7 Statefeminism and equalitypolicies The caseof Spain(1983-95)t

Celia Valiente

Since the 1960sand 1970s,institutions with the concretepurpose of improving the statusof women havebeen set up, developed.and sometimes even dismantled in most advancedindustrial societies.In social science 'state literature, these institutions have been called feminist' institutions, bureaucraciesor machine¡ies.The people who work in them are labelled 'femocrats' or 'state feminists' (Stetson and Mazur 1995). This chapter seeksto make a contribution to the analysisof the effects (if any) of these institutionson the formulation of genderequality policy, and to examinethe relationshipbetween state feminists and activistsin the women'smovement. This is a casestudy of the main (althoughnot the only) feminist institution at the central statelevel in Spain, the Institute of the (lnslituto de Ia Mujer,IW) which wasestablished in 1983. The first sectionofthis chapterpresents the insightsof scholarlyand non- academicfeminist literatureinto the contributionofstate feministsto policy and to their relationshipwith feministsin society.The secondsection is devoted to the case study. I argue that state in Spain hashad a significantimpact in the policy areaof genderequality. The IW can claim a positive reco¡d in having persuadedother state units to includeequality measureson their agendas.Nevertheless, the IW hashardly inte¡vened in the implementationof thesepolicies. The relations between IW femocratsand activists in women's organisationshave been scarceand only very rarely cooperativein characterThis gap betweenfeminists with¡n the state and in society has preventedther¡ from pushing state officials further down the equality path. The concluding sectionraises questions for futu¡e research.l

STATE FEMINISM: ITS IMPACT ON GENDER EQUALITY POLICY AND ITS RELATION WITH FEMINISM IN SOCIETY With respectto the impact of statefeminist machinerieson genderequality policy. two soÍs of assessmentscan be found in acadernicpublications and 128 Celía Valiente Sfate.fettutisn ,;r:

in non-academicfeminist w¡itings. For some,these institutions have hardly different means), i.e. to speak on beh¡li had any effect on the policymaking process,since femocratsare too few rn populationand to improverhe \r¡ru\ ut \\ numberin comparisonwith the total numberofpolicymakers, and havelittle may differ in the means chosen to pur power and few political resou¡ces.For others.it is evidentthat somegender femoc¡ats' viewpoint, it is imponanr rhar t. equality programmeshave beenestablished as a result of the efforts of the are not confined to women grouped in a3 femocrats. These programmes have improved the status of their bene- concentratetheir efforts on the formularri. ficiaries (albeit only a small number of women). Nevcrtheless,these policies, regarding them as a usef'uimeu. achievementsfall far sho¡t of the broad goal of the in female citizens, most of whom do not bei, the last three decades:the attainmentof a major and radical redistribution (Ryan 1990:8lt. Conversel¡.some J(lr\: of power betweenmen and women.l In the same wa¡ it might be argued femocratsare not able to diminish gender i that the establishmentoffeminist bureaucracieshas contributed to marginal- theone hand, state feminists have. irr rcar ¡¡: ising feminist demands,and to consolidatingthe insensitivity to women's stateto promotepolicies ofgender equalir\. concernstraditionally held by most state oflicials. This is so becausethe work for the stateas femocrats.ther mi::::: creation of feminist machinedes might have encouragedpolicymakers rn the sense that their demands becorne :: other departmentsto believe that they do not need to concern themselves symbolic.This is becauseradical dema¡d. I ' with women's interests, since these are the exclusive responsibility of within the sratelsee Watson I aao: lO' femocrats. or that the mere existence of these machineries means that A more positiveassessment of the rel¿:l women's most urgent problems have alreadybeen solved. feministsis maintainedby GeorgiaDuer. In contrast,other authorsand activistshave argued that in somecountries affirms that in somecases collaboration tel the establishment of the aforementioned institutions has provided the beneñcial. The former have material an; i feminist causewith material and human resourcesthat the movementnevc¡ almostalways lack. Equally. rhe e\r.rcn-. had before (Threlfall 1985: 53). Furthe¡more,feminist burcauc¡acieshave leministmovement mighr be u.elul ro tc:.. been useful in the attempt to translatethe gene¡al goals of the movement policymakerscompete agJinst olhersl¡l. :: into objectivesfor concretepublic policies. This has beenpossible because It may be helpful for them to sho$ rhei¡ .;: statefeminists now have a permanentplace in the arenaof power (Stetson populationare interestedin such issue... andMazu¡ 1995:l). The femocratsnow occupysufficiently high positions around them. Second,for variousreason\_ \: on the bureaucraticladder to be theoretically capableof bringing matters defend propositions consideredtoo ¡aú!JJ- which concern women, such as parentalleave or domestic violence, to the theseoptions, they are in a positionlo ter, attentionof senior state off,cials (Eisenstein1991: 23). This positive societymobilising in supportof theseden.-": assessmentof femocrats'capacity to claim public spacefor women's issues reasonwhich supportsDuerst-Lahti s ars;::l informs most of the recent scholarlv literature on statefeminism (see for statefeminists if a powe¡ful feminist mor c,::, exampleRyan 1990;Outshoorn 1994a: 9-11 Stetsonand Mazur 1995).4 In this situation femocratscan presenrrhe:: While studyingthe impact of statefeminism in the policymaking process, the population in generalas the supponer. \ it is impo¡tant not to forget that this process is composed of some The ne\t seclionconsiders an emp¡niJ: - intrinsically interrelatedstages: problem definition, agenda-setting.policy Womanin Spain.It examinesthe I\\"s im¡. formulation, and policy implementation(Kingdom 1984: 3). This chapter of genderequality, and the relationsbers er,r arguesthat femocratsmight play an important role in somc stages,but not in others.The fragmentednature of their influencemight be overlookedif STATE FEMINISM AT WORK: THE /.\.: we only considerthe process as a whole. IN SPAIN (1983-9s) The relationship between femocrats and activists in the women's movementhas beencomplicated in many weste¡ncountries. This is hardly The[W wasestablished in 1983.six r eu¡.¡r:, surprising,since both pursue the samebroad objectives (although through took place in Spain.