World Development Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 641±656, 2001 Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev 0305-750X/01/$ - see front matter PII: S0305-750X00)00120-0 Somali Reconstruction and Local Initiative: Amoud University

ABDI ISMAIL SAMATAR * University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA and Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, South Africa Summary. Ð No one could have predicted Somalia's disintegration into ``clan'' ®efdoms. The country was thought to be one of the most homogenous nation-states in Africa. Many observers stridently insist that clan structures are necessary for Somalia's rehabilitation. All international sponsored reconciliation conferences premised on the centrality of the clan failed. I argue that Somalia's shared cultural values were necessary, but an insucient basis for national cohesion. Public institutions are key to sustainingshared values and foraginganinclusive identity. Local initiatives like Amoud University, a community-owned institution, is the forerunner of a new type of Somali institution that caters to common, rather than sectarian, interests. If initial steps are sustained, this local initiative could mark the birth of a new Somalia. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words Ð Somalia, public institutions, shared values, social capital, sectarian entrepreneurs, Amoud University

1. INTRODUCTION resources declines when mined continuously without the society reinvestingin them. The Observers of African nation-states assumed callous exploitation of shared cultural resources that Somalia was unique in the continent as the not only impoverishes their richness and resil- nation and the state nearly overlapped. The iency, but may also turn them into a national population shared many social and cultural liability. This is exactly what has transpired in traits, such as language, mode of economic Somalia. If a society does not take the long- production, and religion. Given its social and term vitality of cultural resources for granted, cultural base, the state was thought to be via- however, but continuously and consciously ble. Just over a decade ago, it would have been replenishes their richness and value, they will impossible to imagine the disintegration of the continue to be a source of social cohesion. This Somali state. Today, many political commen- means that a society must actively nourish tators are similarly strident about the clan inherited shared values and develop new ones structure beingessential to the very essence of a that reinforce the appeal of this common heri- Somali community. The commentators argue tage. that it is not possible to reconstruct Somalia The most important addition to Somalia's without the clan beingthe basis of the new pool of shared resources since the middle of last polity. century has been the 7colonial) state and its These essentialist arguments are grounded on institutions. The imposition of the state, in its a limited understandingof Somali political colonial and post-colonial forms, induced history. They also lack an appreciation of the art of state formation. The ``shared social and cultural heritage'' thesis fails to recognize that * I want to thank the supporters, sta€ and students of common traits can form a necessary, but Amoud University, and the Borama public for respond- insucient foundation for buildingstate insti- ingto my questions. Special gratitudeto Hajis Dahir tutions that cater to the community's collective Elmi and Jama Muhmumed, Suliman Ahmed Gulaid, interest. The ability of cultural resources to Abdirahman H. Dahir, and Mohamed Abdillahi You- bind a society together depends on how they nis. I appreciate the useful suggestions made by two are used. The socially unifyingappeal of these referees. Final revision accepted: 1 November 2000. 641 642 WORLD DEVELOPMENT social processes that had the potential to rein- cause. Shared values across communities are force and positively transform shared value in the basis of civic bonds and trust in a society. an inclusive manner, or to undermine and But the state must take leadership in nurturing distort their appeal to the entire community. 1 society-wide civic bonds. Communities, in turn, The state's impact on the vitality of shared must scrupulously monitor state actions to values, depends on whether the authorities use ensure that public institutions function in ways public institutions to nurture a common or that consistently enhance the quality of those sectarian agenda. The diminishing attractive- shared values. Such partnership between state ness of traditional shared Somali values is not and community will facilitate social capital due to Somalis' primordial predisposition for generation in relatively short time. 6 divisiveness. Instead it is due to the misuse of The followingdiscussion about Amoud public institutions and resources for private University shows that buildingpeople's con®- gain. Moreover, the use of public power to dence that they can work together for common intimidate and punish those who try to protect good and establishing their trust in public common causes has delegitimated public institutions is not necessarily a long-term authority and the worth of these public proposition. I argue that there is one critical resources. The authorities' cynical manipula- factor to reversingthe trends of the last three tion of shared values and traditions to mollify decades in Somalia. That key is to create public distrust and prolongtheir tenure further institutions that constrain sectarian entrepre- alienated the public from the state. The public neurs while strengthening shared values and is not only hostile toward the state but is deeply hopes. The community-owned Amoud mistrustful of anyone who attempts to mobilize University may signal a new type of public them on the basis of shared sentiments. institution in Somalia, one that will enhance Traditional analysts of Somali politics have accountability, rebuild public trust, and cited two occurrences as evidence of the Soma- advance a common agenda. lis' sectarian nature despite the fact that they The rest of the discussion is divided into three share a common language, culture, and reli- parts. Section 2 panoramically sketches Somali gion. 2 These occurrences are the Somalis' elite politics and describes how they destroyed recent antipathy toward the state and national- public trust for state institutions and under- ism, and the warlords' success in carvingup the mined the importance of shared norms. Section country into ®efdoms. Advocates of the clanist 3 narrates how Borama community members thesis wrongly insist that a clan-based federal are tryingto resuscitate common cause through dispensation is the only political formula that the establishment of Amoud University. will reunite Somalia. They erroneously assume Section 4 assesses Amoud University's signi®- that genealogical di€erences led to Somalia's cance to the remakingof public trust in disintegration. 3 I argue that the causes of the Borama and Somalia and the re-formingof a Somali calamity are: state leaders' failure to inclusive national identity. nurture shared cultural and social commonalties and sectarian entrepreneurs' instrumentalist accentuation of social di€erences. The innocu- 2. ELITE POLITICS AND DESTRUCTION ous di€erences' transformation has become OF PUBLIC TRUST lethal weapon in the hands of sectarians. The state's credibility has been destroyed A key development problem in Africa is the because it failed to guard common interest and discrepancy between states' claims and the the erosion of social solidarity based on inclu- impacts of its actions on communities. Most sive values makes Somali reconstruction an Africans assume that state managers care little awesome task. Putnam's thesis that buildinga about the common good and are in business for stock of social capital requires many decades themselves and their clients. Somalis are seems to apply here. 4 If Putnam is right, it will extreme amongAfricans in this antipathy. take a longtime for generalizedsocial trust to Hostile feelings toward state authorities rarely develop 7millenarian). Tendler's thesis that existed 40 years ago when most countries public trust can be built in a relatively short become independent. Hopingto replace colo- time seems more feasible. 5 These authors' nial bosses with regimes that respected Afri- seemingly contradictory positions are reconcil- cans' dignity and managed public a€airs justly, able. Communities and states can steadily Africans routed colonial authorities. This generate trust and con®dence for common section brie¯y sketches how the mismanage- AMOUD UNIVERSITY 643 ment of public institutions in Somalia turned The second republic 71964±67) is singularly Somalis' hope into despair. unique in postcolonial Somali history on two Public despondency in the continent is deep. accounts. First, the 1964 national parliamen- In fact, today citizens are shocked when they tary elections exposed the ascendancy and receive courteous and ecient service from a strength of the sectarian forces and the public servant. This sharply contrasts with opportunistic tendencies of many elite popular opinion from 40 years ago when people members. The number of political parties embraced the nationalist project. 