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[2005] 1 MLJ 245 UNIPHOENIX CORP BHD & ANOR v WONG CHAN MING & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R1–25–2 OF 1999 RAUS J 19 APRIL 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application to quash decision of Industrial Court — Change of ownership — Company regarded as employer during incidence of dismissal — Whether decision tainted with irregularities — Whether relevant matters considered — Whether decision to be quashed
Labour Law — Employment — Termination of employment — Change of ownership — Employer status — Constructive dismissal — Claim for — Whether company properly identified as employer at time of dismissal
The first applicant’s manufacturing operations, located in Shah Alam, were conducted through seven companies, namely, Flexipak, Steripak, UCHT, USM, Star Art, Poly Paks and Poly Paks Singapore. The second applicant was the first applicant’s wholly-owned subsidiary and served as the first applicant’s management services company. Prior to 1990, the higher ranking employees for the Shah Alam operations were appointed by and placed on the payroll of the second applicant. Subsequent to 1990, the employees for the Shah Alam operations were made by the first applicant. The first, second and fourth respondents were employed by the second applicant. The third respondent was initially appointed by Mapek Industries Sdn Bhd (‘Mapek’) as a shipping/ purchasing assistant in 1978. Mapek was subsequently purchased by the second applicant and consequently, the first applicant appointed the third respondent as the head of marketing in the Shah Alam operations. The fifth and sixth respondents were employed by the first applicant. By four separate agreements made on 21 December 1995, Steripak, Flexipak, Star Art and Poly Paks disposed of their machinery and factory equipment to the eighth respondent. By a sale of shares agreement dated 3 January 1996, the second applicant sold the shares in Steripak, Flexipak, Star Art and Poly Paks to the seventh respondent. In January 1996, the first applicant through UCHT, entered into an agreement to dispose of its factories, land and building at Shah Alam to the seventh respondent. After the above transactions, the first applicant sent memo to three of the first respondent’s subordinates to report to other named officers. Further, heads of departments who had been reporting to the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 2 first respondent were instructed by the first applicant to report to other managers. The first applicant then sent another memo informing the first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents that certain divisions of Star Art had ceased operations and they were requested to cease the purchase and delivery of items for the two divisions. The first applicant sent another memo removing further duties of the first and the second respondent. These and a number of other events led ||Page 246>> the first to the sixth respondents to send a letter dated 14 March 1996 to the first applicant, wherein they considered themselves constructively dismissed. The first applicant replied the first to sixth respondents stating that the matter had been referred to the seventh and eighth respondents as the first applicant was no longer responsible for their affairs as Star Art and Poly Paks had already been divested to the seventh and eighth respondents. The first to the sixth respondents’ representations were referred to the Industrial Court. The seventh and eighth respondents were parties which had been ordered to be joined by the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court held that the first and sixth respondents were employees of the applicants and that they had been constructively dismissed by the applicants. The Industrial Court found that reinstatement was not a viable remedy and awarded compensation and back wages to the first to the sixth respondents. This was an application by the applicants for an order of certiorari to quash the Industrial Court’s award. The issue to be determined here was whether the Industrial Court had committed a jurisdictional error in concluding that the applicants were the employers of first to sixth respondents purported to treat themselves as constructively dismissed.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) From the record, there was no evidence before the Industrial Court to show that there was in existence any agreement or arrangement between the applicants and the seventh or eighth respondents regarding the first to sixth respondents’ employment status or that the seventh or eighth respondents had offered employment to the first to the sixth respondents, which offers were accepted by the first to sixth respondents. Thus, the Industrial Court had rightly concluded that the applicants were the employers of the first to the sixth respondents (see para 21). (2) According to the learned Chairman, the sale of shares agreement expressly stipulated for the fulfilment of certain conditions precedent for the purpose of determining the completion date and the last condition was only fulfilled in September 1996. The Industrial Court also held that there was a joint management from 1 March 1996 to September 1996, during which time the operations were conducted in the name of first applicant. Thus, when the Industrial Court held that ‘the court cannot possibly hold that ESPI (the seventh respondent) is the new employer of the claimants’, it had taken into account all the relevant matters into consideration (see paras 28–29). (3) The learned Chairman of the Industrial Court had correctly distinguished the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 3 Kumpulan Kamuning case with the instant case. The Kumpulan Kamuning’s case was distinguishable because in that case, the agreement was for the sale and purchase for the active undertaking of the estate. In contrast, ||Page 247>> there was only a sale of assets and sale of shares in the present case. Further, in the Kumpulan Kamuning’s case, the agreement provided that the actual completion of the transfer of the undertaking shall be completed as soon as possible after the execution thereof whereas in the instant case, the completion date was defined as 120 days from the date of the share sale agreement or on the day when the last condition precedent was fulfilled. Thus, the Industrial Court did not err in law or acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it held that ‘the court cannot possibly hold that ESPI is the new employer of the claimants’. The first applicant continued, until the date of the alleged constructive dismissal, to be the employer of the first to the sixth respondents (see paras 32–33); Kumpulan Kamuning Sdn Bhd v Rajoo & 200 Others [1983] 2 MLJ 400 distinguished.
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Operasi perkilangan pemohon pertama, yang terletak di Shah Alam, dikendalikan melalui tujuh syarikat, iaitu, Flexipak, Steripak, UCHT, USM, Star Art, Poly Paks dan Poly Paks Singapura. Pemohon kedua adalah syarikat milik sepenuhnya pemohon pertama dan berkhidmat sebagai syarikat pengurusan perkhidmatan pemohon pertama. Sebelum 1990, pekerja-pekerja jawatan tinggi untuk operasi Shah Alam dilantik oleh dan diletakkan dalam senarai gaji pemohon kedua. Selepas 1990, pekerja-pekerja untuk operasi Shah Alam dibuat oleh pemohon pertama. Responden-responden pertama, kedua dan keempat diambil bekerja oleh pemohon kedua. Responden ketiga pada mulanya dilantik oleh Mapek Industries Sdn Bhd (‘Mapek’) sebagai penolong perkapalan/pembelian dalam tahun 1978. Mapek kemudiannya dibeli oleh pemohon kedua dan berikutnya, pemohon pertama melantik responden ketiga sebagai ketua pemasaran untuk operasi Shah Alam. Responden-responden kelima dan keenam diambil bekerja oleh pemohon pertama. Melalui empat perjanjian berasingan yang dibuat pada 21 Disember 1995, Steripak, Flexipak, Star Art dan Poly Paks menjual peralatan mesin dan perkilangan mereka kepada responden kelapan. Melalui perjanjian jualan saham bertarikh 3 Januari 1996, pemohon kedua menjual saham-saham Steripak, Flexipak, Star Art dan Poly Paks kepada responden ketujuh. Dalam bulan Januari 1996, pemohon pertama melalui UCHT, memasuki perjanjian untuk menjual kilang-kilang, tanah dan bangunan-bangunannya di Shah Alam kepada responden ketujuh. Selepas transaksi-transaksi di atas, pemohon pertama menghantar memo kepada tiga daripada orang bawahan responden pertama untuk melaporkan kepada pengurus-pengurus yang lain. Pemohon pertama kemudian menghantar satu lagi memo memaklumkan responden-responden pertama, ketiga, keempat dan keenam bahawa bahagian tertentu Star Art telah tamat beroperasi dan mereka diminta menghentikan pembelian dan penghantaran item-item untuk dua bahagian. Pemohon pertama telah
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 4 menghantar satu lagi memo melucutkan tanggungjawab seterusnya daripada responden pertama dan kedua. Kejadian ini dan beberapa kejadian ||Page 248>> lain menyebabkan responden-responden pertama hingga keenam menghantar sepucuk surat bertarikh 14 Mac 1996 kepada pemohon pertama, yang menyatakan mereka menganggap diri mereka telah dipecat secara konstruktif. Pemohon pertama memberi jawapan kepada responden-responden pertama hingga keenam menyatakan bahawa perkara tersebut telahpun dirujuk kepada responden-responden ketujuh dan kelapan oleh kerana pemohon pertama tidak lagi bertanggungjawab untuk urusan-urusan mereka kerana Star Art dan Poly Paks telahpun dilucutkan kepada responden-responden ketujuh dan kelapan. Representasi responden-responden pertama hingga keenam telah dirujuk ke Mahkamah Perusahaan. Responden-responden ketujuh dan kelapan merupakan pihak-pihak yang diperintahkan untuk digabungkan oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan. Mahkamah Perusahaan memutuskan bahawa responden-responden pertama hingga keenam adalah pekerja-pekerja pemohon-pemohon dan bahawa mereka telah dipecat secara konstruktif oleh pemohon-pemohon. Mahkamah Perusahaan mendapati bahawa pengembalian jawatan bekerja bukan satu remedi yang berdaya maju dan mengawardkan pampasan dan gaji tunggakan kepada responden-responden pertama dan keenam. Ini adalah satu permohonan oleh pemohon-pemohon untuk satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan award Mahkamah Perusahaan. Persoalan yang perlu ditentukan di sini adalah sama ada Mahkamah Perusahaan telah melakukan satu kesilapan bidang kuasa semasa memutuskan bahawa majikan-majikan responden-responden pertama hingga keenam adalah pemohon-pemohon pada masa responden-responden pertama hingga keenam bermaksud untuk menganggap diri mereka sebagai dipecat secara konstruktif.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Berdasarkan rekod, tiada keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan untuk menunjukkan bahawa terdapat apa-apa perjanjian atau aturan antara pemohon-pemohon dan responden-responden ketujuh atau kelapan berhubung status pekerjaan pertama hingga keenam atau bahawa responden-responden ketujuh atau kelapan telah menawarkan pekerjaan kepada responden-responden pertama hingga keenam, yang mana tawaran tersebut telah diterima oleh responden-responden pertama hingga keenam. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Perusahaan dengan betul telah memutuskan bahawa pemohon-pemohon adalah majikan-majikan kepada responden-responden pertama hingga keenam (lihat perenggan 21). (2) Menurut Pengerusi yang bijaksana, perjanjian jualan saham tersebut dengan jelas menetapkan perlunya pematuhan pra syarat tertentu bagi tujuan menentukan tarikh penyelesaian dan syarat terakhir hanya dipenuhi dalam bulan September 1996. Mahkamah Perusahaan juga memutuskan bahawa terdapat pengurusan bersama daripada 1 Mac 1996 hingga ||Page 249>> September 1996, dalam masa itu operasi dikendalikan atas nama
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 5 pemohon pertama. Oleh itu, apabila Mahkamah Perusahaan memutuskan bahawa ‘the court cannot possibly hold that ESPI (the seventh respondent) is the new employer of the claimants’, ia telah mengambilkira semua perkara relevan yang perlu dipertimbangkan (lihat perenggan 28–29). (3) Pengerusi yang bijaksana Mahkamah Perusahaan telah dengan betul membezakan kes Kumpulan Kamuning dengan kes semasa. Kes Kumpulan Kamuning dibeza kerana dalam kes tersebut, perjanjian bukan untuk jual beli akujanji jelas ke atas estet tersebut. Sebaliknya, hanya terdapat jualan aset dan jualan saham dalam kes semasa. Tambahan pula, dalam kes Kumpulan Kamuning, perjanjian tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa penyelesaian sebenar pemindahan akujanji tersebut hendaklah diselesaikan secepat mungkin selepas penyempurnaan tersebut manakala dalam kes semasa, tarikh penyelesaian ditafsirkan sebagai 120 hari dari tarikh perjanjian jualan saham atau pada hari apabila para syarat terakhir dipenuhi. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang atau bertindak melampaui bidang kuasanya apabila ia memutuskan bahawa ‘the court cannot possibly hold that ESPI is the new employer of the claimants’. Pemohon pertama terus, sehingga tarikh pemecatan konstruktif yang dikatakan itu, menjadi pekerja responden-responden pertama hingga keenam (lihat perenggan 32–33); Kumpulan Kamuning Sdn Bhd v Rajoo & 200 Others [1983] 2 MLJ 400 dibeza.]
Notes For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185–393. For cases on dismissal, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 849–873. For cases on Industrial Court awards, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1241–1288.
Cases referred to Kumpulan Kamuning Sdn Bhd v Rajoo & 200 Others [1983] 2 MLJ 400 (distd) Uniphoenix Corp Bhd & Anor v Wong Chan Ming & Ors [1998] 3 ILR 914 (refd)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 20
Suganthi Singam (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the applicants. P Vickneswaran (Murugavell Arumugam & Co) for the respondents. ||Page 250>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 6
[2005] 1 MLJ 320 YUSUF BIN SUDIN v SURUHANJAYA PERKHIDMATAN POLIS & ANOR
HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–4 OF 1997 LOW HOP BING J 27 OCTOBER 2004
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Dismissal from service — Police force — Rules of natural justice — procedural fairness — Whether infringement of rights by not giving information and documents even if not requested for — Federal Constitution art 135(2)
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Procedural fairness — Rules of natural justice — Whether unfair to not to give oral hearing — Federal Constitution art 135(2)
The plaintiff was an Assistant Superintendent of Police (‘ASP’) in the Royal Malaysian Police Force (‘the police force’). Vide a letter, the first defendant informed the plaintiff of its intention to dismiss the plaintiff from the police force and directed the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be dismissed (‘the show-cause letter’), pursuant to general order 26 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 (‘the GO’), in relation to five charges brought by the first defendant against the plaintiff. The plaintiff was given the opportunity to make written representation to the first defendant through the Inspector General of Police not later than 21 days from the date of receipt of the show-cause letter. The plaintiff had vide a letter sent his 40-page representation (‘representation’) to the first defendant wherein he denied all the five charges. The first defendant has considered the plaintiff’s representation and the finding showed that the plaintiff’s representation has not shown sufficient cause. As such, the first defendant vide a letter dismissed the plaintiff from the police force. This was plaintiff’s claim against the defendants, inter alia for a declaration that the plaintiff’s dismissal from the police Force is unlawful, unconstitutional, void and of no effect on the grounds that the rules of natural justice were patently contravened, resulting in the infringement of his rights under art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution as the information and documentary evidence in the first defendant’s possession was never given to the plaintiff and the defendant’s failure to hold an oral inquiry is lack of procedural fairness in the decision making process.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 7 Held, dismissing plaintiff’s claim with costs: (1) The plaintiff has given his representation without having to ask for any information from the defendants. The defendants have actually taken into account the plaintiff’s representation and so there is no denial of any rules of natural justice or procedural fairness (see para 31). ||Page 321>> (2) The plaintiff has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, in accordance with the requirement enshrined in art 135(2) Federal Constitution and GO 26(4). The right to be heard given by art 135(2) does not require that the person concerned be given an oral hearing. The failure to give the plaintiff an oral hearing has occasioned no procedural unfairness (see paras 39, 45 and 46).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif adalah Penolong Penguasa Polis (‘PPP’) di dalam Polis Di Raja Malaysia (‘pasukan polis’). Melalui satu surat, defendan pertama memaklumkan kepada plaintif keinginannya untuk memberhentikan plaintif dari pasukan polis dan mengarahkan plaintif untuk tunjuk sebab kenapa beliau tidak harus diberhentikan (‘surat tunjuk sebab’), menurut perintah am 26 Perintah-perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 (‘Perintah Am tersebut’), berkenaan dengan lima tuduhan yang di bawa oleh defendan pertama terhadap plaintif. Plaintif diberikan peluang untuk membuat representasi bertulis kepada defendan pertama melalui Ketua Polis Negara tidak lebih dari 21 hari dari tarikh penerimaan surat tunjuk sebab. Plaintif melalui satu surat menghantar 40 muka surat representasinya kepada defendan pertama di mana dia menafikan kelima-lima tuduhan tersebut. Defendan pertama telah mengambil kira representasi plaintif dan keputusan menunjukkan representasi plaintif tidak menunjukkan sebab yang mencukupi. Oleh itu, defendan pertama melalui surat memberhentikan plaintif dari pasukan polis. Ini adalah tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan, inter alia untuk satu deklarasi bahawa pemberhentian plaintif dari pasukan polis adalah menyalahi undang-undang, bertentangan dengan perlembagaan, terbatal dan tak berkesan atas alasan peraturan keadilan asasi telah dicabuli, mengakibatkan pelanggaran haknya di bawah art 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan kerana informasi dan dokumen yang berada dengan defendan pertama tidak diberi kepada plaintif dan kegagalan defendan untuk mengadakan perbicaraan lisan kegagalan keadilan prosedur dalam proses membuat keputusan.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Plaintif telah memberikan representasinya tanpa meminta apa-apa informasi dari defendan. Defendan sebenarnya telah mengambil kira representasi plaintif oleh itu tiada penafian peraturan keadilan asasi atau keadilan prosedur (lihat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 8 perenggan 31). (2) Plaintif telah diberikan peluang yang munasabah untuk didengar, menurut apa yang termaktub di dalam art 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan perintah am 26(4). Hak untuk didengar yang diberi oleh art 135(2) tidak perlukan untuk orang yang berkenaan diberikan perbicaraan secara ||Page 322>> lisan. Kegagalan untuk memberikan perbicaraan secara lisan kepada plaintif tidak mengakibatkan ketidakadilan prosedur (lihat perenggan-perenggan 39, 45 dan 46).]
