hpg HPG Policy Brief 28 Humanitarian Policy Group October 2007

Humanitarian advocacy in : the challenge of neutrality

id agencies are grappling with familiar problems around advocacy in Darfur. Key messages Long-recognised as a crisis of protection, and not solely of humani- • Humanitarian agencies have A compromised strict neutrality in order to tarian relief, difficult issues have emerged as to the roles aid actors should play in advocating for advocate on issues related to civilian measures to address civilian insecurity and insecurity in Darfur. A more ‘pragmatic’ conflict resolution. Where does the boundary lie form of neutrality is emerging: sufficiently between humanitarian questions and political non-partisan to facilitate access to or military ones? Should agencies call attention affected communities, while also to these issues, or should they also advocate for sufficiently flexible to allow advocacy. specific political or military measures? As • Aid actors concerned to retain access to Barbara Stocking, Oxfam’s chief executive, put it affected communities should do more to in a recent interview: ‘we think we’ve got to save define and safeguard this new form of lives today while trying to get the international neutrality. This may involve distancing community to sort out the bigger problem. Now themselves from other non-neutral we will do our absolute utmost to go to the edge campaigners. of that. We will try to give as much information • There is a lack of clarity around out, but not in ways that are challenging to the humanitarian actors’ role in advocacy. Khartoum government’ (Cohen, 2007). This can lead to aid actors overstepping humanitarian boundaries and being The difficulty lies in determining where drawn into discussions in which they have Stocking’s ‘edge’ lies. Aid actors have different limited competence or expertise. More mandates, but certain principles – in particular discussion and evaluation of the role of humanity, impartiality and neutrality – are advocacy, and its effectiveness in widely accepted as intrinsic to humanitarian humanitarian action, is required. action. Neutrality is often said to be a Overseas Development Institute ‘pragmatic’ principle: in order to gain access to 111 Westminster Bridge Road communities affected by war, humanitarians London SE1 7JD United Kingdom should not engage publicly in matters of Darfur demonstrates many of the classic political controversy. However, this strict notion characteristics of a non-permissive advocacy Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 of neutrality has been much eroded. For environment: high levels of insecurity for aid Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 instance, Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) views workers, continuous efforts by the Sudanese E-mail: [email protected] acting as an agent of change as central to its government to curtail what it perceives as Websites: www.odi.org.uk/hpg work, including highlighting the responsibilities ‘political’ activities and inconsistent levels of and www.odihpn.org of the various actors involved. For MSF, humanitarian access. There are thus serious neutrality means being non-partisan, and not operational considerations to be taken into siding with any warring party. Other agencies go account when undertaking advocacy. Finally, further, particularly those with mandates that there are issues of competence and expertise. extend beyond emergency action to include recovery and development. These agencies This HPG Policy Brief reviews operational aid

Overseas Development advocate a form of ‘politicised’ humanitarian- actors’ international advocacy on Darfur since Institute ism, where humanitarians seek to influence the the outbreak of the conflict in 2003. It draws political root causes of conflict and poverty. on secondary data available in the public hpg Policy Brief 28

Figure 1: Frequency of press statements on Darfur by select humanitarian agencies, 2003–20071

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sphere, as well as a select number of interviews outgoing UN Resident and Humanitarian with representatives of aid agencies, campaigning Coordinator to , Mukesh Kapila, who in groups and international policy-makers. March 2004 compared the situation to Rwanda in 1994. Earlier, the then Under-Secretary-General for Silenced by insecurity? Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egleland, had called Darfur the world’s worst humanitarian disaster Advocacy by operational aid actors is frequently (IRIN, 22 March 2004). From that point on, the juxtaposed with programming, with speaking out crisis attracted significantly increased attention. weighed against potential costs to programmes, staff and beneficiaries. This relationship between Bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian access advocacy and access and security appears to have were first eased in February 2004, with greater been an important determinant in the quantity and concessions in May and again in July. This quality of advocacy efforts on Darfur. corresponded with a period of intense public advocacy. Initially, humanitarian organisations Figure 1 charts the frequency of public statements concentrated heavily on the humanitarian on Darfur by a select group of six humanitarian situation, calling for additional funding and organisations. It shows that these organisations enhanced access. Figure 2 shows the overall were slow to raise the alarm, at least in their public substance of our sample aid agencies’ public statements. The conflict was at its most intense in advocacy between 2003 and 2007. It highlights the 2003 and early 2004, with villages razed to the heavy emphasis on issues related to humanitarian ground and hundreds of thousands of people killed assistance and delivery, including reports on the or displaced. During this period, most international humanitarian context, response and funding organisations were either unable to gain access to needs, humanitarian access and aid worker Darfur or were publicly silent. With a few insecurity. However, as the crisis extended exceptions, most notably the Office for the throughout 2004, and ceasefire and demobil- Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and isation commitments were not met, the content of MSF, public advocacy on Darfur commenced in press statements changed, with increasing 2004. Many attribute the raising of the alarm to the emphasis on insecurity and demands for international action to resolve the crisis. Sexual and 1 This figure has been generated from an analysis of gender-based violence and the need for stronger 435 press statements with an information or advocacy peacekeeping were particularly emphasised. component, released to ReliefWeb since 2003. Statements on Sudan-wide issues; gratitude to donors; photo montages; and comprehensive reports on Darfur were As aid agencies began to advocate on sensitive excluded (accompanying press statements were included). civilian protection issues, the risks associated with