7 Somalis proliferated into 24 as individual elite shared this optimism in 1960 and their nation- members tried to gain a parliament seat in alism generated incredible fervor and social order to loot the public purse. Only four of unity that re¯ected their hope for democracy these parties succeeded in winningparliamen- and development, the sanguine public did not tary seats. Second, the nationalist forces made realize, however, that their hopes depended on their last systematic e€ort, after the elections, the quality of the national elite and intraelite to contain the sectarian tide from engul®ng politics. Somali elite politics manifested two public life. The nationalist forces attempted to contradictory political and economic tenden- insulate the civil service from undisciplined cies. One tendency emphasized a Somali-wide politicians' particularistic intervention. Presi- identity, nationalism, the protection of dent Osman and Premier Hussein wanted to common good, and justice in the dispensation do more than integrate the two former colo- of the rule of law 7civic movement). The other nies. This regime failed, however, to enunciate predisposition embraced sectarianism and its development project clearly. In spite of this clanism, driven by individualistic interest weakness, the Hussein government understood without regard for community wellbeing that to make public institutions e€ective and 7sectarian movement). 8 root out corruption and the abuse of public The Somali-wide versus the sectarian trajec- power, it needed to bureaucratize its institu- tories were opposingpostcolonial national tions. strategies embedded in the new republic's fabric Two of the Premier's initiatives signaled his in 1960. The struggle between these two elite institution-buildingstrategy.First, he appoin- political projects marked the state's institu- ted his ministers based on their professional tional history since 1960. Four elite qualities skills. As a result of this action, a signi®cant shaped the civic or sectarian impacts on public number of key portfolios went to northerners. institutions and public trust. These character- Many southern MPs were not happy with the istics were: the degree of elite unity or lack ministerial line up and accused the Prime thereof; the legitimacy of its leadership within Minister 7PM) of favoritism. One of the the group and the public; the leadership's northerners, Mohamoud Issa Jama, who was understandingof the nature of the collective nominated as minister of agriculture, gave up project; and clarity of their strategy in trans- his post so southerners could be accommo- latingplans into concrete reality. dated. The second and most important decision The independence euphoria and the uni®ca- was to reform the civil service and establish a tion of former British and Italian Somali lands professional and autonomous Civil Service in 1960 generated national cohesion that Commission. The Commission's mandate, with masked di€erences between groups with technical assistance from United Nations competingagendas71960±64). 9 The patriotic experts, was to professionalize the service. The fervor induced by the 1964 war with Ethiopia Commission started reevaluatingall major prolonged this spirit's life span. But appearance posts in the civil service and the quali®cations of nationalist solidarity was short-lived. 10 The of their occupants. It discovered that many regime's leadership enjoyed a high degree of senior ocials were unquali®ed and ill-equip- legitimacy with the public, however, the lead- ped to lead their departments. Consequently, ership showed no sign of understanding the the Commission recommended relievingthese particulars of the nationalist project. Moreover, individuals of their responsibilities for two the leadership did not articulate a clear road years and giving them an opportunity to map for achievingits development agenda. improve their competency. The Prime Minister Consequently, it undertook minimal institu- heeded this advice and dismissed nearly 200 tional reform, other than streaming-lining the senior ocials over the next year. 12 All those British and Italian colonial administrations discharged were from the republic's southern into a single apparatus. 11 region except for two northerners. 13 Those 644 WORLD DEVELOPMENT discharged were some of the southern elite's course and the public poured into the streets to leadingelements. rejoice over the termination of corrupt politics. This attempt at institutional reform was The military regime enjoyed a high degree of short-lived as an administration less concerned legitimacy during the ®rst years of its tenure. with curbingcorruption and insulatingpublic The swift and e€ective management of the service came to power after the 1967 presiden- 1973±74 drought, the introduction of Latin tial election. 14 President Osman appeared to scripts for the Somali language and the have lost the election for three reasons. First, he expansion of education and other services was competingwith a popular former Prime increased the regime's popularity. The military, Minister. Second, Premier Hussein's anti-cor- with the Soviet's prodding, adopted socialism ruption drive and termination of a signi®cant as its development strategy. But, the govern- number of southern elite members from the ment showed no sign of comprehending what civil service alienated a powerful political socialism meant in the Somali context as it constituency. Third, candidate Sharmarke and blindly adopted Soviet tested but unproductive his allies promised seductive rewards for economic management methods. 17 Conse- parliamentarians who voted for him. Shar- quently, it retained, at ®rst, the rudderless marke's promises worked their magic, and he public service policy of the last civilian regime. captured the presidency with a slim margin. The Somali army's defeat in the Ethiopian- President Sharmarke and his Premier, Egal, Somali war, 1977±78, brought the regime's understood the volatility of the electoral honeymoon period to an end. The government process. Immediately, they started planningfor discarded citizens' rights and any pretence of the 1969 parliamentary election. The elite, and supportinginclusive national project as the especially those in parliament, failed to be public and signi®cant elements of the military united by anythingexcept their willingnessto challenged the regime's right to govern. As trade o€ any public resource for private gain. 15 paranoia engulfed the leadership, it began a The leaders of the government, having fueled massive campaign to put loyal supporters in all this tendency duringthe presidential election, key government positions without regard to knew the only way to remain in power was to merit or due process. The majority of these new appeal to each MP's material interests, tanta- and quickly promoted public employees did not lizingthem with rewards and promises. Given have the skills or experience to manage public these priorities, the regime abandoned civil a€airs, further damaging competency of state service reform initiated by its predecessor. apparatus. Having lost legitimacy, the regime Corruption and the politics of divide and rule, used military power to punish entire regions rather than fosteringinclusive collective and communities deemed disloyal. A most project, became the name of the game. 16 sectarian and brutal use of the military machine The 1969 parliamentary elections proved that occurred in 1988 when Hargeisa and Burao, the elite's sectarian faction had gained the two of the country's largest cities, were upper hand. The struggle for individual politi- destroyed. These cities were targeted for special cal survival divided and united this cohort. The treatment after one of the opposition move- political process disintegrated as 62 political ment's, Somali National Movement 7SNM) parties ®elded candidates. Ambitious individu- guerrillas impetuously entered them. The local als who were not selected by the main parties populations were devastated, and survivors ¯ed formed their own. These so called opposition to Ethiopian refugee camps. parties won 50 of the 123 seats. As soon as the The country bled for another three years election was over, however, the opposition MPs before the regime was ®nally ousted from its abandoned their parties and joined the ruling ®nal stronghold in the capital. By then, unfor- party. The shift of political ``loyalty'' was tunately, all national institutions were ruined. induced by the clear recognition that MPs Moreover, the separate opposition movements, could access public largesse only if they were who collectively destroyed the old regime, were associated with government. Moreover, politi- sectarian themselves and had no national cal bosses in power enticed these MPs to join reconstruction program. They fought each the rulingparty. The only opposition member other for control and in the process ruined of parliament was former Prime Minister what little the old regime left behind. The Hussein. prolonged civil war and the terror instigated by The military took control of the government warlords reversed integrative national proces- before the sectarian stampede could run its ses. Warlords and factions leaders fragmented AMOUD UNIVERSITY 645 the country into ``clan'' ®efdoms. Most 3. AMOUD UNIVERSITY: THE REBIRTH reasonable Somalis agree that Siyad Barre's OF PUBLIC SPIRIT regime was dreadful, but it was better than what followed it. They often note that ``a bad Attempts to rebuild the Somali State have government is better than none.'' Every ¯oundered and conventional international government since independence made some strategies promise not to produce meaningful contribution to shared values, except for two: results. 