Notes For cases on dismissal of a public servant, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 28–31. For cases on dismissal of a police officer, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1148–1174. For cases on disciplinary proceedings involving public servants, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1792–1798.
Cases referred to Ang Seng Wan v Suruhanjaya Polis Di Raja Malaysia & Anor [2002] 1 CLJ 493 (refd) B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (refd) Ganasan a/I Marimuthu v Public Services Commission [1998] 4 MLJ 280 (refd) Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniffbin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 11 (refd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/I K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 (refd) Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah b Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & 2 Ors [1995] 1 AMR 855 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 135(2) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 GO 26
Christopher Fernando (Aris Rizal Christopher Fernando & Co) for the plaintiff. Mahamad Naser bin Disa (Peguam Kanan Persekutuan) for the defendant.
[2005] 1 MLJ 399
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 9 SARAVANAN A/L KS SOMU v TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–5 OF 2004 BALIA YUSOF JC 10 DECEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Habeas corpus — Application for — Double jeopardy — Applicant already charged for allegation of facts contained in detention order — No conviction or acquittal based on charge — Whether doctrine of double jeopardy applied — Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime Ordinance) 1969 s 4(1)
Administrative Law — Remedies — Habeas corpus — Application for — Application of second limb to s 4(1) of Emergency Ordinance — Whether sub-limbs to second limb of s 4(1) were distinct — Whether failure of Minister to specify which sub-limb was applicable in detention order renders order bad in law — Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime Ordinance) 1969 s 4(1)
The applicant was detained pursuant to a detention order dated 12 August 2003 issued by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia (‘the Minister’) under s 4(1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (‘the Ordinance’). He applied for a writ of habeas corpus based on two grounds. On the first issue of double jeopardy, the applicant contended that the allegation of fact no 5 of the ‘Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta Yang Atasnya Perintah itu Diasaskan’ in the detention order which contained a charge which had already been preferred against him at the Johor Bahru Sessions Court, thus offending the doctrine of double jeopardy. The second ground of objection was that the Minister, in issuing the order, had acted arbitrarily and mechanically. The applicant contended that the detention order issued by the minister under the second limb of s 4(1) of the Ordinance must refer to only any one of the two sub-limbs, and not both as in this case. Since the detention order made against the applicant contained both the sub-limbs, the order was therefore defective and bad in law .
Held, dismissing the application for writ of habeas corpus: (1) The principle of double jeopardy could only apply where a person has earlier been acquitted or convicted and is charged again for the same offence. In the case of the applicant, he had neither been convicted nor acquitted of the offence for which he was charged at the Johor Bahru sessions court. In any event the acquittal of an accused person does not necessarily mean that he cannot be acting in a manner prejudicial to the purposes set out in s 4(1) of the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 10 Ordinance (see para 8). (2) There are two limbs to s 4(1) of the Ordinance. The two limbs are distinct and different from one another in its purpose as pronounced under the section. In so far as the second limb is concerned, the two ||Page 400>> sub-limbs are not distinct as in the case of the first and second limbs. The focus and intent of Parliament in the second limb of that section is solely the curtailment of violence as opposed to preservation of public order in the first limb. Seen in that light, thus the second limb of s 4(1) of the Ordinance has only one purpose and intent, namely the curtailment of violence although it is couched in the fashion of giving rise to two sub-limbs. On the close examination of the allegation of facts appended to the order, it was clear that the Minister applied his mind to those facts before making the order (see para 13).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah ditahan atas satu perintah penahanan yang bertarikh 12 Ogos 2003 yang dikeluarkan oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri di bawah s 4(1) Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Pencegahan Jenayah) 1969 (‘Ordinan tersebut’). Permohonan untuk writ habeas corpus berdasarkan dua sebab. Isu pertama adalah isu ‘double jeopardy’. Pemohon telah menentang tuduhan fakta no 5 ‘Pengataan-Pengataan Fakta Yang Atasnya Perintah Itu Diasaskan’ dalam perintah penahanan yang mengandungi dakwaan yang menentang pemohon di mahkamah sesyen Johor Bahru. Isu kedua bantahannya adalah Menteri mengeluarkan arahan secara timbang tara dan mekanikal. Pemohon telah menentang perintah penahanan yang dikeluarkan oleh Menteri di bawah Ordinan tersebut dengan menyatakan bahawa ia sepatutnya hanya merujuk kepada satu dari dua cabang s 4(1) dan bukan kedua duanya dalam kes ini. Oleh kerana perintah penahanan yang telah dibuat menentang pemohon mengandungi kedua dua cabang, perintah itu salah di sisi undang-undang.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan untuk writ habeas corpus: (1) ‘Double jeopardy’ hanya boleh digunakan di mana seseorang itu telah disabitkan bersalah atau dibebaskan pada awalnya dan didakwa sekali lagi untuk tuduhan yang sama. Dalam kes pemohon, dia tidak didakwa untuk kesalahan semasa di mahkamah sesyen Johor Bahru. Dalam keadaan pembebasan tertuduh tidak bermakna tertuduh tidak boleh bertindak dalam cara memudaratkan kepada tujuan yang dikeluarkan dalam s 4(1) Ordinan (lihat perenggan 8). (2) Terdapat dua cabang dalam s 4(1) Ordinan. Kedua-dua cabang adalah nyata dan berbeza dalam tujuan. Fokus Parlimen dalam cabang kedua adalah hanya untuk pengurangan keganasan dan bukan kepada pemeliharaan ketenteraman awan dalam cabang pertama. Oleh itu cabang kedua dari s 4(1) Ordinan hanya
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 11 ada satu tujuan iaitu pengurangan keganasan. Atas pemeriksaan teliti terhadap tuduhan fakta yang dilampirkan terhadap perintah, jelas bahawa Menteri telah meneliti fakta-fakta tersebut sebelum membuat perintah (lihat perenggan 13).] ||Page 401>>
Notes For cases on application for habeas corpus generally, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1727–1824. For cases on proper procedure for habeas corpus, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1803–1818.
Cases referred to A Chandra Segaran a/l Anggapa v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2002] 2 AMR 1917 (refd) Chia Khim Seng v Deputy Minister of Home Affairs [1997] 2 J Cr 279R v Miles[1980] 24 QBD 423 (refd) Henry a/l Arumanathan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [1994] MLJU 565 (refd) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor v Lee Gee Lan and another application [1993] 3 MLJ 673 (folld) Mok Han Liang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1996] 5 MLJ 74 (refd) R v Miles [1980] 24 QBD 423 (refd) Yeap Hock Seng v Minister For Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 (refd)
Legislation referred to Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969, s 4(1) Federal Consitution, art 7(2) Penal Code ss 34, 395
Najib bin Zakaria SFC (Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia) for the prosecution. Sundarajah (Sundarajah & Associates) for the accused.
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[2005] 1 MLJ 551
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 12 WONG CHIOU YONG (P) v PENDAFTAR BESAR/KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA
HIGH COURT (IPOH) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO 22–734 OF 2003 VT SINGHAM J 4 NOVEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration — Gender status — Application to amend or correct gender status stated in Birth Certificate and National Registration Identity Card — Sexual re-assignment surgery — Identity of persons having undergone sexual reassignment surgery — Whether to be accorded recognition as per current gender — Whether current indication of gender wrongly stated in National Registration Identity Card — Whether relevant particulars could be corrected — Whether gender status be maintained as originally stated in birth certificate and National Registration Identity Card — Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 s 27, National Registration Act 1959 s 6(2)(o), Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41 and 44
Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction of High Court — Application to amend or correct gender status stated in Birth Certificate and National Registration Identity Card — Identity of persons having undergone sexual reassignment surgery — Whether to be accorded recognition as per current gender — Whether court seized with jurisdiction to grant application — Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41 and 44
The applicant had undergone a sexual re-assignment surgery to change her gender from a female to male, the reason being that she had two sex organs. It is to be noted that her father had registered her as a female at the time of birth at the Registrar of Births. Subsequently, she applied to the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths to alter the birth register and the national registration identity card from female to male so as to indicate the post operative sex on the ground there was an error in the entry at the register book. When her application was refused, she applied to this court for declaration that she be accorded her current gender status, ie that of a male. The issues before this court were: (i) whether there was an error in the gender of the applicant as initially entered in the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card, and if so, what was the nature of the error; (ii) whether there was a mistake of fact as to the sex of the applicant and if it was made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical examinations, or whether the change of organs was by medical or surgical means; (iii) whether a person who had undergone a sex change operation could be regarded as belonging to the sex for which the reassignment surgery was undertaken for the purpose of correcting the registration of gender of the applicant on the Register of Births and the National Registration Identity
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 13 Card; (iv) whether the fact that the sex change operation was permitted, the change of particulars in the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card required the word “male” and “female” to be given the meaning and includes persons of reassigned sex although the original biological ||Page 552>> characteristics was female; (v) whether the reassignment surgery subsequent to the registration of the birth of the applicant and the issue of the National Registration Identity Card to the applicant based on the biological characteristics at the time of birth affects the true sex for the purpose of the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card; and (vi) whether the court has the power on the facts in the instant case to declare a female as male and consequently direct to alter or correct the Register of Births and the National Registration Identity Card on the ground that there was gender assignment surgery.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) There was no error in the sex of the applicant as initially entered in the Register of Births and the Birth Certificate, which was issued and accordingly in the National Registration Identity Card to come under sub-s 27(2) or (3) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’) or as envisaged under s 6(2)(o) of the National Registration Act 1959 (‘the 1959 Act’) (see para 21). (2) There was no mistake of fact as to the sex when it was registered under the 1957 Act and when the National Registration Identity Card was issued and it did not reveal that further medical examination showed there was a mistake as to the fact or in the substance at the time of the registration of the birth. In fact the change of organs on the applicant is by medical or surgical means and this is supported by the applicant’s own evidence (see para 21). (3) The person who has undergone a sex change operation could not be regarded as belonging to the sex for which reassignment surgery was undertaken for the purpose of correcting the registration of sex of the applicant on the Register of Births or the National Registration Identity Card which was already issued (see para 21). (4) The fact that the sex change operation was permitted, the change of particulars in the Birth Certificate and National Registration Identity Card did not require the word “male” and “female” to be given the meaning and it did not include persons of reassigned sex and contrary to the biological characteristics when the applicant was born (see para 21). (5) The reassignment surgery subsequent to the registration of the birth of the applicant immediately after the applicant’s birth and the issue of the National Registration Identity Card to the applicant did not affect the true gender status for the purpose of the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card, as the registration of the applicant’s sex at the time the National Registration Identity Card was issued in accordance with the original identity of the applicant at the time of the birth which was female and accordingly
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 14 registered in the Register of Births (see para 21). ||Page 553>> (6) Based on the facts, this court has no power to declare the applicant who was born as female as a “male” and consequently to direct the Registrar General to alter the Register of Births and the National Registration Identity Card pursuant to s 27(3) of the 1957 Act and s 6(2)(o) of the 1959 Act on the ground that there was gender reassignment surgery, in absence of sufficient supporting evidence. Accordingly, ss 41 and 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 did not assist the applicant (see para 21).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah menjalani pembedahan tukar jantina untuk menukar jantinanya dari perempuan ke lelaki, atas alasan dia mempunyai dua organ seksual. Harus diketahui bahawa bapanya telah mendaftarkannya sebagai perempuan pada masa kelahirannya kepada Pendaftar Kelahiran. Sejurus kemudian, dia telah memohon kepada Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian untuk mengubah daftar kelahiran dan kad pengenalannya daripada lelaki ke perempuan untuk menunjukkan jantina selepas pembedahan atas alasan terdapat kesilapan pada kemasukan di dalam buku pendaftaran. Apabila permohonannya ditolak, dia memohon ke mahkamah ini untuk deklarasi bahawa dia diberikan status jantinanya sekarang, iaitu sebagai seorang lelaki. Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah: (i) sama ada terdapat kesilapan dalam jantina pemohon seperti yang dimasukkan pada asalnya dalam sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan, dan sekiranya begitu, apakah sifat kesilapan tersebut; (ii) sama ada terdapat kesilapan fakta berkenaan jantina pemohon dan ia dibuat pada waktu kelahirannya dan kemudiannya ditunjukkan oleh pemeriksaan perubatan yang selanjutnya, atau sama ada penukaran organ adalah melalui kaedah perubatan atau pembedahan; (iii) sama ada seseorang yang telah menjalani pembedahan tukar jantina boleh dianggapkan sebagai tergolong di bawah jantina bagi sebab pembedahan itu dilakukan untuk tujuan membetulkan pendaftaran jantina pemohon pada Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan; (iv) sama ada fakta bahawa pembedahan tukar jantina itu dibenarkan, penukaran butir-butir di dalam sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan menghendaki perkataan “lelaki” atau “perempuan” diberikan makna dan ini termasuk orang-orang yang bertukar jantina walaupun sifat-sifat biologi asalnya adalah berupa perempuan; (v) sama ada pembedahan tukar jantina selepas pendaftaran kelahiran pemohon dan pengeluaran kad pengenalan kepadanya berasaskan sifat-sifat biologi pada masa kelahiran mempengaruhi jantina sebenar bagi tujuan sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan; dan (vi) sama ada mahkamah mempunyai kuasa berpandukan fakta-fakta kes semasa untuk mengisytiharkan seorang perempuan sebagai lelaki dan dengan itu memerintahkan untuk menukar atau membetulkan Daftar Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan atas alasan terdapat pembedahan tukar jantina. ||Page 554>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 15
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Tidak terdapat kesilapan dalam jantina pemohon seperti yang dimasukkan pada awalnya dalam Daftar Kelahiran dan Sijil Kelahiran tersebut, yang dikeluarkan dan berikutnya di dalam kad pengenalan untuk berada di bawah sub-s 27(2) dan (3) Akta Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kematian 1957 (‘Akta 1957’) atau seperti yang ternyata di bawah s 6(2)(o) Akta Pendaftaran Kebangsaan 1959 (‘Akta 1959’) (lihat perenggan 21). (2) Tidak terdapat kesilapan fakta mengenai jantina bila ia didaftarkan di bawah Akta 1957 dan apabila kad pengenalan dikeluarkan dan ia tidak memperlihatkan bahawa pemeriksaan perubatan yang selanjutnya menunjukkan bahawa terdapat kesilapan mengenai fakta atau pada amnya semasa pendaftaran kelahiran. Pada hakikatnya, penukaran organ ke atas pemohon adalah melalui kaedah perubatan dan pembedahan dan ini disokong oleh keterangan pemohon sendiri (lihat perenggan 21). (3) Seseorang yang telah menjalani pembedahan tukar jantina tidak boleh dianggapkan sebagai tergolong di bawah jantina atas sebab pembedahan itu dilakukan untuk tujuan membetulkan pendaftaran jantina pemohon pada Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan yang telah pun dikeluarkan (lihat perenggan 21). (4) Fakta bahawa pembedahan tukar jantina tersebut dibenarkan, penukaran butir-butir di dalam sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan tidak memerlukan perkataan “lelaki” atau “perempuan” diberikan makna dan ia tidak termasuk orang-orang yang bertukar jantina dan bertentangan dengan sifat-sifat biologi semasa dia dilahirkan (lihat perenggan 21). (5) Pembedahan tukar jantina selepas pendaftaran kelahiran pemohon yang dilakukan dengan segeranya selepas kelahiran pemohon dan pengeluaran kad pengenalan kepadanya tidak mempengaruhi status jantina sebenar bagi tujuan sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan, kerana pendaftaran jantina pemohon pada masa kad pengenalan dikeluarkan berpandukan identiti sebenar pemohon pada masa kelahiran yang mana adalah perempuan dan telah didaftarkan sebegitu di dalam Daftar Kelahiran (lihat perenggan 21). (6) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta, mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk mengisytiharkan pemohon yang telah dilahirkan sebagai perempuan sebagai seorang “lelaki” dan dengan itu untuk memerintahkan Pendaftar Besar untuk menukar Daftar Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan di bawah s 27(3) Akta 1957 dan s 6(2)(o) Akta 1959 atas alasan terdapat pembedahan tukar jantina, dengan ketiadaan keterangan sokong yang mencukupi. Dengan itu, ss 41 dan 44 Akta Relif Spesifik tidak membantu pemohon (lihat perenggan 21).]