óand one year afier rh: Statefeminism and gender equalítypolicies 129 different means), i.e. to speak on behalf of some sectors of the female population and to improve the statusof women. Femocratsand ferninists may differ in the means chosen to pursue the same goals. From the femoc¡ats' viewpoint, it is important that the objectivesof genderequality are not confined to women grouped in feminist circles. Thus, femocrats concentate their efforts on the formulation and implementationof public policies, regarding them as a useful meansto enhancethe statusof many female citizens, most of whom do not b€long to any women's association (Ryan 1990: 81). Conversely,some activists of the movement think that femocratsare not able to diminish genderhiera¡chies, for two reasons.On the one hand,state feminists have,in real terms,very little power within th€ stateto promotepolicies of genderequality. On the other hand,when women work for the stateas femoc¡ats,they might sooneror later be co-opted,in the sense that theh demands become increasingly moderate, or even symboüc.This is becauseradical demandsnormallyjeopardise their careers within üe state(see Watson 1990: l0).5 A more positive assessmentof the relationship between femoc¡ats and feminists is maintained by Georgia Duerst-Lahti (1989: 250,258). She afÍirms that in somecases collaboration between the two could be mutually beneficial. The former have material and human resourcesthat üe latter almost always lack. Equally, the existenceof a strong, highly mobilised feminist movementmight be useful to femocratsfor two reasons.First, all policymakerscompete against other stateofficials to obtain more resources. It may be helpful for them to show their superiorsthat broad sectorsof the population are interested in such issues,and as a result would mobilise a¡oundthem. Second,fo¡ variousreasons, state officials a¡e often unableto defend propositions considered too radical. Nevertheless,if they favour theseoptions, they are in a position to benefit from organisationsin civil societymobilising in suppon ofthese demands.In my view, there is a third reasonwhich supportsDuerst-Lahti's argument. It may be advantageousfor statefeminists ifa powerful feminist movementadvocates radical measu¡es. In this situation femocratscan presentthemselves to conservativesand to the population in generalas the supportersof moderateand viable options. The next sectionconsiders an empirical case,that of the Institute of the Woman in Spain. It examinesüe [W's impact on policymaking in the area of genderequality, and the relationsbetween femocrats and feminists.

STATE FEMIMSM AT WORK: THE INSTITUTO DE 1.4, MU]ER IN SPAIN I198}95) The fW was establishedin 1983,six yearsafter the flrst democraticalections took place in Spain,oand one year after the Social Democratic Party first 130 Celia Velíente Stqtefem¡nisrr ü gained power (Valiente 1995),7which it retained until 1996 The IW is an and bureaucraticelites in Spainthat rhe tirs administrativeunit which was first attachedto the Ministry of Culture and of their energyto inforrning stateofficials r then moved to the Ministry of Social Affairs. The fW has its own director, in existencein most wes¡erncountries. ar facilities, and independent budget. In spite of its late establishmentrn some of these programmes. Femoc¡ats comparisonwith feminist machineriesin other westerncountries, the [W is transmitting information and lobbving tl nowadayscomparable to them in terms ofpersonnel, budget and the extent policymalers and through the meerine. ofits functions.The staff and resourcesofthe [W haveconstantly increased. ConsejoRector (CD). This was crearedrn This contrastswith the experienceof feminist bu¡eaucraciesin someother The CD was primarily made up of reprc. countries,whose administative level has been downgraded,and personnel governmentministries. Until the lare 1980: andbudget cut.8 Accordingto the 1994tW annualreport,263 peopleworked everysix months.and a smallercommltte.' in the institution in üat year. It had an annual budget of about 2.6 billion In both meetings,the representativesof rhc pesetasor f12.5 million (Instituto de la Mujer 1995: 103-8). equality policymaking, explained rhe mt'a. to take, and received suggestions.adricc becomemore involved in the pursuit of gen The impact of th€ IW on the policy area of gender equality In 1987 femoc¡ats felt they neededpoli. informal contactswith stateofficials and ri Until now, empirical studies have given an affirmative answer to the the unequalcommitment ofdifferent m¡nr:¡ question of whether or not state feminist institutions participate in a p¡event theü efforts from being dispersed.. signiñcantway in the formation ofpublic policies which promote the status to establishgend€r equaliry policies. In of women. For instance,a recent cross-nationalstudy covering fourteen prepareda firsrequality plan. conrainine . countries (Australia, Canada,Denmark, France, German¡ Great Britain, " to be takenby thirteenministries benreen J¡r Ireland, Italy, the ,, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the (Institutode la Muje¡ 1990b:l-l0l ). Fem,r USA) concludedthat statefeministbureaucracies in all thesecounries except 'had with the minishies in an attempt to en\r¡ Poland an impac¡ on equal employmentPolicy (EEP) for women, that measureswhich they were truly willing lo j. is, any stateaction seekingto eliminate direct and/or indirect discrimination The 120 measureswhich made up the n¡. basedon gender in hiring, firing, professionaltraining, and Promotion'.In 'established types:legal reforms aimed ar achievineequ. other words, institutions with a mandateto focus directly on before the law; initiativesfor non-se\i\r ( women's status,have the capacity to turn leaders' attention,in some cases measures;women-specific health programn for the first time, to laws andregulations that can changethe statusof women national cooperation projects with uomen in relation to men' (Stetson and Mazur 1995:' 272,275). This sectron promotion of feminist associationsin S¡ examinesthe sort of impact the IW has had, by focusing not only on EEP, constituteda turning point in that it meanr, . but also on other typesofequality policies, and by examining separatelythe e set of dispersedshort-term efforts madeb) n impact of statefeminists in the different stagesofthe policymaking process feminists and femocratsthemselves (see hcl, degreeofjoint medium-term planning b¡ rc second Equality policies established by other institutions at the IW's equalityplan wasprepared bv rheI\\' I requ€st de la Mujer 1993b).It mainlycontains equal: thoseofthe first plan. The secondequalirr ¡i In common with the majority of state feminist institutions in advanced empirical researchfor this chapter\\'as und.. indusrial societies,the IW has neither the responsibility nor the budget to too early toevaluatethis secondprograrnmc. \ formulate and implement most gender equality policies; rathet it has the