ISPI POLICY BRIEF May 2021 AND THE SAHEL A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN

Camillo Casola, Edoardo Baldaro POLICY BRIEF 31 May 2021 ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

This Report is realized with the support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and ISPI.

Camillo Casola is resident research fellow at ISPI Africa Programme and associate research fellow at the Center for the Study of Contemporary Africa (CeSAC). He earned a PhD in International Studies at the Università degli Studi di Napoli L’Orientale. His main research interests are related to politics, institutions, conflicts and security in sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on West Africa and the Sahel. Before joining ISPI he worked at the Directora- te-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO).

Edoardo Baldaro is Gerda Henkel postdoctoral research fellow at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies - Institute of Law, Politics and Development, and associate fellow at the REPI (Recherches et Études en Politique Internationale) of the Université Libre de Bruxelles. His main areas of interest include critical security studies, African security, EU foreign policy and international interventions. He published in various academic journals, including, Security Dialogue, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Nationalities Papers and The International Spectator.*

Photo credits: Daniel Tiveau/CIFOR

ITALY IN THE SAHEL: A NEW NATIONAL PROJECTION TOWARDS A GREATER MEDITERRANEAN 2 POLICY BRIEF 31 May 2021 ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

The Sahel is the theatre for one of the most significant new developments in Italian foreign 1. THE SAHEL CRISIS: policy in the last decade. As a consequence of JIHADI INSURGENCIES, the intersection of external shocks, domestic ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, MIGRATION pressures, and internal reorganisations, Italy is 5 testing in the region new approaches, instruments and strategies for pursuing its national interest, 2. THE SAHEL AND THE THREE AND which is understood as much in terms of national A HALF CIRCLES OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY security as domestic stability and international 8 status. 3. FROM ‘GROWTH DIPLOMACY’ Contrasting and curbing irregular migration and TO MIGRATION AND SECURITY: 10 fighting against terrorist groups in the region YEARS OF STRATEGIC RE-ORIENTATION are the two main concerns behind the Italian 11 strategic re-orientation towards the Sahel. In this sense, the definition of national interests in the 4. BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND area emerges from the entanglement of foreign COOPERATION: MULTIDIMENSIONAL and domestic considerations. Italian initiatives in ENGAGEMENT the area have also responded to the collateral 14 need to restructure ’s relationship with Paris • The bilateral dimension of and Berlin on specific foreign and security policy political engagement in the Sahel issues and interests. 14

• A multilateral response to the Sahel crisis: the Coalition for the Sahel and the Takuba task force 17

5. ENTANGLED INTERESTS: WHY ITALY IS IN THE SAHEL TO STAY 20

6. ITALY IN THE SAHEL, A PATH FORWARD: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 22

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n 8 April 2021 the Italian Minister of ITALY IN THE SAHEL Foreign Affairs, , arrived in OBamako for a two-day diplomatic mission. A NEW NATIONAL On this occasion he met several members of ’s Government, including the Prime Minister, PROJECTION TOWARDS A Moctar Ouane, as well as the President of the GREATER MEDITERRANEAN transition, Bah N’Daw. Significantly, the head of Italy’s diplomacy took his first Africa trip in the Sahel – a first in Mali for an Italian Foreign Camillo Casola Minister since ’s last visit in 2016. ISPI This was the latest signal of Italy’s growing Edoardo Baldaro Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies political and diplomatic attention to an ever more strategic area in the continent, part of the ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’ region. Talking to the press at the end of the mission, Di Maio stressed that “Mali is a strategic partner for Italy in many priority areas, such as Libya, the fight against terrorism, the management of migration flows and the stability of the Sahel”1 emphasising the need to strengthen the partnership with Malian authorities in security and human mobility. He also anticipated that Mali and the Sahel will have an important place in the discussions with the international partners in the context of the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the Global Coalition against Daesh, to be held in Italy shortly.2 Previously, the Minister of Defence, Lorenzo Guerini, clarified the general terms for growing military involvement south of the Sahara. In an interview given to the national newspaper la Repubblica in March 2021 he pointed out that “Italian military engagement in the Sahel fully complements Italy’s commitment in Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. It is a single

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area of crisis, with a strong jihadi upsurge whose radars of Rome’s presence in the continent. Its consequences reverberate in the Mediterranean stability is today ranked high among national and Europe”.3 In April, talking to the Italian daily strategic interests and priorities6. La Stampa, Guerini put the spotlight on Italy The Italian Ggovernment’s political, diplomatic and France’s common purpose to cooperate and military activism in the Sahel shows how this rather than compete in Libya and the Sahel, region of sub-Saharan Africa has taken centre also underlining the Italian strategic interest in stage on Italy’s foreign policy agenda, despite reinforcing a structural stabilising presence in being historically kept off the radars of Rome’s a triangular zone defined by the Horn of Africa presence in the continent. Its stability is today to the east, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel ranked high among national strategic interests to the west, and the Mediterranean shore of and priorities. Libya to the north.4 Only a few days before, during a summit held in Paris, Guerini and the THE SAHEL CRISIS: JIHADI INSURGENCIES, French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence ILLICIT TRAFFICKING, MIGRATION Parly, had discussions on security in the Sahel and the Italian participation in the French-led The strengthening of Italy’s diplomatic and Takuba task force, giving evidence of a renewed military presence in the Sahel has occurred synergy between Paris and Rome after the in a context of increasing instability. 2020 has unprecedented diplomatic crisis in 2019.5 been the deadliest year in the region since the crisis broke out in Mali in 2012. In the previous On the 19 and 20 May 2021, Minister Guerini years, the trend of violent attacks by Salafi- was in Mali and to discuss Italy’s military jihadi insurgents, ethnic-based militias and state cooperation in the region. He had institutional security forces in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso meetings in Bamako with the Vice President, increased exponentially. Colonel Assimi Goïta, just a couple of days before the new military takeover which ultimately led to After the launch of the French regional him assuming the presidency. He then travelled counterterrorism Opération Barkhane in to Gao to meet with General Philippe Landicheff, 2014, the epicentre of Sahelian insecurity has Head of the Takuba task force, and discuss the gradually moved from North Mali towards the Italian contingent's forthcoming full operational Liptako-Gourma or the “three borders” area capability. The Italian government’s political, between Central Mali, South-western Niger and diplomatic and military activism in the Sahel Burkina Faso. Two jihadi networks are mainly shows how this region of sub-Saharan Africa active in the region: Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam has taken centre stage on Italy’s foreign policy wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM or the Support Group agenda, despite being historically kept off the for Islam and Muslims), a coalition of Katibas linked to al-Qa’ida – Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun,