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Figure 2: Content of press statements on Darfur by select humanitarian organisations, 2003 – 20072

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0 Ceasefire nforce no-fly nforce equest no-fly E R anctions (GoS) ICC – in favour onger AU onger AU force ppeal for funds r UN/AU – ask for UN/AU S A St eace process/DPA UN/AU – welcome UN/AU eporting activities Border Force Chad Border P umanitarian access R eporting GBV needs eporting GBV H R nsecurity aid workers I eporting scale of needs R

advocacy appeared. As agencies began to press for a 59% between 2005 and 2006, and by a further 53% strengthened mandate and increased manpower for in the first half of 2007. While the effects of the peacekeeping mission, AMIS, the insecurity are felt across the humanitarian sector, president of the Sudanese national assembly operational NGOs and other non-UN agencies have announced the dispatch of a parliamentary com- borne the brunt, with a 69% rise in the number of mission ‘to investigate the work of humanitarian security incidents between 2005 and 2006, organizations [which] are trying to gain control of the compared to a 28% increase for UN agencies. Over camps’. The Sudanese president, President Omar al- this period, and particularly during 2007, field Bashir, declared that ‘humanitarian organizations workers also indicated an increase in the number were the real enemies’ of Sudan (AFP, 29 October of expulsions and greater difficulties in renewing 2004). A press release by Save the Children-UK, working papers, particularly for agencies engaged reporting the aerial bombardment of Tawila in North in policy or protection activities. Darfur, resulted in a threat to expel the agency’s head. Similar steps were taken against Oxfam GB in Public advocacy by aid organisations decreased November 2004 when it publicly berated what it saw markedly during this period, especially in the latter as the UN Security Council’s ‘diplomatic dithering’ half of 2005. This coincided with a period of over Darfur. Between December 2004 and April 2005, (relative) calm in Darfur, when the peace talks at at least 20 aid workers, most of them from organi- Abuja were ongoing and rebel movements had sations publicly advocating on IDP issues, were retreated to their strongholds. Since then, public arrested or detained (, 2005). advocacy by the six aid organisations reviewed in this paper has remained limited. There was a spike This increase in the harassment and intimidation of in activity around May 2006, when the Darfur aid actors also corresponded with rising insecurity. Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed. A smaller According to OCHA, reported security incidents spike in August 2006 focused on sexual violence in involving aid workers (including theft, detention, South Darfur. From the end of 2006, however, physical/sexual assault and death) increased by operational NGOs have been all but silent. The content of public advocacy has also changed since 2 This figure draws on the same statements as used in Figure 1. Where more than one issue was included in a press state- 2005. With some exceptions, agencies have ment (for example, reporting need and calling for humanitar- returned to speaking about issues relating to ian access), both issues were included. humanitarian assistance.