here. explicit function of convincing other stateunits to adopt thesepolicies. In The first equality plan had the ler¡ im¡. the early 1980s,gender equality policies were so unk¡own among political terisedby a high level of abstraclion,\\::: Statefeminísm and gender equalítypolícíes 131 and bureaucraticelites in Spainthat the first femocratshad to dedicatemuch of their energy to informing state officials that these measureswere already in existencein most western countries, and convincing them to establish some of these pro$arnmes. Femocrats ca¡ried out this initial task of transmitting information and lobbying through informal contacts with policymakers and through the meetings of the IW advisory council - ConsejoRector (CD). This was createdin 1985 to advise the IW director The CD was primarily made up of representatives from tbe majority of governmentministries. Until the late 1980sa completeCD met at leastonce every six months, and a smaller committeemet at least once every qua er In both meetings,the representativesof the ministries learnedthe basicsof equality policymaking, explained the measuresüeir departmentsplanned to take, and received suggestions,advice, and considerablepressure to becomemore involved in the pursuit of genderequality. In 1987 femocratsfelt they neededpolicy instrumentsother than these informal contactswith stateofñcials and the CD meetings,to circumvent the unequalcommitment of different minisries to gender-based€quality, to prevent üeir efforts from being dispersed, and to pressurise the minisaies to establish gender equality policies. In consequence,state feminists prepareda first equality plan, containing a comprehensiveset of measures to be takenby thfteen ministriesbetween January 1988and Decembe¡1990 (Insütuto de la Mujer 1990b: l-l0l). Femocratshad previously negotiated with the ministries in an attempt to ensure that the plan only included measureswhich üey were truly willing to implement. The 120 measureswhich made up the first plan may be divided into six types: legal reforms aimed at achievingequality betweenmen and women before the law; initiatives for non-sexist education; equal employment measures;women-specific healü programmes:the developmentof inter- national cooperation projects with women in othe¡ count¡ies, and the promotion of feminist associations in Spain. The first equality plan constituteda turning point in that it meant (at least in theory) the end of a set of dispersed short-term efforts made by ministries at the request of state feminists and femocratsthemselves (see below), and the introduction of a degreeofjoint medium-term planning by femocratsand stateofficials. A second equality plan was prepa¡ed by the IW for the period 1993-5 (Instituto de la Mujer 1993b).It mainly containsequality policies of a type similar to thoseof the first plan. The secondequality plan was still in fo¡ce when the empirical research for this chapter was undertaken. At that time it was still too ea¡ly to evaluate this secondprograrnme, so only the first plan i s examined here. The fust equality plan had the very important defect of being charac- terised by a high level of abstraction (with the exception of the legal 132 Celía VeLíente Statefetnttusm tit reforms). For example, measure3.3.1 was to promote the 'professional measures,or would not haveintroduced th( training of rural women ... in managerialand commercialskills'. Yet it is irnpossible to make a similarl¡ ¡ nothing was said about who was going to organisethe courses,how many performance in the stages of polic\ l¡, were to be organised,how were they going to be financed,their character- Specificand concrete measure, Lo rackie r., istics or beneficiaries.Such extremeabstaction constitutesan insurmount- are formulated within ministries. or parlir able obstacle at the evaluation stage, because if goals are not clearly to preserve and reinforce their ou,n p,orr established,it is impossible to evaluatewhether they have been reached influence in these two arenaswhen a ch. or not. variousalte¡natives available to add¡essa r The IW concluded,in its own evaluation,that the implementationof the As for theimplementat¡on oIeender equ first plan had beenhighly successful,since out of the 120 measuresplamed, in chargeofcontrolling this stage.This r-on I 16 were adopted(Instituto de la Mujer 1990b: 105 55). Nevertheless,this mainly caried out through the tW lesal dc-, conclusion has to be heated with great caution. This is because the IW advisorycouncil. Nevenhejess. in pr:r.r information which served as üe basisfor this evaluationwas given to the if a ministry failed to implemenr rhe equ.: fW by the thifieen ministries,who might have overemphasisedthet gender introduce,because the [W has no pos er. .- equality actions, and underestimated(or even concealed)what they had lack of powers of sanctionis not a peculi.,r failed to do. general,hardly any institution exists \\ irh !, The exarnínationof the first equality plan shows that Spanishfemocrats as opposedto symbolic terms) other ¡nsr¡r- have been partially succassfulas problem-definersand as agenda-setters.l0 reason, consciously or othe¡wise. I\\' :t:: With regardto problem definition, feminist theoristshave prcposed that one reasonableto concentratetheir ef¡on... of the sourcesof women's subordinationis the existencein all societiesof consideredmore easily realisable.for a broadly accepteddistinction between public and pdyate matters. Some in.r.: 'public' fW can perform alone,which a¡e studied problemsare generallyconsidered as in that it is believedthat üey r: should be solved by the stateor civil society.In contrast,other topics are conceptualisedas 'private', i.e. the concernof individuals or their families. Gender equality policies established b] tl Matters falling in the latter category,such as the unequalstatus of husbands and wives within marriage, or the violence sometimesperpetrated by the The [W has rhe responsibility and budgc,rI 'üe former on the lattet are issuesthat, in line with the feminist sloganthat promole research.to di[[use informar¡.¡. personalis political', have to be handled- and solved- in the community. recerve and handle complaints of di:c¡¡::r 'private' Femocrats have been quite active in the task of converting regard to researchactivities, it should be hr: 'public' matters into problems. State feminists have always promoted the rerearchhad beencarried out on \{onlcn. (conferences. existencein the institutional arenaof forums sernina¡s.round wiü other weste¡ncountdes. Since then. :..- tables,meetings) where such topics could be discussedboth in public and IW has publishedbooks, periodicals.po.r.