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the Katiba Macina and the Katiba al-Furqan armies, alongside widespread corruption, a lack of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of accountability and general impunity lead – headed by Iyad ag Ghali, a former Tuareg Sahelian youths to join jihadi armed insurgencies. nationalist rebel; the Islamic State in the Greater The Sahel region is furthermore marked by the Sahara (ISGS), an al-Qa’ida splinter group led by presence of transnational organised networks Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a former MOJWA devoted to criminal activities, such as protection (Movement for the Oneness and the Jihad in rackets and systematic extorsions, and is crossed West Africa) spokesperson and al-Murabitun’s by illicit trafficking of subsidised goods, cigarettes, military commander, who pledged allegiance to drugs, gold, natural resources, weapons, and the Caliph of the Islamic State in 2015.6 human beings, with the active complicity of Salafi-jihadi armed groups entrenched their compromised state and local authorities.8 presence in rural areas of the Central Sahel, The fault lines of the security crisis in the Sahel and exploiting state governance failures. In a context a possible direct impact on the Mediterranean of widespread marginalisation of mostly Fulani have pushed the Italian Government to increase semi-nomadic pastoral groups,7 jihadi insurgents a policy focus on the stability of the “Southern have advocated their cause and obtained European border”. This has mostly been done by some sort of social legitimacy, offering them strengthening the Sahelian regimes’ capacity to protection, delivering social services, ensuring fight against local insurgencies, control borders justice and equal access to land in occupied and limit human mobility, in order to curb illicit areas. In a sense, violent extremism intersects trafficking and human smuggling networks. community-based conflicts and inter-ethnic Furthermore, development cooperation tensions: ethnic-based and self-defence militias initiatives have aimed at addressing the root have regularly attacked Fulani villages, with causes of migration in the area, coherently civilian communities accused of supporting with the European “comprehensive approach” extremists, while jihadi groups retaliate against underlying the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Dogon or Bambara villagers. Beside this, the Africa launched at the Valletta Summit on main targets of violent activities from jihadi non- Migration in November 2015. state actors remain French forces, international peacekeepers, national armies and civilians The need to “protect security and national 9 suspected of supporting security forces. interests” from the potential spill-over of terrorism, the proliferation of illicit trafficking Abuses by state and national security forces’ activities and the development of irregular contribute further to a deterioration in the security migration flows set out the guidelines of Italy’s of local communities: targeted violence, extra- “look south policy”, pushing for a more proactive judicial killings, human rights violations by regular political and diplomatic presence in the Sahel

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as well as the deployment of a growing number 2013 – and rebuild the alliance with France, while of armed forces employed both for capacity- gaining a central role within the framework of the building and counterterrorism. In addition, ’s foreign policy towards sub- the Italian Governments’ trans-Mediterranean Saharan Africa. In this respect, the decision to activism indicates the desire to affirm a new answer the French call for a greater involvement assertiveness in Europe. The involvement in of European partners could have been met in the Sahel provides Italy with an opportunity to order to obtain, from France the willingness to reinforce a convergence with Germany – whose accommodate Italy’s strategic priorities in other presence in the Sahel has been growing since theatres.

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THE SAHEL AND THE THREE AND A HALF unstable political equilibria.11 In this sense, even CIRCLES OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY if the end of the Cold War implied the need to recalibrate some strategic assumptions, the role Italy’s growing presence in the Sahel is a major Italy built for itself within the liberal Western strategic re-orientation for Italian foreign policy, order is still the defining feature of the country in which is now deploying multidimensional action the international system. 12 in an area where the country has historically been absent or poorly committed at best. In The image most commonly evoked for analysing order to understand how Italian engagement and disentangling Italian foreign policy is the one in this African region should be interpreted, of the “three circles”.13 According to this analytical it is necessary to define how this shift can be lens, Italian foreign policy can be seen as based inserted within the wider policy paradigms that on three main pillars and vectors for power have informed Italian foreign action since World projection: Atlanticism, Europeanism, and the War II. Mediterranean. The three circles encapsulate Italian national interest in the international system, On the whole, since the transition from the Fascist and for most of the history of the Italian Republic regime to the Republic, the Italian presence they have been developed in a complementary and action in the international arena have been way.14 With few, yet important exceptions – such characterised by substantial continuity, anchored as the Iraqi crisis in 2003, or most recently the in a redefinition of national identity, which framed concerns caused by the Trump Administration’s the country as a middle power fully integrated limited support for multilateralism – the Atlantic into the multilateral system built by its Western and the European circles have advanced allies. Italy’s commitment to the West’s economic, hand in hand without major tensions: Italy has political, and security arrangements became the historically played a major role in the process Pole star guiding Italian foreign policy for two of European integration, and it has showed a main reasons. On the one hand, the quest for staunch commitment towards NATO and more status and recognition: as a former revisionist generally America. Within this framework, the state whose pursuit of power and autonomy Mediterranean area, seen as Italy’s geographic had been abruptly stopped by the defeat during backyard, has epitomised from time to time the War, Italy needed to reconstruct its role in a space where the country could develop a the international community as a trustworthy more autonomous action.15 If Atlanticism and partner fully engaged in the new international Europeanism have reflected the quests for status architecture created after 1945.10 On the other through interdependence (within the North hand, within a Cold War international setting, Atlantic sphere) and integration (within the EU), foreign policy also had a domestic application, as well as the promise for security and economic being instrumentally used as a tool for maintaining

