes in regional frameworks and their utility for sovereign national security; and the effect of global economics on security relationships between nations—a tendency for states to revert to military options to secure access to resources or to seek ‘living-space’.81 It also demonstrates how personal involvement by those working in the relationship effected changes.

The thesis draws on the bases of alignment theory and traditional alliance theory including issues such as formal trilateral arrangements. It also addresses the possibility of formal alliances and less formal extant relationships being replaced or supplemented by new security frameworks.82 In the empirical chapters of this thesis, realism concepts of great power relationships are applied to explain how the trajectory of the A-JDSR changed over time. The thesis critically reviews the relevance of this alliance theory, and drawing inferences from interviews, define what the present and future nature the A-JDSR will take. Realism views of great power relationships are drawn on to propose possible future security architecture. The more critical part of this thesis will answer the quo vadis of the A- JDSR by proposing a conceptual framework defined by concepts of mutual security and relationship-building and some elements of classical and neo-classical realism using this to determine a locus for the trajectory of the A-JDSR.

1.5.1. A Realism Approach to International Relations is used to explain alliance theory.

In 1998, Stephen M Walt examined three theoretical models to understand the development of policy frameworks for International Relations. These were: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. He considered that ‘realism remains the most compelling general framework for understanding international relations’. He added the end of the cold war did

80 Haas, Mark L. ‘Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics’ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), pp. 225-232. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501732461-010 81 Japan, in the inter world war years, considered it needed access to the resources of Siberia (and Manchukuo) for the mobilisation of its economy’ p. 48. ‘Japan’s Siberian Intervention, 1918-1922’. Paul Dunscomb, Lexington Books, 2012. 82 ‘A security architecture can be conceived of as ‘an overarching, coherent and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-derived area, which… achieves its security objectives.’ See: Tow and Taylor, ‘The changing East Asian Security Landscape’ (Stefan Frohlich and Howard Loewen, Springer, 2017), p. 24. 30 not bring the end of power politics, and ‘realism is likely to remain the single most useful instrument in our intellectual toolbox.’83

The thesis explores the A-JDSR in the context of an alliance that can be used as an exemplar for others to follow in developing mutual and regional security. The theory of alliances is discussed here, and contextually in more detail in Chapter 6. As described later, alliances are pragmatic arrangements with the establishment due more to statecraft and sovereign state interests, rather than the manifestation of underlying theoretical concepts. Also as described below, an appreciation of alliances rests on a Realist approach.

This thesis adopts the Realist approach to international relations as the conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis and is based on the following Realist propositions. As described by academic Jack Donnelly a Realism approach is based on the following principles. First, the global system is anarchic. There is no supranational body that governs relationships between states and interaction between states comes about by states independently acting in their interests, with the international system existing in a state of constant tension. Second, states are the most important actors. Third, all states within the system are unitary rational actors pursuing self-interest. Fourthly, the primary concern of all states is survival and to build up military potential to survive. Donnelly argues that ‘Realism is not a theory defined by an explicit set of assumptions and propositions. Realism is an approach to international relations that has emerged gradually through the work of a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, and thus delimited, a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis. Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. 84 Prominent Realist and political analyst John Mearsheimer reminds us that ‘the international system is “anarchical”, always will be, and ‘great powers have little choice but to act according to realist dictates’.85 Compare the Realism approach to its alternative: liberalism, with these principles: a rejection of power politics as the outcome of international relations questioning the security principles of realism; accentuation of the intrinsic benefits of international cooperation;

83 Walt, Stephen M, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, Spring 1998. p 43. 84 Jack Donnelly in ‘The Ethics of Realism’, in Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 150. 85 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/mark-beeson/ Book review, 8 July 2019. 31 and a basis of an altruistic view of international cooperation using international organisations and non-state actors to shape state actions and policy.86

This thesis uses the tenets of realism to build on inferences and observations drawn from A-JDSR historiography. These observations demonstrate that although there is support for multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, only pragmatic and realistic issues define lasting relations between states because they are firmly grounded in sovereign self- interest. The thesis also draws upon the following two theoretical perspectives. First, a description of A-JDSR history drawing in theory defining security relationships between nations. Second, an explanation of the roles of the great global and regional powers in determining relations between countries, especially second-tier powers such as Australia and Japan. Attention is paid to extant alliances and regional frameworks as bases for a pragmatic security architecture. The thesis includes an eclectically informed forecast on the future A-JDSR development.

1.5.2. Realist view of National Security

National security is traditionally associated with the defence of the sovereign nation-state. This national view contrasts with that the security of an individual within that nation-state or associated with it.87 The state-centric approach to national security is one born out of recent historical evolution. A historically contingent relationship illustrates the dominance of traditional national security approaches on the practices of national security. There is a considerable difference behind the semantically similar ‘traditional national security’ and ‘national security’ (which refers to protecting a state). The similarity belies very different concepts. The former refers to an academic tradition that analytically privileges the State and the military, whereas the latter refers to state security practice. Walt observed that ‘traditional national security’ (security studies as used in this thesis) was the ‘study of the threat, use, and control of military force’. Its relationship to international relations was that ‘it fits comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm’.88

1.5.3. Alliance theory - basis

86 Shiraev, Eric B, International Relations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). p. 78. 87 The concept of Responsibility to Protect addresses individual protection for members of the nation-state and to other people to whom the nation-state wishes to extend human security. 88 Walt, S.M. in ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 35(2), pp. 211–39. 32

Important work on the general subject of alliance theory has been done by Glenn H Snyder and Walt. Snyder considered that although there is much in the literature on specific alliances, there is a general lack of work on the issue of theoretical analysis of alliances. Snyder argues that alliances are part of a larger grouping "alignment”—'mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other's support in disputes or wars with particular other states.’ He picks out ‘formal alliances’ which strengthen alignments by their ‘specificity, legal and normative obligations and (in modern times) their public visibility.’ To this end, an alliance agreement is essentially a joint declaration, a mutual promise to act in a specified way. Such declaration ‘communicate future intentions, changing others' expectations in both alliance and adversary relations.’ Snyder also notes that alliance theory needs to consider delineation of alliances to determine how to categorise alliances within the broader construct of associations between states.89

Long-term writers on alliance theory, Kegley and Raymond, commented on the effects of alliances in preserving peace. They said in 1990 that ‘ Recent research has shown that when alliance commitments are considered binding by prevailing norms, the international system experiences a reduction in the percentage of serious disputes that escalate into wars, as well as a reduction in the magnitude and severity of those wars fought.’90

1.5.4. Alliance theory – delineation of alignments.

Wilkins proposes a typology showing how security cooperation between security partners within an overarching ‘alignment’ theory. He has proposed a typology addressing all forms of international alignments, including strategic partnerships, arguing that ‘no single theoretical tradition in international relations can account for each of these varying forms of cooperation.’ He describes alignment as ‘agreements between two or more states to undertake defence-related security cooperation.’ He considers that the Indo-Pacific contains new forms of alignments such as ‘bilateral strategic partnerships, minilateral groupings, issue-specific alignments and hybrid organizations’.91 Australian academic William Tow

89 Glenn H. Snyder in ‘Theory, Values and Practice in International Relations: Essays in Honour of William T.R. Fox’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 44, No. 1. (1990), pp. 103-123. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357226 90 Kegley Jr, C. W., and G. A. Raymond. " Polarity, Polarization and the Transformation of Alliance Norms.” Western Political Quarterly, Volume 43, Issue 1 pp. 9-38, 1 March 1990. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/106591299004300103 91 Thomas S Wilkins, ‘Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment,’ (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2018). p. 3. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID=5649222 33 describes one of these new forms of alignments as a ‘virtual alliance’, an informal process involving two or more smaller allies who normally do not conduct extensive or formal security relations with each other, upgrade such relations through the coordinative efforts of a common senior ally.’92

Neo-realistic approaches to alliance theory, and other theories about international politics centre ‘on a focus on stratifying capabilities among the aggregation of states as having the greatest amount of explanatory power in analysing individual states' behaviour.’93 Walt has provided a classic neo-realist understanding of the role of alliances in international relations.94 A neo-realist concentrates not on adversarial relations, which dominate much of the traditional approach, but on the assumptions flowing from the concepts of ‘balance- of-power’. Walt considers that the realist paradigm has long dominated the field with a heavy reliance on competing conceptualisations. He believes that the best method to analyse individual states' behaviour and the best ‘theorising about international politics have centred on a focus on the stratification of capabilities among the aggregation of states’.

1.5.5. Alliance theory – ‘balance-of-power’ thesis.

Prominent writer on alliance theory academic Patricia Weitsman considers that the traditional view is that alliances ‘are formed and maintained to counter external threats’. Her early 1997 article extends the alliance literature by arguing that ‘the reason why states ally is fundamental to understanding when the resulting alliance will be cohesive’. 95 Weitsman notes that ‘both Realist or neorealist theory answers the question of why states ally: to counter threats, or imbalances of power’. Looking to the balance-of-power theory, Weitsman quotes Walt’s Origins of Alliances which advocates a reformulation of alliance theory to ‘include intentions rather than capabilities alone as explanations of alliance choices. Her conclusion is that balance-of-threat theory suggests that states ally in response to the perception of an external threat.96 She adds that alliances ‘are indeed often formed and maintained to counter external threats; realist theory explains a lot about alliance dynamics. Exclusive attention to the power maximization function as the context of the

92 William Tow, ‘Alliances and Alignments in the Twenty-First Century,’ p. 19. 93 Stephen M. Walt. Reviewed in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3, Aug 1989. 94 Stephen M. Walt (1997) Why alliances endure or collapse, Survival, 39:1, 156-179. 95 Patricia A. Weitsman (1997) Intimate enemies: The politics of peacetime alliances, Security Studies, 7:1, p. 157. 96 Ibid, p.158. 34 post-cold war world suggests, however, obscures much about the realities and practices of alliances.’

1.5.6. Alliance theory – concepts of ‘band-wagonning’ and tethering.

Weitsman considers that the ‘only powerful alternative to balance-of-power theory is a theory of opposite prediction, that states bandwagon.’ This concept is where weaker states algin themselves, usually with formal allying, to a larger power. This will be done for appeasement or survival of the lesser power. She further notes that ‘balancing alliances are formed and maintained to counter a threatening state or states; bandwagoning alliances are those where small or weak states ally with threats or big states appease other big states because of a threat’.97 Weitsman considers that ‘military alliances are the driving force in international politics.’ She argues that, at times, enemies are drawn into “tethering” alliances with each other to preserve peace and manage conflict, suggesting a relationship between alliance formation and threat that is curvilinear. 98

1.5.7. Contribution of Defence and Military Power to National Security

Defence policy directs the raising of military power as directed by government. That military power is the most important guarantor of national security when other policy components have failed to achieve national goals. As mentioned in the Introduction, there are three modes of military power: reassurance—the use of military power to engage others through trust-building military activities; deterrence—the potential application of military power to deter those who oppose the deterring State’s national interests; and compellance—the actual employment of military power aimed at making hostile states to cease their actions.99

The A-JDSR currently exercises the reassurant and deterrence modes of military power. If there were the necessity and collective political will, governments could apply compellance. The current significant activity of A-JDSR is implementing reassurance. The very existence of combined cooperative action as currently practised generates a degree of

97 Ibid, p.163. 98 Weitsman, Patricia A. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, January 2004. Reviewed by Winters, Frank W. in History: Review of New Books. Summer, 2004, Vol. 32 Issue 4, p169. 99 Macke, op.cit. 35 deterrence to others. 100 This deterrence level in the A-JDSR would be higher if it approached being an alliance (especially any alliance with any degree of automatic response by alliance partners), but this seems currently unlikely. The increasing closeness of the relationship in terms of preparation for cooperative action (logistic support agreements, combined exercising bilaterally and with the US) is necessary for any act of compellance. These elements of military power are important determinants for achieving national security for any nation. The thesis examines the relationship between military power and security as the most important single contribution to national security, the protection of a state from external aggression

1.5.8. Understanding the A-JDSR in an alliance context.

The concept of alliances being a nuanced form of alignment is expanded on in Chapter 5 where the A-JDSR is examined in the context of the extant and future alignment. Using Wilkin’s typology of alliances—a continuum of alignments, the A-JDSR is shown to be, or will soon be, an alliance just short of a ‘formal alliance’ on the hard extremity of this continuum with the usual hallmarks of mutual reciprocity and identification of threatening sovereign power. Cossa considers that a ‘strategic alignment’ involves three distinctive elements: ‘the formation of consultative security mechanisms reflecting common interests and values; the lack of formal treaty or legislative obligations; and a tendency for such collaborators to diversify their various security collaboration in different institutions to avoid arousal of third party suspicions.’101 The A-JDSR has all the criteria to meet Cossa’s definition of a ‘strategic alignment’ as well as meeting Tow’s classification as a ‘virtual alliance’. The A-JDSR is not a traditional alliance in the form of a treaty. It has developed over time as the two states in the relationship have found it mutually useful to build close relations. It has been formalised only by a declaration made in the 2007 Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation and by designation as a ‘special security relationship’ (see empirical chapters). It has been variously considered to be, a ‘virtual alliance’, a ‘latent alliance’, a ‘shadow alliance’, an ‘intra alliance’ and a ‘quasi alliance’. The A-JDSR is an important bilateral

100 In military jargon, the term ‘combined’ means military activity taken with another state. ‘Joint’ means actions by more than one armed service of a state. 101 Cossa, U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations. Center for Strategic & International studies. 1 November 1999. https://www.amazon.com/U-S-Korea-Japan-Relations-Building-Alliance-Significant/dp/0892063580 36 component of the range of alignments that Australia and Japan use to bolster the security afforded by their alliances with the United States.

The meaning and value of the A-JDSR can be defined by using terminology from alliance theory. Snyder defines alliances as: ‘formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandisement of their members, against specific other states.’ Snyder considers that the associations do not need explicitly to identify the ‘other states’.102 Snyder adds that he differentiates this concept from the broader idea of association with a multilateral organisation such as the United Nations which makes specific provision for members of that organisation to act together in ‘collective self-defence’. Snyder’s definition refers to declared threats but does not mention mutuality of response; both factors usually associated with a traditional view of an alliance. Walt has a similar definition of an alliance. Walt considers that alliances between states can exhibit levels of formality, noting that the ‘precise arrangements embodied in different alliances vary enormously. The defining feature of any alliance is a normative obligation in the form of commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s)’. Walt argues that mutuality applies only to formal alliances, and he accepts that states can provide considerable support for each other even without a treaty. Conversely, even with a treaty, commitment sometimes plays little part.103

Alliances are part of a spectrum of relationships between states. The concept of ‘alignment’ is also a relationship between and among states. While alignments may or may not create normative obligations, they have implicit value in the expectations they create between two (or more) states because they generate a form of deterrence in third parties. Notably, Walt says that ‘an alliance agreement is essentially a joint declaration, a mutual promise to act in a specified way in specified future contingencies.’ From these two views, a ‘formal alliance’ is seen to be different from other forms of alliances. A formal alliance is one where there is mention of a shared adversary (even if unidentified) and a degree of mutuality of response. Most of those interviewed by the candidate held that an alliance incorporated a normative obligation and identification of a threat. This thesis considers that the term ‘formal alliance’ implies a threat-based mutual

102 Snyder, op. cit. 103 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why alliances endure or collapse’, Survival, 39:1, 1997, pp.156-179. 37 obligation: where one or both elements are absent from any relationship between states, the term alliance means an ‘informal alliance’, association or alignment between states.

1.6 Research Methodology

An eclectic approach to research was made through a traditional literature search and direct interviewing. Interviews formed the basis of the ethnographic research, adding to the theoretical bases found elsewhere. 104 The candidate used: Government archives in Australia 105 and Japan, personal records and colleagues’ insights, standard internet scholastic and other internet searches, periodicals, and mainstream media. The thesis used only open-source documents (scholastic and other searches) and reviews of journals and publications)—no government security classified material was accessed. Documents found in national public archives in Australia (DFAT) and Japan were mainly original documents, now declassified due passage of time.106 They included: records of conversations of high- level discussions, Australian Cabinet papers, reports from overseas officials in Australian Embassies (including reports from and to the candidate when DASA, policy guidance and correspondence to and from Government departments to Embassies.

This thesis's thrust is to bring the development of the relationship into focus as a logical progression of the history of the A-JDSR by drawing on selected items and events in that chronology and drawing inferences. That said, the thesis adds a prognosis for future development based on a recursive, deductive, and collective basis of all research found.

Social science data-gathering and deductive analysis principles were followed as required for a historiographical thesis and used as an empirical basis and analysed to generate new meaning. The candidate used a social science and historical discipline approach but applied other constructs: national security, defence, economics, international relations, politics, strategy, and philosophy. The candidate used this approach deductively to focus on the meaning of events described and postulated a trajectory for the A-JDSR.

104 The candidate’s discipline is: International Relations with a sub-discipline of Defence and Security Policy. 105 The candidate was the first researcher to gain access to previously classified government (DFAT) files on the A-JDSR. 106 Defence would not allow the candidate any access to their archives. 38 While this thesis uses a social scientist’s theoretical framework in terms of a structured, rational, and logical framework firmly rooted in western perspectives and realistic theoretic constructs, the candidate’s background as a physical scientist led him to employ an empiricist testing approach. The candidate developed the thesis from a practitioner’s perspective,107 and by analysing qualitative historical data. He then tested it against Classic Realism theory and other theories of sovereign and collective security determinants that shape alliance and similar relationships between nations.

The cultural space occupied is that of the disinterested academic observer of past, current (and through prognosis) future history. However, the candidate modifies this strictly theoretical approach by combining insights and experiences as a practitioner in national security and international relations. These insights generate new insights and knowledge by describing an admixture of disinterested observations of history with the wisdom of those who participated in the A-JDSR.

This thesis focuses on security practitioners and their insights into developing security policy. It does address some theoretical aspects as this is required to explain the bases behind policy decisions and accepted academic theory. But there is a gap between the two which must be mentioned. The candidate’s own experience and his observation of other security practitioners is that there is a significant gap between academic scholarship on security matters, and the development of security policy in defence organisations. Other than thinking gained by exposure to academic scholarship at military command and staff colleges for middle-ranking officers, and war colleges for those destined for senior command, there is very little attention paid in the defence and security policy development process by security practitioners. It is a truism that those been given exposure to theoretical and other elements of security scholarship have these principles in mind when performing their work, but the candidate’s experience suggests that there is very little conscious appreciation of contemporary theory and policy for those at the ‘coalface’ of defence and security development in government. Joseph Nye, himself a prominent security practitioner and security academic, and quoting his own experience in academe and government, considers that that this ‘gap between academic theory and foreign policy practice’ not only exists but is growing wider.108 Nye notes that while some academics are engaged with

107 My undergraduate discipline of Physics developed in me an empirical approach to analysis. My working life in the military further developed in me a strong appreciation of the empirical method. 108 Nye, Jr, Joseph S. "Bridging the gap between theory and policy." Political Psychology 29.4 (2008), p. 593. 39 government in security policy formulation, they consider their role ‘is to use their independence to criticize the power structure, not support it.’ They criticize the policymakers ‘no matter how little relevance their theory appears to have in the eyes of policy makers or how little it conforms to the central professional standards of the discipline.’ General theories such as structural realism and liberal institutionalism have become more abstract and less relevant to policymakers. Nye laments ‘it is one thing to train PhDs primarily for academic careers; it is another to have this be virtually the only purpose of most major international relations/ political science Ph.D. programs’.109

1.6.1. Additional sources

The candidate found the best academic source for the post-war period until 2000 to be the ‘Australia in World Affairs’ quintennial book series published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Their nature provided progressively developed insights into the evolution of analytical thought over this period covered in this thesis. De-classified government documents as available from the National Australia Archives are cited from post-second world war to 2000 as later documents are still under classified coverage. The period from 2000-on is drawn from contemporary open-source literature and personal interviews.

1.6.2. Approach

The candidate uses his personal history and that of over 90 other practitioners in the national security community of the ‘five-eyes’ intelligence group of nations, plus Japan. 110 This thesis contains extensive original research and engagement with other practitioners and academia in the United States, Japan, India, and the United Kingdom, and Australia. The candidate builds on this, adding insights from previously classified government files to fill an epistemological gap, creating new knowledge on the history and development of the A-JDSR.

109 Nye, op. cit., p.599. 110 The Five Eyes (FVEY) community an intelligence alliance of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 40 1.6.3. Interviews

The candidate constructed an interview database from those known or referred to him. These potential interviewees included those foremost in Australia and Japan in the national security community and the collateral academic community who specialised in defence and security.

The candidate made two field trips to Japan interviewing officers and officials in Government, Embassies, academic institutions, and research institutions. The candidate visited Peking University in Beijing to deliver an early version of this thesis and interviewed security scholars at Peking and Tsinghua Universities. The candidate interviewed all living Australian Ambassadors and Defence Attaché s to Japan who had been involved in the A-JDSR since the early 1970s. Personal connections facilitated access to the Defence Staff in the Japanese Embassy in Canberra, the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, and others in the national security community in Japan and Australia.111

All those interviewed in Japan and Australia were ready to provide invaluable insights. Although recalled experiences and insights are subject to the vagaries of imperfect memory and the interviewee's inherent perspectives, they nevertheless help cover extant gaps in other recorded history. They provide insights into ‘what happened’, ‘how it happened’ and ‘who made it happen’. Wherever the candidate gained a controversial view, he sought to find an opposing view from other sources. Interviewees in current government service were circumspect in their comments. Some requested anonymity or provided insights for background use only. Not all interviewees were able to address all questions asked.

A selective approach was made to be as wide as possible. This large cohort, which not representing a statistical sample, was designed to produce an eclectic and hopefully collective group. The candidate took care to select interviewees who would give a range of views and political dispositions. The strength and rationality of their comments informed arguments and analysis rather than interviewees’ ideological positions. Appendices list those interviewed and show the open-ended questions put to interviewees. The candidate used an open-ended interview process to minimise any of his personal bias intruding.

111 The author’s engagement from 1986 until the present with the Royal United Services Institute of Defence and Security Studies–Australia including the last 10 years as RUSIDSS-S National Secretary enabled him to identify interviewees. 41 1.7 Thesis Structure

The thesis has an introductory opening which demonstrates the rationale behind the candidate’s desire to record the A-JDSR. It addresses the bases for an autoethnographical approach by describing the candidate’s professional background and why this provided insights into the A-JDSR. It continues with an overview of how previous publications and other professional writing contributed to this thesis and provided material to enable the candidate to complete the requirements imposed in a PhD by Portfolio program.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the history and possible future of A-JDSR, setting in place contextual descriptions that will be expanded later in terms of describing the beginning of cooperative security activity and a likely trajectory. The literature search in this thesis does not exhaustively evaluate the extant literature other than using seminal literature to provide theoretical underpinnings for building a foundation for analysis. Literature is used in subsequent chapters to provide theoretical bases to address autoethnographic and related material, providing accepted counterfoils to demonstrate where new material relates to actual knowledge.

Empirical Chapters 2 and 3 review the history of the A-JDSR from two perspectives: one relating to politico-security matters, and one relating to defence and military matters. Both build on the awakening of common economic convergence, eventually leading to mutual and economic dependence for the period starting from after the Second World War. During the Cold War tension period, both Australia and Japan first sought the embrace of their traditional allies to guarantee their security. As the Post-Cold War period came in without its expected ‘peace dividend’, both Australia and Japan started to seek broader connections than offered by traditional allies. In the 1990s both countries laid the foundations for a more cohesive A-JDSR. These chapters address the period when, with the support of the United States, Japan and Australia developed bilateral, trilateral, and limited multilateral relationships with like-minded countries, a situation which continues to the present. Chapter 4 examines the separate views of Australia’s and Japan’s security environment, domestic issues and related issues which inform the security debates in both countries. It provides a basis for examining prospects for future bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defence and security cooperative activity.

42

Chapters 5 and 6 look at the range of alignments of nations coming together for mutual security. They examine the theoretical and practical aspects of forming pragmatic alignments that allow states to operate together in bilateral and multilateral arrangements. It defines the current nature of the A-JDSR and how it may develop in the future. It then draws on the preceding foundational and development chapters to consider the adequacy and utility of extant and possible future frameworks, summarises the argument and proposes answers to the critical question: what will the prospective nature of regional security frameworks and the A-JDSR? A final Chapter draws together all conclusions and proposes possible actions to further develop the A-JSDR.

The last date for research used in this thesis is 12 April 2021. All URLs were confirmed correct and accessible on that same day.

43 Chapter Two

A-JDSR History–political and security perspectives

2.1 Introduction

Empirical chapters two and three provide an history of the A-JDSR from the end of the Second World War to 2021. They address how Australia’s role moved from being an occupying power to becoming a partner in a defence and security relationship described by some as a ‘virtual-alliance’. Australia provided part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan until 1952. For the next almost forty years, there was significant Japanese reluctance to engage in security relations with anyone other than its main occupying nation and later protector. The overall A-J relationship started in the 1960s with the beginnings of economic interdependence, and like most relationships has often moved slowly with occasional periods of inaction due to inattention.

Defence and security relationships between nation-states are increasingly drawn together under the rubric of national security. Consequently, whole of government approaches are necessary to manage the complex threads of national security. However, at the level just below national responsibility, defence issues are handled by Ministers of Defence, and security issues involving other nations are the responsibility of Foreign Ministers. Embassies and governments departments, at least in Japan and Australia, reflect this bifurcated but coordinated nature. This thesis also reflects this duality, with Chapter 3 discussing the political and broader security aspects of the A-JDSR and Chapter 4 addressing the purely military and defence thread.

This thesis addresses the political nature of the A-JDSR only where it provides context for the two foci of these chapters: the security, and the defence and military aspects of the A- JDSR.112

This chapter also draws on the extant—mostly secondary and tertiary—academic literature, mainly contemporaneous articles published in five-yearly tranches by the

112 For a full political history of the A-JDSR for the post WWII period to 1998, see Rix, Alan. ‘The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present’. (New York: Routledge, 1998). 44 Australian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA). Contextually useful extracts from government papers supplement this. The thesis specifically references National Archives of Australia (NAA) sources only where it cites officials’ quotations or mentions contentious items. Otherwise, sources providing background and other illumination will not be specifically referenced.

International engagement is often classified under ‘tracks’ with varying degrees of government involvement. As the practicality of formal agreement becomes more complex, and as governments seek out ‘deniable engagement’, it is increasingly convenient for governments to incorporate ‘back channel’ diplomacy where they can mutually adduce policy and strategic positions. Track 1.5 dialogues involve a mix of government and non- government officials participating outside their official capacity. Similarly, track 2 diplomacy brings together unofficial representatives on both sides, with no government participation. No tracks other than first track engagements at the political or official carry the weight of formal diplomacy. These alternate channels offer a sounding board to exchange views or examine possible solutions to common problems. The use of dialogue than cannot be characterised as first track discussions has much aided A-JDSR development.113 Indeed much progress has been made in the A-JDSR by working-level talks of the ‘possible’, with first and 1.5 tracks providing a prospective, and sometimes retrospective cover for new initiatives.

The A-JDSR developed from the axis of economic relations started in 1957 with the seminal Agreement on Commerce with Japan brokered by Deputy Prime Minister John McEwan.114 The 1976 signing of the Nippon-Australia Relations Agreement (NARA) Treaty extended the relationship.115 By 1997, Japan's relationship was described as 'by far Australia's most substantial and successful' bilateral economic relationship.116

113 For a primer see: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/primer-multi-track-diplomacy-how-does-it-work 114 The Agreement on Commerce between the Commonwealth of Australia and Japan was originally signed at Hakone on 6th July 1957. The Agreement was reviewed in 1963 and a Protocol of Amendment and other documents were signed in Tokyo on 5th August 1963.The documents were ratified in Canberra on 27th May, 1964. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_i nquiries/1999-02/japan/report/e03 115 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan. Signed: Tokyo 16 June 1976. Entry into force: 21 August 1977. Treaty Series 197. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/basic-treaty-between-australia-and- japan.pdf A photograph of the signing still hangs in the foyer of the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. 116 Rikki Kersten in Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000 Eds, and John Ravenhill. (OUP 2002). p. 72. 45 Rix said of the 1957 trading agreement that this ‘was not just an economic agreement, but also a political settlement of enormous significance, made possible under the umbrella of American security arrangements with both Australia and Japan.’117

Actual security cooperation came a little later, but by the 1970s, exchanges between the two countries’ intelligence institutions were quietly underway. Still, defence and military engagement was sporadic and inconclusive until the late 1980s. There was initial hesitation on both sides in establishing purely military interaction: on the Australian side due to cautiousness in dealing with public post-WWII antipathy; and post-war reluctance on the Japanese side under constraints from the United States as they focused on economic recovery.

Australia did not pursue these early 1980 defence cooperation initiatives from Japan until the late 1980s. In August 1989 the A-JDSR took hold when CDF General Peter Gration visited Japan. Gration recommended a series of proposals to develop a military relationship with Japan which were effected over the following decade as the A-JDSR matured.118 Soon, Australia was recognised by Japan as an ‘indispensable partner for coping with regional and global issues, including environmental problems, arms control and disarmament, and the Cambodian peace settlement’.119

The 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation started a formal defence and security relationship built upon to the extent that both countries' armed forces are now capable of operating together or in conjunction with other countries.

Engagement at the political level quickened in the early 1990s. The Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, commented in 1993 that Australia was a ‘natural ally of Japan’.120 Australian and Japanese Defence Ministers' statements in reciprocal visits indicated agreement to increase defence contacts between Australia and Japan.

117 Rix, Alan. 1998. The A-J Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present. (New York: Routledge): 159-168. 118 Peter Gration, personal interview 28 Jan 2019. 119 MOFA, Diplomatic Blue Book, December 1991. https://www.MOFA.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-contents.htm0. 120 ‘Australia’s Role in the New World Order’. Speech by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun/Australian Financial Review Japan-Australia Asia Symposium, Tokyo, 4 November 1993. https://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1993/041193_fm_australiaandthenewworld.pdf 46 2.2 Beginnings

2.2.1. Reconciliation after the Second World War

After the war the Australian people held firmly to the view that ‘‘defeated Japan should never be allowed to re-arm and become once more a threat.’’121 Even after the Australia- New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) and United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (US-JMST) treaties were in place, anti-Japanese attitudes persisted until well after the realisation came to Australia that Japan could be a valuable trading partner.

2.2.2. Economic interdependence and the awakening of shared security interests

In the 1960s, there was a growing level of reconciliation between Japan and Australia. There was also a change in the region's security situation, and both countries were interested in extending their security horizons. Australian academic W Mcmahon Ball noted that in the late 1950s it was in Australia’s interest that Japan prosper as this would contribute to regional security.122 However, there were still residual concerns over the prospect of a resurgent Japan. Australia could see that ‘Japan’s assumption of a political, as distinct from a military, role as contributing positively to objectives; objectives that Australia also shared’.123 Even so, there was a security, and perhaps even collective security element to this. Rix says that at the time of creating the ANZUS Treaty, Australia and the US had looked to a future collective security arrangement that could involve Japan. He noted that John Foster Dulles had said that the United States, Australia New Zealand, and other countries ‘must try to ensure that the development of Japanese armed forces will be for purposes of collective security.’ Sir Percy Spender, Australian Defence Minister, was of the same view.124

During the 1960s in overall trade with Australia, Japan was eclipsed only by Britain. Japan also took the bulk of primary non-agricultural Australian exports. Japan had almost

121 Gordon Greenwood, in ‘Australia In World Affairs 1950-55.’, Gordon Greenwood & Norman Harper eds., (Cheshire, Melbourne. 1957). p. 101. 122 Gordon Greenwood in ‘Australia in World Affairs 1956-60’, Gordon Greenwood & Norman Harper eds., (Cheshire, Melbourne. 1963) Chapter 5. 123 Ibid., Chapter 11. 124 Rix p149. US Pact, pp. 606-7 (Document 226) 47 overtaken the UK in terms of overall trade at the end of the 1960s.125 Presaging Australia’s current economic dependence on China, the expansion in trade between Australia and Japan generated prosperity for Australia but created some concern about its new partner's over-reliance.126

Until the 1970s, there was very little in Australian literature and government documents on defence relations with Japan. As late as 1972 the Australian Defence Review made almost no mention of Japan and there was publicly little mention elsewhere.127 Senator Partridge visited Japan in 1965, the first-ever by Australian Defence Minister. He met the Japanese PM, Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. The Australian press quoted Partridge as asking Japan if they were interested in being a ‘possible forerunner to eventually entering some form of alliance with the other Pacific Powers’. There is no record of a response. Paltridge’s proposal was not widely reported, not even in his visit report to Parliament, likely due to fear of public criticism.128

2.2.3. Japanese views of security in the 1960s

In 1958, Japan had negotiated the US-JMST which came into force 23 June 1960. It precipitated a national crisis. Later, the Japanese Government extended it in 1970 in the face of vociferous opposition.129

During its resurrection from the devastation of the Second World War some Japanese wished to build a new economic and security construct.130 The construct would not be a pan-Asian one, not with memories of the ‘Great Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ still raw. Japan wanted a new construction based on the Asia-Pacific, including Australia as a developed economy. Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki first floated the idea of a formal Pacific association when he publicly outlined his ideas for an ‘Asia Pacific policy’ at a speech in the United States in December 1966.131 Some consider that Miki’s proposal

125 Gordon Greenwood in ‘Australia in World Affairs 1961-65’, Gordon Greenwood & Norman Harper, eds., (Cheshire, Melbourne. 1968) p. 378. 126 Ibid, p. 338. 127 Amy King in ‘Australia’s Defence–Towards a new Era. Peter J Dean, Stephan Fruhling, and Brendan Taylor eds. (Melbourne University). pp.81-86. 128 Rix. Australian Financial Review, 5 February 1965. 129 NAA: A5954 69. 26 Jun 1970. f. 120. 130 Japan uses the terms “Greater East Asia War” (大東亜戦争, Dai Tō-A Sensō), and “Pacific War” (太平洋戦争, Taiheiyō Sensō). The term “Fifteen Years’ War” (十五年戦争, Jūgonen Sensō) is also used. 131 Peter Drysdale, ‘International Economic Pluralism, Economic Policy in Asia and the Pacific’, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 1988). p. 208. 48 is the forerunner to Asia-Pacific regionalism. 132 Miki had been espousing from the immediate post-war period that the solution to national poverty was economic development based on international cooperation and would contribute to regional security. Miki considered that Pacific littoral countries: ‘[A]re now fully aware of the fact that they belong to the Pacific region and, as such, are increasingly aware of the common ties of destiny that bind them.’133 With this in mind, Academic Takashi Terada noted that Japan ‘consistently supported Australia’s engagement policy.’ 134 Later, Japan and Australia did build a regional economic and security constituency with their initiatives in helping establish regional institutions such as APEC. Japan strongly supported the APEC Leaders’ meeting proposed by Australian Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating.135 The bases for shared security interests were being built from an increasing economic interdependence and soon, security engagement.

2.2.4. Australian and Japan start security discussions

Annual security talks started in 1967 at senior foreign affairs official level (later Ministerial), alternating between Canberra and Tokyo. Japanese archives show that the foci for these early years followed a regular pattern; Russia and Indochina, ROK/DPRK, Non- proliferation Treaty, China, Nixon’s ‘Guam Doctrine’ and in 1969, US insistence that Japan accept more defence burden for own defence.136 After attending the 1969 talks, Foreign Minister Gordon Freeth spoke of Japan's more significant regional security role. His speech provoked no controversy in Australia, but the statement was later disavowed by Freeth’s Foreign Minister successor William McMahon, apparently at Japanese request. Nevertheless, the Australian government appointed Freeth as Ambassador to Japan in 1970 after he had lost his seat in Parliament at the 1969 elections. 137 Australian Defence Minister, Alan Fairhall called at the same time for more significant regional commitments by Japan, canvassing collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia. The Japanese Ambassador in Australia rejected Fairhall’s call. The Japanese Prime

132 Takashi Terada. ‘The origins of Japan's APEC policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki's Asia‐Pacific policy and current implications’, (The Pacific Review, 1998) pp. 337-363. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512749808719261 133 Miki, Takeo, 'Light and shadow of the Pacific era' Speech to University of Southern California, 30 September 1996. 134 Terada, op. cit. 135 See: Mills, S., 1993. The Hawke Years: the story from the inside, Viking, Ringwood, Ravenhill, J., 2001. ‘Australia and the global economy’, in J. Cotton, and J. Ravenhill (eds), The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in world affairs 1996–2000, Oxford University Press, London. 136 Nippon-Australia Foreign Ministry Discussions, 1967-1970. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Tokyo. 137 Gordon Freeth later became Australian Ambassador to Japan. 1970-73. 49 Minister declared that peacekeeping operations were possible but considered Japan’s best commitment to Southeast Asia was to provide, through its economic growth, opportunities for growth in regional prosperity.138 Then-Foreign Minister William McMahon, who had replaced Freeth in May 1970 that Australia well understood Japan’s reluctance to move beyond self-defence—itself the first statement from an Australia Government that acknowledged Japan’s right to conduct own defence.139

2.2.5. Australia considers the security aspects of the relationship

In April 1970, Australia established its first Cabinet committee to examine how Australia might coordinate its security policy towards Japan. An Inter-Departmental Committee recommended to the Cabinet Committee that Australia should: ‘establish the closest possible relationship with Japan at the political and diplomatic level [but] not unduly encourage the view that the rearmament of Japan should be speeded up or that Japan should play a direct security role in Southeast Asia.’140 It took some time for the Cabinet to address even these modest recommendations.

The JDA informally raised in June 1974 a proposal that it commence dialogue with Australia. DFAT considering then that security dialogue was the prerogative of foreign ministries, was not supportive, and wanted to see a formal invite from Japan’s MOFA. It was concerned that this ‘just the JDA’s idea’. This action showed that both foreign ministries had the expectation they could keep close control over engagement between the two Defence Departments.141 However, after a further informal entreaty from the JDA in December 1974, Foreign Affairs did propose a modest defence exchange program. This program would have civilian officials from the JDA visit every year, supplemented with an exchange of naval intelligence officers and military officers at 2-star level. Visitors to Australia would have discussed issues such as the conduct of Joint Operations (which would have helped the JSDF develop tri-service cooperation to remedy JSDF isolation). However, Defence in Canberra provided only conditional support due to concerns over return on resources needed, and this first overture from the Japanese side did not eventuate.

138 Alan Rix, Australian Financial Review, 4 August 1969. p. 159 139 Alan Rix, Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 3, March 1970. p 160. 140 D.C.S. Sissons in ‘Australia In World Affairs 1971-75’, W.J Hudson, ed. (Allen & Unwin, 1980). p233. 141 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. 15 February 1974. f.19.

50 Nevertheless, Australia considered that the main thrust of developing security policy was to seek to broaden and deepen bilateral relations with Japan and cooperate more to mutual advantage than in the past. DFAT correspondence shows that this approach would be ‘laying the basis for limited defence cooperation between Australia and Japan’. The Department advised the Foreign Minister that there is no suggestion of reaching towards a close or wide-ranging defence relationship in these exchanges. Nor is there any reason to suppose the Japanese are looking for any such relationship.’ 142 However, ministerial discussions did get underway in April 1972 with the first of a long succession of Cabinet Ministers' annual meetings in the form of the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee (AJMC). These were held annually from 1972 until 1997143 when both countries replaced them with Prime Ministerial meetings and Ministerial portfolio discussions. But primacy remained with DFAT in the early days. Trevor Wilson, previous Deputy Head of Tokyo mission in the early 1990s with experience as a then-third secretary in the 1970s said: ‘Foreign ministers were inevitably deeply, and directly involved on both sides, mostly as chair’ in these AJMCs.144

The rapid increase in economic activity between Japan and Australia created closer societal linkages resulted in the building of political and cultural institutions such as the Australia- Japan Foundation.145 But Japan was not on Australia’s defence horizon, with Australia focusing on continental defence and cooperation with the inner region. The Australian 1976 Defence White Paper could not see a regional security role for Japan and stated that ‘Japan appears most unlikely to change its longstanding policy of limiting its military development.’146 However, despite the lack of engagement with Japan, there was tacit bipartisan support for statements made in 1975 by Defence Minister Killen that there was an alignment of security interests (see Chapter 3). Defence Foreign Affairs Opposition Spokesman, William Hayden as part of a team visiting Japan said in unsolicited comments in Tokyo at this time that there is ‘no insurmountable problems’ to exchanging military personnel with Japan, adding ‘joint naval exercises’ also possible.147

142 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. 20 December 1974. 143 The ninth AJMC in 1986 noted that the AJMC had since 1972, provided opportunities for Ministers to consider the totality of the relationship. 144 Trevor Wilson. Deputy Head of Mission, Tokyo, 1996-2000, private interview candidate 3 October 2019. 145 Alan Rix in ‘Australia in World Affairs 1981-90’, P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. eds. (Longman Cheshire 1992), Chap 12. 146 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence, Canberra, November 1976, p. 4. https://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/wpaper1976.pdf 147 NAA: A9564 3/1/20 Part 1. f. 76. 51 The role of personalities is a hallmark of the A-JDSR and perhaps other international relationships. With no great interest at Ministerial level in the early days, security policy was often defined by the bureaucracy, particularly in the Australian and Japanese Foreign Ministry. As Trevor Wilson said, the most powerful influence during the 1970s was Sir Keith Shann (later Australian Ambassador to Japan 1973-77) who exercised much influence on Australia-Japan relations while serving as chair of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Japan.148

2.2.6. Regional security changes and hesitancy in Australia about Japan

Australian Defence Secretary Bill Pritchett and his incoming successor Sir William Cole together visited Japan in 1983 in their interregnum. They raised the possibility of Defence Consultations between Japan and Australia and included the JDA in their visit. In Canberra (through its Minister Konishi), the Japanese Embassy responded to this proposal in May 1984 proposing ‘informal non-institutional and non-attributable talks on strategic issues’ and noting that Prime Minister Nakasone ‘had brought the electorate forward on defence’. Canberra Defence officials then planned to make ‘low-key and informal’ consultations with JDA. Notably, as MOFA handled all politico/military matters this proposed action could have cut across Japanese sensitivities. MOFA offered to have a joint MOFA/JDA delegation on the Japanese side, with discussions to be limited to direct non-controversial military issues such as organisation, force structure and training.

The Australian Defence Department made plans for talks that would: not be institutionalised; be only on an opportunity basis with no publicity; and concentrate only on security situations and not national defence policy. Australian Foreign Minister Hayden was advised on 6 August 1984, two weeks before the planned talks. The Australian Defence Department had wished to have had direct military-military discission with Japan and had not yet raised the proposal with Australian Defence Minister Scholes. Foreign Minister Hayden was asked first, with his Department recommending the new proposal not proceed. DFAT had concerns over direct liaison between Defence and the Japanese Embassy in Canberra. DFAT was already holding similar discussions with MOFA and the

148 Trevor Wilson in ‘Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1972-93’. Melissa Conley Tyler and John Robbins, eds. (AIIA, 2018). pp 82. 52 Office of Net Assessments (ONA) were having side-talks. 149 DFAT proposed that Defence supplement extant talks by including Defence officials from both countries. However, Minister Hayden did not react well to the news and expressed ‘considerable reservations’ saying that ‘I am fearful of how this will be seen in the electorate’. The matter did not advance due to Hayden’s concerns and cancelled the proposal in August 1984150. DFAT suggested that a CDF visit in 1985 would suffice for defence, a visit which did not occur until 1989.151

There was support at this time from the academic security community for a closer A- JDSR, with Tow in 1984 advocating for ’a revived ANZUS with Japanese tie’ as a contribution to arguments that Japan should take on a broader regional security leadership role. He proposed a range of defence cooperation that had been previously contemplated officially, including technical and non-controversial defence cooperation.

In March 1988, John Howard, then Leader of the Opposition, in a visit to Tokyo proposed that there be a more ‘cooperative defence relationship’ between Australia, Japan, and US in a ‘triangular political-security relationship’. Howard’s suggestion was roundly dismissed by Foreign Minister Hayden and later repudiated by Evans (Hayden’s successor as Foreign Minister) with Evans, stating that Japan’s security role should be ‘focused on developing economic power economic support for the region’.152

2.2.7. Reciprocal interest in a bilateral relationship as Australia and Japan engage in regional security cooperation

Australian academic John Welfield, in a 1992 retrospective view from Japan, noted that the 1980s witnessed: radical changes in the international system including changes in great power rivalry; the emergence of regional trading blocs; and higher levels of protectionism. These challenges changed Australia’s international relations, which were also affected by

149 ONA advised government and the bureaucracy. Its successor, the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) has an additional responsibility to coordinate all national intelligence. https://www.oni.gov.au 150 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 4 Oct 1984. f. 168. Letter from Northern Territory Chief Minister Doug Everingham criticised Hayden over Australian support for Japan’s defence re-equipment program. 151 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 9 Sep 198. f. 197. 152 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, vol. 126, 14 April 1988, p. 1532.

53 the evolution of Washington’s ties with Japan.153 Welfield noted that opinion polls in the 1970s and 1980s showed that the Australian public, while still concerned about resurgent militarism in Japan nevertheless held a very positive attitude towards Japan.154 A majority ''saw Japan as a stabilising regional influence and regarded the bilateral economic relationship as vital to their nation’s future’.155 Foreign Minister Bill Hayden made his first official visit to Japan in 1983. He forthrightly told the Japanese Prime Minister of Australian concerns over Japan developing a regional security role as he considered this would have ''a destabilising effect on the Asian-Pacific region.156 This personal and foreign affair departmental view limited the development of the A-JDSR for some time.

In 1984 under Prime Minister Hawke, became Defence minister and began to re-shape the Australian Defence and Security landscape with the Dibb Report's launch in 1986 and the seminal 1987 Defence White Paper. The 1987 paper facilitated a closer relationship with regional nations, including Japan. Beazley was one of Hawke’s proteges and ''had the ear’ of the Prime Minister. With Hawke’s support and the force of his personality, Beazley lifted the A-JDSR from a decade of doldrums. 157 In 1986 Beazley told Hayden that he supported a renewed call from Australian Ambassador in Tokyo, Neil Currie that Australia should conduct ‘low-key, informal discussion between defence officials’ on a periodic, not regular basis. Currie considered increases in Japanese defence capabilities and the greater prominence given to defence issues in Japan had heightened the benefit of informal defence consultations. He argued that Australia’s objective should be to increase mutual awareness of regional defence issues and the impact Japanese decisions have on our region.158 A month later, Hayden agreed to Beazley's proposal to build bilateral relations with Japan, accepting that establishing regular defence contact was useful. 159 The tension between DFAT and Defence, if not between the two Ministers is evident in that DFAT sought to limit discussions by not having direct Defence consultation. Instead, DFAT proposed only adding a Defence official to the extant DFAT-led talks to add ‘broad general defence discussion’.

153 John Welfield in ‘Australia in World Affairs 1981-90 Eds. P. J Boyce & J.R. Angel. Longman Cheshire. 1992. p. 246. 154 Notably, almost 60 per cent feared ‘that a rearmed Japan might emerge as a major, direct military threat.’ 155 Welfield, op.cit, p. 248. 156 ibid. p. 250. 157 Ross Cottrill, Defence First Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy. (1980–1993), Head AIIA 2004, private interview. 31 July 2020. 158 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 4 April 1986. f. 197. 159 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 12 May 1986. f. 212.

54 Rawdon Dalrymple said of his time as Ambassador in the late-1980s it was ‘painful dealing in defence matters with Japan’. He added there was always a core of people who wished to move outside the heavy constraints that were upon Japan but were cautious as a result. He did note some were thinking that Japan ‘should have its place at the table.’ There was more reserve than hesitation expanding Defence horizons on the Japanese side due to pressure

160 from the US.

At this time, Beazley had become Defence Minister with characteristic individual strength and commitment. He was supportive of opening the channels between Australia and Japan and overcoming reluctance to direct military contact. 161 Notwithstanding the previous low level of interest shown for a closer A-JDSR, Japan was also awakening to possibilities. Government official, later Ambassador to Australia, Shizuo Saito162 prepared a security report to a Japanese Government inquiry in the late 1980s which foresaw ''Australian and Japanese Defence Forces cooperating in exchanges of intelligence and personnel for training.’163

Little had happened of a defence or military nature until the 1989 CDF Gration visit.164 Unlike a previous visit 15 years before by his predecessor, Chief of Defence Force Staff Admiral Sir , the Gration visit generated recommendations on future defence cooperation which were acceptable to Japan. Reflecting the very close control that the Japanese MOFA placed on its overseas Defence staff, there was concern from the Japanese Embassy in Canberra that dialogue between the ADF and the JSDF be limited to avoid ‘freestanding’ cooperative arrangements. 165 This concept of close control over the Japanese military by the bureaucracy had been instituted after the Second World War as a reaction to the excesses of the Imperial Japanese Army. The concept of ‘civilian control’ was deeply ingrained in the Japanese defence management psyche at least until the formation of the Japanese Ministry of Defense as a full-fledged ministry of government in 2007 under the Abe defence reforms. The control concept had its origin in the 1947 Japanese Constitution, written in English by the occupying force and reflected the

160 Rawdon Dalrymple, Ambassador to Japan 1989 – 1993, private interview, 4 August 2020. 161 Hugh White in History as Policy: Framing the debate on the future of Australia's Defence Policy, eds. Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher. (ANU ePress, Canberra, 2007). pp. 163-171. 162 Japanese Ambassador to Australia, 1969-73. 163 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 3. 30 Aug. f. 233. 164 Dibb, op. cit. 165 NAA: A9737/3071397 DFAT 1991/3932 Part 4. Japan – Defence Relations with Australia. f.9. 55 democratic principle of primacy of the parliament over the military.166 It came to mean in the Japanese bureaucracy the subordination of military command, within the Japanese Defense Agency to control by civilians at all levels of decision-making. On this basis, Japan exercised tight ‘civilian control’ over Defence Attachés. Until the establishment of the JMOD, Tokyo even categorised all its overseas JSDF officers at Embassies as MOFA officials to avoid any criticism that it ‘deployed overseas’.167

Soon after the Dibb/Beaumont visit, the JDA Director-General (effectively the Minister of Defence) Yozo Ishikawa cemented the re-vitalisation of the A-JDSR by visiting Australia in May 1990. The Australian Defence Department briefed Minister Robert Ray for his meeting with Ishikawa that Australia wanted to ensure that the United States remained engaged with Japan as Australia was concerned that if this relationship were to break down, ‘Japan, in adverse circumstances …could become a source of regional instability’. Ray was also urged to develop Japanese understanding of Australia’s regional security concept, as advocated by then-Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, through multidimensional approach and shared security interests.168

A breakthrough in the physical dimension of closer defence relations between Australia and Japan occurred in the late 1980s when Japan cautiously began to exercise a regional security role by providing military logistic support to the Australian-led United Nations Transition Assistance – Cambodia (UNTAC). This role marked a significant lift in the two countries' relations, further strengthened by later cooperation in Timor L’Este and South Sudan (and later Iraq and Afghanistan).

2.2.8. Strategic Changes after the end of the Cold War

Since the war, Australia had maintained a defensive posture which had varied between emphases on either continental or forward defence, but this changed when the 1986 Dibb Report advocated a stance which proposed the concept of a ‘force-in-being’ operating within an area defined as Australia’s area of direct military interest (ADMI).169 This

166 Kohn, Richard H. ’An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military’. American Diplomacy’. (1997) https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/1997/03/an-essay-on-civilian-control-of-the-military/ 167 Contemporaneous personal notes. 168 NAA: A9737/3071397 DFAT 1991/3932 Pt 4..ff. 222-212. 169 From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army. Report of Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Chapter 3. Para 3.6. 4 September 2000. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/army/Armych3. 56 concept came under severe test when Australia soon participated in the first Gulf War—a region well outside Australia’s direct military interest area. Hugh White said that Australia recognised that its military interest area concept began to ''unravel’ with the end of the Cold War as developments in the wider Asia-Pacific impacted its strategic interests. White considered that this is ‘why we became interested in building relationships with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, as stated in the 1994 Defence White Paper’.170

The end of the Cold War did not bring the Peace Dividend that many western nations were expecting. It ushered in requirements for states to review their positions in the New Global Order. The prospect that the Pax America that had endured for two generations may diminish prompted Australia and Japan and others to review their strategic positions. It was also clear that their mutual alliance partner expected allies to take on more responsibility for their own security. For Australia, there was a need to redefine Australia’s relationship with its region as its security strategies became overtaken by events. Japan, notwithstanding the guarantees and strictures of the US-JMST began to consider that it ‘needed to consider its place in the world’.171 Sheila Smith said that this time was ‘difficult for the JDA as the 1990s’ economic downturn in Japan forced economies on military spending at the same time as Japan struggled with United States’ demands that Japan join in global coalition efforts to contend with post–Cold War security challenges.’172

2.3 Burgeoning of the Relationship

2.3.1. Australia and Japan start to become strategic partners

The early 1990s saw a renewed interest by both Australia and Japan in response to post- cold war strategic imperatives and a flurry of visits in both directions. The fall of the Berlin War and the breakup of the Soviet Union ushered in a new security environment in 1989. A ‘New World Order’ was declared.173 The certainties of the bipolar East-West world were replaced with a euphoria that military commitments could be wound back. Opportunities

170 Hugh White, principal writer of the 1994 DWP, Emeritus Professor, SDSC, ANU, private interview. 171 The Pentagon was reported as saying that, with the Cold War over, there was a feeling in Japan that the US-JMST was considered by Japan as less essential or even unnecessary. See: Asahi Shimbun. 28 February 1995. 172 Smith, S. op.cit. p. 11. 173 Joshua Itzkowitz, The Malta Summit and US-Soviet Relations. Wilson Centre. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-malta-summit-and-us-soviet-relations-testing-the-waters-amidst-stormy- seas 57 opened to pursue new relationships and to establishing new multilateral security organisations. The Australian Government while maintaining its commitment to the ANZUS alliance, sought ‘deeper engagement with both Southeast and Northeast Asia.’174

Following the May 1990 visit to Australia by the Japanese Defense Minister Ishikawa, Foreign Minister Evans visited Japan in September the same year. Prime Minister Hawke followed in October 1990. Rix said the preceding visit by the Japanese Defence Minister to Australia in May 1990 had started the development of agreements to increase defence contacts between Australia and Japan, possibly even instituting annual defence talks. The way was therefore opened for expanded bilateral defence cooperation. Ray made it clear that Japan would become a regular stopping-off point for Australian Defence Ministers. Australian strategic intelligence experts also visited Tokyo in early 1990, and the joint strategic talks that later began in 1996 were an indication of how both countries were implementing closer cooperation.

Further political coverage was given to the A-JDSR when Ray visited Japan in September 1992. He and his Japanese equivalent Director-General JDA Sohei Miyashita agreed to expand the defence relationship. Their talks included discussions on the prospect of a collective security framework and the possibility of joint Australian exercising in Australia.’175 The linkage was strengthened in April 1993 when Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Australia in April 1993, expressing support for closer security relations.176 A later visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister Howard 18-20 September 1996 not long after his election as PM furthered the security relations between Japan and Australia. The DFAT record stated that Howard’s visit ‘convincing conveyed his view of Japan’s importance to Australia’s external affairs and his commitment to carry forward what is already a very successful relationship’.177

1992 and 1993 marked the quickening of interest in a security relationship with Japan. Rix wrote: ‘In December 1992, the Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau and one of the most senior figures in the Ministry, Kazuo Ogura, wrote in an analysis of Japan's

174 Frank Frost. ‘Regional activism and the end of the Cold War (1983–1996). Engaging the Neighbours’. (ANU. July 2016). http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p347483/html/ch03.xhtml 175 Alan Rix, ‘The A-J Political Alignment’, p. 169. 176 ‘Greetings from Prime Minister Miyazawa at the Australian Prime Minister's Hosting Dinner’ (April 30, 1993). Deering Database ‘World and Japan.’ 177 NAA: A1209 1996: 2578, 24 September 1996, f. 162. 58 diplomacy that only Australia could fill the role of Japan's real partner in an Asian-Pacific regional alliance. Australia’s Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans reciprocated with his ‘natural ally’ comments.178 Rix continued: ‘Prime Ministerial attention was firmly focused on the Japan relationship, although without any great clamour; it made sense as a political issue and as a priority in Australian foreign relations and could not be ignored in any case.’179

The 1993 Strategic Assessment referred to closer Asian defence cooperation, saying that ‘We have important interests in developing broader defence relations with Japan. As an increasingly influential power in its own right, Japan will be one of the key determinants of the Asia-Pacific security environment over coming years. We should expand the modest level of defence contact with Japan. Japan is already interested in a more active regional security role.’180

Michael Thawley, in 1992, Australian Deputy Head of Mission in Tokyo was personally close to JDA Administrative Vice Minister (equivalent to a public service Secretary) Hatakeyama. Thawley said that when Prime Minister Paul Keating went to Japan in September 1992, Keating had told Prime Minister Miyazawa that Australia stood ready to conduct defence cooperation with Japan at a pace comfortable to Japan. This had been no confidential agreement – it was out in the open, but there was a lot of talk about China at the meeting. Miyazawa was beginning to get worried about China, and there was a significant attitudinal change developing in the Diet towards China due to rumours of improper influence in the Diet. Keating offered blue-water naval exercises, but Miyazawa was not ready for it. Thawley adds: ‘On the strategic side, an important early step was the drafting of a joint statement for a strategic partnership for Paul Keating to sign on his visit in 1993 when Hosokawa was Prime Minister. It got watered down more than I wanted, but it was an important step as it got the Japanese openly discussing the issues involved with us.’ Michael Thawley noted that a few like him had for many years shared the mission of getting the Japanese to step up and do more strategically. For all the Keating years, Australia would do all it could to bolster Japan. He added ‘Fortuitously, there was a series

178 Australia’s Role in the New World Order. Speech by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun/Australian Financial Review Japan-Australia Asia Symposium, Tokyo, 4 November 1993. https://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1993/041193_fm_australiaandthenewworld.pdf 179 Alan Rix in ‘Australia in World Affairs 1991-95’, James Cotton and John Ravenhill eds., (OUP 1997) p. 134. 180 Department of Defence. ‘Strategic Review 1993.’ December 1993. Para 3.51, p. 31. 59 of strong Prime Ministers in Japan who were prepared to make changes. However, none of them was as keen to ‘break the mould’ as Abe later was.’181

Thawley said of this time, a strong group of Japanese officials were very progressive and acceptable to overtures from Australia. Thawley had been worried that Australia was somewhat neglected and was out of place in the Europe and Oceania bureau of MOFA. Another option was for Australia to be placed in a renamed Pacific bureau, an expanded version of Yukio Sato’s North American affairs bureau where Australia would get more attention; or be in the Asian affairs bureau where again the risk was of being somewhat overlooked. Thawley personally preferred membership of a new Pacific bureau, and both Sato and Vice Foreign Minister Muneo Suzuki supported this. But after an internal battle MOFA decided it wanted Australia in the Asian affairs bureau and then-Foreign Minister Evans supported that view. Nevertheless, Thawley noted that under Keating, it had been easy to get things done in the A-JDSR as Keating was keen to ‘see things done to move the relationship forward’’.182

The Japanese academic community was also voicing interest in a closer A-JDSR and was reflecting early Japanese concern over a rising China. Retired Commander-in-Chief MSDF Fleet Vice-Admiral Kanazaki speaking in August in 1993 considered that the US, Japan, Canada and Australia could form a core of regional security organisation in five to ten years in response to emerging Chinese influence.183 While this grouping did not eventuate, within the naval sphere a catalyst for closer naval cooperation bore fruit when both countries used a visit to Australia by Hatakeyama’s visit to Australia in September 1993 as a catalyst to start holding Navy/Navy talks first held July 1994.

