Humanitarian Advocacy in Darfur: the Challenge of Neutrality
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hpg HPG Policy Brief 28 Humanitarian Policy Group October 2007 Humanitarian advocacy in Darfur: the challenge of neutrality id agencies are grappling with familiar problems around advocacy in Darfur. Key messages Long-recognised as a crisis of protection, and not solely of humani- • Humanitarian agencies have A compromised strict neutrality in order to tarian relief, difficult issues have emerged as to the roles aid actors should play in advocating for advocate on issues related to civilian measures to address civilian insecurity and insecurity in Darfur. A more ‘pragmatic’ conflict resolution. Where does the boundary lie form of neutrality is emerging: sufficiently between humanitarian questions and political non-partisan to facilitate access to or military ones? Should agencies call attention affected communities, while also to these issues, or should they also advocate for sufficiently flexible to allow advocacy. specific political or military measures? As • Aid actors concerned to retain access to Barbara Stocking, Oxfam’s chief executive, put it affected communities should do more to in a recent interview: ‘we think we’ve got to save define and safeguard this new form of lives today while trying to get the international neutrality. This may involve distancing community to sort out the bigger problem. Now themselves from other non-neutral we will do our absolute utmost to go to the edge campaigners. of that. We will try to give as much information • There is a lack of clarity around out, but not in ways that are challenging to the humanitarian actors’ role in advocacy. Khartoum government’ (Cohen, 2007). This can lead to aid actors overstepping humanitarian boundaries and being The difficulty lies in determining where drawn into discussions in which they have Stocking’s ‘edge’ lies. Aid actors have different limited competence or expertise. More mandates, but certain principles – in particular discussion and evaluation of the role of humanity, impartiality and neutrality – are advocacy, and its effectiveness in widely accepted as intrinsic to humanitarian humanitarian action, is required. action. Neutrality is often said to be a Overseas Development Institute ‘pragmatic’ principle: in order to gain access to 111 Westminster Bridge Road communities affected by war, humanitarians London SE1 7JD United Kingdom should not engage publicly in matters of Darfur demonstrates many of the classic political controversy. However, this strict notion characteristics of a non-permissive advocacy Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 of neutrality has been much eroded. For environment: high levels of insecurity for aid Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 instance, Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) views workers, continuous efforts by the Sudanese E-mail: [email protected] acting as an agent of change as central to its government to curtail what it perceives as Websites: www.odi.org.uk/hpg work, including highlighting the responsibilities ‘political’ activities and inconsistent levels of and www.odihpn.org of the various actors involved. For MSF, humanitarian access. There are thus serious neutrality means being non-partisan, and not operational considerations to be taken into siding with any warring party. Other agencies go account when undertaking advocacy. Finally, further, particularly those with mandates that there are issues of competence and expertise. extend beyond emergency action to include recovery and development. These agencies This HPG Policy Brief reviews operational aid Overseas Development advocate a form of ‘politicised’ humanitarian- actors’ international advocacy on Darfur since Institute ism, where humanitarians seek to influence the the outbreak of the conflict in 2003. It draws political root causes of conflict and poverty. on secondary data available in the public hpg Policy Brief 28 Figure 1: Frequency of press statements on Darfur by select humanitarian agencies, 2003–20071 25 25 20 Care Oxfam IRC MSF Ref. Inti 15 OCHA 5 0 2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 sphere, as well as a select number of interviews outgoing UN Resident and Humanitarian with representatives of aid agencies, campaigning Coordinator to Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, who in groups and international policy-makers. March 2004 compared the situation to Rwanda in 1994. Earlier, the then Under-Secretary-General for Silenced by insecurity? Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egleland, had called Darfur the world’s worst humanitarian disaster Advocacy by operational aid actors is frequently (IRIN, 22 March 2004). From that point on, the juxtaposed with programming, with speaking out crisis attracted significantly increased attention. weighed against potential costs to programmes, staff and beneficiaries. This relationship between Bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian access advocacy and access and security appears to have were first eased in February 2004, with greater been an important determinant in the quantity and concessions in May and again in July. This quality of advocacy efforts on Darfur. corresponded with a period of intense public advocacy. Initially, humanitarian organisations Figure 1 charts the frequency of public statements concentrated heavily on the humanitarian on Darfur by a select group of six humanitarian situation, calling for additional funding and organisations. It shows that these organisations enhanced access. Figure 2 shows the overall were slow to raise the alarm, at least in their public substance of our sample aid agencies’ public statements. The conflict was at its most intense in advocacy between 2003 and 2007. It highlights the 2003 and early 2004, with villages razed to the heavy emphasis on issues related to humanitarian ground and hundreds of thousands of people killed assistance and delivery, including reports on the or displaced. During this period, most international humanitarian context, response and funding organisations were either unable to gain access to needs, humanitarian access and aid worker Darfur or were publicly silent. With a few insecurity. However, as the crisis extended exceptions, most notably the Office for the throughout 2004, and ceasefire and demobil- Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and isation commitments were not met, the content of MSF, public advocacy on Darfur commenced in press statements changed, with increasing 2004. Many attribute the raising of the alarm to the emphasis on insecurity and demands for international action to resolve the crisis. Sexual and 1 This figure has been generated from an analysis of gender-based violence and the need for stronger 435 press statements with an information or advocacy peacekeeping were particularly emphasised. component, released to ReliefWeb since 2003. Statements on Sudan-wide issues; gratitude to donors; photo montages; and comprehensive reports on Darfur were As aid agencies began to advocate on sensitive excluded (accompanying press statements were included). civilian protection issues, the risks associated with 2 Policy Brief 28 hpg Figure 2: Content of press statements on Darfur by select humanitarian organisations, 2003 – 20072 250 200 150 100 otal messages T 50 0 Ceasefire nforce no-fly nforce equest no-fly E R anctions (GoS) ICC – in favour onger AU onger AU force ppeal for funds r UN/AU – ask for UN/AU S A St eace process/DPA UN/AU – welcome UN/AU eporting activities Chad Border Force Chad Border P umanitarian access R eporting GBV needs eporting GBV H R nsecurity aid workers I eporting scale of needs R advocacy appeared. As agencies began to press for a 59% between 2005 and 2006, and by a further 53% strengthened mandate and increased manpower for in the first half of 2007. While the effects of the African Union peacekeeping mission, AMIS, the insecurity are felt across the humanitarian sector, president of the Sudanese national assembly operational NGOs and other non-UN agencies have announced the dispatch of a parliamentary com- borne the brunt, with a 69% rise in the number of mission ‘to investigate the work of humanitarian security incidents between 2005 and 2006, organizations [which] are trying to gain control of the compared to a 28% increase for UN agencies. Over camps’. The Sudanese president, President Omar al- this period, and particularly during 2007, field Bashir, declared that ‘humanitarian organizations workers also indicated an increase in the number were the real enemies’ of Sudan (AFP, 29 October of expulsions and greater difficulties in renewing 2004). A press release by Save the Children-UK, working papers, particularly for agencies engaged reporting the aerial bombardment of Tawila in North in policy or protection activities. Darfur, resulted in a threat to expel the agency’s head. Similar steps were taken against Oxfam GB in Public advocacy by aid organisations decreased November 2004 when it publicly berated what it saw markedly during this period, especially in the latter as the UN Security Council’s ‘diplomatic dithering’ half of 2005. This coincided with a period of over Darfur. Between December 2004 and April 2005, (relative) calm in Darfur, when the peace talks at at least 20 aid workers, most of them from organi- Abuja were ongoing and rebel movements had sations publicly advocating on IDP issues, were retreated to their strongholds. Since then, public arrested or detained (Human Rights Watch, 2005). advocacy by the six aid organisations reviewed in this paper has remained limited. There was a spike This increase in the harassment and intimidation of in activity around May 2006, when the Darfur aid actors also corresponded with rising insecurity. Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed. A smaller According to OCHA, reported security incidents spike in August 2006 focused on sexual violence in involving aid workers (including theft, detention, South Darfur. From the end of 2006, however, physical/sexual assault and death) increased by operational NGOs have been all but silent. The content of public advocacy has also changed since 2 This figure draws on the same statements as used in Figure 1. Where more than one issue was included in a press state- 2005.