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development, the Mediterranean was thought Italian foreign policy, which finally gave Africa, to offer Italy a space to obtain international and more specifically to its internal “frontier”,18 recognition through autonomy.16 This has been a new centrality for Italy, which eventually mirrored by the relationship built with the Arab came to see the continent as an “inevitable countries during the first decades of the Cold partner” for the future.19 The first event was the War, or again by the political initiatives towards 2008-09 global financial crisis, which forced the Balkans in the 1990s and the early 2000s. the Italian Government to develop a new form of economic diplomacy towards emerging With the partial exception of North Africa, the markets, in order to open new venues and African continent has historically occupied opportunities for Italian industry. The real turning a marginal place in this quite fixed structure point explaining Italy's current diplomatic, shaping Italian foreign policy. Even in the Horn of military and political engagement in the Sahel Africa, where the country was a former colonial emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, power in Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Italy did following the destabilisation of large parts of not develop strong and durable partnerships. North Africa and the Middle East. Starting from Italy’s presence in Sub-Saharan Africa has been this moment, through the newly introduced de facto delegated to a network of non-state concept of “Enlarged Mediterranean” – namely a actors, mainly NGOs and missionaries. The geopolitical space ranging from the Great Middle revamping of the development aid allocated to East to the Sahel, passing through the Horn of the continent during the 1980s – including the Africa – a “third circle and a half”20 has replaced Sahel, hit by a dire drought and a famine crisis – the Mediterranean one within the traditional was followed soon by a sharp persistent cut. In structure of Italian foreign policy. a similar way, between 1985 and 2014, no Italian Prime Minister officially visited Sub-Saharan In 2015, Italy’s Ministry of Defence, under then Africa.17 In accordance with the logic of the Minister Roberta Pinotti, published the “White three circles, Italy accepted and implemented Paper for International Security and Defence”. a division of labour with its allies, according to The Sahel was viewed as an area with crisis which the continent would remain under the dynamics that were directly influencing equilibria “responsibility” of other European partners in the “Euro-Mediterranean” region, emphasising while Italy channelled its (limited) efforts and the need to understand the root causes of this development aid through the EU and other instability and to engage in initiatives aimed at multilateral initiatives. their resolution to secure national interests. According to the White Paper, indeed, the This state of affairs has changed starting from Sahelian states’ “limited economic development, the beginning of the 2010s. Two main external extreme poverty, religious and tribal conflicts shocks boosted a strategic re-orientation of

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and lack of state structures able to guarantee and counterterrorism initiatives had to be internal security”21 triggered instability in the mainly delegated to US-European partners.24 Mediterranean. What contributed the most to US security and counterterrorism engagement this strategic re-orientation were the migration remained limited, opting to provide political, crisis – a peak of over 1 million migrants arriving logistical and financial support to the traditional in Europe was recorded in 2015 – and the wave security providers in the area, France in particular. of terrorist attacks hitting Europe since 2014. In this sense, the French and EU policies mostly In this view, the growing insecurity in north- complement NATO's limited involvement in the western Africa and the Sahel fed mass migration region, indirectly favouring the deployment of to Europe – with irregular migrants increasingly transatlantic capacity in other geopolitical areas. transiting from Niger, which stands at the core of On the other hand, Italy’s engagement in the all European securitisation strategies in Africa22 Sahel is thought to produce a double effectvis-à- –, illegal trafficking of drugs and human beings, vis the European circle. Since the approval of the and international terrorism. European strategy for the Sahel in 2011, the area – comprising Mauritania, Mali, Niger, The focus of Italian foreign and security policy Burkina Faso and Chad – has represented one of on the Sahel has grown consistently ever since.23 the most important theatres where the European Under the governments led by Paolo Gentiloni Union is defining and testing its capacities as an and a further step forward was international security, development, and stability made in the process of integrating this geopolitical player.25 Given the importance the Sahel has region into a system of direct strategic interests obtained among decision-makers in Brussels, and foreign policy priorities for Italy, encouraging in a post-Brexit European setting the Italian the opening of new embassies, the conclusion presence in the area is reinforcing the role of of bilateral political and military agreements with Italy as a potential third pillar of the EU’s external Sahelian state actors and active participation action, within and beyond the Franco-German within the framework of multilateral initiatives, engine. to promote development, improve governance, curb migration and counter violent extremism. At the same time, Italian deployment in the area can be seen as a ‘middle way’ between At the same time, the opening of the new the approaches pursued by the two European “southern front” for Italian external engagement Member States that are the most engaged in should not be interpreted in opposition, but the region, namely France and Germany. While rather as fully integrated with the two other France is pursuing a strategy mainly based on a foreign policy circles. On the one hand, under the counterterrorism and security-focused approach Obama administration the Sahel already started to the stabilisation of the area, Germany is to be considered as a region where stabilisation

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favouring the multilateral deployment of its 2014, paved the way for the re-direction of Italy’s security and development capacity, mostly foreign policy towards the African continent.26 framed within current EU and UN missions In accordance with economic rationale, little in the Sahel. Mixing military effort based on attention was paid to the Sahel: the Farnesina’s bilateral agreements with the Sahelian states “growth diplomacy”27 mainly addressed other with the multilateral, cooperative approach African regions, such as Southern Africa, the that characterises the country's diplomatic Greater Horn and the Gulf of Guinea, home to and development policies, the Italian strategy some of the most promising and rapidly-growing promises to integrate and reinforce broader economies in the world. Significantly enough, European action in the Sahel, guaranteeing a Italy’s then Prime Minister , in office new status for Rome. since February 2014, visited the Republic of Congo, Angola and Mozambique in July 2014, The strategic redeployment of Italian foreign followed by Kenya and Ethiopia in 2015. policy, and the opening of a third circle and a half with the Sahel as its focal point, address In fact, the new attention for Africa was primarily two main strategic needs. First, in the Sahel driven by domestic considerations, since Italy Rome is revamping an ancient tradition, which was looking for new market opportunities to sees the foreign policy of the country as a tool mitigate the impact of the 2008-09 financial for managing domestic balances. In this sense, crisis. In a similar way, the centrality acquired by the focus on counterterrorism and migration- the Sahel in the following years must be seen first management clearly responds to the new and foremost as the result of a reinterpretation priorities identified by Italian policy-makers since of Italian political priorities and interests, the 2014-15. Secondly, acting in the Sahel shows deeply affected by the events of 2014-16. The Italy's main European partners its renewed destabilising effects of the Central Mediterranean ambitions both within the European architecture migration crisis and the ever-greater importance and vis-à-vis other interconnected strategic given to migration issues in the Government’s theatres – such as Libya – where the country is political agenda pushed the Italian authorities, seeking to play a leading role. in parallel with European institutions, to place greater emphasis on the Sahel area. The Euro- FROM “GROWTH DIPLOMACY” African summit in Valletta in November 2015 met TO MIGRATION AND SECURITY: the need to curb illegal migrations, stop human 10 YEARS OF STRATEGIC RE-ORIENTATION trafficking and ease repatriation processes through the enhancement of political cooperation The Italy-Africa Initiative launched in 2013 by with African partners – for both countries of then Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Emma Bonino, origin and countries of transit –, strengthening and the subsequent Italy-Africa Conference in