The 1993 inquiry184 by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, the first Parliamentary interest in the A-JDSR, matched Japanese interest in its international security obligations following international condemnation of Japan over its limited response to the 1991 Gulf War. The Senate inquiry urged the government to conduct a range of bilateral activities with Japan. First, strengthening bilateral security dialogue with Japan. Second, establishing closer links with Japan's peacekeeping

181 Michael Thawley, Secretary, PM&C, 2014-16, private interview. 5 September 2020. 182 Thawley, op. cit. 183 NAA: A9737 1991/3932 Pt6. F90. 184 Department of Defence, 1993 Strategic Assessment. Australian Government, Department of Defence, December 1993. https://www.defence.gov.au/SPI/publications/stratreview/1993/1993.pdf 60 operations. Third, stepping up defence personnel exchanges.185 Interestingly for that time, the Senate Committee specifically said that it did not reject the notion of joint military exercises.

There was an opening up also of Government engagement with the public over defence issues. When Australia released the 1993 Strategic Assessment, it was publicly declaring for the first time its strategic position and was doing so in a post-Cold War environment.186 The Australian Government had always classified previous documents on security planning, such as regular Strategic Reviews. The public was only made aware of previous security postures through the annual Defence Report, mostly a statement of annual expenditure and report on activity, and occasional reports such as the seminal 1987 Defence of Australia document. The 1993 report declared a significant change in Australian strategic posture with concepts of global and regional risk. Australia realised that its security depended on the region's security and that geographic separation could no longer be congruent with lower risk. Japanese academic Takashi Terada said: ‘Japan's security and defence policy itself has become more significant in Australia’s strategic environment and strategic planners in Canberra have argued in favour of establishing a direct dialogue with Japan at the policy level.’187

An alignment of view was necessary to build closer understanding in defence and security issues. This had been absent, and plans were made to facilitate understanding and the future conduct of cooperative activity. The Japanese MOFA provided an impetus from its Director for policy planning, Yukio Sato.188 Strategic dialogue with several countries, including Australia, started at this time.189 Plans were made to build closer cooperation with personnel exchanges, policy-planning discussions, visits by Australian strategic intelligence experts to Tokyo (started early 1990). All were harbingers of joint high-level strategic talks that began later in 1996.190

185 Armed with this endorsement of priorities for engagement with Japan, this candidate as DASA made his plan. 186 Department of Defence. ‘Strategic Review 1993.’ December 1993. Foreword by Defence Minister Ray. p. iii. 187 Takashi Terada ‘Thirty Years of the A-J Partnership in Asian Regionalism: Evolution and Future Directions.’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60(4): pp. 536-551. 188 Yukio Sato, ‘Trials of Multidimensional and Multidimensional Diplomacy—Backside History of’ Nakayama Proposal’ (Maruzen). 189 As presaged in: Department of Defense, Strategic Review, p. 21; Department of Defense, Defending Australia. 190 ‘Seeking Asian Engagement Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95’. Ed James Cotton and John Ravenhill. Chapter 9, OUP Melbourne 1997. 61 2.3.2. Japan looks for partners beyond the United States

Japan continued its cautious process of engaging with others outside the US-JMST. In February 1994, Hatakeyama told Embassy staff that Japan had established a panel to review Japanese security. This panel was the Higuchi Panel, established by Prime Minister Hosokawa, charged with conducting a thorough Japanese Defence Policy review. Hatakeyama also told the Embassy that Japan was still keen on maintaining strategic dialogue Australia at the three-star level and that Japan welcomed active defence cooperation with Australia.191

Australia had been concerned that the friction between Japan and the United States had spilled over into the security arena. Coupled with what seemed to Australia to be a lessening of US commitment to the region, Australia sought out partners, as Japan was also doing. A foreign affairs internal briefing paper in 1994 canvassed the view that Australia ‘should prepare for any reduced US role in Asia by developing closer defence and security ties with Japan, which could play a significant part in filling any void, [and] so that we can influence Japanese policies.’ 192 An Embassy cable to Canberra advised DFAT that Australia should ‘start preparing now for a situation where the US presence starts to be wound back, we should do all we can to encourage the Japanese to establish at least at the conceptual level between a moderate Japanese Defence role193 and the strategic interests of its neighbours and partners in the Indo-Pacific.’ The cable did not advocate a wider defence dialogue role. Still, it did advocate that ‘Australia’s aim should be to transition Japan from a situation where it is a direct strategic client of the US to one where it has a more self-reliant posture, still formally allied with the US, but embedded in a loose framework of shared strategic interests with its main White Paper neighbours, especially those that lie between Japan and Australia.’194

Australia was on its way to make a clear commitment to developing the A-JDSR for its interests as well as for shared strategic imperatives. Japan matched Australia’s security view when, on 12 August 1994, the Japanese Defense Agency released the Higuchi Report

191 NAA: A9737 1991/3932 Pt 5. f. 167. 192 NAA: A9737 1991/3932 Pt6. f. 227. 193 Original cable showed underlining. 194 NAA: A9737 1991/3932 Pt6. f. 227. 62 which advocated that Japan be more aggressive in making international contributions.’195 Like the Australian 1993 Strategic Assessment, the report focused on risk rather than threat as a basis for security responses. It declared that Japan would increase its normal strength and pursue a more aggressive security role in the region. The report caused some concern in the US and the 1995 National Defence Program Outline (a once-per-decade strategic assessment) did not mention the term ‘multilateral security cooperation’ to avoid upsetting discussions with the US. For the first time, it did mention a new role for the JSDF under the chapter heading ‘Contribution to building a more stable security environment.’ New SDF roles were PKO, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), security dialogue and other international exchange.

2.3.3. Japan and the US review their relationship and security posture

The seminal 1994 Higuchi review released under Japan Prime Minister Murayama Social Democrat Party Government advocated for a more active role for Japan in PKO and support for ‘cooperative security approaches in the Asia-Pacific’.196 The Japanese public was still wary of overseas military commitment, but an August 1994 survey showed almost 50% support for PKO. Building on the positive outcome of the earlier UNTAC experience, Gareth Evans told JDA Defence Minister Terazawa in a visit in October 1994 that Australia supported Japan’s involvement in PKO and PK enforcement under UN cover.197 Australian and Japan were slowly moving along the path to normal international cooperation.

The economic rise of Japan during the mid-1980s had concerned the United States and other nations, and the 1985 Plaza Accord which had depreciated the Japanese Yen had been insufficient to assuage American fears of Japanese economic dominance. 198 Terada describes a moment when the United States sought to have Australia join economically in ‘encircling Japan with ‘a network of free-trade arrangements’ in 1992’. However, Prime Minister Keating was not supportive, writing that ‘we [Australia] did not benefit from approaches that discriminated against Japan’ due to Australia’s positive balance of trade with Japan. This evoked ‘bitter reactions from the US’, as Keating had messaged the region

195 The ‘Higuchi Report’ as it became known was a report by Morihiro Hosokawa on the findings of an expert panel titled ‘Conference on Defense Problems’ and submitted in August 1994. 196 NAA: A9737 1991/3932 Pt 6. f. 238. 197 NAA: A9737 1991/3932 Pt 4. f. 104. 198 Michael J. Hiscox, The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies’. In John Ravenhill (ed.). Global Political Economy (First ed.). (Oxford; New York 2005). p. 65 63 that ‘there was a shift in our approach to Asia’, a symbol of which was Australia’s keener engagement in regionalism such as APEC.199

The United States saw in the early 1990s a more independent Japan and, once economic issues had been partially resolved, moved to re-invigorate its security relations with Japan with the issue in 1995 of the East Asia Security Review (called the Nye Report)200. Nye had said it was necessary ‘to breath oxygen’ in the US-Japan relationship proposing building on the US-led alliance system's underpinnings, the United States and its allies and dialogue partners (such as the ARF and APEC communities). These actions would build a strong and reliable regional military and security alliance. Both countries could use their alliance as the basis for a broader multilateral security structure. The EASR also clearly enunciated US resolve to remain engaged in the region: a statement welcomed by both Tokyo and Canberra.201 The EASR sought to build on the ASEAN concepts of multilateral security dialogue, the promotion of confidence and security-building measures, and the sharing of responsibility for global and regional security.

Chalmers Johnson said the unstated reason for this new declaration of US security interest in the region was ‘primarily a desire on the part of the American government to keep an eye on Japan, thus preventing it from undertaking international initiatives without consulting Washington and reassuring the rest of Asia that Japan will not rearm on its own.’202 The Nye Report prompted a review of defence cooperation guidelines between the United States and Japan which addressed mutual logistic support and cooperation issues. This review moved their relationship to a more mature basis for supporting the United States to meet its defence obligations to Japan under the US-JMST. It addressed issues such as medical support, ammunition supply and other items necessary to conduct military operations to defend Japan.203 The Nye Report was a call for Japan to be more outward-looking in an atmosphere of full engagement by Washington, a call soon answered tentatively but positively by Tokyo.204 Japan reaffirmed its support through a significantly

199 Takashi Terada in ‘Japan’s future in East Asia and the Pacific’, Mari Pangestu; Ligang Song eds. (Asia Pacific Press 2007). p. 59. 200 Nye, 1994, op.cit. 201 Interview: Japan-US Security Relations with US Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye, in Mainichi, 20 February 1995. 202 Chalmers Johnson, ‘The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia’. Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 16: February 1996. 203 Candidate’s contemporaneous notes. 204 Prime Minister Hosakawa’s Defence Panel’s report (the Higuchi Report) endorsed the concept of multilateral activity centred on the US-JMST. See: The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century. Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues to the Prime Minister. Tokyo, 12 August 1994. 64 different (compared with previous versions) New Defense Program Outline (NDPO), a twenty-year program of defence capability planning. The first NDPO after the Nye review coincided with Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton on 17 April 1996 declaring a new Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security.205

2.3.4. Australia seeks a closer A-JDSR

Foreign Minister Downer in a visit in June 1996 urged Japan to accept a closer A-JDSR and a more substantial role for Japan in Asia.206 In February 1996, at Australian request, Japan agreed to formal annual political and military207 and military to military talks at senior officials’ level between Japan and Australia. These were the first such talks with a country other than the US.208 The Australian government changed in March 1996, and the new Howard Government was ‘interested in building up closer defence cooperation with Japan on a step-by-step basis.’209 Dibb recalls his role at the quickening of the A-JDSR. He said ‘We have moved to a new phase in the relationship—one where our dialogues with Japan at MOFA and the JDA reflect considered realistic appraisals of the strategic environment: [we were] no longer ‘the echo of Washington’. He added that it was still obvious that the JDA was not a free hand in the A-JDSR, noting that in the first high-level talks defence talks Australia had with Japan, the defence interlocutor was the official responsible for international relations. The Government always filled this position and other key positions by senior people seconded from other key ministries such as Treasury and MOFA. The people controlled the ‘internal bureau’ who in turn controlled the JDA: these were the ‘naikyokuin’ (内局員, the ‘people in the inner circle’.

A three-way dialogue process between Australia, Japan and their mutual alliance partner now began to emerge. Prime Minister John Howard in 1996 in Tokyo for a summit, made a joint announcement with the US that both Tokyo and Canberra would assume more significant regional security roles in exchange for the continuous security commitment of

205 US Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region East Asian Strategic Review 1996-1997 NIDS Chapter 5.. No pagination. 206 Rix, op. cit. p 170. Quoting ‘Speech by Alexander Downer at Japan’s National Press Club, 6 June 1996’. 207 The Pol/Mil talks had been proposed by Ambassador Calvert in 1995 with talks to be chaired by officials from both foreign and defence sides in Tokyo. 208 Yukio Sato, Yoshio Kazusawa ‘Japan-Australia Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific’ ‘World Economic Review’. (January 1998). 209 NAA: A9737 1996/2578 of 20 June 1996, f. 277. 65 the US.210 Later that year, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, in a visit to Tokyo, spoke of both countries' fundamental interests. These were: regional stabilisation; US strategic presence; trade and investment; promoting liberalisation; and commitment to freedom and democracy.’211

Downer then considered proposing formal trilateral talks but was asked by his Department to hold back on this for fear of regional criticism, proposing instead he hold informal meetings in margins of other multilateral meetings—but not the ARF for fear of being overheard by China—and sounding out Japan and then the US. Downer agreed with this approach. Of note, Downer told his Department then that the ARF is ‘meritorious but is not going to underwrite regional security.’212 Each country’s relationship with the other became the most important security bilateral after that with the United States. For the first time, in 1997, Japan’s Defence White Paper named Australia in its section on bilateral defence exchanges with foreign countries. At this stage, China's rise was becoming an increasingly important issue for both Japan and Australia.’213 In a 1997 bilateral summit between Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Howard both affirmed for the first time that they would ‘make efforts to keep China engaged with the international community’.214

2.3.5 Societal Issues

Some elements of antipathy by Australia towards Japan were extant as late as the early 1990’s, but this was quietly put aside after retired Major-General Phillips as President of the Returned and Services League accepted a Japanese invitation to make a reparation visit in 2000. This visit was the first-ever by an Australian ex-service organisation. Philips said the visit was successful, but on return home, the media, and some elements of the RSL ‘raised a ruckus’ but eventually backed off.215 2.3.6 Japan accepts Australian overtures to build bilateral relations

210 Tomohiko Satake, ‘The origin of trilateralism? The US–Japan–Australia security relations in the 1990s’, Inter- national Relations of the Asia Pacific 11: 1, 2011, pp. 87–114. 211 Rix, op.cit. p. 170 ‘Australia and Japan: Cooperation in the Region,’ Introductory Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Japan's National Press Club, Tokyo. 212 NAA A9737 1996/2578 of 17 June 1996, f. 276. 213 Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings. ‘Japan–Australia security cooperation in the bilateral and multilateral contexts’ International affairs Vol 4 2018. Oxford university press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 214 Hugh White in ‘Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle, W. Tow, M Thomson, Y Yamamoto and S Limaye, eds. (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, UK, 2007) pp. 101-111. 215 Peter Philips, National President of the RSL, private interview. 29 October 2019. 66 Throughout the 1990s, the A-JDSR was largely marked by dialogue, but it started to become substantive dialogue, and there were other useful exchanges. JDA Director- General Fumio Kyuma and Minister of Defense Ian McLachlan had the second Japan- Australia Defence Ministerial-level Meeting in Japan in 1997 (Minister Robert Ray came to Japan in 1992). They agreed to: an increased level of dialogue; strengthened PKO cooperation; closer MSDF/RAN engagement; and better information exchange (which included assistance to Japan on developing their nascent DIHQ). 216 Kyuma made a reciprocal visit to Australia in January 1998. His visit came not long after China had fired ballistic missiles around Taiwan, and China’s behaviour and strategic intention became a permanent agenda on the Ministerial talks and other interlocutions. By then Japanese Ambassador to Australia, Yukio Sato was promoting the A-JDSR based on ‘strengthening the US-led regional order’. He later said: ‘The US and Australia's allies, Japan and Australia are working on a new military cooperation based on an alliance with the United States.’217

It is notable that this burgeoning defence relationship was significant in that ‘it was, for a change, not a mediated relationship’218 NIDS researcher Sajima had made this observation when the US was wanting to ensure that it controlled the ‘hub-and-spokes’ system of alliances from the centre and that Japan did not stray too far from their close attention. Needless, as seen later in the development of the A-J-US trilateral, it was clearly in US interests to see closer coordination between like-minded alliance partners.

With the return of conservative government in 1996, some commentators were concerned that new Prime Minister John Howard would draw on conservative values and would focus on the ANZUS alliance at the expense of building closer relations with Asia. However, Howard was keen to capitalise on the opportunity to build on the concepts in Northeast Asia listed in the Nye Report, likely with an eye to seeking continued US engagement in the wider region.219 Howard told the candidate: ‘It was never my intention to just focus on ANZUS. I saw the benefit of building a close relationship with Japan, China, Indonesia. As I said in my autobiography ‘Asia first, not Asia only’’. He continued this stance

216 Des Ball, ‘The Role of Japan-Australia Security Relations’, pp. 38-40. 217 Yukio Sato, ‘From’ Distant Country ‘to’ Partner’ Diplomatic Forum (August 1997 issue) page 43. 218 Sajima, Naoko, Japan and Australia: A New Security Partnership? SDSC Working Paper no. 292 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra 1996). p 1. 219 Office of the Secretary for Defense, US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, US Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1995. Joseph Nye, then US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs. 67 throughout his tenure as Prime Minister and worked to get Japan, the US and Australia to build a Trilateral Strategic relationship. Howard’s actions eventuated in Sydney's first formal TSD in 2006, which laid the groundwork for the seminal 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC).220 Howard said of his first official, but second as Prime Minister, visit to Japan 5-9 July 1996 that the purpose and expectations of the visit were: to build a relationship based on personal trust; establish a partnership for the 21st century; develop bilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia; and create collaboration in the global community.

2.3.7. Japan and Australia build stronger bilateral security ties

The Koizumi Government decided to dispatch a JSDF task group in Samawah, Iraq for the period 2004-2006 to provide reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Iraq. 221 Japanese law did not allow the use of force in a conflict area and the JSDF was unable to protect itself from attack.222 The Dutch had been provided this protection in the early part of the JSDF deployment, but as the Dutch were pulling out, this left the JSDF in a difficult situation. Japan formally requested Australia to provide Force Protection to the deployed JSDF element.223 Michael Thawley, Australian Ambassador to the US at this time said: ‘It was a real advance for the A-JDSR that Japan asked us to protect the JSDF in Iraq—this idea was discussed by the White House with the Australian Embassy and then raised by the White House with Japan and by the Embassy in Canberra. Japan did not need much encouragement.’

One step was to get the US and the Japanese Embassy in Washington to encourage the Japanese to invite us to protect them in Iraq. 224 Murray McLean, then Australian Ambassador to Japan225 recalled that he had previously ‘negotiated with non-defence officials (and with the assistance of the British Embassy) for Japan to accept an unsolicited

220 King, op cit., p 91. 221 Prime Minister Koizumi farewelled the JSDF deployment on 1 February 2004. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumiphoto/2004/02/01asahikawa_e.html. 222 Matteo Dian. ‘The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance – the Eagle and the Chrysanthemum’, Chandos Publishing, Oxford, UK. 2014. p 141. JSDF protection in Samawah was provided primarily by Australian troops as the Japanese soldiers were prohibited from engaging Iraqi guerrillas unless they came under fire. 223 Force protection (FP) consists of preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against military forces. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, November 2019. 224 Thawley, op. cit. 225 Murray McLean was Australian Ambassador to Tokyo for eight years (2004-11) under seven Japanese Administrations, Koizumi 2003-06, Abe I 2006-07, Fukuda 2007-08, Aso 2008-09, Hatoyama 2009-10, Kan 2010-11, 68 offer for the ADF to provide that Force Protection.’226 McLean said ‘bilateral relations after Iraq were very different. Japan began to take Australia more seriously, as one of the primary security partners of choice.’227

The later establishment of the 2007 JDSC was a surprise to many. It had been clear that Australia was interested in making a more formal statement on reciprocal understandings. Successive Japan Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers had declared the need to move together on defence and security matters. Nevertheless, the commentariat had seen no precipitating action that might have caused this event. Of course, the overlapping of two conservative administrations—Howard at the end of his time and Abe starting his first administration—provided fertile ground, but what engendered the trust in Australia that would create a spark for declarations of shared security interests?

McLean explains the background to event in the context of engendered trust. Soon after his arrival in December 2004, DFAT had tasked him to prepare for a seminal meeting between Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi in Tokyo on 20 April 2005. This meeting was to lay down an agreement for Australia and Japan to begin a feasibility study as a prelude to formal negotiation of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement.228 Subsequently, this was to have wider security connotations.’229 McLean said ‘the issue of the potential Free Trade Agreement was to provide a focus for Howard in his meeting with Koizumi.’ It was widely believed in Australian circles that ‘there was little chance of an FTA being agreed with Japan due to its past protectionist history.’ However, Japan nevertheless agreed to progress the issue despite the expected strong resistance from the Japanese agricultural lobby (and part of Koizumi’s conservative political base). McLean said ‘the support that the ADF was providing the JSDF in Iraq had been noted and welcomed by conservative Japanese politicians’. This support had helped quell the heat of resistance to a free trade agreement.

From a relationship initially based on economic underpinnings, the activities conducted under the A-JDSR were bearing both economic and security fruit. McLean added: ‘Japan

226 Murray McLean, private interview. 1 May 2020. 227 Satake, private interview Murray McLean, Australian Ambassador to Japan, 2004–11, 11 March 2015. 228 Ibid. 229 Koizumi’s press release on the meeting implied a link between the issue of ADF support for the JSDF and the possibility of a FTA. Koizumi said: ‘Japan and Australia will further expand their areas of exchange.’ Speaking to the JSDF deployment in Iraq ‘I intend to realize a smooth return of the SDF.’ In the same release both prime ministers agreed to conduct study into a free trade agreement. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumiphoto/2005/04/20australia_e.html

69 now had Australia as a trusted partner – and not just because of our shared linkage with the US-–and this was paying dividends in both an economic and a defence and security manner.’230

2.3.8. Contribution of Regionalism to the A-JDSR

Koizumi supported Australia joining in an emerging East Asian regionalism: the beginning of the East Asian Summit (EAS), held in Malaysia in December 2005. Japan wished to see Australia engaged in its proposed East Asian Community due to the long-term relationship with Australia and a wish ‘to check China’s growing political influence in the region’.231

The Howard government’s later approach to regionalism had been missing during the first three terms (1996–2004), but he showed later interest in furthering relations with East Asian countries by ‘promoting East Asian regionalism since late 2004’.232

2.3.9. Beginnings of Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

In the early 2000s, Japan began to develop closer security relations with Australia, and the Japanese public became more comfortable with its government dealing with security matters outside the US-JMST. This period marked the beginning of formalised three-way security talks between the US and its major alliance in the Pacific which had beginnings in the separate bilateral discussions the US was conducting. Ambassador McLean tells of his involvement in this development when he was (in 2001)233 the Head, North Asia Division, working to DFAT Secretary Ashton Calvert.234 Calvert was working with US Deputy Secretary of State Rich Armitage235 and the then Japanese MOFA Vice-Minister on ‘high- level dialogue’ between the US, Japan, and Australia. All interlocutors considered that the three countries ‘should be working together, notably including Japan, taking a more active international security role in the AP region.’ The fear of Chinese objections caused participants to coordinate and initially conduct their meetings secretly in the margins of conferences such as the ARF. In 2001, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer retold the

230 Ibid, McLean. 231 Takashi Terada in ‘Japan’s future in East Asia and the Pacific’. Mari Pangestu; Ligang Song, eds. (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2007) pp. 73-74. 232 Ibid. p. 56. 233 McLean, op.cit. 234 Calvert was DFAT Secretary April 1998 – January 2005 following his time as Ambassador to Japan. 235 Armitage was US Deputy Secretary of State and close associate of Secretary of State Powell under George W Bush. 70 history saying he had Armitage that ‘Australia, Japan and the US should meet once a year at the ministerial level in what became known as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’. The first meeting was in Sydney in 2006. ‘I hosted the meeting, and it was attended by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Aso.’ Downer’s view was that there needed to be ‘better architecture to lock the Americans into the region and guarantee Chinese power was balanced.’ He added that Abe had wanted, in 2007, to extend the trilateral dialogue to include India. While this happened in the form of the initial QUAD, Australia lost appetite due fear of Chinese criticism, and this extended trilateral, itself springing from the A-JDSR bilateral, became the basis in 2021 for a new regional security architecture, based on keeping the United States in the region, and balancing China.

The 2007 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was the forerunner of the present A-J-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. This forerunner TSD was soon achieved at leaders-level, when President Bush, Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Howard conducted the first trilateral summit meeting in the margins of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in September 2007.236 Howard said: ‘Our building relations with Japan was very much our own initiative, but the US would have been pleased—it would be wrong to assume otherwise’.237

2.3.10. Bilateral ties strengthened with three-way activities under the A-J-US Trilateral

Thawley said that the growth of a sense of strategic alignment between Australia and Japan really began under Japanese Prime Minister who pushed back against Prime Minister Mohd Mahathir’s concept of an East Asian economic caucus that would exclude Australia. This interest stemming from reassessments in Japan's foreign policy about China’s possible predominance in East Asia, the need for more regional acceptance of Japan’s security interests, as well as improving the effectiveness of cooperation under the alliance with the United States. These all led eventually to the establishment of the trilateral defence talks. Thawley noted that he and Embassy officers who went on to occupy key positions in defence, Prime Minister & Cabinet, and the Prime Minister’s office had

236 ‘George W. Bush’s APEC schedule in Sydney’, Daily Telegraph, 30 Aug. 2007. 237 Private interview. John Howard, Prime Minister 1996-2007). 1 July 2020. 71 pushed hard on the TSD issue in Washington when he was Ambassador in the United States. He added that US Secretary of State Rich Armitage had been much in favour.238

Previously, the United States had been possessive of the US-Japan strategic dialogue process. This position changed under President George Bush, who ‘consulted Australia on everything, especially the security relationship’. Thawley said, ‘Under Keating and Howard, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet was ‘pushing the issues’, but DFAT was always worried about China’s reaction. DFAT was focused more on diplomacy, sometimes to the cost of strategic vision.’239

As trust grew, Japan under Abe moved to receive overtures from Australia about a more formalised A-JDSR leading to the 2007 JDSC—a seminal event for the A-JDSR, but which was ‘one step short of a formal alliance’.240 The agreement ‘was a significant step for both countries’ and ‘phenomenal only hint[ing] at the types of things that Australia could do with Japan’.241

2.4 Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation

Howard had been highly supportive of the A-JDSR throughout his long tenure as Prime Minister and his interest culminated in the 2007 JDSC. In 2006 Embassy Minister- Counsellor Bruce Miller (himself Ambassador for five years 2001-16) had been ‘working this issue with the Japanese even though there was opposition from Japan who was very sure that their constitution debarred any form of alliance’. Thawley said of the JDSC that Australia well recognised Japan’s constitutional limits concerning alliances, but ‘we were hoping for something as close as possible for both sides to an alliance.’ Thawley had in the back of his mind the concept 1995 Indonesia-Australia Security Agreement (IASA), of which he had been the principal architect.242 That document had not been an alliance but was close to one, requiring only that parties ‘consulted’ if there ‘adverse challenges.’243

238 Satake considers that the US encouraged the TSD to make sure Australia stayed aligned with Japan and the US side so that it ‘would not grow too close to China’, private interview. op. cit. 239 Thawley, op. cit. 240 John Howard, ‘Lazarus rising: a personal and political autobiography’, (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2010), p. 536. 241 Interview, Satake. Scott Dewar, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, 11 March 2015. 242 Thawley, op. cit. 243 The Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement - Issues and Implications. Research Paper 25, 1995-6. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9596/96rp25 72 The JDSC was agreed in Tokyo in March 2007 when Howard called on Abe.244 The draft agreement was ‘a skeleton with some ideas’, and both sides needed to negotiate further to flesh out the details. There was real concern that the JDSC not be seen by others as an alliance as Defence had been seeking (with DFAT and the Embassy pushing back at Defence). Abe was seeking to make his security mark (changing Article 9, changing the JDA to become the JMOD) so Australia did not have to work so hard to convince Japan to accept the JDSC. It was clear that the success of the JDSC was due to Abe’s support. Still, the Samawah experience had generated positive views of Australia and its contribution to regional security and was an essential factor in achieving Japan’s agreement. Howard told the author: ‘A significant impact was the decision of Australia to provide Force Protection to the JSDF in Iraq.’ Japan very much appreciated that we were to send forces to protect them. It was in Australia’s interests to do so.’245Apart from constitutional limitations, Japan’s defence establishment was reluctant to move towards any form of alliance because there was a consensus that this would take away resources that Japan would otherwise spend on the US-JMST.246

Defence in Australia had been pushing hard for some form of alliance in the leadup to the declaration. Greg Sheridan reported that Howard’s Defence Adviser Andrew Shearer had briefed Howard to consider offering Abe a formal security treaty.247 Howard told the candidate that, from his perspective: ‘An alliance was never part of our thinking. We were ‘allies’, but there was never any thought of an alliance, and we were very sensitive to the constraints that Japan’s Constitution imposed on Japan. On the question of possible Chinese criticism, Howard added: ‘It seemed to me [at the time of the signing] that the most effective way to counterbalance China was unified action to the extent possible by the democracies of the region, US, Japan, (and later India).’ Howard considered that counterbalancing should not criticised because the United States, Japan and Australia had a long commitment to democracy. He added: ‘Of course, relations with China were easier then—now there is belligerence—and we had hoped that China’s previous leaders were seeking calmer and better relations. It was then not aimed at constraining China.’248

244 Howard said ‘Abe and I were very close having met in the 2007 APEC meeting in Sydney (5-6 September 2007) with the TSD (with US President Bush), the first time that we had had such a high-level meeting’. 245 John Howard, Prime Minister 1996-2007), private interview. 1 July 2020. 246 Japanese Embassy Official, private interview. 4 January 2019. 247 Greg Sheridan. ‘Security Treaty rejected by Tokyo.’ The Australian, 12 March 2007. P. 1. 248 John Howard, Prime Minister (1996-2007), private interview. 1 July 2020. 73 Although not a formal alliance with an identification of threats and declarations of mutual military support, the JDSC ‘provides that Japan and Australia will consult on common threats and collaboration to prevent such threats within their constitutional frameworks’. This A-JDSR invigoration stemmed largely from ‘a reappraisal of Australia’s importance by Japan, producing a much more positive response to Australian overtures for closer ties.’ The JDSC was not just a declaration of common security principles but was a real declaration of commitment, albeit in certain areas of cooperation. It only envisaged joint cooperative action in several non-traditional security (NTS) areas, but it did presage future strategic collaborative activity.249

At the time, Tow argued that Australia needed to decide whether it would follow a regional engagement strategy to avoid strategic shock or follow a path that saw China as a rising threat that Australia (and others) could manage by working with ‘like-minded allies’. Tow did not accept that the JDSC, like other ‘hedging, balancing’ or ‘bandwagonning’ postures extant in 2007 would lead to either ‘complete instability’ or inevitable conflict’. He did warn then that China could see the JDSC as the beginning of containment. He did more presciently consider at the time, that the US needed to embrace ‘cooperative multilateral instrumentalities’ as it considered its future role in Asia.250

2.5 Building on the Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation

Since the signing of the JDSC, the region has seen: the rise of a more assertive China; a United States that has arguably been seeking to diminish its international commitments to allies; challenges to global public health; and increased instability in the world. Nevertheless, and perhaps because of these challenges, the A-JDSR has been steadily, but not spectacularly, growing in cooperative activity. There have been TSDs in most years. Bilaterally, Australia and Japan have conducted annual Defence Ministerial and regular Prime Ministerial visits and a busy military exercise program. These have helped shape the understandings of parties involved and defined areas for cooperative activity.

249 Aurelia George Mulgan, A-J relations – new directions ASPI Strategic Insights, Note 36. 2007. p 7. 250 William Tow, “The Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Strategic Geometries”, Australia Policy Forum 07-16 Nautilus Institute at RMIT, 6 September 2007.

74 2.5.1. Academic views of the JDSC

Academics considered the JDSC was based on concerns to act against China. However, NIDS analyst Yusuke Ishihara made the case that Japan-Australia collaborative approaches towards China needed to be understood by others in a broader perspective. He proposed a ‘bilateral-plus’ approach in which Japan and Australia sought to build the ‘bilateral cooperation into a wider application of their trilateral cooperation with the US and their respective regional multilateral efforts.’ Ishihara added that hedging was then a common concept in the literature.251 This hedging was ‘realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national military modernisation programs’.252 Another Japanese academic argued that Japan-Australia security relations developed as ‘collective hedging’ aimed at China, with Terada characterising the two countries as putting China ‘in check’. 253 In Australia, Mulgan saw bilateral cooperation as a ‘containment coalition’ against China.254 William Tow described the relationship using ‘competitive strategic geometry’ to deal with China.255 Not all these assessments endured, especially in the context of the close alignment of Australia’s and Japan’s view of China.

At the time, the strategic impact of the declaration was not clear. Bisley noted that some had argued that it was a ‘small but qualitatively significant shift in the essential features of the regional security architecture.’ He thought then that it was ‘of little strategic significance to the broader patterns of East Asian security over the short to medium term’. However, it was an important development for Japan and Australia and ‘a leading-edge indicator of broader forces for change that are increasingly present in East Asia.’256 Doubts over US( regional commitment, and a challenging China have since lifted the value of the 2007 declaration and the A-JSDR.

251Yusuke Ishihara, ‘Japan-Australia Security Relations and the Rise of China: Pursuing the ‘Bilateral-plus’ approaches’, NIDS, Japan. UNISCI Discussion Paper No 32, May 2013. p 81. 252 Evan Medeiros ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1 (2005), p. 145. 253 Ishihara quotes: Yamamoto in ‘Triangularity and US-Japanese relations: Collaboration, collective hedging and identity politics’, in Tow, William; Thomson, Mark, Yamamoto, Yoshinobu, and Limaye Sato (eds.) (2007): Asia-Pacific Security- US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle, New York, Routledge, p. 77. Terada, Takashi: ‘Evolution of the A-J Security Partnership Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance with the United States?’ Asia Visions, vol. 35 (October 2010), p. 9. 254 Aurelia George Mulgan ‘Breaking the Mould-Japan’s subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 1 (April 2008), p. 54. 255 William T Tow, 2008, op.cit. 256 Nick Bisley, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Volume: 62, Issue: 1, pp. 38-52. 2008.

75 On the issue of hedging, McDevitt and Kelly in an article on trilaterals say ‘Strategists attempt to shape outcomes and hedge against an uncertain future.’ Japan considers maintaining its alliance with the US is central to its security and working with others is ‘a key element in such a hedging strategy.’ Japan’s long-term objective is ‘to be prepared to restrain China, should it opt to misuse the economic and military strength it is rapidly accumulating.’ By doing this, Japan can ensure regional stability.’257 This first use of ‘hedging’ in connection to the trilaterals is significant, and although neither McDevitt nor Kelly defines hedging, or state how hedging is done, its link to trilaterals dates from this period.258

2.5.2. Political Changes in both Australia and Japan

Despite changes in leadership in both countries, the A-JDSR in the decade after 2007 largely maintained its course at bilateral and trilateral levels. This was because both countries recognised the power shifts due to the rise of China and the relative decline of US power.259 A Prime Ministerial summit between Prime Ministers Rudd and Fukuda in July 2008 maintained this bi-partisan global view. They declared they would continue strengthening the bilateral relationship based on the 2007 agreement made under conservative governments in each country.260 However, the new Rudd government did flag aspiration for a more comprehensive security framework when Rudd described Asia- Pacific security as being multi-layered, mentioning the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN as useful vehicles.261

Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper proposed a substantial boost in Australia’s air and naval power amid China’s increasing military presence in the region. It predicted that ‘China by 2030 will become a major driver of economic activity both in the region and globally and will have strategic influence beyond East Asia’. It added that ‘by some

257 Michael A. McDevitt, James A. Kelly in ‘US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a ‘Virtual Alliance’’, (Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 154. 258 John Hemmings, Quasi-Alliances, Managing the Rise of China, and Domestic Politics: The US-Japan-Australia Trilateral 1991-2015. PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2017. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3598/ p. 27. 259Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, ‘Japan–Australia security cooperation in the bilateral and multilateral contexts. International Affairs Vol 94, Issue 4. 2018. pp 815-834 260 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Joint Statement by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia on’. 12 June 2008. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/2plus2joint08.html 261 ‘Building on ASEAN’s Success: Towards an Asia Pacific Century’, 12 August 2008. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies January 2009. 76 measures, China has the potential to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy around 2020’.262 As this time, Australia was hedging its alliance on the prospect of a regional security framework based on the A-JDSR and an undefined structure based on extant regional multilateral organisations. As shown later, this framework is yet to emerge. Japan’s 2010 National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) also noted ’a global shift in the balance of power with the rise of powers such as China, India and Russia, along with the relative change of influence of the United States’. It also affirms that ‘the United States continues to play the most significant role in securing global peace and stability’.263 The 2010 NDPG recommended that Japan strengthen its partnerships with like-minded democracies, especially South Korea and Australia.264

Domestically, Japan experienced a political and security challenge in the ‘2011 Triple Disaster’ when the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami killed many, devastated a large area, and destroyed a nuclear power station.265 Australia contributed very effectively to the disaster relief mission with immediate military and civilian assistance; a contribution much appreciated, and one that was reciprocated by the JASDF providing aid to the 2020 Australian bushfires. Australia’s response was instrumental in lifting Australia’s commitment to Japan’s national security higher in the eyes of the Japanese public.

2.5.3. The A-JDSR languishes under Labour due to fear of Chinese criticism

The election of a Labour Government under Kevin Rudd, a Mandarin-speaking Prime Minister, signalled a change in Australian priorities in the region. Rudd paid close attention to Australian relations with China. Governments in Japan after Abe’s defeat in 2007 created changes in their international priorities. The A-JDSR languished for some time due to lack of attention on both sides of the relationship. Bruce Miller said of this time: ‘Kevin Rudd had a strategic vision for the [A-JDS] relationship and wanted to do more with it but handled the Japanese poorly at key moments’.266 He added, the Japanese government, like other governments, carefully watches how new Heads of Government prioritise their

262 Australian Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), p. 34. 263 Japan Ministry of Defence, The National Defence Programme Guidelines for FY2011. Tokyo, December 2010, p. 3. 264 Ibid. p. 8. 265 Samuels, Richard J. 3.11: Disaster and change in Japan. Cornell University Press, 2013. 266 Bruce Miller, Ambassador to Tokyo, Private interview. 4 July 2020. 77 inaugural overseas diplomatic visits as an indicator of relative priorities.267 Prime Minister Rudd’s inaugural visit was to China, the United States and Europe. He did not visit Japan until later. Miller added that Rudd’s successor, Julie Gillard, did enhance Australia’s reputation in Japan when she visited the tsunami disaster area. Miller notes that when Prime Minister Gillard later visited China, the Tokyo Embassy told Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga of Gillard’s message to the Chinese leadership of Australian opposition to China’s ‘use of force and coercion’. This helped rebuild trust in the political dimension of the A-JDSR.268

Later, on Rudd’s return to the prime ministership, Miller had to explain why the second Rudd Government supported China’s hosting of the G20 that Japan had been expecting to host. Japan blamed Rudd for going out of his way to offend them. Miller explained to the MFA that Australia’s support for China was because ‘China hosting the G20 bound it more closely into global rules-based framework’. Some officials told Miller that Australia’s handling of this ‘would affect the bilateral relationship’—a level of rebuke not often used. This unfortunate misunderstanding did not then help engender closer ties in the A-JDSR, an unfortunate outcome because Rudd wanted to strengthen the relationship and saw the importance of a robust strategic partnership with Japan for Australia.

Former National Security adviser to Prime Minister Rudd, Duncan Lewis accompanied Rudd on his visit to February 2008 China, and again later that year in August to Japan. While in Japan Rudd signed a renewal to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (hereafter ACSA). Lewis said that ‘Japan was then very keen to do more and were more ‘forward-leaning’ than we were on defence cooperation’. However, there was a feeling in Australia that Japan ‘might get into hot water’ over China. There was a reciprocal Japanese view that Australia was untrustworthy because it was too close to China economically. This second assessment was shared by others in the Japan-watchers area who had been alarmed over Rudd not visiting Japan on his first overseas visit. Rudd was ‘focused on China’ and had not been as supportive of ties with Japan as he was with China, likely due to his familiarity with China and Australia’s China trade imperative, and at the time, the

267 ‘Japan-passing’ was addressed in: ‘Japanese media scrutinises Rudd ‘snub’’. The World Today. Private interview Shane McLeod. 31 March 2008. https://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2008/s2203602.htm 268 Bruce Miller, unpublished memoirs, provided to author. 12 Aug 2020. 78 state of Chinese-Australian relations. Rudd’s visit to Japan balanced the books with Japan.269

2.5.4. The A-JDSR moves to a new level under new conservative Governments in Japan and Australia

In the decade since the 2007 JDSC, the A-JDSR did move forward even in a period of political change on both sides. There had been three Japanese Prime Ministers during the time when the Liberal Democratic Party had been displaced from long-term government by the Democratic Party of Japan and there had been similar changes in Australia during the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd period. 270 Nevertheless, during the Japanese interregnum of LDP domination: the 2010 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was agreed,271 consolidating Australia as Japan’s number two security partner and both sides were able to achieve such milestones as the establishment of 2+2 ministerial level talks.272

By September 2013 there were again conservative governments in both countries. Australia had just elected the Abbott government, and Abe had come back to government in December 2012 for the second time as Prime Minister. A-J relations had not been foremost on the Japanese political agenda after Abe’s first government, and no Japanese Prime Minister had visited Australia since the first Abe administration. With Abe back Australia again became high on the Japanese agenda for priority engagement. Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida visited Australia in January 2013, only one month after Abe returned to power. Japan was taking a firmer and more realist approach to protecting its strategic interests in response to Chinese assertiveness. Soon after assuming government and ten months after Abe’s return, Abbott was preparing to visit Japan. Ambassador Miller said that Abe had told him that he wanted to make it a real success but was ‘very attentive to handling signalling strategically’, including such proposals as a trilateral US/Japan/Australia leaders’ summit.’ Miller had discussed with Abe the prospects of a ‘defence cooperation agreement’ that Abe thought would take time. Discussions were made with Abbott’s national security adviser, Andrew Shearer, to ‘take the bilateral

269 Duncan Lewis. Director-General, Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation, private interview. 10 February 2021. 270 Hatoyama 16 Sep 2009 – 8 Jun 2009, Kan 8 Jun 2010 – 2 Sep 2011, Noda 2 Sep 2011 – 26 December 2012. 271 On 19 May 2010, the ‘Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan (JSDF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) (Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement [ACSA]) was signed in Tokyo.

79 relationship to a new level.’ The approach taken was to develop ’a genuinely personal connection’ between the two Prime Ministers—to significant effect as the press reported they ‘have great chemistry and get on well’. The Abbott visit was a great success with an agreement to conduct biennial visits, something very new for the A-JDSR and a change in Japanese priorities that followed the Rudd’s ‘by-pass’ of Japan in favour of China on his first overseas visit.273

A reciprocal visit to Australia by Abe in July 2014 was also a great success, with Abe speaking in English in the Australia Parliament where he declared a ‘special bilateral relationship that will expand into the field of security’. Abe announced that Japan wished to lift practical defence cooperation to a ‘new level’ by improving interoperability between the two countries’ defence organisations and further expanding combined exercises and Trilateral Strategic cooperation with the US. There was an initial agreement-in-principle to negotiate a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) to allow cross logistic support for activities and work together in joint defence research and development, including the construction of Australia’s next-generation submarines. They committed to support the conduct of TSDs with the United States and to support the East Asia Summit as the premier forum for addressing regional challenges.274

Miller said the demise of Abbott as Prime Minister in September 2015 was a shock to Japan. Both sides had made a significant investment in the personal relationship between the two leaders. Still, it became clear that it was ‘shared values and interests which drove our cooperation, and the personal affinity was ‘another bonus’. Prime Minister Turnbull visited Japan in December 2015, continuing strategic dialogue continuing. Talks focused on submarines, and Japanese Defence Minister Nakatani emerged as a strong and vocal supporter of the A-JDSR.275

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop visited Japan in February 2016. On her call on Abe and Foreign Minister Kishida, she called for ‘greater strategic and defence cooperation with Japan to counterbalance a ‘profound transformation’ in strategic circumstances brought on ‘in part by a rising China.’ Bishop’s initiative was ‘the culmination of 26 years of patient

273 Miller, op. cit. 274 MOFA, Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe Joint Statement ‘Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century’. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044543.pdf 275 Miller, op. cit. 80 Australian diplomacy, referencing CDF Gration’s ground-breaking first defence visit to Japan in 1989.’276 Dupont noted that taking the A-JDSR ‘to a higher level would facilitate regional responses to emerging threats, position both countries to play a more influential role in regional affairs and create new opportunities for shaping US policy in Asia and the Pacific.’277 Bishop made a contiguous visit to Beijing where her call on counterpart Wang Yi was upstaged by US announcements of new Chinese militarisation in the South China Sea. Bishop made no adverse comments to her hosts that such a deployment repudiated ‘President Xi Jinping's public pledge not to militarise its man-made islands’. She did tell Wang that Australia has ‘an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea’.278 The press asked Wang at the following press conference whether Australia was, together with the US and Japan, intent on containing China's rise. Wang’s reply was ‘I don't think that is Australia's policy,’ adding that no ‘country or power in the world can stop that rise.’ The Turnbull government sought then to differentiate itself from the belligerent statements made by the United States. The conservative policy of maintaining ambiguity over Chinese criticism lasted until early-2020 when the Morrison government attracted aggressive Chinese trade action and initiated a position of passive resistance.

In July 2016, Japan, Australia, and the United States held a TSD for the first time in three years. In August that year, Japanese and Australian defence ministers met to confirm that they would promote even stronger defence cooperation. At the Japan–Australia summit meeting a month later, Australian Prime Minister Turnbull met Prime Minister Abe for his first meeting as prime minister. They agreed to strengthen bilateral security and defence cooperation, and trilateral cooperation with the United States.279 Satake and Hemmings suggested that this was ‘partially attributable to the continued Japanese and Australian fears of abandonment. The impetus for the TSD was also provoked by the relative decline of American military capabilities vis-à-vis the Chinese, and domestic turmoil in American politics. Together, these threatened to limit US influence in the region through a new reciprocal approach towards alliances and hostility to multilateral trade agreements.’280

276 In time of uncertainty, Canberra betting on deeper ties with Japan. Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 2020. https://www.smh.com.au/world/in-time-of-uncertainty-canberra-betting-on-deeper-ties-with-japan-julie-bishop- 20160216-gmvjv4.html 277 The Australian, 20 February 2016. Alan Dupont. 278 ‘Julie Bishop's trip to Japan and China marked by tension over South China Sea’. Sydney Morning Herald. Philip Wen, 19 February 2016. https://www.smh.com.au/world/bishops-trip-to-japan-and-china-marked-by-tension-over-south-china-sea-20160219- gmy67j.html 279 Satake and Hemmings, op. cit. 280 Ibid. 81 In November 2019, Prime Ministers Abe and Morrison agreed in Darwin to deepen defence cooperation in the face of China’s growing influence in the region. They expressed their support for a free multilateral trading system. They declared support for Japan’s concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ with its promotion of freedom of navigation, the rule of law and financially viable infrastructure projects from Asia to Africa.281 The press release after the meeting said: ‘Japan and Australia will further deepen our special strategic partnership to realise our shared vision of a free and open Indo- Pacific,’ Morrison went further, declaring that both countries were resolute in resolving disputes in the South China Sea, ‘peacefully and in accordance with international law’ and stating opposition to ‘any actions that could increase tensions within the region.’ Prime Ministers Morrison and Suga made an ‘agreement-in-principle’ in November to soon sign a Reciprocal Access Agreement (hereafter RAA) to facilitate joint military exercises, and perhaps operations, in each other’s countries.

There is a view in the National Security Communities in Japan and Australia that Japan now views Australia as a ‘quasi-ally’.282 There was an understanding that cooperative ‘capacity building in the Asia-Pacific and the RAA will elevate relations to a new level leading to a new security framework.’283 These two actions could lift the relationship to a more mature level.

When the RAA is in place, the A-JDSR will have all the foundational elements that would allow Australia and Japan to operate in cooperative military action, if this were in both countries' interests. As shown later in this thesis, such a ‘quasi-alliance’ with all military enabling underpinnings in place is effectively a ‘virtual alliance’. A strong bilateral relationship will be stronger if it is part of a framework that includes multiple bilateral arrangements, and perhaps more importantly, effective multilateral organisations.

281 John Bolton, US National Security Adviser says: ‘even in our otherwise indifferent administration, the FOIP concept was a way to enhance horizontal ties among like-minded nations’. The Room where it happened. Simon & Schuster, New York. 2020. 282 Private Interview General Shigeru Iwasaki, 12 December 2019, and Graham Dobell, ‘After Abe: Where to for Australia’s quasi-alliance with Japan?’ The Strategist, 6 October 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/after-abe-where-to-for-australias-quasi-alliance-with- japan/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist +CID_47e6749d0ea8a90df9228c379919b3b9&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=After%20Abe%20Where %20to%20for%20Australias%20quasi-alliance%20with%20Japan. 283 Japanese Government official A, private interview. 5 March 2019. 82 2.6 Multilateralism and the A-JDSR

The A-JDSR has grown from small beginnings from the late 1980s and continues to grow. Concurrently, both Japan and Australia helped in this period establish many regional multilateral organisations. No history of the bilateral, and later trilateral relationship between Australia and Japan is complete without a discussion of both countries’ engagement in multilateral organisations: both global (such as the United Nations), and regional (such as the EAS), and well as conceptual multi-relationships such as Abe’s concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

2.6.1. Building bilateralism within a regional framework

Kersten considered that Australia and Japan in the late 1990s both sought to place the A-J bilateral relationship into the context of a regional framework which would ‘create an A-J negotiating axis within multilateral forums’ This would allow for an expansion of the relationship beyond trade. She added that events such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and an economic turndown in Japan caused both nations to reconsider their views. She also considered that Australia’s involvement in East Timor in 1999 had not been well-received initially in Japan with some believing the Australian Coalition government under Howard was ‘less committed to the kind of Asian regionalism that Japan regarded as desirable’.284 However, this negative view was negated by Japan’s involvement in the UN International Force in East Timor and UN Transitional Assistance in East Timor operations. Japan balanced its Constitutional strictures on the use of force against its assumed international obligations under the UN Charter to join Australia in East Timor. Kersten considered that the UN operations ‘were a model for how Australia and Japan could act as a bilateral axis in a multilateral context’ demonstrating a neat fit between an extant structure such as the A-JDSR and its adaption to accommodate inclusion into a multi-national cooperative activity.285

Australia and Japan have developed their separate hedging partly by involvement with organisations such as the ARF and the EAS. But neither country has been able to articulate

284 Rikki Kersten, Director, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, private interview. 11 October 2019. 285 James Cotton, ‘Australia and Japan’ Chapter 5 of ‘The National Interest in a Global Era Australia in World Affairs’, James Cotton and John Ravenhill eds., Oxford University Press, Melbourne 2002. P 82. 83 the A-JDSR into a more comprehensive security architecture. Both Bush and Howard at the time of the JDSC signing considered that a stronger A-JDSR ‘enhanced Trilateral Strategic cooperation’ that could perhaps lead to a ‘minilateral collective security arrangement.286 Mulgan then opined that there might have been ‘a profound shift in the AP security architecture which had previously ridden on the back of the US alliance hub and spoke’ system’ and if these were so it ‘represented a major change in Japanese defence thinking.’ 287 Conservative governments do not usually favour global or regional multilateral organisations (the Trump administration being an egregious example). So, it is not surprising that the A-JDSR under conservative governments has not developed into a more comprehensive regional security system. However, as adduced later in this thesis, Japan, Australia, and the new Biden administration are all reconsidering multilateralism's utility to resist Chinese actions: the QUAD being the best example.

In 2009, Ishihara considered that there had been a missed opportunity when the JDSC partners did not follow their cooperation by seeking to shape Asian multilateralism further, although Abe did seek later sought to build Asian consensus with the FOIP. At that time, Ishihara proposed a strategy of systematically cooperating on multilateral building in Asia by integrating other regional countries, including even China, into their bilateral cooperation activities. His objective was to ensure that engaging China, within a multilateral framework (but not the ARF) would minimise their concerns. Specifically, on the A-JDSR, he argued that Australia and Japan should not stay narrowly in bilateralism. He claimed they should expand their practical cooperation from bilateralism through ‘mini-

288 lateralism’ to eventually a more comprehensive multilateral basis.

2.6.2. Multilateralism – conservatives vs progressives

There is a traditional divide in Australian political-strategic postures over multilateral organisations' ability to enhance regional security. But pragmatic action marks the history of the A-JDSR and a possible convergence with regional multilateral organisations in the formation of regional security architecture is pragmatically possible. The ALP has long been a champion of multilateral security institutions' value with its foundational support of

286 Mulgan, op cit., p4. 287 Aurelia G Mulgan, ‘Asia’s New Strategic Partnerships’, East Asia Forum (20 January 2010), https://www.East Asiaforum.org/2010/01/20/asias-new-strategic-partnerships/ 288 Yusuke Ishihara, ‘Partnership Adrift: Reshaping A-J Strategic Relations’. Security Challenges Vol 5, Number 1 (Autumn 2009). 84 the UN and regional institutions such as APEC and the ARF. Conservative governments are often more sanguine, supporting such organisations if they can generate practical outcomes. But a 2020 speech 289 by Foreign Minister Marise Payne ‘confronts the multilateral rejectionism in the Liberal Party over the past 25 years.’290 Payne spoke of the necessity to combat global challenges through global cooperation, saying: ‘At the heart of successful international cooperation is the concept that each country shares, rather than yields, a portion of its sovereign decision-making. And in return, each gets something from it that is greater than their contribution.’ Perhaps presaging a new policy direction, Payne said that the Morrison Government had completed a ‘comprehensive audit of global institutions and rule-making processes where we have the greatest stake’. She concludes that Australia needs to do much more in engaging in positive globalism with more representation in crucial committees and seeking to have like-minded nations take leadership roles. She said the audit ‘affirmed that multilateral organisations, especially international standard-setting bodies, create rules vital to Australia’s security, interests, values and prosperity’. Payne warned though that such organisations must be ‘fit for purpose, free from undue influence’, and for Australia, have a strong focus on the IP, adding that extant organisations such as the UN must demonstrate effectiveness, accountability, and transparency.291

2.6.2. Chinese Challenges drive closer cooperation in the A-JDSR

PRC President Xi Jinping visited Australia in November 2014, spoke to the Australia Federal Parliament and was warmly welcomed by the Abbott Government and people.292 Xi said the visit was a ‘new milestone in relations’ and a ‘golden opportunity’ to get things done. Abbott’s reply was that the visit will provide ‘strong momentum for our bilateral relations’. The China/Australia relationship has soured since then. China has expressed displeasure with Australia in several fora and has imposed tariff and non-tariff barriers on Australia products. Concurrently, Chinese has ramped up militarisation of islands in the South and East China Sea, threatening the free passage of trade and the sovereignty of

289 Marise Payne, Foreign Minister. Speech to ANU National Security College, 16 June 2020. https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/department-news/16893/foreign-minister-delivers-major-policy-speech-nsc 290Graham Dobell, ‘The Liberal Party’s rocky relationship with multilateralism.’ The Strategist. 22 June 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the- -partys-rocky-relationship-with-multilateralism/ 291 Payne speech, op.cit. 292 Chinese President Xi Jinping in Sydney: 'Team China is here to meet Team Australia'. Sydney Morning Herald. Daisy Dumas. 19 November 2014. https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/chinese-president-xi-jinping-in-sydney- team-china-is-here-to-meet-team-australia-20141119-11px0x.html 85 littoral nations.293 Of particular concern to Japan has been the continual incursions into waters around the Senkaku islands.294

In November 2020, Beijing released an attack on the Australian government in a document passed to the press by the Embassy in Canberra. The Sydney Morning Herald listed 14 charges by China ‘aimed at pressuring the Morrison government to reverse Australia's position on key policies.’295 A subsequent briefing in Beijing by China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian blamed Australia for the poor state of the relationship. These charges demonstrated a significant tactical shift from Beijing, but Australia did not resile despite threats of coercive import restrictions and months of escalating Chinese rhetoric and verbal instructions to state-linked traders to stop importing Australian products. The heightened tension came soon after Australia had agreed-in-principle to the RAA with Japan.296 Tensions have been strained since 2015, but previous cold periods were warmed because economic interests overcame disputation. The relationship is now cold, and visits and high-level dialogue have ceased. A speech by then-Prime Minister Turnbull marked the beginning of iciness when he spoke of a ‘dark view’ of a ‘coercive China’ seeking global domination. 297 The ‘special strategic partnership’ declared under the Gillard Labor government, was put aside by Prime Minister Morrison who said in February 2021 ‘We

298 cannot pretend that things are as they were. The world has changed.’