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Those interviewed claim that fear of repercus- efforts on a core humanitarian issue. Far from sions has played a role in the downturn in public advocacy being pursued at the expense of advocacy, though the precise relationship be- operations, many interviewees believe that the tween advocacy and risk is unclear. Changes in fact that agencies have access to Darfur at all is as public advocacy can also be influenced by a result of this work. In early 2004, when air and institutional strategy, profiling or funding ground attacks were at their most intense, requirements or staff turnover. Field staff spoke humanitarian visas and customs clearances for of pressure from headquarters to be active and Darfur were taking up to three months to process, outspoken. In any case, seasoned advocates and humanitarian organisations were able to reach claim that time-strapped managers often do not only a small fraction of those in need. High-level have the time, knowledge or ability to judge a advocacy, most of it behind the scenes, is thought situation fully. The enormous task of maintaining to have resulted in a progressive easing of these operations in a difficult environment such as restrictions. Agencies relied on other actors with Darfur monopolises senior management atten- greater or different leverage over the national tion, with sensitive public advocacy often authorities to put forward their concerns. Private regarded as too difficult. advocacy towards Western donor governments and OCHA, often institutionalised through regular Out of the spotlight: the role of private meetings at field level, in Khartoum and in donor advocacy capitals, has been vital in maintaining access as a priority issue. While our review of public advocacy on Darfur suggests that risk – perceived or actual – The need to work privately or through alternative influences the level of public advocacy, many channels increases with the sensitivity of the advocates challenge the assumption that subject matter. This has been particularly the advocacy and programming are irreconcilable. case in relation to the protection and security of They focus instead on the complementarities civilian populations in Darfur. The Darfur crisis between advocacy and programming, and erupted just as the Responsibility to Protect highlight the availability of less vocal and (R2P) doctrine was gaining currency in attributable modes of advocacy. international political debate, and for many Darfur has become its first test-case. The fact Such an evolution in thinking has certainly been that discussion of the crisis was couched in the evident in Darfur. Agencies have sought to language of protection from the start has in itself continue advocacy efforts through a combination been significant in guarding against humanitarian of three tactics. First, they have sought to reduce assistance being used as a substitute for more the visibility and sensitivity of their statements by concerted political action, as was the case in using more private methods. Indeed, the level of Bosnia, for instance. However, whilst usefully private advocacy has been such that some highlighting the limits of humanitarian action and observers have claimed that it has undermined the need for action by other (political/military) the capacity of aid organisations to respond to players, the protection debate has also drawn needs on the ground (Minear, 2005; Stoddard, humanitarians into highly technical political and 2006: 61). Second, agencies have sought to military discussions. reduce the extent to which they are uniquely or directly identified with advocacy messages, Many agencies have become engaged in R2P instead using collective approaches. One example discussions generally, as well as specifically in is the Sudan Advocacy Coalition, a consortium of relation to Darfur. Some have been central in calls six NGOs, which was an active advocate in the for more effective peacekeeping in Darfur. Others, early phase of the crisis. More recently, agencies such as MSF-France, have publicly voiced concerns have used local coordination mechanisms and about non-consensual intervention (MSF, 2007). have released joint press releases.3 Third, they However, beyond highlighting the need for have turned to other advocates, including OCHA, protection (and, in the view of some, the need for Western donor governments and human rights peacekeepers), many humanitarian representatives organisations and pressure campaigns like the were uncertain about the limits of their . responsibility to describe the type of political or military response that was required, and spoke of The issue of humanitarian access provides a good being drawn into discussions in which they have example of both private and indirect advocacy little authority, and frequently less expertise. The question of the legitimate role of aid actors in 3 For instance, a group of NGOs (CAFOD, CARE International, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, IRC, Oxfam engaging in and informing these debates is difficult. and Tearfund) demanded more funding for the African Union On the one hand, aid organisations are perceived as force following a Darfur donors’ conference. having expertise by virtue of their on-the-ground