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their capacity to control borders and mobility.28 – were highly prioritised and obtained the largest The ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for share of funding.29 stability and addressing root causes of irregular In line with the changed European approach migration and displaced persons in Africa’ (EUTF towards Africa, the Valletta summit also marked for Africa) was created to provide African partners a symbolic starting point for Italy’s strategic with financial instruments and resources – €1.8 re-orientation towards the Sahel. Since 2016, billion – to invest in job creation, socioeconomic Rome’s Africa policy has increasingly focused programmes, food security, the resilience of local on migration issues and the stabilisation of communities, conflict prevention and migration the Sahel belt. In May 2016 the second Italy- management. In this framework of intervention, Africa conference reflected the Government’s the Sahel states – and particularly Niger and Mali new priorities on migration and security along

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Europe’s “external frontier”. During the ministerial Government – the first led by the Prime Minister summit in the presence of 52 African delegations, Giuseppe Conte – was based on three thematic the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paolo Gentiloni, pillars (peace and development; political stability put forward Italy’s "Migration Compact" proposal. and security; human development), with a focus The aim was to build a long-term partnership on the Sahel sub-region. A few months later, in between Europe and Africa, based on the January 2019, Conte was received in Niamey and financing of sustainable economic development N’Djamena, where high-level meetings between in return for effective border control, cooperation the Italian Prime Minister and the Nigerien and in managing irregular migration, repatriations Chadian national authorities respectively were agreements and the fight against human dedicated to discussing migration and terrorism.32 trafficking.30 In October of that year, Gentiloni Lastly, December 2020 saw the issuing of the visited Senegal, Mali and Niger to follow up “Partnership with Africa” document, promoted discussions on the migration compact issue. by the Africa Direction of the Ministry of Foreign The strategic weight of the Sahel countries in Affairs and International Cooperation.33 The Sahel the struggle against illegal migration, terrorism is identified among the four priority areas of Italy’s and illicit trafficking was reaffirmed. In February Africa policy, alongside the Mediterranean area, 2017, the new Government led by Gentiloni the Horn of Africa/Red Sea and Southern Africa, announced a €200 million Fund for Africa to underlying its strategic value “in terms of security, help African partners – including Mali, Niger and management of the migration phenomenon and Chad – control their borders and stop departures the fight against illegal trafficking of all kinds, by promoting technical support, training, local which have found fertile ground in the fragile community development, information about the social, economic, and institutional fabric of the dangers of the migration journey, protection for Sahelian belt”.34 Italy’s Africa strategy highlights refugees and vulnerable migrants. Libya, Tunisia the need to contribute to the stabilisation of and Niger were considered “strategic partners” the Sahel region through the enhancement of for the fund.31 cooperation with the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force In October 2018 a new Italy-Africa ministerial (FC-G5S), in order to support governments in conference was launched on the initiative of strengthening their institutional and military the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Enzo Moavero capacity, improving border control activities Milanesi, and Emanuela Del Re, Vice-Minister and fighting organised crime and terrorism. with responsibility for international cooperation. For human mobility, it puts the spotlight on the The summit, aiming to revive Italy-Africa relations need to act on the root causes of migration, help after difficult diplomatic months following the migrants and refugees in transit countries, tackle establishment of the new right-wing populist human trafficking and criminal networks, and assist with voluntary repatriations.

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The unprecedented diplomatic activism of Rome in the field of migration and security, affirming towards its Sahelian partners has been coupled Italy’s engagement to assist Malian authorities with the deployment of multidimensional in managing irregular migration flows, fighting and multisectoral action in the area. Surfing human trafficking networks, and implementing between autonomy and cooperation, Italy development projects in the North.35 According has implemented both bilateral initiatives and to leaks, the agreement allows Bamako to multilateral actions in the Sahel, alternating accept the repatriation of Malian irregular and integrating diplomatic, defence, and migrants in return for a €2.5 million in funding.36 development instruments. In the same occasion, the representatives of the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND COOPERATION: (CMA) and the Platforme, the two coalitions MULTIDIMENSIONAL ENGAGEMENT of former rebel actors and pro-Government militias which are parties in the Algiers Process, As remarked, the strategic re-orientation of adopted the “Rome Declaration”, committing Italy’s Africa policy towards the Sahel has been themselves to fostering the implementation of built upon bilateral initiatives and multilateral the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in engagement in the area. In continuity with the Mali, ensuring social cohesion among Malian traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy, at communities and operationalising the joint the frontiers of the "Enlarged Mediterranean" mechanisms for combating insecurity by region Rome is developing autonomous action setting up a political coalition funder the Cadre to reinforce its status as a pivotal partner in the Stratégique Permanent (CSP).37 Facilitated by multilateral security architecture currently active the Rome-based NGO Ara Pacis Initiatives for in the Sahel. Peace, the declaration was hailed by Italy’s The Bilateral Dimension of diplomacy as an important development for Political Engagement in the Sahel the advancement of peace and security in Mali; however, as confirmed by ministerial sources, Between 2017 and 2019, three similar defence the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not cooperation agreements were reached between involved nor aware of the initiative38 – which Italy and Sahelian countries, namely Chad (26 begs the question about a possible role of other July 2017), Niger (26 September 2017) and state actors in the process. Burkina Faso (1 July 2019). More recently, on 6 May 2021, Italy’s Minister Di Maio and Al Hamdou The salience of the bilateral cooperation Ag Ilène, Bamako’s Minister of Malians Abroad agreements in the context of a gradual and African Integration, signed a joint declaration strengthening of Italy’s political relations with in Rome to strengthen bilateral cooperation Sahelian states is associated with a growing