Notes For cases on declarations, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 16 420–486 ||Page 555>> For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1684–1692 For jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [20.066]– [20.073]
Cases referred to Attorney-General for the Commonwealth & “Kevin and Jennifer” & Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1991] 2 FLR 492; [1993] 2 FCR 97; [1991] Fam Law 362 (distd) Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 All ER 593 (folld) Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] 2 WLR 513 (refd) C and D, Re [1979] 28 ALR 524 (refd) Cartledge & Ors v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 (refd) Corbette v Corbette [1970] 2 All ER 33 (folld) Corocraft Ltd & Anor v Pan American Airways Inc [1969] 1 QB 616 (refd) Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 (folld) Guaranty Trust Company of New York v Hannay and Company (1915) 2 KB 536 (refd) Harnett v Fisher [1927] 1 KB 402 (refd) Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan & Anor Appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Ikebife Ibeneweka & Ors v Peter Egbuna & Anor [1964] 1 WLR 219 (refd) In re S(Minors) (Careorder: Implementation Of Careplan) [2002] 2 AC 291 (refd) Julius v Bishop Of Oxford (1880) 5 App Cas 214 (refd) Karpal Singh & Anor v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 544 (refd) Koon Hoi Chow v Pretam Singh [1972] 1 MLJ 180 (folld) Kuala Lumpur, Klang & Port Swettenham Omnibus Co Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1971] 1 MLJ 102 (refd) Lee Boon Tuan v PP [1960] 26 MLJ 179 (refd) Letchumanan Nagappan v Nadarajah [1993] 4 CLJ 253 (refd) Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming Eric [1992] 1 SLR 184 (distd) Loh Wai Kong v Government Of Malaysia & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 175 (folld) Maryon-Wilson’s Will Trusts, Re [1968] Ch 268 (refd) Mohamed Noor Bin Othman & Ors v Mohamed Ismail Bin Haji Ibrahim & Ors [1998] 3 MLJ 82 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 17 MT v JT 355 A 2d 204 [1976] (refd) P and G (Transsexuals), Re [1996] 2 FLR 90 (refd) Padfield And Others v Minister Of Agriculture, Fisheries And Food And Others [1968] AC 997 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court Of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) R v Cogley [1989] 31 Crim R 198 (refd) R v Harris And Mcguiness [1988] 17 NSWLR 158 (refd) R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex parte A, D and G [2000] 1 WLR 977 (refd) Re T [1975] 2 NZLR 449 (refd) ||Page 556>> Rees v United Kingdom [1987] Family Law 157 (refd) Richardson v Bardenhagen Enterprise Pty Ltd [1971] Tas SR 307 (refd) Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] 118 ALR 467 (refd) Sheffield And Horsham v UK [1998] 2 FLR 928 (refd) Siskina (Cargo Owners) v Disstoss SA [1979] AC 210 (refd) Sundralingam v Ramanathan Chettiar [1967] 2 MLJ 211 (folld) Teh Hon Kam @ Teh Ywai Chong (P) Originating Summons No 24–595 of 2002 (distd) The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth & “Kevin and Jennifer” & Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2003] FamCA 94 (refd) The King v Banbury I AD & E 136 1159 (refd) Thein Tham Sang v United States Army Medical Research Unit & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 97 (refd) W v W [1976] 2 SALR 310 (refd) Warburton v Loveland (1831) 2 D & CL (HL) 480 (refd) Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] All ER (D) 187 (refd) Workon Sdn Bhd v The Director Of Lands And Surveys, Sabah [1999] 4 MLJ 177 (folld)
Legislation referred to Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 ss 7, 27, (1), (2), (3) Births and Deaths Regulation Rules 1958 r 3 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 [NSW] s 32B Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25 Family Law Act 1975 [Aust] s 113
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 18 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 [Aust] s 47(1) Marriage Act 1971 [Aust] National Registration Act 1959 (Revised 1972) s 6(2)(o) National Registration Regulations 1990 r 18 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 [Aust] Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41, 44
Mohamad Asri Othman (Asri Chek Ming & Co) for the applicant Mohamad Abazafree Mohd Abbas SFC (Ministry of Home Affairs) for the respondent
[2005] 2 MLJ 25 FATIMAH BTE SIHI & ORS v MEOR ATIQULRAHMAN BIN ISHAK & ORS (MINORS, SUING THROUGH SYED AHMAD JOHARI BIN SYED MOHD)
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 01–76 OF 1999 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ AND MOHD GHAZALI JJCA 11 DECEMBER 2004
Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Right to wear serban in school — Whether an integral part of religion of Islam — Whether sufficient evidence adduced to justify such an act — Refusal by school principal to allow students to wear a serban in school — Students expelled after insisting to do so — Whether a violation of right to profess and practise religion of Islam — School uniform — Appropriateness — Whether a matter within discretion of educational institution —Federal Constitution Art 11
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Disciplinary action — Refusal by school principal to allow students to wear a serban in school — Students expelled after insisting to do so — Whether a violation of right to profess and practise religion of Islam — School uniform — Appropriateness — Whether a matter within discretion of educational institution
The first appellant was the principal of a public school attended by the three respondents. She had disallowed the respondents from coming to school dressed in a serban. When the respondents insisted, she expelled them. Dissatisfied, the respondents commenced an action against the appellants, seeking to restore their status as pupils of the said school. They contended that as Muslims, their fundamental right of freedom of
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 19 religion guaranteed by Art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution had been infringed because they had been prevented from entering school wearing a serban which is part of their religious right. The High Court judge allowed the respondents’ application. Hence, this appeal by the appellants. The main issue before this court was whether the right to wear a serban is an integral part of the religion of Islam.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Whether the wearing of a serban forms an integral part of the religion of Islam involves a question of evidence and it was for the respondents to adduce sufficient relevant admissible material to prove that the wearing of a serban was mandatory in Islam. This, they failed to do. However, it was in evidence that merely, it was permissible for a male Muslim to wear a serban (see paras 10–11). (2) At common law, every educational institution is entitled to prescribe the appropriate uniform that is to be worn by its pupils and maintain discipline. The court is ill-equipped to enter into such issues save where ||Page 26>> there is plainly a duty to act fairly and that duty is breached. Each case depends on its own facts and it is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to lay down any fixed principle that is meant to govern all cases. Where observances as to dress, food, ceremonies and modes of worship are regarded as integral parts of a religion, and these are denied by State action, then and then only could a complaint under Art 11(1) legitimately be made (see paras 12–14).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu pertama merupakan pengetua sekolah kerajaan yang dihadiri oleh ketiga-tiga responden. Dia telah melarang responden-responden daripada hadir ke sekolah memakai serban. Bilamana responden-responden berkeras untuk berbuat begitu, mereka dibuang sekolah. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, pihak responden telah memulakan tindakan terhadap pihak perayu, dalam usaha mereka untuk mendapatkan kembali status mereka sebagai pelajar sekolah tersebut. Mereka menghujah bahawa sebagai orang Muslim, hak asasi kebebasan agama mereka yang diperuntukkan oleh Art 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, telah dilanggar oleh sebab mereka telah dihalang daripada memasuki sekolah dengan memakai serban yang merupakan sebahagian daripada hak agama mereka. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan permohonan pihak responden. Maka, rayuan ini oleh pihak perayu. Isu utama di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada hak untuk memakai serban merupakan suatu keperluan di dalam agama Islam.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 20 Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Sama ada pemakaian serban termasuk sebagai suatu aspek yang wajib di dalam agama Islam melibatkan persoalan keterangan dan pihak responden seharusnya memajukan material untuk membuktikan bahawa pemakaian serban adalah mandatori di sisi agama Islam. Ini tidak dibuat oleh mereka. Sebaliknya, terdapat bukti bahawa pemakaian serban oleh seorang lelaki Muslim bukan suatu perkara yang diwajibkan (lihat perenggan 10–11). (2) Di bawah common law, setiap institusi pengajian dibenarkan menentukan pakaian seragam yang sesuai dipakai oleh murid-muridnya dan mengekalkan disiplin. Mahkamah tidak berupaya untuk melibatkan diri di dalam isu-isu tersebut melainkan terdapat kewajipan untuk berlaku secara adil dan kewajipan tersebut dilanggar. Setiap kes bergantung pada faktanya sendiri dan adalah tidak munasabah atau dihasratkan untuk mencuba menetapkan apa-apa prinsip yang merangkumi semua keadaan. Di mana amalan berkenaan dengan pakaian, makanan, adat-istiadat dan cara-cara untuk bersembahyang dianggapkan sebagai keperluan asas sesuatu agama, dan ||Page 27>> ia telah dilarang oleh tindakan Kerajaan, maka pada ketika itulah suatu aduan boleh dibuat dengan sah di bawah Art 11(1) (lihat perenggan 12–14).]
Notes For cases involving expulsion of students from school, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 745–747 For cases on exercise of administrative powers, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 28–90 For cases on freedom of religion, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1257–1263 For freedom of religion, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (1999) paras [20.189]– [20.191]
Cases referred to Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadishwaranada Avadhuta [2004] 2 LRI 39 (refd) Hajjah Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (refd) Javed v State of Haryana AIR 2003 SC 3057 (refd) Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Lain-lain lwn Fatimah binti Sihi & Lain-lain [2000] 5 MLJ 375 (overd) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853 (refd) The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 21 Swamiar AIR 1954 S C 282 (refd)
Legislation referred to Constitution of India [India] Arts 25, 26 Federal Constitution Art 11(1), (4)
Abdul Rahim bin Uda SFC (AG’s Chambers) for the appellants Mohd Hanipa Maidin (Abdullah Abd Karim with him) (Mohamed Hanipa & Associates) for the respondents
Appeal from: Civil Suit No 22–13 of 1998 High Court (Seremban)
[2005] 2 MLJ 252 MATTHIAS CHANG v THE DISTRICT GRAND LODGE OF THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO (SUED BY ITS DISTRICT GRAND MASTER JOSEPH WILLIAM YEE EU) AND ORS
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–Q2–25 OF 1998 PS GILL, RAHMAH HUSSAIN FCJJ AND MOKHTAR SIDIN JCA 23 DECEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration — Applicant a member of a registered society — Notice indicating intention to relinquish membership given to court — Whether renders further hearing of matter an academic exercise
The appellant and the second-sixth respondents were members of a Fraternity known as the Freemasons, which conducted its activities through the first respondent. The appellant had sought for certain declarations in the High Court against the respondents on the ground that they had pursued a course of action against him which was contrary to the rules of natural justice. The High Court dismissed his application and hence this appeal. Prior to the hearing of this appeal, the appellant filed a notice a motion vide encl 9 and in the affidavit in support had stated, inter alia, at para 7, that he did not intend to retain his membership in the said Fraternity. The issue before this court was whether determining this appeal would be an academic exercise in light of that statement made in para 7.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 22 With reference to the appellant’s sworn statement in the affidavit in support of encl 9, it was concluded that the appellant had no desire to retain his membership in the said Freemasons Lodge and had decided to pursue this appeal as a form of vindication for himself against the acts of the Committee of Inquiry of the Freemasons Lodge. Accordingly, he could no longer be the recipient of any benefit of any of the declarations sought. Although the grant of declaratory continues to remain a useful remedy granted by court in appropriate cases, it remains a discretionary remedy (see paras 13, 17 and 19).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu dan responden kedua sehingga ke-enam adalah ahli-ahli kepada suatu Fraternity yang dikenali sebagai Freemasons, yang mengendalikan aktiviti-aktivitinya melalui responden pertama. Perayu telah memohon untuk beberapa deklarasi di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap pihak responden atas alasan mereka telah melaksanakan suatu siri tindakan yang bertentangan dengan rukun keadilan asasi. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonannya, dan maka rayuan ini. Sebelum rayuan ini dibicarakan, perayu telah memfailkan suatu notis usul melalui lampiran 9 dan di dalam afidavit sokongannya telah menyatakan, antara ||Page 253>> lain, pada perenggan 7, bahawa dia tidak ada niat untuk mengekalkan keahliannya di dalam Fraternity tersebut. Isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada membicarakan rayuan ini akan menjadi suatu latihan akademik melihat kepada pernyataan berkenaan yang dibuat di perenggan 7.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: Merujuk kepada pernyataan bersumpah perayu di dalam afidavit sokongan kepada lampiran 9, telah diputuskan bahawa perayu tidak berhasrat untuk mengekalkan keahliannya di dalam Freemasons Lodge dan telah menetapkan untuk memajukan rayuan ini sebagai suatu cara untuk menjustifikasikan dirinya terhadap tindakan jawatankuasa siasatan Freemasons Lodge. Maka dengan itu, dia tidak boleh lagi menjadi penerima kepada apa-apa manfaat di bawah perintah deklarasi yang dipohon olehnya. Walaupun pemberian relif deklarasi terus wujud sebagai suatu remedi yang berguna yang diberikan oleh mahkamah di dalam kes-kes yang sesuai, ia adalah suatu remedi yang mengikut budi bicara (lihat perenggan 13, 17 dan 19).]