-: in smaller gatheringsamong stateofficials. In theseforums, issuessuch as rate of thirty-six a year Along $irh olh. rape within marriage or sexual harassmentin the wo¡kplaca began to be commissionedresea¡ch and established 'things a c,, teated not as of life' or citizens' pdvate business,but as social In relarionro thediffusion o[ inform,l;.: problems which deserve public attention (and solutions). Some policy the Spanish population (especiallr anror: decision-maters have been convinced by state feminists that issues inlormation,rntrrs lr"n,ro, ,1, i,¡iurrrr,. , previously 'pdvate' public considered are really the concernof authorities. in some cities, where citizens can ot\i:::: With respectto agenda-setting,IW femocratsalso have a positive record, rights.l2These centres have answered a:,:: since they succeededin persuading other political to introduce actors informatiot per year The most cornmon .. equality goals into their agendas. In fact, if üe IW had not existed, urban women aged25-55, ma¡ried and * l: many of these ministries would probably never have establishedequality completedcompulsory schooling but did n, : Stafefemínism and gender equalitypolícies 133 measures,or would not have introducedthem as soonas they did. However, it is impossible to make a similarly positive assessmentof üe IW's performance in the stages of policy formulation and implementation. Specificand concretemeasures to tacklevarious types ofgender inequalities are formulated within ministries, or parliament, which in general try hard to preserve and reinforce their own powers. State feminists have little influence in these two arenaswhen a choice is being made between the various alternativesavailable to addtessa problem. As for the implementationof genderequality policies,the IW is formally in chargeofconÍolling this stage.This control function hasbeen, in theorf mainly caried out through the IW legal departmentand the meetingsofthe IW advisory council. Nevertheless,in practiceabsolutely noüing happened if a ministry failed to implement the equality measuresit was supposedto introduce,because the fW has no powers of sanctionover ministries. This lack of powers of sanctionis not a peculiarity of the IW, since in Spain, rn general,hardly any institution exists with enoughpower to control (in real as opposedto symbolic terms) other institutions of similar status.For this reason,consciously or otherwise, fW staff may have acted as if it were reasonable to concentrate their efforts on other objectives which are consideredmore easily realisable,fo¡ instance,the very few tasks that the IW can perform alone,which are studiednext.rl

Gender equality policies established by the IW

The IW has the responsibility and budget to peform only three tasks: to promote research,to diffuse information about women's dghts, and to receive and handle complaints of discrimination against women. With regardto researchactivities, it should be highlighted that before 1983 little researchhad been carried out on women's issuesin Spain, in comparison with other westerncountdes. Since then,according to its annualreports, the IW has published books, periodicals,posters, and brochuresat an average rate of thi¡ty-six a year. Along with other activities, the IW has also commissionedresearch and establisheda documentationcentre in Madrid. In relation to the diffusion of information about women's rights among the Spanish population (especially among women), the IW has set up information centes (centros de información de los derechos de la mujer) in some cities, where citizens can obtain information about women's rights.l2 These centreshave answereda total of some 50,000 requestsfor information per year. The most cornmon users of this service have been urban women aged25-55, married and with one or two children, who have completedcompulsory schoolingbut did not attendfurther education,who 134 Celia Valiente Statefemntvn cr do not perform waged wo¡k outsidethe home, and whose family units have formulationand success[ulimplemenrarr had an income of approximatelytwice the minimum wage. Sirnilarly,Drude Dahlerup(1993: l7r. ia In addition, a toll-f¡ee women's rights information phone line was set up policies in Denmark in the 1980s.foun,j : in 1991, in an attempt to extend the service to women who do not live tn many membersof the polirical panie:. cities. By the end of 1994,this phoneline answered241,038 calls (Instituto organisations,some unemploymenr policir, de la Mujer 1995:65). The most common use¡sof this line have againbeen principlesof radicalfeminism lfor rn,r¡n. urban women (in spite of the objective of spreadinginformation to non- part this was made possible by the err.i urban areas) aged 25-35, who have either not completed compulsory formed by some femocrars.femjnr:r.. lr¡ schooling or have completedit, but without further education,and who do female trade unionists,who suppo¡tedsu.i. not pe¡form waged work outside the home. The IW has contributed On the contrary,in countriessuch as Fru: significantly to the diffusion of information about women's rights through Britain(Lovenduski 1995: 127-9). relari..r: theseinformation cenhes and the toll-free phone line. Nevertheless,some ists have been almost non-existent.or h::., sectorsof the female population still do not benefitftom its services;these by reticence,lack of cooperation.a¡d er ¡: are mainly rural women, and thosewho are aged45 or over, typically those argueüat Spain belongsto rhis laÍer gr..r: who tend to be the least awareof their rights. threeaspects ofthese relationships: the inl,.: As for the receptionand handling ofcomplaints of discriminationagainst and feminists,the accessthe latter ha\ e lir i women, it is importantto note that the [W can initiate a legal complaint with policy of subsidisingwomen's :l\\ocr:j: the appropdateauthorities only at the requestof women who believe that consequencesof thesetense relationshrF. they have been discriminated against. The IW cannot lodge complaints Informal relationshipsbetween I\\' per. without the victims' permission.The IW doesnot representwomen tn court. organisations in Spain have. with sorr_.' The numberof thesecomplaints has been low: an averageof fifty-six a year' exrstent.This contrastswith the frequenrr: Femocratsgave two reasonsto explain this low number: the fear many andfeminists in othercounrries.for in\rr:.t-r Spanishwomen have of inítiating legal action, and their lack of awareness 1992b: 1) or in Australia up to rhe mri-:' oftheir own rights and the ways to defendthem. It could also be arguedthat feminists accessto decision-makrngin .:.: the IW has not provided incentivesfor a more extensiveuse of the service. eristedin somecountries,.uch a. óenn:-: Similarly. it might be the casethat when Spanishfemale citizens think that (Bystydzienski1995).In Spain. such acce.. they havebeen discriminated against, they go to otherplaces in searchof as explained below, was ¡estricted ro m!' : information and legal advice, for instanceto the women's departmentsin councilof a smallnumber of gendcrcq u:.r: trade unions. if the discrimination problem is work related. of somemembers of womens organisa,.:. Since its foundation, the IW adr¡sorr :. entativesof most governmentminist.ies ir..l The relationship of the IW with the women's moYem€nt: practicing vocales.Theywere appointedbv the mrnr::: feminism without the feminists? IW's di¡ector These yocales had ro be ...:: The relationshipbetween feminists in state institutions and in society has equalityin their professionalor public lir: varied ove¡ time and/or among countries. Several studies have revealed consideredrepresentative of the femlnrsr::: episodesof fruitful cooperation between femocrats and activists in the one hand.they werenominlted a\ ü r(.