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diplomatic presence on the ground. In February for Italy’s development and humanitarian 2017 Italy established a new embassy in Niger cooperation, due to the presence of countries of (Niamey) – the first one in the Sahel. In the particular concern for human migration routes, following years, two other diplomatic missions climate change, weak economic development were inaugurated, in February 2018 in Burkina and food crises. Cooperation interventions Faso (Ouagadougou) and in June 2018 in in the Sahel area – mostly Niger and Burkina Guinea (Conakry) – in fact a re-opening (it was Faso – for the 2019-21 period have focused on closed in 1998), in a country deemed strategic regenerating degraded soil, integrated agro- for managing irregular migration flows. In pastoral land management and the commercial October 2020 Vice-Minister Del Re announced improvement of agro-biodiversity, to deal with the establishment of a new embassy in Mali malnutrition and food insecurity, and bolster the (Bamako), with this opening currently in the local capacity to frame migration flows.41 pipeline, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Since 2018, the strategic weight of Niger in the has confirmed that a new one will probably be context of Italy’s Sahel policy has been reflected established in Chad by the end of 2021.39 Under by the launch of a bilateral military mission in the this framework, just as significant has been the country, MISIN (Missione Bilaterale di Supporto appointment of former Vice-Minister of Foreign alla Repubblica del Niger). It was negotiated by Affairs Bruno Archi as a Special Envoy for the Minister of Defence Pinotti with the Government Sahel, whose mandate recently expired and will in Niamey, based on the military cooperation seemingly not be renewed because of Rome’s agreement signed in September 2017 and a attempt to get an Italian diplomat designated as formal request made by the Nigerien authorities the new EU Special Envoy for the Sahel.40 on 1 November 2017. 470 personnel units – an The notable increase in Italy’s diplomatic average yearly presence of around 250 soldiers presence in the Sahel has come together –, mostly light infantry troops responsible for with greater attention on the enhancement of reconnaissance, control and command operation, bilateral development cooperation plans, mostly training, health support, infrastructural work, force thanks to the political initiative of Vice-Minister protection, intelligence and surveillance, alongside Del Re, who travelled to Niger, Burkina Faso and 130 land vehicles and 2 aerial vehicles, were to Mali on severaloccasions, heading business and be deployed between Niamey and Madama, not NGOs delegations, and encouraging the direct far from the southern border of Libya. The main involvement of representatives from Sahelian goal of the mission would have been to provide diasporas. In the last “Three-year Programming support to Niger’s efforts to control territories and and Policy Planning Document”, the Sahel is frontiers, while ultimately contributing to develop confirmed as one of the geographic priorities the capacities of the national security and to assist

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them in tackling illicit trafficking, human smuggling mutual trust and preserving balances with and security threats.42 the local Government.45 With a €49.5 million budget for 2018, the mission Others pointed at a supposed reluctance by should have started in January 2018. However, it French authorities to accept Italy’s new military was stalled for most of the year due to the alleged role in the country, resulting in pressure on the opposition of political actors in Niamey – as well Nigerian Government. If this assumption seemed as of a large part of the local populations – to the at least difficult to reconcile with France’s need strengthening of a new foreign military presence to obtain support from European partners for in the country: its military commitment in the Sahel,46 what is more likely is a partial lack of understanding Niger was then going through a season of protests and, as President Issoufou told and coordination between Italy and its European 47 us on many occasions, it found it difficult partners, as also assumed by the person we to justify an increasing number of external spoke to.48 The first 40 Italian units arrived in military interventions. And that’s also the Niger in January and were stuck inside the US reason why Nigerian authorities refused at base at Niamey airport until September, when the time to give us a military base: this led the deadlock was brought to an end and other the Italian contingent to be deployed on the contingents finally joined the mission. In October US and the French bases in the country.43 2018 the first training course was carried out. Official Nigerian sources cited by Radio France In 2020 MISIN – whose mandate includes International, instead, complained about the fact intelligence information gathering related to that the Government had not been informed as to human trafficking and training of special forces the beginning of the mission and did not need it, units in Agadez, Niger’s main migration hub until having access to American training and coordination 2016 – was extended, with an average presence 44 with French forces on the ground. Particularly, the of 208 units and a maximum availability of 295 fiercest opposition to Italy’s deployment allegedly units, 160 land vehicles and 5 conventional and came from then Minister of Interior and current remotely-piloted aircraft, for a total cost of €43.8 President, Mohamed Bazoum. This state of affairs is million.49 It had trained about 3,000 Nigerien corroborated by the words of a former high-ranking soldiers by late 2020, mostly through delivering official of the Italian Ministry of Defence: parachuting and anti-terrorism courses, while The launch of the MISIN mission occurred in implementing civilian-military cooperation a strange manner: nobody knew but us, and activities, mostly in the health sector.50 In addition, my sense was that Niger didn’t really ask for Italy and Niger have recently concluded an a deployment with those numbers. Niamey exchange of notes with which the Government perceived a lack of respect from Italian authorities with regards to the deployment of Niamey has granted Italy land to build its own 51 of the bilateral mission. At some point, we military facility in the airport area. had to change our approach, rebuilding

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A Multilateral Response to the Sahel Crisis: every multilateral operation launched in the The Coalition for the Sahel and Sahel. In most cases, however, it only offers a the Takuba Task Force small contribution in personnel and funding. In 2020 it was a contributing member state of the Along with the two Franco-German initiatives in UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA the region – the Sahel Alliance, bringing together ( Multidimensional Integrated international donors to promote development Stabilization Mission in Mali), with 7 staff units projects, improve coordination on the ground deployed in the Bamako headquarter; it provided and increase funding for stabilisation,52 and 12 military units to EUTM Mali (EU Training the Partnership for Security and Stability mission in Mali), a European mission that trains in the Sahel (P3S), which focuses more on and advises Malian armed forces (FAMa) and mobilising international support to address the G5 Sahel Joint Force units; it also broadened governance issues – Italy took part in nearly