Australia publicly aligned itself with the United States in resisting Chinese expansionism, recently re-stating this position after the August 2020 Australia-United States Ministerial meeting.299 There was an immediate response from China, with Chinese media reporting that Australia could ‘be punished with trade sanctions’. Chinese academic Zhou Fangyin

293 Steven Stashwick, China’s South China Sea Militarization Has Peaked. Foreign Policy News, 19 August 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china-sea-militarization-has-peaked/ 294 Koda, op. cit. 295 ‘Unmistakable threat: China gives up the charade on trade dispute with Australia’, Sydney Morning Herald, Eryk Bagshaw, 20 November 2020. https://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/unmistakable-threat-china-gives-up-the- charade-on-trade-dispute-with-australia-20201117-p56f96.html 296 'If you make China the enemy, China will be the enemy': Beijing's fresh threat to Australia. Sydney Morning Herald. 18 November 2020. Jonathan Kearsleand. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/if-you-make-china-the-enemy-china-will- be-the-enemy-beijing-s-fresh-threat-to-australia-20201118-p56fqs.html 297 Malcolm Turnbull, Keynote address at the 16th IISS Asia Security Summit, Shangri-La Dialogue. 3 June 2017. https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/keynote-address-at-the-16th-iiss-asia-security-summit-shangri-la- dialogue 298 Graeme Dobell. Fourteen points on Australia’s icy times with China. The Strategist. April 2021. 299 Australia joins US in declaring Beijing’s South China Sea claims illegal. The Australian, 25 July 2020. Ben Packham. 86 said: ‘from China‘s perspective, it’s [Australia] recklessly making provocations.’ 300 In response, Morrison rebuffed Chinese views that Australia was acting against China as a lackey of the United States. Morrison stressed Australia is merely defending its sovereignty. He said it was not seeking to contain China and desired a ‘mutually beneficial relationship with China.’ He added that Australia was deeply committed to the alliance and affirmed that Australia ‘must be true to our values’ and protect our sovereignty.’301

2.7 Summary

The A-JDSR has grown from modest beginnings to a mature political security relationship which could form the basis for a regional security framework within the global alliance system. The A-JDSR was held back from fruition by reticence in action by the foreign ministries of both countries for fear, initially of domestic backlash, and later fear of criticism by a rising China. Building on economic cooperation, Japan and Australia began to realise that they shared mutual interests in regional security in a post-Cold War world. With the United States' encouragement, Japan began in the 1990s to define its security posture, expand its strategic horizons, and take Australia as a trusted strategic partner. It cautiously began to take its security place in Asia, starting with modest peacekeeping assisted and encouraged by Australia. With US encouragement, Australia, Japan, and the United States created a Trilateral Strategic dialogue. The bilateral A-JDSR complemented the ‘hub-and-spokes’ system. These two demonstrated a model for other regional nations. The closening of the A-JDSR was formalised with the 2007 JDSC which was the harbinger for other agreements that could facilitate the development of what may be a ‘virtual alliance’.

The Australian and Japanese governments came together in necessity but developed positive and deeper relationships over time in common purpose and in recognition of similar values, commitment to democracy and trade freedom in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. While the A-JDSR has its genesis in a genuine desire in both nations to open opportunities for exchanges of strategic views, it moved inexorably to a relationship

300 China accuses Australia of trade violation and ‘damaging relations’ The Australian. Ben Packham. 18 December 2020.https://www.theaustralian.com.au/breaking-news/china-accuses-australia-of-trade-violation-and-damaging- relations/news-story/cbbebc333430c936923dc638aaf13cd9 301 UK policy exchange virtual address. PM Morrison, 23 November 2020. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/uk-policy-exchange-virtual-address 87 that was in effect, a form of hedging against a possible withdrawal of the United States from the region. It would be wrong to suggest that fear of Chinese challenges to regional security was not a factor in the early days on the A-JDSR, but it was not a major factor. Since 2015, Chinese aggressiveness and trade and other coercion has driven the A-JDSR to move towards developing military interoperability in possible preparation for collective defensive action. This concept is developed later in Chapter 5 in the context of a future A- JDSR.

The next chapter describes parallel development in the defence and military realm, building on the notion of a ‘virtual alliance’ which could form the basis for close political and defence alignment as addressed. Recent events such as the revitalised QUAD linking Japan, the United States, India, and Australia may prompt others in the region to move as Ishihara argued. The thesis further develops these concepts in Chapter Five.

88 Chapter Three

A- JDSR History–defence and military perspectives

3.1 Introduction

This Chapter describes A-JDSR history from military and defence perspectives from after the Second World War to 2021. It builds on the political and security history described in the previous chapter. This separation uses the same separation criteria that Governments use: political and security and political matters managed by politicians and diplomats; and military and defence matters managed by defence officers, defence officials, and staff in allied agencies. This chapter starts when post-war enmities and mistrust gave way to economic cooperative imperatives. It then describes how Australia and Japan, over four decades from the early 1980s, began to move the A-JDSR forward to become the second most active military engagement for both. Both countries understood that creating underpinning agreements and understandings helped countries with shared values and interests to come together for mutual global security. Initiative to start the relationship came with a tentative first move from Australia and a muted response from Japan.

Concerns over both Japanese and Australian sensitivities held the A-JDSR back until it began to move forward in the late 1980s when it became clear the post-cold war world faced a more multipolar threat to security. The gradual building of confidence and with the encouragement of the United States, Australia and Japan began to move the A-JDSR through early beginnings, to a joint declaration of security principles and a relationship that is an integral part of the regional security architecture which could form the basis for future mutual security action.

Two largely unrecorded issues merit particular attention in this thesis. Firstly, the military intelligence relationship that pre-dates the start of military dialogue and which was conducted through separate channels. Secondly, the presence in Tokyo of a Rear Headquarters of the United Nations Command based in Seoul. The intelligence history is recorded here from primary sources. The Rear UNC Headquarters story relates to the

89 facilitation of visits to Japan by aircraft and ships of Australia and other countries than in other sovereign states would be accomplished by bilateral military engagement. Empirical data in Chapters 2 and 3 are drawn from Government documents only recently released, plus first-hand interview accounts from those engaged in this history, and academic papers from the literature. The thesis analyses these sources to put into perspective a basis for later assessing a possible future A-JDSR trajectory. This analytic view contributes new intellectual knowledge to the defence and security relationship between two democracies working to preserve global and regional security.

3.2 Beginnings

In 1915, Japanese and Australian naval vessels combined in common purpose in the Indian Ocean. Japan deployed the Imperial Japanese Navy’s ship (IJNS) Ibuki, to contribute to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It joined Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy vessels protecting Australian and New Zealand troopships sailing from Albany in 1914 to go to the European War. In 2020, RAN, MSDF and USN vessels operated together in freedom of passage operations in the South China Sea.302 Ships from the same triumvirate plus India's now exercise under QUAD guidance for similar Western Indo-Pacific operations. Even during the Second World War and later, the Japanese Navy had respect for the RAN, especially after they returned (via neutral Switzerland) the remains of the submariners who had died in the 1942 submarine attack on Sydney. The Japanese Naval Academy Museum at Etajima has a diorama featuring the Sydney Morning Herald covering the military funeral given those Japanese who died in the attack. While Australia was sending a message to Japan to treat its Australians POWs responsibly, returning the remains of Japanese submariners endures as a sign of past and perhaps future naval bonds of respect and cooperation.303

3.2.1. Military engagement starts

The Australian military contributed to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan from 1947-1952, responsible for the military occupation of Hiroshima Prefecture,

302 Australia, Japan and US exercise in Philippine Sea, Defence Press release, 21 July 2020. https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australia-japan-and-us-exercise-philippine-sea 303 Personal Records. While DASA, the author was approached by members of the WWII-era IJN Midget Submarine Society who wished to commemorate their comrades’ treatment with a donation to the RAN Museum at Garden Island. 90 later changed to a status role of ‘protective power’.304 In 1950 Australian forces were deployed to Japan and employed under the United Nations Command, in operations in Korea. Australia established an Embassy in Tokyo in 1952 although there had been a Head of Mission since 1947. There was little defence engagement between Australian and Japanese defence forces until the early 1960s when Australia posted in a Defence Attaché. 305 The role of the Defence Attaché in Japan was to observe ‘the state of preparedness of Japan’s armed forces and their capacity for further development and expansion if the need arises’ allow’.306 Over time this role expanded to include developing Defence and military ties between Australia and Japan, but this took another two decades to be effective.

Direct engagement started with the first-ever visit by an Australian Defence Minister when Senator Shane Paltridge visited Tokyo in 1965. After this political overture, the JSDF Chairman of Joint Staff Council (CJSC) General Yoshifusa Amano made the first post- Second World War senior Japanese military visit to Australia in 1967 at Paltridge’s invitation. 307 Visit content was anodyne, but the visit marked the beginning of the military dialogue.308 It also heralded overtures from the Australian defence industry to sell arms to Japan and Defence and to establish two more defence staff in Japan: naval and military assistant attaches. Nevertheless, tight control over defence engagement by both countries' foreign ministries, fearing a public backlash, continued until the late 1980s when Defence took more overt action to create engagement.

3.2.2. Modest Beginnings

Two parallel threads characterise the A-JDSR: dialogue and defence diplomatic engagement at the international level; and visits–-until the 21st Century—almost entirely unilaterally by RAN vessels and RAAF aircraft. Comprehensive politico-security- defence and military dialogue at several levels complemented direct and reciprocal single-service unit engagement by all three services. The first visits to start were military exchanges created by Service Chiefs who saw the opportunity to engage with other

304‘The Australian military contribution to the occupation of Japan 1945–1952’, Australian War Memorial, James Wood. https://www.awm.gov.au/system/files/documents/BCOF_history.pdf 305 RAN units assigned to Far East Strategic Reserve made occasional visits to Japan from 1955-1971. 306 Australian Defence Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) memo. NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. 3 March 1965. 307 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. 29 June 1965. 308 Alan Rix p 158. Australian Financial Review, 5 February 1965.

91 nations.309 The RAN commenced visits to Japan in 1965 as ‘Goodwill’ bilateral port calls, but visits made to exercise the UNC-Japan Status of Forces Agreement were more common.310 Initially, the parallel stream of the defence and military aspects of the A- JDSR began when a JSDF General was curious about Australia’s strategic posture after its military participation in the Vietnam War. Japan’s Chairman of Joint Staff General Kinugasa sought insights into Australia’s security role in Southeast Asia. He invited the Chairman, Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Sir Victor Smith to visit Japan in September 1972. Kinugasa told Smith that Australia represented ‘the most reliable and accurate source of Intelligence’ on Indonesia and asked Australia if it could provide formal intelligence on ‘Indochina’.311

Interest in exchanging intelligence and convening discussions of mutual interest consolidated quickly. The success of this initial visit set the scene and themes for future military-to-military engagement. Later that year, the JDA sought a military intelligence exchange but it was limited in scope to non-classified oral discussions. After a two-year pause, the Australian Embassy in Tokyo raised in 1974 the prospects of Defence exchanges with the JDA (viz., dialogue and training of JDA civilians in Australia). The Ministerial discussions in October 1973 which had created the Nippon-Australia Reciprocal Agreement (NARA) seemed to have stimulated this initiative. Ambassador Yoshida in Canberra supported the proposal, but Defence was not ready to entertain military engagements talks at that time.312 The Australian Foreign Affairs Department did not support the proposal either as it considered direct dialogue would compromise their dealings with the MFO.313 This position presaged years of effort to maintain strict control over defence relations with Japan. Nevertheless, middle-level military short-term personnel exchanges of an intelligence nature did quietly occur between the MSDF and DIO in 1973/4 with discussions and observation of joint operations.314

In 1975 Defence Minister James Killen initiated closer military-to-military ties between Australia and Japan. A parliamentary ad hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan

309 The MSDF has made, since 1966 an annual visit by its training squadron. See NAA: A1501, A6745/3. MSDF icebreakers have also been visiting Hobart since 1983 en-route to the Antarctic. 310 Campbell was crew on a port visit by HMAS Supply to Yokosuka in 1972 under the authority of the UNC. 311 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. 5 October 1972. 312 Secretary of Defence Arthur Tange ‘sounded out’ the Embassy on an exchange of military appreciations on Southeast Asian security. 313 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. f. 29 October 1972. 314 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 1. 14 March 1974. 92 relations told him that Japan could make sophisticated military equipment and the potential to expand military capability. It noted that Defence ‘assessed that [Japan could produce] nuclear weapons with a missile delivery system within five years of a decision to do so.’ Killen seems to have deduced that Japanese military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, were no longer a threat, but a welcome development for Australia’s national interests and regional security. He affirmed that ‘Australian and Japanese interests coincide in sustaining the Pacific and Indian Ocean sea routes' security.’315 In an apparent effort to test public opinion on developing closer ties, he made a public statement a little later that there may be personnel exchanges with Japan. Prompted by Killen’s advocacy, the Australian Cabinet approved an increase in Tokyo's defence staff to prepare for exchanges in technology, training, hydrography, naval intelligence (Soviet naval movements), and staff college exchanges.316

In 1976, the Australian government’s policy was to foster limited defence contacts with Japan and take cautious steps to expand strategic consultations with Japan without upsetting Japanese sensitivities. Chairman Joint Staff Council, General Takashima met with Australian Defence Secretary Tange in January 1979317 where they discussed the waning of US influence.318

With no Defence Attaché resident in Canberra until 1974, the JDA sought to extend the dialogue with Australia by asking Defence to accept a few defence civilians to Australia for short-term ‘training’. 319 Defence sought Government approval to proceed, believing this would lay the basis for limited defence cooperation between Australia and Japan. Again, Australian Foreign Affairs opposed the submission instead proposing regular (18- month) informal and non-committal’ officials’ talks between the Japanese and Defence Ministries (joint MFA-DFA/Defence attendance), supplemented by occasional visits by Ministers and Service Chiefs.

In 1976, an Inter-Departmental briefing paper for Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser’s visit to Japan revealed Australian government thinking. It analysed Japan’s security options and Australia’s policy position in the aftermath of the end of the Vietnam War, USSR

315 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 3. 3 Aug 1976. f. 102. 316 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 3. 23 June 1976. f. 20. 317 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 3. 17 Jan 1976. f. 143. 318 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 3. 30 Aug. f. 174. 319 Japan sent its first Defence Attaché to Canberra (Commander Terai) in mid-1974. 93 incursions into Japanese airspace, and the DPRK threat. Its premise was that Japan might assess it could not rely on its mutual security treaty with the United States. The briefing paper considered Japan’s response options to this assessment were unarmed neutrality or rearmament bolstered by an alliance with China. For Australia, it recommended a Track 2 construct for trilateral dialogue between the United States, Japan, and Australia rather than formal dialogue arrangements. It cautioned that public sensitivities in Australia and Japan obligated gradual and only high-level strategic military-to-military dialogue. Independent of this Australian position, closer Defence and JDA ties progressed in the background. The Tokyo Embassy recommended that Defence expand the annual Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) visit, established in 1972, to become the proposed Defence Officials’ Talks (as submitted by defence policy staff). The proposal did not eventuate due to Foreign Affairs’ desire to limit direct Defence-JDA dialogue.320

In summary, Foreign Affairs’ desire to control the process of defence dialogue impeded the evolution of defence side of the A-JDSR in the 1970s. They continued to dissuade direct contact between Defence and JDA until the late 1980s when Defence Minister Kim Beazley took office, and CDF General Peter Gration visited Japan.

3.2.3. From hiatus to new momentum in the 1980s

In the early 1980s, Defence and Service-level engagement with the JDA and the SDF was informal and uncoordinated. In 1984 Kishiro Nakamura, JDA Parliamentary Vice-Minister made calls on Australian Defence Minister Gordon Scholes, CDF General , and Defence Secretary William Coles. This low-visibility visit became Defence consultations by another mode. The visit reinforced high-level defence links, but the dialogue was not substantive.321 The RAN made one of its port calls visit with the Chief of Navy accompanying Her Majesty’s Ships Sydney and Canberra on a bilateral visit with the Japanese Navy. Chief of Air Force Air Marshal David Evans visited Tokyo for counterpart talks with Japanese Air Force General Shigehiro Mori. 322 Evans visited the ASDF Headquarters where the introduction of the F-18 into RAAF service was the centrepiece of their discussions. Notably, the ASDF had no comparable strike aircraft in their inventory

320 NAA: A9564 3/1/20 Part 1. f .92 321 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 4 Oct 1984. f. 150. 322 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 2 Jul 1984. f. 10. 94 as it was ‘too warlike’.323 The P3C crew made an impromptu staff visit to the MSDF P2 base at Atsugi to discuss air training linkages as the MSDF was about to introduce the P- 3C.324

Japan-Australian defence relations in the early 1980s were inconsequential. The then- DASA said ‘there was never any real substance in workings with the JDA/SDF and Canberra paid little attention to reports and sought no debriefing on [military] attachés return to Australia.’ He considered that the A-JDSR had no future at that time. He observed that the departments of foreign affairs in Australia and Japan constrained bi-lateral Defence and military engagement, 325

Japan and the United States bi-lateral security arrangements were also a constraint. Dunn said that the US-JMST was a significant obstacle in communicating directly with the SDF. Both Australia and the United States were ‘third parties’ to the SDF when sharing information regarding partners’ activities with SDF interlocutors and American military attaches. Dunn reinforced the view that Australian Foreign Minister Hayden had concerns about direct military contact between Japan and Defence. Hayden’s departmental officials closely monitored correspondence with the Australian Minister-Political in Tokyo, Ashton Calvert, later Ambassador to Japan. Calvert was then bypassing Defence staff in the Embassy, most likely due to MOFA insistence, by unilaterally opening a direct link with the JDA Internal Bureau.326

3.2.4. Interest quickens in the late 1980s

Defence interest, particularly maritime interest quickened in the later 1980s. In 1986 a senior NIDS official, Masashi Nishihara told the USN War College that he expected to see closer defence cooperation between Japan and Australia, specifically maritime surveillance which might lead to agreements on protecting sea-lines of communication.327 At the same venue the following year, Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral Michael Hudson speaking at the International Naval Symposium, proposed the forming of a Western Pacific Naval

323 Williams Evans, Staff Officer to CAF who accompanied him on 1985 visit, private interview. 27 October 2020, 324 Personal records. The author was the senior aircrew member on the aircraft. 325 John Dunn, Air Commodore, DASA Tokyo, 1984-88, private interview. 4 December 2019. 326 Ibid. 327 NAA: A1838 3103/10/4 Pt 6. 20 Jun 1986. f. 225. 95 Symposium which soon became a valuable 1.5 Track conduit for Japan, the United States, Australia, and other regional navies.

In August 1989 CDF Gration made his defence visit. The call on his counterpart, CJSC General Ishii was well-received. The Japanese referred to ‘the defence relationship’ during the call on Defense Minister Matsumoto. On his return, Gration sought approval to conduct high-level (three-star military/Deputy Secretary) dialogue and other actions.328 Gration’s proposals were for modest development of the A-JDSR, ‘focussing initially on consultation and perhaps some limited maritime cooperation’ but recognising both sides' sensitivities. Gration said he made these proposals: ‘To illustrate the renewed level of interest from Japan and an indicator that Japan may be looking for strategic partners outside the US- JMST.

Defence policy official Behm, took a philosophical view on Australia’s role in developing closer relations with Japan. He opined that it was in Australia’s interests to ensure that Japan grew strong as a society but said that ‘these thoughts were not shared by the strategic thinkers of the day’. He added that Gration had a view of Japan not based on WWII historical legacies, but rather in terms of the Meiji Restoration when Japan moved from an agrarian society to an industrialised nation in one generation. Behm was then thinking that, rather than considering transnational interests, Australia needed to think of Japan’s deep national interests. Australia’s interests were in Japan doing great things. In the mid-90s, when the candidate was Defence Attaché in Japan under Behm’s policy direction, the focus was on issues which sought to bring Australia and Japan together in terms of national endeavours, such as peacekeeping operations.’329 There was also not just altruism, but broader strategic considerations based on shared interests.

Prime Minister Hawke, presaging his Government’s wish to engage closer with Japan said in 1987: ‘Over time Japan will want to do more for itself [in defence]...the most important thing is that it does so in the context of a tight integration with the Western Alliance and in the context of collective perceptions about what serves the security interests of the region.’330

328 Dibb, op. cit. 329 Behm. op. cit. 330 R.J.L. Hawke, Prime Minister, Lecture, The Challenge of Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, Singapore, 27 November 1987. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-7251. 96 3.2.5. Consolidation in the 1990s

After the 1989 Gration visit, military engagement began with Cabinet approval for more substantial engagement. Gration directed his deputy Vice-Admiral Alan Beaumont, and Paul Dibb, Defence Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, to visit both MOFA and JDA to exchange strategic views and consider the possibility of cooperative activities. Foreign Affairs was still concerned about sensitivities. DFAT thought that JDA’s engagement in international security dialogue with Australia would offend MOFA. Ashton Calvert, then-Counsellor in the Tokyo Embassy advised that Australia handle visits on a ‘case-by-case’ basis and under MOFA/DFAT's close supervision. Neither JDA nor Defence accepted this close supervision. Eventually, MOFA accepted that the visit would go ahead as planned.331 Seven months after Gration’s breakthrough visit, Beaumont and Dibb held discussions with Japan. They secured a future valuable relationship during a call on Yukio Sato, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau, MOFA, and future Japanese Ambassador to Australia.

These visits established the precedents and processes for the evolution of the A-JDSR in the 1990s. By late 1991, Japan recognised Australia as an ‘indispensable partner for coping with regional and global issues, including environmental problems, arms control and disarmament, and the Cambodian peace settlement’.332 Later talks at the same level resulted in ‘ready agreement’ to move irregular and non-committal discussions to regular political- military talks with JDA/MOFA as part of the JDA Defence Diplomacy Program, a program that allowed the JDA to militarily engage regional nations.333

A few decades later, Satake recalled a cautionary note from Australian Ambassador Rawdon Dalrymple at the time of the Gration visit. Dalrymple said: Japan and Australia were both talking separately to the US and each other, giving rise to the ‘concept of ‘the two anchors’ in the Asia-Pacific region which China later critically compared to the claw of a crab squeezing China.’334

331 NAA: A1838 1991/3932 Pt 2. 11 Dec 1989. F203. 332 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991 Diplomatic Blue Book, http://www.MOFA.go.jp/policy/other/blue- book/1991/1991-4-1 333 NAA: A1838 1991/3932 Pt 2. 27 Jan 1990. F117. 334 Rawdon Dalrymple, ‘Japan and Australia as Anchors,’ p. 46. 97 3.2.6. Cooperative activities start

The A-JDSR was boosted in 1990 when Japan joined Australia in the UN-sponsored operation to restore peace in Cambodia. JSDF personnel were deployed to operate the command of Australian Army Lieutenant-General John Sanderson.335 The ground force relationship was later strengthened further by Japanese cooperation with Australia in Timor L’Este336 and Iraq. But PKO cooperation is not the same as armies working together for more traditional security. Chief of Army Peter Leahy said there was little to say on the army-army relationship with Japan at this time ‘because they really don’t have an army’.337 He added, ‘we were babysitting the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) when they started carrying out PKO in UNTAC, and during Timor when we engaged in engineering, but we really didn’t do any combat with them.’ In Iraq, we became protectors of the GSDF. Their camp was neighbouring, so there was close contact allowing us to build their confidence’, but there was not a lot of contact.338

Defence Minister Robert Ray met with his Japanese counterpart, Miyashita Shinpei in 1993, in only the second visit to Japan by an Australian Defence Minister.339 Their discussions included an agreement to expand the defence relationship and work towards a collective security framework and begin a program of combined ADF-SDF exercises. The visit of Japan’s prime minister, Kiichi Miyazawa in April 1993 continued the momentum of discussions between the defence ministers. Miyazawa expressed support for closer security relations.340

Single service discussions aimed at sharing experience commenced. Australia had already moved into a joint service approach to conduct military operations by developing tri-service military strategy. However, the individual SDFs were keen to engage only with ADF single services due to their JSDF’s siloed nature of the JSDF and a weak Joint Staff Office (JSO).

335 Japan, in its first PKO, sent the JSDF to Cambodia under command of Lieutenant General John Sanderson. 336 In 2000, the JSDF participated in PKO in East Timor sending 6,000 JSDF members. 337 Peter Leahy, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Chief of Army 2002-2008, private interview. 15 February 2019. 338 The ADF deployed a task group to the southern Iraqi province of Al Muthanna in May 2005, with a second rotation in November 2005 to protect JSDF personnel and to continue to train new Iraqi army personnel in the province. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/iraqdelegation/chapter2 . 339 Alan Rix, op. cit., p. 169 quoting Japan Times, 30 September 1992; Transcript of Press conference by Senator Ray, 29 September 1992. 340 ‘Greetings from the Prime Minister Miyazawa at the Australian Prime Minister's Hosting Dinner’ (April 30, 1993). ‘Deering Database ‘World and Japan.’ 98 Maritime strategic threats prompted initial navy-to-navy engagement. RAN-MSDF talks predated other single service talks between Australia and Japan, and all other military-to- military talks by any country other than the United States. The MSDF was concerned about: the DPRK missile threat; Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea; and contested claims over sovereignty over the Senkakus islands. Australian Deputy Chief of Navy, Rear- Admiral David Campbell, opined ‘the MSDF saw the RAN as a catalyst in developing new regional security framework.’ He observed that there was ‘wariness in Canberra and from some DFAT officers in Tokyo and the Foreign Ministries in both countries, due to a reluctance to allowing Defence to take the initiative.’ However, their line was: ‘We don’t want to know officially but keep us informed.’341

Australia was seeking to ensure that it had alignment with other like-minded nations at the time. In 1996, Prime Minister Keating secretly negotiated the Indonesia-Australia Security Agreement (IASA). Retired CDF Gration visited Japan as part of an Asian briefing tour on the IASA. JDA and MOFA Ministers appreciated Gration’s visit and called the IASA an ‘historic agreement.’342

By the mid-1990s, there were already signs of concern about the rise of China, at least in Australia. Defence tasked DIO to consider China’s options over ‘military action short of invasion.343 Defence Ministers Ray and Eto met in 1995 in Honolulu to discuss ‘promotion of bilateral dialogue between Australia and Japan, defence and security cooperation, and Confidence-building measures (CBMs).344 Concurrently, the JSO was growing in strength and developing a coherent policy framework for security dialogue and defence exchanges with regional countries, including Russia, China, and Australia.345 The JDA moved swiftly to build closer relations with many nations, and by early 1998 it was in regular political- military dialogue with over 12 countries.346

In 1994 political-military talks had identified possible defence cooperation areas with Australia presaging an A-JDSR expansion. Concurrently, there were seminal changes in

341 David Campbell, , private interview. 28 January 2020. 342 NAA: A9737 Rikki Kersten, Director, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, private interview. 11 October 2019. 1996/2578 of 26 December 1995, ff. 193, 199. 343 NAA: A9737 1996/2578 of 31 August 1995, f. 276. 344 NAA: A9737 1996/2578 of 28 August 1995, f. 146. 345 NAA: A1209 1995/1879 of 15 March 1995, f. 130. 346 The talks were: political and military talks (Pol-Mil); and Military-military talks (Mil-Mil). Pol-Mil talks were security dialogue between officials at Defence Director-General level, and Foreign Affairs officials. Mil-Mil talks were purely military dialogue at Defence Director-General level. 99 Japan’s domestic situation and its external perspectives on regional security issues. The US-JMST continued to be the foundation of Japan’s security and stability. However, the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), drawing on changed strategic circumstances heralded a more mature and expansive security posture. This posture was no longer based solely on matching regional threats but sought regional engagement and a more normative use of the SDF.347

In 1996 the pace of dialogue increased with political-military talks in February. The agenda reflected new mutual security policies regarding peacekeeping operations, regional security, and bilateral activities with Australia. Post-meeting follow-up addressed bilateral defence development, including closer maritime cooperation. There was interest in air force cooperation for the first time, building on existing combined maritime surveillance activities. Other features were intelligence cooperation with the new JSO Defence Intelligence Headquarters, and staff college exchanges and policy assistance in setting up a Ready Reserve Program for the GSDF (based on an Australian model).348

In 1996, China precipitated a crisis in the Taiwan Straits by firing ballistic missiles against Taiwan. The US responded by launching a Task Force from the US 3rd Fleet, homeported in Yokosuka, outside Japan, and sailed through the Taiwan Straits in a show of support for Taiwan. The crisis was a central focus at the political/military and military/military talks at the time, and the issue of China became a fixture for future discussions.

The ADF and SDF Service Chiefs began meeting regularly. In February 1997 regular annual visit programs by Service Chiefs commenced. ASDF General Koji Muraki and MSDF Admiral Kazuya Natsukawa Chiefs both visited Australia. The visits provided opportunities for cooperating at the operational and tactical levels. 349 There was an agreement for the ADF to participate in a July 1997 bilateral exercise of anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare involving RAAF and MSDF P3C aircraft, two MSDF ships and an MSDF submarine. 350 This agreement marked an unprecedented new high in cooperation and bilateral exercising. The JMSDF wished at the time to keep the exchange out of public sight. There was a risk of a breach of the SDF Law that precluded ‘collective

347 Candidate’s contemporaneous notes. 348 NAA: A9737 1996/2578 of 20 June 1996, f. 207. 349 NAA: A1209 1996/2578 of 28 January 1997, f. 190. 350 NAA: A9737 1991/3934 Pt 5 of 22 April 1997, ff. 120, 134. 100 self-defence’ and this exercise could have breached that law. Its conduct was a test of the JSDF to demonstrate its desire to conduct operational training with a country other than the US. There was no political criticism accompanying this new initiative. The MSDF considered that, as the substantive activity took place on the high seas, no constitutional breach occurred.351 Reciprocal visits by Defence Ministers followed, with Ian McLachlan and Fumio Kyuma visiting each other in 1997 and 1998. These visits flowed from the strategic Mil/Mil and Pol/Mil talks and a conjunction of views by both Howard and Hashimoto during their reciprocal visit.352 It appeared that Japan had accepted that closer defence relations with Australia represented only a slight political risk. The following table lists talks extant as of March 1998.353

Table 3.1 – Frequency of defence dialogue in 1990s.

COUNTRY POL-MIL TALKS MIL-MIL TALKS United States Annually for some time Annually for some time Australia 1996, 1997, 1998 1996, 1997, 1998 + Canada 1997 1998 Singapore - 1997 Indonesia - 1997 Thailand 1998 1998 Republic of Korea 1998 Working-level Defence dialogue (x 3) China 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 - Russia Policy conference (x 3) since 1994 2 times since 1996. United Kingdom Six times since 1990 - Germany Four times since 1994 4 times since 1994 France 1997 2 times since 1994 NATO 2 times since 1993

3.2.7. Implementation of Cooperative Engagement

There were still real sensitivities to work through. JDA Secretary Akiyama had told Ambassador Ashton Calvert in late 1997 that ‘Australia was a top priority after the United States for developing relations’ but added that a proposed bilateral air defence exercise

351 NAA: A9737 1991/3934 Pt 5 of 22 July 1997, f. 146. 352 NAA: A9737 1991/3934 Pt 5 of 8 December 1997, f. 170. 353 Briefing provided to Defence Attaché s by JDA. March 1998. 101 ‘would not proceed due to political sensitivities’. These arose because of perceived linkages with JASDF involvement in the US Cope Thunder air defence exercise, and the review of US-Japan Defence Guidelines. As the United States was conducting Cope Thunder in Alaska, the JASDF F-15 planned aircraft's deployment would have required air-to-air refuelling by the USAF, an activity then unacceptable due connotations of extended airstrike capacity. Instead of conducting the plan to conduct air defence exercise with Japan before both air forces travelled onto to Alaska, the RAAF simply conducted a fighter aircraft transit thorough Japan under the auspices of the United Nation Command Rear) auspices. Nevertheless, it was the first transit through Japan of fighter aircraft other than those of the United States. The July 1997 P3C visit had been an example of Japanese willingness to extend bilateral cooperation boundaries, but fighter aircraft cooperation was then a step too far.354

In 1998, the Director-General of the North America Branch, Tanaka, informally floated with the Embassy, the possibility of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (based in Okinawa) training in Australia to reduce the military burden on Okinawa. This was done at a time of Japanese negotiations with the United States on the Review of Guidelines, and Australian hosting of US forces would have eased Japanese hosting obligations. The query had arisen from perceptions gained during Defence Minister Kyuma’s January visit to Australia that Australia could have assisted in easing burden-sharing. Defence in Australia responded that although Australia could not substitute for Japan in terms of US forward deployment, it could take the proposal for training in Australia forward ‘quietly and cautiously’, doubtless as a visible means of supporting the United States.355 Actual US Marine Corps deployments from Okinawa did happen, but not for another 14 years.

ASDF/RAAF talks started in 1998. The ASDF was interested in building a closer intellectual relationship with the RAAF, rather than one with the RAF whom they saw as less relevant to Japan. 356 CDF Mark Binskin recalled that when RAAF was designing its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Japan was very keen to work with others building similar systems. Although it could call on the US, it was pleased to have reciprocal engagement with Australia to develop interoperability and sharing of

354 NAA: A9737 1991/3934 Pt 6 Cable to Defence, 7 July 1998f. 5, 38, 98. 355 NAA: A9737 1991/3934 Pt 6 f. 52, 71. The training rate suggested was 2-3 weeks, 3-4 times annually. 356 Candidate’s contemporaneous notes. 102 tactics, especially where this involved humanitarian operations. RAAF and JASDF later demonstrated interoperability when RAAF Wedgetail AEW&C engaged in searching for the Malaysian airliner MH370 controlled JSDF P-3 aircraft.357

3.2.8. Consolidation of A-JDSR

The first decade of the 21st Century was one of consolidation for the A-JDSR. Japan’s security engagement with Australia bolstered US resolve to remain engaged with the region. The A-JDSR also provided Japan with a modest level of hedging as NEA's security environment became more hostile to their interests, such as missile threats from the DPRK and growing Chinese diplomatic and military power. Regular service-service dialogue, plus increasingly more substantive security dialogue in the political-military and military- military talks strengthened the A-JDSR. As referenced in the previous chapter, the triangle of bilateral discussions between the US and Japan, and Japan and Australia had been made with US encouragement, soon to move to Trilateral Strategic dialogue, initially held secretly, later openly. The strategic shock created by the 9/11 attack changed the strategic environment globally. Japan considered it needed to contribute more to global security. Japan also believed it was necessary to support the United States by supporting US global commitments.

In February 2005 the Australian government announced that Australian Army would deploy a battlegroup to Al Muthanna Province to provide security for the Japanese engineers after the protection offered by Dutch to the JSDF was lost when the Dutch returned home early. Defence forces usually operate in a warzone with rules of engagement (ROE) which allow them to apply military force for effect, and for self-protection and others under their protection. In contrast, the JSDF were strongly constrained in their own ROE by the prohibition of collective self-defence under the Japanese Constitution Article 9 and were effectively unable to defend themselves. 358 The Australian Task Group conducted operations from April 2005 until the JSDF contingent left. Incoming DASA, Mark Hoare had previously suggested in a NIDS thesis that the ADF provide force

357 Mark Binskin, Air Chief Marshal, Chief of Defence Force 2014-18, private interview. 7 September 2019. 358 The Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group was a JSDF contingent in Iraq and was Tokyo’s first multilateral military mission outside of U.N. peacekeeping operations. 103 protection to the GSDF, saying the ADF could be a ‘guardian’ for JSDF forces if Japan chose to deploy them internationally.359

The first Army-Army and Joint Staff-level discussions were held under the Koizumi Government after the 9/11 shock. A new Japanese counter-terrorism law and Japan’s dispatch of SDF elements to Iraq indicated that the Japanese government wanted to provide real support to the United States. ADF force protection of the SDF highlighted the linkages between Australia’s commitment to Iraq (and to the US alliance) and support for Japan’s efforts to contribute to security relationship.360

Angus Houston recalled at this time being visited by many Japanese officers who were talking about Japan’s approach to military relations and what Australia was doing to support the United States. The trust that came from personal relationships, and the gratitude generated at a national level when the ADF provided force protection to the SDF allowed Japan to meet its international obligations while meeting restrictions on collective self- defence. This trust laid the groundwork for the next step in the A-JDSR, the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.

3.3 Burgeoning of the relationship

The signing of the 2007 JDSC on 13 March 2007 was a significant political endorsement of the A-JDSR and the first declaration of security cooperation by Japan with any country other than the United States.361

3.3.1. Security and Political agreements foster the Defence and Military relationship

The JDSC, combined with the TSD signalled that not only had Australia and Japan, as US partners, had committed themselves to regional security, but had also done so willingly and with the encouragement of the United States. Both were mindful of the challenges of a rising China. William Tow considered that the JDSC ‘designate(d) China as a rising strategic challenge that ultimately cannot be accommodated and thus must be contained

359 Mark Hoare, Colonel, DASA Tokyo, 2001-2005, private interview. 9 October 2019. 360 David Walton, (2008) ‘Australia and Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?’ Japanese Studies, 28:1, 73-86. 361 Japanese Government Official A, private interview. 5 March 2019. 104 with like-minded allies’.362 The agreement itself contains security statements relating to Non-Traditional Security but does not explicitly address cooperation in traditional military activities. It gives little guidance on how the treaty partners can conduct activities other than exercises to ‘increase effectiveness of cooperation’ including HA/DR.363 It agreed to create an action plan that later listed a series of intentions to conduct regular security dialogue but provided very little guidance on cooperative military activity. Nevertheless, traditional military activities that lead greater interoperability and more military exercises did characterise the A-JDSR from 2007 and onwards. The first example of closer exercising came in late 2007 when the MSDF made its first overseas deployment to Australia, and any country apart from the United States, of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) to conduct exercises with the RAAF.364

At the turn of the century, Australia accelerated its planning processes to move from a tri- service basis to a ‘true’ joint planning organisation. In 2000 it opened its tri-service Australian Command and Staff College training middle-ranking officers from Australia and the region, including Japan, to conduct joint operation.365 In 2004 it established of an operational level joint headquarters responsible for worldwide command and control of ADF operations. The ADF was now better prepared to work with partners such as the JSDF. It was pursuing a path that leads to significant increases in ADF efficiency resulting from having a single operational headquarters and a focus on joint operations. The ADF had previously been engaging the Japanese Joint Staff Office to help them learn from the ADF how to develop its processes from its single-service silos.366 The ADF’s demonstrated ability of the ADF to plan for and conduct joint operations and to pursue a wholistic defence and security planning processes provided an example for Japan to follow.

When Abe came into office in 2007, he made significant changes to the Japanese defence apparatus. The Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMOD) was established on 9 January 2007, putting the responsibility for defence planning on an equal footing with other central ministries. Sheila Smith said: ‘The defence ministry is growing in popularity for newly

362 ‘The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Strategic Geometries’, APS Net Policy Forum, September 06, 2007. https://nautilus.org/apsnet/the-japan-australia-joint-declaration-on-security- cooperation-and-asia-pacific-strategic-geometries/ 363 Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’, 13 March 2007. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html 364 The candidate, an experienced MPA aviator acted as Host Officer, on behalf of the CAF, for this deployment. 365 The candidate was the founding Commandant of this establishment. 366 Candidate’s contemporaneous notes. 105 incoming Japanese civil servants, and most of the top bureaucrats in the JMOD have spent their full careers working on Japan’s defence plans.’367 This change built on the March 2006 establishment of a revised JSO, imbued with authority over the three single-services. As Smith said: ‘The idea of the Joint Staff was to begin to forge a defence strategy …to amplify the SDF voice in long-term defence planning.’ 368 Another profound change occurred in Abe’s second term of office when his Cabinet established a National Security Secretariat (NSS) with staff from MOD, MOFA and the JSDF. The NSS reported directly to the Prime Minister, ensuring that all involved in the defence and security planning process had a clear authority line to shape Japan’s strategic planning. The greater authority granted to the JMOD enabled it to better respond to military cooperation proposals from Australia.

3.3.2. Practitioners’ Insights-post JDSC

Dudley noted that the pace of actual engagement, including intelligence, before the JDSC was low. On intelligence exchange, Japan ‘had a poor record on cybersecurity and was reluctant to engage substantively’ although they provided information provided ‘on North Korea and perhaps China’. An example of a lack of engagement related to preparations for the ADF’s 2005 deployment to Iraq. Australia was seeking tactical advice from the JDA as the JSDF was already in country. The JDA provided little of real use even though Australia and Japan were about to work together.369

The first openly acknowledged TSD took in Tokyo in April 2007 in the margins of an APEC meeting. An advantage of the TSD was that it facilitated trilateral exercising. At this time, there were difficulties in running trilateral exercises of military units underway due to proscriptions against collective self-defence, and restrictions associated with compliance with US exports controls370,371 These constrain what armed forces can do together, even when operating the same type of equipment. The constraints required that Australia and Japan exercise only bilaterally, even if both were in the same overall activity as the United

367 Smith, Sheila A, ‘Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power’, (Harvard University Press, 2019). p144. 368 Ibid, p146 369 Dudley, op. cit. 370 International Traffic in Arms Regulations control the use of weapons in third-party situations, even where there is trilateral agreement to act together. See: https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-itar-compliance. 370 Dudley, op. cit. 371 See https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-itar-compliance. 106 States. Partners completed exercises separately: working first with each other and then exercising individually with the United States.372

3.3.3. Changes in the A-JDSR post-JDSC

Foreign Ministers Koichiro Gemba and Bob Carr signed, an Information Security Agreement in May 2012, Japan’s fourth such agreement allowing for more trust in the exchange of military information.373 This resulted from a diplomatic program of pressure from the United States that allies and partners like Japan better treat the security of intelligence. The agreement is beneficial to Japan as it helps Japan increase its intelligence capability as protection of shared intelligence is central to gaining admission to the ‘Five- Eyes’ community.374

The 2010 signing of an ACSA, a necessary precursor to cooperative military activity, allows Japan and Australian forces to provide logistic support to each for military operations. The 2007 JDSA specifically did not address cooperation of purely military operations. But the ACSA, even with declared intent to support logistic support for PKO, represented a formal and public declaration that both countries were preparing the basis for possible cooperative military activity. In May 2012, Japan’s fourth amendment to ACSA was agreed, further strengthening Japan–Australia security cooperation.

Closer defence links between Australia and Japan, and increasingly in a trilateral arrangement, the US, increased during this decade (defence, space and cybersecurity, joint exercises between Japan and Australia, and between the United States, Japan, and Australia).375 In 2017, Japan and Australia revised the ACSA enabling the mutual supply of ammunition – an unusual agreement if the 2007 JDSC was only for cooperation on PKO and humanitarian activity.

372 Dudley, op. cit. 373 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Signing of the Japan–Australia information security agreement’, press release, 17 May 2012. https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/0517_01.html 374 Satake and Hemmings, op.cit. p. 8. 375 Simon Monterola, Colonel DASA Tokyo 2019-20, private interview. 28 February 2019 107 3.3.4. Tipping-point in the A-JDSR

Australian reactions to the Japanese ‘2011 triple disaster’, created a tipping-point in the A-JDSR. Australia was the first country to respond, providing all three of its available C- 17 heavy-lift aircraft to Japan for humanitarian relief. As they flew into Japan, it was the first time that any country other than the United States had flown military aircraft operationally inside Japan since the Korean Armistice.’376

The Australian Embassy started advising agencies in Japan within 50 minutes of the earthquake that Australia would send their C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft to assist with HA/DR. The RAAF response demonstrated beyond doubt that Australia was committed to the A-JDSR and to Japan. Headquarters US Forces in Japan and the SDF were very aware of the speed of Australian reaction and the smoothness of integrating the RAAF into the US effort. A JASDF senior officer said to the Australian UN Commander (Rear) in Japan Tony McCormack at the time: ‘you did not need to help us, but you did.’377

The then-DASA Colonel Tim Gellel, assisted by Wing Commander Halloran, a Japanese linguist (and now Head, Defence Staff Tokyo) managed all transport aircraft receipts and onwards transfer arrangements in this operation called ‘Pacific Assist’, (called by the US Operation Tomodachi (友達, friend). In August 2014, as Binskin hosted Iwasaki visit to Australia, he said: ‘The regard the Japanese government and its people held for the RAAF and ADF, and indeed Australia grew significantly due to the support given. It is difficult to overstate the value of the relief effort to the overall A-JDSR. We were never going to have built such a close relationship without the role we played in the tsunami relief.’378

3.3.5. A-JDSR cooperative activity continues

Trilateral air activity started in 2011 when the United States invited Australia and Japan to be involved in an Air Defence Exercise (ADEX) in Guam. The invitation had arisen from a bilateral visit to Tokyo in April 2010 when Binskin was CAF, meeting General Hokazato, Chief of Staff, JASDF who expressed his desire to work with Australia.

376 Angus Houston, Air Chief Marshal, Chief of Defence Force 2005-11, private interview. 19 February 2019. 377 Tony McCormack, Air Commodore, Commander, United Nations command (Rear), 2009-12, private interview. 378 CDF Binskin was awarded ‘The Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star in 2018 for his work in building the relationship. Similarly, CDF Iwasaki was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 2015. 108 Hakozato said he did not feel he needed the required Diet approval to approve combined ADEXes as these ‘were over-the-horizon’. The 2011 ADEX set a precedent, and the three countries participated in later exercises—it is now ‘trilateral in participation’’.379 There had been an immediate ‘spin-off’ from Operation Tomodachi which generated public support for the SDF. Kersten said the relief of the populace generated ’a social good’ and support for the SDF and partners. For Australia, this meant that it was easier for Japanese authorities to later accept a transit of RAAF C-17 (and their escorted F-18s) coming to JASDF Misawa as a bilateral visit.380 The much-prior 1998 RAAF deployment through Yokota (as they travelled to an exercise in Alaska) had been a valuable precursor and ‘benchmark’ to this later 2011 bilateral exercise. This had almost been achieved in 1998 but the 2011 deployment demonstrated the ‘real but glacial’ nature of developing bilateral combat-related exchanges.

From 2011 there was a big increase in A-JDSR activity, both bilaterally and under UNC (Rear) auspices, to a peak-to-date in 2019 of 60 bilateral ship and aircraft visits per year. The A-JDSR increased in activity and complexity. There was an increasing level of naval cooperation on submarine issues, in particular remediation problems on the Collins-class submarines and the prospect of technology transfer involving submarines. In 2012, Australian began to be interested in the JMSDF Sōryū and Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, the New Australian Submarine Program Director visited Japan and inspected a Sōryū submarine. Early talks were hold on the possibility of purchasing Japanese submarines, but this was only exploratory as the Japanese Government had not yet removed its proscription on export of arms. Nevertheless, other talks were held on the opportunity that might be offered for RAAF/JASDF cooperation as both had made the decision to acquire the Joint Strike Fighter.381

In 2013 additional linkages were made with the Defence Science and Technology Group in Defence in 2013, a vital link that would have conducted cooperative submarine development had the Japanese Submarine bid been successful.382 In the next year Prime Ministers Abe and Abbott signed the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement.

379 Exercise Cope North at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The latest exercise was held from 18 February to 8 March 2019 and included participants from Australia, Japan, and the United States. RAAF deployed 14 aircraft (including an AWAC Wedgetail) to focus on interoperability with United States and Japanese counterparts. 380 RAAF fighter aircraft returning from an air defence exercise in Alaska and accompanied by a supporting C-17 made an operational stop for the first time at a non-UNC US Airbase in northern Japan – Misawa. 381 Malcolm Selkirk, Group Captain, DASA Tokyo 2011-13, private interview. 4 March 2021. 382 John Harwood, Group Captain, DASA 2013-17, private interview. 11 February 2019. 109 This is the most significant economic accord between the two countries since the 1957 Agreement on Commerce. Both Governments spoke then of ‘the recent growth and deepening of the bilateral defence and security relationship in support of international peace and stability’. The press release also announced the signing of an agreement ‘Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology’.383 These agreements laid the groundwork for substantial cooperation including collaborative military equipment transfer and a deepening of the A-JDSR.

3.3.6. Recent activities mark the maturing of the A-JDSR

In 2105 Japan wanted to build a new amphibious brigade-sized capability based on the Australian model. The GSDF Chief of Staff General Kiyofumi Iwata was the force behind it, relying for credibility on ‘external pressure’ from the US—a common excuse in Japan for taking action that might mot otherwise have been taken.384 The capability would allow Japan to maintain a sovereignty role and is a precursor to a joint operational capability. Australia provided advice on its own journey in this area. 385

Iwasaki, Chief of ASDF during the triple disaster and later Chief of Staff, Joint Chiefs, said that the 2018 NDPG addresses Australia's importance, listing it second only to the US. Japan intends to strengthen military cooperation with Australia further in the fields of: bilateral training and exercises, anti-piracy operations, capacity-building assistance, counterterrorism and the field of defence equipment and defence technology. Iwasaki underlined the critical role of personal relationships to achieving outcomes in the A-JDSR: Prime Minister to Prime Minister, Minister to Minister, and CDF to Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (統幕長, tōbakuchō ).386

Binskin also gives an example of mutual trust when he called on Iwasaki, then Chairman, Joint Staff. They were discussing Japan’s pending deployment of JSDF troops to South Sudan for peacekeeping where the ADF also had a contingent.387 Binskin asked if Iwasaki

383 Joint Press Statement by Prime Ministers Abe and Abbott. Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century. 8 July 2014. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/jaepa/Pages/japan-australia-economic-partnership-agreement. 384 GSDF and U.S. reached secret deal in 2015 to station amphibious unit in Okinawa. Japan Times. 25 January 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/25/national/gsdf-marines-okinawa-plan/ 385 Bilton. op. cit. 386 Iwasaki, op. cit. 387 Operation ASLAN was the deployment of ADF personnel to the UN’s' Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). 110 would consider ‘having Australian military people embedded to allow them to work together better in Japan’s South Sudan contribution.’ Nothing eventuated, mainly because Japan could not then accept having Australians under command. However, on his next visit to Japan, Binskin and Iwasaki tried a different approach to cooperation in emergencies by having assigned people under separate command arrangement.’ The deployment went ahead, and the ADF contingent had about 20 JSDF people posted in over time, two at a time, for ten rotations.388

Trilateral cooperation and exercising increased in the period 2017 to present. The Tokyo DASA in 2018 presaged the prospect of all three engaging in coalition operations. His view on cooperation in military activity was that there is not yet interoperability at the high-end, but ‘we currently do have the ability to partner and work together at the tactical level.’389

Defence significantly upgraded its presence in Tokyo in early 2020. The 2016 Defence White Paper had identified a greater need to engage with Japan. Defence posted in a highly experienced officer and Japanese linguist. Sonja Halloran, Head of Australian Defence Staff (HADS) manages a staff in Tokyo of 15 (with one civilian staff embedded in the JMOD reporting directly to Canberra)—a tripling of defence presence.390 The expanded office now includes three dedicated single-service attaches and more staff to deal with expanded engagement and more activities.391

There is now an increasing openness in what Australia can do with Japan, beyond what the 2016 DWP mentions.’392 Defence goals in Tokyo are to deepen the A-JDSR in practical and meaningful ways, demonstrating Australia’s merit as a defence and security partner of choice (after the United States) across multiple areas.393

388 As at the end of the embedded rotations in September 2016, Operation ASLAN and the ADF contribution to South Sudan. 389 Simon Monterola, Colonel DASA Tokyo 2019-20, private interview. 28 February 2019. There are three levels of military operational cooperation: Strategic where whole defence forces actin a combined manner such as in the Second World War; Theatre Command where large formations of forces work together in a Theatre of War; and Tactical, where forces or individual units operate together, usually under own chains of command. 390 A title shared only with counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom and Indonesia, 391 Sonja Halloran, Group Captain, HADS Tokyo, 2020-, private interview. 19 December 2020. 392 Joshua Wilkinson, Commander RAN, Chief of Staff Defence Tokyo, private interview. 3 July 2020. 393 Halloran, op. cit. 111 3.3.7. Reciprocal Access Agreement

Since the 2007 JDSC, Australia has focused on building formal frameworks with Japan in ’a trusted relationship’. A significant impediment to efficient cooperation has been the absence of a treaty-level document, the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) that would facilitate the conduct of bilateral activity in Australia and Japan.394 A member of the NSS said that the ACSA and the RAA are essential components of the framework Australia and Japan are building, but that was not easy for Japan to achieve, requiring the government Japan to change about ten national laws. 395 Once ratified, the RAA will streamline administrative aspects of Australia’s and Japan’s ability to exercise or operate in each other’s country, supplementing the ACSA and leading to the capacity for collective operations.

ANU academic H.D.P Envall says that the RAA will ‘further facilitate joint training activities, considering the anticipated deal is not intended to ‘counter China’s might’ and won’t trigger a major ‘Chinese backlash’. The establishment of an RAA, the first visiting forces agreement for Japan other than the one it has with the United States represents the continued progress of Japan’s security ‘normalisation’’. Envall added the ‘RAA is more concerned with keeping the US engaged in the region than with balancing China.’396

Prime Minister Morrison called on Prime Minister Suga in Tokyo on 17 November 2020, the first head of government to call on the new Japanese leader.397 They announced in- principle agreement to the RAA. The actual signing will take later once domestic legislative processes have been satisfied, which may take another year. The preparation of supporting documents and protocols will follow. There has been criticism that the RAA may expose ADF members to capital punishment due to their alignment under Japanese National law. Morrison considers that this prospect can be accommodated by Australia ‘meet[ing] all of its obligations under its international agreements.’ 398 A realistic assessment is that Australia has come to accept that bringing up the death penalty issue will result in a stalemate—so an outcome, albeit pragmatic, was achieved.

394 Kim Moy, Defence Policy Officer in Tokyo, private interview. 28 February 2019. 395 Japanese Official D, Private interview. private interview. 1 March 2019. 396 H.D.P. Envall, ‘Australia–Japan defence deal: noteworthy, not newsworthy.’ The Interpreter, Lowy Institute.22 January 2018. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-japan-defence-deal-noteworthy-not-newsworthy. 397 Historic deal ... and a climate boogie dance, The Australian 18 November 2020. 398 Olivia Caisley, ‘Japan defence pact ‘a pivotal movement’’. The Australian, 18 November 2020. 112 Australia and Japan signed the in-principle RAA in the same week they signed the economically significant Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). As they both sought to engage with China inside the Indo-Pacific economic architecture, they were also looking to build security partnerships with like-minded countries to build a rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Nagy said: the RAA ‘blends engagement and hedging to manage an assertive China, time-honoured concerns about abandonment, and the challenges of an intensifying US-China strategic competition.’ 399

Commentator Greg Sheridan considers that this is a significant step. Both countries are aware of this, wishing to make a security statement, saying that ‘Tokyo and Canberra are, bit by bit, inching ever closer to a full military alliance. It’s not there yet, and it would be wrong to misrepresent it. But it’s getting very close.’ He added that Canberra ranks its Special Strategic Relationship with Japan ranks ‘just below a formal military alliance.’

China has criticised the agreement accusing Australia and Japan of acting on behalf of the United States. China’s nationalistic newspaper, the Global Times said it was showing a confrontational posture warning, saying ‘they should know the potential strategic dangers of doing so.’400 Morrison said China should not fear the signing of the defence treaty. ‘This is a significant evolution of this relationship, but there is no reason for that to cause any concern elsewhere in the region,’ he said. ‘I think it adds to the stability of the region, which is a good thing.’401

3.3.8. Recent Developments

Recently, trilateral, and bilateral activities military activities have taken place in both Australia and Japan. Significant activities conducted in Australia have been: Southern Jackaroo—an annual trilateral Army exercise; Nichigo Trident—bilateral exercise between RAN and MSDF with high-end warfighting; and Talisman Sabre—a large bilateral Australia-US exercise held in Australia with the JSDF Japan participating as part of the US contingent.402 In the 2019 Talisman Sabre exercise, the JSDF sent two ships, a helicopter

399 Stephen Nagy, Japan-Australia Defense Treaty: US Allies Adapting to New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Geopolitic Monitor. Situation Reports. 24 November 2020. https://www.academia.edu/s/ac0baa5956?source=ai_email 400 Caisley, ibid. 401 Australia and Japan agree 'in principle' to historic defence pact. ABC News, 17 November 2020. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-17/australia-japan-agree-in-principle-to-defence-pact/12891322 402 The PLA-N sent an intelligence-gathering ship to observe the exercise: it visited Sydney first, attracting criticism. 113 carrier destroyer, and an amphibious landing ship with embarked GSDF troops. Most ship visits to Japan are now conducted on a bilateral basis (rather than under the Japan-UN SOFA), reflecting the special strategic partnership.

Air exercises have been more difficult to arrange as there is a Japanese perception that associates fast military jets with strike capability—a concept that continues to test the boundaries of a self-defence force. Since 1998, the RAAF has wished to take the opportunity to practise interoperability with the JASDF. Recently, RAAF and ASDF achieved this goal in August 2019 with the conduct of their first bilateral air defence exercise (Bushido Guardian) held in the skies over under the full glare of the Japanese press.

Exercising between aligned militaries allows them to prepare to conduct operations together—to understand and trust each and gain and practise skills and share experiences. The building of mutual competency and trust is the real core of interoperability, not just technical aspects but also the ability to work together to achieve directed political outcomes. A naval interlocutor told the candidate that current trilateral naval exercises are now demonstrating higher levels of interoperability. He noted that Japan remains firmly wedded to ‘Hub-and-spoke’ model of cooperation. Nevertheless, the US Indo-Pacific Command is ‘very heavily involved’ in Australia’s trilateral maritime activities. He said that A-J naval interoperability seems adequate, adding ‘we are interoperable for most things we are likely to do’.403 The Australian Chief of Navy, Michael Noonan says that growing naval cooperation with Japan's operations is routinely coordinated through Japan-based US Commanders.404

In summary, recent activities have moved the level of cooperation from humanitarian scenarios to the development of interoperability to allow for high-intensity operations, a significant departure from those foreshadowed in the 2007 JDSC. Trilateral cooperation in the bilateral A-JDSR and in conjunction with the United States can help redress capability shortfalls, enhance coalition warfighting, and strengthen deterrence and reassurance in the Asia Pacific’.405

403 Australian Defence Official B, private interview. 2 July 2020. 404 Michael Noonan, Vice-Admiral, RAN Chief of Navy, private interview. 18 June 2020 405 Andrew Shearer, Australia–Japan–US maritime cooperation: creating federated capabilities for the Asia Pacific (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), p. 37. 114 3.3.9. A basis for the future

Ministers of Defense, Nobuo Kishi and Senator Linda Reynolds met in Tokyo on 19 October 2020 and agreed to build closer relations amid China’s growing regional assertiveness. 406 They resolved to enhance cooperative activities, build interoperability, and deepen trilateral action.