-.: women'smovement. In her study of statefeminism in the USA at the federal to genderequalitf and not becauserrf rh::: and state level in the 1960s, Georgia Duerst-Lahti reported episodesof On the other hand, they were not eler-tc; : collaboration of the two actors. Likewise. according to Joyce Outshoorn representit in the IW advisorycouncil. (1992b: 11,-12. 1994a: 1, l¿l 16), the existenceof alliancesbetween In 1988the lW promoredrhe tbrm.:. feminists, femocrats.parliamentarians, and high-level burcauc¡atsis. in the exclusivelyof feministsin chargeot mo¡::. Netherlands. a necessaryalthough not a sufficient precondition for the equalityplan. Suspicion\ abour lh i. mo\( ^, Statefeminism and gender equalitypolicíes 135 formulation and successfulimplementaüon of gender equality policies. Similarly, Drude Dahlerup (1993: l7), in her resea¡chon unemployment policies in Denmark in the 1980s,found that in spite of the opposition of many members of the political pa.rties,trade unions, and employers' organisations,some unemployment policies were designedaccording to the principles of (for instance,courses for women only). In part this was made possible by the existence of a cooperative network formed by some femocrats, feminists, feminist researchers,scholars and female trade unionists,who suppo¡tedsuch radical initiatives. On üe contrarf in countdessuch as France(Maz ur 1995:90-2) or Great Britain (Lovenduski 1995: 127-9). relationsbetween femocrats and femin- ists have been almost non-existent,or have been scarceand characterised by reticence,lack of cooperation,and even confrontation.In this sectionI arguethat Spain belongsto this latter group ofcountries. I wish to examine threeaspects of theserelationships: the informal contactsbetween femocrats and feminists,the accessthe latter have to fW decision-making,and the IW policy of subsidising women's associations.Finall¡ I will explore the consequencesof thesetense relationships. Informal relationships between IW personnel and members of feminist organisations in Spain have, with some exceptions, been almost non- existent.This conhastswith üe frequent informal links betweenfemocrats and feministsin other countries,for instance,in the Netherlands(Outshoorn 1992b:7) or in Australia up to the mid-1980s (Sawer 1990: 25). As for feminists' accessto decision-makingin statefeminist machineries,this has existed in some counhies, such as Denmark (Borchorst 1995) or Norway (Bystydzienski 1995).In Spain,such access has been extremely limited, and as explained beloq was restrictedto üe participation in the IW advisory council ofa small number ofgende¡ equality advocatesuntil the 1990s,and of somemembers of women's organisationssince then. Since its foundation, the IW advisory council included not just repres- entativesof most governmentministries but also six oüer memberscalled vocales.T'heywere appointedby the minister on the recommendationofthe IW's director These yocales had to be outstandingproponents of gende¡ equality in their professionalor public lives. Nevertheless,they cannot be consideredrepresentative of the feminist movementfo¡ two reasons.On the one hand, they were nominated as a result of their individual commitment to gender equaliry and not becauseof their activities in women's groups. On the other hand, they were not electedby any feminist organisationto representit in the [W advisory council. In 1988 the fW promoted the formation of a commission made up exclusively of feminists in chargeof monitoring the implementationof the equalityplan. Suspicionsabout this move by the femocratswas immediately 136 Celi.r Velíente Statefenitisn o: noted by activists in the women's movement.They rcsentedhaving been lemocrats. When some of the fornter deJ asked to evaluatethe implementation of a plan which they had not been found il naturallo maintaintheir pcr.on;. invited to formulate. Mo¡eover, feminists doubted that the lW femocrats ¡n the movemenl.their companion' in ¡:. were in fact interested either in the commission's evaluation of the only a minority of fW femoc¡ats s ere ¡ .. implementationof the equality plan or in the initiation of long-term feministsdefinitely prevented the nr¡inrcr cooperative links with the movement. The feminists' suspicions appear womenin the movement,simply becau.,-':i reasonableif we bear in mind that activists were not invited to Participate The Spanishfeminist movemenr is hisir. in the formulationand the monitoringof rhesecond equality plln.ll For all data, approximately 100 women s ¡ssrr-r.,: thesereasons. some activists decided not to take Part in the work of the existat nationallevel, and some 3.000 ar r¡ commission. feminists,this atomisationis a rutherp,,. Due to the numerousdisagreements arising among the feminístsparticr- because,in consequence,women \\'ilh \ a:.. pating in the commission. some abandonedit before the completion of ¡ts organisationmost appropriatefor rhem. () work. These differencesof opinion made it difficult to agree on even the seefragmentation as an insurmountable,,¡ most basic recommendations.This experiencerevealed to many activists them and feminists,because the latter harc . the difllculties involved when members of different organisationswork of view. together.Besides. many participantswere of the opinion that working with The establishmentof long-tern cooprr.,:: (or for) the institutions was a wasteof time and energy. femocratshas also beenhampered hecau.r' . when the commission finished its deliberations,three representativesof coliaborat¡onas necessaryor eren,.lc.rr:i.