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its contribution to the European Union Mission Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel, making United Kingdom – issued a joint communiqué available 16 personnel units to EUCAP Sahel expressing political support for the creation Mali and 14 units to EUCAP Sahel Niger, two of a task force mainly made up of European civilian capacity-building missions intended to special force units and integrated into the joint supportthe capacity of internal security forces’ Barkhane-G5 Sahel JF command, in order to (police, gendarmery, national guard) to control enhance the counterterrorism response to borders, curb illegal migration and contain violent extremist groups in the Liptako-Gourma criminal activities.53 area.55 The plan was for initial operational capability by the summer of 2020 and full In January 2020, on the side-lines of the France-G5 operational capability by early 2021. Takuba – a Sahel summit hosted by French President Macron Tuareg word meaning “sabre” – will operate from in Pau, with the participation of the Heads of State Malian armed forces’ bases in Gao, Ansongo of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, and Ménaka, and relies on a 3A – assist, advise, the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, as accompany – rationale. Its mandate allows well as the European Union’s and African Union’s for advising, assisting, training and mentoring high authorities, a new framework for political regional armed forces and special forces, and cooperation was announced. Proposed by the strengthening local capacities to tackle terrorist G5 Sahel and led by France, the “Coalition pour and criminal activities. Some of the European le Sahel” was based on four pillars – fight against forces involved in the initiative, furthermore, will terrorism; strengthening of national defence be called to conduct direct counterterrorism and security force capabilities; support for the operations and reconnaissance missions under redeployment of the state, the administrations French leadership.56 However, the mechanisms and basic services in the territory; development of coordination with the other actors operating actions – and promoted the adoption of an in the area have not been defined yet, and the integrated approach to address the multiple details of how the command will be structured dimensions of the Sahel crisis through political, as well as the division of tasks within the force social, development and military means, are still under review. Belgium, Denmark, coordinating and complementing the activities Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, of the different actors on the ground.54 together with France, expressed the political will The deployment of the Takuba task force falls to make military contributions to the force. The within the first pillar of the Coalition for the Sahel. first European special operations forces to join It was officially launched on 27 March, 2020: 11 France in Mali were Estonian units, followed by European states – Belgium, Czech Republic, Czech and Swedish (150) ones, while Denmark Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the will keep its military commitment as of 2022.

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Italy was not part of the political declaration, economic costs of Opération Barkhane.57 An but joined the task force later, answering the understanding between France and Italy was French call for European partners to share the probably reached in February, on the occasion burden of counterterrorism operations in the of an inter-governmental summit held in Naples, Sahel, in the face of the growing political and during which Italian Minister of Defence Guerini,

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met his French counterpart, , status. As summarised by our respondents, the probably discussing Italy's involvement in the list of priorities to be pursued in the area is clear Takuba mission.58 and shared with our partners, and structures the special framework in which Italy operates: In June 2020, a Government decree authorising international missions allowed Italian participation The need to guarantee security, the need in the Takuba task force with 200 military units to control migrations, the need to protect our Mediterranean border from terrorism – reportedly from the 9th Parachute assault and migrations, but also the necessity to Regiment “Col Moschin”, the Navy's Operating re-orient our approach towards African Group “Incursori” (GOI), the Special Intervention development ... have brought together Group (GIS) of the Carabinieri, the Air Force's 17th the different countries [participating in the Raiders Wing, and the 4th “Monte Cervino” Alpini multilateral initiatives in the Sahel] and regiment59 – headquartered in Ansongo, 20 land persuaded us of the need to be there. We vehicles and 8 aircrafts – AW-129D Mangusta are not the only ones, but we are those who have done the most.63 and UH-90 helicopters –, for a total cost of €15.6 million. In particular, Italy’s contribution As suggested by the interviewees and reiterated will consist of transport and medical evacuation in parliamentary debates and several official helicopters, as well as training units in charge statements since 2016,64 contrasting and curbing of accompany local forces, in coordination with irregular migration and fighting against terrorist the other international partners operating in groups in the region are the two main concerns the region.60 The first Italian units left for Mali behind the Italian strategic re-orientation on 9 March 2021, as stated by Guerini,61 and full towards the Sahel. In this sense, the definition operational capacity should be reached by the of national interests in the area emerges from end of the year.62 the entanglement of foreign and domestic considerations. The migration question has been ENTANGLED INTERESTS: a dominant issue in the national political debate WHY ITALY IS IN THE SAHEL TO STAY since 2015-16, and the urgency to manage The Sahel has been the theatre for one of the most and reduce the flow of arrivals via the Central significant new developments in Italian foreign Mediterranean Route has shaped the Italian policy in the last decade. As a consequence of approach towards the Mediterranean, with Libya the intersection of external shocks, domestic as the most evident case in point. At the same pressures, and internal reorganisations, Italy is time, this domestic need has intercepted and testing in the Sahel new approaches, instruments reinforced the recently developed move towards and strategies for pursuing its national interest, Africa in Italian foreign and development policy which is understood as much in terms of national circles, making the Sahel the perfect space for security as domestic stability and international the merger of these two trajectories.

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The preeminence of the security concerns same policy initiatives and “solutions” to the about the Sahel helps to explain the central role crisis identified by its European and international the Ministry of Defence has played in favouring partners. In terms of diagnosis, the crisis in the and defining Italian redeployment in the area. Sahel is interpreted primarily as a consequence As demonstrated by the 2015 White Paper, the of the presumed interconnections between very definition of “Enlarged Mediterranean” terrorist insurgencies and transnational criminal and the opening of the third-and-a-half circle activities, ranging from drug and arms trafficking emerged first in the defence circles of Italian to illegal migration. Within this context, the policy-making. This was not only due to the institutional and material fragility of local states, identification of new security threats from the and the porous borders of the region, provide other side of Mare Nostrum, but also linked to the perfect framework for these destabilising the recent reorganisation Italian defence policy, actors to reinforce their presence and further with regards to the international deployment their activities, finally becoming a direct threat and distribution of Italian military missions.65 to Europe. So, most of the international initiatives In this sense, missions such as MISIN, or Italian implemented to tackle the Sahelian crisis have involvement in Takuba, fit perfectly with the new focused their action on reinforcing the security strategic thinking of Italy’s Ministry of Defence, capacities of local states. Border control and aiming at reducing the Italian military presence the need to guarantee the redeployment of globally while increasing its efforts in those the local states in their peripheral territories has theatres considered as key for the security of Italy been a particular area of importance, with the and its main allies. So, while Italian involvement in priority being to strengthen local security forces the Sahel is now multidimensional, characterised and make them more ‘efficient’. These strategic by the simultaneous deployment of diplomatic, paradigms and priorities clearly emerge in the military, and development instruments, European Regional Action Plan for the Sahel, the theMinistry of Defence still plays a major role in document which has informed the EU approach translating the Italian engagement in the area to the Sahel for 2015-20.67 Nonetheless, the into action. worsening of the conflicts in the region, and worrisome events such as the military coups As remarked by a former high-ranking official in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, illustrate of the Italian Ministry of Defence, “defence the limits of an approach that does not take commitment is not enough, we need more the political dimension of the crises in the area coordinated engagement at the level of states sufficiently into account, nor the breakdown and development initiatives ... implemented of the social contract, which characterises the around specific areas of strategic interest”.66 relationship between Sahelian states and large This points to the fact Italy's action in the Sahel parts of their citizens: tends to be aligned with and reproduces the