18 Warlords' and faction leaders' the 1967±69 and those dominated by warlords. machinations to create homeland-like, mini- The people's antipathy toward public states in the provinces have also failed to gain management is the antithesis of how Somalis the public's respect and the international felt about the nationalist project in 1960. The community's recognition. Two of the more thoughtful citizen who takes account of what ``advanced'' clan-states have succeeded in unifyingvalues have been added to the old stock restoringpeace in most areas of their provinces of shared traditions since independence will ®nd but have failed to establish legitimate and slim pickings. The ®rst reinforcement of shared functioningand inclusive institutions. Even traditions was the uni®cation of British and some of the ardent supporters of these entities Italian Somalilands in 1960. Northern Somali admit that they are corrupt and beyond leaders spearheaded this act. The second epi- reform. 19 In their present guise, then, none of sode is President Osman's digni®ed and demo- them can be a blue print for national redemp- cratic departure from the presidency in 1967 tion. The alternative to these e€orts has been after failingto be reelected. President Osman's civic-minded local initiatives to repair commu- compliance with the constitution signaled that nity infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, no one was above the law of the land. Somalis water, and electricity. These local initiatives now recognize him as an exemplary founding have made important contributions to reducing president whom they wish others emulated. A hardships in many communities across the third tangible addition to the Somali social country. However, these e€orts and others by capital was Premier Hussein's valiant e€ort to nongovernmental organizations 7NGOs) professionalize public service and insulate it whether local or international have not been from sectarian political intervention. Premier able to do more than restore local services. Hussein's qualities underscore the character of Amoud University is the only known excep- public service for which most Somalis so tion to this locally-oriented activity. This desperately yearn. The fourth and perhaps the recently chartered, community owned institu- most enduringaddition to Somali social capital tion is also instigating new debate between was the development of orthography for the localities about national concerns. Before language. The writing of Somali language is examiningdynamics this event generated,it is taken for granted to the extend that even faction necessary to consider the historical background leaders desperate to create their little ``home- of Borama community that made the univer- lands'' use it as their ocial medium. sity's establishment possible. Somalia's social and political balance sheet since independence is dominated by liabilities 7a) Borama: a brief history that have signi®cantly diminished the country's sense of a common destiny. The murderous and Like other towns in British Somaliland, illegal uses of state power and sectarian Borama, a village established in 1921, had only exploitation of national resources ®gure Qoranic schools. Religious men dominated prominently in the population's collective Borama's social circle, although, many urban memory of the last three decades. Moreover, people from Zeila, an old cosmopolitan coastal incompetent management of public a€airs for port, who moved to town had a moderating most of the country's recent history has eroded in¯uence. 20 A British colonial ocer with a leg Somalis' communal self-con®dence. Undoing injury came to Borama in the mid-1930s to these liabilities is what reconciliation and determine whether the town's population was reconstruction is all about. Creatingcommon more receptive to secular education than others projects that are e€ectively and fairly managed in the Protectorate. Borama's elders learned is essential to establishingcollective self-worth that people opposed to secular education in and rebuildinginclusive polity and identity. Burao injured the ocer. Since religious men These seem to be Amoud University's guiding dominated Borama, they, too, rejected the principles. ocer's message and in¯uenced Borama's 646 WORLD DEVELOPMENT opinion makers to organize a demonstration mean abandoningIslamic learningor prosely- against the ocer's visit by hoisting tall reli- tizingfor Christianity. gious ¯ags and singing religious hymns. Mr. Ali's ®nal stop was in Aw Abdi Shiekh Nonetheless, the demonstrators never threat- Noor's Madrasa in Borama. He explained his ened the ocer's personal safety. secular education program for Somalis and his Aw Abdi Shiekh Noor 21 established Bora- disappointingencounters in Berbera and ma's ®rst non-Qoranic one-room school Hargeisa. Aw Abdi told Mr. Ali that he would 7Madrasa) in 1932. He taught Arabic and call a meetingof town elders so that Mr. Ali arithmetic. Similar schools existed in other could directly present the secular education regions of the country. Religious leaders did case to them. When Mr. Ali explained his not object to Madrasas since Christians did not ambition at the elders' gathering, they endorsed run these schools and the language of instruc- mission. 23 ``Qabuul''Ðwhich means accepted tion was that of the Qoran. Aw Abdi Shiekh in SomaliÐwas the word elders used to signal Noor, however, was not a typical religious man their approval. Mr. Ali was moved by the who taught in Madrasas. He invented non- elders' simple response and those six letters of Arabic and non-Latin script for the Somali approval marked a watershed in northern language and trained some of his pupils in the Somali educational history. Borama elders use of this script. Moreover, some of the decided to try something, namely secular edu- merchants in Borama and Zeila used the script cation, that the leadinglightsof the Northern to conduct their business correspondence. Somali community had rejected. This was the Borama's religious opinion makers did not second time Borama took the lead in such object to Aw Abdi Shiekh Noor's Somali matters, the ®rst occasion was Aw Abdi's script, despite its beingnon-Arabic. Although invention of Somali script. Aw Abdi Shiekh Noor's history or that of his At that meeting, Mr. Ali inquired about who script have not been thoroughly investigated, paid Aw Abdi's salary for teachingin the Borama's religious men may have tolerated Aw Madrasa. The answer was no oneÐAw Abdi Abdi Shiekh Noor's invention since he was a depended on his father. Mr. Ali then asked member of their club and came from a promi- whether the community would be willingto nent religious family. collect 360 rupees to pay for Aw Abdi's services The religious community's acceptance of Aw for the followingyear. The elders successfully Abdi Shiekh Noor's orthography as a non- raised the money from the community by noon threateninginnovation may have softened the followingday. Mr. Ali took the money and Borama's political terrain for secular education deposited it at the main government oce in in later years. A decade later, his Madrasa town and told Aw Abdi to collect monthly pay students were amongthe most educated and of 30 rupees from that oce. respected youngmen of Borama. Aw Abdi Mr. Ali told his supporters in Borama that he Shiekh Noor's school had become an institu- would go to Hargeisa and solicit the colonial tion with an excellent reputation by the 1940s. government's support for secular education. He About this time, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmed Ali also promised that Borama would receive its visited Borama. Mr. Ali, a former head clerk in fair share of whatever resources he was able to the colonial service in Berbera, had resigned obtain from the administration. A few months from his job to campaign for secular education later, he returned to Borama and reported to in the Protectorate and to convince Somalis the elders that the colonial government gave about the bene®ts of modern education. 