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information on the crisis and, at least to some including recommending measures such as UN degree, their understanding of the perspectives of peacekeeping, no-fly zones and sanctions. While local actors. Many aid organisations are also ‘multi- some aid organisations guard their independence mandate’ actors, combining humanitarian concerns fiercely and remain cautious about sharing with developmental and other aims. With well- platforms with these groups, others are less established relationships with Western govern- reticent. In addition to the informal channels of ments, they have also become trusted sources of communication that have always existed, new information and analysis. coordination groups, such as Crisis Action in the UK, reflect a trend towards collective action based on While there are different perspectives in different shared analysis. agencies, most of the field staff consulted believe that humanitarian agencies have the legitimacy The crisis in Darfur has triggered what has been and competency to present the facts as they exist described as the greatest level of global activism on the ground, but that the details of a political or witnessed since the end of apartheid in 1991. military response are a matter for military or Concern that genocide was taking place resulted in political experts. Others, and particularly those in the creation of an unlikely alliance of the American headquarters, have engaged more deeply in liberal left and Christian right, the Black Caucus, technical discussions in an effort to reach policy European think-tanks, human rights campaigners recommendations which will have an impact on the and grass-roots activists. Using a powerful mix of humanitarian and protection conditions on the high-profile public rallies, media advertising, popular ground. These actors call for stronger local campaigning and celebrity endorsements, these analysis, greater investment in expertise to groups have invoked the ‘never again’ formula to substantiate policy recommendations and the justify a series of confrontational policy recommen- development of more sophisticated advocacy dations. The emergence of this transnational strategies. In this perspective, all humanitarian activism has presented new possibilities for action is political; the issue is not whether humanitarians. Many, particularly those in head- agencies are engaging in politics, but rather quarters, welcome the attention to Darfur that this whether they are doing so in a partisan way. high-profile campaigning has achieved, and point to the increase both in media coverage and in public New alliances, new challenges engagement in the Darfur crisis (see Figure 3 (page 6), which depicts the frequency of online searches Advocacy by individual aid agencies is necessarily and online print coverage of different crises). They limited. It is generally secondary to the provision of attribute the increased engagement of China, and its relief assistance, and capacity is constrained. Some agreement to stronger UN action against Sudan, to aid organisations are attempting to broaden their the campaigning efforts of these coalitions, in field of influence, for example by establishing policy particular the ‘Genocide Olympics’ initiative, where positions in Addis Ababa to influence the African campaigners threatened to mount an international Union, or using field offices in neighbouring boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games unless countries to influence regional policies. However, China used its influence on Sudan to induce it to their main leverage is over Western governments, accept UN peacekeepers. media and publics. Experience from development practices, for example on landmines or on the ‘Make The apparent success of these campaign groups in Poverty History’ campaign, has shown the potential increasing the profile of the Darfur crisis has led for policy impact when working in alliances, whether some humanitarian organisations to join forces with with other groups or through grass-roots these coalitions. Others have received support from mobilisation. Many aid organisations have drawn on campaigning groups, either directly in the form of these experiences to inform their approach in Darfur, financial assistance, or indirectly, to the extent that whether sharing platforms, working in coalitions or these organisations highlight humanitarian needs. forming partnerships with different groups. Many have also shared campaigning tactics with these groups, participating directly in their As with aid organisations, Darfur is a priority for international rallies, such as the Day for Darfur, or many human rights groups and policy think-tanks. In employing similar techniques. UNICEF and the 2003, issued a number of International Rescue Committee, for instance, have alerts on Darfur; it has since been joined by Human each hosted high-profile visits to Sudan by actors Rights Watch and other human rights organisations. Mia Farrow and , prominent figures in The International Crisis Group has also been a the US Save Darfur campaign. However, critics are consistent voice on Darfur. Focusing on questions of concerned that the bluntness of the campaign has peace, security and justice and unrestricted by in- led to an over-simplification of the conflict, country presence, these organisations have publicly encouraged ‘deadline diplomacy’ in relation to the called for strong international action on Darfur, negotiation of the DPA and placed undue emphasis

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Figure 3: Comparison of online print coverage and public searches on Darfur, DRC and Somalia, 2004–2007

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on an international peacekeeping presence which is including specific adverts attacking Bashir. While unlikely to resolve the crisis. It has also posed a this level of partisanship may be appropriate for number of specific challenges for humanitarians. campaigning organisations that believe that one One high-profile difficulty emerged when cam- party to the conflict bears greater responsibility, it paigning groups advocated for the enforcement of is problematic for aid organisations concerned to no-fly zones over Darfur. A number of aid maintain access to affected populations. Whether organisations complained that the measure would working in alliance with these groups actually place humanitarians and their work at risk given their protects aid organisations is also questionable. reliance on aircraft to reach affected populations. Senior aid officials in Khartoum claim that the MSF and Action Contre la Faim also publicly argued Sudanese authorities are convinced that that non-consensual enforcement of such a measure anglophone aid actors in particular are fuelling the could trigger a further escalation in violence. campaign against them.

The fact that the campaign groups have different Teetering on the edge? objectives and approaches can also be problematic. While the main thrust of the campaign – ensuring The experience of advocacy in Darfur indicates a security and humanitarian access and pressing for a lack of consensus about where the ‘edge’ of political resolution of the conflict – is broadly in line humanitarianism lies. Different agencies have with the objectives of humanitarian organisations, its adopted different approaches, but in general there public messages are much more robust. Advocacy has been a willingness to compromise strict officials in aid organisations in the US in particular neutrality in order to address questions of civilian have claimed that their efforts to raise humanitarian insecurity and/or conflict resolution. This reflects a concerns have been drowned out by the louder, more growing acceptance of the role that humanitarian emotive campaigning groups. Humanitarian agencies can play in influencing political debates. agencies therefore are caught in a dilemma: they However, what has yet to emerge is an articulation seek to attract high-level attention to the Darfur of the humanitarian agenda in these debates. crisis, but are then unable to control the direction of While MSF’s approach tends to be more closely the campaign. This has led some agencies to adopt defined – focusing on catalysing attention to public positions opposing the dominant campaign, injustice, rather than prescribing solutions – this is with MSF-France for instance insisting that the crisis not always consistent. Certainly, by raising in Darfur did not amount to genocide. concerns about non-consensual military inter- vention MSF-France implied that it supported, even Furthermore, campaigning groups have almost if it did not propose, non-intervention. The scope of exclusively targeted the Sudanese government, legitimate involvement in these questions currently