A pivotal precursor to joint military cooperation is a commitment to allow the SDF to protect ADF assets. The JSDF is now permitted to protect ASF assets if they are engaged in certain operations near Japan. Australia is the only country other than the US whose assets the JSDF can protect under this change to the SDF Act. Although Japan does not intend to protect during actual combat, the JMOD said that the protection could cover ‘Gray Zone’ situations, such as if Australian vessels are being intimidated without an armed attack taking place.’407

3.4 Defence Intelligence Relationship

Purely military cooperative actions have ramped up for slow beginnings in the late 1990s. But there has been a parallel channel of exchange of security intelligence underway for a much longer time. Such channels are rarely publicised, especially for this channel. There is a broad continuum of intelligence exchange: some central to national security and tightly held; some able to be shared. The intelligence exchange between Australia and Japan has happened because both countries considered it to be in their interests to share intelligence.

Secret exchanges allow governments to speak frankly with each other about: themselves, each other, third and other parties, knowing that the recipient will respect shared confidences. Further, exchanged intelligence is usually subsumed into analyses that often disguises and protects the source. ‘Raw’ intelligence is seldom exchanged for this reason of source protection. The geographical location of an intelligence-gathering state (geography allowing for the physical electronic gathering of technical intelligence) and

406 Kishi/Reynolds Joint Statement on Advancing Defence Cooperation. October 19, 2020. Japan Ministry of Defense. October 19, 2020. https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/area/docs/2020/20201019_j-aus-en.html 407 Japan and Australia to coordinate on protection of military assets. The Japan Times, 20 October 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/10/20/national/japan-australia-coordinate-protection-military- assets/?utm_source=pianoT5&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=295&pnespid=P8YpwknkLyUAp4QD0yZs6ygbs 8rDIzb8LcmP 115 socio-cultural aspects (which facilitate the gathering of human intelligence) means that regionally-dominant countries often have close to a monopoly of regional intelligence. Australia enjoys regional dominance in its geographical area, as does Japan. Each can complement the other.

States have been gathering intelligence and if aligned, not necessarily allied, with another state, trading intelligence, for time immemorial. The relationship between Japan and Australia is no different. While the exchange of intelligence has been an essential part of the A-JDSR, the separate recording (focusing on military intelligence exchange) of this part of the relationship merits special attention as its conduct is not widely or publicly discussed. It is an important part of the military side of the A-JDSR. The next section addresses this area.408

3.4.1. Background to Intelligence Relationship

After the Second World War, the US dismantled the Japanese security apparatus. This included taking apart the extensive imperial intelligence apparatus that had facilitated Japanese expansion in Asia. Post-war Japan opted for a decentralised intelligence system as an alternative to its pre-war model as it reconstituted itself. The result was more a fragment than a full intelligence system, with Tokyo outsourcing the missing components mainly to the United States. This system worked through the Cold War when Japan was essential to US anti-Soviet strategy. However, since then, Japan had found itself unable to count on this source, promptly providing vital intelligence. Japan was now looking post- Cold War to the addition of more regional partners.409

In her detailed history of the JDA (later JMOD), Sheila Smith noted that Japan’s domestic intelligence agency was the National Police Agency from after the Second World War. They were the first to develop a capacity to share information with the United States and other national intelligence agencies on policing and global terror networks. It took decades for Japan to build its military intelligence architecture after the war. Each arm of the SDF built their own stove-piped military intelligence organisations.410 In 1997, the JDA established

408 No access to classified information was used for this research. All is based on open-sources and interviewees’ recollections. 409 Campbell, op. cit. 410 Smith, Sheila A. Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power, Harvard University Press, 2019. 116 the joint Defense Intelligence Headquarters, a signals intelligence agency. After the North Korean Taepodong launch in 1998, Japan sought independent space-based intelligence gathering and began to invest in its military satellite capabilities.411

Exchanges of intelligence by Japan with Australia on military, security and economic issues have been underway for almost 50 years. Military intelligence exchanges started with the Australian Director of Military Intelligence visiting Tokyo in 1972. Annual visits started in 1974.412 The scope and sensitivity of issues addressed, and the quality of analysis reflective of mutual trust between the two countries has been steadily growing. Former Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation Bill Crews said: ‘Japan is interested in our view of the world: we can share with them our views and any of our intelligence that is not inimical to the interests of our ‘five-eyes’ partners.’413 Former Head of Tokyo Mission Trevor Wilson said of the success of these exchanges: ‘We could not have done this without long-term engagement by Defence and DFA/DFAT since the 1970s and we have built a good relationship with Japan because of lots of groundwork’. He adds that this we have gained trust in our work over the years because Australia considered that it was worth doing and notably was done in a way ‘without missteps and undue publicity.’414

Since the Second World War, Australia has been since of the ‘Five Eyes’ (FVEY) intelligence network of Australia, the US, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. This group has an agreement which allows for significant sharing of classified information, analyses, and technology. Australia’s geographic location, sophisticated intelligence-gathering infrastructure, and close integration within the region, allows it to be a strong intelligence collector, and provider to and from the region to its partners. Intelligence marked Five- Eyes Only can only be shared with other FVEY nations. Exchanges with countries outside the pact regularly proceed but must be separated from any limited only to the FVEY community. This constraint limits the type of information that both the US and Australia can exchange with Japan, but they can share own-country-sourced intelligence and analyses. Japan seeks membership in the FVEY arrangements. Kusaka, immediate past Japanese Ambassador to Australia, said that Australia and Japan could work even more closely if Japan could join the community. ‘As ‘Six Eyes’, our nations could co-ordinate

411 See: Richard J. Samuels, Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019). 412 NAA: A9564 3/1/20 Part 1. f. 17 413 Bill Crews, Major General, Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation 1997-99, private interview. 8 October 2019. 414 Wilson, op.cit. 117 their policies much more effectively and with better results.’415 Reciprocity is central, as is the trust that the recipient will protect that information. This latter issue limits information exchange, but Japan is gradually building Australia’s confidence that it will safeguard the intelligence provided.

Australia and Japan agreed to work together in 2012 with the signing of the US-constructed GSOMIA, and a subsequent bilateral ISA which will build greater trust and military cooperative activity.416 Thorough implementation of the GSOMIA may be the first step along the path of Japan becoming part of the ‘five-eyes’ intelligence-sharing community by requiring Japan to strengthen its processes to protect foreign-sourced intelligence.417

3.4.2 Early Days

In the early days of Australia’s first exchange of Defence Attachés, the Australian government focused on the possible rise of Japanese militarism. This focus resulted in Japanese defence and foreign officials being suspicious of Australian defence staff motives and the SDF was very unwilling to speak of activities. At the same time, Australia placed a low priority on both the selection for and the preparation of, military officers for posts in Asian legations. Australia also paid little heed to the scant reporting that the Tokyo Embassy generated.418

In the 1970s, Japan could work security issues only with the United States. Japan treated Australia as a friend but kept the security relationship ‘at a distance’. In the 1980s and 90s, Japan started to do more on Australia's security issues after pressure from the United States to do more for its defence. From the 1980s, Japan appreciated the opportunity to seek views on regional and global engagement on defence and security matters beyond that provided by the US. They developed a more Japan-centric focus of potential threats to its interest and the region. The US encouraged an outreach which included the slow but measured establishment of bilateral defence intelligence relationships with other selected nations, including Australia. This complementarity provided the Japanese government and

415 Alliance never more critical. Interview by Dennis Shanahan with Sumio Kusaka. The Australian. 6 October 2020. 416 MOFA, ‘Signing of the Japan–Australia information security agreement’, press release, 17 May 2012. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0708.html 417 Approach of Japan-Australia PCW—From the viewpoint of ’diversification’ of security cooperation. Tomohiko Satake. Translation of original paper. ‘Research on Defense Studies No. 57) 418 Dunn, op. cit. 118 JSDF with better awareness and understanding of Japan's political, economic, defence and strategic environment.419

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Australia and Japan conducted strategic assessment exchanges between Foreign and Defence Ministries. MOFA had a broader view than the JDA of national security, which factored in economic security, and the impact and constraints of domestic politics and economics on others, including Cold War rivals. Wilson said that Australia’s Office of Net Assessment (now the Office of Net Intelligence) only exchanged information with the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office and the Ministry of Justice’s Public Security Intelligence Agency, starting in the mid-1990s (perhaps earlier). Formal agreements had been to authorise these intelligence exchanges. These backed up the Defence exchanges of classified assessments tailored for the Japanese. MOFA exchanges were undoubtedly reciprocal.420

The Defence and Political sections of the Australian Embassy in Tokyo have worked in the past with the Internal Bureaux of the JDA/JMOD and MOFA on intelligence exchange. However, there was no engagement with the military parts of the JDA until the mid to late 1990s. In the late 1990s, the Australia Defence Intelligence Organisation assisted with establishing the Defence Intelligence Headquarters under Lieutenant General Mashiro Kunimi.421 Military information and other intelligence was shared.422 Crews said that intelligence exchange with DIHQ was up to SECRET level without compromising ‘five-eyes’ material, and selectively included modified Australian eyes only (AUSTEO) information. Crews considered that Australia saw Japan as trustworthy friends and a ‘centre of virtues’ with interests that we shared, and it helped Australia understand the Japanese view of the world. Fundamental issues to understand is intelligence relating to enemies’ intentions and other close-held information—but this may not yet be ready to be shared. However, Japan is implementing better frameworks to effect such sharing.423

A US view of intelligence sharing with Japan is that arrangements made to support TSD go well. However, there is no overarching Government of Japan coordination of

419 Ian Dudgeon, previous DFAT Officer, private interview. 10 October 2019. 420 Wilson, op. cit. 421 DIO helped the JDA establish the DIH by sharing with them structure and related information 422George Spence, Captain RAN, DASA Tokyo 1998-2001, private interview. 7 July 2020. 423 Crews. op. cit. 119 intelligence exchange other than at the ministerial level between agencies. The Japanese Security Protection Act, passed in 2014, has not been well embedded into the Japanese bureaucracy – certainly not well enough to allow them to join the Five-eyes community which they seek to join.424 Ross Babbage says Australia still has concerns over the Japanese ability to protect intelligence saying ‘In a crisis, we would wish to assist Japan, so there are real reasons we need to develop proper enabling processes’.425 A former Director, DIO said: ‘Our ability to conduct meaningful high-level activity is limited by our inability to share US-based intelligence and to perform high-level operations with a third party (especially one outside the Five-Eyes community).426

At a practical level, the two governments signed the bilateral Information Sharing Agreement (ISA) in 2013. The agreement requires both countries to protect transmitted classified information. 427 The posting of a Defence Intelligence Organisation Liaison Officer on the Defence Staff in Tokyo will help develop sharing mechanisms between Japan and Australia and, even more importantly, trilaterally with the United States.

Bruce Miller said that ‘a significant achievement in the A-JDSR has been the growth in the intelligence relationship, bilaterally as well as trilaterally with the United States.’ He added that ‘this required perseverance from the Australian end’.428

3.5 United Nations Command (Rear) – its utility in the A-JDSR

3.5.1. Strategic View of Threat from the DPRK

Japan and South Korea face an existential threat from North Korea. DPRK belligerence has been marked by incursions and the firing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The UNC has responsibility for keeping the peace on the peninsula but does not have enough in- theatre military capacity to repel a full-scale assault. It acts as a force-in-being with ability to accept transfer of arms and manpower to conduct full-scale warfare form other countries.

424 US Defence Official, private interview. 5 Mar 2019. 425 Babbage, op cit. 426 John McGarry, Air Vice-Marshal, Director Defence Intelligence Organisation, 2014-16, private interview. 31 October 2019. 427 ‘Agreement between the Governments of Japan and Australia on the Security of Information (2013)’. https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2012/5/0508_01.htm 428 Miller, Bruce, unpublished memoirs, provided to author. 12 Aug 2020. 120 Japan is a war-staging area for US, UNC and ROK forces to defend the ROK against the DPRK. Japan and especially the US Bases on its soil, would likely be targetted in a conflict, perhaps pre-emptively.

To counter a missile threat, Japan is improving its missile defence (although there are sharp differences with the United States on how to achieve this). Interviewees considered that Japan would support the United States in a military action on the Korean peninsula if the DPRK attacked. This would include antisubmarine operations against the North’s ballistic missile-capable submarines and wide-area surveillance.429

Australia is currently engaged in conducting sanctions operations against the DPRK. Australia is already committed to assisting due to its UNC commitments. In 2017, Prime Minister Turnbull declared that if the DPRK attacked US forces, Australia would invoke the ANZUS treaty and come to its aid (without stating what form that aid would take).430 A security challenge on the Korean Peninsula is the most likely scenarios that would see military cooperation between Australia and Japan if Australia were to join the United States in a conflict relating to North Korean aggression. Australia might provide direct assistance to Japan in such a conflict, and recent changes to Japanese laws would allow Japan to protect ADF assets in such a contingency.

3.5.2. Background to UNC (Rear)

The A-JDSR has another parallel stream of defence and security engagement. Australia has been sending, since the outbreak of the Korean War, military forces to Japan. These dispatches are in addition to those conducted under sovereign state agreements. Australia is a ‘sending state’ under a UN Resolution with the responsibility to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. Australia exercises some of that responsibility by exercising its right of entry to prepare for that contingency. The United Nations negotiated this right with the Government of Japan. At the time Japan was weak, just starting to recover after years of war and under threat from regional neighbours and was in no strong negotiating position. It is unlikely any sovereign nation would today make such an agreement. The UN-Japan

429 For example, Koda, op. cit. 430 For more on the Treaty, see North Korea, Australia and the ANZUS Treaty Alison Pert. The Strategist 4 April 2018. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/north-korea-and-anzus-treaty 121 agreement predates the US-JMST. The access and other aspects of the UN-Japan SOFA are not well-known but are essential for Northeast Asian security.

The UNC is a US command construct dating from the Korean War. The Headquarters UNC is based in Seoul, ROK and has the responsibility to protect the ROK. It has a rear headquarters (UNC (Rear)) located in Tokyo.431 A US four-star general commands United States forces assigned to the peninsula, ROK Forces and UN Forces. The UN function requires it to facilitate sending states to contribute to peace and stability, including the coordination of force movements in the ROK, directly and through Japan. Japan has provided the UNC with seven US Forces' nominated bases in Japan (USFJ). These are accessible to the UNC (Rear). These bases in Japan support sending-member nations as they conduct designated activities in support of the UNC. The SOFA allows ADF ships and aircraft to visit Japan to ‘exercise the SOFA’. This facilitates the conduct of bilateral exercising with Japan as visits to UNC bases invariably allow for contiguous visits to JSDF bases.

Although the UNC may seem to be a Cold War anachronism, it is essential to combat the North Korean threat. As long as it exists, it serves a useful purpose for Japan, the US, and other signatory nations as it gives them the ability to move forces through Japan rapidly. UNC arrangements in Korea and Japan are ‘the only multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia’.432 It forms an integral part of the history, and perhaps future of the A- JDSR. Although it forms a part of the overall A-JDSR, it is a parallel activity conducted under bilateral (and trilateral) arrangements and merits a separate discursive section.

3.5.3. Role of the UNC and UNC (Rear) in the A-JDSR

The UNC was rapidly established in wartime under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 83 in July 1950. The UNC’s mission is to carry out the terms of the 27 July 1953 Armistice Agreement to preserve peace in Korea. There are 11 Signatory Nations, including the United States as the executive agent, and Japan as the Host Nation. It provides a continuing deterrent to the DPRK through regular demonstration of Japan's commitment, USFJ and sending states to maintain a credible force flow capability to Korea. 433

431 The UNC (Rear) is responsible for managing the UN-J SOFA. HQUNC in Seoul oversees UNC-Rear. 432 Tim Gellel, Colonel, DASA Tokyo 2007-10, Private interview. 9 January 2019. 433 Adam Williams, Group Captain, CDR UNC (Rear) 2018-present. private interview. Tokyo, 5 March 2019. 122 Over the past decade, Australia has conducted more UNC (Rear) activities in Japan than any other non-US sending nation.434 The SOFA importantly grants authority to the UNC to approve access to Japan for any UN forces engaged in the UNC mission—and nominally does not require the prior approval of the GOJ to approve any such movement of member state forces. However, the UNC (Rear) invariably flags all such activities to Japan and notes any objections (and usually respected). The operational flexibility this allows is very valuable to both Japan and the 16 sending nations. 435

In 2008, the UNC Commander sought more international participation in his command by seeking a non-US member state to provide the Commander for the UNC (Rear) in Japan. Australia agreed, and Australian CDF Houston agreed to a formal proposal to have an ADF officer fill the Commander UNC (Rear) post.436 The appointment demonstrated that the UNC (Rear) was a multinational organization, currently there are officers from four nations in UNC (Rear). The UN bases in Japan, and by extension Japan, remain essential to sustainment and support for UN operations on the KP. There is political reluctance by the ROK to accept there its protection relies on the UNC staging through Japan.437

Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral Michael Noonan considers that the Australian commitment expresses the importance Australia places on the relationship with the ROK and Japan saying: ‘we well understand the current sensitivities between Japan and the ROK, and the UNC provides us with an opportunity to talk to both.’438

3.5.4. Recent History of UNC (Rear) support to Japan and the region

Within an hour of the earthquake and the ensuant tsunami hitting northern Honshu, Australia prepared its disaster relief response for Japan. Australia initially considered using the UN-Japan SOFA provisions to allow RAAF C-17 aircraft into USAF/UNC airbase Yokota, near Tokyo. However, diplomatic clearances were rapidly provided (verbally) by Japan for operations within Japanese airspace. Australia conducted all disaster relief with

434 In 2012, saw 12 visits from eight sending nations with Australia making seven visits, rising five-fold in 2018 to 62 visits, with Australia making 26 and New Zealand (the next highest) ten. Private interview. , Williams, 5 March 2019. 435 Williams, op. cit. 436 ibid. 437 Chris Smith, Captain RAN, Defence Attaché-elect Seoul, private interview candidate 12 October 2020. 438 Michael Noonan, Vice-Admiral, RAN. Chief of Navy, private interview. 18 June 2020 123 the full knowledge and concurrence of Japan. This operation was done solely for Japan's benefit and showed how rapidly assisting nations could act in crises.439

In 2016, Commander UNC (Rear) Mick Jansen said the DPRK again ‘assaulted the sea areas around Japan with ballistic missiles’. The attack led to JMOD planners considering how they would evacuate their nationals from South Korea, a process called non-combatant evacuation operations, an essential part of UNC’s responsibilities. Japan became interested in and was briefed on this evacuation policy.440 Jansen added that the military visit program under UNC (Rear) auspices had grown to over 60 compared with 2011 when there were only six visits (all connected with disaster relief from Australia).

Since 2018, an UN-sponsored operation has been underway since off the Korean Peninsula enforcing sanctions against the DPRK.441 Australia supports this operation, deploying maritime patrol aircraft and major fleet Units to conduct maritime surveillance operations in DPRK contiguous waters442 to prevent the DPRK gaining weapons with which to threaten South Korea.443 The JSDF is also heavily engaged in the operation and is involved in continued navy and coast guard patrols. Military aircraft and naval units from other UNC-sending nations involved in this operation are operating under UNC(Rear) SOFA auspices. The surveillance operation is the first operational use of the UNCR SOFA in Japan since the Korean Armistice. It represents a seminal change in the use of UNCR bases to effect regional security operations. As the UNC was establishing the multinational surveillance operation, Japan took one month to consider how it would allow basing of assigned forces—under sovereign arrangements or the UNC-Japan SOFA's auspices.

Eventually, Japan agreed to allow the UNC (Rear) to support Japan's sanctions operations through the UNC (Rear) bases. UNC (Rear) Commander Adam Williams said ‘Japan almost, but not quite went down the path of invoking their Important ‘Influence Situation Law’.444 This new law would have allowed them to cooperate with other nations' militaries in situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. A

439 Gellel. op cit. 440 ‘Statement of General Vincent Brooks, Commander, UNC; ROK and US Combined Forces Command; and Commander US Forces Korea’. Testimony before ‘The House Armed Services Committee, February 14, 2018. p. 4. 441 Conducted under UN Security Council Resolution 2397 (22 December 2017) 442 As of October 2020, the ADF has made seven-month-long deployments since 2108. 443 Defence Ministerial Press Release, 19 February 2020. https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/australia-unscs-operation-argos/ 444 Williams. op.cit. 124 Japanese official said Australia preferred not to see the SOFA used for operations on the Korean Peninsula for bilateral activity. Still, Japan chose to use this for Operation Argos, (the ADF’s name for the operation).445 Australia preferred to use the UNC (Rear) bases because this gave them better support for their activities as it provided direct access to the US supply system.446 However, Japan’s agreement to allow this stretched the previous level of understanding of using the UNC (Rear) bases to support operations on the Korean peninsula.

3.5.6. Use of the UNC-Japan SOFA vice Bilateral Arrangements

It was easy for Australia to use the UNC-J SOFA to seek to use UNC bases in Japan to support the sanctions activity, using well-practised protocols. Japan could have justified its people's sovereign use of SDF bases by others, not under the UNC-Japan SOFA. (It could have done so under the 2015 Revision of the Guidelines for the use of the JSDF and its infrastructure). Such a decision would have been an explicit declaration of implementing these guidelines, but Japan chose not to do so. Bruce Miller considered that Operation Argos ‘really stretched the interpretation of the UNC(Rear) process. A Japanese defence official told the candidate that there was sufficient impetus in Japan to ensure that the operation was supported from Japanese bases. He said ‘if they had been no SOFA, then this operation would have gone ahead without any issue. This was the height of political concern over the DPRK and could have been undertaken from the beginning under bilateral arrangements.447

The Australian Head of Military Strategic Commitments said: ‘Japan will not commit to just anything under the UNC-Japan SOFA. They will be careful but will always be cognisant that the use of the SOFA by sending states does have implications in that, by keeping the SOFA/dialogue alive, it denotes possible commitment by UNC (Rear) nations to the Defence of Japan.’ He added that Headquarters US Forces Japan spends a great deal of effort managing the relationship with the GOJ.448

445 Defence Official C, private interview. Canberra, 3 July 2020. 446 Bilton. op. cit. 447 Japanese Defence Official, private interview. 6 March 2019. 448 , Major General. Head, Military Strategic Commitments. HQADF, private interview candidate 2 July 2020. 125 3.5.7. Use of the UNC (Rear) for Bilateral Activity

Tony McCormack said the entry of the relief aircraft into Japan to provide ‘was given under an immediate verbal diplomatic clearance as a civilian/bilateral action (not through the UNC (Rear)). This decision was an unusual response as such clearances usually involved much formality and delay and was a common-sense response given it was clearly in Japan’s benefit.449 Nevertheless, despite their clear role to operate under UNC-Japan arrangements, UNC (Rear) Headquarters coordinated a bilateral activity specifically provided for in the 2007 JDSC, the provision of humanitarian assistance, but not for a third country—for Japan. McCormack said that the CAF Binskin designated him as the local air component commander, despite such ‘in-country’ action not generally associated with the UNC (Rear) where sending forces near always retain command authority450. With this delegation, McCormack offered the USAF Headquarters (5th Air Force at Yokota) operational control for the RAAF C-17s to conduct HA/DR for Japan. He added that this ‘turned my HQ into a multinational coordination centre’ for all UNC (Rear)-sending nations involved in this activity. It worked so well because Australia was determined it wanted to assist. Further, military-to-military relationships are built on two pillars: agreements and shared understanding of procedures, comes from agreements; and personal trust. The ADF has been investing in its relationships with both the air forces of both the United States and Japanese for many decades providing the bases to ‘make it happen.’

The blurring of the UNC's role (Rear) in Japan was an important example of the way the existence of the UNC assisted in bilateral security activities between Australia and Japan. It could serve as a pragmatic example of how UNC-Japan arrangements can help Japan and Australia work together in security operations.

3.5.8. Japan’s view of the UNC (Rear)

A cynical, but pragmatic view of Japan’s continued acceptance of the imposition of other nations’ forces into Japan is that it is in Japan’s interests to allow this access to continue. Chairman of Joint Staff Council, Iwasaki tells of the entry into Japan of RAAF C-17 relief aircraft within days of the 2011’ triple disaster’ and how staff from UNC (Rear), Embassy,

449 Our Man at Yokota, Air Mobility News & Views: Airlift/Tanker Quarterly, Fall 2019, Robert Sligh. 450 This meant that he was able to transfer operational control to US forces in Japan. 126 US Forces Japan and SDF staff all working together to ensure mission success.451 Within hours of the disaster, Iwasaki was called directly by the Australian CAF (Air Marshal Mark Binskin) who offered air transport on a scale not available in Japan.

Background interviews with GOJ officials indicate that Japan sees the UNC (Rear)’s presence as a useful tool, enabling it to conduct a bilateral military activity without going through a bureaucratic process that would likely result in unwanted political visibility. In other words, it is convenient for Japan to allow operations under UNC auspices, but it may not be of critical value.452

Nevertheless, Japan considers that the UNC (Rear) makes a real contribution to Northeast Asia security by allowing other nations to participate. If there were a contingency on the KP, Japan would make every effort to support the UNC (Rear) and sending countries. The 2015 review of guidelines addressed the provision of logistic support to others has been interpreted to relate only to times of threat to Japanese sovereignty. Prominent security commentator Yuichi Hosoya considers that, in a situation like operations in South Korea or elsewhere on the Korean peninsula against North Korea, Japan would provide support to Australia. 453

Nevertheless, there is a view that Japan, aware of its sovereignty, is now trying to minimize the use of the UN-Japan SOFA for purposes other than the defence of Korea. 454 Notwithstanding, the continued existence of the UNC in Japan provides not only a critical ‘stepping-stone’ to support operations on the KP, but, by the demonstration of recent actions, provides a militarily convenient facility for sending forces into Japan at short notice for, at least HA/HR actions in Northeast Asia.

3.5.9. The ROKs view of the UNC (Rear)

The ROK is very sensitive about speaking of relying on Japan or its hosting of UNC bases being used by the UNC for relief on the Korean Peninsula. Even though the US, Japanese,

451 Iwasaki, op. cit. 452 Japanese Embassy Official A, private interview. 4 January 2019. 453 Yuichi Hōsoya, Professor International Politicsn, Keio University, private interview. 1 March 2019. Hosoya was a member of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013-14). 454 Narushige Michishita, Graduate Director, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, private interview. 5 March 2019. 127 and South Korean militaries train together to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles from North Korea, Seoul continues to reject any Japanese military role on the Korean Peninsula.455

This sensitivity extends to any statement that Japan may assist in relief staging. The United States has recently pushed for an expanded role for the UNC and has also emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation with South Korea. Last year, the UNC Headquarters in the ROK released the English-language version of its ‘2019 Strategic Digest’. It said it would continue to ensure support and cooperation ‘through Japan’ in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. These comments have caused some observers to question if the US was hinting at whether it would include Japan as a country that might assist in a security crisis.

Such expansion could coincide with the US’ strategy of containing China through stronger alliances in the region. Military experts also predicted Japan would not shy away from UNC participation. Some observers see the US’ push to expand the UNC as an attempt to reduce its responsibility for defending the Korean Peninsula while building a US-centered multilateral military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia.456

3.5.10. Summary

Australia has a long history of being involved in conflicts in NEA. Operations Argos and Linesman (Australian military support to the ROK) are just recent examples of Australian involvement. If Australia were to become involved in Northeast Asia in any form of conflict or contingency, it must have a support base, and Japan seems likely to be the only place that can offer that.

Operations Tomodachi and Argus demonstrate that both Japan and Australia can pragmatically act when it is in their interests to do so. The blurring of the UNC (Rear)’s role in Japan for Tomodachi was a striking example of how the existence of the UNC assisted in bilateral security activities between Australia and Japan. The 2018 stretching of the UNC- Japan SOFA provisions to accommodate support for a UNSR that was not part of the basis

455 Shelia A Smith, op. cit. 456 UNC’s ‘2019 Strategic Digest’ wording causes controversy regarding inclusion of Japanese Troops. Hankyoreh, 12 July 2019. 128 for UNC establishment provided a further pragmatic example of how UNC-Japan arrangements can assist Japan, and Australia can work together in security operations. The possibility that Japan and Australia (with US support) can use the UNC for new cooperative military and security action in Northeast Asia makes the UNC (Rear) very valuable.

3.6 Submarine proposal – a missed opportunity

3.6.1. Japan and Australia attempt cooperative force development

Strategic strike capability, through long-range bombers and submarines are powerful military and national deterrents. With the assistance of the United States, Australia and Japan became close to helping Australia build a submarine force deterrent, par excellence in the region. This development would have cemented the A-JDSR and guaranteed close operational naval operational cooperation.

Seven years after the signing of the JDSC a conservative government was again in place in Australia. Anxious to put his mark on defence and security, new Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, capitalising on a review of arms export guidelines by Japan, proposed that Australia and Japan cooperate on developing a submarine that would meet the needs of the RAN. The A-JDSR would have moved significantly forward if this cooperative weapons development had gone ahead.457 As the RAN had intended to use US-sourced weapon systems, the three countries in the A-J-US trilateral would have taken the trilateral relationship to a new level. This missed opportunity would have been a giant leap in the relationship given the scale of technology, doctrine, and policy transfer. It would bound operational capability between the three countries. This lost opportunity merits particular attention in this history of the defence relationship in this thesis.

3.6.2. Background

In December 2014, the press reported that Australian Prime Minister Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Abe had agreed that Japan would build eight submarines for Australia in

457 In April 2014, under their new National Security Strategy, Japan set out ‘Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ that allowed the controlled export of defence arms. MOFA, 6 April 2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000083.html 129 Japan.458 Inferences that Abbott had committed Australia to purchase without due process were not entirely accurate. As the then-Ambassador to Japan, Bruce Miller witnessed and recorded the discussions between the two Prime Ministers said that there ‘never was an explicit deal between the two prime ministers that Australia would buy Japanese submarines’, but the press had nevertheless raised expectations. Miller did add that, in explaining the timeline behind the submarine decision during Abbott’s call on Abe in April 2014, Abbott had made a ‘persuasive strategic case for Japanese involvement’. However, both PM Abe and his National Security Adviser Shotaro Yachi told Abbott that ‘getting the Japanese system onboard would prove a challenge, but they would try.’ Later, Defence Minister Onodera reiterated that the Japanese system would have difficulty in delivering.

The submarine issue consumed much of the Australian Embassy’s effort for 2½ years from early 2014, with work across political, defence, intelligence and trade strands working ‘all the different aspects of the Japanese system’. 459 Miller said they were ‘pushing (unsuccessfully) [for] the Japanese to produce a better-quality input,’ as well as managing Australian expectations. His position on the final decision was that: ‘as Ambassador to Japan, and as an advocate of the Japan option for good strategic reasons, I could see that government could not spend taxpayers’ money on anything second-rate’. Miller also noted that although Labor had taken little previous action on a submarine purchase, Defence Minister Stephen Smith when visiting Japan a few years before 2014 had ‘advocated a ‘quiet conversation’ with Japan on submarines’ but had not sought a domestic consensus on such progression.460

Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral Michael Noonan describes what the RAN had been expecting Japan to provide. The Sōryū 461 (青竜) submarine, the basis for the Japanese submarine proposal (called by Japan the Gōryū (豪竜 the Australian submarine)) was ‘a very capable conventional submarine and the fact that Australia considered it showed how much we respected it’. Noonan said: ‘A Japanese submarine made for Australia with a US combat system would have been highly effective in combined tri-national operations due to commonality of systems and interoperability of operations and doctrine.’462

458 Paul Malone, Tony Abbott blunder on submarine promise goes unnoticed. SMH, 6 May 2016. https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/abbott-blunder-on-submarine-promise-goes-unnoticed-20160505-gonbz1.html 459 In preparation, the RAN posted submarine officers to the Embassy in Tokyo. 460 Miller, Bruce, unpublished memoirs, provided to author. 12 Aug 2020. 461 Official names of JMSDF boats are written in phonetic Hiragana, not by Chinese characters (Kanji). 462 Noonan, op. cit. 130 Dissenters in the Japanese defence community did support the proposed sale. Their nationalistic views were challenged when the tender process was underway, a process that showed that the RAN were very ‘close to the USN and enjoyed a much closer level of technical cooperation that that given to the MSDF. Koda added to this view saying that that ‘MSDF submarines were good but not as good as some in Japan thought.’463 He says that a ‘minor opinion in the Japanese engineering community was that the engineering conventional submarine technologies are Japan’s treasures gained through very long experience in the Imperial Japanese Navy and JMSDF. They should not be released to anyone else.’ Koda added that in his experience the relationship between the USN and RAN ‘is, and has been for some, closer and deeper than the relationship between the JMSDF and the USN.’464 The implications for missed operational opportunities are clear, although the prospect of more comprehensive naval active cooperation endures.

Were the US supportive of the process? Graham Bentley, the local representative of Lockheed-Martin, supplier of the weapon system later chosen that Australia chose for the new submarine, said his company ‘was very supportive of Australia …but was agnostic of the hull choice.’465

Past Chief of Defence Force Binskin stated that Australia had made its decision based on capability and the French design had offered a superior capability. He added that both the Australian and Japanese Governments were keen to cooperate early on, but the Japanese had seemed unprepared. Australia tried to encourage them to develop their processes during the period of open tender, ‘but I was not convinced that they were ready for the export of such a complex and sensitive system as a submarine.’466

3.6.3. Comparative Evaluation Process

In April 2014, Japan’s Ministry of Defence launched the Australia–Japan Defence cooperation office.467 This opening came soon after the quickening of the A-JDSR. It enabled Japan to respond to the Australian Submarine Comparative Evaluation Process (CEP) later initiated by the Abbott Government in February 2015. Many in the defence

463 Previous ADF officer A, private interview. 7 July 2020. 464 Yoji Koda, private correspondence, 28 November 2020. 465 Graham Bentley, Lockheed-Martin Company, private interview. Canberra, 2 February 2020. 466 Binskin. op. cit. 467 Ministry of Defense (MOD), ‘Defense White Paper 2014’ 131 industry in Japan and Australia considered the CEP release to be reversing the reported understanding between the two Prime Ministers. In a previous election promise, Abbott had declared that Australia would build the submarines in Australia shipyards. The Australian Defence Industry, particularly in South Australia, met this recognition with dismay. Industry Minister Christopher Pyne, a South Australian Member of Parliament holding a marginal seat, played up the chances of Japan building the submarines in South Australia. Pyne’s action resulted in Abbott pledging that the submarine would have a significant linkage with Defence Industry in South Australia.

In March 2015, the Royal United Services Institute–Australia conducted a national conference in Adelaide to debate issues surrounding the new Australian submarine. Defence Minister Kevin Andrews supportively addressed the meeting. There was much anxiety over the prospect of Australian Defence Industry participation in the submarine build. The convenors invited two Japanese Vice-Admirals to speak and to assuage fears of abandonment of an Australia build. They were Yoji Koda, previous Commander-in- Chief of the Japanese Self-Defense Fleet, and Masao Kobayashi, previous Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force. Both had long experience in Japanese submarine force capability development. They confidently advised that Japan could develop a submarine that met the Australian Naval Requirements, and that Japan could build them in Australia. The conference and reporting press acclaimed the comments. 468 In September 2015, Australia declared that it would proceed with a tender process with Japan, France, and Germany as invited bidders.

In September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull replaced Abbott as Prime Minister. Christopher Pyne became Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science. Soon after, Pyne spoke to Japanese Defence Industry representatives who expected that they might be successful in their bid. Pyne said that colleagues later told him informally that ‘only after this meeting did the Japanese bidders believe they might not win.’ It may be that Pyne’s meeting precipitated the loss of Japanese trust in the declared process which ‘before the rebellion of February 2015’469 had seen Australia not then commit to an open tendering process for choosing the submarine builder.470

468 Personal records. The author was, as RUSI-A National Secretary, a convenor of that conference. 469 The meeting occurred just after leadership contenders first challenged Abbott, with Abbott just retaining leadership. 470 Christopher Pyne, ‘The Insider’ 30 June 2020. Hachette Australia. 132 In November 2015, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida agreed to participate in the process, noting ‘the strategic significance of bolstering bilateral defence and security cooperation between Japan and Australia and trilateral cooperation involving the United States’.471

The process resulted in Australia selecting France, not Japan, as the preferred tenderer. Australia later contracted with France to build 12 submarines for Australia, based on an unproven design yet to be developed. The Japanese government much regretted the decision.472 It severely tested but did not break the A-JDSR.473 It highlighted the role of domestic politics (in both Australia and Japan) in the process of capability development and the challenge of differing cultural understandings. Poor diplomatic management had allowed Australia and Japan to put their ‘more aspirational hopes for a major strategic relationship ahead of the complex realities of the biggest defence acquisition in Australian history’.474 Miller noted that the decision was a blow to Japan officials who had trouble accepting Australia’s explanation that the Japanese proposal did not meet its unique requirement, especially that of range. Some officials were more sanguine, speaking of the enduring nature of shared interests between Japan, the US and Australia. Miller (who spent an extra year as Ambassador managing the issue) said: ‘the scar tissue that came with these issues gave our relationship greater resilience than it previously had had.’475

3.6.4. Strategic Implications

The idea to take the A-JDSR to a new high by the cooperative building of a powerful and sophisticated weapon system such as a new submarine would have been far-reaching for the strategic partnership. Greg Sheridan said that Abbott’s intention to have Japan build the Australian submarine was based on a ‘superb strategic insight and could have yielded magnificent strategic dividends. But both the Japanese and we messed it up.’ Sheridan considered that not only would we have gained access to new technology, but such a

471 Greg Sheridan, ‘Japan and Australia share a special relationship.’ The Australian, 20 November 2015. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/japan-and-australia-share-a-special-relationship/news- story/38d51b6cd333b2b3662adafe30ca1004. 472 Japan sees Chinese hand in decision to overlook Sōryū. The Australian, Greg Sheridan 30 April 2019. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/tablet-t3/tablet-t3/lifestyle/japan-sees-chinese-hand-in-decision-to-overlook- Sōryū/news-story/89093cdb39cc4a5a7189b9610c6d8048 473 Insulting Japan over subs tender: rude, crude, and unnecessary. The Australian, 23 April 2016. 474 Nick Bisley and H. D. P. Envall, ‘The Morning After: Australia, Japan and the submarine deal that wasn’t’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 346, Washington, DC: East-West Center: June 7, 2016. 475 Miller, op cit. 133 defence export would have changed Japan’s strategic identity. It would have ‘profoundly deepened the three-way strategic alliance with Washington and underlined our long-term partnership with Japan.’476

For Japan, there had been immaturity in the process of exporting defence material. In April 2014, Japan had replaced its ‘Three Principles on Arms Export (which had effectively banned defence exports) with its ‘Three Principles on Defence Equipment and Technology Transfer. The new guidelines authorised defence exports in specific circumstances, but the more comprehensive regulatory structure had remained immature. Even after Australia started the CEP process, Japan had no regulatory policy on Defence Exports. The author was commissioned in early 2016 by a Japanese company (Institute of Future Engineering) under contract to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (経済産業 , Keizai- sangyō-shō) to source policy bases from the Australian Government, defence industry and academia.477 METI was particularly concerned about implementing controls to export contracts to protect Japanese defence industry interests and enforce Intellectual Property (IP) and other technology transfer to ensure China gained no secrets.478

Some in Tokyo believed that the eventual failure was down to geopolitical considerations as the proposal had initially gained traction in Canberra and Tokyo due to its strong political support. The speed with which both sides initially began work on the deal under Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, was remarkable.479 The pace was surprising, given the traditional reticence and caution with which most Japanese defence companies treated international sales, only recently released from Government policy restrictions. But the new Turnbull Australian government was not wholly convinced of the ‘strategic benefits’ espoused by Abe in the Japan bid.’480 Some considered that Turnbull’s ‘more neutral stance between Japan and China had an impact on the decision-making process.’481 Hugh White was also conscious of the potential strategic trap that Australia may fall into if it was convinced that the submarine purchase would facilitate a later formal strategic

476 Greg Sheridan’ ‘Japan’s departing Shinzō Abe has been a great friend to Australia and a trusted ally in the region.’ The Australian. 3 September 2020.. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/japans-departing-Shinzō-abe-has- been-a-great-friend-to-australia-and-a-trusted-ally-in-the-region/newsstory/8bbec0ae82c074f577310f3893f9a80d 477 The candidate was selected to do this work by Iwasaki who was a close colleague when both were at NIDS 20 years before. The role of personal relationships has been pivotal in the A-JDSR. 478 Kersten, op. cit. ‘Japan had a fear its technology would have found its way to China.’ 479 Junichi Nishiyama, Director, Institute of Future Engineering, private interview. 16 January 16, 2016. 480 Cameron Stuart, ‘US eyes strategic benefits from Japan submarines deal’, The Australian, 22 Jan. 2016. 481 Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Why Japan lost the bid to build Australia’s new subs’, The Diplomat, 27 April 2016. 134 commitment. He said ‘We must be quite clear about this. Tokyo expects that in return for its help to build our submarines, it would receive not just many billions of dollars, but clear understandings that Australia will support Japan politically, strategically, and even militarily against China.482

3.6.5. Political Implications

Abbott and his defence adviser Andrew Shearer were strong advocates of Australia’s cooperating with Japan in submarine development. Their objective was to build a stronger A-JDSR and build a stronger and more resilient trilateral maritime security cooperation by ‘boosting deterrence and helping to reduce the risk of future conflict’ in the region.483 Past Associate Defence Secretary Brendan Sergeant said that Abbott and Shearer were pushing Japan hard for strategic reasons: a US-Japan-Australia strategic relationship and the submarine acquisition would add weight. 484

Previous Defence Secretary Ric Smith considered that we were ‘never going to buy the Japanese (Sōryū) submarine, it was a design we were going to ask them to build. It was a contest as to who was going to design our submarine.’ At one stage during the political difficulties in going with the Abe/Abbott understanding, Smith says that ‘Andrew Shearer called the Japanese and told them ‘don’t worry about the politics here, it will still be alright’, and I just question the propriety of that.’ 485 According to Sergeant, former Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson who had been Head of the CEP Defence Review Committee (on which Sergeant was a member), said that Abbott brought in the CEP because he felt that Japan would get through the CEP. Discussing the Defence Review Committee’s deliberations, Sergeant said: ‘Every person on the committee spoke. Some based their arguments for the Japanese proposal on the strategic benefits. Arguments against were the usual ones’ (risk, technical competence). Sergeant added: ‘I wrote the documents relating to risk, in particular sovereign risks to Australia’ where he agreed with published statements by Hugh White that ‘we have a need to expand our strategic view’ and not be faced with ‘strategic dependence’. He considered that France was less likely to

482 Hugh White, ‘If we strike a deal with Japan, we’re buying more than submarines,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 2016. 483 Andrew Shearer’ ‘The Strategist Six’, The Strategist, 20 May 2016. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-strategist- six-andrew-shearer/ .See also M. Erika Pollmann and Alan Tidwell, ‘Australia’s submarine technology cooperation with Japan as burden-sharing with the USA’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 69:4, 2015, pp. 394-413. 484 Brendan Sergeant, Professor, ANU, private interview. 25 October 2019. 485 Smith, R. op cit. 135 put restrictions on Australia than Japan ‘who might be constrained by China’. Sergeant considered from the Japanese Tender Documents that the Japanese were neither ready not willing and the ‘process was politically-driven.’486

3.6.6. Reasons for the failure of the Japanese bid

Despite his leadership on security issues, Abe could not fully bring the Japanese bureaucracy and defence establishment with him. The resultant tender offered by Japan was deficient in several key areas, and the design was of lower quality to what the tender process had expected. In 2014, then-Secretary Prime Minister & Cabinet Denis Thawley doubted the Japanese submarine proposal would be realised, although I supported its intellectual underpinnings. I thought the Japanese venture was doomed to fail for some obvious reasons which came to pass.’487

Chief of Navy Noonan said that Japan had been very keen to engage with the US on the Gōryū proposal. Still, it failed for several factors: ‘none of them taking away from the baseline Sōryū—a ‘world-leading technology’. He did consider future strategic materiel cooperation in this area was possible: ‘As Japan moves to move away from lead-acid batteries towards lithium-ion batteries, I expect them to share this technology with us as an example of future cooperation.’488

Previous UK Defence Attaché to Japan, Simon Chelton explains that cultural and experiential differences between Japan and a western country like Australia exposed issues such as Japan having little experience in a competitive tender, even in their domestic market. They also had a poor understanding of the overseas competitor’s needs. The GOJ (perhaps unadvisedly for a commercial offering) took the lead in tendering with Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI) as the industrial lead, with many other Japanese companies in support. Although Australia would want to be part of the supply process, there was real doubt that domestic pressures in Japan would restrict this. Further, Japan’s defence industrial structure with a planned continuous building process which provided steady employment and thus continuity of workforce skills meant that ship and submarine building in Japan created a workforce who expected lifelong engagement. Therefore, the

486 Sergeant, op. cit. 487 Thawley, op. cit. 488 Noonan, op. cit. 136 Japanese industry was cautious and perhaps unwilling to help build a shorter-run production in Japan for Australia and was nervous about workforce investment in Australia. Even though there were concerns, Japan was not interested in building the bulk of the Australia submarines in Japan.489

Chelton (a past RN submariner) considered that there was doubt that the offered Sōryū- derivative did not represent the best technology. There is no hard public evidence for this contention other than one industry concern who said that the steel to be used was inferior to that in the current Collins-class submarines.490 Factors were the Japanese reluctance to give sufficient information, and not all Japanese stakeholders were supportive. In the end, Japan failed to bridge the culture gap. Chelton considered491 that if Australia had down selected to two rather than one contender in April 2016, this might have allowed Japan more time to bridge the cultural gap and prepare a better bid. A funded competitive design process would have produced a better solution for Australia which now finds itself beholden to one supplier for a design yet to be completed.

3.6.7. Japanese Perspectives

At a political level, Japan was aware of Australia's political turmoil and was cautious not to become entangled in this. Koda said that there was indifference in Japan from MOFA, MOD, and the JMSDF to participating in competing for the new Australian submarine program from the very beginning. He added that the legacy of the Japanese non-arms-export policy (only relaxed in 2011and which had not been previously tested) was a contributing factor in determining Japan’s policymakers' attitudes to export a strategic asset that was regarded by the MSDF as ‘the Jewel in their Crown.’ Koda noted that Japanese government departments and agencies did not share Abe’s and Abbott’s understanding of the deal's merits. This lack of ownership by those required to carry it out explained why government felt it was not their responsibility.492

Koda explained the reluctance by the Japanese Defence industry to participate. Japan’s submarine builders (Mitsubishi and Kawasaki who operate on a year-on-year alternating

489 Simon Chelton, Captain RN (Retd), UK Defence Attaché to Tokyo 2002-2007. 11 October 2019 490 Private Interview, unattributable engineer. 2 February 2021. 491 Ibid. 492 Koda, op. cit. 137 delivery), had by policy been guaranteed to build one boat a year since the 1960s. They had structured accordingly and were initially indifferent to expanding into export to Australia. Koda immediately started a lobbying program in Tokyo to support the Japanese bid after speaking at the Sub Summit and having gauged Australian domestic sensitivities. His efforts resulted in the Japanese National Security Secretariat (NSS) making in- government coordination to establish consensus on Japan’s participation in the Australian submarine program.493 The NSS clearly understood the importance of strategic cooperation between Japan and Australia and helped to clarify Japan’s position. Still, it took precious time to get all government elements together in the limited time allowed under tender processes. Engaging the two submarine builders took some time, but by mid-2015-three months after the seminar, the Japanese government, based on NSS inputs, was actively participating as a Japan team. But poor inter-ministry coordination remained a problem.

Nevertheless, after a slow start and despite their intellectual property concerns, Mitsubishi and Kawasaki, with fulsome direction from the Japanese Government got fully engaged in preparing their tender response. The MSDF, seeking to build on its previous close relations with Australia, made every effort to strengthen the strategic partnership that would have accrued from the submarine sale. MSDF efforts included supporting the appointment of a retired submariner and former Chief of Joint Staff, Admiral Takashi Saito as the Head of the Japan team.

Hideaki Watanabe, founding Commissioner of the Japanese Defence Ministry’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) said that Japan was now better able to address to develop better defence relations, having learned lessons from the failed bid. He added that the JMOD was addressing systemic inflexibility, which had resulted in a significant amount of time expended getting approval from the Government of Japan. Looking to the future, Watanabe added ‘we do not know each other well due to cultural differences, but Japan has a great deal of respect for Australian industry, and we have a good image of Australia generally–-the future is bright.494

493 ibid. 494 Hideaki Watanabe, Director-General, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 – 2017, interview by author, 27 February 2019.

138 3.7 Summary

The preceding chapter has shown that an increasing level of political and diplomacy commitment to the A-JDSR is underway, forming an alignment underpinning closer defence engagement. This political alignment has been greater under conservative governments, but this is only by a matter of degree. The threat offered to Australia by China which appears to be intent on singling out Australia by trade sanctions will generate a strong domestic bipartisan sovereign response. The next chapter examines the strategic environment and the challenges this creates for regional and global security. It also briefly addresses the roles, activities and aspirations of China and the United States and their impact on the A-JDSR.

The natural outcome of developing a close defence and security relationship is to create close military ties. Ties that would be sufficiently strong to enable the aligned partners the opportunity to create better security for themselves by deterring military action, and, if necessary, conduct military operations, bilaterally or with like-minded countries. The trajectory of the A-J defence and military relationship is tracking in this direction. The next step is signing the RAA, allowing legal-based processes for operating in other’s sovereign spaces. An update of the 2007 JDSC could well be the next step to moving to a closer degree of interoperability if that agreement addressed traditional military activities. Further, the level of exercising bilaterally and the United States continues to grow in intensity and complexity. Engaging militarily with regional nations is also undertaken with increasing frequency, adding to a regional approach to security by the tripartite members.

The history of the A-JDSR has been long and tortuous, but is approaching a normative relationship between, as Peter Jennings says ‘the only two consequential democracies in the region’.495 As the next chapter will show, constraints under the ‘Peace Constitution’ and public opinion expectations will continue to slow the progression of this normative development. Still, significant political and legislative changes have allowed Japan to use its forces in a manner commensurate with Japan’s standing in the international community. Substantial changes in the security environment hastened these changes. Japan is now preparing to face military and security challenges by hedging (with the US's willing

495 Jennings, op. cit. 139 encouragement) with others in the region. Primus inter pares of Japan's military and security relationships are with Australia (after the US). Both countries recognise that their shared interests and close embedment in the US-led alliance systems are essential for their security and that of the region. The A-JDSR had moved from modest beginnings in the 1970s when both countries reached out hesitantly to each other to a degree of political, security, and defence alignment that was unthinkable 50 years ago.

As shown in the next chapter, Japan and Australia with the backing and encouragement of the United States as the leading democracies in the Pacific496 have demonstrated that they are prepared to take a lead in maintaining an open trading system, defending it with words and perhaps action. A robust economic relationship, and careful diplomacy and trust- building in the period up to 2007 and beyond has created a defence and security relationship that, by example, could become a critical component of any East Asian security framework. For Australia and Japan, the A-JDSR is second in its regional efficacy and potential only to that achieved by under the ANZUS and US-JMST treaties. By their politico-security actions and the development of military interoperability they are now preparing to work together for the security of the region, if necessary, by cooperative military action to back up their political and diplomatic actions. However, there are more agreements yet to be put in place to enable military cooperation should this be necessary. Both militaries need to practise their interoperability and improve it to include higher-end warfare and move beyond current capability. The tripartite nature of the US-Japan-Australia connection must endure and build stronger bilateral links. All three countries must pursue regional engagement to build a coalition of like-minded nations. Japan must improve both the protection of intelligence provided by others and its own gathering capabilities—and the last White paper presages this497. When all the elements planned for the A-JDSR are in place, the A-JDSR will have become a military alignment with all the enabling elements that would be present if Australia and Japan were in an alliance. The previous two empirical chapters have described the bases of cooperation between Japan and Australia as they face an uncertain future. The next chapter looks at the regional and global security challenges for both countries as they develop their strategic postures and set their defence priorities.

496 Jennings, interview, op. cit. 497 The 2020 Japanese Defense White Paper speaks of new investment in the space and cyberspace domains. Government of Japan, Ministry of Defense, 2020 Defense of Japan, p. 450. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp_2020.html

140 Chapter Four

Imperatives of Australian and Japanese Strategic Postures and Defence Priorities

4.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the strategic imperatives that define how Australia and Japan may act cooperatively to contribute to regional peace and security. It addresses the current strategic posture, regional challenges, and how these contribute to the A-JDSR. The chapter provides analysis drawn from government defence and foreign policy white papers, supplemented by security practitioners' insights. A section describes how regional tensions impact respective defence postures. The prospect of a closer, more operational A-JDSR depends on how the Japanese Government sees its ability to move beyond the US-JMST and the role of the JSDF—a section addresses how re-interpretation of those elements of Japanese law, including the Constitution, affect the JSDF's participation in sovereign and perhaps regional and global security. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis on factors that determine how the A-JDSR developed.

The following table lists how often Japan has been referenced in the two main Australian Government defence and strategic documents: the White Papers from the Defence and Foreign Affairs. This gross statistic provides a temporal and relative view of the impact of Japan and China on Australian defence and security policy. The table shows the number of times countries are mentioned, together with a normalised score of mentions per 100,000 words. As seen in Chapter 3, there was much greater engagement between Australia and Japan in the economic and security spheres a little earlier, and this is reflected in high scores in the DFAT figures for Japan compared with those for Defence. The increasing trend picks up in the 1994 Defence White Paper and remains consistent until 2013 on when the number doubles again. A similar trend is seen for China, with the DFAT White Paper mentions consistently higher due to the trade relationship, but again doubling after 2013.

141 Table 4.1 – Wordcount analysis of mentions of various countries in white papers

Document Mentions by country Mentions by country (size in words) per 100,000 words Defence WP Japan US China Japan US China 1976 (100K) 8 64 9 8 64 9 1987 (40K) 3 58 6 8 145 15 1994 (55K) 13 55 19 23 99 34 2000 (40K) 14 43 14 35 108 35 2009 (54K) 18 80 34 32 144 61 2013 (48K) 20 88 85 40 176 170 2013 NSS (20K)498 8 40 28 40 200 140 2016 (45K) 36 127 64 65 229 115 2020 (10K) 5 17 10 50 170 100 DFAT WP 1997 (30K) 57 57 55 172 172 166 2012 (100K) 218 98 349 218 98 349 2017 (40K) 52 94 99 130 235 248

4.2 Australia's view of its region and its security

4.2.1. Australian Strategic Imperatives to 1989

Since Prime Minister Curtin looked towards the United States for Australia’s security after the fall of Singapore, there have been some enduring strategic themes.499 These perennial aspects of Australian policy are: 'a great and powerful friend'; 'regional engagement'; and a 'rules-based international order'.500 Both Coalition and Labour Governments in Australia have primarily maintained a bi-partisan approach to these principles, differing only in priorities and willingness to defend these principles.