Notes For cases on declaration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 420–486. For cases on application for declaration, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1947–1963. For declarations, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2001) paras [160.166]– [160.168].
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 23
Cases referred to Ainsbury v Mlllington [1987] 1 All ER 929 (refd) Datuk Syed Kecik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor v Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & Ors and Another Application[1997] 1 MLJ 257 (refd) Loknath Padhan v Birendra Kumar Sahu AIR 1974 505 (refd) Matthias Chang v The District Grand Lodge of the Eastern Archipelago & Ors [1998] MLJU 273 (refd) Matthias Chang Wen Chieh v Joseph William Yee Eu & Anor [1997] 5 MLJ 727 (refd) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Karpal Singh [1992] 1 MLJ 147 (refd) Mohamed Noor bin Othman & Ors v Haji Mohamed Ismail bin Haji Ibrahim & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 82 (refd) Raphael Pura v Insas Bhd v Anor [2003] 1 MLJ 513 (refd) Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v Jervis [1994] 1 All ER 469 (refd) Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat v Mohamed bin Ismail [1982] 2 MLJ 177 (refd)
Appeal from: Originating Summons No R2–24–26 of 1997 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) ||Page 254>>
Dato’ Cecil Abraham (Lorraine Cheah with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the first– third respondents DP Naban (BH Yap with him) (Lee Hishamuddin) for the 4th–6th respondents Zainur Zakaria (Neoh Poh Cheng with him) (Zainur Zakaria & Co) for the appellant
[2005] 2 MLJ 269 REKAPACIFIC BHD v SECURITIES COMMISSION & ANOR AND OTHER APPEALS
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NOS W–02–845 OF 2002, W–04–151 OF 2002 AND W–02–231 OF 2003 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ MOHAMAD AND MOHD GHAZALI JJCA 27 NOVEMBER 2004
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 24 Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Discovery — Circumstances where discovery should be allowed in application for judicial review — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 6
Civil Procedure — Stay of proceedings — Stay pending appeal — Whether applicant would suffer irreparable harm through delisting of company if stay not granted
Rekapacific, a public listed company, was de-listed by the Stock Exchange (‘the second respondent in the first two appeals’) for alleged breaches of listing rules. It appealed unsuccessfully to the committee of the Stock Exchange and the Securities Commission (‘the first respondent in the first two appeals’). Rekapacific then took out an application for judicial review. In the course of the proceedings it applied for discovery of documents and later to interrogate the respondents and to cross-examine the deponents of affidavits delivered in opposition to the application for judicial review. The High Court refused both applications and Rekapacific appealed (‘the first and second appeals’). The High Court then granted a stay of the judicial review proceedings pending the first two appeals and the second respondent appealed (‘the third appeal’).
Held, dismissing the first and second appeals and allowing the third appeal: (1) Rule 6 of the new O 53 that permits discovery and cross-examination are new enabling provisions. As a matter of procedural history, certiorari and the other prerogative remedies were proceedings on the Crown side of the Queen’s Bench Division and were not therefore civil proceedings. The consequence was that at common law, discovery, whether of documents or by way of interrogatories were procedurally not available in an application for prerogative remedies (see para 4). (2) It was only in very rare cases that either cross-examination or discovery or both should be permitted in judicial review proceedings. This was because questions of fact were rarely in dispute in judicial review proceedings (see para 5). (3) The only expressly recognised exceptions to this were alleged procedural unfairness or a breach of natural justice; O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 followed. Upon general principles, discovery should not be ordered unless and until the court was satisfied that the evidence reveals reasonable ||Page 270>> grounds for believing that there had been a breach of public duty; and it should be limited strictly to documents relevant to the issue which emerges from the affidavits (see para 10); Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 followed. (4) Since all relevant material based on which the Stock Exchange arrived at its decision was already with Rekapacific, there was therefore no necessity to order discovery. Second, the further material of which Rekapacific required the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 25 Stock Exchange to make discovery related to other companies which were on an objective view of the matter wholly irrelevant to Rekapacific’s application for judicial review. Third, it was clear from the passage in the judgment of the trial judge that he adopted the approach recommended by the English authorities when exercising his discretion whether to grant or to refuse the appellant’s applications. In these circumstances there was no appealable error in the way in which discretion was exercised. Also, in appeals of this sort, the initial jurisdiction of this court was one of review only and that the court do not have an independent discretion of its own to exercise. It was only after an appellant had established a case for appellate correction that this court became entitled to exercise an independent discretion. That was certainly not the case here. The first and second appeals therefore fail (see para 12). (5) As regards the third appeal, the judge had misunderstood the nature of the order he was asked to make. He was of the opinion that if a stay of the judicial review proceedings were not granted then Rekapacific would suffer injury through de-listing, which had been stayed pending disposal of the proceedings. But it was not the case of Rekapacific that it would suffer irreparable harm if a stay were not granted. Further, the de-listing of Rekapacific which would take effect if and when it fails in those proceedings would cause it or its shareholders no harm in real terms as it was plainly insolvent. The trial judge was therefore plainly wrong in directing a stay (see para 13).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Rekapacific, satu syarikat senarai awam, telah disingkirkan dari senarai oleh Bursa Saham (‘responden kedua di dalam kedua-dua rayuan yang pertama’) perlanggaran peraturan penyenaraian. Ia telah gagal di dalam rayuannya kepada Jawatankuasa Bursa Saham dan Suruhanjaya Sekuriti (‘responden pertama di dalam kedua-dua rayuan yang pertama’). Rekapacific kemudiannya telah membuat permohonan untuk kajian semula kehakiman. Semasa prosiding ia telah memohon untuk penemuan dokumen-dokumen dan kemudiannya menyoal siasat responden-responden dan memeriksa balas deponen kepada afidavit-afidavit yang diserahkan sebagai bantahan kepada permohonan untuk kajian ||Page 271>> semula kehakiman. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak kedua-dua permohonan dan Rekapacific telah merayu (‘rayuan pertama dan kedua’). Mahkamah Tinggi kemudiannya telah membenarkan penggantungan kepada prosiding kajian semula kehakiman sementara menunggu kedua-dua rayuan pertama dan responden kedua telah merayu (‘rayuan ketiga’).
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan pertama dan kedua dan membenarkan rayuan ketiga: (1) Kaedah 6 kepada A 53 yang baru membenarkan penemuan dan pemeriksaan balas adalah merupakan suatu peruntukan baru yang memberi bidang kuasa.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 26 Menurut common law, penemuan, sama ada melalui dokumen-dokumen atau interogatori secara prosedurnya adalah tidak didapati di dalam permohonan untuk remedi-remedi yang prerogatif (lihat perenggan 4). (2) Pemeriksaan balas atau penemuan, atau kedua-duanya, adalah jarang dibenarkan di dalam prosiding untuk kajian semula kehakiman. Ini disebabkan persoalan fakta jarang dipertikaikan di dalam prosiding untuk kajian semula kehakiman (lihat perenggan 5). (3) Satu-satunya pengecualian yang diiktiraf di dalam perkara ini adalah ketidakadilan prosedur atau suatu perlanggaran keadilan asasi; O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 diikut. Menurut prinsip-prinsip am, penemuan tidak boleh diarahkan kecuali atau sehingga mahkamah berpuas-hati bahawa keterangan menunjukkan alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai bahawa terdapatnya perlanggaran kepada kewajipan awam, ia sepatutnya terbatas hanya kepada dokumen-dokumen yang relevan kepada isu yang timbul daripada afidavit (lihat perenggan 10); Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 diikut. (4) Memandangkan kesemua material yang relevan di mana Bursa Saham telah mencapai keputusan ada bersama Rekapacific, tiada keperluan untuk memerintahkan penemuan. Kedua, material yang seterusnya di mana Rekapacific menghendaki Bursa Saham untuk membuat penemuan berkaitan dengan syarikat-syarikat lain yang merupakan pandangan objektif perkara itu adalah tidak relevan secara keseluruhannya kepada permohonan Rekapacific untuk kajian semula kehakiman. Ketiga, adalah jelas perenggan di dalam keputusan hakim bicara bahawa dia telah mengambil pendekatan yang disyorkan oleh autoriti undang-undang Inggeris di dalam menggunakan budi bicaranya sama ada untuk membenarkan atau menolak permohonan-permohonan perayu. Di dalam keadaan ini, tidak terdapat sebarang kesilapan yang boleh dirayu berkenaan cara di mana budi bicara telah digunakan. Juga, di dalam rayuan-rayuan sebegini, bidang kuasa awal mahkamah ini adalah suatu kajian semula sahaja dan mahkamah tidak mempunyai budi bicara yang bebas untuk digunakan. Hanyalah selepas perayu telah membuktikan suatu kes untuk pembetulan rayuan mahkamah ||Page 272>> ini berhak untuk menggunakan budi bicara yang bebas. Itu bukan merupakan kesnya di sini. Oleh yang demikian, rayuan pertama dan kedua adalah gagal (lihat perenggan 12). (5) Berkenaan rayuan ketiga, hakim bicara tersalah faham sifat arahan yang beliau telah diminta untuk membuatnya. Dia telah berpendapat bahawa sekiranya penggantungan kepada prosiding kajian semula kehakiman tidak diberikan Rekapacific akan mengalami kemudaratan melalui penyingkiran daripada penyenaraian, yang digantung sehingga selesainya prosiding. Tetapi itu bukanlah merupakan kes kepada Rekapacific di mana ia akan mengalami kerugian yang tidak dapat dipulihkan sekiranya penggantungan tidak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 27 dibenarkan. Seterusnya, penyingkiran daripada penyenaraian oleh Rekapacific yang hanya bermula sekiranya dan apabila ia gagal di dalam prosiding tersebut tidak menyebabkan kerugian kepada pemegang-pemegang sahamnya di dalam erti kata sebenar kerana ia adalah jelas tidak berupaya membayar hutang. Oleh itu hakim bicara adalah jelas salah di dalam mengarahkan penggantungan (lihat perenggan 13).]
Notes For cases on application for judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 162–164. For cases on stay of proceedings pending appeal, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 5582–5586. For stay of court proceedings, see 13 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [220.019]– [220.041].
Cases referred to Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18 (refd) Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 (folld) O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (folld) Pahang South Union Omnibus Co Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 199 (refd)
Legislation referred to Government Proceedings Act 1956 s 2 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 6
Appeal from Judicial Revision No R2–34–135 of 2001 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Richard Yeoh with him) (Ranjit Ooi & Robert Low) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No W–02–845 of 2002 and W–04–151 of 2002 and, for the respondent in Civil Appeal No W–02–23 of 2003 ||Page 273>> N Navaratnam (Brendan Siva and Selena Chow with him) (Kadir Andri Aidham & Partners) for the second respondent in Civil Appeal No W–02–845 of 2002 and W– 04–151 of 2002 and, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No W–02–23 of 2003. Tommy Thomas (Tommy Thomas) for the first respondent in Civil Appeal No W–02–845 of 2002 and W–04–151 of 2002.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 28
[2005] 2 MLJ 493 LAM ENG RUBBER FACTORY (M) SDN BHD v PENGARAH ALAM SEKITAR, NEGERI KEDAH DAN PERLIS & ANOR
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO K–01–44 OF 1995 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ AND MOHD GHAZALI JJCA 23 NOVEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Licence — Application for licence refused based on non-conversion of land use — Ground for refusal had no basis — Subsequent refusal of licence based on different grounds — Whether legitimate expectation that licence will be granted — Whether discretion exercised unfairly
Environmental Law — Environmental Quality Act — Application for licence — Licence refused based on non-conversion of land use — Ground for refusal had no basis — Subsequent refusal of licence based on different grounds — Whether legitimate expectation that licence will be granted — Whether discretion exercised unfairly
Environmental Law — Environmental Quality Act — Appeal Board — Appeal against refusal to grant licence dealt with by State Director instead of Appeal Board — Whether ultra vires Act
The appellant operated a rubber factory in Sungai Petani, Kedah since 1940. In November 1993, the appellant applied for the licence from the Department of Environment, Kedah. The first respondent, the director of environment for Kedah and Perlis responded in mid-February 1994, saying that the appellant’s land had not been converted from agriculture to industry and for that reason the appellant’s application for a licence could not be considered. In actual fact, an earlier court judgment of KC Vohrah J between the appellant and the state director, Kedah and the land administrator, Kuala Muda, Sungai Petani, Kedah had held that the appellant had not infringed the condition of the issue document of title to their land — therefore, there was no necessity for the appellant to apply for a change of land user. After some correspondence and a reminder from the appellant, the department did not respond further. The following year, the appellant applied for the licence for 1995. Its application was refused, the reason given was that the area surrounding the factory had become a residential area and it was unsuitable for the appellant to carry on operations there. The appellant was dissatisfied and appealed to the Appeal Board created by the Enviroment Quality Act 1974 (‘the EQA’). However, its appeal was purportedly refused by the first respondent. The appellant accordingly moved to the High Court for certiorari to quash the first respondent’s decision. Its application failed. The High
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 29 Court held that since the appellant had no licence for the year 1994 they had carried on their factory illegally and had no legitimate expectation to have a licence for 1995. ||Page 494>>
Held, allowing the appeal with costs, remitting the appeal to the Appeal Board and setting aside the orders of the High Court): (1) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, Mohd Ghazali JCA concurring) In the first place, it was the wrongful conduct of the first respondent that led to the appellant having had no licence for 1994. The first respondent had told the appellant that the licence for 1994 was not forthcoming unless the condition of land use was altered. That objection was of no consequence in the light of KC Vohrah J’s ruling. So the appellant was legitimately entitled to have the licence issued to it (see para 4). (2) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, Mohd Ghazali JCA concurring) Parliament had conferred upon the first respondent the discretion to decide whether to issue the licence or not. But the law requires him to exercise this power or discretion fairly, justly and without misdirecting himself on the law or the facts (see para 5); Savrimuthu v Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 MLJ 173 and Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 followed. Any reasonable man in the appellant’s shoes would have been led by the words and conduct of the first respondent to believe that the 1994 licence would be issued once the problem about the condition in the title to the land had been resolved. As for conduct, he accepted the payment made by the appellant and also did not respond at all to the appellant’s reminder. Then at the hearing came the suggestion that the appellant was not entitled to relief because it carried out its operations in 1994 without a licence. There was a smacking of unfairness and injustice in administration (see para 9). (3) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, Mohd Ghazali JCA concurring) The EQA had vested the appellate power in the Appeal Board: not in the first respondent (see para 3). The first respondent had no jurisdiction whatsoever to deal with the appellant’s appeal. His act in dealing and refusing the appeal was ultra vires the EQA (see para 13). (4) (per Abdul Aziz JCA) The only issue that the court had to decide was whether the decision of the first respondent that the appeal could not be considered was lawful. The decision was obviously unlawful. The appellant’s appeal being a matter within the jurisdiction of the Appeal Board, it was not for the first respondent to decide that the appeal could not be considered. It was for the Appeal Board to decide the fate of the appeal (see para 18). (5) (per Abdul Aziz JCA, dissenting) Other matters that had been submitted on in the appeal before the court, which turned on the question whether it was correct that as the learned judge held, the appellants had not been issued a licence for the previous period of 1 April 1994 to March 1995 and therefore