- feminist organisationsand one represeütativeof the women's departments that public policies should be fornrularcti.': ofeach ofthe two main Spanishunions. the IJnirjnGeneral de Trabajatlores aremembers of, or havebeen appoinred ¡.,. and Comisiones Obreras were appointed membe¡s of the IW advisory population.Activists in thewomen s mcrrl::: council,substituting the former six vocr¡1¿S(Instituto de laMujer 1991:143). participantsin the policymakin-eprocc\\. .:: In the spring of 1994 the participation of these five women in the Iw to playlhis role. Similarly. some lcnloir":. :: advisory council was the only permanent formal channel of accessfor be implementedexclusive¡y by statcofri.rr.. feminists to IW's decision-making.Nevertheless, they only obtained it ¡n requiredpublic examinations to $ ork lor :: the early 1990s.when the advisorycouncil almost ceased to meet.This ls havethe necessaryqualifications tt) pen',::l not a paradox but a partial confirmation of feminists' suspicion that IW either as individualswho do not ha\e ::: femocratshave not been truly interestedin building permanentbridges of implementpublic policies.or as merelr .':: collaborationwith the women'smovement. ignorantof the buretucrat¡crule\ nt Fr,\.rj.. Why are informal and lormal relationships between feninists and Someactivists in the women'smo\ cm.:.: femocrats so scarce and tense in Spain? The question is particularly collaborationwith institutions.Thrs ¡l!:l-- intriguing given the fact that many feminists,who in the 1980swere feminist groups werc fo¡med in rhc ir:. sceptical (or even opposed)to the establishmentof state l'eminist institu- pcrticiparedin rhc oppo.irionro rhc ¡uri.:. tions, have eventually acceptedthe desirability of the existenceof these 94). This experienceleft most l'ernini.i. .r machineries,even ifthey arestill very critical ofwhat IW femocratsactually towardsthe state,given that for ntanr I c¡:. do. As for informal links. in other countries such as the Netherlands who held political power. insteadot lc¡¡f.:::: (Outshoorn1994a: 5-6) or Australia(Franzway, Coun and Connell I989: achievefeminist goals. 138), an important number of femocratshad previously been membersof By far the mostimportant formal coni.,-: women's organisations.In fact, in many cases,having beenengaged in the groupshas been rhe subsidies rhe Ioroljr -..-. 'merit' feminist movementis a in the curriculum vitae of candidates ately 10 15 per cent of the IW's bud-ger:- applying for a position in a state feminist institution. These countties are women's(but not necessaly feminist)orj.::: oreciselvthose in which frequentinformal links exist betweenfeminists and also exist in other countries.for in.rar;: Stotefeminism and gender equalitypolicies 137 femocrats.When some of the former decided to work for the state,they found it natural to maintain their personalties with women who remained in the movement, thefucompanions in past battles. In Spain the fact that only a minority of IW femocrats were activists before they becamestate feminists definitely preventedthe maintenanceof informal relations with women in the movement,simply becausethese links had neverexisted. The Spanishfeminist movement is highly fragmented.According to IW data, approximately 100 women's associations(not all of them feminist) exist at national level, and some3,000 at regional and local level. For some feminists, this atomisation is a rather positive feature of the movement, because,in consequence,women wiü very diffe¡ent interestscan find the organisationmost appropriatefo¡ them. On the contrary, most femocrats see fragmentationas an insurmountableobstacle to collabo¡ationbetween them and feminists,because the latterhaveso many spokespeopleand points of view. The establishmentof long-term coope¡ativelinks betweenfeminists and femoc¡atshas also beenharnpered because some of the latter have not seen collabo¡ationas necessaryor evendesirable. Some statefeminists consider that public policies should be formulated only by policymakers,since they are membersof, or have been appointedby, political partieselected by the population.Activists in the women'smovement are perceived as illegitimate paÍicipants in the policymaking process,since they have not been elected to play this role. Similarly, somefemocrats think that public policies should be implementedexclusively by stateofficials, becausethey havepassed the required public examinationsto work for the state,and thereforein theory have the necessaryqualifications to perform that task. Feminists are seen eithe¡ as individuals who do not have the required technical skills to implement public policies, or as merely enthusiasticamateurs completely ignorant of the bureaucraticrules ofprocedure. Some activists in the women's movementhave also opposedthe idea of collaboration with institutions. This attitude has historical roots. Some feminist groups were formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and participated in the opposition to the authoritarianregime (Scanlon 1990: 94). This experience left most feminists with a legacy of ambivalence towards the state,given that for many yearsthey had fought againstthose who held political power, insteadof learning how to use stateresources to achievefeminist goals. By far the most impofiant formal contact betweenthe Iw and women's groupshas beenthe subsidiesthe former has given to the latter Approxim- ately 10-15 per cent of the IW's budget has been devoted to subsidising women's(but not necessarilyfeminist) organisations.Subsidies of this type also exist in other countries, for instance France (Mazur 1995: 9l-2), 138 CeLíaVaLíente Statefentnusn ar, Germany(Ferre 1991-2), andthe Netherlands(Outshoorn 1994a). In Spain, very few informal lints with the \\'ome in the early years of the IW, subsidies were granted without the IW feminists to fW decision-making has bee: specifying definite criteria regarding the type of projects to be orgamsed. formal link betweenmost activists in üe ., Conversely, since the late 1980s, the IW has only been subsidising hasbeen the subsidiesthat the latter granreJ programmeswhose objectives have beenstrictly definedin accordancewith both have lost crucial opportunitiesto in:: the IW's priorities. initiative has been taken by other aclo¡i !tr. The policy ofsubsidising the women'smovement has had the unintended provides a rclling example of the lirnir¿:: effect of raising rhe level of animosity of activists towards the IW. Many feminists and femocratsto actively collat\.: feminists have beendeeply critical of this policy, but this has not impeded abofion in three circumstances:*ncn u:a them from continuing to apply for, and receive, subsidies.Some activists pregnancywould seriously endangerrhe _:: suspectthat the organisationswhich have receivedmost funding are those foetus has malfo¡mations.The majorirr o: I which have close links with the ruling party and not those which have in favourof a more permi¡siverbonion ._ worked the hardestto improve the statusof women. Some feminists have collaborated,in that the former initiare b¡..., arguedthat by imposing such strict crite¡ia about the type of projectsto be and the latter organise mobilisations. I: :: subsidised.the IW hasjeopardised the autonomyof the movement.This is initiative for political reform \\'hich ntj!:r: becausethe IW hasindicated to women'sorganisations the type ofactivities restrictivelegislation has been left to orhe:. they should concentrate theh efforts on. In order to unde¡stand this party in power. complaint, it should be noted that the IW has increasingly subsidised projects (such as refuges for battered women o¡ centres which provide CONCLUSION supportto separatedor divorced women or rape victims) but organisational weakness unde¡mines the support it offers to a broad range of issues. Through the study of the main srarefemin:.: Feminists have thought that theseprojects are very useful in improving the in Spain,this chapterhasshown rhat rhe ir.