22 him 17 pounds for education. Mr. Ali invested Mr. Ali's initial strategy was to introduce most of the money in a classroom hut in secular education in English to Somali people Hargeisa. However, he presented a set of text- through Madrasa teachers in various towns. He books, pencils, and chalk to the Borama elders. assumed that by collaboratingwith religious The elders were disappointed as they thought Madrasa teachers he would blunt more tradi- that Mr. Ali should have given Borama a better tional leaders' opposition. His ®rst encounters share of the money. were in Madrasas of Shiekh Jama in Berbera The colonial regime ®nally decided to initiate and Shiekh Ali Ibrahim in Hargeisa. The two its educational program for the Protectorate in teachers turned down his o€er, for they did not 1944, by buildingelementary schools in several intend to become involved in non-Islamic edu- towns, includingBorama. For the ®rst two cation. Mr. Ali tried, but failed, to win over the years Borama children were smuggled into two teachers that modern education did not school to register, as the religious leaders' AMOUD UNIVERSITY 647 opposition to secular education was still ®erce. consider Borama's role in Somali postcolonial But, that opposition dissipated in the third year politics, until 1991. Duringthe civilian regimes, as people realized that the children were not 1960±69, Borama had three members of beingconverted to Christianity. Consequently, parliament. Mr Abdi Booni was deputy Prime the school could not accommodate the large Minister in the ®rst government, while Mr. number of children who came to enroll. Aden Issaq was the minister of education and The need for an intermediate school arose as defense in Premiers Hussein's and Egal's cabi- the ®rst group of children approached the end nets. Duringthe military years, Colonel Musa of the elementary school program 7third grade). Goud was Borama's native son in the govern- Intense competition ensued between Hargeisa ingmilitary council. He held various ministerial and Borama over the intermediate school's posts duringthe military's longterm in oce. location. Mr. Ali, who was then a senior edu- Generally speaking, Borama district, and later cation ocer, was the chief advocate for the Awdal region, played a political role propor- Hargeisa location. Claiming Borama was a tionate to the size of the region's population. better location than Hargeisa, the Borama Some dispute this and claim that Borama elders petitioned the Education Department. R. played a greater role in public service in the C. Bell, a new education ocer for the Somali Republic due to its more educated Protectorate from Rhodesia, arrived in the population. Whatever these arguments' relative middle of this tussle. After some deliberations, merits Borama avoided beingcaughtin the Hargeisa was ruled out as a site for the school con¯ict of ``clan giants.'' Consequently, for the due to a water shortage in the area. Arabsiyo most part Borama was spared the physical 735 miles west of Hargeisa) was discussed as an devastation of the civil war that ruined alternative site. Bell was impressed with Hargeisa, Burao, and later Mogadishu. Borama elders' persistence that he decided to In 1991, the sectarian Somali National travel there with a deputy, Mr. Yusuf Haji Movement 7SNM) claimed sovereignty over Aden. Once in Borama, he asked the town northern Somalia after the collapse of the elders to take him to the school's potential site. military regime. Immediately thereafter, SNM The elders took him to Amoud Valley. It had declared northern Somalia's pseudo-indepen- rained a few hours before Bell and his guides dence. This act broke SNM's promise, made came to the site, and the intermittent river was duringits years in political wilderness, that still full. Amoud Valley was then thickly Somali unity was sacrosanct. The north's forested, and the beauty of the valley and the secession did not produce peace and political surroundingmountains absorbed Bell's atten- stability, nor establish a functioningadminis- tion. Before leavingthe valley, he decided to tration. The governing coalition's tenure ended build the ®rst intermediate school in British in April 1993 before stability was restored. 26 Somaliland there. Elite SNM and non-SNM factions could not Four years later the struggle over the loca- agree on a leadership succession method and tion of the Protectorate's ®rst Vocational many feared that a regional civil war might TrainingCenter 7VTC) began7trainingcenter erupt in Hargeisa. Borama elders took the lead for primary school teachers and government to mediate between the two groups by hosting a clerks). The contest was between the Protec- regional peace and political meeting in Borama torate's eastern 7areas east of Hargeisa) and that lasted for more than three months. A new western regions. 24 The Governor and his team head for the so-called Somaliland Republic was awarded the bid to Amoud. R. C. Bell laid the elected without hostilities breakingout imme- foundation stone for the school in 1952. When diately. 27 Borama remained one of the most VTS accepted its ®rst class of students, Borama peaceful towns in Somalia duringthis period, needed a secondary school to have a complete and the community's elders were the principal primary, vocational and secondary school guardians of stability. Two of the most distin- system in northern Somalia. Amoud Secondary guished elders, Haji Dahir Elmi and Haji Jama School was established later. Shiekh village in Muhumed, had supported Borama education the east was the only other town in the for over ®ve decades. Protectorate that had a complete primary and Borama residents rehabilitated local schools secondary school system at this time. 25 and the hospital which had fallen into disuse. Borama was at the forefront of educational By 1997, nearly 8,000 students were in schools development in northern Somalia duringthe in Borama and its vicinity. Such a success ®nal years of colonial rule. Now let us brie¯y alerted town elders to what was to become of 648 WORLD DEVELOPMENT the growing number of school children after all major institutions of higher learning in other they completed high school without jobs or parts of the world had humble beginnings and further educational opportunities available to Borama's should not be di€erent. Despite the them. Some of these children had already audience's skepticism, the elders' enthusiasm joined militias that terrorized people in the carried the day. By the ®rst eveningof the region. At this time, the idea of a Samaroon 28 workshop, participants saw the need for a owned university began to circulate among university. Furthermore, they concluded, in line some of the educated people in Borama. with the humble beginning argument, that Several pamphlets, entitled Awdal University, Borama natives at home and abroad would were produced in the Middle East and distrib- have to mobilize the necessary resources to lay uted amongSomali Diaspora in late 1993 and the institution's foundation. early 1994. An item in the workshop that caused the most spirited debate was the university's name 7b) Amoud University: investing in community and owner. The workshop organizers and institutions others felt that the institution should belongto the Samaroon clan. This sectarian attitude was The idea of establishinga university origi- typical in all regions of the country, even to this nated with a small group of Awdal natives day. Some vocal participants cautioned that it livingin Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. would be dicult to raise money from the local Their intention was to ®nd an outlet for the population and the Diaspora if the university many children in the region who had no real was not the sole preserve of the Awdal prospect of productive employment other than community. This feelingdid not run as deep as joiningthe roamingmilitias. Four of these one might have expected, however, given the individuals, Abdisalan Ahmed Nur, Hassan Ali conditions in the country. Other workshop Haji, Suliman Ahmed Walhad, and Idris Ibra- participants argued that the university should him Awaleh, came to Borama in the summer of belongto the community but must be open to 1994 to share their idea with local groups. all quali®ed Somali students, regardless of their Given the community's dire need to ®nd region of origin. 30 The reasoningbehind the resources to support the small community inclusive pan-Somali thesis moved many. police forces, and rehabilitate water and elec- Consequently, they accepted Amoud as the trical services, most citizens considered the idea university's name. After all, Amoud had been of establishinga university impractical. The the home of the oldest public schools in advocates went back to Arabia, but discussions Northern Somalia. Moreover, the old boarding of the university idea continued in the secondary school had a national reputation for community. A year later, they returned in academic excellence, and its student body came another attempt to persuade the community of from all regions of the country. the value of the venture. This time, the discus- Once participants reached these agreements, sions held in Borama and in Hargeisa were they elected two bodies: the University's Board encouraging. A small committee was created to of Trustees and its Management Committee, plan and organize a workshop in which the idea now known as the Technical Support would be ventilated. 