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 30 there was no licence to renew and also because in that period the appellant had been operating illegally since they had no license, and ||Page 495>> which included the question of who was at fault in the appellant’s not being able to obtain licence for that period, were not matters that the court needed to decide. They were matters that may be relevant to the appeal to the Appeal Board and that the Appeal Board may have to consider, the court should refrain from expressing any views about them (see para 19).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu mengendalikan sebuah kilang getah di Sungai Petani, Kedah semenjak 1940. Dalam bulan November 1993, perayu memohon lesen dari Jabatan Alam Sekitar, Kedah. Responden pertama, pengarah alam sekitar untuk Kedah dan Perlis membalas dalam pertengahan bulan Februari 1994, dan menyatakan yang tanah perayu belum ditukar dari pertanian kepada perusahaan dan dari itu, permohonan perayu untuk lesen tidak dapat dipertimbangkan. Pada fakta sebenar, penghakiman terdahulu yang dibuat oleh KC Vohrah H di antara perayu dan pengarah negeri, Kedah dan pentadbir tanah, Kuala Muda, Sungai Petani, Kedah telah memutuskan bahawa perayu tidak melanggar syarat dokumen hak milik keluaran tanah mereka — dari itu, adalah tidak perlu untuk perayu memohon pertukaran kegunaan tanah. Selepas beberapa pertukaran surat menyurat dan satu peringatan dari perayu, jabatan tersebut tidak memberi maklum balas langsung. Tahun berikutnya, perayu memohon untuk lesen untuk tahun 1995. Permohonan tersebut ditolak, alasan yang diberikan ialah kawasan sekitar kilang tersebut telah menjadi kawasan perumahan dan ianya tidak sesuai bagi perayu mengendalikan operasinya di sana. Perayu tidak berpuas hati dan merayu ke lembaga rayuan yang ditubuhkan oleh Akta Kualiti Alam Sekitar 1974 (‘AKAS’). Walau bagaimanapun, rayuannya ditolak oleh responden pertama. Perayu dengan itu memohon Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan responden pertama. Permohonan tersebut gagal. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan, oleh kerana perayu tidak mempunyai lesen untuk tahun 1994 mereka telah mengendalikan kilangnya secara haram dan tidak mempunyai harapan yang sah untuk mendapat lesen untuk tahun 1995.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos, meremitkan rayuan ke Lembaga Rayuan dan mengetepikan perintah-perintah Mahkamah Tinggi: (1) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR, Mohd Ghazali HMR bersetuju) Pertamanya, ianya merupakan salah laku responden pertama yang menyebabkan perayu tidak mempunyai lesen untuk tahun 1994. Responden pertama telah memberitahu perayu bahawa lesen untuk tahun 1994 tidak dikeluarkan sehingga syarat guna tanah diubah. Bantahan tersebut tidak mempunyai kesan berikutan keputusan KC Vohrah H. Dari itu, perayu berhak di sisi undang-undang mendapat lesen dikeluarkan kepadanya (lihat perenggan 4).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 31 (2) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR, Mohd Ghazali HMR bersetuju) Parlimen telah memberikan kepada responden pertama budi bicara untuk memutuskan ||Page 496>> sama ada untuk mengeluarkan lesen atau tidak. Akan tetapi undang-undang memerlukannya menggunakan kuasa tersebut atau budi bicara tersebut secara adil dan saksama dan tanpa salah arah mengenai undang-undang atau fakta-fakta (lihat perenggan 5); Savrimuthu v Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 MLJ 173 dan Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 diikut. Mana-mana orang waras dalam keadaan perayu disebabkan oleh perkataan dan perlakuan responden pertama akan mempercayai bahawa lesen untuk tahun 1994 akan dikeluarkan setelah masalah mengenai syarat dalam hak milik tanah tersebut diselesaikan. Berkenaan dengan perlakuan, beliau menerima bayaran yang dibuat oleh perayu dan tidak memberi sebarang maklum balas kepada peringatan yang dibuat oleh perayu. Kemudian semasa perbicaraan terdapat cadangan bahawa perayu tidak berhak untuk relief kerana ia mengendalikan operasinya di dalam tahun 1994 tanpa lesen. Ini merupakan satu ketidakadilan dalam pentadbiran (lihat perenggan 9). (3) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR, Mohd Ghazali HMR bersetuju) AKAS telah meletak hak kuasa rayuan pada lembaga rayuan: bukan pada responden pertama (lihat perenggan 3). Responden pertama tidak mempunyai sebarang bidang kuasa untuk berurusan dengan rayuan perayu-perayu. Tindakannya untuk berurusan dan menolak rayuan tersebut adalah ultra vires AKAS (lihat perenggan 13). (4) (oleh Abdul Aziz HMR) Satu-satunya isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada keputusan responden pertama yang memutuskan bahawa rayuan tersebut tidak boleh dipertimbangkan adalah sah. Keputusan tersebut jelasnya tidak sah. Rayuan perayu-perayu adalah di dalam bidang kuasa Lembaga Rayuan, ianya bukan untuk responden pertama memutuskan sama ada rayuan tersebut tidak boleh dipertimbangkan. Ianya adalah untuk Lembaga Rayuan memutuskan nasib rayuan tersebut (lihat perenggan 18). (5) (oleh Abdul Aziz HMR menentang) Perkara-perkara lain yang dihujahkan semasa rayuan di hadapan mahkamah, yang menyoal kesahihan keputusan yang arif hakim yang memutuskan bahawa oleh kerana perayu tidak diberikan lesen untuk jangka masa terdahulu iaitu dari 1 April 1994 ke Mac 1995 maka tidak terdapat lesen untuk diperbaharui dan dari itu juga dalam jangka masa tersebut perayu telah beroperasi secara haram kerana mereka tidak mempunyai lesen, dan juga persoalan siapakah yang bersalah kerana perayu tidak dapat memperoleh lesen dalam tempoh tersebut, bukanlah perkara yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah; kerana ia merupakan perkara-perkara yang mungkin relevan untuk rayuan kepada Lembaga Rayuan dan yang mungkin akan dipertimbangkan oleh Lembaga Rayuan, mahkamah patut dihalang dari memberikan apa-apa pandangan mengenainya (lihat perenggan 19).] ||Page 497>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 32 Notes For cases on Enviromental Quality Act generally, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) paras 2266–2268. For cases on exercise of administrative powers, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 8.
Cases referred to Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (folld) Malayan Banking Bhd v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 204 (refd) Menteri Sumber Manusia v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia [1999] 2 MLJ 337 (refd) Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (folld) Savrimuthu v Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 MLJ 173 (folld)
Legislation referred to Environmental Quality Act 1974 ss 18, (1), 35(1)(a), 36
Appeal from Originating Motion No 25–11 of 1995 (High Court, Alor Setar)
Ghazi Ishak (B Jayasingam with him) (Ghazi & Lim) for the appellant. Suzana Atan (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents.
[2005] 2 MLJ 555 SHAHARUDDIN BIN ALI & ANOR v SUPERINTENDENT OF LANDS AND SURVEYS KUCHING DIVISION & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUCHING) — SUIT NO 22–142 OF 2002–I CLEMENT SKINNER J 25 AUGUST 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration — Native customary rights — Plaintiffs seeking to set aside minister’s direction — Whether matter should be resolved through judicial review under O 53 of the Rules of the High Court and not by seeking private law remedies
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 33 Civil Procedure — Striking out — Abuse of process of court — Whether plaintiffs’ application for declaration an abuse of court
Pursuant to s 5(3) and (4) of the Sarawak Land Code, the Minister of Planning and Resource Management (‘the Minister’) issued a direction that by virtue of a notification appearing in the Government Gazette dated 14 November 2001 being the Land (Native Customary Rights) (No 143) 2001 Direction (‘the direction’), all native customary rights over certain areas of land situated between Loba Rambungan and Kubah National Park containing approximately 23.06 hectares, were extinguished. The plaintiffs claimed to have acquired their native customary rights to the said lands through sale transactions entered into between them and persons who allegedly ‘owned’ those native customary rights or whose relatives had purportedly acquired such rights by cultivating the said lands before the year 1958. The plaintiff proceeded to submit their claims for compensation to the first defendant who notified them that all their claims for compensation had been rejected, and that they were entitled to refer the matter for arbitration under s 212 of the Land Code if they were dissatisfied with his decision. Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs applied to set aside the direction and the decision by the first defendant via declaratory relief. The defendants applied to the deputy registrar to stay the present proceedings pursuant to s 6 of the Arbitration Act 1952 (‘the Act’), so that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants may be referred to arbitration or, alternatively to have the writ of summons and statement of claim herein struck out or, in the further alternative, for statement of claim to be struck out. This appeal arose from the deputy registar’s decision to dismiss the defendant’s application. The issues for consideration before the court were: (a) whether the plaintiffs were by this suit seeking relief or remedy for the infringement of rights protected by public law or private law; and (b) if it is held that the plaintiffs were enforcing their rights under public law and should therefore seek their remedy under O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’), whether their claims fell within the exceptions to the general principal stated in O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237. ||Page 556>>
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) On the facts of this case, the defendants had not made out a case for stay of proceedings because under s 5 (4) of the Land Code, the plaintiffs could not be compelled to refer to arbitration any dissatisfaction they may have with the decision of the first defendant, the operative word in the sub-section being ‘may’ (see para 13). (2) Both the Minister (who issued the Direction) and the first defendant (who rejected the plaintiffs’ claims to compensation) acted under powers conferred upon them by s 5 (3) of the Land Code, and are public authorities whose decisions are subject to supervisory control of the court through process of judicial review under O 53 RHC (see para 24).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 34 (3) Although the plaintiffs claimed that the native customary rights which they acquired (through persons who had created those rights before 1958) were proprietary in nature, the fact remained that the rights which they claimed were rights created or recognised by statute, or rights protected by public law. The plaintiffs’ alleged native customary rights did not arise out of any private contract or arrangement between the plaintiffs and the government. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ remedy to enforce or protect rights created or acquired or recognised in accordance with the provisions of the Land Code must be sought under public law and not private law (see para 26). (4) The question on the invalidity of the Minister’s direction arose only as a collateral issue. That direction had the overwhelming effect of terminating or extinguishing the plaintiffs’ native customary rights over the said lands. As such, it was apparent that what was really being attacked by the plaintiffs’ pleadings was clearly the Minister’s Direction (see para 31). (5) It was an abuse of process for the plaintiffs to resort to an action for declaration and thereby evade the clear requirements of O 53 RHC (see para 40).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Menurut s 5(3) dan (4) Kanun Tanah Sarawak, Menteri Perancangan dan Pengurusan Sumber (‘Menteri’) telah mengeluarkan suatu arahan bahawa melalui suatu pemberitahuan yang dikeluarkan oleh Warta Kerajaan bertarikh 14 November 2001 sebagai Arahan Tanah (Hak-Hak Adat Anak Watan) (No 143) 2001 (‘Arahan’), semua hak-hak adat anak watan ke atas beberapa kawasan tanah yang terletak di antara Loba Rambungan dan Taman Negara Kubah seluas lebih kurang 23.06 hektar, telah diluputkan. Plaintif menuntut telah memperoleh hak-hak adat anak watan ke atas tanah-tanah tersebut melalui suatu transaksi jual beli di antara beliau dan satu orang yang dikatakan ‘memiliki’ hak-hak adat anak watan tersebut atau saudaranya yang dikatakan memperoleh ||Page 557>> hak-hak tersebut dengan mengusahakan tanah-tanah tersebut sebelum 1958. Plaintif meneruskan dengan menyerahkan tuntutan mereka untuk pampasan kepada defendan pertama yang telah memberitahu bahawa semua tuntutan mereka telah ditolak, dan bahawa mereka mempunyai hak untuk merujuk perkara ini kepada timbang tara di bawah s 212 Kanun Tanah sekiranya mereka tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusannya. Tidak puas hati, plaintif telah memohon untuk mengetepikan arahan itu dan keputusan yang dibuat oleh defendan pertama melalui satu relif deklarasi. Defendan telah memohon kepada timbalan pendaftar untuk menggantung prosiding ini menurut s 6 Akta Timbang Tara 1952 (‘Akta ini’), oleh itu pertikaian di antara di antara plaintif dan defendan boleh dirujuk kepada timbang tara atau, secara alternatif writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan dibatalkan atau, di dalam alternatif selanjutnya pernyataan tuntutan dibatalkan. Rayuan ini timbul daripada keputusan timbalan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 35 pendaftar menolak permohonan defendan. Isu-isu untuk dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah adalah: (a) sama ada plaintif, dengan guaman ini menuntut relif atau remedi untuk perlanggaran hak-hak yang dilindungi oleh undang-undang awam dan persendirian; dan (b) sekiranya diputuskan bahawa plaintif menguatkuasakan hak-hak mereka di bawah undang-undang awam dan oleh yang demikian mestilah menuntut remedi di bawah A 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), sama ada tuntutan mereka jatuh di bawah pengecualian kepada prinsip am di dalam kes O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) Di atas fakta-fakta kes ini, defendan gagal membuktikan kes untuk penggantungan prosiding kerana di bawah s 5(4) Kanun Tanah, plaintif tidak boleh dipaksa untuk merujuk kepada timbang tara sebarang ketidakpuasan hati yang mereka ada dengan keputusan defendan pertama, kerana perkataan operatif di dalam sub-perenggan adalah ‘ may’ (lihat perenggan 13). (2) Kedua-dua Menteri (yang telah mengeluarkan Arahan) dan defendan pertama (yang telah menolak tuntutan plaintif untuk pampasan) telah bertindak di bawah kuasa yang telah dianugerahkan kepada mereka oleh s 5(3) Kanun Tanah, dan merupakan pihak berkuasa awam di mana keputusan mereka adalah tertakluk kepada kuasa penyeliaan mahkamah melalui proses semakan kehakiman di bawah A 53 KMT (lihat perenggan 24). (3) Walaupun plaintif mendakwa bahawa hak-hak adat anak watan yang telah diperolehi (melalui suatu orang yang telah mewujudkan hak-hak tersebut sebelum 1958) bersifat tuan punya, fakta tetap menunjukkan bahawa hak-hak yang dituntut adalah hak-hak yang diwujudkan dan diiktiraf oleh statut atau hak-hak yang dilindungi oleh undang-undang awam. Hak-hak anak watan plaintif yang didakwa tidak timbul daripada kontrak persendirian atau persetujuan di antara plaintif dan kerajaan. ||Page 558>> Oleh itu, remedi plaintif untuk menguatkuasakan atau melindungi hak-hak yang diwujudkan atau diperoleh atau diiktiraf tertakluk kepada peruntukan Kanun Tanah mestilah dituntut di bawah undang-undang awam dan bukan undang-undang persendirian (lihat perenggan 26). (4) Persoalan sama ada ketaksahan arahan Menteri hanya timbul sebagai isu kolateral. Arahan itu mempunyai kesan yang amat besar untuk menamatkan dan menghapuskan hak-hak adat anak watan plaintif ke atas tanah tersebut. Oleh itu, adalah jelas apa yang telah diserang di dalam plid plaintif adalah arahan Menteri (lihat perenggan 31). (5) Adalah satu penyalahgunaan proses bagi plaintif untuk mengambil jalan menggunakan tindakan untuk suatu deklarasi dan oleh yang demikian mengelakkan syarat-syarat jelas A 53 KMT (lihat perenggan 40).]
Notes
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 36 For cases on the remedy of declaration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 321–382. For cases on striking out of actions, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 160–161. For application to strike out, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002 Reissue) para [10.6–075].