Australian Governments have long failed to provide strategic guidance to its force planners and published only a few national security statements for public edification until the late 1980s. Postwar policies until the late 1980s focused on the alliance with the United States, with some attention given to the bases of force structure and disposition, including the use of the ADF overseas. Actual operational force deployments provided support to other nations' (usually the United States') forces. From the late 1950s the Menzies government’s external focus was on preventing Indonesia from moving into the Communist sphere of

498 The Gillard Government released a White Paper and a National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2013. 499 The links with the UK nevertheless remained strong: Though Australia looked primarily to the US for a reliable security guarantee from this point, Australia enthusiastically maintained defence and alliance relations with the UK meaningfully until late 1960s. 500 Allan Gyngell, ‘Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942.’ (LaTrobe University Press. 3 April 2017). 142 influence and acting against its neighbours. Later governments were focused on the wider threat of communism. There were early security declarations of moving to a more self- reliant posture. 501 Still, Governments seldom followed through with guidance on deterministic force structure or rational strategic planning. The Holt Government subscribed to the 'Domino Theory', prevalent at the time in the United States that the political structure of Southeast Asia was so unstable, that if a country such as South Vietnam were to fall to communism, then adjacent countries would, like dominoes, fall one after another.502 Holt's famous statement of unconditional support to the United States then aligned Australia's strategic imperatives with its protector's regional imperatives.503

Air Force historian Mark Lax writes that the Gorton Government and McMahon Governments moved beyond the ‘dualistic approach of 'forward defence' and continuing alliance obligations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore and Malaysia.’ Under Whitlam, Australia's strategic posture shifted from ‘Forward Defence’ to greater engagement with the region, especially with Indonesia. Whitlam saw Asia as benign, and successive defence ministers throughout the Whitlam and Fraser years shared this view, stating Australia faced no immediate threat. However, the Fraser Government, reacting to Nixon's Guam Doctrine, did focus more on self-reliance and Australian leadership in Asia. In 1983 the Hawke Government began to consider rational bases for Australia's security and defence posture.504

Defence policies of 1976 and 1987 focused Australia’s defence policy on Southeast Asia and the South-West Pacific—what the 1987 Defence of Australia called its ‘Region of Primary Strategic Interest’. Australian Defence and 1987 Defence of Australia clearly emphasised Australia’s direct strategic interests in this region. They both explicitly acknowledged that Australia might need to undertake military operations to protect these interests.505

In 1987, Australia saw that its strategic environment had changed. It accepted the political reality that Australia could no longer rely on a guarantee of immediate and unconditional

501 Hugh White, 2007, op. cit. p. 170. 502 United States President Eisenhower propounded the theory in a 1954 news conference, referring to communism in Indochina. 503 White, 2007. op.cit. 504 Mark Lax, ‘Taking the Lead 1972-1996 The Royal Australian Air Force’, Blue Sky Publishing. (Newport. March 2020.) 505 White, 2007. op.cit. 143 defence support from the United States under the ANZUS Treaty. 506 Australia's new defence policy had a core concept of self-reliant defence against ‘credible contingencies’507 and identified a policy shift towards constructive engagement with Asia. 508 A closer security alignment with Japan was a feature of new policy.509 This alignment gained traction in 1989 and steadily increased over the next three decades.510

4.2.2. Australian Defence Posture since the 1970s

Australian Governments published Defence White Papers in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2016 (with an update in 2020). They have been more public and precise about Australia’s strategic circumstances defence requirements since the 1976 white paper. The 1986 Dibb Review and the Defence White Paper the following year marked a bringing together of strategic assessment, a rational process, and force structure imperatives.511 It reaffirmed the strategy of self-reliance, seeking an expenditure of 3 per cent of GDP to achieve its strategic goals, but this fell to 2.3 per cent within two years.512 The 1987 paper considered that Southeast Asia and the South Pacific be part of an area of primary strategic interest.513 Asia was appearing on Australia’s strategic horizon, but Northeast Asia had to wait a while. The 1994 white paper drew on the 1993 Strategic Basis which had assessed that the strategic environment had changed, and regional stability was now harder to predict. It presaged a greater emphasis on regional engagement, but stressed as all papers did, the importance of the ANZUS alliance.514

Six years later, the 2000 Defence White Paper, in contrast to earlier papers, linked strategic priorities to capability development in a ten-year program. A previous strategic policy document had, in 1997, introduced a three-element tasking for the ADF which required it to: ‘defeat attacks against Australia, defend regional strategic interests and support

506 Hansard, ‘Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities. No. 149, 1986. 3 June 1986, p. 4419. 507 Australian Parliamentary Library, Defending Australia: a history of Australia’s Defence White Papers. p. 17. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/Defen dAust. 508 ibid, p. 21. 1987 Defence White Paper assigned priorities in military planning to an area of direct military interests (ADMI) and broader strategic interests. 509 Department of Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper. Para 8.7, p. 91. 510 McDermott, 1995, op. cit. 511 The candidate wrote a paper for the ADF in 1989 on capability development which linked national strategy to force structure imperatives based on the 1986 Dibb Report and 1987 Defence White Paper. 512 Parliamentary Library Paper, History of Australia’s Defence White Paper, op. cit. p. 16. 513 Ibid. p. 21. 514 Ibid. p. 24. 144 Australia’s global interests.’515 Northeast Asia was now in the horizon in the context of Australia ‘contributing to the maintenance of ‘strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region’’.516

There were Defence Updates in 2003, 2005, and 2007. The changes in the security environment following the ‘9/11’ Terrorist attack in New York in 2000 prompted the 2003 Defence Update517 which was released just prior to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, demonstrating Australia’s support for the region and the alliance with the United States. The 2005 Defence Update reflected calls by the United States for its allies to do more for regional security. The 2005 update indicated a subtle shift from the Defence of Australia to one that focused on protecting Australia’s interests. The 2007 update reflected an expansion of ADF roles into HA/DR and other Human Security activities. By this time, there was a clear focus in strategic documents over Chinese military development and security in the

518 Asia-Pacific.

More recent Defence White Papers began to acknowledge the importance of other defence relationships. The 2009 Defence White Paper identified Japan as a key strategic partner. It also identified the rise of China as being ‘front and centre in the strategic vista’.519

The 2009 Defence White Paper followed an unprecedented series of reviews into Defence. It expressed concern over Chinese expansionism, noting that modernisation seemed to be more than would be needed for a conflict over Taiwan, raising fears in regional states.520

In 2012, the Gillard Labour Government issued a major foreign policy statement521 and a year later in 2013 released a national security strategy 522 which was never formally presented to Parliament. No government has since released a national security strategy. Later in 2013, the second Rudd Labor Government delivered a revised posture in a Defence White Paper523 that sought to achieve regional leadership ambitions.524 Commentators

515 Ibid. pp. 32-34. 516 Ibid. p. 38. 517 It also prompted the first exercise of consultation under the ANZUS Treaty by Howard who was then in Washington. 518 ibid., p. 45. 519 ibid., p. 58. 520 Ibid. p. 58. 521 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. https://apo.org.au/node/31647 522 Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security, announced at the National Security College, ANU in a speech by PM Gillard on 23 January 2012. 523 Department of Defence White Paper 2013. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf 524 Ibid. p. 4. 145 criticised the paper's conciliatory comments about the lack of Chinese strategic transparency compared with that displayed in ‘the confrontational rhetoric of the 2009 version’.525 This Australian softening of views created some concern in Japan.526

The Turnbull Coalition Government released a Defence White Paper in 2016,527 which remains extant but superseded by events and the Morrison Government has since released a strategic update.,528 The government also released a foreign policy white paper in 2017.529 Previous Associate Defence Secretary Brendan Sargeant said that the 2013 Defence White Paper was only a reset of the 2009 version which had been cautionary over China and had been a statement of 'warfighting strategy'.

4.2.3. 2016 Defence White Paper

The 2016 Defence White Paper presaged fears that China's rise and the growing level of strategic competition between China and the United States were challenging the regional status quo. The paper emphasised the concept of defence of the 'rules-based' strategic environment, much changed from the benign situation experienced over the previous 20 years and meriting a significantly different security posture. It also added a cautionary message to China, indirectly asking 'newly powerful countries' to ‘act in a way that constructively contributes to global stability, security and prosperity.’530

The last four Defence White Papers have defined a security posture with these characteristics. First, Australia's region offers significant economic opportunities. Second, the stability of that region depends on open markets and mutually agreed rules that protect the rights of all states against coercive power. Third, Australia's and the region's security is critically dependent on continued engagement by the United States. Fourth, Australia must work with major democracies to maintain a peaceful rules-based order. The message was it is in Australia's interest to engage with China constructively.

525 Andrew O'Neil, Defence White Paper pulls its punches over China. The Interpreter, Lowy Institute. 6 May 2013.. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/defence-white-paper-2013. 526 As Defence Associate Secretary, Brendan Sergeant visited Japan and assured them ‘we were still wary over China.’ Sergeant, interview, op. cit. 527 Department of Defence White Paper 2016. https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf 528 2020 Defence Strategic Update & 2020 Force Structure Plan. https://www1.defence.gov.au/strategy-policy/strategic-update-2020 529 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper 530 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, Canberra, Paragraph 2.24. https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf 146 4.2.4. 2017 Foreign Affairs White Paper

The Turnbull Government released a White Paper on Foreign Affairs in 2017. It was a good strategic re-think, with wide consultation, considered the rise of China, and the changing nature of the United States. It defined Australia's strategic interests and it was expected that judgements made in the paper would stand the test of time.531

A differentiator made in this white paper was that it was encouraging the United States to prioritise engagement in the Indo-Pacific region over global engagement. Amy King says that this differs from Japan's view of US leadership who encouraged US leadership globally.532 This is an important point for Australia and Japan—it is in the interests of the both countries and the region that US military and security power is not diverted from the Indo-Pacific to meet other global priorities. While sharing Australia's wish for the United States to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific, Japan appears to be taking a different tack by seeking to encourage the United States to build sufficient military global resources to always to have adequate forces to defend Japan.

The 2017 Australian DFAT White Paper raised the prospect of US declining influence in the Indo-Pacific region and the rise of Chinese economic power.533 Australia and Japan, facing similar challenges, could find additional security in a A-JDSR within a new framework of security arrangements that would necessarily imply a more formalised relationship. This relationship might become an alliance possibly contained within a framework of sub-alliances in a broader international security framework. In 2012, Hugh White was more circumspect, saying that ‘we need to push the pause button on the idea of a strategic alliance with Japan.’534 Conversely, Jennings said in 2019: ‘A treaty with Japan is an idea whose time has come.’535

531 DFAT official, private interview. 6 June 2019. 532 Amy King in ‘Japan in Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper.’ Security Challenges 12, no. 1 (2016): pp. 177-80. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465727 533 2017 Australian DFAT White Paper. p. 25 534 Hugh White, An A-J Alliance? Centre of Gravity Series 2012, SDSC, ANU. 535 Jennings, interview, op cit. 147 4.2.5. Strategic Defence Objectives & Security Drivers

One of the Strategic Defence Objectives of the 2016 Defence White Paper is to maintain a stable Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order. Australia intended to work closely with its ally, the United States, and other international partners, including Japan, to achieve this goal.536 This was an important strategic driver for the A-JDSR. It means that Australia may choose to be engaged in a coalition involving military action if Australia's interests are engaged—this judgement made in a section relating to the relationship between the United States and China.537

The 2016 paper singled out North Asia as a source of concern for Australia's security, given that the bulk of ‘Australia's exports are to North Asia: with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea being three of Australia's four biggest trading partners.’538 The paper notes that ‘Japan is a major power in North Asia, welcomes the prospect of Japan playing a larger role in international security and will continue to deepen and broaden our growing security cooperation with Japan’.539 Specifically for the A-JDSR, the paper lists these strategic initiatives to implement: increased training and exercises, increased personnel exchanges, deeper HA/DR, maritime security, and trilateral cooperation with the United States. Future cooperative opportunities include intelligence, developing common capabilities like the Joint Strike Fighter, air and missile defence and maritime warfare technologies.540

The Government made it clear its alliance with the United States ‘will continue to be Australia's most important strategic partner …and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of our region.’ The Government concluded that China did not then match ‘the global strategic weight of the United States’. It did judge that the growth in Chinese national power meant that ‘China's policies and actions will have a major impact on the stability of the Indo-Pacific to 2035.’ Chinese actions over the next five years from 2016 proved the prescience of this judgement.541

536 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 15. 537 Ibid. p. 44. “The Government will also continue to work closely with the United States and coalitions of like-minded countries to address common global security challenges’. 538 Ibid., para 2.85, p. 60. 539 Ibid., para 2.91, p. 61. 540 Ibid., para 5.61, p. 132. 541 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, pp. 17, 18, 32, 41, 42. 148 4.2.6. 2020 Defence Strategic Update

The Morrison Government released a strategic update on 1 July 2020 which built on but did not replace the 2016 Defence White Paper. The update added new emphases and priorities and more importantly, presaged provisions for significant increases in military resources to address a more unstable strategic environment. Defence Minister Linda Reynolds, when launching the new policy in mid-2020 said: ‘The world we grew up in is no more’. 542 Clearly, changed circumstances demanded` a changed response, and the Government responded with a more proactive posture based on resisting challenges to Australian sovereignty.

The bases for a re-statement of Australia's strategic imperatives were obvious: an intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States; deterioration of the rules-based order, and the rise of ‘gray-zone’ activities (including economic coercion, foreign interference, and cyber-attacks).543 The new policy declared that Australia would ‘deploy military power to shape Australia's strategic environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with credible military force, perhaps even high- intensity conflict.’544

The 2016 Defence White Paper had made a geographic distinction in defence leadership responsibilities: within and without 'Australia's immediate region'. The Government defined its immediate region to range from the Northeast of the Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland Southeast Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South-West Pacific.545 Within this region, the Australian Government considered it could cooperate militarily with the United States to achieve mutual security goals, including the assuming of military leadership by the ADF.546 This approach would appear to resonate with a similar, earlier concept of Australia's area of direct military interest (ADMI), raised after the Dibb Report of 1986 but soon discarded when Australia joined in coalition operations well outside the ADMI. This time, the Government stated that it remained prepared to make military contributions

542 Speech to USASIA Centre, University of . 6 July 2020. Defence Minister, Senator Reynolds. https://www.medianet.com.au/releases/188998/ 543 2020 Australian Defense Strategic Update: The Revenge of Geography. The Diplomat, 22 July 2020. Peter J Dean. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/2020-australian-defense-strategic-update-the-revenge-of-geography/ 544 2020 Defence Strategic Update & 2020 Force Structure Plan. Commonwealth of Australia. 2020. p. 6. https://www1.defence.gov.au/strategy-policy/strategic-update-2020 545 Ibid., p. 21. 546 Ibid., p. 22. 149 outside its immediate region where Australian interests are sufficiently engaged. This implied supporting US-led coalitions, but not leading them, and perhaps engaging in high- end warfare in a coalition. This implication meant that Australia would act in concert with the United States in contingencies where it is in Australia's interests to do so (including maintaining ANZUS commitments—potentially world-wide). More importantly, if the security challenge were within Australia's immediate region, it would consider acting as a military coalition leader.

The Government is keen to demonstrate that it does not consider that conflict with a major power is inevitable. Defence Minister Linda Reynolds qualified judgements made in the Strategic Update by saying: ‘I do not agree with commentators who have sought to describe emerging great power competition as a new Cold War’. She considered that US-China relations should not be seen ‘in wholly adversarial terms’. She added that Australia does not want to contain China but seeks China to ‘exercise its power in ways that increase regional trust and confidence.’547 This is a powerful statement, a message that was repeated by many interviewees. It encapsulates the fine line that countries like Australia must walk when economic reliance coincides with threats to national sovereignty. It also sends the message that Australia is prepared to see China rise to be an economic power but not at the expense of ideological or military dominance.

This rise of China and the necessity to accommodate a new global economic power has generated much commentary centring on how Australia can accommodate this rise without openly supporting the US’ opposition to a new balance of power and precipitating a trade war. Some defence and security planners consider that the rise, if not managed globally, represents a direct threat to Australia’s and others’ security.548 Allan Gyngell observed that the two previous international systems ended in war. This one, he says, ‘seems to be draining away, as its core components led by the United States lose confidence in its purpose, and emerging powers see opportunities to assert their interests.’ Gyngell considers

547Brendan Nicholson, Defence minister explains strategic update ASPI Strategic Update. 2 Jul 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/that-future-is-now-defence-minister-explains-strategic- update/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+ CID_dc91c98982c4c99bdc520974e1d90a7f&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=That%20future%20is%20now %20defence%20minister%20explains%20strategic%20update 548 Paul Dibb, ‘New security reality demands new Australian policy’, The Strategist, ASPI, Canberra 23 Jul 2018. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-security-reality-demands-new-australian-policy/ 150 China will increase its pressure on Australia for its respected position in the western alliance and place pressure on the United States to step back from restricting Chinese imports.549

This has had the opposite effect, with alliance resistance hardening. As Biden continues US restrictions over Chinese imports, his administration ‘has ramped up its rhetorical attacks’ on China and spoken on its allies’ behalf.550 What is at risk is the integrity of the global trading system. As commentator Alan Dupont said, Australia is ‘countering China’s coercive diplomacy and power trading’ to protect the global trading system. While the United States is vocal in its support for Australia’s posture, Australia needs to continue its approach despite Chinese pressure. Any fallback will generate fear in other regional countries who ‘may well conclude that appeasement is the only feasible alternative’.551

Australia has diversified its exports after China commenced coercive trade action, extending its markets to other countries like India.552 But, as Australia diversifies itself on trade with China it must continue to maintain good relations. A strong eclectic view from thesis interviews was that Australia needs to: stand up to China; push back on security issues; strengthen the US alliance; and diversify.553 On the US alliance, Brendan Sargeant considered that the nature of foundational United States alliances, even under a Biden Administration ‘is changing and our policy settings need to change with it.’554

Echoing the Australian Government’s statements in the 2020 Update, Australia needs to be prepared for whatever contingencies arise in the region and globally and have strategic responses.555 Peter Jennings considers that China will continue to punish Australia ‘for failing to bow to its domination’. He adds that Japan and Australia, as the only consequential democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and as two countries dependent on an alliance with the United States, need to help build new security frameworks for the future. This framework should include a formalised security framework under the QUAD and preparation of

549 Allan Gyngell, National President, Australian Institute of International Affairs and previous Director-General, Australian Strategic Intelligence Organisation, in a presentation to RUSI-UK, 28 June 2018. 550 Biden’s ‘allies first’ approach puts pressure on Beijing to behave. Australian Financial Review. 17 March 2021. https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden-s-allies-first-approach-puts-pressure-on-beijing-to-behave- 20210317-p57bjg 551 Alan Dupont, Resisting China’s Economic Coercion: Why America should support Australia. The Centre for Independent Countries. Policy Paper 38. April 2021. https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2021/04/pp38.pdf 552 Ben Packham. Exporters defy China bans. The Australian. 8 April 2021. Front page leader. 553 Malcolm Davis, Senior Analyst, ASPI., private interview. 26 Jun 2019. 554 Sargeant, op.cit. 555 Gyngell, op. cit. 151 combined planning to meet regional contingencies, including helping to defend Taiwan.556 These points are developed further in chapter 6 which discusses security frameworks.

In summary, Australia needs to stand by its security guarantor, assert its sovereignty and by so doing, encourage other countries to resist unfair pressure. It must also defend the rules- based trading order, but work with others to manage China’s position as an economic power. Overlain are other security issues. If these issues cannot be managed by diplomacy and the deterrence of allied military power, then there is the threat, as the 2020 Update reminds, of conflict involving the nations of the IP. Japan faces similar threats, but its trade reliance with China is less than that for Australia.557 If a military response, in assurance, deterrence or compellance mode is part of the regional response, then the A-JDSR will be an integral part of that as it links two regional countries directly affected by Chinese coercion by its economic and ideological competition.

4.2.7. Australian Security Posture and the A-JDSR

The building of regional relationships, especially with Northeast Asian countries, is still an essential part of Australian security development and defence posture. With Australia promoting the benefit of building a closer working defence relationship with Japan with implications of interoperable force development, the conditions are enabled for coalition operations involving Australia, Japan, and the United States if such action coincided with mutual national interests.

The Morrison Government has built on the groundwork in the A-JDSR laid by previous Australian Governments. The militarisation of the A-JDSR has quietly proceeded apace since the 2007 JDSC. The 2020 Update specifically speaks of supporting US action in North Asia. The establishment and continual update of the ACSA allowing for cross-servicing and support of the ADF and the JSDF now permits Japan to support Australia other in the event of operations in Northeast Asia out of Japan, as well as mutual support elsewhere. The RAA, when finally agreed, will allow ADF forces to be hosted in Japan (and vice versa)

556 Jennings, op cit. 557 China took 39% all goods exported by Australia in 2019-20. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics website at https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/australias-trade-goods-china-2020. Japan exports only 17.7% of its trade with China in 2015-16. Australian exports to Japan in 2015-16 were 15% of its total trade. Source: Asialink Business website at https://asialinkbusiness.com.au/japan/getting-started-in-japan/japans-imports-and-exports?doNothing=1 152 and operate from there.558 At the same time, Japan is changing laws that will conditionally allow the JSDF to provide force protection to the ADF when they are operating together. Morrison flew to Japan under challenge of facing quarantine on return, to meet with new Prime Minister Suga to agree-in-principle to the RAA, hoping that this will soon lead to a signing of a final agreement. This 2020 visit was taken in the sure knowledge that China would complain. There can be no doubt that the current conservative Australian Government is firmly committed to strengthening the A-JDSR. Past action by previous Labour governments indicates this a bipartisan view.

4.2.8. Military Responses to new Challenges

The battle for economic and perhaps ideological dominance in a new global order may precipitate a military response by nations affected by the rising power. As the 2020 Update indicated, Australia may be involved outside the immediate region in a US-led coalition if its interests were threatened, specifically mentioning making contributions in North Asia.559 Australia needs to be prepared for such eventuality.

The military power model advanced in Chapter 1 of this thesis had elements of: deterrence; reassurance; and compellance. These resonate with the themes in the 2020 Strategic Update. The strategic update requires the ADF to 'shape Australia's strategic environment' (i.e., reassure), build 'credible deterrence', and respond (i.e., compellance). Both deterrence and compellance modes mean that the ADF must have ‘more potent capabilities to hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia, including longer-range strike weapons, cyber capabilities and area denial systems.’

The new force structure following this upgrading of strategic posture will require considerable funding. The Australian Government has said it will increase the Defence budget to two per cent of Australia's Gross Domestic Product in 2020-21 with an outlay of $42 billion, growing to $74 billion in ten years.560

There is political support for the A-JDSR from both national partners and there is will in Japan to change legislation to allow a more militarised A-JDSR. A necessary step to

558 As described in thesis Chapter 3.3.7. 559 Ibid, para 2.11, p. 23. 560 Ibid, p. 53. 153 implementing the deterrent quality of the A-JDSR would be to declare an update to the 2007 JDSC to include an intention that both partners are engaged in developing a cooperative military capability. Recent changes to Japan’s interpretation of the Constitution reflects the enablement, if not pursuit, of a collective self-defence posture for Japan. With Australia demonstrating political support for cooperative action, and in the face of Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and aggressive action over Taiwan, the development of the A-JDSR is a necessary part of creating a comprehensive security system to secure regional security.

4.3 Japan’s View of the region and its security

4.3.1. History of Japanese Security Posture

Japan's post-war occupation ended in 1952, restoring Japan's sovereignty.561 It was not until 1957 that Japan created a basic national defence policy. The war and its aftermath had generated extreme pacifism in the Japanese people, and as it took some time for the country to regain economic prosperity, defence took a low national priority and a low profile. The United States had imposed a ‘peace constitution’ upon Japan that disempowered Japan’s military capabilities. With the United States guaranteeing Japan’s security coincidental with the return of sovereignty, there was little appetite or ability to restore a strong defence force. However, Japan's modest military strength and capability increased steadily over the next few decades under the threat of Cold War pressures. Japan built its self-defence force (JSDF) in close alignment with US security policies. Regular defence build-up plans were formulated every decade and reviewed mid-term into each program, slowly augmenting Japan's military strength.562 Sheila Smith records that the Japanese Defense Agency drafted its first real planning document in 1976. The debate preceding this document's release focused on balancing responses to threat-based worst-case scenarios with building a JSDF constrained by funds available.563

In 1957 Australia became the first nation to trade formally with Japan after the Second World War, and the economic relationship prospered thereafter. As described in Chapter 3, defence relations between Australia and Japan took much longer to develop and were

561 Except for the Ryukyu Islands, host to the USMC presence on Okinawa, which the US returned in 1972. 562 ‘Japanese Defence Policy Since 1976: Latest Trends’ K. V. Kesavan. SDSC, ANU, 1984. 563 Smith, Sheila A, op. cit. p. 9. 154 dependent on Japan believing that it could work with countries other than the United States. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and a following burgeoning mutual interest allowed Japan to look to Australia as a possible future security partner.

Japan’s contribution to the Western alliance for the 1990 Gulf War revealed Japan’s reluctance to join United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Western alliance expected Japan to contribute according to Japan’s position as an economic power and major user of the Middle East oil lifeline.564 During the 1991-92 Gulf crisis, other nations pressured Japan to commit forces, not just money, to Western collective efforts to maintain world peace and security. Trevor Wilson, then senior staff member in the Australian Embassy in Japan noted that in the early 1990s Japan had come under increasing UN pressure to deploy the JDF in non-combat peacekeeping roles. He said the Japanese were very cautious about this, especially in Asia, given Japanese forces' reputations during the Second World War. This period marked the beginning of a transition of recognition in Japan to balance its economic power and reliance on the United States' security with autonomous regional and global security contributions. Significantly, but still amidst political disapproval, the Japanese Government deployed JSDF forces to the United National Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) under Australian leadership in 1992. The fact that the UNTAC United Nations Chief of Mission, Yasushi Akashi, was a Japanese national made that deployment more politically acceptable.565

The relationship between the Australian UNTAC Commander, Lieutenant General John Sanderson, and the Japanese contingent was significant. Sanderson recalled, ‘The Japanese were very pleased with how I was ‘looking after them.’ I just wanted them to look after themselves – they were ‘in cotton wool’. I placed some Japanese liaison officers in my headquarters, and young ADF officers engaged the Japanese personally as we ‘hid them in the headquarters.’’. He noted though that ‘many Japanese were frustrated at not having real duties, and they were nurtured ‘as a chrysalid’ in a way that allowed them to go home as heroes.’ 566 The Japanese briefed Sanderson on their sensitivities and looked to him to provide the advice and guidance that would ensure their deployment was non-contentious locally and a success. The deployment was a success, both within Cambodia and for the

564 ‘Japan as Peacekeeper: Samurai State or new Civilian Power’ Peter Polomka, SDSC. 1992. 565 Wilson, op cit. 566 John Sanderson, Lieutenant General, Force Commander UNTAC, private interview, 22 October 2019. 155 Japanese government. It contributed significantly to a closer future relationship between Australia and Japan across all its aspects, including defence.

In 1994, the curriculum of the strategic-level fulltime course at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo revealed Japanese strategic thinking at the time.567 Japanese defence policy was rigid and unrealistic. Even after the fall of the USSR, Japanese force structure was focused mostly on the threat of a Soviet invasion, although there were those in the MSDF more concerned over Chinese naval expansionism. Operational doctrine required the JSDF to respond only when invading forces crossed Japanese land borders. However, incursions of Soviet aircraft probing Japanese were numerous, but were met by ASDF aircraft only when JDA civilian policy-officers permitted them to intercept. This was an unworkable way to conduct military air defence.

Interestingly, Japanese lecturers told NIDS students about JDA interest in the Australian 1987 defence construct of a non-threat-based structure and the 1986 Dibb Report. These Australian strategic concepts informed the Japanese National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) and National Defence Program Outlines (NDPO).568 Fellow British NIDS student Simon Chelton recalled that a seminal moment for the JSDF occurred when they were, for the first time in a civil emergency, asked to assist in relief operations after the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake near Kobe. The JSDF response began a reverse of the ‘left-wing rejection of the JSDF and acknowledged that the JSDF had a more positive role in society in a post-Second World War Japan.569

The Murayama Government (1994-96) unexpectedly moved to a more normal security posture, including defence policy570 and acceptance of war responsibility in ways that helped Australian interests. The following Hashimoto (1996-98) government further advanced these interests by its resolution to endorse and enhance the US-JMST.571 The 1996 NDPO contained new overseas missions for the JSDF that could go beyond previously

567 The candidate attended the NIDS in 1994-5 as a student. 568 Contemporaneous course notes. NIDS, 1994-95. The NDPG outlines the bases for defence posture and force structure, and the NDPO sets out a ten-year program of force acquisition, reviewed halfway through by the MTDP. 569 Chelton, op. cit. 570 Ibid. Murayama’s Japan Socialist Party was forced to accept the legitimacy of the JSDF as the price for power sharing with the LDP and there was a political majority in favour of JSDF existence for the first time since their 1954 establishment. 571 The term ‘joint’ is used in military terminology to denote operation involving one or more armed services, while the term ‘combined’ denotes operations military operations or exercises conducted by more than one country. The term Joint is used in security documents to denote arrangements between two or more countries. 156 expressed concepts of Japanese national defence. It included acknowledging a greater public expectation of the JSDF to perform roles supporting disaster relief and regional security.572

In August 1999 Japan participated in another Southeast Asian peacekeeping operation that began as a UN-sponsored humanitarian aid distribution operation. Several JSDF aircraft provided air transportation for humanitarian relief supplies for the Australian-led UN intervention in the East Timor crisis as it unfolded after May 1999. When an armed intervention appeared likely, Australia asked for a SDF contingent, but Japan was unable to do so then. This deployment happened later, in March 2002, when Japan sent 690 JSDF personnel, the largest engineering component in the United Nations’ provisional administrative agency in East Timor to participate in the operation. 573 As well as the Cambodian (1992-93) and East Timor deployments (2002-04), the JSDF has since participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Rwanda, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Haiti, and South Sudan.574

For many in the Western alliance, 9/11 changed the frontline for contributing to a rules- based global order. Japan made non-combat military contributions around the world after the Japanese Government made annual laws authorizing refuelling at-sea operations in the Indian Ocean, and allowed the MSDF to go overseas, but only for non-combatant humanitarian deployments. 575 From 2009, more enduring laws authorized anti-piracy enforcement operations in the Indian Ocean. This change resulted in a near-permanent MSDF presence off the Horn of Africa coast and an overseas base in Djibouti. Previously, no rationale to go outside Japanese contiguous waters existed. All these led to a position of forward presence that is notionally predicated on contributing to international stability but conveniently places Japanese naval forces along the strategic lines of communication for the bulk of Japan’s energy imports.576

572 Contemporaneous notes 1996. 573 ‘Opening Statements by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Prime Minister John Howard of Australia at the Joint Press Conference, ‘1 May 2002. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0204/op_0501.html 574 Japan's Contributions Based on the International Peace Cooperation Act. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/page22e_000684.html 575 Chelton, op. cit. 576 Ibid. Escort activities in accordance with the Anti-Piracy Measures Law started in 2009 and the MSDF escorts not only Japan-related ships but all vessels. 157 4.3.2. Recent Changes in Japanese Defence Posture

Japan specialist scholar Richard Samuels considers that the handling of the 2001 triple disaster (called in Japan the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (東日本大災害, Higashi Nihon Daishinsai)) by Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Prime Minister Kan Naoto, raised questions about the viability of the political system as a whole providing Abe on return to government with the opportunity to change ‘the parameters of the political situation.’577

Another Japanese security specialist, Andrew Oros considered that Japan’s military capability has been much improved in the last few decades, and especially since Abe’s return. Ordos argues that this re-awakening to the challenges of the new century has ‘culminated in the multifaceted "security renaissance" of the past decade’. He notes that Japan's future security policies will continue to be shaped by intractable post-Cold War legacies, limiting opportunities for movement to becoming a normal country. Oros argues that ‘claims of rising nationalism in Japan are overstated, but there has been a discernible shift favoring the conservative Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party’.578

In his second administration (2012-20), Abe commenced a review program which moved Japanese defence policy to a more normative posture for Japan and brought about significant change in major foreign policy areas. He succeeded in institutionalizing national security into the Japanese psyche with new changes, including creating a National Security Council in 2013.579 Previously, internecine tensions between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Economic Trade and Industry had precluded forming common defence and security positions. The National Security Council with 100 seconded staff in its supporting secretariat now provides security advice directly to the Prime Minister. This establishment allowed Abe to implement his radical foreign policy agenda without much bureaucratic constraint. The adoption of a National Security Strategy in December 2013 enabled Japan to have a clear and long-term defence vision.

Abe also established a panel in 2013 to advise Cabinet on the re-interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, resulting in the 2016 Collective Security Declaration and a raft of

577 Samuels, Richard J., ‘3.11: Disaster and change in Japan’. (Cornell University Press, 2013), p.509. 578 Andrew Oros. ‘Japan’s security renaissance’. (Columbia University Press 2017). 579 Rory Medcalf, Head, National Security College, ANU, private interview. 19 May 2020 158 legislative changes. Defence commentator Yuichi Hosoya said that the review panel suffered from significant differences between defence and foreign affairs officials. These differences later created problems for the Cabinet Legislative Bureau because ‘no one represented Defence and they were able to focus on domestic political issues with no interest in strategy for international issues.’ Hosoya considers that the changes still do not allow the JSDF to protect itself, resulting in problems when they worked with Australia in Al-Sabah in South Sudan on PKO.580 However, on a strictly bilateral basis, Hosoya considers that the 2017 Collective Security Declaration allows Japan to support Australia and the United States in operations on the Korean peninsula against North Korea.581

4.3.3. Japan’s Security Posture.

After Abe presented his military normalization program as part of a ‘concept of proactive contribution to peace’, Japan was looking for friends, and Australia was seen as ‘being there’ and as a friendly country. Marta Ross saw this as Japan demonstrating that it could be responsible in the exercise of national power, including military power.’ 582 A commentator on Abe’s politics, Seiji Endo said: the Abe Government chose the words ‘pro- active contribution to peace’ to allow it to promote ‘Japan’s international cooperation and military normalization at the same time.’ 583 The publication of ‘15 Cases’ soon after Abe came back into government explained new laws to the public by describing fifteen cases where the JSDF could be militarily cooperating with other forces. Bibek Chand and colleagues considered that Abe was now pursuing a ‘classical hedging response, spreading Japan’s strategic risk by adopting a proactive regional security policy and strengthening defence and security co-operation with countries such as Australia.’ At this time, relations between China and Japan began to sour. China started to smear Abe’s reputation in articles placed in the New York Times. It was time to bolster relations with like-minded countries. Abe had previously set out his vision in 2012 for a ‘democratic security diamond’ with Japan ‘linking with Australia, India and the US to safeguard the Indo-Pacific maritime commons, human rights and the rule of law.’584

580 Hosoya. op. cit. 581 Hosoya, op. cit. 582 Marta Ross. 2015. ‘The Abe Restoration: Pushing Past Japan’s Wartime Legacy and Restoring a Responsible Use of Force’. Issues & Insights. (Pacific Forum CSIS). Vol. 15, No 14, p. 9. 583 Seiji Endo in , ‘‘Sekkyokuteki Heiwashugi’ o Hihanteki ni Kensho suru (A critical Review of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace)’ pp. 116-124. 584 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Winter 2018. ‘Southeast Asian Hedging and Indo-Japanese Strategies’. Bibek Chand, Zenel Garcia, Kevin Modlin. 159 For a country that draws its security and economic prosperity from open seas and the rule of international law, Japan saw the safety of the seas as its own safety. In launching his concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) in 2016, Abe stressed the vital importance of Asia’s maritime domain to Japan: ‘Japan’s national interest lies eternally in keeping Asia’s seas unequivocally open, free, and peaceful, in maintaining them as the commons for all the people in the world, where the rule of law is fully realized.’585

Nicholas Szechenyi and Yuichi Hosoya consider that Japan and the United States share a critical interest in the prosperity, security, and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. But they are ‘grappling with thorny challenges’ as the regional balance of power is increasingly contested as China seeks to enhance its economic and political influence. This has caused both to ‘adopt a comprehensive strategy that accounts for regional diversity, encourages adherence to shared principles, and incorporates tools to manage strategic competition with Beijing.’ Both now use the term FOIP to cover their ‘respective regional strategies.’ However, these authors consider that the two countries are ‘not aligned completely.’ Abe announced the FOIP strategy as a ‘network of nations and regional organizations that value freedom, the rule of law, and market economics that are “free from force or coercion” and serve as a foundation for peace and prosperity.’ They add that Japan is quick to assert that this strategy is not meant to counter or contain China but note that FOIP is now more of a vision or concept. The authors suggest that this revision allows Japan to facilitate bilateral diplomacy with China but also demonstrates ‘a lack of consensus on exactly how FOIP should be defined.’ 586

During Abe’s tenure Japan lost faith in traditional collective security arrangements to counter the challenges it saw in its security environment. Michael Heazle considered that Abe’s leadership both helped save the Trans-Pacific Partnership from Trump’s ‘America first’ posturing and revived the QUAD. He considered these were compelling examples of how much Japan’s foreign policy and defence capabilities had changed under Abe.587 Ian

585 See ‘The Bounty of the Open Sea: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy’, 18 January 2013. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/ statement/201301/18speech_e.htm 586 Nicholas Szechenyi and Yuichi Hosoya, ‘Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, Policy Brief from China Risk and China Opportunity for the Us-Japan Alliance project. 10 October 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/working-toward-free-and-open-indo-pacific-pub-80023 587 Abe’s domestic failings may cost Japan—and the region—dearly ASPI ‘The Strategist’ 10 Jun 2020. Michael Heazle. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/abes-domestic-failings-may-cost-japan-and-the-region- dearly/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+C ID_0ba2aa9aebabb62e97b9546510ecac4e&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Abes%20domestic%20failings% 20may%20cost%20Japanand%20the%20regiondearly 160 Storey wrote: ‘As tensions have ratcheted up in the South China Sea over the past several years, Japan has expressed growing concern at negative developments and the lack of progress in implementing effective conflict management mechanisms’. 588 Abe’s government began engaging in ‘broad-based multilateralism, proactive engagement with partners in the region, including China, and strategic hedging.’ according to Tokyo-based observer Stephen Nagy. Nagy felt that the foreign policy of ‘proactive pacifism’ allowed Japan to support the global free trade order ‘through regional trade agreements, and by playing a proactive role in international organizations and regional security operations that abide by Japan’s constitutional limitations.’589

Japan’s hardening security posture was evident in public documents. The December 2018 NDPO heralded a significant build up in military capability. The MSDF upgraded the Izumo class helicopter destroyer with a flight deck strengthened to operate the vertical take-off F- 35B fighter aircraft. This will give the MSDF an organic air capability, although a JMOD source said this was only for fleet air defence saying ‘we will not have an aircraft carrier for force projection or attack purposes’590

The December 2018 NDPG looked to respond to new challenges. While the US-JMST is still the bedrock of Japan’s defence, the (extant) 2018 NDPG notes Japan is positioning itself to assume more responsibility including promoting ‘multi-faceted, multi-layered security cooperation’ with others. The document specifically mentions the JDSF building interoperability with Australia and strengthening ‘cooperative relations under trilateral framework with Japan, Australia and the United States’.591

Glosserman considers that ‘though Shinzo Abe's and the LDP's return to power was due largely to promises to reinvigorate the economy, in reality Japan is now at the peak of its power, and the current political stability and limited economic recovery put in motion under "Abenomics" are temporary’. He states that Japan faces structural challenges that it simply cannot surmount… is the result of powerful resistance to real change and to its culture, history, and traditions. The Abe years, Glosserman concludes, are a last-gasp effort to boost

588 ISEAS Perspective. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore. 8 Apr 2013 ‘Japan’s Growing Angst over the South China Sea’ Ian Storey 8 April 2013. 589 ‘Japan’s Proactive Pacifism: Investing in Multilateralization and Omnidirectional Hedging’ Taylor and Francis online. 20 March 2017. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2017.1295607 590 JMOD official A, private interview. 27 December 2018. 591 Japanese Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines, 18 December 2018. p. 16. 161 Japan's standing and secure a leading regional and international role.592 Time, and the passing of the COVID-19 pandemic will tell if the Suga and subsequent governments can prove this false.

What is the political locus of this from an A-JDSR perspective? Michael Heazle opined that Abe’s legislative changes and agreements allowed increased security cooperation with the United States and others (beyond just disaster management), particularly with Australia. 593 Medcalf considers that this process of building a network of partnerships to limit Chinese power and threats from North Korea is a hedging mechanism. He believes that ‘Tokyo is no longer placing all its hopes on Washington’ and has a strategy of ‘cultivating friends from India to Europe to Southeast Asia and Australia.’594 Sheila Smith considers that ‘changing US views on its alliance commitments, as well as a growing confidence within Japan over its use of military power’ are important inputs ‘into Tokyo’s strategic thinking.’595

Abe’s call for a free and open Indo-Pacific region resonated with allies. The Trump Administration released a strategic statement emphasising ‘its Indo-Pacific strategy’.596 In a 2020 commentary on the Indo-Pacific, Graeme Dobell considered that the Indo-Pacific term was not just geographical but, denoted ‘pushback aimed at achieving balance [and is] loaded with ambition and driven by power.’597 Rory Medcalf covers this significant change in a ‘centre of gravity’ at length in his 2020 book. He said the focus on the Indo-Pacific ‘heralded a new era of power rivalry, a world away from the optimism of globalization’ and was, in addition to a global centre of population and wealth, ‘the heartland of military might and latent conflict (where) confrontation was trumping cooperation.’598

Australia joined Japan in raising concerns about the ‘implications for free and open trade’ of the ‘competition between major powers’ and the increased ‘risk for military

592 Brad Glosserman. ‘Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions’. (Georgetown University Press, 2019). 593 Michael Heazle, Abe’s domestic failings may cost Japan—and the region—dearly ASPI ‘The Strategist’ 10 Jun 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/abes-domestic-failings-may-cost-japan-and-the-region- dearly/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+C ID_0ba2aa9aebabb62e97b9546510ecac4e&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Abes%20domestic%20failings% 20may%20cost%20Japanand%20the%20regiondearly 594 Rory Medcalf. op cit. p.154. 595 Council on Foreign Relations. Blog Post. ‘Japan's Active Defences’ December 20, 2018 596 Sheila A. Smith, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific - Advancing a Shared Vision. US Department of State. 4 November 2019. P.3. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf 597 Graeme Dobell, ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, ASPI, The Strategist 2 March 2020. 598 Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won't Map the Future. (Latrobe University Press. 2020) 162 confrontation.’599 The 2017 DFAT White Paper noted that ‘APEC leaders have also agreed to work towards free and open trade and investment in the Asia–Pacific.’600 The 2020 Strategic Update, with its division of the Indo-Pacific into a nearer and a wider region, does not mention the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). However, the idea of developing regional partnerships, central to the implementation of the FOIP, is also central to Australia’s defence strategy.

4.3.4. Japan and the United States

In 2020 the relationship between Japan and the United States received further clarification and prediction. Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, two prominent US strategic thinkers and commentators wrote a report in late 2020 on where the US-Japan alliance might be in 2030. They considered that the alliance was an important source of regional security, but both countries needed to prepare for the most significant security challenge since the Second World War with the rise of China. They also considered Japan should take an ‘equal, if not leading, role in the alliance. Japan was doing this by setting the regional agenda, championing free trade agreements and multilateral cooperation, and implementing new strategies to shape a regional order at a time when the United States has been ‘unsteady.’ They also called for Japan and like-minded nations to build new security frameworks, noting that both countries shared growing concern over ‘Chinese military and political pressure on Taiwan.’601 In summary, they considered President Trump’s lack of attention to regional security had caused Japan to take on a regional security leadership role.

In October 2020, outgoing Japanese Ambassador to Australia Sumio Kusaka commented publicly that the Trump presidency had both ‘alienated foreign allies and partners on one hand and entrenched foes on the other.’ He had alienated allies by ‘turning his back’ on multilateral bodies but to Trump’s credit, ‘took a firm stand against China's unilateral claims in the South China Sea.’ He feared for what may happen if ‘the United States and China stay their confrontational course.602

599 2016 Defence White Paper, Chapter 1.12, p. 33. 600 2017 DFAT White Paper. p. 63. 601 Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2020. An Unequal Alliance with a Global Agenda. CSIS. December 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-japan-alliance-2020. 602 Sumio Kusaka, Canberra, Tokyo grow together. The Australian, 6 October 2020. 163 4.3.5. Japan and China

Abe did not ignore engagement with China, attempting to achieve a position of accommodation with China. He made a diplomatic ice-breaking trip to Beijing in October 2018 for the first Sino-Japanese summit in seven years. President Xi was prepared then to build better relations with Japan, but there has been no reciprocal visit. By 2021, warmer relations had yet to transpire. US commentator Minxin Pei considers that Japan-China tensions can only increase as the United States continues to pressure Japan to restrict the technologies it provides to China and to continue participating in joint naval exercises in the South China Sea.603

Discussion now turns to other signs of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region that influence the trajectory of the A-JDSR.

4.3.6. Japan and ASEAN countries

Economic engagement has been the pathway for soothing post-Second World War antipathies between Japan and its neighbours. Japan’s 2013 NSS speaks of the ASEAN countries' importance to Japan’s security, noting their strategic locations in ‘critical areas of sea lanes of communication’. 604 Referring to long-lasting post-war economic partnerships, the NSS affirmed Japan’s intentions to develop closer security relations with ASEAN countries.605 The NSS illustrated Japan’s regional policy shift from Japan-ASEAN bilateral ties to strategies of comprehensive regional networking and institutionalization.606

Japan has taken the lead on some ASEAN initiatives and has heavily invested in some ASEAN countries providing significant support in a program of ‘capacity-building’. Commentators suggest that this is counter Chinese economic leverage over Southeast Asian nations. Japanese NIDS academic Tomotaka Shoji considered China’s growing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas had prompted Japan to optimise its

603 Minxin Pei. ‘Japan’s geopolitical balancing act just got harder’, 18 September 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/japans-geopolitical-balancing-act-just-got-harder/ 604 National Security Strategy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan. 2013. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html 605 Yasuyuki Ishida, ‘Evolving Strategic Partnership from Fukuda to Abe Doctrine’, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2 Volume 2., December 2018. 606 Susumu Yamakage, ‘Japan’s Regional Vision and China’s Rise’, in Mie OBA ed., The Making of East Asia: Order, Integration and Stakeholders, Tokyo: Chikura Shobo. (in Japanese) 164 cooperation with ASEAN and support for ASEAN countries economies. 607 Susumu Yamakage highlights the active roles of the Koizumi cabinet in the ‘ASEAN Plus Six’, the Aso cabinet’s facilitation of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ strategy, and the Abe Cabinet’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy declaration.608 These initiatives have also been useful in constructively engaging China and the United States. Still, many ASEAN countries perceive China’s expansion and assertive behaviour as a threat to the region.

The pursuit of the Abe cabinet’s FOIP initiative increased Japan’s engagement with its ASEAN neighbours. Michel Green and Greg Poling opine that Prime Minister Suga’s visit in mid-October 2020 to Vietnam and Jakarta visit ‘indicates that the ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance system is being positively changed as Japan pursues its FOIP policy’. They consider that stability ‘requires that key allies like Japan become ‘hubs’ themselves within the region’s emerging security architecture.’ They consider that Japan, the most trusted partner for ASEAN countries, needs to provide ‘options, rather than pressing them to choose between China or the United States.’ Japan is making security agreements with Indonesia and both countries are holding Foreign and Defence Ministerial talks. As US regional influence wanes, Japan is positioning itself to create a Southeast Asian security hub.609 Malcolm Cook and colleagues say that by making Vietnam and Indonesia his first overseas ports of call in 2020, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga signalled that he intends to adhere closely to his predecessor Shinzō Abe’s ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy.610

4.3.7. Japanese Security Posture and the A-JDSR

The A-JDSR continued to mature in the decade from 2010 due to Japan’s security posture hardening in response to China’s strategic assertiveness and the initiatives taken by Japan and Australia to proactively engage with their regional neighbours. Both countries issued Defence White Papers in 2016 emphasizing the A-JDSR. The Japanese version devoted a whole chapter to the relationship, placing it immediately after chapters on China and Russia,

607 Tomotaka Shoji, ‘Japan’s Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a ‘Relevant’ Partner’, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 16, Dec. 2015. p. 97. 608 Susumu Yamakage, ‘From the Two Ps to the Two Cs: The Accomplishments and Challenges of ASEAN at 50’, AJISS-Commentary No. 247. 5 October 2017. https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201710/05-1.html 609 Michael J Green, Gregory B Poling, ‘Suga in SEA: Japan’s Emergence as a Regional Security Hub.’ (CSIS, 27 October 2020). https://www.csis.org/node/58660 610 Malcolm Cook, David Engel, Huong Le Thu, Suga signals commitment to ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ with Vietnam and Indonesia visits. ASPI, The Strategist. 2 No 2020.

165 and before the ASEAN chapter.611 The paper also lists Australia first after the United States as a defence partner, stating ‘Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy.’612 In 2016 the Japanese Embassy in Canberra published a document stating that the ‘Japanese government sees closer security cooperation with Australia as integral to maintaining the existing US-led regional order’. It has described Japan and Australia as ‘‘bookends’ sandwiching the western Pacific (the East China Sea and the South China Sea)’.613 Amy King concurs, noting that the Australian 2016 Defence White Paper aimed to pursue ‘strategic policies designed to ensure that the United States maintains its post- Cold War position as Asia’s leading power.’ She notes the Abe Government’s initiatives that moved Japan to become a more normal western military power help maintain, not change, the US-led order in Asia.614

But will the current closeness in the A-JDSR continue in a post-Abe era? Graeme Dobell says: ‘the departure of Abe Shinzō as Japan’s leader [in 2020] opens a new era for Canberra’s quasi-alliance with Tokyo. Australia is going to find out how much its small ‘a’ alliance was due to Abe’s personal connections, and how much on more permanent shifts in Japan’s policy personality. China’s bullying has shown Australia that a quasi-alliance with Japan is more of a necessity than an option. Abe’s personality was persuasive, but Beijing’s policies have been decisive.’615

In 2020 Ambassador Kusaka was emphatically positive about the A-JDSR. He considered that both countries have similar interests that are ‘aligned, if not identical’ in their desires to mutually manage current global challenges. First among these actions is to ensure the United States is thoroughly engaged in the region. The second action is to respond effectively ‘to an aggressive, bullying China.’ He added that Australia and Japan should build on their special strategic partnership to include like-minded nations such as the UK

611 The 2020 Japanese Defense White Paper says in its opening statement on Australia: Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Japan’s relationship with Australia is becoming more important than ever before. Government of Japan, Ministry of Defense, 2020 Defense of Japan, p. 129. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2020/DOJ2020_EN_Full.pdf 612 JDA 2019 Defence White Paper Chapter 5. 613 ‘Japan & Australia: A Complementary Relationship with Strategic Interests’, Embassy of Japan in Australia, February 2016. 614 Amy King, ‘Japan in Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper.’ Security Challenges 12, no. 1 (2016): 177-80. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465727 615 Graham Dobell, ‘After Abe: Where to for Australia’s quasi-alliance with Japan?’ The Strategist, 6 October 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/after-abe-where-to-for-australias-quasi-alliance-with- japan/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CI D_47e6749d0ea8a90df9228c379919b3b9&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=After%20Abe%20Where%20to %20for%20Australias%20quasi-alliance%20with%20Japan 166 and France. He thought that ‘only a wider network of countries can persuade China to understand the danger and accept the reality on the ground. In the end, we must establish peaceful co-existence with China.’616

Abe's departure may slow the momentum of a maturing A-JDSR, but Michael Thawley consider the general thrust will continue and there will be no backsliding, ‘Japan now faces a ‘mortal threat’ to its sovereignty and must face up to this. It has taken 20-30 years for Japan for this security issue to become ‘socialised’ in the minds of the Japanese. Japan now knows it must do more on the defence front and must work hard on its alliance with the United States and other alignments’.617

4.3.8. Military Responses to Chinese assertiveness under the US-JMST

US security policy has a strong influence over the postures by Australia and Japan, more so for Japan due to unique nature of the ‘sword and the shield’. Trump’s defence policy, declassified and released a few days before his departure made prescriptive statements about deterring China ‘from using military force’ against the United States and its partners and commits to ‘defeat Chinese actions across all conflict.’ Deterrence was to be based on building a credible military present, backed with capability. It sought to: deny Chinese dominance inside the ‘first island chain in a conflict; defend the first-island-chain nations, including Taiwan; and to dominate all domains outside the first island chain.’ The policy makes the most explicit statement made in decades about US commitment to its partners in Northeast Asia. It implicitly invites its Indo-Pacific allies to consider options to become engaged.618

China hawk Michele Flourney619 agrees that the US needs to rebuild credible deterrence to reduce the risk of a war that neither side seeks. Deterrence must be backed with a credible capability to act and defeat aggression. Flourney considers that, if war starts, the United States ‘can no longer expect superiority’. She also considers deterrence could break down due to a miscalculation, such as China choosing to blockade or attack Taiwan.620 Effective

616 Kusaka, op.cit 617 Thawley, op. cit. 618 Rory Medcalf, Declassification of secret document reveals US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The Strategist, ASPI. 13 January 2021. 619 Prominent Democrat and past Pentagon official. 620 The Erosion of American Deterrence Raises the Risk of Chinese Miscalculation. Foreign Affairs November/December 2020. Michele A. Flournoy 18 June 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-18/how-prevent-war- 167 deterrence does not depend just on a belief that an adversary state has the capability to enter a conflict; they must also demonstrate they have the will to do so. Flourney says: ‘Beijing has doubts on both scores’. While Beijing may match the United States’ economic and military within a decade, it cannot for some time, exceed the strength of the US global alliance system.

4.4 Future US Strategic Posture

While there is a commitment to deter and prepare for conflict with China, extant US strategy still acknowledges the need to ‘cooperate with China when beneficial to US interests.’ The new Biden administration will determine its future policy settings, but past bipartisanship indicates that the need for conditional cooperation with China would likely be a foundational policy. It is yet to be seen if a Biden policy will either accommodate a rising power or continue to seek to maintain US hegemony. Biden faces significant issues at home and may prioritise these domestic rather than focus on the Indo-Pacific. It may need to do both simultaneously.

Babones writes in early 2021 in a piece on the new Presidency that Biden is ‘determined to depart from Trump’s unilateralism and organise allies to join in American efforts.’621 He considers that the new administration has similar goals on China as the Trump administration. Domestically these are: rebuilding US manufacturing and protecting intellectual property. Specifically, against China, these are: ‘denying China access to military technology, countering China’s military modernisation and supporting Taiwan’. While this may be the status quo from an Australian perspective, Australia has more potential to support the United States than vice versa.

Looking to relations with Australia, new ‘Asia czar’ and ‘old Asia hand’ Kurt Campbell considers that the United States has ‘deep and real commitment to Australia, adding that he was personally optimistic about United States-Australia relations, and that ‘Biden’s people

asia?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fabackstory&utm_content=20201115&utm_campaign=FA%20Backstory%201 11520%20The%20Backstory:%20The%20Transformation%20of%20U.S.%20China%20Policy&utm_term=fa-backstory- 2019 621 Salvatore Babones, The New President: What Biden’s Foreign Policy Agenda Means for Australia. (CSIS Occasional Paper 178. January 2021). https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2021/01/op178.pdf? 168 are well-disposed to Australia.’622 The United States seems ready to re-build alliances with its allies and partners and is looking to Australia and Japan (together with India) to continue their regional leadership roles. There is strong reason to believe that the A-JDSR will be an integral, if not a foundational component of building security, trust, and prosperity in the IP.

4.5 Indo-Pacific Regional Tensions

Tensions created by strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and Chinese assertiveness are of concern to Japan, Australia, the United States, and other regional nations seeking to achieve an environment of free trade, open borders, and prosperity. In 2021, Chinese belligerency towards Australia has caused Australia to maintain a firm stance against political, trade and cyberspace attacks. A change of administration in the United States will change American domestic and foreign policy. Still, US pushback against China will continue even if both countries seek to accommodate each other. Biden's Secretary of State- nominee Antony Blinken said during his congressional hearing that China is the US’s top strategic competitor, and the new administration would continue some of Trump's hard-line policies toward China.623 Tensions have been exacerbated not only by economic issues, but by Chinese militarisation of the seas to its east. In 2011, China claimed islands, some man- made, in the South China Sea, each with a significant EEZ overlapping others’ accepted exclusive economic zones. As well as claiming sovereign and economic rights, the claims have the potential to disrupt vital trade routes through this area and could deny trade passage in times of hostilities.624 Forces at claimed Scarborough Shoals, just 250km west of Subic Bay near Manila and previous US forces’ stronghold would have an ability to ‘control’ air and sea traffic to the northeast exit of the South China Sea. President Obama reportedly warned CCP President Xi in a 2105 meeting in Washington that this was a red line and China should ‘not move on the Scarborough Shoals’.625

622 Kurt Campbell, Online Seminar. Lowy Institute. 11 June 2020.https://myaccount.lowyinstitute.org/events/2020-ldli- june-li 623 Yang Sheng, Wang Xi, ‘Biden ‘needs courage’ to pull China-US ties from chilliness.’ Global Times, 20 January 2021. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213453.shtml 624 Steve Mollman, The line on a 70-year-old map that threatens to set off a war in East Asia. Quartz, July 8, 2016, https://qz.com/705223/where-exactly-did-chinas-nine-dash-line-in-the-south-china-sea-come-from/ 625 Michael McDevitt, Rear Admiral USN (Retd). ‘Analysis: Is it Time for the U.S. to Take a Position on Scarborough Shoal?’ USNI News 19 July 2016. https://news.usni.org/2016/07/19/take-position-scarborough-shoal 169 In 2012, China deployed naval vessels to the Senkakus challenging Japanese sovereignty. There is now a regular Chinese presence in the islands’ adjacent waters. Japan has been contesting each infringement by Japanese Coast Guard vessels—not naval vessels—to avoid escalation.626 China has made these challenges since at least 1997.627 In early 2021, Chinese state media reports indicated that the Chinese Coast Guard has approval to use weapons to ‘carry out defence operations’ against foreign vessels.628 While governments invariably hold approval for actual engagement centrally, the legislative action represents a degree of political deterrence by China.

These regional tensions have ramped up military competition in a area of volatility, but also one of great economic importance to global world order and ability to trade. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN countries ‘worry about China’s growing power and the possibility of Chinese domination’.629 A closer A-JDSR relationship has resulted from these regional tensions, and the necessity to counter sovereignty challenges in a deterrent posture. In this context, Japan and Australia have become regional leaders in ASEAN for consolidation against China.

This next section looks at regional tensions from point of view of Australia, Japan, the United States, and other regional nations. It also looks at regional tensions from regional ‘flashpoints’ created by the DPRK and Chinese challenges to Taiwan. Comments on flashpoints apply to tensions and responses in the South China Sea.