-.:. status of certain women. Nevertheless,feminists also believe that the on policymakingis signifrcant.since put -:. projects should not be exclusively dedicatedto the provision of services or by otherslate units at the [W s reque.r:, that the state cannot or does not want to provide. Other activities are The IW itself has establishedrhree r\pe\ , also importantfo¡ some women'sgroups. e.8. consciousness-rrisingac- ¡esearchon genderissues, the diffusion .: tivities, but in general these are no longer subsidised by the [W as rights, and the receprionand handling..: they were a decadeago. agamstwomen. The IW has neitherrhe::,. Feministshave also criticised the fact that, in their vie\t, subsidieshave establishmost genderequality programme.. been given in somecases to women who have not been'true' membersof function of trying to persuadeother slarer::: the women's movementbut insteadopportunist newcome$ to the feminist The fW hasbeen quite active in rheralk..: . milieu. They have actually been unemployed women in search of self- ls to say,in persuadingstate officials rhar i\.- 'private', employment.The Spanishfemale unemploymentrate (in percentages)rose as suchas domesticviolence. ¡-.e : f¡om 20.8 in 1983to 27.6 in 1988,then fell to 25.4in 1989,before rising deserveattention and solutionsfrom the ¡t:::, agait to 29.2 in 1993 (El País 1995: 435). Given the high female able to include genderequality nteasuresrn : unemploymentrates and the existenceof IW subsidies,some unemployed and senior bureauc¡ats.In contrast. the ¡i..: women might have establishedfeminist associationswhich provided the usually modest or even i¡relevant \\ h.r- : type of social services that the IW has consistently subsidised.These implemented. associations might in fact have been primarily created to give thetr Relationsbelween fem¡nisl\ in theSpJ¡:.- foundersjobs, usuallybeen rare and conflictual. As a cc,n.:. ln short, generally speaking, relations between IW femocrats and opportunitiesto push stateofficials fun::- feminists havebeen scarceand conflictual. Statefeminists have maintained Activistsin the women'smovement coulJ a, Statefeminism and genderequality policies 139 very few informal links with the women'smovement. The accessof feminists to fW decision-makinghas been extremely limited. The marn formal link betweenmost activistsir the women'smovement and the IW hasbeen the subsidiesthat thelatter grantedto theformer. As a consequence, both have lost crucial opportunitiesto initiate political reforms, and thrs initiative hasbeen taken by other actorssuch as political parties.Abortion provides a telling example of the limitations arising from the failure of feministsand femocrats to actively collaborate.Act 9 of 5 July 1985allows abortion in three circumstances:when the woman has been raped, when pregnancywould seriouslyendanger the life of the ,and when the foetus has malformations.The majority of IW femocratsand feminists are in favour of a more permissiveabortion law. Neverüelessthey have not collabo¡ated,in that the former initiate broadpublic debateabout the issue and the latter organisemobiüsations. ln the absenceof joint action,an initiative for political reform which might lead to üe approvalof a less restrictive legislationhas been left to other actors,for instancethe political party in powe¡.

CONCLUSION Though the study of üe main statefeminist institution of the cenhal state in Spain,üis chapte¡has shown that the impactof statefeminist machineries on poücymakingis significant,since public policies establishedby the IW or by other stateunits at the IW's requesthave raised the statusof women. The IW itself has establishedthree types of measure:the promotion of researchon genderissues, the diffusion of informationabout women's rights, and the reception and handling of complaints of discrimination againstwomen. The IW has neither üe responsibility nor the budget to establishmost gender equality programmes, but hasbeen given the explicit function of trying to persuadeother stateunits to setup theseprogrammes. The fW hasbeen quite active in the task of defining public problems,that is to say,in persuadingstate officials that issues which in thepast were seen as'private',such as domesticviolence, are in fact socialproblems which deserveattention and solutions from the state. State feminists have also been able to include genderequaliry measures in the agendaof other politicians and senior bureaucrats.In contrast,the role played by [W femocratsis usually modestor even irrelevantwhen policies are formulatedand implemented. Relationsbetween feminists in the Spanishstate and üose in socieryhave usuallybeen rare and conflictual. As a consequence,both have lost crucial opportunities to push state officials further down the path of equality. Activists in the women'smovement could have actedas the eyesand ears 140 Celia Valiente State.fentintsla,i':,. of state feminists in the task of ensuring that equality programmeswere insights.I would alsolike to thankBena.{. actually implemented.This has not happened,and as a result the IW hasnot Chuliá,Robert Fishman, Josu Mezo ¡nd J. on earlier drafts, preparcd for the Conle.a.. in fact controlled the implementationof theseprogrammes, which, given Di:¡logue\on Cender SoLi¡l Pulil... -r.: the IW's resources. is an enormous task. Conce¡ted action between 27-9 May 1994;and rhe World Cons¡e.,,: femocratsand feminists could also have beentaken in order to reform some Association,Berli¡.21 5 Augusr199-1. Iegislation,such as the Abortion Act. In the absenceof coopcrationof this 2 The researchfor this chaprerhas mainl\ . : type, the initiative for political reform has fallen to other political actors. unpublrshedlW docunreirrs.legr.lrri.n. r four in-depthpersonal interr ieu r rr iin I\i As for future research,it might be interestingto explore the real impact :, orSanrsationsconducted between }f¿r.