Cases referred to Abdul Razak Ahmad v Majlis Bandaraya Johor Bahru [1995] 2 MLJ 287 (refd) Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v The Minister of Resource Planning & 2 Ors [1995] MLJU 506 (refd) O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (refd) Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 413 (refd) Subramaniamm a/l Vythilingam v The Human Rights Commissioner of Malaysia (Suhakam) & 5 Ors [2003] MLJU 94; [2003] 3 AMR 213 (refd) Yahya Bin Kassim v Government of Malaysia [1997] 3 MLJ 749 (refd)
Legislation referred to Arbitration Act 1952 ss 2, 6 Land Settlement Ordinance 1933 s 66 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53, r 3(b) Sarawak Land Code ss 5, (2), (3), (4), (a)(i), 212 Specific Relief Act 1950 s 41
Baru Bian (See Chee How with him) (Baru Bian Advocates) for the plaintiffs. JC Fong (Jonathan Jolly & Kezia Norella Daim with him) (State Attorney General’s Chambers, Sarawak) for the defendants. ||Page 559>>
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[2005] 2 MLJ 644 EVERGREEN FRONTIER (M) SDN BHD v THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND SURVEYS, SABAH & ANOR
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 37 HIGH COURT (SANDAKAN) — SUIT NO S22–16 OF 1999 LINTON ALBERT JC 7 OCTOBER 2004
Land Law — State land — Alienation by State Authority — Withdrawal of offer to alienate land — Whether justified
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Alienation of land — Withdrawal of offer to alienate land — Whether such discretion not within court’s scrutiny
The second defendant had on 22 August 1997 offered to alienate land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted the offer and duly complied with the condition of the offer by paying RM125,750 representing 50% of the premium payable. The second defendant did not proceed to alienate the said land to the plaintiff because the first defendant had, prior to the offer to alienate the said land to the plaintiff, issued the necessary papers called RSP to another group of 62 rival land applicants to survey the said land. Upon the refusal of the first defendant to accede to the plaintiff’s demand to cancel the RSP issued to the 62 applicants, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the first and second defendants for breach of the agreement to alienate the said land. Subsequently, a replacement piece of land was offered to the plaintiff which he duly accepted and expended a sum of RM15,965 as survey fee and the replacement land was duly surveyed and measured and the plan forwarded for approval. However, this deal did not materialize due to allegedly, non-compliance with governmental procedure. As a result, the plaintiff was asked to resubmit his land application. Dissatisfied, the plaintiff commenced this action for breach of agreement. Counsel for defendant submitted that s 9 of the Land Ordinance of Sabah (Cap 68) confers a discretion on the first defendant to alienate state land and the exercise of the discretion is, by virtue of s 41(1), not appealable. Hence, it is argued, the court has no jurisdiction over the withdrawal of the offer to alienate the replacement land to the plaintiff. The issue before the court was whether the defendants were correct in law to say that the said offer of amendment was issued under a mistake and as such should be retracted.
Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim for damages: (1) The defendants have sent the plaintiff on a wild-goose chase for 22 years, in the course of which the plaintiff paid a substantial sum of money to the defendants or authorities related to them and not a cent has been refunded to the plaintiff. What the plaintiff went through constitutes an injustice (see para 9). ||Page 645>> (2) The exercise of the first defendant’s discretion, based as it was, on what was clearly a trumped up excuse cannot be exempted from judicial scrutiny. In any event, s 41(1) of the Land Ordinance of Sabah (Cap 68) does not preclude the court from exercising jurisdiction just because the plaintiff’s claim relates to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 38 matters pertaining to the alienation of the replacement land by the first defendant. Here, the court is not concerned with the alienation of the replacement land by the first defendant which is prohibited by s 41(1) of the Land Ordinance of Sabah, but rather the withdrawal or revocation of the offer to alienate, which clearly falls outside the ambit of s 41(1) (see para 11). (3) The issuance of the said letter to the plaintiff and its unconditional acceptance by the plaintiff undoubtedly constitute a binding contract between the plaintiff and the second defendant. The fact that both parties agreed on the relevant issue implied admission of the existence of a binding contract. The second defendant cannot wriggle out of the agreement to alienate the replacement land simply by issuing the withdrawal letter (see para 13).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Defendan kedua telah pada 22 Ogos 1997 membuat tawaran untuk memberi milik tanah kepada plaintif. Plaintif telah menerima tawaran tersebut dan mematuhi syarat tawaran dengan membayar RM125,750 yang mewakili 50% daripada premium yang perlu dibayar. Defendan kedua tidak meneruskan dengan pemberian milik tanah tersebut kepada plaintif kerana defendan pertama telah, sebelum tawaran pemberian milik tanah tersebut kepada plaintif, mengeluarkan suratcara yang dikenali sebagai RSP kepada sekumpulan 62 orang pesaing lain yang memohon tanah tersebut untuk menilai tanah tersebut. Setelah defendan pertama enggan bersetuju dengan tuntutan plaintif agar membatalkan RSP yang dikeluarkan kepada 62 pemohon itu, plaintif telah memulakan prosiding terhadap defendan-defendan pertama dan kedua kerana melanggar perjanjian untuk memberi milik tanah tersebut. Berikutan itu, sebagai ganti sebidang tanah telah ditawarkan kepada plaintif yang telah diterima oleh beliau dan membayar sejumlah RM15,965 sebagai yuran penilaian dan tanah gantian tersebut telah dinilai dan diukur dan pelan telah dikemukakan untuk kelulusan. Bagaimanapun, urusan ini tidak berjaya diselesaikan kerana dikatakan tidak mematuhi prosedur kerajaan. Akibatnya, plaintif telah diminta untuk menghantar balik permohonan tanah beliau. Berasa tidak puas hati, plaintif telah memulakan tindakan ini kerana perlanggaran perjanjian. Peguam untuk defendan berhujah bahawa s 9 Ordinan Tanah Sabah (Bab 68) memberikan budi bicara kepada defendan pertama untuk memberi milik tanah kerajaan dan penggunaan budi bicara ini, menurut s 41(1), tidak boleh dirayu. Justeru itu, ia dihujahkan, mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atas ||Page 646>> penarikan balik tawaran untuk memberi milik tanah gantian kepada plaintif itu. Persoalan yang dihadapkan ke mahkamah adalah sama ada defendan-defendan betul dari segi undang-undang untuk mengatakan yang tawaran pindaan tersebut telah silap dikeluarkan dan patut ditarik balik.
Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan ganti rugi plaintif:
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 39 (1) Defendan-defendan telah membuang masa plaintif selama 22 tahun, dimana dalam tempoh ini plaintif telah membayar sejumlah besar wang kepada defendan-defendan atau pihak berkuasa berkaitan dengannya dan tidak sesen pun yang dikembalikan kepada plaintif. Apa yang dilalui oleh plaintif merupakan satu ketidakadilan yang nyata (lihat perenggan 9). (2) Penggunaan budi bicara defendan pertama, berdasarkan satu alasan yang nyata dibuat-buat tidak boleh dikecualikan daripada penelitian kehakiman. Dalam apa keadaanpun, s 41(1) Ordinan Tanah Sabah (Bab 68) tidak menghalang mahkamah daripada menggunakan bidang kuasa hanya kerana tuntutuan plaintif berkaitan dengan perkara-perkara mengenai pemberian milik tanah gantian oleh defendan pertama. Di sini, mahkamah tidak mementingkan pemberian milik tanah gantian oleh defendan pertama yang dihalang oleh s 41(1) Ordinan Tanah Sabah, tetapi mengambil berat tentang penarikan balik atau pembatalan tawaran pemberian milik yang jelas di luar ruang lingkup s 41(1) (lihat perenggan 11). (3) Pengeluaran surat kepada plaintif dan penerimaan tidak bersyarat oleh plaintif secara langsung membentuk kontrak yang mengikat plaintif dan defendan kedua. Hakikat bahawa kedua-dua pihak bersetuju tentang isu berkaitan secara tersirat menerima kewujudan kontrak yang mengikat. Defendan kedua tidak boleh melepaskan diri daripada perjanjian untuk memberi milik tanah gantian ini hanya dengan mengemukakan surat penarikan balik (lihat perenggan 13).]
Notes For cases on alienation by state authority, see 8(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 3868. For cases on exercise of administrative powers, alienation of land, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 4.
Cases referred to Burhan Ating v Director of Lands & Surveys & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ 1203 (distd) Lim Fong Tsin & 23 Ors v Asst Collector of Land Revenue, & 2 Ors(Suit No S(22)–24 of 1996) (refd) Sa-Mal (Sabah) Corp Sdn Bhd v Director of Lands & Surveys, Sabah [1994] 3 CLJ 229 (refd) ||Page 647>>
Legislation referred to Government Proceedings Act 1956 s 29 Land Ordinance of Sabah s 9, 9(1), 41(1)
David Wong (Peter Lo & Co) for the plaintiff.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 40 Halim Hanapia (State Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendants.
[2005] 2 MLJ 769 PIHP (SELANGOR) BHD v KESATUAN KEBANGSAAN PEKERJA-PEKERJA HOTEL, BAR & RESTORAN SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTIONS NO R2– 25–31 OF 2001 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 31 JULY 2002
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application to quash part of decision of award by Industrial Court — Dispute on terms and conditions of employment in collective agreement — Whether Industrial Court had erred in law or acted in excess of its jurisdiction
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Award — Award in relation to terms and conditions of employment in collective agreement — Whether there was errors of law — Whether Industrial Court had erred in law or acted in excess of its jurisdiction
This was an application by the applicant under O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’) for an order of certiorari to quash part of the decision of the Industrial Court. The applicant was the owner of a hotel known as Petaling Jaya Hilton International (‘PJ Hilton’), and the first respondent was a trade union (‘the Union’) representing employees within the scope of its representation and who were employed in the hotel. The present case arose out of a dispute on the terms and conditions of employment to be contained in the hotel’s third collective agreement with the first respondent, whereby the case was referred to the Industrial Court as a trade dispute under s 26 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘IRA 1967’). Upon the Industrial Court handing down the award on 21 February 2000, the applicant sought to quash part of the decision in the award relating to the salary structure, the salary adjustment, appendix A and the annual bonus. The applicant was also dissatisfied with the Industrial Court’s award vis-à-vis the applicant’s proposed introduction of a new job classification.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) The 9.5% salary increase awarded by the Industrial Court was wholly consistent with industrial practice as evidenced by the collective agreements of
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 41 other hotels, Shah’s Village and the Shangri-La, which had provided for a 10% increase. PJ Hilton had never pleaded nor asserted financial inability to pay. In fact, its general manager had admitted that there was RM5,550,000 in fixed deposits at the end of 1999, as opposed to RM4,750,000 in 1998, and that PJ Hilton had made a gross operating profit of RM15,992,660 for 1999. The Industrial Court had quite correctly applied its mind to the fact that PJ Hilton had the ability to pay as a result of the evidence produced in court (see para 28). ||Page 770>> (2) The onus was on PJ Hilton to introduce a proper scheme and to prove that it was in the hotel’s and its employees’ interests when introducing a productivity-linked bonus system to replace the current contractual bonus system that had prevailed in the first and second collective agreements, and also when introducing a new job integration scheme. However, PJ Hilton had failed to do so and totally failed to prove that it was ‘a hotel in decline’ (see para 28). (3) Sufficient reasons were given by the Industrial Court for its decision in the award. Therefore, it was not now open to PJ Hilton to submit that the industrial Court had declined jurisdiction when PJ Hilton itself had failed to equip the Industrial Court with the evidence required to prove its case (see para 28). (4) The collective agreement in question was to have commenced in January 1999 and should continue until 31 December 2001. The delay in implementing the same was detrimental to good industrial relations (see para 28). Further, even if there were errors, these were not errors of law and were minimal in nature. This court should exercise its discretion in allowing this collective agreement to proceed forward, which was wholly in accordance with the industry standards (see para 28). (5) As such, taking into account the evidence, documents and submissions in delivering its award, the Industrial Court had neither erred in law nor acted in excess of its jurisdiction (see para 28).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini merupakan permohonan pemohon di bawah A 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk suatu perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan sebahagian daripada keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan. Pemohon adalah pemilik sebuah hotel dikenali sebagai Petaling Jaya Hilton International (‘PJ Hilton’), dan responden pertama adalah satu persatuan pekerja (‘persatuan pekerja’) mewakili pekerja-pekerja di dalam skop perwakilannya dan telah diambil bekerja di hotel itu. Kes ini timbul daripada pertikaian berkenaan dengan terma-terma dan syarat-syarat pekerjaan yang sepatutnya dimasukkan di dalam perjanjian kolektif yang ketiga hotel itu dengan responden pertama, di mana kes ini telah dirujukkan kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 42 sebagai pertikaian dagangan di bawah s 26 Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (‘Akta 1967’). Apabila Mahkamah Persekutuan memberikan award pada 21 Februari 2000, pemohon telah memohon untuk membatalkan sebahagian keputusan di dalam award itu berkenaan dengan struktur gaji, penyelarasan gaji, apendiks A dan bonus tahunan. Pemohon juga tidak puas hati terhadap award Mahkamah Perusahaan berkenaan cadangan pemohon untuk memperkenalkan suatu klasifikasi kerja yang baru. ||Page 771>>
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan: (1) Peningkatan 9.5% gaji yang diawardkan oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan adalah konsisten secara keseluruhannya dengan amalan industri sebagaimana yang dibuktikan oleh perjanjian-perjanjian kolektif hotel lain, Shah’s Village dan Shangri-La yang telah memberi 10% kenaikan. PJ Hilton tidak pernah memplidkan atau menyatakan ketidakupayaan kewangan untuk membayar. Malahan, pengurus besarnya telah mengaku terdapat RM5,550,000 di dalam simpanan tetap pada akhir tahun 1999, berbanding RM4,750,000 pada tahun 1998, dan PJ Hilton telah memperoleh keuntungan kasar operasi sebanyak RM15,992,660 untuk tahun 1999. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah mempertimbangkan fikirannya secara betul kepada fakta bahawa PJ Hilton berupaya untuk membayar berdasarkan daripada keterangan yang dikemukakan di mahkamah (lihat perenggan 28). (2) Beban adalah ke atas PJ Hilton untuk memperkenalkan skim yang sesuai dan membuktikan bahawa ia adalah untuk kepentingan hotel dan pekerja-pekerjanya untuk memperkenalkan suatu sistem bonus yang berkaitan rapat dengan produktiviti untuk menggantikan sistem bonus kontrak yang sedia ada yang telah diperuntukkan di dalam perjanjian-perjanjian kolektif, dan juga semasa memperkenalkan skim integrasi kerja yang baru. Walau bagaimanapun, PJ Hilton telah gagal untuk berbuat sedemikian dan gagal sepenuhnya untuk membukti bahawa ia adalah ‘a hotel in decline’ (lihat perenggan 28). (3) Alasan-alasan yang mencukupi telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan atas keputusannya di dalam award itu. Oleh itu, tidak lagi terbuka kepada PJ Hilton untuk mengemukakan bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah menolak bidang kuasa apabila PJ Hilton sendiri gagal untuk mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan keterangan yang diperlukan untuk membuktikan kesnya (lihat perenggan 28). (4) Perjanjian kolektif yang dipersoalkan ini sepatutnya bermula pada Januari 1999 dan berterusan sehingga Disember 2001. Kelewatan untuk melaksanakannya adalah merugikan kepada perhubungan industri yang baik (lihat perenggan 28). Seterusnya, walaupun terdapatnya kesilapan-kesilapan, ianya bukan merupakan kesilapan-kesilapan undang-undang dan adalah minimum pada sifatnya. Mahkamah ini sepatutnya menggunakan budi bicaranya membenarkan perjanjian kolektif ini untuk diteruskan, yang bertepatan sepenuhnya dengan standard industri (lihat perenggan 28).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 43 (5) Oleh itu, dengan mengambil kira keterangan, dokumen-dokumen dan hujah-hujah semasa memberikan awardnya, Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak membuat satu kesalahan di segi undang-undang ataupun tidak bertindak melampaui bidang kuasanya (lihat perenggan 28).] ||Page 772>>
Notes For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 165– 173. For cases on Industrial Court’s awards, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1241–1288. For certiorari generally, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160.117]– [160.129].