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appears to extend to whatever is considered likely competition between organisations for media space to improve the humanitarian condition of affected or even rivalry between career advocates seeking to populations. This could potentially be limitless in raise their profile. its range. Finally, a lack of clarity on the part of aid actors as While neutrality appears to have been to the purpose of advocacy and how it relates to compromised, it has not been entirely discarded. programming makes it difficult to judge potential The ‘new neutrality’ of humanitarian agencies is not impacts and risks. It appears that, in Darfur, there the same as that of human rights actors, which has been a trade-off between access and the level operate under what de Waal has called ‘neutrality of and type of public advocacy that aid agencies have principle’, or objectivity (de Waal, 1994). This means undertaken. While operational agencies are rightly assessing the parties to a conflict according to the very wary of speaking publicly and individually on same standards, so that the more abusive party sensitive issues, more work is needed to better faces greater condemnation than others. Instead, understand the nuances of this relationship for all humanitarians are testing a form of ‘relative’ or forms of advocacy work, not simply that ‘pragmatic’ neutrality, sufficient to maintain the undertaken publicly. If aid actors genuinely appearance of general non-involvement in the believe, as Stocking does, that they must do their politics of war, thereby retaining access to affected utmost ‘to sort out the bigger problem’, then this populations in order to provide relief, but flexible should, in certain contexts, include jeopardising enough to allow different forms of advocacy to programmes where they are of limited impact. In respond to life-threatening situations. others, it should also include abjuring advocacy in order to save lives. However, these decisions rest But this ‘pragmatic neutrality’ is not without risks. on the assumption that advocacy by humanitarian It is unclear whether these risks correlate directly agencies has a positive impact on the needs and with the advocacy efforts of individual aid actors, safety of populations affected by crises. In the or their (perceived) association with the advocacy absence of debate, discussion and evaluation of of other groups, or is a consequence of more advocacy as a form of humanitarian action, this is general perceptions of aid actors’ alignment with by no means proven. the values and objectives of Western governments. Whatever the causes, if aid actors are unclear about their neutrality, it is not surprising that References and further reading others are too. Operating in a political arena occupied by a range of other actors – actors who Cohen, N. (2007) ‘Time Out with Nick Cohen: Barbara often take far more politicised and partisan stances Stocking’, New Statesman, 28 May. – compels aid agencies to define and advocate for De Waal, A. (1994) ‘Humanitarianism Unbound? their own form of neutrality. Thus, while some aid Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief actors have raised concerns about publicly Operations in Political Emergencies’, African Affairs, highlighting divisions between humanitarian and Discussion Paper No. 5, November 1994. human rights campaigners, for those agencies Human Rights Watch (2005) ‘Darfur: Arrest War concerned to retain some measure of neutrality Criminals, Not Aid Workers’, 31 May. such distance may be an operational necessity. Minear, L (2005) ‘Lessons Learnt: The Darfur Experi- Aside from whether aid actors can legitimately ence’, ALNAPReview of Humanitarian Action in present policy suggestions, there is the question of 2004. London: ODI. whether they have the competency to do so. Aid Minear, L. and H. Smith (eds) (2007) Humanitarian actors can certainly highlight the level of need and Diplomacy Practitioners and Their Craft. Tokyo: risk that civilian populations face, but this does not United Nations University Press. necessarily mean proposing solutions. Humanitarian MSF (2007) A Critique of MSF-France Operations in agencies do not and cannot have unlimited Darfur (Sudan). Paris: Crash/Fondation MSF. expertise. Ad hoc propositions put forward by O’Brien, P. (2004) ‘Politicised Humanitarianism: A advocates in order to maintain a ‘place at the policy Response to De Torrente’, Harvard Human Rights table’ are not satisfactory. Clearer definition of the Journal, vol. 17, Spring. boundaries of humanitarian discussions is required to guide advocates. Above all, humanitarian Stoddard, A. (2006) Humanitarian Alert: NGO organisations need to assess very carefully their Information and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy. reasons for undertaking advocacy. In the absence Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. of greater clarity on objectives, advocacy may be Tanguy, J. and F. Terry (1999) ‘On Humanitarian more easily undertaken for non-humanitarian Responsibility’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 13. reasons, whether institutional visibility, fundraising,

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