29 Committee. Board of Trustees members were Fifty individuals participated in the deliber- respected Borama elders. The Technical ation of the workshop, held in Borama on 6±7 Support Committee 7Committee from here August 1996, including senior town elders, after) consists mostly of intellectuals and other intellectuals, and other concerned citizens. professionals, some of whom had taught at the Participants debated three key issues duringthe old Somali University. workshop: the need for and feasibility of the The Board and the Committee had two university; the proprietorship of the university; strategic short-term objectives: 7i) to challenge and location of the university. the community to support materially and The town elders, inspired by the workshop morally the establishment of the university organizers' commitment, took the lead in 7self-reliance on local resources); and 7ii) to armingthe need for a university. Haji Jama rebuild community trust in public institutions Muhumed and Haji Dahir Elmi were key and consequently reduce the in¯uence of ®gures. The two Hajis were pivotal in the sectarian ideas. Well-attended public rallies and development of public schools in Borama since focused group meetings educated the public the ®rst one was built. The elders insisted that about the university project. The Committee set AMOUD UNIVERSITY 649 a ®rst precedent in self-reliance. Each member purchased the frame back from the thief. contributed $150 to the university fund. Next, Although the guardian families and the elders the Committee invited the 40 business leaders were worried that by buyingthe stolen frame to a meetingwith the Board and the Commit- they might be setting a precedent and encour- tee. All invitees showed up for the meeting. aging other thieves to follow suit. Fortunately, Committee members introduced the university no more stealingoccurred. The only other idea and their plans for self-reliance. Once damages the secondary school buildings initial introductions had taken place, a leading sustained were from the elements because businessman thanked the group for its e€orts nearly all glass windows were shattered early on and invited his colleagues to take the lead in duringthe civil war. venture. The business people agreed to donate The families livingon and around the $8,000 to the university fund. campus turned two of the old classrooms into a As community's support for the University school for their children, and University surged the Board and the Committee traveled authorities permitted the community to use the to Hargeisa. They jointly petitioned the buildinguntil a primary school could be built in authorities to transfer ownership of the dilapi- the neighboring areas. Moreover, families dated former Amoud Secondary School prop- would continue to live in the school's residen- erty to the university; the authorities granted tial compounds until they ®nd proper accom- the community its wish. The Board and modations. For those who protected the Committee then focused their attention on property the university employed as ground- repairingthe 8-km gravelroad that links keepers and promised that their children could Borama and Amoud and school buildings. attend the university, providingthey were aca- Many members of the community contributed demically quali®ed. Finally, the administration labor and machinery to ®x the road. The total decided to reclaim slowly all school land from cost of the repairs was over $8,500, of which the trespassers, some of them are well-known and University paid $350. well-o€ Borama natives, within the next few Earlier, looters completely vandalized the years. The University's considerate and former intermediate boardingschool buildings, nonconfrontational approach to solvingsocial stealingall removable parts, such as roo®ng problems has endeared the buddinginstitutions material, doors, and window frames. This was to the community. the fate of many public and private properties The date for Amoud University's ®rst in all parts of the country duringthe civil war. entrance examination, to be held in Borama, As people ¯ed the war, bandits stole whatever was announced. Sixty-nine students quali®ed to they could, often destroyingvaluables they enroll in preparatory courses. In September could not take with them. Such acts of banditry 1997, they began a yearlong remedial course in came to be known as ``bililiqo.'' 31 The school basic sciences, English, and mathematics. Since buildings were completely ruined, except for the university facilities were still under repair, these principal's house which was saved by a family courses were conducted at Shiekh Ali Jowhar occupyingit. In contrast, the old secondary secondary school in the town. Borama citizens school, less than one kilometer away, sustained in Arabia bought and shipped enough text- minimal damage. Once Borama elders and the books 7six subjects) to the 69 students. After families who lived around the school realized completingtheir pre-university courses, 47 of what had happened to the intermediate school, the students received satisfactory grades that they protected the properties of the secondary quali®ed them to enter the university. Students school. The families who lived adjacent to the it currently pay a monthly tuition fee of $15 that took residence in the buildings and guarded covers a fraction of the University's operating them from looters. Further, they stored all costs. school materials, such as books 32 and furni- The pace of activity increased as the ture. In one instance, a known Borama resident University's openingdate drew closer, and stole a window frame from the school. When classroom, library, and oce repairs neared the guardian families discovered the missing completion. Organized women's groups played frame, they went to town, confronted the thief, a signi®cant role in these preparations. The and demanded the return of the frame. The women poured onto the campus in large thief refused. Fearingthat the stand o€ would numbers to prepare the buildings for use. Two lead to violence that sectarian entrepreneurs of the three classroom buildings, each consist- could exploit the elders intervened and ingof four lecture halls, the library building 650 WORLD DEVELOPMENT which was completely renovated and expanded, showingup. Most Borama businesses closed and sta€ oces were in mint condition before for the day. Many spectators compared the the University was formally inaugurated. A crowds joyous mood to the sentiment people local manufacturer produced the tables and expressed duringthe commemoration of inde- chairs for the classrooms at a generous pendence in past decades. The University discount, and the Committee bought two buses leaders announced that 4 November 1998, to transport students since the campus was marked the beginning of an important chapter several kilometers from town, and boarding in Somali history. They told the audience that facilitates has not been restored yet. Somalis in all resources, except for book donations to the the Middle East paid $18,000 to get the buses to library from Book Aid International, which Borama in time for the school's opening. 33 went into establishingthe University, came The University needed two drivers for its from Borama citizens or other Somalis in the buses. The Committee consciously used the region and the Diaspora. They challenged drivers' hiringas trust buildingexercise. A leaders in the audience to heed their civic duty committee of 10 people was selected of which to harness the enormous latent energy in ®ve members were designated watchdogs of the communities to promote the public good. ®ve examiners. The monitors' duty was to Students began their classes the day after the insure that applicants received fair treatment inaugural ceremony. All students registered for from the ®ve examiners. Such transparency was twelve credit hours for the ®rst term of studies. necessary because people did not have con®- College English, introductory Psychology, and dence that this competitive hiringprocess could biology were taught during this term. Spring produce a just outcome. The University semester course o€erings included College advertised the posts in the local media. Twenty- Algebra, English, Somali literature, and three applicants satis®ed the posts' require- Psychology. ments. The hiringcommittee interviewed each The University has two departments, educa- candidate and tested him on trac rules. Only tion and business administration. University eight candidates quali®ed to proceed to the next authorities selected education as a foundational stage. The committee then announced to the discipline due to the country's dire need for community the date of the road test, and many quali®ed schoolteachers. The community and people came to witness it. The examiners the administration intend to reverse an old selected three candidates as the best drivers. Somali educational tradition in which all The University employed two of the drivers and university graduates expected to obtain posi- placed the third on a waitinglist. The monitors tions in government. By contrast, it is hoped concurred with the examiners' selection. that those majoringin business administration Finally, the onlookers applauded and declared will secure employment in established private the process fair and professional. enterprises or create their own businesses. The University and the hiringcommittee Other disciplines envisaged include: public earned a lot of public trust for the unbiased