Cases referred to B Braun Medical Industries Sdn Bhd Pulau Pinang v Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja B Braun Industries Sdn Bhd, Pulau Pinang [1998] 3 ILR 154 (refd) Colgate Palmolive (M) Sdn Bhd v Yap Kok Foong and another appeal [2001] 4 MLJ 97 (refd) Desaru View Hotel, Kejora Avi Sdn Bhd Johor v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1991] 1 ILR 82 (refd) Felda Oil Products Sdn Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perkilangan Perusahaan Makanan [1998] 3 ILR 374 (refd) Goh Keah Hock v Mahkamah Perusahaan, Malaysia & Anor [2002] 5 MLJ 37 (refd) Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perkayuan v Syarikat Jengka Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 MLJ 464 (refd) Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perusahaan Dunlop Malaysia v DMIB Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 279 (refd) Koko (M) Sdn Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perkilangan Perusahaan Makanan [2002] 1 MLJ 262 (dist) Kuantan Beach Hotel Sdn Bhd – Hyatt Kuantan v National Union of Hotel Bar & Restaurant Workers [1998] 2 ILR 29 (refd) Malayan Banking Bhd v Association of Bank Officers [1984] ILR 537 (refd) Plywood Manufacturing Co Sdn Bhd v Timber Employees Union [1986] ILR 457 (refd) Sarawak Commercial Banks Association v Sarawak Bank Employees’ Union [1989] 1 ILR 349 (refd) Shivaraj Fine Arts Litho Works v State Industrial Court, Nagpur [1978] LAB IC 828 (foll) Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1995] 2 MLJ
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 44 317 (refd) Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Bhd [1991] 1 ILR 512 (refd) Toweltech Sdn Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perusahaan Membuat Tekstil dan Pakaian Pulau Pinang & Seberang Prai [2000] 1 ILR 591 (refd) Tractors Auto Components lwn Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perusahaan Alat-alat Pengangkutan dan Sekutu [2000] 1 ILR 723 (refd) Trengganu Bus Co Sdn Bhd v Transport Workers Union [1983] 1 MLJ 393 (refd) Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 600 (refd)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 13(3), 26, 29, 30(4), (5) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3(2) ||Page 773>>
N Sivabalah (Raymond Low with him) (Shearn Delamore) for the applicant. Ambiza Sreenevasan (Alan Gomez with him) (Tommy Thomas) for the respondents.
[2005] 3 MLJ 425 NIK ADLI BIN NIK ABDUL AZIZ & ORS v KETUA POLIS NEGARA & ORS
HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–41 OF 2004 KN SEGARA J 1 SEPTEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Habeas corpus — Preventive detention — Extension order under Internal Security Act — Detention based on original grounds — Whether order must be served on detainee — Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8 & 11 — Federal Constitution art 151(1)
Preventive Detention — Extension order — Legality — Extension order under Internal Security Act — Detention based on original grounds — Whether order must be served on detainee — Whether any non compliance with procedural requirements — Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8 & 11
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 45 Preventive Detention — Security cases — Extension order — Legality — Extension order under Internal Security Act — Detention based on original grounds — Whether order must be served on detainee — Whether any non compliance with procedural requirements — Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8 & 11
The applicants challenged the legality of the extension order made by the minister. The applicants complained that there had been non-compliance with art 151(1) of the Federal Constitution in the making of the extension order and the service of it on the applicants. Counsel for the applicants also submitted that the allegations of fact on which the extension order was based was neither served nor created, thus depriving the applicants of their rights under s 11 of the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘the Act’).
Held, dismissing the application for habeas corpus: (1) The making of the extension order under s 8(7) of the Act by the minister is clearly a discretionary act and decision on his part, within the ambit of the Act. Upon the affidavit evidence before the court, there had been no breach of any procedural requirement by the minister when he made the extension order and, therefore, there could be no judicial review on the extension order (see para 5). (2) Article 151 of the Federal Constitution must be read together with the Act. All the requirements of art 151 of the Federal Constitution have been incorporated in ss 11, 12 and 16 of the Act. The provisions are consistent and harmonious with article 151 of the Federal Constitution. Based on the affidavit evidence before the court, there been no breach of ss 11, 12 and 16 of the Act by the minister when making the impugned extension order (see para 6). ||Page 426>> (3) The applicants did not dispute that the allegations of fact on which the original order was based had been served on them and there was no dispute that the applicants had been availed all their statutory rights under s 11 of the Act, with respect to the original order, and that the process under s 12 of the Act duly observed and carried out, thereafter. The submission by the learned counsel for the applicants that the statement in writing of the allegations of fact was not served with the extension order was without merit, as the extension order was made on the same grounds as those on which the order was originally made and, consequently, the furnishing of the allegations of fact (again) did not arise. The furnishing of the allegations of fact only arises when the detention has been extended on wholly different grounds or, partly on different grounds, to that of the original order (see para 10).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon-pemohon mencabar kesahihan perintah lanjutan yang dibuat oleh menteri.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 46 Pemohon-pemohon mengadu bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan dengan per 151(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dalam membuat perintah lanjutan dan penyampaiannya ke atas pemohon-pemohon. Peguam bagi pihak pemohon- pemohon juga berhujah bahawa pengataan fakta berdasarkan perintah lanjutan dibuat tidak disampaikan mahupun dibuat, oleh itu menyebabkan pemohon- pemohon terkilan akan hak mereka di bawah s 11 Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘Akta tersebut’).
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan untuk habeas corpus tersebut: (1) Perintah lanjutan yang dibuat di bawah s 8(7) Akta tersebut oleh menteri dengan jelas adalah satu tindakan menurut budi bicara dan keputusan dipihak beliau, dalam ruang lingkup Akta tersebut. Berdasarkan keterangan afidavit di hadapan mahkamah, tiada perlanggaran apa-apa keperluan prosedur oleh menteri semasa beliau membuat perintah lanjutan tersebut dan, oleh itu, tidak perlu satu kajian semula dilakukan ke atas perintah lanjutan tersebut (lihat perenggan 5). (2) Perkara 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan hendaklah dibaca bersama Akta tersebut. Kesemua keperluan per 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan termaktub dalam ss 11, 12 dan 16 Akta tersebut. Peruntukan-peruntukan tersebut adalah konsisten dan selari dengan per 151 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Berdasarkan keterangan afidavit di hadapan mahkamah, tiada perlanggaran ss 11, 12 dan 16 Akta tersebut oleh menteri semasa membuat perintah lanjutan yang dipersoalkan itu (lihat perenggan 6). (3) Pemohon-pemohon tidak mempertikaikan pengataan-pengataan fakta yang mana perintah asal tersebut dibuat telah disampaikan ke atas mereka dan tiada pertikaian bahawa pemohon-pemohon telah menggunakan ||Page 427>> segala hak statutori mereka di bawah s 11 Akta tersebut, yang berkaitan dengan perintah asas, dan bahawa proses di bawah s 12 Akta tersebut telah diteliti dan dilaksanakan sewajarnya, selepas itu. Penghujahan oleh peguam bijaksana bagi pihak pemohon-pemohon bahawa kenyataan bertulis tentang pengataan-pengataan fakta tersebut tidak disampaikan dengan perintah lanjutan tidak bermerit, kerana perintah lanjutan tersebut dibuat atas alasan yang sama dengan perintah asal yang dibuat dan, dengan itu, pengataan fakta yang dikemukakan (sekali lagi) tidak timbul. Pengemukaan berhubung pengataan fakta hanya timbul apabila penahanan dilanjutkan berdasarkan alasan yang berbeza atau, sebahagiannya merupakan alasan yang berbeza, daripada perintah asal (lihat perenggan 10).]
Notes For cases on habeas corpus, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 494–548. For cases on legality of extension order, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 1418.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 47 For cases on security cases generally, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras1474–1490.
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 151(1) Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8(1), (7), 8B(1), 11, (2)(b), 12, 16
Edmund Bon (Edward Saw, Amer Hamzah bin Arshad and Muhammad Faiz bin Fadzil with him) (Chooi & Co) for the applicants. Mohamad Hanafiah bin Zakaria (Senior Federal Counsel) (Abdul Wahab bin Mohamad, Raja Rozela bte Raja Toran and Sharlyza Alis bte Sharkawi with him) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents.
[2005] 3 MLJ 502 DARSHAN SINGH v FARID KAMAL HUSSAIN (SUED ON BEHALF AND FOR THE BOARD OF MEMBERS AND KELAB SUKAN PULAU PINANG)
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO A–02–15 OF 1997 ARIFIN ZAKARIA, MOHD GHAZALI JJCA AND AZMEL J 21 SEPTEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Bias — Whether allegations of bias supported by evidence — Whether allegations related to subject matter of disciplinary proceedings
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Bias — Witness in disciplinary proceedings acted as judge in appeal proceedings — Whether necessary for appellant to prove actual bias — Whether appellant only had to show real likelihood of bias on part of appellate tribunal — Whether appellant’s apprehension justified — Whether decision of appellate tribunal to be vitiated
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Breach of — Failure to furnish appellant with report made available to disciplinary committee — Whether need to consider whether evidence prejudiced appellant — Whether court would go into likelihood of prejudice — Whether there is risk of prejudice — Whether proceeding to be vitiated
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 48 Unincorporated Associations — Internal management — Discipline — Suspension of member — Whether rules of natural justice applied — Extent to which court would intervene in matters involving domestic tribunal of social club
The appellant and one Gitu Chakravathy (‘Gitu’) were members of the Penang Sports Club (‘the club’). They were alleged to have abused and assaulted one another within the club premises. Each had lodged a complaint against the other and their complaints were referred to the disciplinary committee (‘DC’) appointed by the main committee (‘MC’) pursuant to r 35(a) of the Rules of the club (‘the Rules’). At the conclusion of the inquiry, the DC found both the appellant and Gitu guilty and as penalty, the appellant was suspended for four months while Gitu was suspended for one month from the privileges of membership. The appellant, being dissatisfied with the decision of the DC, appealed to the MC. The MC dismissed the appeal and enhanced the suspension order of the appellant from four to six months. The appellant then brought this action against the club seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the decisions of the DC and MC were null and void and of no effect. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s claim with costs. This was the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the High Court. The appellant’s complaints centred on the following issues: (i) the chairmanship of the DC; (ii) the composition of the MC; (iii) the failure of respondent to furnish to the appellant a report prepared by a member, Melvin Low (‘ML’); and (iv) the increase of the penalty imposed on the appellant by the MC. ||Page 503>>
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The respondent was a social club and was governed by its constitution and the Rules. The rules of natural justice applied to the respondent and, therefore, members of the club could not arbitrarily be expelled or suspended without first being given a hearing, for their contracts of membership included a duty to act fairly; by accepting them as members and receiving their subscription the club impliedly undertook to treat them justly and in accordance with rules (see para 9). (2) The extent to which the court would intervene in matters involving domestic tribunal of a social club, as in the present case, as opposed to tribunals sitting in judgment over matters of a trade or profession had been succinctly stated by Denning LJ in Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175 (see para 10); Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175; Chong Kah Lim & Ors v Yong Su Hian [1979] 2 MLJ 11 followed. (3) The appellant had objected to the appointment of one Paul Manecksha (‘PM’) as chairman of the DC on the ground of likelihood of bias against him. The appellant did not call any witness to support the allegations. The learned High Court judge held that there was no merit in the appellant’s objection and
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 49 accepted the evidence of PM that he had no feeling of bias or animosity against the appellant. The appellant’s allegations against PM were mere allegations unsupported by evidence. Furthermore, those allegations related to the past relationship between the appellant and PM and was not at all related to the subject matter of the proceeding before the DC. The mere fact that the appellant was not in the thickest of term with the chairman of the DC, without other evidence, would not be conclusive ground that the chairman was likely to be biased (see para 20). (4) The appellant’s second complaint was against the presence of LY Hong (‘LYH’) at the MC meeting. LYH had given evidence before the DC. The appellant contended that by allowing LYH to attend the MC meeting and hearing his appeal against the DC’s decision, the respondent had acted in breach of the rule of natural justice and for that reason the decision of MC ought to be vitiated (see para 21). The complainant or prosecutor should not participate in a decision or in an appeal from a decision, and should not even appear to participate. To do so would be contrary to the rule of natural justice (see para 22). In the instant case, LYH could not be regarded as a complainant or prosecutor in this case. However, in his evidence, LYH had admitted to listening to the version given by Gitu and had expressed his displeasure of the appellant’s conduct for being involved in a fight again. Although there was nothing to suggest that LYH had any personal grudge against the appellant, judging by his evidence before the DC, LYH was not at all pleased with ||Page 504>> what had happened that night and seemed to suggest that the appellant was partly to be blamed, if not wholly, for the incident. In the circumstances, it might be difficult for LYH to act impartially in considering the appeal before the MC (see para 24). (5) The other complaint against LYH was that having given evidence before the DC, he then sat on the MC to hear the appeal from the DC. The appellant contended that this amounted to allowing LYH to act both as a witness and as a judge at the same time contrary to the rule against bias. In this regard, it was not necessary for the appellant to prove actual bias — what he needed to show was merely a real likelihood of bias on the part of tribunal hearing the appeal. In the present case, the appellant’s apprehension was justified. LYH, who had personal knowledge of the incident and was in fact called to give evidence before DC, might in all likelihood have a strong influence on the other members of the MC in the course of their deliberation. For that reason, as a general rule, a witness after having given evidence should not be allowed to sit on the enquiry or the appellate body. On the above premises, the decision of the MC ought to be vitiated (see para 27); Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 followed. (6) The appellant’s complaint against ML, who also sat as a member of the MC, was that ML had submitted a report to the DC regarding the incident on the night in question. Although ML did not give evidence before the DC, his report