¡ -_ that genderequality policiespromoted by femocratshave had on the lives of mirinl¡inlhe anonymityol lhose¡n(er \ t<\. .. different sectors of the female population. In particular, it would be ch¡pler.but arearailable on rcqu<,r. important to know if thesemeasures are in fact reducing the inequality of 3 Theseopinions (with whichthe au(ho¡. d,. . opportunitiesfor women - a traditional feminist aspiration.As this chapter I lq9l: ::. 7G 7) andSrel:.on irn.l \f¡,,1f . 4 This soí of posirive assessmenlinfbrm! :-. has shown with regard to the IW information centres,it might be the case on statc ieminism. that equality policies have been disproportionately beneficial to some 5 Thesearguments found in Watson( lggf]: . women, fbr instanceto thosewho live in cities and are younger (or in case views. of measuresother than the information centres,those who have completed ó From the secondhalf of the 1930sunril _,- university education),that is, women who are already in a better position wing authoritá¡ianregime. which $ as nr.:.: 7 Thee\t blishmenlofrhe lW ¡nLith( with respect to other women (and some men). Researchin Denma¡k for rn,rr.::: aredescribed in Valienre(1995). example,has similarly indicated that state f'eministshave been embracing 8 For example, in France in 1986. lhe \1 the interestsof well educated.rather than unskilled or marginalisedwomen do\ n8r¡dedto a Delegalionon \\omrr'. s.. (Borchorst 1995: 72-3\. Social Afl'airs, and its operat¡ngbud-sel r.. : A secondquestion to be addressedin the future would concern the style 9 Onc caveatis necessaryat this poinl. T:: - pol¡cymaling made here i:' nor Jnrlr.J:.. of policymaking in feminist bureaucracies.The IW has been able to ach¡evement\are nor nteil5ured. Thercti,:( :i convinceother institutionsthat the establishmentof equality measuresis an of whelhe¡ the objectives a[ained b\ lh., j\¡ appropriateand desirablepolitical goal. As has been explained by Drude throughthe seme concrere pro!:ramnrc. iL: : Dahlerup(1993: l8) writing about the Danish case,the art of political other les.expensire progr",nn'... persuasionconsists of advancing demands that do not irritate political I0 The ¡gend¿ is the lirt ol subjeer:ur lrn".r': and people outside the government clo:e... opponents,and in finding points of common agreementwith them, while in _ payingsome serious attention ¡t ¡n\ ci! e: :::: somecases abandoning other demands.These also happento be character- I I The low importanceattached to rhc tun¡t: : istics of the political actions of IW femocrats,but other aspectsmay also of gender equality measuresis rellecrei. : : exist which have yet to be exploredin the Spanishand other national people who work in the IW lcgal depurnr:: contexts. of the inierviewsfor this research\\ere .. .,: IW ¡egal departmenr.which $as rc.r.:- er¡rnininglhe implemenri¡rron{" ,ll ., i.... NOTES Spain. 12 These infbrmation cenhcs lvcrc nor i1 .:i..: I This chapteroriginated as my initial contribulionto an internalionalstudy of central state feminist institulion. the _{i-. state feminism in advancedindustrialised societies, direcled by Dorothy dependenton the Minisrry of Culrure.h..: ._: McBrideStetson and Amy G. Mazur I am indebtedto both of themfor üe inheritedwhen it wasesrablishcci. The nu:.:,:: organisationof such a theoreticallychallenging and empiricallyinleresting fourin lq85;len in Iq86:r,nLlclcrcn.r-,.- researchproject, whose firs! outcomewas the volumeedited by Stelsonand 13 At least not until May 199-1.$hen in:, .-. Mazur(1995). The first findingsaboul state feminism in Spainwere published conducledfo¡ this article. in Valiente(1995). I am gratefulto thoseinterviewed lbr this chapterfor generouslygiving their time andproviding me with valuableinfbrmation and State femínism and gender equality polícies l4l insighls.l$ould alsolike to thankBerta Álvarez-N{úanda. Justin Byrne. Elisa Chuliá, Robert Fishman, Josu Mezo and José R. Monte¡o for their comments 'Crossing on earlier drafts, preparedfor the Conference Borders: lnternational Dialogues on Gender, Social Politics, and Citizenship', Stockholm, Sweden, 27-9 May 1994|.and the World Congressof the InternationalPolitical Science Association,Berlin, 2l-5 August 1994. The researchfor this chapterhas mainly consistedof analysisof publishedand unpublished IW documents,legislation, political pafy documents,a¡d thirty- four in-depth personalinte¡views with IW personnela¡d membersof feminist i orga¡risationsconducted between March and September 1994. In o¡der to maintain üe anonymity ofthose interviewed, üeir namesdo not appearin this chapter but are availableon request. 3 Theseopinions (with which the autho¡sdo not agree)can be found in Eisenstein (1991.22,'16-7\ and Stetsonand Mazur (1995: 2). 4 This sort of positive assessmentinfo¡ms most of the ¡ecent scholarly literature on statefeminism. 5 Thesearguments found in Watson( 1990: l0) arenot presentedas Watson'sown

6 From the secondhalf of the 1930suntil 1975 Spain was govemed by a right- wing authoritaria¡ which was '7 regime, notably anti-feminist. Theestabüshmentofthe IW andthe main formal characteristicsofthe institution a¡e describedin Valiente (1995). 8 For example, in F¡ance in 1986, the Minist¡y of Woman's Rights was dowtrgradedto a Delegation on Women's Statusdependent on the Ministry of Social Affairs, and its operatingbudget was reduced(Mazu¡ 1995:82). One caveat is necessaryat this point. The evaluation of the IW's impact on policymaking made here is not complete because the costs of the IW's achievementsare not measu¡ed.Therefore this article doesnot raisethe question of whether the objectives attained by the IW could have also been achieved through the sameconc¡ete prcg¡ammes but organisedat a lowercost, orthrough othe! less expe[sive p¡ogrammes. 'is 10 The agenda the list of subjectsor problemsto which governmentalofncials, and people outside the goveÍnment closely associatedwith those officials, üe paying some se¡iousattention at a¡y given time' (Kingdom 1984:3). lt The low importanceattached to the function of controlling the implementation of gender equality measuresis reflected, for instance, in the low number of people who work in the lW legal department.In the spring of 1994,when most of ihe inteñiews for this researchwe¡e conducted,five people worked in the IW legal depafment, which was responsible fo¡ among other matters, examining the implementation of all central state gende¡ equality policies in Spain. These information centres we¡e not a creation of the IW becausean ea¡lier central state feminist institutior¡, the Subdireccíón General de la Mujer, dependenton the Ministry of Culture, had already set up three, which the IW inheritedwhen it was established.The numberofcent¡es were:three until 1984: four in 1985:ten in 1986:and eleven since 1987. l3 At least not until May 1994, when the last interview with a feminist was conductedfor this article.