administration, public health and medicine, professional way that it conducted this minor, veterinary medicine, and agriculture. but foundational, event. The symbolic value of Twelve lecturers, includingthe University's this event has been enormous, as the public has two administrators, teach in the degree come to associate the University with profes- program. Three of these lectured at the former sionalism and fair management of public Somali University. The chief administrator of a€airs. The community calls on the University's Amoud University, Suliman A. Guleid, was a services when public issues are at stake, or it former dean of the College of Education at the demands that others emulate the University's Somali University in the early 1980s. Earlier, he practice when carryingout their responsibili- was also the principal of Amoud Secondary ties. 34 School from 1970±71, while his deputy, Farah The Board and the Committee set the inau- Shuun, taught English at Somalia's College of gural date for 4 November 1998 and invited 300 Education. Seven of the other instructors hold guests from the region to the opening cere- M.A. degrees. In addition, the pre-university mony. Senior authorities from Hargeisa came program has three teachers. Other sta€ to inauguration to give their blessings to the members include a registrar, librarian, eight University, and donated $5,000. The occasion groundkeepers, drivers, and watchmen. Sta€ turned into a major celebration, with nearly salaries range from $500±100 per month. Since 4,000 people, rather than the 300 invitees, the university does not have a wealthy bene- AMOUD UNIVERSITY 651 factor, its ability to pay sta€ on time depends do not attend school. In other cases, they are on contributions from the local population and permitted to go to school, but they are still the Diaspora. 35 Thus, the University operates expected to manage many daily family chores. on shoestringbudget. 36 As a result, they have little study time. 38 These Nearly all faculty and sta€ members are all conditions have decimated girls' enrollment in from the Awdal region, but three instructors in schools and negatively a€ected their classroom the degree and pre-university programs are not performance. A few women activists and a originally from Borama. Until last year, all ¯edgling institution cannot immediately rectify Board of Trustees and the Technical Support these serious social problems. However, as Committee members were from Borama. some initial steps, University administrators are Awdal natives also dominate the student creatingtutoringand other special programsto population. Only three of the 50 ®rst-year help prepare girls for the entrance examina- students are from other regions. The distribu- tion. 39 tion of students in the 1999±2000 class has Amoud University faces many challenges become slightly more diverse in regional terms. that may all together undermine its existence. Ten of the 62 students are from as far away as Two of the most formidable risks are: the Mogadishu. The class of 2000±01 is expected to University's shallow ®nancial base, sectarian be more diverse. Gender balance remains turn of politics in Amound, and the possibility skewed. There are only 15 female students at that sectarian entrepreneurs in other regions the University. may try to duplicate the University and there- Accordingto University policy any Somali fore undercut its national and civic scope. student who passes the entrance examination Despite these dangers, Amoud has already will be accepted. However, the problem is that made its mark on the national map. The most students live in regions where the question is: how signi®cant is the mark locally University cannot conduct the entrance exam- and nationally in terms of rebuildingshared ination. As a result, Borama natives dominate values and public institutions that cater to the the student body. This year's entrance exam- Somali community's common interest? ination was conducted in two locations: Borama and Hargeisa. The addition of more examination centers in other regions will help 4. AMOUD AND THE RECOVERY OF to further diversify the regional distribution of SOMALI IDENTITY the students. In fact, many areas in the country have asked for such centers. Somali communi- The military dictatorship's collapse gave ties in other regions are putting a growing many Somalis false hope that a second libera- pressure on the University to expand and tion would come. Instead, they su€ered the rehabilitate boardingfacilities speedily so that worst calamity in their history: political and students from outside Borama can be accom- social disintegration. Comparatively homoge- modated. nous Somalia, which seemed free from ethnic University administrators are particularly cleavages, disintegrated more easily and sensitive to the gender gap in its student speedily than other multiethnic countries in the population. Local women activists have been continent. Sectarian entrepreneurs' ruthless urging authorities to develop urgently a strat- exploitation of shared values and Somalis' egy to narrow this gap. Both groups agree that unwillingness to protect public institutions a major factor in girls' low enrollment in high made this fate inescapable. The failure of the schools, and consequently the University, is the international community and organizations heavy responsibilities girls bear in families. The who used clan divisions as the basic building girls' burden in the family has become more block for reconstruction to help restore exactingsince Somalia's disintegration.The national institutions con®rms that genealogical ever-increasingrate of male unemployment, divisions within Somali society are not the now estimated to be about 70%, and excessive cause of Somalia's disintegration. This section male consumption of Kat, 37 have forced of the paper encapsulates the symbolic signi®- women to become their family's main income cance of Amoud University in rehabilitating earner. Income-generating activities take trust in public institutions and remakingsocial mothers out of the home, compellingdaughters relations and national identity. The results of to take over their mother's responsibilities in two surveys illustrate the social meaningAwdal the home. In some cases, this means daughters community attaches to the University. 652 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Furthermore, the results show how Amoud words, nearly 65% of the sample believe that University students are rediscoveringtheir Amoud University belongs to Somalis, not the national identity in a context of sectarian Samaroon Clan. politics. Second, over 50% of respondents to question Borama di€ers from other major urban areas three indicated that Awdal natives in Borama in Somalia on three accounts. First, nearly all and in the Diaspora fund the University. This public schools were reestablished within ®ve contradicts interviewee's answer to question years of the country's fragmentation. Second, two that the Samaroon clan does not own the in 1993 Borama hosted the most successful University. Why would Awdal citizens fund peace conference in the country since 1991. the University belonging to Somalis, in a Finally, Borama established the only institution society where clan identity is presumed to be of higher education in the country. A handful supreme? The respondents told us that clan of seasoned community elders and intellectuals identity is necessary in the context of lawless- were responsible for these unique accomplish- ness, but that clan can not replace nationality ments. Borama citizens are keenly aware of and the nation-state. Furthermore, they indi- these achievements and approve of the elders' cated that since the community initiated the guidance. In contrast, the people have nothing idea of the University, the population is but disdain for the local and regional govern- responsible for takingthe lead for the time ments. Two students and I interviewed 60 being, but, in the end, the University is a Borama residents. To determine Borama resi- Somali institution. dent's knowledge about Amoud University, Third, most respondents, to question four, their sense of identity 7clanist or nationalist), recognized that the majority of current and their attitude toward the University and university students are from the Awdal region. Borama local government, we randomly selec- But this situation is both natural and tempo- ted interviewees who worked or lived in the rary. Because the natives of the region founded center of town. Residents' responses to ®ve the institution, it was normal, at early stages, questions are summarized in Table 1. that proximate settlements will have an Three key points are clear from this survey. advantage. As Amoud takes root and expands, First, accordingto question two 50% of those however, the composition of its student will interviewed think the University belongs to the change. Ten percent of those interviewed regional administration. Another 15% assume believe that only Awdal natives can attend the it to be a Somali University. Only 20% consider University. In contrast, 75% of those inter- the University to be clan property. In other viewed indicated that the University should be

