Annex Ii: List of Natural and Legal Persons, Entities Or Bodies Referred to in Article 14 and 15 (1)(A)

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Annex Ii: List of Natural and Legal Persons, Entities Or Bodies Referred to in Article 14 and 15 (1)(A) VEDLEGG II ANNEX II: LIST OF NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES OR BODIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 14 AND 15 (1)(A) A. Persons Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Date of birth: President of the 23.05.2011 (ب شار) Bashar .1 September Republic; person 11 (اﻷ سد) Al-Assad 1965; authorising and Place of birth: supervising the Damascus; crackdown on diplomatic demonstrators. passport No D1903 Date of birth: Commander of the 09.05.2011 (ماهر) Maher .2 (a.k.a. Mahir) 8 December 1967; Army's 4th ,diplomatic Armoured Division (اﻷ سد) Al-Assad passport No 4138 member of Ba'ath Party Central Command, strongman of the Republican Guard; brother of President Bashar Al-Assad; principal overseer of violence against demonstrators. Date of birth: Head of Syrian 09.05.2011 (ع لي) Ali .3 February 1946; General Intelligence 19 (مم لوك ) Mamluk (a.k.a. Mamlouk) Place of birth: Directorate (GID); Damascus; involved in violence diplomatic against passport No 983 demonstrators. Former Head of the 09.05.2011 (عاطف) Atej .4 (a.k.a. Atef, Atif) Political Security Directorate in (ن ج يب) Najib (a.k.a. Najeeb) Dara'a; cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad; involved in violence against demonstrators. Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Date of birth: Colonel and Head of 09.05.2011 (حاف ظ) Hafiz .5 April 1971; Unit in General 2 مخ لوف ) Makhluf )(a.k.a. Hafez Place of birth: Intelligence Makhlouf) Damascus; Directorate, diplomatic Damascus Branch; passport No 2246 cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad; close to Maher Al- Assad; involved in violence against demonstrators. 6. Muhammad Date of birth: Head of Political 09.05.2011 ;May 1951; Security Directorate 20 (دي ب) Dib (محمد) Place of birth: involved in violence (زي تون) Zaytun (a.k.a. Damascus; against Mohammed Dib diplomatic demonstrators. Zeitoun) passport No D000001300 Head of Political 09.05.2011 (أمجد) Amjad .7 Al-Abbas Security in Banyas, involved in violence (ل ع باس) against demonstrators in Baida. Date of birth: Syrian businessman; 09.05.2011 (رامي) Rami .8 Makhlouf 10 July 1969; cousin of President ,Place of birth: Bashar Al-Assad (مخ لوف) Damascus; controls the passport No investment funds Al 454224 Mahreq, Bena Properties, Cham Holding Syriatel, Souruh Company thereby furnishing financing and support to the regime. 9. Abd Al-Fatah Born: 1953; Head of Syrian 09.05.2011 Place of birth: Military Intelligence (ع بد ال ف تاح) Qudsiyah Hama; (SMI); involved in diplomatic violence against the (ق د س ية) passport No civilian population. D0005788 Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Head of Syrian Air 09.05.2011 (جم يل) Jamil .10 (a.k.a. Jameel) Force Intelligence; involved in violence (ح سن) Hassan against the civilian population. Date of birth: Head of Syrian 09.05.2011 (ر س تم) Rustum .11 May 1953; Military 3 (غزال ة) Ghazali Place of birth: Intelligence, Dara'a; Damascus diplomatic Countryside Branch; passport No involved in violence D000000887 against the civilian population. Date of birth: Involved in violence 09.05.2011 (ف واز) Fawwaz .12 June 1962; against the civilian 18 (اﻷ سد) Al-Assad Place of birth: population as part of Kerdala; passport the Shabiha militia. No 88238 Date of birth: Involved in violence 09.05.2011 (م نذر) Munzir .13 March 1961; against the civilian 1 (اﻷ سد) Al-Assad Place of birth: population as part of Latakia; the Shabiha militia. passports No 86449 and No 842781 14. Born: 20 July Head of Syrian 23.05.2011 (امهش) Hisham .15 place of National Security ;1941 إخ ت يار, ) Ikhtiyar birth Damascus Bureau; involved in اﻹخ ت يار, a.k.a. violence against the) (ب خ ت يار Al Ikhtiyar, civilian population. Bikhtiyar, Bikhtyar, He is reported to Bekhtyar, have died because of Bikhtiar, the bombing of 18 Bekhtyar) July, 2012 Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Date of birth: 10 Vice-President of 23.05.2011 (ف اروق) Faruq .16 (a.k.a. Farouq, December 1938 Syria; involved in Farouk) Al Shar' violence against the .a.k.a. Al civilian population) (ال شرع) Char', Al Shara', Al Shara) 17. Muhammad Date of birth: Deputy Vice- 23.05.2011 Nasif 10 April 1937 (or President of Syria (محمد) a.k.a. 20 May 1937); for National) (ن ا ص يف) Naseef, Nassif, Place of birth: Security Affairs; Nasseef) Hama; involved in violence Khayrbik diplomatic against the civilian .passport No population (ب كخ ير ,ب كخ ير) 0002250 Date of birth: Syrian businessman 23.5.2011 (محمد) Mohamed .18 May 1966; and local agent for 20 (حم شو) Hamcho passport several foreign No 002954347 companies; associate of Maher al-Assad, managing a part of his financial and economic interests and as such provides funding to the regime. a.k.a. Date of birth: Brother of Rami 23.05.2011) (إي اد ) Iyad .19 Eyad) Makhlouf 21 January 1973; Makhlouf and GID Place of birth: Officer involved in (مخ لوف) Damascus; violence against the passport No civilian population. N001820740 Presidential Advisor 23.05.2011 (ب سام) Bassam .20 Al Hassan for Strategic Affairs; a.k.a. Al involved in violence) (ال ح سن) Hasan) against the civilian population. 