4.4.1. View from Australia

The China/Australia relationship has soured since 2015. China has expressed displeasure with Australia in several fora and has imposed tariff and non-tariff barriers on Australia products. On cultural differences and lack of understanding of each other, Ric Smith said that Australia: ‘underestimated how long the post-Tienanmen power political struggle was taking and it was not settled when I took over [as Ambassador] in 1996.’ Smith said the

626 Toshi Yoshihara in. Chinese hybrid warfare in the IP: issues and options for allied defense planners Case Study #5, Volume ii: case studies, (published online Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, March 2019). p 33. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Stealing_a_March_Annex_Final.pdf 627 Contemporaneous personal notes, 1997. 628 Natalie Brown, China authorises coast guard to fire on foreign vessels. World Asia. 23 January 2021, https://www.news.com.au/world/asia/china-authorises-coast-guard-to-fire-on-foreign-vessels/news- story/7fefa4894aa9cf2e0f83a388653cbaaa 629 Vibanshu Shekhar, ASEAN’s Response to the Rise of China: Deploying a Hedging Strategy. Sage Journal Vol. 48, Issue 3, p. 253. https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445512462314 170 struggle between old guard Li Peng and the progressive Zhu Rongji630 (who had wanted to separate party and state), had resulted in the ‘party running the state’.631 Like others in the western alliance, Australia had thought that the process of normalising government relations would lead to political progress, but this did not happen.632

Australia and Japan are looking to diversify their security away from reliance on the United States. Smith notes that ‘everyone is hedging in a way, all the ASEANs, some more than others, certainly Laos, Cambodia less so. Hedging is the response to a new power in the region.’ Smith considers that we need another formula for dealing with China, suggesting ‘counter influencing’ by ‘constant negotiation’. He also thinks that Japan can make greater accommodation with China than Australia can, due to better trade diversity than Australia’s. In his time in China, Smith considered that China ‘wanted respect and acknowledgement for their achievements and past ‘sins against China’. In response, Australia had only wanted business opportunities’. Smith says, ‘we now need to re-establish that respectful relationship with China.’633

In November 2020, Beijing released an attack on the Australian government in a document passed to the press by the Embassy in Canberra. The Sydney Morning Herald listed 14 charges by China ‘aimed at pressuring the Morrison government to reverse Australia's position on key policies.’ A subsequent briefing in Beijing by China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian blamed Australia for the poor state of the relationship. These charges demonstrated a significant tactical shift from Beijing, but Australia did not resile despite threats of coercive import restrictions. months of escalating Chinese rhetoric and verbal instructions to state-linked traders to stop importing Australian products. The heightened tension came soon after Australia had agreed-in-principle to the RAA with Japan.634 Tensions have been strained since 2015, but previous cold periods were warmed because economic interests overcame disputation. The relationship is now cold, and visits and high-level dialogue have ceased. A speech by then-Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull marked the beginning of iciness when he spoke of a ‘dark view’ of a ‘coercive China’

630 Zhu Rongji, Premier of People’s Republic of China from March 1998 to March 2003. 631 Smith, R. op. cit. 632 Xi Jinping—The Backlash, Lowy Institute Paper, July 2019 633 Smith, op.cit. 634 Jonathan Kearsleand, 'If you make China the enemy, China will be the enemy': Beijing's fresh threat to Australia. Sydney Morning Herald. 18 November 2020. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/if-you-make-china-the-enemy-china- will-be-the-enemy-beijing-s-fresh-threat-to-australia-20201118-p56fqs.html 171 seeking global domination.635 The ‘special strategic partnership’ declared under the Gillard Labor government, was put aside by Prime Minister Morrison who said in February 2021

636 ‘We cannot pretend that things are as they were. The world has changed.’

Alan Dupont considers that China’s recent trade actions against Australia are an egregious example of ‘economic coercion for geopolitical purposes’. He considers that any lack of resilience by Australia, the United States and others would encourage China to use malevolence in a ‘new China-dominated authoritarian world order’, with smaller states reduced to suzerainty.

Ross Babbage considers that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is coercing Australia to ‘cede key parts of our political independence’ and that trade sanctions are just part of a broader offensive. He notes that all grievances against Australia listed in a document leaked to the Australian media related to Australian sovereignty’. Babbage considers security issues at stake, saying that Australia needs to rapidly build its defence and other deterrent capabilities to confront this assertiveness.637

Australia publicly aligned itself with the United States in resisting Chinese expansionism, recently re-stating this position after the August 2020 Australia-United States Ministerial meeting.638 There was an immediate response from China, with Chinese media reporting that Australia could ‘be punished with trade sanctions’. Chinese academic Zhou Fangyin said: ‘from China‘s perspective, it’s recklessly making provocations.’639 In response, Prime Minister Morrison rebuffed Chinese views that Australia was acting against China as a lackey of the United States. Morrison stresses Australia is merely defending its sovereignty. He said it was not seeking to contain China and desired a ‘mutually beneficial relationship with China.’ He added that Australia was deeply committed to the alliance and affirmed that Australia ‘must be true to our values’ and protect our sovereignty.’640

635 Malcolm Turnbull, Keynote address at the 16th IISS Asia Security Summit, Shangri-La Dialogue. 3 June 2017. https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/keynote-address-at-the-16th-iiss-asia-security-summit-shangri-la- dialogue 636 Graeme Dobell. Fourteen points on Australia’s icy times with China. The Strategist. April 2021. 637 Xi is waging more than a trade war. AFR, 11December 2020. Ross Babbage. https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign- affairs/xi-is-waging-more-than-a-trade-war-20201211-p56mmo 638 Australia joins US in declaring Beijing’s South China Sea claims illegal. The Australian, 25 July 2020. Ben Packham. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/australia-joins-us-in-declaring-beijings-south-china-sea-claims-illegal/ 639 China accuses Australia of trade violation and ‘damaging relations’ The Australian. Ben Packham. 18 December 2020. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/breaking-news/china-accuses-australia-of-trade-violation-and-damaging- relations/news-story/cbbebc333430c936923dc638aaf13cd9 640 Scott Morrison, UK policy exchange virtual address., 23 November 2020. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/uk-policy-exchange-virtual-address 172

Dupont also considers that, rather than planning to fight China, Australia should move to a position that influences China to act as a positive regional player. He sees Australia as an ‘influential, democratic middle power and close ally of the US’ and that this presentation could ‘embolden others to resist China’s mix of blandishments and heavy-handed coercion’. He considers that China fears ‘the emergence of an anti-China alliance’ led by Australia’s example. Dupont opines that Australia must resist CCP assertiveness by a ‘seamless integration of political, diplomatic, trade and defence policy’. He notes that the 2020 Strategic Update and associated the plan to build Australia’s military capabilities is an excellent start to combatting the ‘hybrid politico-military ‘grey zone’ tactics used by China to ‘impose its will on others.’641

Diplomat John McCarthy also considers Australia needs to implement an alternative way to deal with the emergence of a rising power. He also believes that there is doubt over a ‘rock-solid’ alliance with the United States. 642 McCarthy quotes previous High Commissioner to India, Peter Varghese, who considers that Australia should seek a situation where there was a regional ‘balance of power’ with the United States being a major player. He adds China and Australia should be ‘contributing to this balance with closer strategic engagement with others, especially Japan and India.’643 In reviewing Geoff Raby’s thoughts on a new global order, John West considers that Raby is saying Australia needs to return to being ‘an activist middle-power diplomacy involving coalition-building across a range of issues.’644

A summary view of interlocutors is that Australia needs to avoid being drawn into a global strategic contest if the United States considers it needs to push for economic dominance over China. Australia needs to balance support for the United States and the alliance's security against Australia’s economic reliance on China. Australia may consider that the financial costs of supporting the alliance are less important than the value of the security

641 Alan Dupont, ‘Fighting the dragon: we’re doing it wrong. The Australian, 13 December 2020. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/exclusives/fighting-the-dragon/news-story/ 642John McCarthy, Post Trump, our Plan B needs to focus on China, India, Japan, The Australian, 28 July 2018. McCarthy was Australian ambassador to Japan, the United States, three Southeast Asian countries and High Commissioner to India. 643 Ibid. 644 John West, Review of Geoff Raby, China’s Grand Strategy and Australia’s Future in the New Global Order. Melbourne University Press. 2020. Australian Outlook, AIIA. 3 November 2020. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/book-review-chinas-grand-strategy-and-australias-future-in-the- new-global-order/ 173 guarantee. As Morrison has stated, Australia may consider protecting its sovereignty is worth the damage caused by any economic and other sanctions that China may apply. If Australia can achieve this balance, it can bolster its prosperity by coming to an accommodation with China, simultaneously resisting Chinese expansionism and protecting its national interests, and if necessary, contributing to regional deterrence by raising credible national capability.

Australia will need to manage its diplomatic relations with the United States carefully. The United States can help Australia in this challenge if the Biden administration maintains a dual policy of resistance and accommodation towards China. If Australia moves to join like- minded countries as the United States is asking, then any development of deterrence, military or otherwise that Australia contributes to any coalition resisting Chinese expansionism must be matched with a dogged determination to accommodate China. Such a position may place Australia at odds with the United States if the Biden Administration seeks a balance of economic power that limits China’s taking its place in a new economic order.

4.4.2. View from Japan

A summary of interviews conducted in Japan for this thesis is: Japan relies upon US protection but doubts that the US has the capacity and the will to so protect; Japan considers that China is acting as a hegemon, but still seeks to find an accommodation with China; and Japan seeks to work with Australia to oppose Chinese influence. Japan believes it must engage with China in an attempt to constrain its behaviour. It must also supplement its security relationship by hedging with other middle powers like Australia. A Tokyo-based US observer of Japanese Government policy says that Japan’s resistance strategy is to build a consortium of like-minded middle-powers such as Australia.645

Japanese government officials considered that China is undoubtedly seeking regional hegemony and can achieve it. They expressed the concern Japan has about Chinese ‘in the seas outside the second line’, the South China Sea and its trade routes. One interlocutor mentioned that the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ is a political infrastructure strategy, starting with expansionism in Southeast Asia and ‘then going elsewhere’. A summary view was that

645 Stephen Nagy, International Christian University, Tokyo, private interview. 7 March 2019. 174 Japan seeks to work with Australia and New Zealand to oppose Chinese influence.646 Another interlocutor said Japan is sending strong messages about working with others: sending the Izumi air-capable destroyer to Australia for joint exercising in 2019. This deployment showed reassurance to others and deterrence to China.647

The dramatic increase in military sea and air operations around the Senkaku Islands has threatened to overwhelm Japanese capabilities.648 In 2019, Prime Minister Abe accused China of wanting to establish sea control over the South China Sea, where Chinese forces could use expanded power projection capabilities to intimidate regional states.649 Former MSDF Fleet Commander Koda says Chinese aggression against the Senkakus and in the South China Sea has awakened a public response. Its people want to see a change in Chinese behaviour. But he adds: ‘The Senkakus are not the real threat or hotspot: that is in the South China Sea where airbases at Hainan, the Paracels and the Spratleys can threaten others.’ If China builds up these bases, it can deny this whole area to others.650 However, Koda says China could not defend its newly claimed islands in a major conflict. ‘China could not defend itself against swarms of submarine-launched cruise missiles that allied forces could deliver. Missteps in political posturing could bring about this calamity, and, as Koda says, ‘the air, sub-surface and surface capabilities of the MSDF will become more important’ for any coalition involved in these actions.

Michishita says that the US-JMST has been given real weight by Japan building up JSDF capabilities, now with greater strength due to partial relaxation of traditional limits on JSDF use. Notably, the United States is committed to defending Japan, including providing a ‘nuclear umbrella’. However, he adds that the DPRK's introduction of intercontinental missiles that can hit cities on the United States mainland has changed the environment. This new threat could undermine Japanese confidence that the United States would continue to make this commitment, given America's risk.651

646 Japanese Government Official B, private interview. 1 March 2019. 647 Japanese Government Official C, private interview. 1 March 2019. 648 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response: Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea’, 7 June 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html. 649 Shinzō Abe, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012. https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-Shinzō- abe?barrier=accesspaylog 650 Koda. op. cit. 651 Michishita. The U.S.-Japan alliance and the problem of deterrence, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution. 22 February 2018. 175 4.6 Re-interpreting the Japanese Constitution

Article 9 of the US-written Japanese Constitution drawn up by the MacArthur-led occupying forces was quite clear in its intent to deny a future government from resorting to militarism. The critical clause renouncing war is: ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.’652 Successive Japanese governments have re-interpreted this by Cabinet fiat, with legislative impact created by using their numbers in the Diet. This pragmatic approach has allowed for: the establishment of the JSDF; the signing of the US-JMST; and other actions by the Diet. Japanese people have never been directly asked to agree to these proposals by changing the Constitution. Faced with security challenges and doubt over the legitimacy of using the JSDF to meet these challenges, Abe commenced a program of re- interpretation, reform of national security apparatus, and moved to vary the Constitution to give foundational bases for these changes.

4.5.1. Abe Re-interpretation

In May 2007, Abe established an advisory panel to consider Japan’s defence requirements and the right of collective self-defence653The panel returned its recommendation in June 2008 that new legislation that would permit the JSDF to undertake high-priority actions of these activities, but Abe was no longer in office to move on these recommendations.654 When Abe returned to office in late 2012, he reconstituted the ‘Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security’ in February 2013, giving it a wider mandate than the last panel. Abe tasked the panel with assessing the JSDF legitimacy of the JSDF and reviewing new security needs due to Chinese challenges. The panel released its report in May 2014.655 The panel, echoing the previous panel’s findings, said that Article 9 of the Constitution's extant interpretation constrained JSDF employment. 656 Japan needed to significantly re-interpret the Constitution to adapt to new realities.657 The report considered

652 Government of Japan, Prime Minister and Cabinet. Constitution, Chapter II, Article 9. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 653 Smith Sheila, op. cit. p. 139. 654 Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,’ and His Cabinet, June 24, 2008. 655 Sheila A Smith, op. cit. p. 1 656 Clause 2 of Article 9 is the one that could clarify the role of the JSDF to allow it to be a normalised military force. 657 ‘Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,’ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, May 15, 2014, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf 176 that the JSDF could work not only with the US but with other nations’ forces. Shigeru Ishiba, former defence minister and LDP secretary-general in 2014 said: ‘If Japan chooses not to exercise the right of collective self-defence, it will be unable to maintain deterrence and independence. It will be unable to contribute to the peace and stability of the region.’ LDP preference was to move also to a more normative alliance posture in the US-JMST.658

The coming into force on 29 March 2016 of the ‘Legislation of Peace and Security’ was seminal. It allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence partially. Nevertheless, a political consensus arose that the Abe Government could no longer rely on re-interpreting the Constitution. Article Nine needed to be revised to allow normative use of military force in defending Japan from attack.

The Japanese Government introduced fifteen pieces of legislation to effect the Abe cabinet’s re-interpretation of Article 9. Tokyo-based observer Michael Bosack said these changes will allow the JSDF to better respond to contingencies, including using weapons to defend themselves and others (but not in collective self-defence with others). Three conditions must be met: there must be a formal request form another sovereign country for protection; the operation must support Japan's defence; and it cannot take place in a combat area. He added ‘The legislation includes provisions for employing new authorities either in support of or alongside nations other than the United States’. Readers can draw an inference that this includes Australia. He adds Japan ‘will develop operational policy guidance for new security situations, especially those governing support to coalitions and those authorising Collective Self-Defense.’659

Rikki Kersten considers that the recent changes have served to legitimise the SDF. There are still uncertainties relating to collective self-defence, a significant issue as the JSDF is expected to operate with US forces. Majority public support for changing the Constitution will only come if there were a strategic shock such as DPRK missiles hitting the Japanese homeland. Kersten said: ‘The security environment in Japan’s immediate vicinity will drive the constitutional issue.’660

658 Smith S, op cit. pp. 155-6. 659Michael Bosack, Japan’s Security Legislation Turns Two. Tokyo Review, 29 September 2017. https://www.tokyoreview.net/2017/09/japan-peace-security-legislation/ 660 Kersten. op. cit. 177 Bruce Miller considers that Abe has changed the ‘system in a way that will stick’. The Komeito and LDP coalition covers ‘a broad church’, especially given coalition partner Komeito’s pacifist constituency661. Miller thought Abe now considered he had ‘all he needed’ under the re-interpretation of Article 9 to use the JSDF, but ‘they can’t do some things: they still can’t assist allies if there is no threat to Japan’. He adds: ‘The Constitution is a ‘legacy thing’, but if the GOJ changed it, it would become a ‘real Japanese document’’.662

When looking to the future of security reform, domestic issues may slow progress. Suga is viewed by many as less enthusiastic about constitutional reform. ‘He is a realist, so he knows that it’s hard to revise the Constitution,’ said a former Cabinet minister who belonged to the LDP faction led by Shigeru Ishiba, who lost to Suga in the most recent LDP leadership election. ‘He appears to be pretending to make efforts (toward constitutional reform), as it is difficult to tone down the party’s initiative on the issue immediately’ (after Abe stepped down).663 With Abe gone, his goal to achieve normalcy in security matters may well atrophy. Akira Kawamoto, writing on Abe’s political legacy, opined that Suga’s best strategy might well be to go to the voters soon. Winning a general election, rather than just an internal party contest, would give him the popular mandate he needs to chart a bolder course.664 An Australian commentator considers Suga has indicated that his administration may seek opportunities to improve Tokyo’s relations with Beijing but will ‘put defence issues on the back burner’. He considers domestic issues, notably the pandemic and internal party problems, mean that they are more likely to be less ‘focus in such important areas as innovation in Japan’s defence relationships.’ 665 However, writing at the same time in September 2020, Satake considered that the Suga administration would continue to promote FOIP as Japan’s vision for a stable regional order. He said that China will continue to rise, and Japan must cooperate with Indo-Pacific powers such as the United States, India, and

661 The Komeito resumed its role as part of the ruling coalition in 2012 when the LDP won the general election. 662 Miller, op cit. 663 Japan's ruling LDP approves reshuffle of key officials on constitutional reform. Tokyo Times, 30 September 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/30/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-ldp-constitutional- reform/?utm_source=pianoT5&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=295&pnespid=YMMowV2wKmAA_9KBK5QeAl 3vdMpIQJmxTHTD. 664 Akira Kawamoto, ‘Abenomics after Abe’. The Strategist 16 Sep 2020. Kawamoto was former deputy director-general in Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/abenomics-after- abe/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID _7d4484236a6256a081458b251862a7bc&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Abenomics%20after%20Abe 665 Bryce Wakefield, ‘For Japan’s New Prime Minister, Personnel is Policy and Politics’. Australia Outlook, AIIA. 18 September 2020. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/for-japans-new-prime-minister-personnel-is-policy-and-politics/ 178 Australia, and with the EU. This is necessary to manage Japan’s relations with China made more difficult as China continues its military activities in maritime areas near Japan.666

4.5.2. Societal Issues

Abe started to revise Japan’s post-war security posture but was unable to complete the task before his departure from politics in 2020. There were political and societal impediments to achieving Abe’s goal. The New Komeito Party were unwilling to accept the specific changes Abe sought for rewording the two clauses of Article 9. These would have made clear statements on the legitimacy of the JSF and the right to collective self-defence. A public referendum and parliamentary approval are required to ratify the changes. While Abe may have got the necessary parliamentary numbers in both Diet Houses, it would have been challenging to get the required public support. In an annual mail survey conducted by Kyodo News of almost 2,000 adults, only 30 per cent chose to support an option that the SDF’s legitimacy should be clarified with the deletion of the clause proscribing the raising of ‘war potential’. More generally, over 54 per cent said they were opposed to amending the Article while 42 per cent backed its amendment. Jain suggests that the lack of public support is due to societal concerns that ‘regional countries will poorly receive this’ and that the community does not wish to see any (further) legitimisation of the JSDF.’ He observes, the ‘Pacifist Movement is still strong and works to oppose any changes in the JSDF’.667

The Abe cabinet re-interpreted Article 9, and a bill was subsequently passed in both houses on 19 September 2015 to endorse the re-interpretation. The bill was titled ‘The Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People’. It aimed to allow some form of collective exercise of self-defence and legitimise the JSDF’s status. Abe ‘played it down as a simple continuation of Japan’s proactive pacifism’, but it heralded a big step in normalising Japanese security policy.668

As espoused by New Komeito, community views were that the US's extended deterrence, including its ‘nuclear umbrella’, was sufficient for Japan’s defence and security needs. This view had not been shared by governments from both sides who had for a decade or more,

666 Tomohiko Satake, Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision will endure. East Asia Forum, 19 September 2020. https://www.East Asiaforum.org/2020/09/19/japans-indo-pacific-vision-will-endure/ 667 Purnendra Jain, Professor of Asian Studies, University of Adelaide, private interview. 19 May 2020. 668Michal Kolmaš, ‘Japan’s Security and the South Sudan Engagement: Internal and External Constraints on Japanese Military Rise Reconsidered.’ Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 13, no. 1: 61–85. 179 practised hedging and balancing. Hedging included engaging with others in the region, including Australia and India. Jain considers that when Abe realised that he was unable to gain the necessary public support to effect changing the Constitution, he embarked on building ‘a new security network with Australia, India and the ASEANS in an incremental process leading to some form of network that will allow for collective security action.’ His advocacy for the FOIP and the QUAD is evidence of this view.669

Akihiro Ogawa considers that Japanese people, ‘both revisionists and anti-revisionists, need to jointly develop a clear vision on how to transform the ideology of Article 9’ into a consensus that will allow Japan to contribute to ‘international efforts toward peace’.670 Iwasaki considers that although only half of the population supports a change, this sentiment will increase in time. He considers that community engagement is essential, and the academic community should take a lead on this.671

However, it may be that any further pushing of the security agenda will expend too much political capital and the LDP may be unwilling to do this. In any event, domestic issues have put defence and security reform aside for some time, unless a strategic shock occurs.

4.5.3. Role and legitimacy of SDF

Despite objections from some legal scholars, the Government has maintained its position that the JSDF is ‘constitutional’ and that re-interpretation means that Japan can build the ‘minimum necessary’ capability to defend itself.672 But the re-interpretation did not go far enough for Abe. For some time until a year before his departure, he sought to change Article 9 to stop further argument that Japan’s forces were ‘unconstitutional.’673

British Japan scholar, Christopher Hughes says the recent re-interpretations give the JSDF real capacity to engage in defence of Japan. Japan is now prepared to engage in collective self-defence. He considers Abe tried to make a formal change because he believes his

669 Jain, op. cit. 670 Akihiro Ogawa, Peace, a Contested Identity: Japan’s Constitutional Revision and Grassroots Peace Movements. Peace & Change: A Journal of Peace Research 36 (3): 373-399. July 2011. 671 Iwasaki, op cit. 672 JSDF defence posture focuses on defensive operations with allied US forces providing an offensive a strike capability. The relationship is one ‘complementary mission-sharing’: a ‘spear and shield’relationship. 673 Japan Times. 11 April 2019. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/11/national/politics-diplomacy/poll-shows- 54-oppose-revision-japans-pacifist-constitution/#.Xl85Hy1L1Bx 180 security legacy is at risk, but this may only be symbolic because Japan has everything it needs now (in terms of its legitimacy the SDF). Hughes thinks ‘the changing international security environment and growing acceptance of the indivisibility of US-Japan security interests, coupled with hollow domestic legal, political, and bureaucratic constraints, heighten the likelihood Japan will use force to assist the United States.’ He adds that changes enable the JSDF to support the United States properly and even third countries.’674

Others doubt the adequacy of re-interpretation and legislative changes made. Michishita says ‘there is a gap between the elites and the people with the elites believing that the 2013 re-interpretation of the Constitution was sufficient.’ He observes ‘security specialists say that nothing more is needed.’ 675 Military and other commentators disagree.676 Hosoya considers the JASDF cannot protect itself under the new re-interpretation of Article Nine of the Constitution. 677 Koda said: ‘the current re-interpretation does allow some deployments of the JSDF and includes some level of collective self-defence’ but wishes to see more clarity. He thought that there was flexibility in the new legal framework addressing the possibility of countering contingencies on the Korean peninsula and in Taiwan. However, he believed that there must still be changes made to allow the JSDF to work with the United States under the US-JMST and ‘allow the JSDF to assume responsibility for its defence’. Koda accepts that the Japanese people will be uncomfortable over these additions, especially any that would allow for pre-emptive action in the future. Koda considered that, if the JSDF had clear responsibility for Japanese defence, it ‘could engage in any contingency on the Korean peninsula and be able to assist Australia in its defence.’ 678

Sheila Smith considers that re-interpretation is permitting significant changes in the missions and JSDF capabilities. She notes that, despite public reluctance to use force in Japan’s defence, ‘there is far greater interest in ensuring that Japan’s military is ready and able to defend the country and actively deter aggression by Japan’s neighbours’.679

674 Christopher W. Hughes. ‘Japan’s Strategic Trajectory and Collective Self-Defense: Essential Continuity or Radical Shift?’ The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 43, Number 1, Winter 2017, p. 93 675 Michishita. op. cit. 676 Amendment of the second clause relating to that proscribes the maintenance of forces could clarify the JSDF role and allow it to be a normalised military force. 677 Hosoya, op. cit. 678 Koda, op. cit. 679 Smith, Sheila A. op. cit. p171. 181 Jain suggests that the Japanese Ministry of Defence still seeks more clarification on the legitimacy of the JSDF. However, he considers a consensus exists that the JSDF ‘can do now all it needs to do to defend Japanese territory and dispatch JSDF people overseas.’ He believes that ‘further changes can be made by re-interpretation and declarations made by the Cabinet.’680

The Abe Government suggested fifteen scenarios which became prototypes of Japan’s Peace and Security Legislation, enacted 19 September, in force on 29 March 2019. These laws allow the country to exercise the right of collective self-defence partially.681 Academic Shingo Masunaga opined that the new interpretation of collective defence can exercise the right ‘when attacks are made on Japan or Japan’s friendly nation and in case of an imminent threat to Japanese citizens.’682

The central thrust of changes to laws related to JSDF employment centre on the concept that there must be a threat to Japanese sovereignty, but there is ambiguity over where this is restricted to attacks on Japanese territory, or broader and more geographically dispersed threats. 683 The re-interpretation thrust made it clear how Japan could work with other countries. For example, Japan could interpret military action in Taiwan or Korea as threatening Japanese interests. The JSDF could then collaborate with US forces to counter this threat. Extending this example, the JSDF could join foreign forces responding militarily to the same regional crisis, as Australia might do. Arguably, if Australia were reacting to this regional instability that Japan interpreted as a threat to its sovereignty and national interests, Japan would cooperate with Australia.684

The most recent (2018) Japanese Defence White Paper describes how Article 95-2 of the JSDF Act, enacted in the Peace and Security Legislation, allows the JSDF to protect other nations' assets in actions that do not amount to an armed attack (that is, collective self- defence is not activated).685 The armed forces of other foreign countries in 95-2 need to be listed explicitly to the Diet, and this is the step that the JSDF sees as enabling better coalition operations. The July 2014 Cabinet decision was clear in terms of the use of force by the

680 Jain, op.cit.

682 Shingo Masunaga, Possibility of Asian NATO from Japanese perspective. Conference Paper. ‘Possibility of Asian NATO from Japanese Perspective’, Tallinn University. pp. 1, 6. 683 ‘Use of force’ to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. See Cabinet decision made 1 July I 2014. 684 Japanese Government Official C, private interview. 28 February 2019. 685 See Defence of Japan 2018 (p. 257 and 266-67) 182 JSDF. It said, ‘in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against a foreign country occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to Japan.’

Abe’s new scenarios provided the domestic constituency with justification for his reform program. They were indicative, but not comprehensive. There is still ambiguity, perhaps deliberate, over how the JSDF can, or may be used. An American academic made a case study in 2019 on how these new arrangements could be used to allow the use of the JSDF. She examined the legality of possible JSDF Deployments under the new laws. Japan may only deploy its JSDF where there is a specific statutory legal authority in a statute such as the JSDF Act. However, these provisions often have significant caveats and unless resolved have superordinacy over international law and any UNSC Resolution authorising a possible JSDF deployment. An example of an authority that might allow escort operations is in Article 95-2 of the JSDF Act, which enables the MSDF to escort US military vessels, a process that the MSSF undertakes now. Effinowicz speaks of a 2018 example of such a deployment. The MSDF gave ‘asset protection’ to the US Fleet (USS Carl Vinson strike group ex-San Diego), conducting ‘joint drills’ in exercises near Japan.686 The Abe cabinet sent the Japanese destroyer Izumo, the largest of the MSDF’s helicopter-capable ships, to join the US strike force. 687 Effinowicz considered that MSDF was part of the US Seventh Fleet when deployed and conducted exercises in the South China Sea.688 While it is unlikely that the MSDF was operating under operational command of the US, it is likely that operational control may have been given.689 Nevertheless, the optics of such a combined deployment were not lost of the DPRK or China.

4.5.3. Factors contributing to the evolution of the A-JDSR

Before looking at the future of the A-JDSR in the next two chapters, it will be useful at this point to explain more clearly the extent to which individual factors have contributed to the

686 Smith, S. op cit. p. 160. 687 U.S. aircraft carrier and MSDF helicopter destroyer conduct joint exercises in disputed South China Sea. The Japan Times, 13 March 2018. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/13/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/u- s-aircraft-carrier-msdf-helicopter-destroyer-conduct-joint-exercises-disputed-south-china-sea/ 688 Smith, S. ibid. p. 160. 689 Operational command of a military unit in this example is the authority given to allow another authority complete authority over the military to achieve a military outcome. It is akin to transferring ownership of an asset. Operational control is authority to direct a military unit to perform specified tasks in a specified area for a specified reason. 183 evolution of the relationship. Drawing on this and previous Chapters, this section seeks to summarise these factors and their relative importance by discussing in this order: systemic factors; government-level policymaking; and specific actions last.

The overall relationship grew out of shared benefits from trade, initially minerals one way, manufactures the other. But after the end of the Cold War and the move from a well-defined bipolar world, through an unstable unipolar one, to the uncertainties of a multipolar world, both countries now face unwelcome challenges and the rise or re-rise of authoritarian states. The largest systemic factor is now the emergence of a new hegemon and the challenge this creates for world order. Prior to 2015, the developed world was content to see China lift itself from poverty, but more recently, an aggressive approach has been observed, and while the United States does not seek war it nevertheless does not wish to see the balance-of- power shifted from itself. This chapter has shown that both Japan and Australia do not wish to ‘contain China’, but they do expect China to act with respect for others. From the 1990s to the present both Japan and Australia have considered that the rise of China has shaped their actions in coming together, initially through careful watching, to expressing more vocally their concerns over China’s actions. This steady rise in concern has been a fundamental driver of the need for Australia and Japan to work closely together to align their security postures and to make military interoperability a priority.

Government policymaking over this same period has moved from separate declaration of security purpose in the early 1990s, through the establishment of secret three-way dialogue and the establishment of the TSD, to the 2007 JDSC. The 1990s saw both countries profess a need to seek ‘strategic stability’. A foray into multilateralism with both supporting the creation of regional fora was a necessary policy step, given that neither was prepared to risk criticism from China—the reason the TSD was first conducted in secret. The 2007 JDSC was the seminal policy change for the A-JDSR. While it spoke only of cooperation on ‘non- traditional coordination’ it provided the policy cover for a gradual increase in military cooperation. As the expected benefits that might have come from the development of multilateralism and regional security fora such as the ARF did not eventuate, both countries moved inexorably closer together though post-2007 JDSC declarations as the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper that declared Japan was a ‘key strategic player’. The United States and Australia endorsed the FOIP espoused by Japan as the basis for resisting Chinese expansionism but implemented their own policies in differing manners.

184 Nevertheless, these three prominent democracies declared that trade freedom, improving prosperity, and managing security issues was a uniting factor. The A-JDSR was a beneficiary of these actions.

Specific actions have accrued from these systemic and policy bases. Key among these have been the agreements that followed on the heels of the JDSC. The ACSA, first agreed to by Prime Minister Rudd in August 2008 not only cemented the bipartisanship support for the A-JDSR but marked the first time Japan had agreed to support another country’s military – with Japan’s only ally, the United States enjoying this privilege. The cross-servicing agreement has been updated five time, with a 2017 amendment to allow for exchange of ammunition—a strange outcome if the original policy agreement was only for non- traditional military cooperation. The ACSA will soon be supplemented by the RAA, an agreement that will address legal and territorial aspects of military forces operating in and from each other’s country. While the imperative to effect changes through Japanese legislation has been slower than Australia would wish, there seems to be political will on the Japanese side to complete these changes. Meanwhile, specific actions such as the doubling of defence representation from both sides over the past few years, and the steadily increasing level of military engagement and development of interoperability has ‘put the flesh’ over the bones of the A-JDSR created by systemic and policy foundations. All is in place to take the ‘virtual-alliance’ to the next stage—if that is what both governments wish to do.

4.7 Summary

The A-JDSR stands on a political and security crossroad. It has matured from antipathy to the status of a ‘virtual alliance’. Both countries’ armed forces can now build on a nascent capacity for interoperability in conflict should that be the sovereign nations' choice that command them. The world faces challenges to its peace and stability not seen since that time in the 1930s when rampant nationalism, nativism, economic disadvantage, and isolationism descended into the cataclysm of the Second World War. With national governments distracted by the coronavirus and the economic threat shutdowns bring, there must be a concerted global effort to face new security challenges brought about by a rising China. In concert with a hopefully outwards-looking United States, Japan and Australia

185 with strong economies and effective defence forces can provide the leadership necessary to rally ‘like-minded nations’ to meet these challenges.

The alliance system on which Japan and Australia rely is under tension. Now the past isolationist Trump Administration has gone, the threat of rupture seems less likely under a more alliance-friendly Biden Administration. Regional nations are under intense pressure from tensions created by the US-China economic, political and security struggle. There are considerable challenges to public health and economic survival from the 2020 pandemic. Henry Kissinger notes that his country is divided and efficient, and ‘farsighted government is necessary to overcome obstacles unprecedented in magnitude and global scope.’690 These obstacles will be a big task for Biden and his Cabinet.

For Australia, the economic boom may be coming to an end as pressure comes for decoupling the global economy into opposing camps. Greg Sheridan says that: ‘The shuddering crisis in Australia/China relations this week [September 2020], the worst since the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, bears one clear message. Beijing will not allow Australia to continue to grow rich from its relationship with China unless we conform our strategic and political personality to Beijing’s wishes.’691 For Japan, under past and perhaps future pressure from the US to do more for its defence, and faced a threatening China, hedging with Australia and building closer relations with Southeast Asia economic partners makes sense. But instability due to PM Abe's departure, the COVID-19 pandemic and poor economic performance, and an economy reliant on international trade makes reliance for Japan on other nations a necessity.

Dibb notes that the ‘US failure to provide leadership in the current pandemic crisis has resulted in other nations losing confidence in the US’.692 Australia’s security hedge with Japan by itself will not provide the level of security that ANZUS provides. However, the A-JDSR can provide a North-South anchor that, given leadership by both Japan and Australia can accrete other like-minded countries to join in an informal, if not ad hoc alignment that can provide collective security resilience. ASPI’s Le Thu said: ‘we do not

690 Henry Kissinger, The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order. Wall Street Journal. 21 April 2020. 691 Greg Sheridan, ‘China crisis an unavoidable test of Australia’s resolve.’ The Australian 12 September 2020. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/china-crisis-an-unavoidable-test-of-australias-resolve/news- story/fbdc505aefe2dc98c3c68e217459769a 692 Covid-19 crisis has big geopolitical implications for Australia. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/covid-19-crisis-has-big-geopolitical-implications-for-australia/ 186 need a new security architecture, we need to make the current ones work,’ echoing Foreign Minister Payne’s comments after the 2020 AUSMIN talks. Le Thu added that we need to choose what regional multilateral organisation can be reformed and encouraged to provide the necessary security outcomes. Her view was that although ASEAN frameworks were not capable, due division, of delivering, Australia must still engage the ASEAN countries and others in the region ‘especially post-COVID19 when some countries will be left in a weaker state.’693 Some commentators labelled aggressive speeches from the Trump Administration in mid-2020 as heralding a new Cold war. However, in a seminal speech, then-Secretary of State Pompeo laid out the Western alliance challenge in accommodating China's rise. In July 2020 he said that the free world ‘must induce China to change in more creative and assertive ways because Beijing’s actions threaten our people and our prosperity’ adding that if the free world doesn’t change China will surely change it. There can be no return to the status quo ante.694

The next chapter looks at alliances and alignments and draws on this chapter to suggest how the A-JDSR may develop in the future. Both Australia and Japan have enhanced their security by widening their formalised defence and security arrangements by creating a series of less formal agreements, documented publicly and not-publicly. These new ‘hedging’ and ‘accommodating’ strategies supplement extant treaties as post-Cold War certainties give way to new challenges.

693 Huong Le Thu, ASPI in answer to question by author on prospects of a new security architecture in region). VTC. Launch of ASPI publication ‘After Covid-19: Australia and the world rebuild’. 7 May 2020. 694 Communist China and the Free World’s Future. Secretary Pompeo speaking at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. 23 July 2020. https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ 187 Chapter Five

Research Findings on the A-JDSR

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the results of the interviews conducted as primary research for this thesis. The findings are consistent across all responders in terms of support for the past and present conduct of the A-JDSR. There was a bifurcation of responses over future actions that could be taken, but all considered the relationship is useful in contributing to security of both nations and the region and needs to be closer.

Findings from original and secondary research indicate that the history of the A-JDSR shows that it has become a virtual alliance. From the original research, all four cohorts of interviewees affirm that a formal military alliance with reciprocity and threat identification is not preferred because of Chinese responses and alliance entrapment. But there is consensus across cohorts for a closer A-JDSR, but no consensus on what form that ‘closeness’ might take. The thesis proposes that the current nature and tempo or engagement within the A-JDSR constitutes an intra-alliance within bi-lateral alliance and tri-lateral A- J-US TSD and QUAD dialogues.

5.1.1. Overview

The next two chapters examine the adequacy of current regional security arrangements, discuss an alliance option for enhancement and propose a new pragmatic collective security arrangement to meet 21st Century challenges for Indo-Pacific security. They answer the main research question posed at the beginning of this thesis—what is the future trajectory of the A-JDSR? Could it become a formal alliance or some other form of security alignment, perhaps within a new broader framework? Will the A-JDSR be developed as part of a new security arrangement to balance Chinese pressure in the region? Conclusions will be based on preceding argument in this thesis and inferences drawn from research responses.

188 This chapter examines whether an alliance is the optimal next enhancement for the A-JDSR, or whether some other form of mutual agreement is a better option. It does so by examining the benefits of a more formalised A-JSDR in the context of the military power model discussed earlier in this thesis. It concludes that the current state of the A-JDSR is sub- optimal and increases the risk of regional conflict. Chapter 6 reviews extant alliances and formal associations involving Australia and Japan and discusses whether extant mini-and multilateral constructs are optimal for bi-lateral and regional security. It concludes that the status quo is inadequate and, based on the analytical history of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and the inputs of 94 practitioners, proposes a pragmatic and more nuanced option for the future of the A-JDSR. Chapter 6 includes a summary and reprise of conclusions.

The qualitative ethnographic research taken is a significant input to culminating conclusions. The presentation and analysis of the experiences, views, and insights of 94 security practitioners in this research represent a unique contribution to this thesis on the A- JDSR. This representative qualitative survey reflects the views, collectively and singularly, of past and present defence and security practitioners at the highest levels in Australian, Chinese, and Japanese academe, government, defence, foreign affairs, and research institutions. The collection and analysis of their experiences and insights constitute a significant contribution to the literature.

The chapter makes the case that the extant multinational organisations with a regional security role have the appetite or ability to meet security challenges from China, Russia, and the DPRK. Through empirical research, this thesis shows that the status quo architecture is unable to meet those challenges. This demonstration has two parts. First, Australia and Japan have formally declared the current A-JDSR to be a declaration based on non-traditional, i.e., not military, cooperation. It is sub-optimal if it is to be used for any form of collective security action. If, as it states, it is only to be used for humanitarian activities and disaster relief there is no need for the current conduct of activities or to pursue interoperability between the ADF and JDSF in a program that can only be described as precursor to collective military action. Second, the extant multilateral organisations have been unwilling, for reasons explained in the next chapter, to be able to address challenges to regional security. Examples of these challenges are: Chinese economic coercion and aggressiveness in the militarisation of the western Pacific and moves against Hong Kong and Taiwan; Russian extra-territorial incursions in the Ukraine and in and over the seas

189 west of Japan; and North Korean ballistic missiles threats against its neighbours. Empirical bases for these assertions are drawn from the interviews underpinnings this thesis.

The following brief discussion on the theoretical and practical bases of alignments between nations sets the scene for culminating discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of options for the future of the A-JDSR.

5.1.2. Current view of A-JDSR

The Japanese and Australian Governments elevated the A-J relationship in 2012 to be a ‘Special Strategic Partnership’.695 Such partnership relationships (not always only bilateral) enable governments to define and declare areas of bilateral cooperation. They also help the partners better contribute to regional multilateral organizations by supporting positions that have already reached agreement. Strategic partnerships can aim for ambiguity, exemplified by the implied but not explicit criticism of China in the informal QUAD four-member partnership grouping.

The A-JDSR moved forward after the 2007 JDSC Agreement, moving through implementing multiple confidence-building measures, and is now attempting to tackle more challenging issues. Wilkins as an interviewee said that more could be done in the A-JDSR to build this special strategic relationship in a spirit of pragmatism and ‘plausible deniability’.696 In other words, ‘Doing without saying’ as past Ambassador Miller has said. As shown in earlier Chapters, new outcomes continue to be achieved ‘behind the scenes.’

Australia and Japan have strategic relationships with almost every country in the United Nations, but few are classed ‘special’. The A-JDSR is an exception, being declared to be a ‘special strategic relationship.697 Interestingly, DFAT has no hierarchical list of definitions for relationships with other countries and uses unpublished criteria to accept definitions proposed by or to its national interlocutor on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. However, the PRC does have a list of published definitions, considering that ‘strategic partner’ (a term Australia uses for China) includes cooperating ‘in the military, strategic and international arena.’

695Australia-Japan bilateral relationship. DFAT website. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/Pages/australia-japan-bilateral-relationship#strategicpartnership 696 Thomas Wilkins, Senior Research Fellow JIIA, 29 October 2020. 697 Joint Communique, Sixth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations. 22 November 2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000112906.pdf 190 China considers its shares with Japan a ‘strategic relationship of mutual benefit’. In contrast, according to the same source, Australia shares with the United Kingdom and 52 other countries a relationship with China titled ‘Comprehensive strategic partnership’, which includes cooperation ‘in all aspects of strategy.’698

5.2. Analyses of Original Research Findings

5.2.1. Findings of formalisation issue – summary analysis

The candidate interviewed 94 serving and retired security practitioners and academics in Australia, Japan, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom, most face-to-face, some electronically. He interviewed a small percentage of these to seek only their views on specific issues such as the submarine proposal (see section 3.5) and United Nations Command (Rear) (see section 3.5). Not all commented on all questions asked. This left 81 responders who touched on alliance issues, with 27 directly commenting on the prospect of a more formalised A-JDSR—but not necessarily a formal alliance. Nine of the 27 who offered an opinion of a more formal A-JSR prospect agreed they wanted to see a more formalised A-JDSR, some explicitly stating this should be a traditional alliance. None of these nine considered that this should be a traditional alliance with reciprocity and identified threats.

Almost everyone considered the A-JDSR should become closer. Many considered that increasing Chinese pressure would prompt that closer A-JDSR. This thesis proposes that the alignment represented by the A-JDSR will become some form of alliance, but short of a formal alliance.

Looking at responses by cohort, none of the academics and government and foreign affairs officials who offered a view on formalisation considered that a formal alliance was appropriate. This result contrasted with half in the defence and military cohort and all in the research institutions cohort who considered that an alliance was needed. This is to be expected and reflects the gap between theory and practice mentioned earlier: those in the defence and military cohort are, or were, charged with the responsibility to prepare and

698 PRC Bilateral Relations press release. February 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/ 191 conduct military responses to security challenges in the event of failure of diplomatic options. A relationship formalised by political action such as a formalised declaration can more easily form a basis and necessary precursor for military planning.

5.2.2. Interviewees Data

The candidate sought responders’ views of the A-JDSR evolving into a more formalised structure.699 A central question in the questionnaire sent to all potential interviewees related to the prospect of the future of the A-JDSR—this is analysed in this section and shown in Table 5.4 below. The ‘formalisation’ question (number 11 in the list of attached questions) was couched in general terms to elicit a discursive answer:

Do you think that the relationship could go as far as a formalised security relationship between Australia and Japan? If not, how far might the current level of cooperation go?

Neither the term alliance nor any definition of the term alliance was offered to interviewees in the requests for interview offered to them, but many responders, especially those providing a focused answer inferred that the term alliance reflected a ‘traditional alliance’, perhaps with the inclusion of threat identification and mutual reciprocity.

There was a wide spectrum of responses ranging from no formal prospect of an alliance through to strong support for a formal alliance. A summary analysis of those interviewees who responded to direct questions follows. The gist of the questions in thesis research related to the locus of security relationship. That is, can the A-JDSR develop into a formalised security relationship, and how far might that go?

Responses are summarised below, grouped into broad cohorts defining current or past positions within the national security community. The candidate used interviewees’ experiences as bases for cohort selection and this allowed for a grouping of views within that cohort based on their major lifetime experiences. For example, some working in research institutions were included in the defence and military cohort as their work experiences were largely within previous military and defence roles. Nevertheless, concluding inferences for the thesis were based on totals aggregated across the cohorts.

699 Analysis in this section does not address anything taken from the literature or sources other than interviews. 192 Some chose to answer directly—most chose to speak discursively—across the 12 questions posed to them. This discursiveness allowed freedom of expression but did not facilitate quantitative aggregation or analysis. Interviewees’ interests, experiences, and current and past appointments guided their answers. For limited quantitative analysis (see Table 5.1), the candidate inferred binary support or not for formalisation from the textual response of those who offered an opinion on the A-JDSR. Interviews with those of direct involvement in the A-JDSR were asked to recount their experiences with the development of the A- JDSR, especially during periods of service in Japan, and to also respond to specific questions about the future of the A-JDSR. Those with indirect involvement, such as academics and think tank experts, were asked their views on the future of the A-JDSR.

Responders identified two elements that would preclude the A-JDSR from becoming an alliance. These were fear of Chinese criticism or adverse response and the traditional fear of alliance entrapment. Many interviewees mentioned China, and some addressed the entrapment issue. Few supported a traditional military alliance with an identified threat and mutuality of response, although most supported closer security and military alignment between Japan and Australia. Demonstrated ‘pushback’ actions by the Morrison government have recently shown that the Australian government is prepared to no longer avoid Chinese criticism as it defends Australia’s interests. However, many responders felt that China may still make more robust representations or take further economic or other action if there were further formalisation of the A-JDSR.

Responses are examined qualitatively in following sub-sections. Table 5.1 presents a limited quantitative view of responses.

Table 5.1 – analysis of responses to question of further A-JDSR formalisation

Opinion Favouring A-JDSR Cohort Number offered on Formalisation (as a formalisation percentage of those offering an opinion Academia 13 5 0% (0) Government/Foreign Affairs 18 8 0% (0) Defence & military 46 11 64% (7) Research Institutions 5 5 50% (2) Total 81 27 33% (9)

193 5.2.3. Research Results by Groups

Without exception, every interviewee considered that the A-JDSR was useful, with a large majority expressing interest in seeing it grow closer. Many interviewees declined to answer the formalisation question directly but provided qualified and discursive replies, giving a spectrum of nuanced qualitative responses.700 Current government employees were reticent to offer a personal response to a direct question and spoke in general terms, and ‘for background only’. Some expressed a lack of qualification in specific areas.701

Many mentioned their view of an alliance was that of a traditional alliance. Some were reluctant to see the A-JDSR move beyond current arrangements, noting that it has enough formality. For some, moving further with formal structures would legitimise others’ fears, with many mentioning China. All saw Australia as a most important security partner for Japan, second only after the US. Most noted that Australia wants to enhance its cooperation with Japan, although a few considered that the A-JDSR was more important to Japan than vice versa.

The academic and government, and foreign affairs responders as a group of two cohorts thought that the A-JDSR would become a stronger strategic relationship but not an alliance as this meant to many, a traditional alliance). The defence and military, and research institution responders were more likely to encourage more formalisation in the A-JDSR.

In summary, a clear conclusion was that the A-JDSR should not become a traditional alliance. However, there was strong support for further close interactive cooperation, likely within a formalised structure, being essential for regional, if not global, security. Specific insights and analyses by cohorts follow.

5.2.4. Academe

Academics did not favour a traditional alliance but were supportive of any closer cooperation between Australia and Japan that improved regional security. There was

700 To stimulate free expression, interviewees were invited to speak discursively with no prompting. 701 Many interviewees were approached for interview based on the researcher’s knowledge of their specific experiences and backgrounds across the breadth of the security relationship and many did not offer specific responses to all questions. 194 recognition that Australia and Japan were hedging their respective bi-lateral alliances with the United States with some form of security alignment or enabling security relationship. There was a view that Japan, through its FOIP vision and a concentrated diplomatic program of external security coordination,702 was already underway building a consortium of like- minded middle-powers to support the rules-based global order.703 It may be assumed that Australia was doing the same.

Most academics interviewed were uncomfortable with discussing even the concept of a traditional alliance. Indeed, some were wary of the Japanese use of the term ‘quasi alliance’ considering that Japan could not provide Australia with a mutual defence commitment.704 However, there are a range of alignments other than a traditional alliance. Strategic relationships are a form of alignments on a spectrum ranging from trading partnerships to traditional alliances (see Chapter 1).

There was a view that the A-JDSR could be regarded as an intra-alliance relationship within the US-led alliance network construct. The A-JDSR is currently flagged by the Australian and Japanese governments as a ‘special strategic partnership’. Some interviewees in Japan referred to it as a ‘quasi alliance’. In interview, Australian Northeast Asian academic, Rikki Kersten says that some in Japan consider that the word ‘alliance’ could be attached to A- JDSR in the context of ‘a sub-alliance network with high levels of interoperability’. It is, in other words, one step below that which Japan has with the United States. She considers that a ‘strategic alliance-type relationship is possible because Japan feels even more exposed recently and perhaps isolated, with bad relations with both the United States (the Host Nation Support funding issue and the threat of US withdrawal of support for allies) and being threatened by others. She adds that a first step in a closer alignment process is already underway, with both Australia and Japan ‘maximising the utility of the A-JDSR as an integral and important input into ANZUS and the USJMST.’ Subsequent steps would involve, in a hedging process, building a ‘solid security arrangement with others not in an alliance with the United States’, noting that is the basis of the declared FOIP policy of both the US and Japan. She adds that if there is increasing decoupling in the region by the US at the political level, ‘we will head towards an alliance-type relationship with Japan’.705 This

702 Medcalf, op.cit. 703 Nagy, op.cit. 704 Medcalf, op.cit. 705 Kersten, op. cit. 195 view articulates what others in this survey a also described—an intra-alliance relationship within the US-led alliance network construct.

British Japanese academic Chris Hughes says that the A-JDSR is a place where it is ‘really happening’, considering that it allows Japan to hedge outside the US-JMST whilst simultaneously enabling it to be a better partner in its alliance with the United States.706 Wilkins believed that the A-JDSR was a ‘latent alliance’ as all elements to enable an alliance are in place.707 So, leaving nomenclative pedantry aside, this cohort describes the A-JDSR with emphases on theoretical explanations as an alignment between Australia and Japan that facilitates cooperative action. The cohort consensus stops short of describing it as the basis for collective military action, a position at odds with the actual state and recent development of combined military activity in the A-JDSR.

There was a view that Japan, through its FOIP vision and a concentrated diplomatic program of external security coordination, was already underway building a consortium of like- minded middle-powers who act in a normative manner supporting the rules-based global order.708 There is also evidence that hedging outside formal alliances is underway. An example is Japan’s call for countries like Australia and other Indo-Pacific nations to join it in building through the FOIP support for regional security in a multilateral manner outside the traditional alliance structure. Dibb said that Japan has moved to develop a sense of ‘strategic independence beyond its traditional ties with the United States’. Concurrently, Australia had built a ‘role as a prominent regional security player’ outside its normal influence area. However, Dibb dismisses a mutual security treaty or formal alliance, as neither country is ready for ‘that sort of commitment.709 White considered there was no ‘scope for a formal alliance but suggested there is scope for something of lesser impact’. He noted there was a strong alignment of values with Japan but ‘no real strategic alignment strong enough for us to go to war.’ He did add that, were the United States to limit its security guarantees to allies, then an alliance was possible. He added. that both countries were hoping to rely on the continuance of the status quo and US dominance in the IP. But if there were significant US pushback against China hegemony, ‘a credible case could be

706 Christopher Hughes, Professor of Japanese Studies, Warwick University, private interview. 13 November 2019. 707 Wilkins, interview, op. cit. 708 Nagy, op.cit. 709 Paul Dibb, Australia’s Security Relationship with Japan: How much further can it go? SDSC Working Paper No 407 April 2008. (Given as a public speech in Japan on 8 and 9 April 2008). 196 made for creating ‘the third leg of an alliance’’. However, there would need to be a threshold event—for example, a crisis in the Taiwan Straits.

Addressing the balance of power struggle, Medcalf considers that there is ‘a third way to US dominance or Chinese future of the IP’ with the possible arising of a ‘balanced construct’. Still, in the short term, there will be varying forms of confrontations. Australia needs to chart its own course, acting in its own interests as these big issues work out.’710 He amplifies these comments in a recent publication, noting that security and defence is the most remarkable pillar of Australia-Japan diplomacy. He added that the Australian and Japanese security establishments are close and getting closer in policy, intelligence, military capabilities, and operations. ‘It won’t be a formal alliance, though our parallel bonds with the US provide an extra layer of interoperability and trust.’ 711

Overall, there was significant support for the A-JDSR, with a consistent theme emerging of a strategic relationship based on developing linkages between regional nodes of the ‘hub- and-spoke’ system. These nodes anchor the A-JDSR into being an ‘integral and important input’ into the separate alliances each country has with the United States, helping to keep it closely engaged in the IP. The establishment of north and south nodes allows other countries not in alliance with the United States to be part of a more comprehensive grouping of like- minded states, giving substance to implementing the FOIP vision. Sargeant, reflecting a thread in the security literature, said that Australia develops closer relations with Japan to enable it to influence the outcome of Northeast Asian security.’712 Medcalf echoed this view of further cooperation, opining that this was driven by Chinese pressure: ‘the more China opposes, the more likely it is for Australia and Japan to work together.’713

While there was no support for a traditional alliance, there was scope for another form of formalisation that would allow the A-JDSR to reach a potential beneficial to security in the Indo-Pacific and achieve a considered balance in the economic power struggle.

710 Medcalf, interview, op. cit. 711 Japan under Abe is a leader again AFR 11 July 2020. Rory Medcalf. 712 Sergeant, op.cit. 713 Medcalf, interview, op.cit. 197 5.2.5. Government & Foreign policy cohort

There was no support for a formal alliance in the A-JDSR among government and foreign policy survey participants. However, it was supportive of closer cooperation that improved regional security. These was ad hoc recognition that the A-JDSR was a model of cooperation that should be emulated by others and that it was successful in keeping the United States engaged in the region and balancing China’s ascendant power. This rise of Chinese power would determine how relationships would develop, and there was support for a more formalised consultative agreement between Australia and Japan if this occurred.

Responses from this cohort, as expected, reflected a diplomat’s view of the A-JDSR. Australian current and past foreign affairs officials did consider that the A-JDSR was a bilateral relations template that Australia could build with other countries.714 Nevertheless, an overriding imperative was that there was no prospect of a formal alliance with Japan due to the constraint of the Japanese constitution. However, there was some support for formalising a triangular relationship under the A-J-US TSD.715 There was also an indication that diplomatic action was already underway at formal and Track 2 levels to build a consensus of like-minded countries to increase cooperative action in the near region.716 Thawley considered that the A-JDSR could move closer to something like an alliance, perhaps mirroring the 1996 Indonesia-Australia Security Agreement.717 Prime Minister Howard favoured bilateral relationships such as the A-JDSR, saying ‘these are the key, not necessarily [the] multilateral’. Howard also said that, as China was ‘becoming ‘infinitely more belligerent’ Australia, as well as India and others, need to do more to develop our relationships.’718

Ambassador Bruce Miller considered that a pragmatic approach to formalising regional security structures was very much consonant with Japanese thinking (日本の考え方 nihon no kangaekata), embedding ‘the Japanese concept of ‘doing without saying’, noting that ‘actions speak louder than words’’.719 Others supported this pragmatic view, suggesting that

714 Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister 1988-96, private interview. 5 August 2020. 715 John McCarthy, op.cit. 716 Australian Government Official F, interview by author, 16 June 2019. 717 Thawley drafted the Indonesia-Australia Security Agreement, negotiated in secret by the Keating Government. It provided for both countries to meet to discuss adverse challenges. The agreement included no threat identification or response commitment. Thawley, op.cit 718 Howard, op.cit 719 Miller, op.cit 198 Australia, Japan and the United States should work together in a construct that had a component of ‘plausible deniability’.720 Miller considered that Australia and Japan are taking a supportable path, embedding ‘all forms of cooperation, without necessarily having the high-level statements [as this is counter-productive].’ He cautioned, though, that this takes effort on both sides, saying ‘We do need to keep up our strategic signalling, to ‘build the sinews’ of the relationship and by doing so demonstrate without fanfare to the region we are connected, and ‘let others draw their conclusions.’721

Past Ambassador to China, Ric Smith says that following a western line of thinking would lead us to inexorably assume that a ‘straight-line projection of China’s progress’ will lead to economic dominance. Smith cautions that ‘we should fear China’s failure, rather than its success because that would be catastrophic.’722

Geo-political reasons are driving Japan and Australia to build a close strategic partnership. A Japanese interviewee spoke of a ‘special strategic partnership’ in the A-JDSR, which was effectively ‘a framework in place’ marked by political and military cooperation.723 Other responders considered Japan, Australia, and the US could work together on any US-led coalition response to a regional contingency in the region.724 However, even with recent changes to JSDF employment, it would be difficult to go further as Japan cannot ‘help Australia’ if there is no concomitant threat to Japan.725 A pragmatic conclusion is that Japan would welcome Australia helping its defence and the defence of security where Japan’s interests are threatened. Still, the reverse is not assured—if there is no threat to Japanese sovereignty, then Australia could not expect armed assistance from Japan. One Japanese Government official thought it unlikely that Australia would want to protect Japan against China.726 Another thought it unlikely that Japan would want to ‘protect Australia from invasion’. However, these views presuppose that conflict can be contained to a particular region; concepts of gray-zone conflict acting outside the direct physical domain challenge this assumption. Conflict anywhere in the Indo-Pacific may challenge Japan’s security, especially if it affects her reliance on trade's free movement.