Table 1. Study questionnaire 71) Do you know about the university? Yes No 59 1 72) Who owns the university? Samaroon Somaliland Somalis Do not know administration 12 30 9 9 73) Who funds the university? Samaroon Somaliland Diaspora Development Do not know agencies 27 6 15 6 6 74) Who can attend the University? Samaroon only Somaliland only Any quali®ed Somali Do not know Islamic world 6182439 75) If you had to choose giving a loan to the Borama local government or to Amoud University which would you choose and why? University Local government Do not know 48 0 12 AMOUD UNIVERSITY 653 open to students from the entire country and to sentiments. I wanted to know what the other Muslims. students thought of their identity given Survey respondents' answers to questions Somalia's fragmentation into warlord or clan two, three, and four suggest that despite Awdal ®efdoms. Like the Borama population, their region's signi®cant contributions to funding the response was counterintuitive. Nearly 74% of University, all Somalis should have access to its the ®rst year's cohort and 76% of the second educational opportunities. This nonsectarian year's class identi®ed Somalia as their country attitude of the majority of those interviewed is of citizenship. Eleven percent of the second surprisingin the face of the common interpre- year students and 19% of the ®rst year tation that clanist identity is the supreme driver students claimed to be ``Somalilanders,'' 5% of of the country's fragmentation. Given the the second year students identi®ed themselves retreat of civic-minded people from the public as Samaroon, and the remaining8% choose arena and the dominance of sectarian political not to answer the question. Seven percent of entrepreneurs in the country, Borama's citizens the ®rst year students saw themselves as Afri- nationalist attitude repudiate the supposed cans and none claimed clan identity. Most of deterministic force of clan identity. those who claimed Somali citizenship were Respondents' answers to question ®ve emphatic about who they were. The three most further establish the shallowness of clan iden- assertive answers were: ``I am a citizen of tity. Ninety eight percent of the respondents felt Somalia but not a Somaliland.'' 41 ``I want to that they would prefer to loan their resources to be Somali as I was before because nobody can the University rather than to Borama's local change my [nationality].'' ``Obviously I am a government. Interviewees also commented that Somali boy who live[s] in Somalia and never the local government had yet to use taxpayer had the will to go elsewhere. [I am] not those money in accountable and productive ways. 40 who denied their nationality and claimed [to They contrasted this corrupt behavior with the be] Americans or Europeans. I am a Somali transparent way the University is managed. patriotic boy.'' About half of our informants noted that they Amoud University has had several far- would still lend money to Amoud University, reachingin¯uences on its students and on the even knowingthat they may not gettheir local population. In addition, the inaugural money back. They considered contributions celebration and commencement of classes has and loans to the University as a worthy held additional meaningfor some guestsfrom investment but not to the local government. war-torn or con¯ict-paralyzed communities in When asked why they were willingto invest in other regions. The ®rst and most obvious lesson the University when a majority of its students Amoud drove home was the necessity of peace will be non-Borama natives, they replied that and stability for any development. A Hargeisa education and clanism do not mix. They elder, Abdi Warabeh, summed this up. He told underscored their hope that these investments his old friend, Haji Jama Muhumed, `` you are will help create a better Somalia. establishinga university for your youngpeople Nearly everyone interviewed was proud of while mine are roamingarmed bandits.'' The Borama's civic leadership in national reconcil- restoration of peace and stability in Borama iation and reconstruction. Most of Borama's does not mean that the community is con¯ict- population feels good about the civic role its free and has reached consensus on all major elders played in the 1993 Borama peace and issues. Rather, it signals that no issue is su- political conference, mediatingcon¯icts in the ciently important in of itself to polarize and eastern part of the northern region, and the give sectarian entrepreneurs an opportunity to pioneeringrole of Amoud University in jump- pro®t from discord. Focusingon common staringhighereducation in the country. This in ground may, in fact, lay the groundwork for no way means that clanist chauvinism is absent peaceful resolution of contumacious di€erences from Borama, but it does suggest that most in the future. Second, the openingceremony people prefer to be part of the larger Somali also had another signi®cance for some Borama community and yearn for public institutions natives and others who came from afar. Many that are democratically and professionally of these individuals had been enthusiastic managed. contributors and had supported the idea of the The second survey questioned ®rst and University, but they were skeptical the orga- second year University students about their nizers could refrain from usingpublic dona- identity. The students echo the populations' tions for their private gain. With such suspicion 654 WORLD DEVELOPMENT in their minds, they inspected the University's Amoud University is that well-managed rehabilitated infrastructure with particular community or public institutions are the best care. The organizers' appropriate use of public defense against exploitation by sectarian contributions to jumpstart the University entrepreneurs. This conclusion supports the restored a measure of the skeptics' faith in the initial thesis that shared cultural values are feasibility of collective projects. necessary, but an insucient condition, to Third, from the openingday, Amoud insure cohesion and national integration. University underscored the preciousness of Accountable institutions, which strategically investingin collective projects that strengthen build on shared traditions, foster tomorrow's common values and deepen peace. Without common values and identity. The implication such investments, peace will remain fragile, and of this ®ndingis that Amoud University and the community will be incapable of leaving similarly run community enterprises can play a anythingbehind other than a legacyof civil vital role in reestablishingSomalia's national strife. government and inclusive, rather than sectar- Fourth, nurturingcollective projects advan- ian politics. ces common cause and inclusive politics, and Seventh, the Somali calamity and Amoud marks the transition from peacemakingto University's establishment speak directly to the development. ways in which social capital is destroyed or Fifth, the University's foremost impact is formed. Instrumentalist uses of public institu- that it has given the population con®dence that tions can easily demolish shared values built local resources can be e€ectively mobilized to over decades, and may be centuries. This means address development needs. The University's that communities and states cannot take trust e€ective use of resources and its professional and common traditions for granted. Somalia's and transparent management system convinced story alerts us that national authority and the Borama citizens that public institutions need people should continuously reinvest in public not be corrupt and inecient. In fact, the institutions lest the nation's social capital is public often contrasts the University with the eroded and/or destroyed. Moreover, common corrupt local governmentÐa di€erence associ- heritage is not sucient enough to purposively ated with the latter's appointment by the unite people unless they are embodied in regional government and, hence not account- collective institutions that cater to the entire able to the population. This is not the case with community. These institutions are the best the University that is ®nancially dependent on defense against sectarian fragmentation and the local people and the Diaspora. national mayhem. Finally, state collapse, as in Sixth, Borama citizens have witnessed the Somalia, need not lead to despair in a society as birth of a new type of public institution that is individual communities can draw on their answerable to the community. If Somalis are social capital to deal with collective needs. by nature clanist as some claim, Amoud Single community bound projects may not be University, which was created after the enough, however, to reignite national concili- national government's disintegration, should ation and development. Buildingnational have hardened community's clanist feelings. institutions that supercede particularistic Instead, Amoud has had the opposite e€ect. projects and embody common cause is the next By contrast, Borama's fraudulent local step in scaling- up 42 shared values' appeal. government has been fertile ground for divi- This is precisely the essence of Amoud sive politics. The most potent lesson of University.