21. Dawud Rajiha Chief of Staff of the 23.05.2011 Armed Forces responsible for the military involvement in violence against peaceful protesters. Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Died in the 18 July 2012 bombing Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Date of birth: President of 23.05.2011 (إي هاب) Ihab .22 (a.k.a. Ehab, 21 January 1973; Syriatel, which Iehab) Makhlouf Place of birth: transfers 50 % of its Damascus; profits to the Syrian (مخ لوف ) passport No government by way N002848852 of its licencing contract. Born: 1951 or Head of presidential 23.06.2011 ال همة ) Zoulhima .23 a.k.a. Zu al- 1946 or 1956; security; involved in) (ذو Himma) Chaliche Place of birth: violence against a.k.a., Kerdaha demonstrators; first) ( شال يش) Shalish, cousin of President Shaleesh) (a.k.a. Bashar Al-Assad. Dhu al-Himma Shalish) Director of Military 23.06.2011 (ري اض) Riyad .24 Chaliche Housing ;a.k.a. Establishment) ( شال يش) Shalish, provides funding to Shaleesh) (a.k.a. the regime; first Riyad Shalish) cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad. 25. Brigadier Date of birth: General Commander 23.06.2011 Commander 1 September 1957; of Iranian Mohammad Place of birth: Revolutionary ,a.k.a. Yazd, Iran Guard Corps) (محمد) Mohamed, involved in Muhammad, providing equipment Mohammed)Ali and support to help Jafari the Syrian regime (ع لي) a.k.a. suppress protests in) (ج ع فري) Jaafari, Ja'fari, Syria. Aziz; a.k.a. Jafari, Ali; a.k.a. Jafari, Mohammad Ali; a.k.a. Ja'fari, Mohammad Ali; a.k.a. Jafari-Naja- fabadi, Mohammad Ali) Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 26. Major General Commander of 23.06.2011 Iranian (ق ا سم) Qasem Soleimani Revolutionary a.k.a. Guard Corps, IRGC) ( س ل يمان ي) Qasim - Qods, involved in Soleimany) providing equipment and support to help the Syrian regime suppress protests in Syria. 27. Hossein Taeb Born: 1963;Place Deputy Commander 23.06.2011 (a.k.a. Taeb, of birth: Tehran, for Intelligence of Hassan; a.k.a. Iran Iranian Taeb, Hosein; Revolutionary a.k.a. Taeb, Guard Corps, Hossein; a.k.a. involved in Taeb, Hussayn; providing equipment a.k.a. and support to help Hojjatoleslam the Syrian regime Hossein Ta'eb) suppress protests in Syria. Business associate 23.06.2011 (خال د) Khalid .28 (a.k.a. Khaled) of Maher Al-Assad; provides funding to (ق دور) Qaddur (a.k.a. Qadour, the regime. Qaddour) Al- Business associate 23.06.2011 (رئ يف) Ra'if .29 Quwatly of Maher Al-Assad a.k.a. and responsible for) (ال قوت لي ) Ri'af Al-Quwatli managing some of a.k.a. Raeef Al- his business Kouatly) interests; provides funding to the regime. 30. Mohammad Head of Syrian 01.08.2011 a.k.a. Military Intelligence) (محمد) Muhammad, in the town of Mohamed, Hama, involved in Mohammed) the crackdown on .demonstrators (م ف لح) Mufleh (a.k.a. Muflih) Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 31. Major General Head of the 01.08.2011 Department for (ت وف يق) Tawfiq (a.k.a. Tawfik) Internal Security of the General (ي ون س) Younes (a.k.a. Yunes) Intelligence Directorate; involved in violence against the civilian population. 32. Mr Mohammed Date of birth: Close associate and 01.08.2011 Makhlouf 19.10.1932; maternal uncle of (محمد) a.k.a. Place of birth: Bashar and Mahir) (مخ لوف) Abu Rami) Latakia, Syria al-Assad. Business associate and father of Rami, Ihab and Iyad Makhlouf. Place of birth: Associate of Mahir 01.08.2011 (أي من) Ayman .33 Latakia al-Assad for the (جاب ر) Jabir (a.k.a. Jaber) Shabiha militia. Directly involved in repression and violence against the civilian population and coordination of Shabiha militia groups Al- Assistant to Maher 23.08.2011 (هاي ل) Hayel .34 Al-Assad, Head of (اﻷ سد) Assad the military police unit of the army's 4th Division, involved in repression. Al- Director of the 23.08.2011 (ع لي) Ali .35 supplies office of (ال س ل يم) Salim (a.k.a. Al- the Syrian Ministry Saleem) of Defence, entry point for all arms acquisitions by the Syrian army. Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Al- Previously head of Very close to key 23.08.2011 (ن زار) Nizar .36 the 'Nizar Oilfield government (اﻷ س عد) Assad (a.k.a.
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