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In this moment, the priority is to maintain and German multilateral engagement, Italy is now security against terrorism, criminality, and reinforcing its status as a potential driving force the irregular flows of human beings […] of European external action towards its southern Nevertheless, we are aware that too many border. Through their cooperation in the Sahel, elections that seem democratic in Africa are not. There is clearly an issue around the Italy and France are building increased mutual effective democratic nature of the regimes trust, paving the way to develop coordinated that we sustain: either we start to question and integrated action in other strategic theatres ourselves about this problem ... or we keep – such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean – on doing business as usual. ... We are now where they have competed until recently. More containing the damages [but we would generally, the new relation between Rome and need a] sursaut civile – as stated during the N’Djamena summit – to reconquer territory, Paris in the Sahel captures a larger trend pointing public services, justice, schools, in those to a stronger partnership between the two lands where they have been absent.68 countries – which are expected to sign the new ‘Quirinale treaty’ this year – aiming at indirectly The recently published “European Union strengthening European cohesion and common Integrated Strategy for the Sahel”,69 along with action, in line with Berlin’s expectations. the launching of the Coalition for the Sahel, suggest the international community, and the On the whole, Italy is showing new and enduring European Union more specifically, are now ambitions in the Sahel. Nonetheless, its action trying to rethink their engagement in the area, is hampered by the same limits that have in order to take into account the root political characterised European involvement in the area and governance causes which are transforming so far. The real challenge for the country and its the crisis in the Sahel into a never-ending and partners will be to translate the new consensus expanding multidimensional conflict. Italy's around the effective causes of the crisis in the contribution to the various initiatives designed to Sahel into a sound and effective strategy and transform the European approach towards the course of action. Sahel shows that Rome sees its engagement in the area as a deep, long-term involvement. ITALY IN THE SAHEL, A PATH FORWARD: POLICY Aside from the security and domestic RECOMMENDATIONS considerations, the European level is an additional Promote a human security approach among indicator that Italy is in the Sahel to stay. As noted international actors involved in the Sahel. The above, Italian initiatives in the area have also number of attacks against civilian populations responded to the collateral need to restructure in the region has peaked. Violent extremist Rome’s relationship with Paris and Berlin on groups and jihadi insurgents are not the only specific foreign and security policy issues and parties responsible for this: state-sponsored self- interests. Beside France’s counterterrorism efforts defence militias and national security forces are

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also to blame. Moreover, increasingly resorting peace agreements and favouring trust-building to remote warfare techniques by counterterrorist processes among local populations, in order to forces also feeds the risk of an ever-higher settle community-based conflicts that are often number of civilian casualties. Foreign military at the roots of insecurity. The Italian state can interventions should first and foremost address play a crucial role in preventing and managing the security of Sahelian populations: Italy must local-based conflicts, by acting as mediators advocate for revising the security approach of through the involvement of state actors, NGOs international partners to prioritise the protection and community representatives. of local populations over counterterrorism. Problematise the support ensured to electoral Set up higher quality standards of assessment for autocracies. Economic funds and political capacity-building missions. Italy is an important actor support provided to Sahelian regimes by the for capacity-building activities in the Sahel. However, European Union have too often been translated the lack of professionalism of national armed forces into tools for strengthening the grip on power of still remains a crucial issue. Coordinating with EU and ruling élites and illiberal forms of governance, US partners, Italy should put human rights protection without concretely addressing governance at the core of military and police training processes issues or development. Italy should encourage as a way to enhance trust between security forces a more critical approach by European partners, and local communities. effectively urging transparency and fairness in the Move beyond considering migration only as a use of funds, as well as the enhancement of local national security issue. To address migration governance processes and the implementation phenomena Italy should adopt a comprehensive of democratic practices. Moreover, it should be stance, reinforcing legal pathways of entry for made clear that ‘good governance’ cannot just be economic migrants and humanitarian corridors a label, but must be accompanied by concrete for asylum seekers. It is also important to take actions both by donors, which must stop their into account the potential for instability that unconditional support to allied regimes and their comes with security measures enforcing strict uncritical acceptance of electoral processes and regulations against human smugglers and outcomes, and by Sahelian states, which must be smuggling activities in the Sahel. Migration called upon to adopt accountability mechanisms policies, as well as local development plans, and respect rule of law principles. must be discussed at grassroots levels, engaging Support the implementation of the new EU state and local actors, civil society organisations Strategy, with its focus on governance and political and traditional authorities. accountability of local states and security forces, Foster local peacebuilding. Italy’s diplomacy and reinforce coordination with other European should recognise the importance of brokering partners.