NOTES

1. Samatar 71989, 1994). 4. Putnam 71993).

2. Lewis 71994), Luling71997), Laitin and Samatar 5. Tendler 71997). 71987). 6. Lamos 71998), Evans 71995). 3. For a critical analysis of ethnicity and national development in Africa, see Mustapha 7forthcoming). 7. Mkandawire 71999). AMOUD UNIVERSITY 655

8. This section draws on Samatar 71997). 23. Haji Dahir Elmi was present in this meetingas a youngman and a former student of Aw Abdi Shiekh 9. This division was clear even in the ®rst Somali Noor. governments formed under Italian and British colonial masters in the late 1950s. Hussein, A. H. 7Prime Minister 24. Borama and Hargeisa supported the Amoud 1964±67) Interview 21 October 1999, Minneapolis. location. Hargeisa people were comfortable with Amoud as their children were already in the interme- 10. Major di€erences emerged between the President diate boardingschool there. The chief advocate of the and his Prime Minister with regard to the government's eastern location was none other than Mr. Ali, who public management strategy. The President appointed a argued that the school should be built in the eastern like-minded Prime Minister. region. The speaker for the Borama±Hargeisa coalition was Mr. Said Abby, a broker for the Wasame Birko company in Hargeisa. The two groups faced each 11. It must be noted that the integration of these two other at the Protectorate Advisory Council held in the administrative systems into a coherent one was a major town of Shiekh. The Protectorate Governor, nick- accomplishment of the ®rst and second republics. named ``Kamekame,'' chaired the meeting, and Bell participated. The vocational school was the last item 12. Several hundred junior employees appointed on the on the agenda, and the two sides presented their cases. basis of clientalism were also dismissed. Hussein, A. H. The debate between the two sides was acrimonious and Interview 23 October 1999. Amongthose ®red was the the Governor had to intervene and cut the debate Primer's older brother who was hired employed by the short. Italian colonial administration.

25. Somaliland Protectorate Education Department 13. Hussein 71999), Interview, 30 October 1999. 71953, 1956).

14. Abib 71996). He was cabinet secretary under Prime 26. Mr. Abdirahman Ali headed this coalition. He was Minister Egal. the younger brother of Mohamoud Ahmed Ali.

15. Lewis 71972). 27. Mr. Ali is recognized for gracefully accepting his defeat and relinquishingpower as the head of the so- 16. Abib 71996). called Somaliland. He is the only one amongthe faction leaders and warlords to have done so peacefully since 17. Samatar 71993). Somalia's disintegration.

18. There have been over 12 international confer- 28. Samaroon or Gadabursi is the clan name for the ences, but none has produced tangible results. In fact, majority of people of Awdal origin. some of these conferences organized by regional leaders became instruments for exploitingSomali Fragmenta- 29. This section is based on my observations and tion to extend the interests of Ethiopia, Kenya, or interviews I conducted over the last two years. Eriterea. 30. I attended, as an observer, the meetingin which 19. These were revealed to the author in discussion some of these issues were debated. with senior ocials of the so-called Somaliland Repub- lic. Gabileh and Hargeisa, June 1999. 31. This term was added to the Somali language during the height of the civil war to denote brutal banditry. 20. Muhumed and Elmi 71999), Interview, Borama 28 January 1999. 32. When I visited the school in June 1995, I saw the physics and history textbooks I used as a student in the 21. ``Aw and Shiekh'' are religious titles. The latter is secondary school. These books were stored in one of the more educated than the former. dormitories and protected from the elements.

22. Various Somali governments recognized Mr. Ali as 33. More recently, The Djibouti government donated a the father of modern Somali education. Schools and new bus, one electrical generator, several computers, and other institutions were named after him. two hundred chairs and tables. 656 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

34. In contrast, no one wants to deal with Borama 37. Kat is a mild stimulant men chew. local government, as it is thoroughly corrupt and sta€ed by sectarians. Moreover, the rehabilitated old interme- 38. University's Women Support Group, Group Inter- diate school was turned into an agricultural school. The view, Borama, 3 April 1999. school was temporarily closed as nepotism marred its management. 39. Gulaid 71999), Interview, Borama, 3 April 1999.

35. The Diaspora is organized into three groups: 40. This is changing slightly as a new mayor has North American contingent, Europe and the Middle started to rebuild city roads of Borama. East. These belongto the Friends of Amoud University. 41. Somaliland is the name of the clan ®efdom for 36. The University has repeatedly submitted requests what was northern Somalia. to local government authorities to invest in the institu- tion by levyingmarginaltaxes on water and electricity. 42. Evans 71996). The former mayor of Borama district repeatedly turned down these requests. The new mayor has promised to examine the feasibility of such taxes.

REFERENCES

Abib, H. 71996). Interview, 11±12 October. Ottawa. Muhumed, H. J., & Elmi, H. D. 71999). Interview, 28 Evans, P. 71995). Embedded autonomy: States and January. Borama. industrial transformation. Princeton: Princeton Mustapha, R. 7forthcoming). The house Lugard built University Press. and the zones of contention: the Nigerian state in Evans, P. 71996). Government action, social capital and historical perspective. In A. I. Samatar, & A. development: reviewingthe evidence on synergy. Samatar 7Eds.), The state in Africa: Reconsidered. World Development, 2476), 1119±1132. Putnam, R. 71993). Making democracy work: Civic Gulaid, S. A. 71999). Interview, 3 April. Borama. traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Hussein, A. H. 71999). Interviews, 23 and 30 October. University Press. Minneapolis. Samatar, A. 7Ed.) 71994). The Somali challenge: From Laitin, D., & Samatar, S. 71987). Somalia: Nation in catastrophe to renewal. Boulder: Lynne Riener. search of a state. Westview Press: Boulder. Samatar, A. I. 71989). The state and rural transformation Lamos, M. C. 71998). The politics of pollution control in in northern Somalia 1884±86. Madison: University of Brazil: state actors and social movements cleaningup Wisconsin Press. Cubatao. World Development, 2671), 75±87. Samatar, A. I. 71993). Structural adjustment as devel- Lewis, I. M. 71972). The politics of the 1972 Somali coup. opment strategy: bananas, boom and poverty in Journal of Modern African Studies, 1073), 383±408. Somalia. Economic Geography, 6971), 25±43. Lewis, I. M. 71994). Blood and bone: The calling of Samatar, A. I. 71997). Leadership and ethnicity in the kinship in Somali socitey. Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea makingof African state models: Botswana versus Press. Somalia. Third World Quarterly, 1874), 687±707. Luling, V. 71997). Come back Somalia? questioning a Somaliland Protectorate Education Department 71953). collapsed state. Third World Quarterly, 1872), 287± Annual Report 1953. Hargeisa. 303. Somalil and Protectorate Education Department 71956). Mkandawire, T. 71999). Globalization and Africa's Annual Report 1956. Hargeisa. un®nished agenda. Macalester International, 7, 71± Tendler, J. 71997). Good government in tropics. Balti- 107. more, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.