720 Activities between the RAN, RAAF and the MSDF initiated by the candidate in 1996-8 were conducted at seas and ‘over the horizon’ and were said to have offered plausible deniability. 721 Miller, op.cit. 722 Smith, R. op cit. 723 Japanese Government official B, private interview. 1 March 2019. 724 Japanese Government official A, private interview. 3 January 2019. 725 Japanese Government official C, private interview. 1 March 2019. 726 Japanese Government official E, private interview. 27 December 2019. 199 A summary view was that a pragmatic relationship was already in place that: supported the retention of the United States in the region; and allowed for trilateral cooperative action if necessary. However, views did not address how the status quo could be maintained if there were a strategic shock to the region or if China’s dominance needed to be constrained. Fear of criticism or adverse response by China was a factor in moving only cautiously on developing a more formalised A-JDSR. As for the academic cohort summary response, there was support in this cohort for a realistic measured diplomatic development in the A- JDSR that would not draw the opprobrium of a formal military alliance. There was more pragmatism in this cohort than that seen in the academic cohort, representing the actions this cohort is used to taking in resolving regional tensions through diplomatic processes. The expressed concept in this cohort of a formal consultative agreement with no mutual response, nor threat identification is a construct that sits easily with views expressed in the other cohorts.

5.2.6. Defence and Military cohort

The consensus among survey participants in the defence and military cohort partly favoured a formal alliance in the traditional sense. There was overall strong support for moving to a more formal relationship, especially if there were a precipitating ‘strategic shock’. The cohort was very supportive of closer cooperation, including the realistic prospect that current security challenges demanded the development of military potential to respond, including collective defensive action to meet current and especially future threats. Many in this cohort reflected a realism view in their responses, generated by their current or past responsibilities to prudently prepare to militarily respond to all possible challenges to national security.

There was strong support for continuing or increasing bilateral cooperative activities in the A-JDSR and engagement with the United States trilaterally or in coalitions. While there was support for a formal alliance, some respondents considered an alliance was not needed because both countries already cooperated in military activities as if they were allies.727 Those who believed an alliance possible or necessary surmised that an alliance could be rapidly established if there were the will or precipitating strategic shock to do so.728

727 Monterola, op.cit. 728 Japanese Government official D, private interview. 4 March 2019. 200 A summary view was that many respondents in this cohort held a position on an A-JDSR alliance based on their assessment of the likelihood of major conflict in Northeast Asia soon. This view is supported by the judgment made in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, which states that the previous basis for defence planning that assumed a ten-year strategic warning time can no longer be assured.729 One interviewee in this cohort considered in 2020 that we are already eight years into that traditional 10-year warning time and that ‘a distracting conflict is possible’.730

The record of current cooperative military activities with Japan suggest that the A-JDSR is on a trajectory that could permit the conduct of collective operations.731 The current DASA Tokyo is working to ‘ambitiously advance the Australia-Japan defence and security relationship in practical, integrated ways.’ 732 Her predecessor said that Australia had focused on building formal frameworks with Japan in ‘a trusted relationship’.733 The pursuit of interoperability mentioned by interviewees indicates that both countries are preparing to be able to conduct collective military operations if this were necessary.

An underlying assumption was that no collective or cooperative military responses would occur in the region without the United States' involvement, with many noting the necessity to build the triangular relationship between Australia, Japan, and the United States [to address this possibility].734 A current example is the JSDF encouragement to develop their amphibious capability, with the United States providing support and technology and Australia providing advice and exercising opportunities in ADF exercises.735

A participant in Track 2 discussions with Japan said that a triangular construct was the only approach to take, noting that he had observed current support in Japan, including in the MoFA, for more formalised trilateral arrangements. 736 There was greater support for bilateralism than trilateralism alone because it generates a stronger trilateral or even quadrilateral dialogue. A consensus view among interviewees was that the United States

729 Defence 2020 Strategic Update, op. cit. p. 14. 730 Jennings, op cit. 731 Monterola. op.cit. 732 Halloran, op.cit. 733 Moy, op.cit. 734 Houston, op.cit., Iwasaki, op.cit. 735 George McWilliams, Captain, US Defence Attaché to Japan 1995-1998, private interview. 5 May 2018. 736 Nicholson, op.cit. 201 supports a closer A-JDSR and the concept of multiple bilateral arrangements—especially if they move to multilateral arrangements.737

A serving senior ADF officer opined that if Australia were involved in responding to a Northeast Asian contingency, Japan would likely provide operational support bases.738 A serving Japanese official said Japan and Australia share values, recognising the potential threat, and although neither country uses the word alliance, behave as if there were one. He added ‘If there were a regional conflict, Japan would expect cooperation from others, including Australia, although there is no plan. Japan must work its relations with others to stabilise Northeast Asian security.’739 Some responders felt ‘we would need to have a contingency arise to cause the A-JDSR to develop into something like the US-JMST (but without the United States’ obligation part for Japan's defence).740 A summary view was that there are all the hallmarks of a formal defence relationship—but of course, without the obligations being specified.

Former National Security Adviser Duncan Lewis said that Japan’s impetus for closer cooperation is due to its ‘neuralgia of history’, which may cause Japan to lean forward to assist others in building prosperity through security. He also considers the progress of the A-JDSR is inexorable even though there are considerable societal differences. He opines that Australia has been concerned about possible adverse reactions by Japan to Chinese aggression. This concern has been a ‘brake’ on the progression of the A-JDSR. There are differing interests: Japan is still struggling with China's terms, and Australia has had a concern that Japan may mishandle Japan-China relations. He noted that our respective relationships with China were different until about 2015 but are now not so different.741

This concern over the other partner in the A-JDSR being pressured by China is reflected by a Japanese responder’s comments that a typical Japanese discourse is that ‘Australia is not trustworthy because Australia deeply depends on China economically’.742 These sentiments now seem dated, as evidenced by recent Australian government action wishing to restrain

737 US Government official, private interview. 5 March 2019. 738 Roger Noble, Major General, Head, Strategic Commitments, Headquarters ADF (2020-2021), private interview. 2 July 2020. 739 Japanese Defense official A, op.cit. 740 Japanese Government official B, op.cit. 741 Lewis. op. cit. 742 Tomohiko Satake, The Background to and Outlook for Japan-Australia Security Cooperation (translated from Japanese by the candidate). Briefing Memo. August/September 2010 (No. 146) NIDS Research Department. p1. 202 Chinese actions and Japanese tolerance in the face of sovereignty challenges in the Senkakus, for example, mutes Australian concern over undue Japanese reactionism. Deeper and more trusted dialogue overcomes these mutual mistrusts. True interoperability is not limited only to military preparation—it extends to all types of dialogue and engagement across the economic, political, security and military spectrum. Past Chief of Air Force Leo Davies who shaped recent airforce-airforce exercising says it includes ‘gaining absolute trust’ especially at the senior levels where partners can trust each other to speak frankly, openly and share close-held understandings. It involves a deep understanding that can only come from continually working together.’

As presaged, the crux of closer relations between countries lies not in common threats but shared interests and perhaps values. The rising level of ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ from China that Australia is prepared to pay in ‘calling China out’ for its actions indicate that resolute action is being taken to build a stronger defence of values and shared interests in the US alliance and sub-alliance systems. A common thread in responses was that Australia and Japan can do more to confront a more challenging regional security environment as important regional security leaders.743 Jennings considered in his interview that a traditional alliance between Australia and Japan was an idea ‘who time has come’.

Binskin and Iwasaki both said that Australia and Japan must continue to build relationships, not letting an opportunity pass. Iwasaki considers that the A-JDSR is moving slowly to become a form of an alliance, a quasi-alliance (準同盟関係（jun dōmei kankei)), almost but not yet a real alliance. He adds ‘we may have such an alliance in the future, but we already act like allies.’’ He sees the JSDF eventually moving beyond its current understanding of the A-JDSR to a more formal relationship if that move were to benefit both countries' peoples.744 Past Australian Chief of Defence Force Binskin says of the prospect of A-JDSR formalisation: ‘We could quickly develop this further if there were a situation which called for it.’745

A summary view from this cohort is that Australia is prepared to counter aggressive action in the region by building up the offensive capability of the ADF. This is underway under

743 Behm, op cit. 744 Iwasaki was, in retirement Abe’s personal adviser on shaping public opinion regarding changing Article 9. 745 Binskin. op cit. 203 the Force Structure program announced in conjunction with the 2020 Defence Strategic Update.746 Cohort interviewees considered that the A-JDSR, separately and together with the trilateral construct with the United States would be a useful way of cooperating to meet challenges in the Northeast Asian area. Such actions would be necessary and enabling critical components in preparing for collective military action to deter or engage in regional contingencies.

5.2.7. Research Institutions cohort

The consensus among participants in the research institutions was like that in the defence and military cohort, but more positively in their views. The majority of respondents were in favour of some form of alliance as this facilitated preparing for military action to constrain China and other regional threats to Japan and Australia. Interviewees mentioned that this had not come about to date because of fear of Chinese response. Some considered that if Australia wanted an alliance with Japan, it would be encouraged by the United States, noting that Australia would assist Japan in a crisis so formalisation of the A-JDSR was necessary. Taiwan was mentioned by many, with some indicating that the United States would expect Australia to join it in resisting Chinese aggression Taiwan. There were views that such response would necessarily involve Japan because of Japanese interests in Taiwan and Chinese control of the first and second island chains which would represent ‘encirclement’ of Japan. For this reason alone, formalisation of the A-JDSR is necessary.

The views of these institutions are important because they are widely reported in the mainstream media and some social media, compared to academic views which are reported in more closed communities.

There was unanimity in both Australian and Japanese communities of the need to develop the A-JDSR. However, Japanese views were more nuanced in terms of hedging and accommodation of China.

Accommodating China has gained widespread public support in Japan compared to Australia. Japan has improved (or normalised) its relations with China even though Japan’s economic dependency on China made it difficult for Japan to completely follow past

746 2020 Strategic Update, op. cit. p. 4. 204 President Trump’s hard-line approach to China. There is a view that the A-JDSR is a form of ‘soft balancing’ or hedging against a rising China. The same commentator cautioned that unless the A-JDSR contributes to Japan’s security areas such as the Korean peninsula, Japan is not interested in pursuing an alliance with Australia.747

Most interviewees in both countries mentioned concern over Chinese ‘gray-zone’ activities targeting both countries. 748 Japanese respondents said in 2019 Japan had been more concerned over influence from China than Australia was, but the situation has reversed now ‘that Australia is experiencing Chinese influence’. A respondent added that if Japan cannot accommodate China, it needs to prepare for confrontation.749

Australian researchers were in early 2020 much more sanguine about the threat from China and the need to resist Chinese pressure. A majority supported an alliance with Japan, stating that it was in Australia’s interests to assist Japan in a crisis and to do so by formalising the A-JDSR. Babbage noted before the 2020 Defence Strategic Update that cautiousness in the Australian national security community and a propensity not to offend China was not assisting the public understanding of the issues. However, the 2020 Strategic Update has brought concerns to the fore.

Babbage considers Australia and Japan need to work to create some form of A-JDSR formalisation. He opined that if Australia wanted an alliance with Japan, ‘the United States would encourage as Washington would appreciate the strategic value and implicitly trusts Australia’. He was of a view that of a possibility of a significant war’ was credible, so developing alliances and relations with like-minded others was very important.’ He suggests that ‘there would be support at the senior level of the Australian government for some form of alliance. The Australian government has said for some time that it supports closer military relations with Japan as part of its ‘strategic partnership’ with Japan. Only Australia and Japan strongly contribute to regional security, and both are well-placed to act as nodes to accrete other nations to support regional security.

747 NIDS news. August/September 2010 (No. 146) Briefing Memo. The Background to and Outlook for Japan- Australia Security Cooperation (translated from Japanese by this author. Tomohiko Satake, NIDS Research Department. August 2010. p1. 748 The conduct of ‘gray-zone’ activities involves military and non-military forms of assertiveness and coercion which achieve strategic goals without involving physical or kinetic warfare. See: 2020 Defence Strategic Update, op. cit. p. 5. 749 Michishita. Op cit. 205 5.2.8. Summary of responses

So, what is the locus of the A-JDSR? The research showed that only a third of interviewees considered that the A-JDSR should evolve to become a formal alliance. However, two- thirds of those were from a cohort that is entrusted with preparing for future military actions and would be expected to support a more formalised alliance. All responders considered that the relationship will develop but did not opine how this should happen. The discussion now considers options for developing the A-JDSR, drawing on all research inputs. The point made here is that all cohorts favoured ‘a closer’ A-JDSR but most do not favour more closeness to equal a traditional alliance. The thesis will propose argument that the A-JDSR can be developed to argue for a form of closeness that mitigates the risk of Chinese criticism, alliance entrapment and the optics of containment.

The themes of containment and ‘pushback’ were mentioned by some interviewees. No interviewee considered that China as a rising power should be ‘contained’. Containment would be inimical to free market principles and would be impossible to exercise given China’s size, momentum, and market power. Few supported Australia or Japan supporting the United States in defending a ‘balance of power’. But many mentioned taking action to ‘constrain Chinese behaviour’ citing economic coercion and militarisation within the ‘first and second island chains. Many interviewees considered that action to ‘pushback’ at Chinese expansionism was necessary, citing the taking of maritime action to pushback at possible denial of access to sea routes was of concern to many, especially those Japan military responders. Interviewees considered that this collective diplomatic needed to be made by those countries directly affected, with some saying that this was unlikely due to fear of adverse Chinese responses. For many interviewees, the Chinese response to any formal agreement was ‘front-of-mind’, noting the strategic relationship's locus depended on how China moves into a position of dominance. Peter Varghese summed up Japan’s position of moving from a ‘strategic client’ to ‘strategic personality’, which would greatly facilitate the A-JDSR becoming a strategic relationship, but not an alliance.750

Table 5.2 provides indicative responses from interview transcripts.

750 Varghese, op.cit. 206 Table 5.2 – Indicative responses by interviewees from transcripts

Cohort Indicative comment

Academics • Australians are traditionally wary of any threat that might result in engagement in an Asian war. • We should fear China’s failure, not its success—that would be catastrophic. • The AJDSR is more attractive to Japan than it is for Australia. • The A-JDSR is 'where something is happening’. • Hedging with Australia reinforces Japan’s relations with the United States. • Japan invests in multilateralism, playing a proactive role in international organizations and regional security operations. • The A-JDSR is mutating into ‘a latent alliance’ because all elements are in place. • There is no scope for a formal alliance, but scope for something of lesser impact.

Government • The A-JDSR is a model of bilateral relations for Australia to build with others. and Foreign • For geo-political reasons we are now special strategic partners. Australia is now Affairs the most important partner for Japan after the United States and vice versa now. • An alliance is deeper if it keeps United States engaged. • Collective self-defence is possible, but mutual obligation is not. • An A-J-US trilateral alliance is possible. • There is benefit in Japan, Australia and the US working together on any US-led contingency in the region. • The progress of the A-JDSR is inexorable. • Neuralgia of history’ may cause Japan to want to ‘lean forward’. • There is support in Australia for a formal triangular relationship. • No prospect of a formal alliance between Australia and Japan due constitutional limitations. • Something as close as possible to an alliance, like the 1996 IASA, is possible. • Inconceivable that Australia would not be involved in any conflict over Taiwan. • Closer strategic relationship depends on how China moves into a position of dominance. • Japan is moving from being a ‘strategic client’ to being a ‘strategic personality.' • The AJDSR is already strong and will get stronger because there are strong underlying factors. • Days of alliances are over, but there is really close interactive cooperation. • China’s actions mean the QUAD is more likely to develop into a strategic grouping. The interests of the four members still differ but are now closer.

Research • If Australia wanted an alliance with Japan, it would be encouraged by the United Institutions States. • Australia would assist Japan in a crisis. Formalisation of the A-JDSR is necessary. • Australia has not agreed to an alliance because of fear of Chinese criticism. Australia needs to stop thinking about China’s views of an Australia and Japan security treaty—we need a full treaty which identifies threats and reciprocity. • Australia’s interests would force it to assist Japan even without a treaty. Taiwan is a tripwire because the United States would expect us to support action. • Japan would also support action a Taiwan threat because a China controlled Taiwan is ‘encirclement’. • An alliance is required to deal with contingencies and ‘confront China’.

207

Defence • There’s no constraint at the operational level of cooperation such as ‘troops in and Military Australia, PKO cooperation: nothing’s off the table.’ • Australia and Japan need to build deep strategic corporation by the development of collective capacity. • There is now interdependence, but not really interoperability. • We have set the foundation, and we exercise and cooperate until people are comfortable. Building relationships is the key, and we must not let an opportunity pass. • We could quickly develop the A-JDSR [to become an alliance] if there was a situation which called for it. • We are achieving cooperative activities, but Article 9 still shapes the strategic environment. • As the USJMST is not reciprocal and only covers Japan and surrounding areas, would Australia accept only a one-way obligation? Higher level of cooperation could occur if clear need. • Australia and Japan have both done well in capitalising on the AJDSR. • The concept of an alliance with Japan is no longer needed nor relevant – what is relevant is that we cooperate militarily as if we were allies. • Australia aims to ambitiously advance the Australia-Japan defence and security relationship in practical, integrated ways. • If Japan were under threat as a strategic partner, we would be there to support them in some way. • Alliance would not add any deterrent quality because an overt statement of support is already there. • Ability to conduct meaningful high-level activity is limited by our inability to share US-based intelligence. • The AJDSR is a demonstration of messaging in the region. • Current activities are a great example of operationalising the relationship. • Australia has focused on building formal frameworks with Japan in ‘a trusted relationship’. • There is support in Japan, including in MoFA, for more formalised trilateral arrangements and a spectrum of ideas for more formalised arrangements; from an MOU to a formal defence treaty. • If Australia is involved in conflict in NEA, it will need a support base, likely provided by Japan. • The quasi alliance between Australia and Japan would clearly allow Australia to send forces to Northeast Asia. • Bilateralism is more important than Trilateralism alone because it generates a stronger trilateral or even quadrilateral dialogue. • The United States supports a closer A-JDSR. • Multiple bilateral arrangements are good especially if they move to multilateral arrangements. • There are still unresolved issues relating to the use of the JSDF in coalition operations in East Asia. • Japan considers that Taiwan is not part of the geography defined in the UNC SOFA and any participation by Japan in any action over Taiwan would be effected by acting under Japan’s own sovereign power. • An alliance could be made in a week if there were the will to do so.

208 This research showed ambivalence over using the term ‘quasi alliance’ as Japanese were using the term soon after the 2007 JDSC to describe the strategic alignment in the A-JDSR. Some saw it as a ‘latent alliance’751 Some agreed that this A-JDSR has the hallmarks of a formal alliance. Some agreed the A-JDSR could be regarded as an important ‘sub-alliance’ within the US post-war alliance construct.

A consensus of views in the research institutions is that a formal security alliance in the form of reciprocal commitment is almost certainly ‘off the table’ as policy elites in both countries cite entrapment dangers from additional formal treaty commitments. However, they were unanimously positive on the future of the A-JDSR, with some divergence on how it might develop. Varghese’s comments summed up others’ responses over China saying that its ‘rise needs to be managed not frustrated.’ He thinks that, of the two Asian powers committed to balancing China, Japan and India are moving to create that balance. Still, Varghese considers that such balance ‘should not involve a capital 'A' alliance of democracies because that would create a structural fault line in Asia and further harden China's position’. In the nearer term, a closer strategic relationship between Japan and Australia depends on if, how and when China moves into a position of dominance. Varghese sees a difference in the 'wellsprings': China sees Japan from a historical perspective. Australia no longer sees this but sees China's lack of democracy as a problem and as an input into its own calculations.752

The four cohorts did not support a traditional alliance as the optimal future enhancement of the A-JDSR. However, all stated there was scope for more formalisation ranging from updating of the 2007 JDSC to reflect the current state of activities—all currently visible to China, to a declaration that the A-JDSR can become the declared basis for future cooperative and collective military action within a coalition. There is a continuum here, not wide, but representative of political choices that the two countries could make.

The outcomes sought were different across the cohorts. In the defence and military and research institutions cohorts, some sought to build a military containment process. Such containment would be looking to secure a favourable power of power in the IP. The

751 Latent military power allows political relations to develop without violence. See: Lawrence Freedman, Military Power and Political Influence. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 4 (October., 1998), pp. 763-780. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy-f.deakin.edu.au/journal/inteaffaroyainst 752 Peter Varghese, Chancellor University of , private interview. 1 July2019 209 containment mentioned was not necessarily the maintenance of military dominance, but pushback on military actions that directly challenge passage of free trade in east Asian waters and other areas. For the ‘constrainers’ accommodation for China needs to be found, and while a declared military alliance might be counter-productive, a closer relationship in the A-JDSR and the QUAD can facilitate that accommodation by keeping it within mutually agreed boundaries.

5.2.9. Main Finding: A Closer A-JDSR

The A-JDSR is not a traditional alliance, and there has been no indication from either government that a formal alliance is inevitable. Almost no responder considered that the A- JDSR would become a focused military-only traditional alliance. Still, there was overwhelming support for it to be classed as one respondent said, a close ‘alignment of a multidimensional intersection of security postures.’ This was taken to mean a coming- together of national interests in multiple areas such as economics, society, defence, and security—the A-JDSR has these intersecting components. An overall academics’ view on a closer A-JDSR was that enthusiasm waxes and wanes, but it never drops back to its starting point. Now it is waxing. At the beginning of 2021, Embassies in Tokyo and Canberra are strengthening their strategic cooperation, ensuring that Japan and Australia join forces to keep the United States engaged in the region. A Japanese political commentator notes this will achieve a ‘Japan-American-Australian model of cooperation. This would be the real added value of a Japan-Australia alliance.’753

The 2007 JDSC was expressed in terms of non-traditional cooperation and contained no statements or objectives relating to traditional military activities. This construction was understandable. Japanese public opinion from 2000 on was gradually moving towards a greater societal acceptance of the JSDF. As the country deployed forces overseas on UN- agreed peacekeeping operations with a formal peacekeeping basis, Japanese society considered that cooperation with other countries should only focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Nevertheless, the A-JDSR moved inexorably towards progressively increasing levels of traditional military cooperation. Agreement to a hierarchy of military logistical documents has facilitated this closeness and built a basis for future

753 Yoichii Funabashi. Chairman of Asia-Pacific Initiative. The era of the Japan-Australia alliance is here. Japan Times, 21 March 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/03/21/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-australia- alliance-u-s-china-asean/ 210 collaborative action. However, there has been no headway made to agreeing to overarching strategic agreements, even as pragmatic enabling development took place. Notably, Australia is now the only country except for the United States, which has all these enabling documents with Japan. These are all enabling steps on the way to allow for an overarching formal agreement if both countries decided that this were necessary. Such an arrangement would likely not be in the form of a traditional alliance as ANZUS but may be a pragmatic extension of extant arrangements. It would not need to identify threats, nor specify mutual obligations. A useful construct exemplar would be the 1995 non-binding Indonesia- Australia Security Agreement (IASA) which identified neither threat nor response mutuality but required only those both sides confer to meet a common danger’.754

Japan and Australia are significant members of the US-centred alliance network and prominent members of US-led trilaterals, so a bilateral sub-alliance between Australia and Japan per se merits special consideration in terms of formalising their defence and security cooperation. Any arrangement with Japan would need to consider extant alliance members and the role of Quad, ASEAN, EAS and other bodies in the regional security architecture. Also, Australia, the US and Japan would need to further improve their engagements with others in the Indo-Pacific region, especially with India and Indonesia, and Indonesia, other ASEAN countries and the Pacific Islands Countries.755

The A-JDSR per se cannot be considered a formal alliance as it has only a declaration of security cooperation in humanitarian activities (the 2007 JDSC), it does not have an element of overtly stated obligation, not does it define challenges or threats.756 However, if the A- JDSR were to become more formalised why would Australia and Japan have sought such a close relationship while denying to themselves the benefit of a declared alliance? Japanese commentators considered that Japan is engaging in hedging and balancing against the rise of China by ‘building stronger ties with the US as well as diversifying its security partnerships with other countries in the region.’757 Both countries declare that their bilateral relationship is a means to enhance the US strategic presence in the region—echoing the usual fear of abandonment. This Australian fear of entrapment will be addressed later: it

754 The 1995 Security Agreement between Australia and Indonesia meant that Australia then had treaties or agreements with all its major near neighbours. ‘The Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement—Issues and Implications’. Parliament of Australia. Research paper 25 1995/96. 755 Peter Nicholson, Air Vice-Marshal, Head, Defence Strategic Planning (1998-2000), private interview. 25 May 2019. 756 Walt, op. cit. pp. 12–13. 757 Satake and Hemmings. op. cit. 211 centres on fears of regional conflict in Asia that may accrue if the United States no longer has regional primacy.

Sargeant sees parallels with the immediate post-WWII when new structures were needed. He considers that a NATO type of arrangement is inappropriate for the Indo-Pacific but expects to progressively see ‘multilateral activities which will become a structure or ‘sub- alliance’ structures – there’s lots of pragmatic support for this.’758 This concept is developed in the next chapter which used the template of the A-JDSR in two ways. First to build an intra-alliance between two major allies, and to use this as an exemplar for other singular legs of the Indo-Pacific hub-and spoke system. Formalisation of these intra-alliances could be affected by simple declaration of their value, or they could in the case of the A-J-US triangular relationship be upgraded to the status of a non-traditional alliance in the form of the IASA. Second, the A-JDSR in current format of declared mutual security interests can be used as a template by the four members of QUAD to build a network of like-minded nations working to the common purpose of promoting regional security and the maintenance of the rules-based global order.

For Japan, the prospect that Australia will be there to assist in defending Japanese national security interests either from a deterrent or more active military mode must provide some input into Japanese security planning. The level of commitment that Australia has put into the A-JDSR, and the responses from those interviewed for this thesis support that there is a basis for this expectation. For Australia, the question is how far will Japan be prepared to go in building the A-JDSR and what load is Japan prepared to bear for own, collective, and regional security? The question for both countries is this—if a formal alliance is not so important, is there an understanding of the way to go, and do they need a series of enabling agreements in place?

5.2.10. Entrapment fears

In any agreement between nations, there needs to be a balance between the expected benefits of an agreement, and the risks and costs—extant and potential—that may accrue. In a security agreement a significant risk may be that one partners to formal agreements

758 A political focus is on the domestic political challenges across the Indo-Pacific, and a diminished focus on system and institution building in ways that supports a sense of a shared community. Indo-Pacific Strategies Conference, Oct 2019, ‘Possible Futures for the Future Regional Strategic Order’. 212 may find that they are exposed to unwanted and perhaps unforeseen circumstances and commitments. The literature describes historical and theoretical situations where a lesser partner finds itself ‘entrapped’ by a stronger partner in a traditional alliance due to statements of mutuality of response or commitment to act. Edelstein and Shifrensen describe entrapment as “a situation where one state exposes itself to political and military conflicts it would not otherwise encounter”.759 Synder states that states risk entrapment in an alliance to counter abandonment: likely the reason Australia and other US allies continue to put so much store in their alliances.760

For Australia, its alliance with the United States provides it with security but at the cost of maintaining that relationship. This has resulted in some cautiousness by Australia about the way it manages that alliance. 761 Some political commentators have suggested that Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War ‘was a means of providing our usefulness to the alliance’. 762 With the not-so-distant memory of the Vietnam War in the public consciousness, a central question to be asked of any closer engagement with Japan is the likelihood that this may lead Australia to be again engaged in a war in Asia, either under the ANZUS Treaty—noting that this potential already exists, or in any alliance with Japan that would have an element of commitment. Looking at the ANZUS commitment, in Australia, a public majority support having US forces and bases. Still, few approve of Australia contributing to US military action in the event of an Asian conflict.763 Notably, 73 per cent of people surveyed in 2019 believed that the United States would come to Australia’s defence if it were under threat. However, almost the same number (69 per cent) felt that an alliance made it more likely that Australia would be drawn into a war in Asia that would not be in Australia’s nation’s interests.”764

On 23 June 2021, the Australian Lowy Institute published its annual survey. Of those polled, 78% considered the alliance with US is important for Australia’s security, with 75%

759 A Trevor Thrall, ‘US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century.’ A Trevor Thrall. and Benjamin H. Friedman, eds., David Edelstein and Joshua R Shifrinson. It’s a Trap! p. 23. 760 Greg Snyder. ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.’ World Politics, 36 (4). pp 461-495. 761 Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 22 May 2006. Australia’s Defence Relations with the United States. Chapter 2. p. 2.4. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/chapter2 762 ‘ANZUS in practice’, National Museum of Australia website. ANZUS Treaty. https://www.nma.gov.au/defining- moments/resources/anzus-treaty 763 Vince Scappatura, The US “Pivot” to Asia, the China Spectre and the Australian-American Alliance, The Asia- Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, issue 36, no. 3, 9 September 2014. http://apjjf.org/2014/12/36/ Vince-Scappatura/4178/article.html 764 Rory Medcalf. op cit. p. 156. 213 considering the US would come to Australia’s defence if Australia were under threat. In a significant shift in sentiment toward China, 63% considered China in 2021 to be a threat to Australia (up from just 13% three years ago), with the importance of the economic partnership between Australia and China falling from 82% to 34%. Of note, 94% consider that a military conflict between the US and China is a critical or important threat.765 Of significant to the A-JDSR, a 2021 nationally representative survey suggested that Australians are fearful of China, but that only around 20% are prepared to support commitment to war in support of the people of Taiwan.’766 By comparison, opposition to the Vietnam War, even in retrospect, was less negative. A 1995 opinion poll taken at the 30th anniversary of Australian commitment to sending a battalion to Vietnam found that “55% of Australians thought that it was wrong to have sent troops to Vietnam and 30% considered it the right thing to have done.”767 The risk of entrapment is well-recognised, and perhaps accepted in Australia (though not welcomed).

5.3 Conceptualisation of the Nature of the A-JDSR

This section offers a qualitative analysis of the nature of A-JDSR. Conceptualisation views range from maintaining the status quo—continuing as if both were in an alliance, to a centrepiece of a formalised structure as advocated by Brendan Sargeant who expects to progressively see ‘multilateral activities which will become a structure or ‘sub-alliance’ structures. The two nations operate in exercises with a view to improving interoperability to conduct operations, there is a declared political statement relating to joint defence and security cooperation. Both countries have or will soon agree to support each other logistically in the ACSA and to allow their forces to operate in each other’s country under the RAA. Japan is preparing to conditionally support the ADF is it comes under attack. In all respects, then, the A-JDSR has, or will soon have, all the enabling components of a virtual alliance.

It is not an overstatement to say that Japan-Australia defence cooperation is entering a new evolution. In retrospect, the first phase of transformation began with the 2007 Japan-

765 See: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2021/ 766 ‘Should Australia go to war with China in defence of Taiwan? Polling on defence and security issues in Australia and Taiwan’ Australian Institute, Alan Behm and Melissa Conly Tyler, 9 July 2021. The poll also found that as many Australians (42%) as Taiwanese (49%) will launch an armed attack their respective countries. Australian Institute. https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/should-australia-go-to-war-with-china-in-defence-of-taiwan/ 767 Department of Veteran Affairs website: ANZAC Portal – Vietnam War 1962 to 1975: Public Opinion. https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/wars-and-missions/vietnam-war-1962-1975/events/public-opinion 214 Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, aimed for the institutionalization of cooperative relationships centred on non-traditional security areas, exemplified by disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. The emerging trend of bilateral defence relations, which can be termed as a second evolution, is unfolding as the scope of Japan-Australia cooperation is beginning to expand beyond non-traditional security. New areas could include capacity-building assistance on maritime security in Southeast Asia and seeking ways for defence equipment cooperation related to the new Australian submarines.768 Thus, continued caution must simultaneously be paid to the points of divergent perception of issues related to China, not just the alignment of positions regarding its rise.

5.3.1. An Intra-alliance?

Another way of describing the A-JDSR is as a type of virtual alliance with the specific meaning of ‘intra-alliance’. This is taken to be a working definition of the A-JDSR for the remainder of this thesis. We will further address the utility of this term as part of a proposed regional security structure in the next chapter on security frameworks.

Formal declaration of the A-JDSR as the third leg of the A-J-US triangle would demonstrate its political and deterrent value. A more formal three-way process would also facilitate a coordinated military and security response than would be achieved by separate processes. A trilateral dialogue has existed for almost two decades, but it is a dialogue process, albeit a valuable one. But it has no formal structure.

5.3.2. Political, defence, and military aspects of the A-JDSR

From here, the thesis adds to the discussion with the introduction of insights gained from the literature.

In previous years, Japan’s Defense White Papers used the expression of focusing on ‘non- traditional security’ cooperation to characterize the relationship between Japan and Australia, represented by disaster relief efforts and international peacekeeping operations (PKO). NIDS proposed in 2015 that new cooperative initiatives between Japan and

768 The Attack-class submarines may have Japanese diesel engines and may, in the future, have Japanese batteries. Noonan, op.cit. 215 Australia be instituted under the rubric of a New Special Relationship. 769 They are meaningful in that they go beyond the non-traditional security initiatives as declared in the 2007 JDSC. They include cooperation on defence science and technology and defence equipment; trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Australia in maritime security (especially with Southeast Asian countries); and improvements in legislative arrangements to effect collaboration.770

Political. At the political level, there is declared support for the A-JDSR. The seminal 2007 JDSC—avowedly not a military alliance—is the political expression the A-JDSR provides this face to the world. The JDSC addresses in its detail actions not in the traditional military cooperative process, focusing on human security. Both countries could decide to upgrade this agreement to include a public statement reflecting the reality of the A-JDSR as this would allow for increased cooperation on traditional military activity. The activity could consist of declared support for exercising and other actions, including preparation to work in a military coalition. Other than the deterrent effect of exercising together, there is no reason to improve interoperability if that capacity is never intended to be used.

Defence. Second to the trade delegation, Defence diplomatic staff constitute the largest functional groups in the Australian Embassy in Tokyo and in the Japanese Embassy in Canberra.771 Australia’s defence goal in Japan is to advance the A-JDSR in a way that will build practical operational outcomes. For the first in many decades, there are now three single dedicated service attaches and other liaison and support staff in both Embassies to deal with expanded engagement and activities. An ongoing activity is negotiating to enable documents (such as the reciprocal access agreement) to allow each country’s armed forces to operate from the other’s territory and be mutually protected.

Military. Bilateral and multilateral training and combined exercises demonstrate the military-to-military engagement of the A-JDSR. Multilateral Exercises involving JSDF forces embedded within US force groups in bilateral exercises with Australia and bilateral

769 Yusuke Ishihara, Policy Studies Department, NIDS. Japan-Australia “New Special Relationship”. NIDS Commentary No. 44, 4 April 2015. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary044e.pdf 770 NIDS East Asia Strategic Review 2016. Chapter 6, Australia - The challenges of the Japan-Australia Quasi- Alliance. 771 Halloran, op. cit. 216 exercises between the JSDF and the ADF are the first steps to developing the capability to conduct coalition military operations.

Declaration of Political support for A-JDSR. A joint political declaration on the future of the A-JDSR would have a significant deterrence component and would reflect the virtual alliance it has become. If would not need to declare mutual reciprocity nor identify a threat. It would be a pragmatic ‘sub-alliance’ and, with other preparatory work being undertaken in logistic support and other actions, provided much of the structure and formality that would be facilitated under a formal military alliance without taking that extra step. Realistically, it would offer the overt cover for what is already underway and would be a logical next step as both countries develop their ‘special strategic partnership’. A re- negotiation of the details of the 2007 JDSC would be a signal invigoration of the A-JDSR. Re-visiting the details would require the inclusion of those cooperative actions now missing from the JDSC. These are traditional military activities currently happening now but only ‘under the radar’ or ‘plausibly denied’. None of these activities are hidden, but their declaration as current activities to be developed sends a message about future cooperative activity.

Preparation for Coalition operations. Preparation for coalition military operations requires: shared operational and tactical processes and procedures; high levels of operational trust; interoperable if not common weapons systems with the ability to support network-enabled warfare; regular exercising to develop interoperability at the theatre, operational, and tactical levels; effective command, control and coordination arrangements; shared intelligence at national and lower levels: the ability to support each other logistically; and most importantly, agreement at the political level that such preparation meets each countries individual (and therefore shared) national interests.

Many of the above preparatory elements are present in the activities currently undertaken under the A-JDSR. Some elements are nascent (such as completeness in shared intelligence), some are in the process of final negotiation (RAA, development of shared doctrine)), some are well-underway to being implemented. With Japanese and Australian science and technology organizations developing common weapon systems (e.g., F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, AEGIS navy surveillance systems), the two military forces have a level of interoperability and ability to work together bilaterally matched only by their separate

217 bilateral capabilities in these areas with US forces. Notably, these developments have occurred under the aegis of political (but not made public for that forum) coordination under the A-J-US TSD. In all respects, the locus of all this activity will be to ensure that US, Japanese, and Australian defence organisations and military forces could operate in collective defence whenever strategic necessity and political will deems it necessary.

The most significant military impediment to developing a trilateral collective operational capability is limited intelligence exchange circumscribed by the members of the ‘five-eyes community’. This organisation has been reluctant to let Japan achieve its cherished goal of joining their grouping. Hesitation on including Japan in this group has traditionally been the low level of trust by providers in Japan’s ability to protect shared information.772 Conversely, determined political action to bolster the security of highly classified information shared by allies could permit Japan to join an expanded ‘five-eyes community’ (a ‘five plus one’ (or more) structure could suffice).

As past Chiefs of Defence of Australia and Japan have said, a declared alliance (but likely not one involving mutuality of response nor threat identification) could be rapidly created if required. This declaration could occur if either Japan and the US, or the US and Australia were engaged in allied operational action in their separate national interests, such as defending sea-lanes and came under attack. In this case, the three countries acting in a coalition would be working as if there were that third leg of a military alliance triangle between Australia, Japan, and the United States.

5.3.3. A-JDSR in the US alliance structure

In the IP, defence, and security relationships rest on the US alliance system. Multilateral fora and a multitude of bilateral and trilateral relationships supplement the system. All relationships have varying degrees of formality, activity, cohesiveness, and resilience. Many of the trilateral relationships have the United States as a central pivot, and many are also, but not exclusively, between countries who are in alliance with the United States. The A-JDSR is one arm of a trilateral arrangement with the other two arms formalised in an alliance relationship. The nature of that singular arm will be examined later in the context

772 Under GSOMIA agreements, the United Sates requires its intelligence partners to adequately handle classified. This may assist Japanese inclusion in Five-Eyes, or an expanded version. 218 of a proposed regional security structure, addressing the concept of institutionalisation in both the A-J bilateral arm and the contiguous triangular relationship. There are many TSDs in the region. Indeed, many are ‘double diamonds’, such as the triangular A-J-US relationship and a mirror image including Japan, the United States and India.

These trilateral relationships represent a different level in a hierarchy of relationships: the ‘hub-and-spoke’ as the foundation with bilateral relations between alliance partners acting as the rim of the ‘hub-and-spoke’ wheel, a plethora of much less formal multilaterals working as braces between the spokes. Australia and Japan nourish the trilateral relationship between them and the United States with regular dialogue and exercises. This nourishment represents an effective way to conduct three-way bilateral cooperative activity while keeping all partners engaged. If Australia and Japan were to formalise the A-JDSR into an alliance or ‘quasi-alliance’, all three partners would need to agree to such an arrangement. Wilkins makes comments on this prospect, saying ‘the (Australia-Japan) strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy– ostensibly independent of the US-alliance. He considers that such a relationship would remain fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system.’773

The A-J-US trilateral forms an apex for collaborative consultation between the states in the A-JDSR and their alliance partner. While it has no greater importance than the three separate bilateral conduits for exchange of views, it has the benefit that it facilitates the formation of trust and understanding in the presence of all three partners. Further trilaterals allow for a nucleus of shared positions that can be taken to multilateral security arrangements. They are useful and supplementary collaborative conduits that supplement trusted bilateral, and occasionally less-trusted multilateral, dialogue fora.

Hemmings has provided a thorough review of trilateral relationships. He uses the informal US-Japan-Australia trilateral to illustrates the role in trilaterals in his rigorous description of the A-JDSR. 774 Dittmar provides a useful framework for describing trilaterals, particularly those composed of unequal (in terms of national power) partners. In the case of the A-JDSR, the United States as the predominant partner and with whom the other members are in alliance represents a situation which generates the most utility to the junior

773 Thomas Wilkins, Japan and Australia ‘decentering’ from the US alliance? The Pacific Review, 30 October 2017. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1391867 774 Hemmings, op. cit. p. 219 partners. It does this while allowing the apex power to demonstrate that its motives in entering the partnership are shared and supported by the other two.775

5.4 Future A-JDSR Development

5.4.1. Introduction

This section discusses findings related to future possible cooperative activities in the A- JDSR. If it is a 'virtual alliance', is there is a prospect that the A-JDSR may be so formally recognised? If a formalised declaration is made that the A-JDSR is more than a ‘special strategic partnership’, would it be taken closer and what would that closer relationship look like? Future possibilities for closer cooperation could range from: a limited vision as described under the 2007 JDSC; though the current military exercising program where the pursuit of interoperability would allow for collaborative action; to a situation that may occur in a crisis where the JDSF and the ADF could possibly be acting collectively with the United States and others, in a military coalition. The section examines the implications of this latter prospect in the context of a military power model of re-assurance, deterrence and compellance previously mentioned. The conduct of military patrols, and the development of military resilience in ASEAN countries including ‘capacity-building’ marks the re- assurance function. The same actions provide a deterrence to escalatory military responses. Preparation to conduct military actions through the development of interoperability is a necessary precursor to compellent action. All these elements are present in the extant A- JDSR.

This chapter reviewed the status quo in the security environment and the bases for A-JDSR and then posits a locus that may include combined military cooperation. It discussed an indicative case study to illustrate how both countries could conduct cooperative military action if there some strategic shock that precipitated such action. Discussion now turns to a brief analysis of how Japan and Australia might respond to NEA contingencies. An important issue to address is the level of commitment of both nations to future military action.776

775 Huong Le Thu, ‘China's Asia: Triangular Dynamics since the Cold War’. Reviewed by Lowell Dittmer 1793284X, Vol. 41, Issue 3. Dittmer states: ‘Increasingly, however, especially after 2012 when the United States could no longer easily play a pivotal balancing role due to China's more assertive foreign policy, the China-Japan-US triangle has further entrenched the importance of Japan and the Japan-US alliance.’ 776 William T Tow, Emeritus Professor, ANU, private interview. 1 October 2020. 220 The future direction that the A-JDSR will take will be defined by sovereign needs directed by political imperatives. Any possible defensive responses will be limited by military capabilities and shaped by the level of commitment each country brings to the relationship. The section examines each of these bases in turn.

5.4.2. Political and Security links to A-JDSR future

Australian and Japanese declarations of solidarity have increased as China escalated its assertiveness in regional affairs. Declarations by ambassadors are important indicators of their governments’ views if not intent—no diplomatic envoy will last by making a public statement not consonant with their government’s position. For this reason, declarations by envoys are valuable signs of cooperative action with the host nation. In October 2020, former Japanese ambassador to Australia Sumio Kusaka called for Australian support for a new era of cooperation to help counter an ‘aggressive and bullying China’ and respond to the US retreat from global governance. Kusaka said Japan and Australia—already ‘special strategic partners’—must strengthen the regional order amid the pandemic's fallout. Kusaka said there is ‘huge potential’ for Australia and Japan to work together to improve the Indo-Pacific's economic and strategic order.777 Current Ambassador Yamanagi, appointed to Canberra in late 2020, stated that expanding the A-JDSR was important because this increases Australia and Japan's importance in working together in the East and the South China Seas, where the free passage of sea-lanes is of vital importance.778 He added that ‘the two nations were set to establish closer security ties in the coming years to meet challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including an increasingly assertive China. As a measure of regard for the relationship, he declared that Australia is not just a middle power ‘but a global power with an agile defence force and intelligence apparatus.’779

5.4.3. Military links to A-JDSR future

Chapter 3 confirms that in 2021 Australia now does more military activity with Japan than any other nation except the United States. There is evidence Australia is making practical preparations to collaborate and cooperate more closely with regional allies, including Japan.

777 Ben Packham and Will Glasgow ‘Japan wants our help to get in on Five Eyes.’ The Australian, 9 October 2020.. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/japan-wants-our-help-to-get-in-on-five-eyes/news- story/b257f15824e39e8fefac5b8c3342cca2 778 Current Japanese Ambassador to Australia, Shingo Yamagami, quoted in: Security co-operation ‘vital to counter China’. The Australian. 25 February 2021. Dennis Shanahan. 779 Glen Norris. ‘Japan promises hydrogen surge’, The Australian, 5 March 2021. 221 The Headquarters Australian Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), located just outside Canberra controls all ADF operational activity, including combined exercises and conducting operations with Japan and other nations. The Australian Government is expanding the headquarters to include a Collaboration Hall to allow other nations to be systemically integrated into joint and combined military planning and conduct.780 At the strategic level, the Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS) and HQJOC staff liaise at least monthly with their Japanese equivalents on the Japanese Joint Staff Council. At the operational level, where exercises and coalition and other operations are planned and controlled new ways are being implemented to manage this process. More generally, the ADF is assisting Japan to develop its joint processes to integrate the actions of the separate SDFs in a similar manner that is used successfully in Australia, and to assist in their implementation. Lieutenant General Greg Bilton, CJOPS operations in 2021 commented: Australia continues to help the JSDF develop their amphibious capability providing the opportunity through Exercise Talisman Sabre to train in Australia ‘because the Japanese cannot do the same level of training in their own area without potentially provoking China.’ He added that Japan and Australia are now developing combined doctrine and policy, and 'there is now interdependence (with the JSDF), but not really interoperability.'781 As this develops, both countries will be able to conduct high-end operations in support of maintaining shared sovereign interests—combined exercising is the key to this.782

Trust and developing interoperability are essential for the success of collaborative military activity. These outcomes can only be sufficiently gained if forces can exercise and train with each other. In the air domain, the RAAF and ASDF are on the cusp of sharing confidences at the senior level and implementing plans to achieve shared interests (the last 10% of building complete trust).783 In the maritime domain, the RAN enjoys a very high level of interoperability with the MSDF. The Chief of Navy considers this is sufficient to support most of the operations both nations could conduct, except for some high-end functions.784 He considers the JSDF should be part of a 'seven-eyes' community (Five-eyes plus France and Japan). The military literature addresses exercising for cooperative maritime action, with Koda and others indicating Japan and Australia can do ‘theatre anti-submarine warfare in

780 Bilton, Lecture to the United Services Institute of the ACT, March 2021. Permission given. 781 Bilton. op. cit. 782 Previous ADF officer, private interview. 10 July 2020. 783 Leo Davies, Air Marshal, Chief of Air Force 2015-19, private interview. 1 March 2021. 784 Noonan, op. cit. 222 the Indo-Pacific’ if needed to protect sea-lanes.785 Cooperative submarine action between the RAN and MSDF started no later than 1991 when DFAT records report RAN submarine Ovens conducted joint submarine exercising with MSDF ASW ships.786

Looking to possible cooperation under QUAD auspices, Noonan cautions that ‘we can get what we want in terms of interoperability and building trust with India better out of bilateral activities.787 While there is merit in multilateral exercising, interoperability is often achieved in a series of bilateral exercising. Noonan says: ‘There is less need for tri-lateral relationships because the bilaterals were working so well.’ For some time, the Australian focus on working with Japan was on capability-building and relationship-building.788 A former Australian DASA Tokyo said in 2019 the A-JDSR ‘is not just about China: it's about security and stability in Northeast Asia and the wider IP.789 Capacity building (for both) is an important construct, as demonstrated by Japan's embrace of the FOIP capability building policy.’790

Interviewees consider that Australia should be working with Japan in further engaging with the ASEANs/Southeast Asian countries. This should not necessarily be in a security framework but in direct assistance terms in such capacity-building. This assistance would be aimed at reversing ASEAN nations' tendency to be separately or collectively drawn into the Beijing orbit.791 Sergeant considered Australia should ‘build capabilities that give us more deterrence with less reliance on Alliance systems’. He opined that Australia be ready for leadership in the event of a major security crisis that engages our national interests. ‘We need defence capability that can support our participation in a world where the ‘rules’ are likely to be negotiated continually and where the capacity to exercise force will be an essential foundation of our ability to live in this world as we want.’792

Any military response in the region will likely involve the United States. As mentioned earlier, Australia and the United States are moving closer together militarily. The USN has

785 Koda, op. cit. See: Maritime Security in the Region: SCS and ECS as Key Arenas for Converging Political Interests. Asia-Pacific Review, 2016. Vol 23 No 2. Yoji Koda. The JMSDF puts antisubmarine warfare as the core of its operations to protect the sea-lanes. 786 NAA: A9737/3071397 DFAT 1991/3932 Part 4. Japan – Defence Relations with Australia. f 107. 787 Noonan, op.cit. 788 McGarry, op.cit. 789 Simon Monterola, Colonel, DASA Tokyo 2018-19, previously Defence Attaché to Beijing. 790 Exercise HARI’I HAMATUK in East Timor is a model example of Australia, the US, and Japan working together to deliver capacity building to a regional partner. See: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media- releases/australian-army-engineers-arrive-timor-leste-exercise-harii 791 Medcalf, op. cit. 792 Brendan Sergeant, Speech at the Williams Foundation panel event. ‘Why Australia Needs a Radically New Defence Policy’, 27 September 2018. 223 decided to rebuild its 1st Fleet as an expeditionary force in the Indo-Pacific. This will strengthen US regional presence and be ‘a response to China and its ‘increasingly expansionist and assertive tendencies’.793 The TSD will be vital in coordinating activity between the new capability and extant forces of the RAN and MSDF.

5.4.4. Preparing for Future Military Action

China has claimed many of the islets and reefs in the South China Sea and has militarised them for force projection. It also mounts a continual challenge to Japan over the Senkakus.794 Many interviewees consider these encroachments are intended to deny access to other nations who depend on trade routes through these areas. China has made defensive lines to its east: the ‘First’ and ‘Second Island Chains.’795 Interviewees consider this is has been done to deny access to others. China has claimed many of the islets and reefs in this area and militarised many. However, access to and from this area can be defence by air defence aircraft, and surface and sub-surface naval units, and can be defeated by opposing (western alliance) forces in the same domains. The JMSDF has long undertaken the blockading of key chokepoint straits—Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits–and defended its critical sea lines from Russian incursion796 The same processes would be used for combatting Chinese military action in the event of aggressive action taken against Taiwan or similar contingency in the East and South China seas.

The United States, Australia and Japan could co-operate in this manner in coalition operations, with or without a formal alliance, once preparatory measures has been made in preparation for, and in response to some form of crisis or contingency.

Japan's defence budget for 2021 will be its largest ever, reflecting the priorities set by previous Prime Minister Abe. The expenditure reflects 'big ticket' items to help the JSDF have greater resilience to react to natural disasters and enhance their amphibious capability. There is no return to militarism, and the budget remains within the traditional

793 US Navy to increase Australia port visits, in message to China. The Australian. 3 December 2020. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/us-navy-to-increase-australia-port-visits-in-message-to-china/ 794 ‘Tensions in the East China Sea’. Global Conflict Tracker, 25 March 2021. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict- tracker/conflict/tensions-east-china-sea 795 ‘The Taiwan Frontier and the Chinese Dominance for the Second Island Chain’. 13 August. Australian Institute for International Affairs. Joshua Espena, Chelsea Bomping. 2020. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwan-frontier-chinese-dominance-for-second-island-chain/ 796 Narushige Michishita, ‘2016: Lessons of the Cold War in the Pacific: U.S. Maritime Strategy, Crisis Prevention, and Japan’s Role. Narushige Michishita Peter M. Swartz David f. Winkler, Asia Program, Wilson Center. 224 one per cent of GDP limit set decades ago.797 Similarly, under the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Australia plans to spend up to 2.4 per cent of GDP from a lower base, focusing on new equipment to defend its own region and contribute to collaborative action elsewhere (see chapter 4).798

Bilaterally, under the revision of Japan's military guidelines, Australia and Japan have agreed to new processes and legislative changes in Japan that will allow the JSDF to provide 'asset protection' for the ADF. The agreement allows the JSDF to deploy weapons to protect Australian military assets, including ships and aircraft during joint training and peacetime surveillance activities in waters near Japan.799

Current HADS Halloran has remarked that Australia-Japan and Australia-US-Japan ‘joint maritime activities are increasing in depth, and the bilateral (Japan-Australia) and trilateral (Australia-US-Japan) transits of the South China Sea in September and October, as well as the very first April trilateral (Australia-Canada-Japan) activity in the Bay of Bengal, are evidence of this willingness to work increasingly more closely together, and with others’. Regarding Australia-Japan joint exercises, she explained that ‘the number of these exercises will increase and that it is important to increase their quality.’800 More recently, Halloran also noted that Japan’s proposal for Article 95-2 of the Self Defence Law allowing JSDF to protect ADF assets in non-combatant situations, is also reflective of Japan’s intent to become closer to Australia in a way that Japan can accommodate within its current legal framework. This is a provision that Japan has only previously offered to the Unites States and would seem to suggest that Japan does consider its relationship with Australia to be far more than could have been imagined 15 years ago.’

A common view is that we now 'need to operationalise intelligence sharing and coordinate our operational activities.' This is a good example of operationalising the relationship.'801 Japan is now talking about doing more training in Australia. It is considering options to store equipment and vehicles in Australia to facilitate this training. The countries are preparing

797 Japanese defence spending at the fiscal crossroads. Yuki Tatsumi, Stimson Center, Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU. 19 February 2021.https://ajrc.crawford.anu.edu.au/node/18463 798 Marcus Hellyer, ‘The Cost of Defence 2020–2021.’ The Strategist, ASPI. 22 October 2020. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cost-defence-2020-2021-part-2-aspi-defence-budget-brief 799 Aurelia G Mulgan, Japan’s new defence minister makes his early mark with Canberra. East Asia Forum, 6 November 2020. 800 Australian defence attaché: joint exercises with Japan and US to counter China in South China Sea. Sankei Shimbun, 27 August 2020, p. 2 801 Monterola, op.cit. 225 to move closer together militarily, bilaterally, trilaterally with the United States. Under separate arrangements, they will also act bilaterally and multilaterally with many ASEAN nations. Within the A-JDSR, interoperability as an outcome is being pursued, and coordination of activities is bilaterally managed at the strategic, operational and (occasionally) tactical levels. All indicators point to preparation that collaborative military action can be accommodated if necessary. But the alignment is still a 'virtual alliance'. The following sub-section looks at the realities of whether the two countries are committed to a strengthened A-JDSR that might involve conflict with China.

5.4.5. Commitments of A & J to cooperate in coalition

The previous section on the legitimacy of the JSDF spoke of a disparity in Japan over what may be conducted by the SDF and what may happen in a contingency. There is still ambiguity over the use of the SDF in cooperating with others and what is being practised with Australia. Japanese academic Michishita opines that the Japanese Government sends mixed message in peacetime to the public and t neighbours on possibilities of Japan working with other countries. However, he added, ‘there is no concern about high-end war-time cooperation. He considered that if there were a contingency such as may arise over Taiwan, the current reinterpretation of Article 9 means that… Japanese forces may be involved. But he added, at lower levels, the credibility of Japan's commitment is lower, leading to China's testing of Japan over areas such as incursions in the South China Sea.802

Politics and the strategic environment will guide any declaration by either Japan or Australia that they are prepared to conduct collective security. However, as shown, the time for such a declaration may soon arrive. Former Defence Associate Secretary Brendan Sergeant, no longer speaking for the government, considers that Japan is looking for new friends such as India and Australia and is trying to scope the broad security agenda. From an Australian perspective, he adds that the only constraint for the A-JDSR is what Japan will agree to do. For Australia, 'There's no constraint at the operational level of cooperation such as 'troops in Australia, PKO cooperation: nothing's off the table.'803 As the previous Chapter showed, the JSDF and ADF are conducting activities together, bilaterally and in conjunction with the United States, of a purely military nature: traditional

802 Michishita, op. cit. 803 Sergeant, op. cit. 226 military cooperation. How is this dichotomy explained in terms of the 2007 JDSC with an absence of intention to pursue these types of activities?

Japanese academic Ishihara considers that the lack of declared intentions in the 2007 JDSC has been no impediment for Japan in continuing with military alignment with Australia. He notes that it stretches credibility to say the A-JDSR is characterised only by 'non-traditional' defence cooperation when: Japan was prepared to share its close-held submarine technology to build Australia's submarine fleet and regularly exercise with the ADF. He does consider that Australia and Japan need 'to consider creating guidelines for their defence cooperation, like those between Japan and the US and South Korea and the United States. These guidelines would address how both can plan for and conduct military cooperation. Doing so would clarify the ambiguity that now exists, particularly on the Japanese side.804 This could be achieved by revising the 2007 Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation to include traditional military cooperation statements. In the end, political considerations will prevail. Still, a revised statement would simply reflect the status quo and perhaps clarify to Australia that Japan is prepared to match Australia's commitment to move beyond the current situation, which involves cooperation with no agreed end-state.

5.4.6. A Formalised update of JDSC/ Endorsement of TSD

As mentioned, the A-JDSR has most elements in place to allow Australia and Japan to take collective action to confront security challenges should it be in their sovereign interests to do so. It is likely that any such action would be part of a coalition created by the United States. For Australia, this commitment to work in a US-lead commitment is part of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. For Japan, as shown in the previous chapter, being part of such collective action is expected where there is a challenge to Japan’s security. Arrangements such as the ACSA and RAA (once implemented) and a declaration that the JSDF can help protect the ADF in a NEA contingency are important factors in a decision to cooperate effectively in a military coalition. In other words, if the A-JDSR is already a latent or virtual alliance, is further formalisation necessary? Many people interviewed for this thesis did not support moving to a more formal position in the A-JDSR: certainly not in advance of any strategic shock. However, in the expectation of

804 Yusuke Ishihara, The case for Japan–Australia Defence Cooperation Guidelines. The Strategist, 6 May 2015, NIDS. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-case-for-japan-australia-defence-cooperation-guidelines/ 227 strategic challenges arising from China and the United States jockeying for dominance, a clear statement is needed that the A-JDSR is robust, moving forward, and needs to be recognised as an exemplar for bilateral security cooperation. This could be simply achieved by Australia and Japan agreeing to a revision to the 2007 JDSC stating the obvious, that both countries are undertaking military activities and development that will enable them to act as coalition partners.