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and NATO – Italy as a protagonist in Africa. Analysis by 33. S. Pioppi, “La missione di Conte in Niger e Ciad è Cristiani (Iai/Gmf)], Formiche, 10 April 2021. (anche) un messaggio all’Europa” [Conte's mission 22. White Paper for International Security and Defence, to Niger and Chad is (also) a message to Europe], Ministry of Defence, July 2015. Formiche, 15 January 2019. 23. M. Bøås, “EU migration management in the Sahel: 34. G. Carbone, L’Italia propone all’Africa un nuovo unintended consequences on the ground in Niger?”, partenariato [Italy and a new partnership with Africa], Third World Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 1, 2021. ISPI Commentary, ISPI, April 2021. 24. A. Marrone, La politica di sicurezza nel vicinato 35. A Partnership with Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs meridionale. A view from Rome, FES, June 2020. and International Cooperation, December 2020. 25. E. Baldaro, Constructing a Regional Order Through 36. Meeting of Minister Luigi Di Maio with the Minister for Security: Strategies and Failures of US Policy Towards Malians Abroad and African Integration, Al Hamdou the Sahara-Sahel Region, US Foreign Policy in a Ag Ilène] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Challenging World, Springer, Cham, 2018. Cooperation, 7 May 2021. 26. L.E. Lopez, “Performing EU agency by experimenting 37. “Rome étend son système de rétention des migrants the ‘Comprehensive Approach’: The European Union au Sahel” [Rome expands its migrant detention Sahel Strategy”, Journal of Contemporary African system in the Sahel], Africa Intelligence, 17 May 2021. Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, 2017. 38. “Firmato a Roma l’accordo tra le comunità tuareg, 27. “Italy-Africa initiative under way. We must focus the presente il ministro Di Maio” [Agreement signed in spotlight on Africa once again”, says Bonino, Ministery Rome between Tuareg communities, with Minister Di of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 30 Maio in attendance], Nova News, 7 May 2021. December 2013. 39. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 7 May 28. G. Carbone, G. Bruno, G. Calchi Novati, and M. 2021. Montanini, La politica dell’Italia in Africa, ISPI, 40. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 26 March December 2013. 2021. 29. S. Carrera, S. Blockmans, D. Gros, and E. Guild, The 41. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 7 May EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis Taking Stock and 2021. Setting Policy Priorities, CEPS Essay, no. 20, December 42. International Development Cooperation.. Three-year 2015. Planning and Guidance Document 2019-2021] Ministry 30. D. Kipp, From Exception to Rule: The EU Trust Fund for of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 2020. Africa, SWP Research Paper, no. 13, December 2018. 43. International Mission Authorisation and Extension. 31. Gentiloni: “We share the same fate”, Ministry of DOC CCL no. 3 e DOC CCL - bis no. 1, Dossier, January Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 19 May 2018. 2016. 44. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 26 March 32. La strategia italiana nel Mediterraneo. Stabilizzare le 2021…, cit. crisi e costruire un'agenda positiva per la regione (The 45. L’Italie veut envoyer des soldats au Niger, refus de Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean. Stabilising the Niamey [Italy wants to send soldiers to Niger, Niamey Crises and Building a Positive Agenda for the Region), refuses], RFI, 26 January 2018. RFI, 26 January 2018. ISPI-Rome MED Report, ISPI, 2017. In the 2017-2019 46. Interview, Ministry of Defence official, 31 March 2021. period, 226 million euros have been allocated for projects in African countries particularly relevant in the 47. “France has always reiterated its interest to have field of migration; in 2020, the Africa Fund has been us involved in Niger, concerning the MISIN training transformed into a Migration Fund, with a broader mission”, official Ministerial source said, Interview, geographical scope and a 100 million euros budget Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 26 March 2021. for 2020-2022.

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48. B. Venturi and N.A. Toure, Out of the Security Deadlock: 61. International Mission Authorisation and Extension], Challenges and Choices in the Sahel, FEPS-IAI-NDI, Dossier, June 2020. June 2020. 62. Hearing of Minister Guerini on the policy guidelines for 49. Interview, Ministry of Defence official, 31 March 2021. his Ministry, Ministry of Defence WebTv, 8 March 2021. 50. International Mission Authorisation and Extension], 63. “Sahel: il contingente italiano in partenza per la Task Dossier, June 2020. Force Takuba” [Sahel: Italian contingent on its way to 51. Mission in Niger: MISIN mandate reaches 1000 days, join the Takuba task force], Nova News, 10 March 2021. Ministry of Defence, 13 October 2020. 64. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 26 March 52. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 26 March 2021. 2021. 65. M. Ceccorulli and F. Coticchia, “I’ll take two.’ Migration, 53. The Sahel Alliance initially included France, Germany, terrorism, and the Italian military engagement in Niger the European Union, the African Development Bank, and Libya”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 25, the United Nations Development Programme and no. 2, 2020. the World Bank. It was joined later by Italy, Spain, the 66. F. Coticchia and F. Moro, “From enthusiasm to retreat: United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy and military missions abroad after the Cold War”, Denmark. According to the “Results Report: 3 years of Italian Political Sciences, vol. 15, no. 1, 2020. the Sahel Alliance” document, the SA global portfolio 67. Interview, Ministry of Defence official, 31 March 2021. accounted in 2020 for 880 projects and €17.1 billion 68. Council conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan committed by member states and organisations in the 2015-2020, Press Release, Council of the European region. Union, 20 April 2015. 54. International Mission Authorisation and Extension], 69. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 26 March Dossier, June 2020. 2021 55. A. Lebovich, Disorder from Chaos: Why Europeans Fail 70. The European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel to Promote Stability in the Sahel, ECFR Policy Brief, - Council Conclusions, Council of the European Union, August 2020. 16 April 2021. 56. Task Force Takuba: déclaration politique des gouvernements allemand, belge, britannique, danois, estonien, français, malien, néerlandais, nigérien, norvégien, portugais, suédois et tchèque, [Takuba task force: political statement from the governments of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the UK], Ministry of Defence, 27 March 2020. 57. A. Schmauder, Z. Gorman, and F. Berger, Takuba: A New Coalition for the Sahel?, Clingendael Spectator Analysis, 30 June 2020. 58. C. Casola, What’s Next for in the Sahel?, ISPI Commentary, ISPI, 3 March 2021. 59. Minister of Defence, Lorenzo Guerini, took part in the Italy-France summit today in Naples, on the sidelines of which he held a bilateral meeting with his colleague Ms Parly, Ministry of Defence, 27 February 2020. 60. T. Ciocchetti, “Parte la missione delle forze speciali italiane nel Sahel” [[Italian special forces mission in the Sahel underway], Difesa Online, 7 February 2021.

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