This thesis has shown that the A-JDSR is on the threshold of enabling significant cooperation between the two countries. The building of trust and interoperability is improving the quality of cooperative action. Political changes in Japan are facilitating the employment of the JSDF for possible collective or collaborative action. Regional challenges in NEA are increasing the likelihood that such action may be required.

A political declaration of the value of the A-JDSR intra-alliance could be effected by the declaration of a robust alignment when the Keating Government entered into the 1995 Indonesia-Australia Security Agreement with Indonesia. This required the partners only to meet to discuss ‘adverse challenges’. Nevertheless, it was a powerful statement of political alignment. Similarly, the A-J-US trilateral, built upon the A-JDSR and the basis for the QUAD, could be similarly recognised. It needs no further formalisation as it rests on three formalised alignments, but it would achieve much greater utility if the A-JDSR were further formalised. A declaration of the utility and value of the TSD by the three governments involved would be assist in development of a new security framework proposed in the next section.

228 Chapter Six

The Future of the A-JDSR in a Regional Security Framework

6.1 A New Security Framework based on the A-JDSR

How might the A-JDSR fit into a future regional security framework? Qualitative research showed strong support for a closer relationship and moving the A-JDSR beyond the status quo. Some felt that a precipitating situation of threat of armed conflict would hasten this process. There was strong support for further A-JDSR ‘formalisation’ but little articulation of what form this formalisation might take, although some argued for a formal alliance, bilaterally with Japan, or trilaterally.

Drawing on the original research in interviewees responses and the literature, the thesis proposes that the A-JDSR as a virtual- and an intra-alliance be used as an exemplar for building a pragmatic regional security framework based on the QUAD.

This last chapter first examines the range of extant regional security organisations to assess their utility for formalising the A-JDSR in a manner that strengthens regional security.

The thesis argues for a ‘bottom-up’ approach building upon an extant organisation such as the QUAD as the basis for a new organisation. This new arrangement takes the existing strengths and weaknesses of current organisations and, using a web of singular and multiple international relationships, builds a framework for cooperation that each member country can use to suit its own, and perhaps collective, interests. The section starts with an overview of extant alliances, regional and global multinational organisations.

Victor Cha’s model of ‘realistic’ pragmatic security architecture informs this chapter. Cha’s model describes, ‘networks and patchworks of differently configured and overlapping bilaterals, trilaterals, quadrilaterals, and other multilateral groupings that

229 stitched together to define the regional architecture.’805 A pragmatic architecture is the basis for a proposal for bilateral linkages like the A-JDSR to the QUAD structure becoming the optimal basis for future regional cooperation. The chapter discusses how this proposed architecture can use a more formalised A-JDSR, firmly embedded as a new ‘intra-alliance’, to facilitate enhanced regional cooperation.

The wider international relationship between Australia and Japan and with other regional partners has significant economic underpinnings and cultural and societal overtones. Latterly, security studies have increasingly looked at human security, including cooperation on pandemic control, climate change management, transnational crime, and refugee placements. All these issues are critically important, but they will only be touched upon in the exposition of security frameworks as this thesis focuses on military engagement and traditional security relationships.

This chapter looks again at the future of the A-JDSR in terms of how this may fit into a regional security framework. Having accepted that there not majority support to move beyond the A-JDSR status quo without a precipitating event, thesis research nevertheless shows strong support for the notion of further ‘formalisation’ of the relationship. This was discussed in the last chapter and will be relied on in the context of proposing a new regional security architecture.

6.2 The A-JDSR and Alliances, Trilaterals, and Multinational Organisations

For Australia, the ANZUS alliance is an enduring feature of the Australian security environment and the relationship in general.806 The US-JMST provides the same assurance for Japan. These two alliances form the backbone of the alliance system in the IP. The TSD is an important program of dialogue. However, thesis research showed some interviewees were concerned over the durability of these US regional commitments. But few saw any alternatives to remaining with and relying on the US alliance system. It has been declared the central component of Australian foreign, defence, and security policy for the foreseeable

805 Victor D. Cha. Asia’s Response to Climate Change and Natural Disasters: Implications for an Evolving Regional Architecture. Charles W. Freeman and Michael J. Green, eds. (Center for Strategic and International Studies July 2010) p. 112, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23561.9?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 806 Gary Brown and Laura Rayner, ‘Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years.’. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group. 28 August 2001. Current Issues Brief 3 of 2001-2. Australian Parliament. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB 230 future.807 This section looks at building that backbone into a whole body of connections. This can be achieved by using the A-JDSR as a template building-block for building a framework of security-building measures.

Past Chief of Defence Force Angus Houston has confidence in the reliability of US assurances under ANZUS for Australia. He notes that the US and Australia have fought alongside each other for a century in ‘a partnership forged under fire that has evolved into an alliance we should work hard to preserve.’ His view is that the United States should be viewed on its record of maintaining a ‘strong military presence in North and East Asia, which has given us more than 40 years of peace, stability and prosperity’. Australia should ‘be resolute in our support for the US with no talk on moving away from the alliance’ because it obtains great benefits from the US’ presence in Asia. He adds that the US is ‘the stabilising glue that binds the region together, and there simply is no substitute for it’ noting no regional security group is cohesive enough to be robust on security issues.’808

Australia reciprocates US commitments by engagement with US Forces and by continually promoting regional security. For example, there are ADF officers embedded in the US military national chain of command.809 Australia has not permitted US military forces to be permanently based in Australia. But it has long provided critical support to the US by hosting specific activities, for example, US space-based surveillance assets in Australia. Australia's Force Posture Initiative’ (FPI) has further opened bases and exercise areas to US forces.810 Under five-eyes cooperative and complementary activities, the ADF (using US-made equipment) has cooperatively provided US forces in the region with an unparalleled security picture. Chief among the Australian contribution has been the Jindalee over-the-horizon RADAR Network with its long-range and wide-area surveillance ability to provide air and surface intelligence covering Australia’s northern approaches as far from the Australian mainland as SEA. Australia’s force structure with its air capabilities in the Wedgetail Airborne Warning and Control System, its fighter force (F-18 Hornet and Super Hornet, and soon the Joint Strike Fighter), its radar-suppressing Growler aircraft, and maritime capabilities with the P-8 Poseidon aircraft, naval task groups and submarines provide

807 Charles Miller, Public support for ANZUS: Evidence of a generational shift? Australian Journal of Political Science, 2015. Vol. 50, No. 3, 442–461. 808 Houston, op cit. 809 Australian Major-Generals have been Deputy Commander, US Army, Pacific Forces, Hawaii. An Australian Vice- Admiral is the Deputy Commander United Nations Command Headquarters Korea. https://www.unc.mil/About/Our- Leaders/Article-View/Article/2067950/deputy-commander/ 810 See: https://www.defence.gov.au/initiatives/usfpi/ 231 considerable deployable military clout to the US—capabilities honed by common procedures, alignment of command and control, exemplary interoperability and regular exercising. The FPI has helped deepen ANZUS by adding a new institution to the treaty.

The pace of improvement is likely to accelerate as both sides build combined tri-service exercising, conduct maritime patrol operations, and build on the experience of successive rotations of US Marines based in Okinawa, Japan into Northern Australia to exercise.811

For Japan, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is central to all current and future planning.812 However, there is considerable ambiguity in the specificities of the US-JMST and ANZUS treaties with respect to mutual obligation and geographic scope. ANZUS is silent on the area of response but can be regarded as global. The scope of the US-JMST is limited and geographically imprecise but taken to be restricted to the areas around Japan. This could lead to some difficulties for Australia if it were to be invited to join in collective conflict resolution in Northeast Asia as these treaty obligations are ambiguous, but a political decision can overcome those.

Although these two treaties are the bedrock of national security, there are not exclusive, and Australia and Japan have hedged their options by making separate, mainly bilateral, links with other countries as well as sharing membership in multilateral organisations.

Other regional defence alliances have been selected for comparison to the A-JDSR ‘virtual’ alliance. These are the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)813 and the now-abrogated IASA.814 The FPDA is worthy of comparison because, although the original raison d'être has long disappeared, it has endured because it has a renewed utility for each of its members. It exercises its new utility by institutionalising a regional security arrangement, the Integrated Area Defence System, with a headquarters funded by members, with a Commander and (most) staff provided by Australia. The United Kingdom declared in its 2015 Security Review that the FPDA is an ‘important commitment to peace and security in

811 Michael Crane, ‘Boosting the US presence in northern Australia—slowly but surely’ The Strategist. 21 Mar 2019. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/michael-crane/ 812 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Article V. 813 ‘Joint Military Exercise Highlights Five Power Defense Agreements’. Prasanth Pamameswaran. The Diplomat. 17 October 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/joint-military-exercise-highlights-five-power-defense-agreements/ 814 The announcement of the IASA (signed on 18 December 1995) was unveiled just before signing. Indonesia's willingness to conclude the IASA was a surprise as Indonesia had long remained aloof from any formal alliances. 232 the region’ and supports ‘strong bilateral defence relationships’ including Australia. 815 Notably, in a sign that the FPDA was extending its geographic interest, the most recent exercise took place in Malaysia, Singapore, and over the South China Sea. Similarly, the IASA required only that ‘both countries agreed to consult each other whenever they faced a ‘common danger’’.816 Both treaties are marked by bilateral pragmatism acting in national interests and using existing organisation.

Prime among minilateral organisations that governments use to coordinate their security are the trilaterals. They gain their relevance by nations building upon their separate bilateral engagements that require only one other partner to improve coordinative possibilities. The US-Japan-Australian Trilateral Strategic dialogue is political as it meets at the elected ministerial-level. Its discussions are not published, and it is not formally institutionalised. It allows for the sharing of views between governments and strategic coordination to achieve agreed priorities. It has real utility in gaining trust between partners and allows for shared endorsement of priorities, shared interests, and provides cover and for activities underway or planned.817 Stimson Center’s Co-director Yuki Tatsumi said, ‘the Trilateral Strategic relationship among the United States, Japan, and Australia has quickly emerged as one of the most robust ‘minilateral’ cooperative relationships that the United States has with its allies.’818 Trilaterals as informal alliances show solidarity to others and their activity shows deterrence and commitment to shared values and interests.

There is a view that the A-J-US trilateral is evolving into what could be described as a program for trilateral engagement beyond annual dialogue. The Australian Chief of Defence Force at the time of TSD commencement, Angus Houston, said: ‘After the JDSC, the enthusiasm for trilateral dialogue between Japan and Australia and the United States gained real momentum. My work at the (Australian) National Security Committee of Cabinet indicated to me Japan was taking interest in these trilaterals.’819 Any regional security architecture should include this TSD as a component. Remembering that the United States

815 ‘National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015—A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom’ UK Parliament. November 2015. Cl 5.82, p 59. 816 Statement made at the time by past CDF Gration acting as PM Keating’s envoy to Asian nations (including Japan, assisted by the author), when he was tasked with explaining the AISA to our strategic neighbours. 817 Australia-Japan-United States Defense Ministers Meeting. Joint Press Statement. 7 July 2020. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2266901/australia-japan-united-states-defense-ministers- meeting-joint-statement/ 818 US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, Program Japan Report. 20 October 2010. Hana Rudolph and Yuki Tatsumi. https://www.stimson.org/2010/us-japan-australia-security-cooperation-prospects-and-challenges/ 819 Houston, op.cit. 233 encouraged Japan and Australia (see chapter 2) to come closer together, the United States uses trilateral dialogues to ‘leverage close US alliance relationships into broader arrangements focused on regional concerns.’820 However, all three governments in the A-J- US trilateral do not consider it to be ‘a mechanism to replace the hub-and-spoke system under whose umbrella both the US-JMST ANZUS alliances fit.’ 821 Nevertheless, any regional security architecture should include this TSD as a component.

6.2.1. Regional Security and Economic Organisations as a basis for security architecture

There is a range of multilateral security organisations or institutions that impact the actions of Indo-Pacific nations. Globally, major ones are the United Nations, NATO (with interests in Indo-Pacific security individually, little collectively, their subsidiaries, and national economic blocs such as the Group of Eight and the Group of 20. Regionally, major fora with a principal or secondary focus on security include: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC); the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although APEC has begun to develop a security cooperation dimension, the ARF is the most comprehensive multilateral security institution. Under China’s leadership, the SCO has a vital role in the region’s multilateral security efforts, if only by dint of its membership.

There are many security-focused mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific, some related to alliances, some not, some ad hoc, some more formalised. An example of an alliance-related security functional mechanism is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which is carrying out, with the agreement of China, UN sanctions against North Korea (see earlier in section 3.5).

The ARF is an example of diplomacy-in-action, preferring to manage affairs through culturally-sensitive informal consensus, cooperation and compromise. 822 Security issues within ASEAN are addressed by the ARF, founded by Australia in 1994, which provides a ‘setting in which members can discuss current security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region.’823 So the ARF, seen by some as a security arm of ASEAN, can provide both the forum and the focus for political dialogue and

820 Cossa et al., ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region,’ p. 32. 821 Auslin, ‘Shaping a Pacific Future,’ p. 18. 822 Gillian Goh. ‘The 'ASEAN Way'; Non-Intervention and ASEAN's Role in Conflict Management’. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs. Spring 2003. pp 113–18. 823 https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/Pages/asean-regional-forum-arf 234 possible implementation of security activity.824 But there are many ASEAN nations who are mindful of economic dependence on China, an ASEAN members. This potential fear and the agreed necessity to not criticise member nations and to abide by consensus views limits ARF willingness to take action, collectively or individually.

Although ASEAN has achieved some security outcomes, Australia has been frustrated with the ‘ASEAN way’ of compromise and slow progress as an organisation. As Australian Ambassador to ASEAN, Jane Duke, said: ‘It’s easy to overlook ASEAN’s contribution to SEA’s transformation from conflict and poverty to peace and prosperity just as it is easy to be frustrated by the slow pace of Asian multilateralism.’ 825

Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who has long been a strong supporter of multilateralism in Asia,826 now considers that ‘the ARF seems irredeemably bust as an effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanism. Australia pushed hard for it to move beyond confidence-building measures to conflict management and resolution (although these are separate concepts) but it has been bypassed.’ He considers that some ASEANs are in China's thrall, and any consensus by the ARF to take is now impossible to achieve. Evans believes that the ASEAN organisation itself needs to change, but there is no appetite for this to happen. He considers that the East Asia Summit (EAS)827 is potentially useful for security cooperation and economic matters. But ‘it needs real commitment, real dialogue, and an effectively functioning Secretariat. I am a true believer in the EAS and the G20 in policy- making processes, but member states need to lift their game.’ In summary, Evans considers that mini-lateralism and the building of cooperative, coordinated behaviour will be significant elements in building regional security, but is concerned at the lack of regional will to achieve this.828

Some of these institutions and organisations could provide accretion points for a regional security architecture. Bisley describes the characteristics of such a pragmatic architecture: regionally inclusive membership like that of the ARF; processes like the six-party talks (for

824 In January 1992, ASEAN leaders agreed that ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of cooperation in security matters using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, See: Singapore Declaration of 1992. ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting Report, Singapore, 27-28 January, pp.1-18. 825 ‘What does ASEAN mean for Australia? Ms Jane Duke, Australian Ambassador to ASEAN. Remarks at ASEAN 50 Years Celebration Business Forum, 31 March 2017. https://asean.mission.gov.au/aesn/HOMSpeech17_01.html 826 What Asia needs is a Europe-style CSCA. G Evans - International Herald Tribune, 1990. 827 The East Asia Summit is the Indo-Pacific's premier forum for strategic dialogue. Australia participated, as a founding member, in the inaugural EAS held in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005. 828 Evans. op. cit. 235 Korean re-unification); and concepts of regional security as argued in the CSCAP.829 He considers that ‘The underlying purpose of an architecture in the Indo-Pacific is to reduce security threats and, in doing so, transform the interests and identities of Asian states and societies’ through the coordination of state(s) policy—the realists call this ‘the realities of power’. Any Asian security architecture must cope with two formidable challenges. The architecture must incorporate a vast range of security threats—from interstate rivalry and territorial disputes to transnational crime—as well as overcome the tremendous gulf of opinion among regional powers over the kinds of risks the region faces. If a security architecture requires a consensus about the nature of security risks and the policies to respond to those risks, Asia falls short. ‘Although multilateral efforts have undergone remarkable expansion, their capacity to deliver substantive policy cooperation has thus far been limited.’830

6.2.2. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as a basis for security architecture

This sub-section looks at the suitability of the QUAD to be the foundation for a pragmatic regional security architecture. In the November 2020 meeting, QUAD members had declared they were determined to ‘support a region of resilient and sovereign states’ and strengthen the rules-based international order. Then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went further, calling for the QUAD to be developed into a ‘true security framework’.831 Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi hinted at the possible expansion of the QUAD.832 Before the second meeting, Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun said that Washington was aiming to institutionalise growing strategic ties with the QUAD.’833 The tenor of the discussion was shifting towards addressing China’s increasing growth, both economically and militarily, in the IP.834

829 Nick Bisley, ‘APEC and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,’ in People, States and Regions, ed. Anne Hammerstad (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005), p. 359 830 Nick Bisley, ‘Domestic political change and grand strategy’. Eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008. Chapter: Asian Security Architecture., pp 341-371. 831Ben Packham and Will Glasgow. Japan wants our help to get in on Five Eyes. The Australian, 9 October 2020. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/japan-wants-our-help-to-get-in-on-five-eyes/ 832 India makes China point, US hints at ‘formal’ QUAD, Hindustan Times, New Delhi. & October 2020. 833 U.S. aims to 'formalize' four-nation 'QUAD' security grouping AFP-JIJI,.1 September 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/01/asia-pacific/china-us-QUAD/? 834 In 1995, China’s defense spending was $26.1 billion in constant 2018 US dollars, 2.4 per cent of the world total. By 2019, it had grown tenfold to $266.5 billion and was then 14.2 per cent of global defense spending. See: How developed is China’s Arms industry? Centre for Strategic and International Studies, China Power Project. 2 March 2021.https://chinapower.csis.org/arms-companies/ 236 On 18 February 2021, at the third virtual QUAD ministerial meeting of Australia, Japan, India, and the United States discussed a range of security matters, including many beyond the usual military security paradigm but nevertheless foci for broader issues of cooperative security. In an historic first, the Heads of the QUAD Governments met virtually on 13 March 2021, lifting the arrangement to a new political high. The meeting moved from a previous position on opposing Chinese expansionism, to one that promoted ‘’softer’ capabilities in line with Indo-Pacific public-goods needs rather than promote a singular counter-China orientation’. Nevertheless, the end of meeting joint statement recalled robust FOIP sentiments that the QUAD nations ‘strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.’835 Prime Minister Morrison indicated that he was seeking security by ‘working with our partners, and with our allies in particular.’

The QUAD is now sending a signal that regional democracies may be prepared to work together and shows early determination by the new Biden administration to focus on the Indo-Pacific. Chinese reaction to the meeting was swift. President Xi Jinping instructed his military to focus on ‘combat readiness’ just before the QUAD meeting and warned that the Quad as an ‘exclusive grouping should not be used to target any specific nation. The country’s state media has been more direct, arguing that Beijing should use its economic power to counter ‘provocations’ by the grouping.836

Interviewees in our research indicated cautious support for the QUAD as a security mechanism. Former Ambassador to Tokyo Bruce Miller says: ‘China’s actions mean the QUAD is more likely to develop into a strategic grouping. The interests of the four members still differ but are closer than they were.’837

US Ambassador Culvahouse said in 2020 ‘if the US moves to contain or thwart China, then the other QUAD members will be tested: India is still least interested in moving QUAD along, based on India wanting to see a balance with China, as it is exposed to China’s economic pressure. The building of economic prosperity is the key to building the resilience

835 ‘Historic’ Summit Quad Commits to Meeting Key Indo-Pacific Challenges. The Diplomat. 13 March 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/in-historic-summit-quad-commits-to-meeting-key-indo-pacific-challenges/ 836 ‘QUAD Leaders meet to discuss Indo-Pacific stability.’ The Australian, 11 March 2021. 837 Miller, op. cit., updated with private correspondence on 9 April 2021. 237 of like-minded nations.’838 Gareth Evans believes that the QUAD had assumed a renewed significance as India becomes much more focused on the Chinese challenge and recognises the utility, as does Australia, of this demonstration of solidarity by this group of major non- Chinese players.839 Commenting on the A-JDSR, Kersten says that Japan sees congruence with the FOIP vision in the QUAD, adding that Australia influences how the QUAD progresses through carefully shaping its institutionalisation and influencing the priorities that this group addresses collaboratively. Notably for this thesis, she considers that the structure and sequence of bilateral and trilateral relations between QUAD member states have followed the template set by Australia-Japan security relations. Through high-level bilateral dialogue, Australia can influence the articulation of an aligned security outlook and policy framework.840

Literature reviews of documents written since the QUAD was revitalised in 2020 show similar views. An Indian scholar indicated that an overarching security architecture could be based on an expanded QUAD by encompassing some more like-minded nations in the region.841 But there are legacy issues for Australia and India to address. Past Australian High Commissioner to India John McCarthy, argues that ‘while we (Australia) build better relations with India, in the past it has made known to us its reservations about closer security relations in the QUAD, as well as doubting our long-term commitment to QUAD post-Rudd withdrawal.’842 This view may have changed in the past five years. A US view is that the QUAD was revived at the foreign ministerial level in 2017 to respond to an increasingly changing regional landscape and as a reconfirmation of its original spirit.

The rise of the QUAD discussions has cast doubt on the concept of ‘centrality’ in ASEAN.843 ASEAN members remain insecure about the prospect of an alternative regional order-making institution like the QUAD, considering that ASEAN centrality should be the ‘primary driving force’ in shaping the group’s external relations in a regional architecture

838 Arthur Culvahouse, US Ambassador to Australia. ASPI Webinar. ‘Indo-Pacific P Leaders’ Dialogue: US-Australia Relations’. 7 October 2020. https://www.aspi.org.au/video/indo-pacific-leaders-dialogue-future-us-australia-relations 839 Evans. op. cit. 840 Rikki Kersten ‘Japan and the QUAD’ ANU Centre of Gravity Series. (Murdoch University 2018). http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/5996/debating-QUAD 841 Rajiv Narayanan in ‘Emerging Geo-Political Trends in the Indo–Pacific: Implications and Way Ahead.’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIX, No. 618, October-December 2019. https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/emerging-geo-political-trends-in-the-indo-pacific-implications-and-way- ahead/?_sfm_journal_author=… 842 John McCarthy, Australian Ambassador to Japan 2001-04, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, private interview. 21 July 2020. 843 See: AntonTsetov,‘Will the QUAD Mean the End of ASEAN Centrality?’ The Diplomat, 15 November 2017. 238 that is open, transparent, and inclusive.844 Inferences that the QUAD is either a nascent NATO or an alternative to the extant US-led alliance system need to be carefully managed, as would any exclusion of China in any every Asian security structure. However, a 2018 survey of ASEAN academics, military, and government staffers found that there was majority support for QUAD as having a valuable role in regional security: complementing existing ASEAN-centred regional security frameworks and being seen as an ‘anti-China bulwark’. One third welcomed the QUAD because it made their countries safer, but another third believed it could raise tensions. An overwhelming number (69%) agreed that QUAD should enforce the rules-based order, especially over Chinese incursions in the South China Sea. Two-thirds of ASEAN respondents agreed that QUAD should not expand beyond the current members: the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.845 However, as discussed previously, QUAD members themselves see little value in placing confidence in ASEAN structures reacting to Chinese expansionism or indeed, acting on other challenges to Southeast Asian security.

QUAD is a dialogue forum. It is neither an alliance nor a defence agreement: it is an imagined grand strategy yet to be realised. It has the support of four of the major regional democracies and has the potential to bind the region together’. 846 However, a former Commander US Forces Japan says, ‘We need organisations like the QUAD as it is an added component for US forward-deployed deterrence. It sends a real, credible message to China. QUAD is not an Asian NATO. It will take lots of commitment to make it so and can only happen if four QUAD countries become an alliance.’847

The value of QUAD so far is that it has brought together four major players in regional security, each of whom has significant bilateral partners who may be enjoined to collaboratively participate in regional security action should it suit their interests. It does so by creating personal dialogue opportunities in situations that can generate trust and understanding. While the United States is a member, there is no overt leadership domination

844 Euan Graham, ‘The QUAD Deserves its Second Chance,’ in Debating the QUAD, Centre of Gravity Series, ed. Andrew Carr (Acton, ACT: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2018). 845 Le Thu, Huong. Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Survey findings. ASPI Special Report, 2018. Survey of 276 answers from staff from government agencies, militaries, academia, think tanks, businesses, media, and university students from all 10 ASEAN countries

847 Ibid. Lieutenant General Martinez. 239 by Washington. QUAD is outside the US alliance system, or at least an adjunct to it, although China has accused the QUAD as being a Trojan Horse for an ‘Asian NATO’.848

Collaborative defence arrangements can be considered the sum of bilateral and trilateral partnerships that are then operationalised as a broader regional grouping. A broader grouping such as QUAD develops slowly with each meeting or exercise without a collective alliance rigidity. This characteristic of the QUAD provides the tactical flexibility for bilateral or trilateral partnerships to be invoked in response to threats.849 In other words, individual or mini-lateral action can take as each member or partner considers appropriate after collaborative discussion. Collective defence in the form of coalition operations could also ensue, but the QUAD would remain a collaborative forum, even in expanded form if that occurred. Some say that the QUAD won’t work because the four partners' histories and agendas are too different. However, this views the QUAD narrowly as a military alliance with an emphasis on collective military action. It can be and is much more.

The UK floated the idea of a ‘Democracy 10’ (including the QUAD countries) to tackle issues of collective interest. QUAD can embrace a multilateral approach that builds on strategic alliances and partnerships globally.850 These thoughts lead to the possibility of an expanded QUAD.

6.2.3. QUAD Plus?

QUAD members have discussed a wider view of security. However, they have still maintained a position of resisting Chinese regional expansionism (maintaining the status quo) and upholding the rules-based order. Some QUAD members, notably the United States, have called for the ad hoc QUAD to be expanded into a grouping called the QUAD Plus. For Australia, its developing security relations with the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam and traditional ANZUS partner New Zealand would seem logical.851 Other ‘like- minded’ nations might wish to join, especially those like the Philippines which is

848 QUAD desires ‘Asian NATO,’ but China has smarter solutions. Global Times. Zhang Jiadong. 11 November 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1203120.shtml 849 Why the QUAD should focus on collaborative not collective defence. The Strategist, ASPI, 16 February 2021. 850 Uniting against authoritarianism: a blueprint for the QUAD. The strategist. 26 February 2021. John Garrick and Yan C. Bennett. 851 The Indo-Pacific: from principles to partnerships. Speech by Winston Peters, Foreign Minister, New Zealand to the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). New Delhi, India. 26 February 2020. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/indo-pacific-principles-partnerships 240 experiencing Chinese coercion.852 France is the first nation to be seen to be participating on a QUAD-plus military activity, joining QUAD navies in a three-day multilateral naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal.853

Beijing does not hide its unhappiness at this new discussion, but it does not always follow its own rules.854 The QUAD Plus expansion debate should not be about the world ‘ganging up on China’; instead, it should be seen as a grouping of nations that consider that internationally agreed levels of behaviours need to be observed. China observers say it is about ‘rather seeking safety in numbers: creating a context where China cannot coerce us individually and has to engage with norms, rules and material realities set by a community of interests.’855

Forestalling Chinese criticism of Australia, a former senior naval officer interviewee said: “We conduct operations in the SCS and have done so for decades: we are simply 'normalising our presence' in an area of interest to us for its supply routes. The same can be said for other activities which Australia has been conducting for many years (such as RIMPAC), or for a lesser time such as supporting rotations of Marines from Okinawa into the Northern Territory. These should not be a basis for criticism from China. The empirical qualitative research for this thesis, especially that of the interviews from many senior security practitioners heavily supports the concept that a security structure based on the QUAD will be of real benefit to maintaining the ‘rules-based global’. On that basis, the thesis proposes that a pragmatic, effective and sustainable regional security architecture be based on the foundation established by the QUAD.

A regional security architecture based on an expanded QUAD represents a pragmatic, collaborative structure that would assist in maintaining regional security by coordinating action in ways that would be comfortable to the nations taking that action. Collaboratively, collectively or in a coalition, responses to security challenges will have a three-fold effect.

852 Ketian Zhang, Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea: Resolve and Costs, Quarterly Journal: International Security. January 2020. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/chinese-coercion-south-china-sea-resolve-and-costs- 0 853 India joins French-led naval exercise, revealing clues about Quad’s plans to contain China in Indo-Pacific. South China Post, 4 April 2021. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3128236/india-joins-french-led-naval- exercise-revealing-clues-about 854 Chengxin Pan, ‘Qualms about the QUAD: Getting China wrong,’ in Debating the QUAD, The Centre of Gravity Series Discussion Paper (Canberra: ANU, March 2018), 855 Rory Medcalf, ‘Five dangerous myths in Australia’s relations with China,’ Financial Review, 11 September 2020. A QUAD Plus? The Prospects for Australia and New Zealand Miguel A. Hijar-Chiapa. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Vol 3, No 3. Special Issue 2020. Pp 87-105. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/

241 Firstly, a coordinated effort will benefit from the weight that multiple replies will have. Secondly, combined action will encourage hesitant nations that acting in their interests can be achieved by doing so with like-minded countries. Thirdly, by encouraging regional governments to enforce the rules in their region, and with the implied or actual support of the major powers at the core of the QUAD and will relieve the United States or Australia of the odium of coming to the region as an extra-regional enforcer.

6.3 Pragmatic proposal

This thesis proposes a pragmatic future security framework for the Indo-Pacific. The proposal emphasises utility and pragmatism; it is based on realpolitik; and takes into account the status quo. The proposed structure will, by its reliance on both extant formal links and other links, provide resilience as the power balances move within the system. The proposed structure allows to seek separate and collective security through the application of own and collective national power backed by the three principles of military power: assurance, deterrence and compellance.

Former Foreign Minister Downer considers that Australia has two key geostrategic goals: ‘a regional architecture that balances the rise of China and engaging the United States in the Indo-Pacific. He considers that the alliances with Japan and Australia underwrite US strategic engagement—and these relationships are necessary to ‘consolidate the power balance of the region’. He considers that the QUAD (with its security focus) and other institutions, including the East Asia Summit (with its economic focus) is part of the ‘architecture we put in place’ to meet Chinese challenges.856

Former Foreign Affairs Secretary Varghese warns against creating a ‘structural fault line in Asia and further harden[ing] China's position’ by having an architecture based on the US- led alliance system. A realistic security construct would assist with ensuring a peaceful evolution of a future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, but not be based on the US-based ‘hub-and-spoke’ system with connotations of ensuring US supremacy. Does such a system exist? What does the theory say?

856 Downer, op. cit. 242 Bisley describes three alternative theoretical security systems based on realism models. His first alternative is based on the template of the ‘Six-Party Talks to a Northeast Asian Security Regime’ which was established to meet a specific need: to bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula. It has hitherto generated no useful outcome. A second alternative is a ‘Pan-Asian Security Community’. Bisley considers that, for this to work, major powers need to ‘stop thinking of one another as threats to their respective interests.’ This alternative also does not look attractive, given the failure of extant organisations such as the ARF, the ‘growing rivalry among the major powers’, and a tendency for major powers to ‘see military mechanisms as the most appropriate means to resolving security problems’. A third alternative is a multilateral organisation based on the United States alliance system. For reasons advanced earlier in this thesis, such an approach would not be attractive to many nations in the region. Bisley advances a final alternative: a ‘Multidimensional Asian Security Mechanism’. This would involve transformation of US presence ‘from a bilateral military alliance system organised on the hub-and-spoke model into a multilateral and multidimensional security mechanism.’ Bisley considers that this model, if fully institutionalised, would have ‘substantial diplomatic, political, and logistical capacities that would operate alongside a multilateral military alliance.’ It would allow for ‘collective defense of all members, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and a political and diplomatic coordination role’. Bisley considered that China should be offered a ‘stake in the system.’857

In all collective security structures, sovereign states seek additional security through non- collective means. This is neither 'bandwagonning' nor multilateralism imposed on an alliance system but is more a pragmatic structure of tiers of alliance and sub-alliance arrangements with a spectrum of commitments and demonstrated alliances overlain with a constructive dialogue construct of diplomacy which excludes none and seeks to engage all in a manner that permits useful dialogue on defence and security issues.

For middle powers such as Japan and Australia, the creation of a dependable security architecture in the Indo-Pacific needs to provide, in the first place, reassurance that their sovereignty and national interests will not be crushed by superpower conflict. It will need to accommodate a rising China, but be one that can co-exist with other nations and respect their interests. The structure must be effective, and this requires that the components of the

857 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Domestic political change and grand strategy.’ Eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008. Chapter: Asian Security Architecture. Nick Bisley, pp 341-371. 243 structure are effective as well as requiring nations to act collective where collective interests are threatened. It must allow for grievances to be addressed, and dialogue and other interaction between members must contribute to greater regional security. Alliances are an important part of this structure, but so are other forms of interaction—bilateral and multilateral.

This thesis proposes a pragmatic future security framework for the Indo-Pacific. It reflects Bisley’s fourth alternative for a multilateral organisation and recognises—for demonstrated reasons—Australia' and Japan's desire to remain firmly grounded in the US-centred' hub- and spoke' alliance system, and to incorporate, by association only, like-minded nations wishing to contribute to maintenance of the rules-based global order. This proposal is based on the extant alliance system, but with those spokes of the hub-and-spokes strengthened by inter-radial security arrangements between alliance partners. There would be trilaterals and bilateral linkages between the United Sates and other allies and non-allied security partners reinforcing the spokes as cross-braces. This foundation would facilitate cooperation and collective activity across a range of security, economic, cultural and defence issues. It would be US-centred, as that is the hub lies, but its intra-alliance linkages and multiplicity of connections would ensure that multiple voices would be heard and accommodated: in other words, not necessarily US-led. The intra-spoke connections would be informal or formal bilaterals between nations: perhaps intra-alliance if there were sufficient formalisation, and trilaterals linking back to the hub. The real strength of this foundational layer would be the linking in of non-alliance partners, again, with degrees of commitment in their alignments. The opportunity to allow the application of soft power in this western values diaspora will encourage the US to engage the with region even more firmly than before.

Overlaying this extended traditional model, would be the multifarious multilateral security organisations, some with a security focus, some with wider economic and other foci, some productive, some less focused. Member nationals would apply resources to these fora in accordance with their national priorities and expected outcomes, recognising their varying utility but accepting the inclusiveness they bring to the dialogue tables.

The final layer would centre on the QUAD (or QUAD Plus) construct as a central ‘node of influence’, with the national members of this extant or extended organisation acting as subordinate nodes of influence. They would also act as ‘accretion nodes’ for influencing

244 and cooperating with others. QUAD, likely extended to QUAD Plus, would act as a peak forum to discuss security (across the whole range of security issues such as human, economic, defence and military matters which would then be acted on collectively and individually. ‘Accretion nodes’, led by Japan, India, Australia, later New Zealand, France, Germany as members of an expanded QUAD Plus, would act to attract like-minded nations to act in consonance. For example, Australia, with significant bilateral linkages with countries in SEA can develop security linkages that are congruent within the overall structure but tailored to the specificities of the bilateral link and the engaged nation. Such actions are underway, informally at government level and in track 1.5 and 2-level discussions.858

While much of this proposal effectively reflects the status quo, institutionalisation of the model would firmly cement it as an effective structure. Bisley’s architecture envisages a full institutionalisation that would have a permanent military headquarters and secretariat with formal accreditation of diplomatic processes. The thesis does not propose this level of institutionalisation but does consider that the QUAD should be institutionalised with a coordinating Secretariat to provide a focus for coordinative and collective action, and to interface with contributing nations and other nodes.859 In the meantime, regional nations would need to be encouraged to build the inter-spoke linkages through formal alignments such as intra-alliances of varying formality as well as other bilateral and multilateral linkages. Australia and Japan will need to make plain their interest in acting as accretion nodes for the advancement, in the relative areas of influence in South Pacific and Southeast and Northeast Asia their intention to act as advocates of sub-regional stability. A multiplicity of these relations can only add significantly to regional and global security.

6.4 Summary

Australia does more militarily with Japan than any other country except the United States. There can be no other reason for this tempo of engagement than a desire to improve their

858 Interviewee Rear Admiral Simon Cullen spoke of involvement in the Track 1.5 Akahan program, an Indonesia- Australian organisation set up by when Chief of Defence Force. It discreetly act as a ‘safety-valve’ with retired 4, 3, and 2-stars speaking in an informal capacity strengthening maritime security cooperation, sounding out ‘the possible’. He gave an example of the Australia’s Pacific Step-up program when a forum was arranged for the Pacific Patrol boat program engaging professionals from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Japan. 859 An example of a small Secretariat to support QUAD is that of the modest (less than 10 staff) headquarters in Malaysia for the to support Five Power Defence Arrangements.

245 own and mutual security and that of the region. As the world witnesses a rising superpower face an extant hegemon, there is real potential for conflict and clash of ideologies. But the Thucydides trap does not need to spring—countries in the Indo-Pacific can come together to help these two powers find accommodation as all pursue their own agenda for peace and prosperity. But they need to show collective resilience if they wish to support the rule-based global order—this is at the heart of the military and security alignment Japan and Australia are building.

This thesis examines the history and possible future trajectory of the A-JDSR. It has done so from the perspectives of those closely engaged in the relationship; they were there and shaped the A-JDSR, and their insights are now added to the academic literature. The thesis has researched sources and tells the story of the A-JDSR from inception to 2021. It supplements and authenticates this story with the recollections of 94 participants in the development of the A-JDSR. The research and story close an epistemological gap and produce new knowledge of the A-JDSR. The new knowledge of what went on, why and who was contributed to the A-JDSR allowed the thesis to develop an argument for the optimum next step for the A-JDSR.

The thesis argued for a triple-tiered arrangement based on the extant alliance system, supplemented by a combination of multiple bilateral engagements using the A-JDSR in a pragmatic range of engagements that constitute a collective ‘virtual’ alliance. The first tier, the foundation, is the western alliance system, but with intra-alliances between the spokes. The second tier is a construct based on the QUAD/QUAD Plus with accretion nodes radiating from QUAD members reaching out to other like-minded nations. Thew third tier is a web composed of the extant multilaterals and other extant security fora. Gluing all together is the normal web of diplomatic linkage. The model is a multi-dimensional construct of overlapping alignments of alliances, intra-alliances, and a range of informal and formal bilateral, multilateral arrangements.

The thesis addressed the challenges to national and regional security and the historical bases for security in both Australia and Japan. A summary statement from the architect of Australia’s first rational view of its security posture, Paul Dibb, is that Australia faces the prospect for the first time in generations of a ‘dominant power adversary with whom we do not share fundamental values, operating in our neighbourhood and capable of

246 threatening us with high-intensity conflict.’860 If true, then Australia needs not only to rely on its traditional source of security under the ANZUS alliance, but must take every action, singly and with others, to avoid such an outcome. This collective action goes well beyond hedging, and is the very essence of why Australia, and its like-minded security partnership are seeking to build their ‘special strategic relationship’ to something stronger to assist in creating their future security.

Chapters 2-5, the history and strategic assessment chapters presented the empirical bases of this thesis. They addressed obstacles to cooperative action such as a need to review Japan’s Constitution or vary its interpretation; political and ideological opposition in Japan and Australia; the long-term impact of a revised US foreign policy; tensions between Japan, China, Australia, the United States and other regional countries; and American and Chinese responses to closer defence and security relations between Australia and Japan. Realism concepts of great power relationships were applied to explain how the trajectory of the A- JDSR changed over time. These chapters were, in turn, the basis for developing a new concept of alignment between Australia and Japan compared to traditional alliance.

The A-JDSR developed only slowly until the first Abe government and the Howard government in 2007 jointly declared that would cooperate in security action. The declaration was based on trust bolstered by the force protection that was offered to the JSDF by the ADF when they faced a security dilemma. This was accompanied trilateral discussions with the United States, their mutual security partner. Mutual trust was reinforced when the ADF came to assist the people of Japan in their hours of need after the 2011 Triple Disaster. The seeds of the current quadrilateral security dialogue were sown. Some events were circumscribed by fear of criticism from China: muted then, more strident now. A gradual strengthening of the A-JDSR followed, leading to the development of interoperability that approaches that level which each partner enjoys with the United States. With the RAA in place, and a commitment to allow the JSDF to help protect ADF assets if they are operating together in defence of Japan, the A-JDSR will have all the foundational elements that would allow Australia and Japan to operate in cooperative military action (if this were in both countries' interests). Some impediments remain such as full and trusted exchange of intelligence, but an expanded construct based on the Five-Eyes system can be developed given political will and trust that confidences will be protected.

860 Dibb. 2018, op, cit. 247

Both militaries need to practise their interoperability and improve it to include higher-end warfare. The tripartite nature must endure and build stronger bilateral links. Both countries must pursue regional engagement to build a coalition of like-minded nations. The A-JDSR as an ‘intra alliance’ has all the military enabling underpinnings in place to become is effectively a ‘virtual alliance’ linking together two arms in the US alliance system.

The Biden administration has indicated that it is prepared to consult and work with allies and partners as they face Chinese challenges—in Australia’s case, aggressive trade policies. Japan is now prepared to engage in collective self-defence, and it has everything it needs now in terms of JSDF legitimacy. The A-JDSR will allow for collective action if needed, especially if there were precipitating action from threats to either nation.

Interviewees had much to say about the A-JDSR. There was unanimity that the days of traditional alliances are over, but all supported close interactive cooperation as being essential for regional, if not global, security. There was no support for ‘containing China’, but most agreed an accommodation for a rising China needed to be found. There was a strong view that the United States supports a closer A-JDSR and the concept of multiple bilateral arrangements—especially if they move to multilateral arrangements. There was support for formalising the A-J-US TSD, if not the bilateral A-JDSR, noting that a degree of formality already existed there. However, many considered that the prospect of a precipitating event would prompt more formalisation to the point of striking an alliance. Two past Chiefs of Defence Force considered that should a contingency arise, the A-JDSR could rapidly change to something more formal. There was overwhelming support for the A-JDSR as an exemplar of multidimensional intersection of security postures to be emulated in other bilateral arrangements. Even without further formalisation, activities in the A-JDSR were being conducted in a spirit of pragmatism and ‘plausible deniability’ as a means to operate together and improve interoperability for future cooperative action.

Biden’s new Asia ‘czar’ considers that Indo-Pacific has three needs: a balance of power; an order that all can recognise as legitimate; and an allied structure to address China’s challenges. He considers that a broad coalition is required to meet these needs. This needs to be done now: it is too late to build partnerships ‘after the status quo is overturned.’ In 2016, US government officials endorsed a ‘networked security’ concept for American

248 alliances in Asia to multilateralise the existing hub and spokes alliance system in Asia. This thesis ends by making a similar proposal that uses the A-JDSR as a template for bilateral intra-alliance linkages.

The A-JDSR stands at a political and security crossroad. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have demonstrated that it has matured from post-Second World War antipathy to the status of a ‘virtual alliance’. Both countries’ armed forces can now build on a nascent capacity for interoperability in conflict. should that be the sovereign nations' choice that command those forces.

The thesis has shown that an invigorated A-JDSR, continuing the work already done to permit US, Japanese, and Australian military forces to act bilaterally and collectively to further each nations' national interests can contribute to regional security through an admixture of assurant, deterrent and compellent military action. An added value alignment exists between Australia and Japan that is a ‘virtual alliance’ sufficiently strong for them to work together in collective action, separately and with others if this was necessary.

The three-tiered security construct advanced in this thesis combines the strength of regional alliance and sub-alliances, and other alignments to create a pragmatic regional security architecture. This framework will ensure that United States is firmly embedded in the region and seeks to build to build an environment that can facilitate a rising power in a balanced manner. Indeed, the future prosperity and security of the region can only be achieved by the extant hegemon and rising hegemon engaging and accommodating with each other and the countries of the region. The A-JDSR, intrinsically, and as an exemplar can help achieve this.

6.5 Conclusions

Two critical conclusions are singled out for final mention. These are: a recommended formalisation of the A-JDSR, and a New Security Framework for the A-JDSR and the Indo- Pacific Region.

The A-JDSR virtual alliance should be recognised formally in the manner proposed by Thawley. The 1996 IASA was an arrangement based on consultation to ‘meet the common

249 danger’. It was abrogated before an activity-based defence, and security relationship was developed. That activity-based relationship is in place in the A-JDSR. Declaration by both countries that it represents a way for the two countries to cooperate to ‘meet the common danger’ will accord it the status it needs to be effective as a basis for collective self-defence and act as a general deterrent. Taking the two bilateral relationships in the alliance system between the only consequential democracies in the Western Pacific would be a logical next step. If the A-JDSR can be declared a formal part of the alliance system, then declaring the A-J-US trilateral in the same mode proposed to formalise the bilateral A-JDSR can only strengthen the ability of these three partners to act as foci for others to join.

The proposed pragmatic regional security described above will allow for collective action to be taken by like-minded countries who wish to abide by the rules-based order, accommodate a rising China and do so without forming formal alliances, or unnecessarily aligning with the United States. Still, the actions of such an organisation can only be effective if there is some form of institutionalization that can coordinate those security actions. This thesis concludes that such an organisation be modelled on that exemplified in the FPDA arrangements. A regional secretariat of diplomatic and military officers staffed, initially by founding QUAD members, with other staff drawn from QUAD Plus countries would be the focal point for supporting dialogue, exercises and other activities as required. This would be no NATO-style headquarters of countries facing a common, but a regional organisation focused on ensuring strategic dialogue and cooperative action replace ad hoc activities. Australia, Japan, India and like-minded nations can act to create regional stability and peace.

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‘Towards a ‘Trilateral Alliance?’ Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations,’ Asian Security, Vol. 3, Issue 3, (2007)

Analysis of the Indian and Australian Strategic Partnerships,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (2011), pp.115-155; Thomas S.

“From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Alliance? A-J Security Ties and the Asia Pacific,” Asia Policy, Issue 20 (2015).

262 White, Hugh. Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on Australian Defence Policy over the Past 40 years', in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (ed.), History as Policy: Framing the debate on the future of Australia's Defence Policy, ANU ePress, Canberra, ACT, 2007.

Prospects for closer, if not formal, alliances between Australia & Japan. Centre of Gravity series paper #4. 2012. ANU SDSC

An A-J Alliance? Centre of Gravity Series 2012, SDSC, ANU

Without America—Australia in the New Asia: Hugh White. ANU Quarterly Essay 68. November 2017.

'Trilateralism and Australia: Australia and the Trilateral strategic dialogue with America and Japan', in W Tow, M Thomson, Y Yamamoto and S Limaye (ed.), Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, UK.

Woodman, Stuart. Waiting for Godot? The Challenge of Asia-Pacific Security in the 1990s.

Yamamoto, Yoshinobu: ‘Triangularity and US-Japanese relations: Collaboration, collective hedging and identity politics’, in Tow, William; Thomson, Mark, Yamamoto, Yoshinobu, and Limaye Sato (eds.) (2007): Asia-Pacific Security-US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle, New York, Routledge.

Yamakage, Susumu. 2016. ‘Japan’s Regional Vision and China’s Rise’, in Mie OBA ed., The Making of East Asia: Order, Integration and Stakeholders, Tokyo: Chikura Shobo. (in Japanese).

263 Interviews

Australia – Academia

Blaxland, John, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 12 February 2019.

Dibb, Paul, Emeritus Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 14 January 2020

Fruhling, Stephen, Faculty Member, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 10 June 2019.

Jain, Purnendra, Professor of Asian Studies, University of Adelaide. 19 May 2020.

King, Amy, Lecturer in Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 26 February 2019.

Kersten, Rikki, Director Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 22 October 2019.

Medcalf, Rory, Head, National Security College, ANU, 19 May 2020.

Tow, William, Professor Emeritus, Coral Bell School, ANU, 1 October 2020.

White, Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies, School of International Political & Strategic Studies, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, 30 January 2019.

Australia - Government

Howard, John, Prime Minister 1996-2007, 2 July 2020.

Evans, Gareth, Foreign Minister 1988-1996, 5 August 2020.

Australia - Defence

Bilton, Greg, Lieutenant General, Chief of Joint Operations 2018- , 30 November 2020.

264 Bentley, Graham, Air Commodore, Air Attaché Washington 2005-08. 2 February 2020.

Binskin, Mark, Air Chief Marshal, Chief of Defence Force 2014-18, 27 September 2019.

Campbell, David, Rear Admiral, Deputy Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation 1994-98, 28 January 2020.

Crews, Bill, Major General, Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation 1997-99. 3 October 2019.

Criss, Peter, Air Vice-Marshal, Air Commander Australia 1999-00. 15 February 2021.

Cullen, Simon, Rear Admiral, Head, Combined Planning Group, US Central Command (2005-2007). 3 October 2019.

Davies, Leo, Air Marshal, Chief of Air Force 2015-19. 1 March 2021.

Dudley, Matt, Group Captain, Defence and Armed Services Attaché 2006-09, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 15 January 2019.

Dunn, John, Group Captain, Defence and Armed Services Attaché 1982-85, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 4 December 2019.

Evans, David, Air Marshal, Chief of Air Force, 1982-85, 12 October 2019.

Gellel, Tim, Colonel, Defence and Armed Services Attaché 2009-12, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 1 January 2019.

Government Official A, Department of Defence, 25 June 2019.

Government Official B, Department of Defence, 2 October 2019.

Gration, Peter, General, Chief of Defence Force 1988-1994, Department of Defence, 27 September 2019.

Halloran, Sonja, Group Captain, Head, Australian Defence Staff 2019-present, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 19 January 2019.

265 Harwood, John, Group Captain, Defence and Armed Services Attaché 2014-17, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 11 February 2019.

Hoare, Mark, Colonel, Defence and Armed Services Attaché 2001-04, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 9 October 2019.

Houston, Angus, Air Chief Marshal, Chief of Defence Force 2014-18, Department of Defence, 13 February 2019.

Howard, Michael as quoted by Admiral Macke, CINCPAC, Royal United Services Institute National Seminar ‘Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific Towards 2001’, Canberra, 21 September 1994. RUSI National Seminar Proceedings, Vol 15, No 1, November 1994.

Jeffery, Hugh, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, 27 August 2019.

Leahy, Peter, Lieutenant General, Chief of Army 2002-08, 15 February 2019.

McGarry, John, Air Vice-Marshal, Director, Defence Intelligence Organisation 2014- 16. 31 October 2019.

Monterola, Simon, Colonel, Defence and Armed Services Attaché 2018-19, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 28 February 2019.

Noonan, Michael, Vice-Admiral, RAN, Chief of Navy. 18 June 2020.

Noble, Roger, Major General. Head, Military Strategic Commitments. 2 July 2020.

Ryan, Alan, Principal, Australian Civil-Military Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, 12 September 2019.

Sargeant, Brendan, Associate Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra 2013-2018, 25 October 2019.

Selkirk, Malcolm, Group Captain, Defence and Armed Services Attaché, 2011-2103. Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 8 March 2021.

Treloar, Robert, Air Vice-Marshal, Commander Australian Theatre 2000-2002. 15 February 2021.

266

Wilkinson, Joshua, Wing Commander, Chief of Staff, Defence Staff, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo. 2 July 2020.

Australia - Embassy

Dalrymple, Rawdon, Australian Ambassador to Japan. 1989-1993. Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 14 August 2020.

McCarthy, John, Australian Ambassador to Japan 2001-04, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 21 July 2020.

McLean, Murray, Australian Ambassador to Japan 2004-11, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 1 May 2020.

Miller, Bruce, Australian Ambassador to Japan 2011-16, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 4 July 2019.

Moy, Kim, Acting Defence and Armed Services Attaché 2017-18, Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 28 February 2019.

Smith, Ric, Australian Ambassador to China, 1996-2000, Embassy of Australia, Beijing, 13 September 2019.

Thawley, Michael, Australian Ambassador to US, 2001-2004, Embassy of Australia, Washington, 3 September 2020.

Wilson, Trevor, Deputy Head of Mission, 1996-2000. Embassy of Australia, Tokyo, 3 October 2019.

Australia - Parliament, Foreign Affairs & Intelligence Agencies

Behm, Alan, Chief of Staff, Senator Penny Wong, Opposition Foreign Affairs Spokesman, 18 January 2019. Dudgeon, Ian, former Official, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 10 October 2015.

Hunt, Garth, Analyst, Strategic Analysis, Office of National Intelligence, 4 October 2020.

267

Lewis, Duncan, Major General, Head, Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation 2014-19, 10 January 2021.

Government Official C, Australian Government, 25 June 2019.

Wise, Bill, Analyst, Strategic Analysis, Office of National Intelligence, 4 October 2020.

Australia – Research Institutions

Babbage, Ross, CEO Strategic Forum, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 24 January 2019.

Bruni, John, CEO Sage International Australia, 6 September 2020.

Jennings, Peter, Executive Director, National Security, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 31 January 2019.

Nicholson, Peter, Air Vice-Marshal, CEO, Institute for Regional Studies, Canberra, 30 January 2019.

Pacey, Brice, Defence Commentator, Canberra, 14 January 2020.

Phillips, Peter, Major General, National President RSL 1997-2003, 23 October 2019.

China - Academia

Jie, Dalei, Professor of International Politics, School of International Relations, Peking University, Beijing. 19 June 2019.

Shou, Huisheng, Professor of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 19 June 2019.

Japan – Defence

Government Official A. Japanese Government. 1 March 2019.

268 Government Official B. Japanese Government. 4 March 2019.

Iwasaki, Shigeru, General, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff 2012-14, JSDF, 12 December 2018. Kobayashi, Masao, Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, Submarine Force, MSDF. 17 July 2020.

Koda, Yoji, Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, Self-Defense Force, MSDF, 7 March 2020.

Nishi, Naruto, Vice-Admiral, Commander, Air Training Group, MSDF, Japan, 6 March 2019.

Satake, Tomohiko, Senior Researcher, National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Japan, 27 February 2019.

Japan - Foreign Affairs

Government Official A, Japanese Government.1 March 2019.

Government Official B, Japanese Government. 1 March 2019.

Japan - Embassies

Embassy Official A, Embassy of Japan in Australia, 3 January 2018.

Embassy Official B, Embassy of Japan in Australia, 28 December 2018.

Embassy Official C, Embassy of Japan in Australia, 4 January 2019.

Embassy Official D, Embassy of Japan in Australia, 8 July 2020.

Japan - Defence Industry

Nagase, Masato, President, Global Insight Corporation, 26 February 2019.

Nishiyama, Junichi, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 2000-15, 26 February 2019.

269

Watanabe, Hideaki, Director-General, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 – 2017, 27 February 2019.

Japan – Academia Hosoya, Yuichi, Professor of International Politics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 1 Mar 2019.

Nagy, Stephen, Senior Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies, at the International Christian University, Tokyo, 7 March 2019.

Wilkins, Thomas, Senior Research Fellow, Japan Institute for International Affairs. 20 October 2020.

Japan – Research Institutions

Michishita, Narushige, Director, Graduate Programs, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 5 March 2019.

Nishihara, Masashi, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security, 15 May 2018.

Yamaguchi, Noboru, Lieutenant General, Vice-President, Sasegawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, 3 March 2019.

United Kingdom – Academia

Hughes, Chris, Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies, Warwick University, UK, 13 November 2019.

United Kingdom – Military & Defence Industry

Chelton, Simon, Captain RN, UK Defence Attaché Tokyo 2002-2007, 11 October 2019. United Nations - United Nations Command (Rear)

Jansen, Mick, Group Captain, Commander, United Nations Command (Rear) 2016-18, 9 March 2020.

270 McCormack, Anthony, Air Commodore, Commander, United Nations Command (Rear) 2010-12, 2020.

Williams, Adam, Group Captain, Commander, United Nations Command (Rear) 2018, 6 March 2019.

United Nations - United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Sanderson, John, Lieutenant General, Commander United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 22 October 2019.

United States – Embassies

McWilliams, George, Captain USN, United States Defence Attaché to Tokyo, 1994-98, US Embassy, Tokyo, Japan 5 April 2018.

Picon, Manny, Colonel, United States Defence Attaché to Tokyo, Japan 2017-2020, 1 March 2019.

271 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interviewees were invited to address any or all, of the following open-ended questions in interviews. A Japanese version was provided for Japanese speakers. Interviewees were provided copies of their responses.

Question 1: Please explain your interest/involvement in the Australia-Japan Defence relationship.

Question 2: What were the issues for both Australia and Japan in the Defence relationship in the past?

Question 3: What are the issues for both Australia and Japan in the Defence relationship now and in the future?

Question 4: How would you characterise the relationship to date?

Question 5: Where do you think the Defence and security relationship will go in the future?

Question 6: What changes would you expect to see in the security environment in the future (5-10 years)? As China and the US (and Russia) struggle for economic domination during the next decade, what security challenges may arise in these Great Power Relationships?

Question 7: Do you see the level of bipartisanship towards national security issues in Australia changing? Do you see any changes in Japanese political views or positions?

Question 8: Australia is already committed to providing levels of security and support through its commitment to the United Nations Command. With Japan hosting (and having its own commitments) to the UNC through the UNC (Rear) bases in Japan, do you consider that there is continuing utility for Australia in using UNC auspices to conduct activities in Japan, or should these be bilateral activities?

Question 10: What do you consider will be the role of informal security dialogues such as the Quadrilateral security discussions in the future?

Question 11: Do you think that the relationship could go as far as a formalised security relationship between Australia and Japan? If not, how far might the current level of cooperation go? Do you think that Australia would want to be drawn into guaranteeing any security for Japan (and vice versa)? Does the ANZUS treaty already provide for such a commitment? How would regional powers react to any formalised security arrangements between Japan and Australia?

Question 12: Are there other issues that should be addressed in our research?

272