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 50 was made available to the members of the DC. Since ML was responsible for putting up the report, he should not have sat on the MC. To do so would be contrary to the rule against bias (see para 29); Collins v Lane, Cornish and Worcester Norton Sports Club Ltd [2003] LLR 19 followed. (7) The other issue raised by the appellant was the failure of the club to furnish him with ML’s report, although the appellant had requested for it. The appellant contended that this constituted another blatant breach of the rule of natural justice which stemmed from the basic principle that a person who was charged before the DC ought to be given whatever report made available to the DC in order that he might answer any allegations that might be made against him. The chairman of the DC defended his ground for not supplying the report to the appellant by stating that the DC did not take into account the report made by ML. It was no answer to say that the evidence did not prejudice the appellant, as the court would not go into the likelihood of prejudice. The risk of such a prejudice was enough to vitiate the proceeding. Hence, the DC had acted in breach of the principle of natural justice in refusing to supply the appellant with a copy of ML’s report (see para 30); Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487; BSS Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 followed. ||Page 505>> (8) In view of the above findings, it was not necessary to consider the question of whether the MC had the right to increase the penalty imposed on the appellant (see para 34).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu dan Gitu Chakravathy (‘Gitu’) merupakan ahli-ahli Kelab Sukan Pulau Pinang (‘kelab tersebut’). Mereka dikatakan telah mendera dan menyerang satu sama lain dalam premis kelab tersebut. Kedua-duanya telah membuat aduan terhadap satu sama lain dan aduan mereka dirujuk kepada jawatankuasa tatatertib (‘DC’) yang dilantik oleh jawatankuasa utama (‘MC’) menurut k 35(a) kaedah-kaedah kelab tersebut (‘kaedah-kaedah tersebut’). Di akhir siasatan, DC mendapati kedua-dua perayu dan Gitu bersalah dan sebagai denda, perayu digantung selama empat bulan sementara Gitu digantung selama sebulan daripada keistimewaan keahlian mereka. Perayu, berasa tidak puas hati dengan keputusan DC, merayu kepada MC. MC menolak rayuan tersebut dan menambah perintah penggantungan perayu daripada empat kepada enam bulan. Perayu kemudian memulakan tindakan ini terhadap kelab tersebut memohon, antara lain, satu deklarasi bahawa keputusan DC dan MC adalah batal dan tidak sah dan tidak berkuatkuasa. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak tuntutan perayu dengan kos. Ini adalah rayuan perayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi. Aduan perayu berkisarkan persoalan berikut: (i) pengerusian DC; (ii) komposisi MC; (iii) kegagalan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 51 responden untuk mengemukakan kepada perayu satu laporan yang disediakan oleh seorang ahli, Melvin Low (‘ML’); dan (iv) penambahan denda yang dikenakan ke atas perayu oleh MC.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Responden adalah satu kelab sosial dan dikawal oleh perlembagaannya dan kaedah-kaedah tersebut. Rukun keadilan semulajadi terpakai ke atas responden dan oleh itu, ahli-ahli kelab tersebut tidak boleh sewenang- wenangnya dibuang atau digantung tanpa terlebih dahulu diberi peluang untuk didengar, kerana dalam kontrak-kontrak keahlian mereka termasuklah kewajipan untuk bertindak secara adil; dengan menerima mereka sebagai ahli dan dengan menerima subskripsi mereka kelab tesebut secara tersirat mengakujanji untuk melayan mereka secara adil dan bersesuaian dengan kaedah-kaedah tersebut (lihat perenggan 9). (2) Setakat mana mahkamah boleh campur tangan dalam perkara-perkara yang melibatkan tribunal domestik sebuah kelab sosial, seperti dalam kes semasa, berbanding dengan tribunal yang mengadili perkara-perkara berhubung suatu dagangan atau profesyen telah dinyatakan oleh Denning LJ dalam Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175 (lihat ||Page 506>> perenggan 10); Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175; Chong Kah Lim & Ors v Yong Su Hian [1979] 2 MLJ 11 diikut. (3) Perayu membantah pelantikan Paul Manecksha (‘PM’) sebagai pengerusi DC atas alasan kemungkinan berlakunya berat sebelah terhadapnya. Perayu tidak memanggil saksi untuk menyokong pengataan tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana memutuskan bahawa tiada merit dalam bantahan perayu dan menerima keterangan PM bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai apa-apa perasaan berat sebelah atau keraguan terhadap perayu. Pengataan perayu terhadap PM hanya pengataan semata-mata yang tidak disokong dengan keterangan. Tambahan pula, pengataan tersebut berkaitan dengan hubungan masa lalu antara perayu dan PM dan tidak langsung berkaitan perkara pokok prosiding di hadapan DC. Hakikat semata-mata kerana perayu tidak mempunyai hubungan baik dengan pengerusi DC, tanpa keterangan lain, bukan satu alasan konklusif yang pengerusi tersebut berkemungkinan akan bersikap berat sebelah (lihat perenggan 20). (4) Aduan kedua perayu adalah terhadap kehadiran LY Hong (‘LYH’) dalam mesyuarat MC. LYH telah memberi keterangan di hadapan DC. Perayu berhujah bahawa dengan membenarkan LYH hadir mesyuarat MC dan mendengar rayuan beliau terhadap keputusan DC, responden bertindak melanggar rukun keadilan semulajadi dan oleh sebab demikian keputusan MC patut dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 21). Pengadu atau pendakwa tidak sepatutnya melibatkan diri dalam keputusan atau rayuan daripada suatu keputusan, dan sepatutnya tidak langsung kelihatan untuk melibatkan diri. Dengan berbuat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 52 demikian adalah bertentangan dengan rukun keadilan semulajadi (lihat perenggan 22). Dalam kes semasa, LYH tidak boleh dianggap sebagai pengadu atau pendakwa dalam kes ini. Namun begitu, dalam keterangan beliau, LYH mengaku telah mendengar versi yang diberikan oleh Gitu dan menyatakan perasaan tidak berkenan beliau terhadap perbuatan perayu yang terlibat dalam pergaduhan lagi. Walaupun tiada apa yang mencadangkan bahawa LYH mempunyai apa-apa perasaan dendam terhadap perayu, berdasarkan keterangan beliau di hadapan DC, LYH tidak gembira dengan apa yang berlaku malam itu dan seperti mencadangkan agar perayu dipersalahkan, jika tidak sepenuhnya, untuk kejadian itu. Dalam keadaan ini, adalah sukar untuk LYH bertindak adil dalam menimbangkan rayuan di hadapan MC (lihat perenggan 24). (5) Aduan lain terhadap LYH adalah kerana telah memberikan keterangan di hadapan DC, beliau kemudiannya bersidang dalam MC untuk mendengar rayuan daripada DC. Perayu berhujah bahawa ini seperti membenarkan LYH bertindak sebagai saksi dan juga hakim pada masa yang sama, dan ini bercanggah dengan rukun terhadap berat sebelah. Dalam hal ini, tidak perlu bagi perayu membuktikan berat sebelah sebenar — apa yang ||Page 507>> beliau perlu tunjukkan hanya kemungkinan berlakunya berat sebelah di pihak tribunal yang mendengar rayuan. Dalam kes semasa, kerisauan perayu adalah dijustifikasikan. LYH, yang mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi tentang kejadian tersebut dan sememangnya dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di hadapan DC, berkemungkinan besar mempunyai pengaruh ke atas ahli-ahli MC dalam membuat pertimbangan mereka. Oleh sebab itu, sebagai rukun am, seorang saksi selepas memberikan keterangan tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan duduk dalam badan siasatan atau rayuan. Berdasarkan premis tersebut, keputusan MC patut dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 27); Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 diikut. (6) Aduan perayu terhadap ML, yang juga bersidang sebagai ahli MC, adalah bahawa ML telah mengemukakan laporan kepada DC berhubung kejadian pada malam yang dipersoalkan. Walaupun ML tidak memberikan keterangan di hadapan DC, laporan beliau disediakan untuk ahli-ahli DC. Memandangkan ML bertanggungjawab menyediakan laporan tersebut, beliau tidak sepatutnya bersidang dalam MC. Dengan berbuat demikian adalah bercanggah dengan rukun terhadap berat sebelah (lihat perenggan 29); Collins v Lane, Cornish and Worcester Norton Sports Club Ltd [2003] LLR 19 diikut. (7) Persoalan lain yang ditimbulkan oleh perayu adalah kegagalan kelab tersebut untuk mengemukakan kepada beliau laporan ML, walaupun perayu telah memintanya. Perayu berhujah bahawa ini membentuk perlanggaran rukun keadilan semulajadi nyata yang timbul dari prinsip umum bahawa seseorang yang dituduh di hadapan DC sepatutnya diberikan apa-apa laporan yang dikemukakan kepada DC bagi tujuan agar beliau mungkin dapat menjawab apa-apa pengataaan yang mungkin dibuat terhadapnya. Pengerusi DC tidak berganjak daripada alasan beliau kerana tidak mengemukakan laporan kepada
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 53 perayu dengan menyatakan bahawa DC tidak mengambilkira laporan yang dibuat oleh ML. Ia bukan jawapan untuk mengatakan bahawa keterangan itu tidak memprejudiskan perayu, kerana mahkamah tidak akan membenarkan kemungkinan berlakunya prejudis. Risiko prejudis sedemikian cukup untuk membatalkan prosiding tersebut. Justeru itu, DC telah bertindak melanggar prinsip keadilan semulajadi kerana enggan mengemukakan kepada perayu dengan sesalinan laporan ML (lihat perenggan 30); Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487; BSS Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 diikut. (8) Berdasarkan penemuan di atas, adalah tidak perlu untuk menimbangkan persoalan sama ada MC mempunyai hak untuk menambahkan denda yang dikenakan ke atas perayu (lihat perenggan 34).] ||Page 508>>
Notes For cases on bias, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 706–711. For cases on breach of rules of natural justices, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 712–722.
Cases referred to Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corp v Satyanarayan Transporters AIR 1965 SC 1303 (refd) BSS Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (folld) Chong Kah Lim & Ors v Yong Su Hian [1979] 2 MLJ 11 (folld) Collins v Lane, Cornish and Worcester Norton Sports Club Ltd [2003] LLR 19 (folld) Florence Bailes v Ng Jit Leong [1985] 1 MLJ 74 (refd) Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1948] AC 87 (refd) Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 1 All ER 1175 (folld) Metropolitan Properties (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] QB 577 (refd) Minolta Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Ng Siew Phang & Anor [1996] 3 AMR 3421 (refd) R v Gouek [1993] AC 646 (refd) Rattan Lal Sharma v Managing Committee AIR 1993 SC 2155 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (folld) Shrager v Basil Dighton Ltd [1941] KB 274 (refd) Singapore Amateur Athletics Association v Haron bin Mundir [1994] 1 SLR 47 (refd) Singh Kalpanath v Choor Singh [1992] 2 SLR 639 (refd)
Appeal from Civil Suit No 22–21 of 1995 (High Court, Taiping)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 54 Appellant in person. Jacy Rani Paloosamy (Ong & Manecksha) for the respondent.
[2005] 4 MLJ 55 SAMUHUM A/L KARAPANAN v KETUA POLIS DAERAH MELAKA TENGAH & ORS
HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO MT1–24–172 OF 2002 LOW HOP BING J 12 MAY 2005
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Dismissal of public officer — Right to representation at disciplinary enquiry — Failure to apply for representation — Whether right of representation denied — Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) Regulations 1970 reg 5
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Rules of natural justice — Burden to prove malice and breach of rules of natural justice — Allegations in affidavit evidence alone, whether sufficient — Whether burden of proof on plaintiff
Civil Procedure — Costs — Solicitor and client — Action against persons acting in execution of statutory or other public duty — Whether award of costs on a solicitor-client basis — Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 s 2(b)
Civil Procedure — Government proceedings — Costs — Whether award of costs on solicitor-client basis — Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 s 2(b)
The plaintiff, a police lance corporal, was found guilty of disciplinary charges against him and was dismissed at the end of a disciplinary enquiry. The plaintiff applied for a declaration that the decision of the first defendant D1 in terminating his service was wrongful, null and void, being in contravention of the rules of natural justice; and for the plaintiff be reinstated to the service. The plaintiff’s allegations essentially revolve around the issues of bad faith and breach of the rules of natural justice. The issues for determination were: (1) whether the adjudicating officer D1 had denied the plaintiff’s right to representation, thereby contravening reg 5 of the Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) Regulations 1970 (‘the Regulations’) — it was
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 55 alleged that D1 had deliberately frustrated the plaintiff’s right; (2) who bore the burden of proving the allegations made against D1 in relation to malice and breach of the rules of natural justice. In this case the plaintiff’s application was supported by way of mere affidavits although D1 had put the plaintiff to strict proof of the allegations; and (3) whether the plaintiff had proved malice and breach of the rules of natural justice in the enquiry conducted by D1 — it was argued that D1 had prejudiced ||Page 56>> the plaintiff’s case and subjected the plaintiff to intense mental distress and anxiety by prolonging the period of suspension
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s originating summons: (1) The discretion to grant or refuse permission to be represented is a judicial or quasi-judicial discretion which must be exercised judicially having regard to established principles and all the facts and circumstances in each particular case (see para 32). This permission to be represented, once granted by the adjudicating officer, shall be elevated to the status of a right under reg 5(3), as the police officer (‘the representor’) nominated by the plaintiff shall be made available to appear at the enquiry (see para 33). After the elevation of the permission under reg 5(1) to a right under reg 5(3), such a right is subject to two conditions subsequent, viz first the representor must agree, ie ready, able and willing to represent the plaintiff and secondly it is not inexpedient for the representor to appear for the plaintiff at the enquiry (see para 34). Since the facts show that in relation to the enquiry held on 31 October 2000 and continued on 3 November 2000, the plaintiff had made no application for permission under reg 5(1), there was no question of denying or depriving the plaintiff of his right to representation. The plaintiff had by such conduct failed to avail himself of the permission to be represented at the enquiry by a police officer of his choice (see para 39). (2) D1’s rejection of the plaintiff’s application of several named representors was not in contravention of reg 5(1) or (3) as it would be inexpedient for them to represent the plaintiff at the respective enquiry, which in any event did not proceed as scheduled. Hence, there was no denial of the plaintiff’s right to representation (see para 40). (3) The plaintiff’s allegations were serious and could not be resolved by way of mere affidavits, especially when they had been vigorously and vehemently denied in the affidavits affirmed by D1. As conceded by the plaintiff’s learned counsel, there can be no doubt that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff (see para 47). (4) The adjudicating officer D1 had done what regs 6(3)(b) and 6(6) required of him and had indeed given the plaintiff the opportunity of pleading in mitigation before the punishments were meted out (see para 58). In the absence of viva voce evidence which is to be tested by way of cross- examination and
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 56 re-examination, upon which an evaluation and assessment may be embarked upon, so as to arrive at a mature consideration, the court was unable to say that the plaintiff had discharged his burden of proving the allegations of D1’s bad faith and breach of the rules of natural justice on a balance of probabilities (see para 59). ||Page 57>> (5) As the plaintiff’s originating summons was commenced against, inter alia, D1 for D1’s act done in pursuance or execution of the Regulations or of his public duty or authority as the adjudicating officer, and judgment had been obtained, inter alia, by D1, the clear provisions of s 2(b) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 viz the words ‘shall carry costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client’ make it mandatory for the award of costs on a solicitor-client basis (see para 64).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, seorang anggota polis berpangkat lans korporal, didapati bersalah atas pertuduhan tatatertib dan dipecat di akhir siasatan tatatertib. Plaintif memohon satu deklarasi bahawa keputusan defendan pertama D1 dalam menamatkan perkhidmatannya adalah salah, terbatal dan tidak sah, kerana bercanggah dengan rukun keadilan semula jadi; dan agar plaintif dikembalikan ke jawatan asal dalam perkhidmatan. Pengataan plaintif khususnya berkisarkan persoalan niat jahat dan perlanggaran rukun keadilan semula jadi. Persoalan yang perlu ditentukan adalah: (1) sama ada pegawai penghukuman D1 menafikan hak representasi plaintif, yang dengan itu bertentangan dengan per 5 Peraturan-Peraturan Polis (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) (Pegawai Polis Junior dan Konstabel) 1970 (‘Peraturan itu’) — ia dikatakan bahawa D1 secara sengaja menidakkan hak plaintif; (2) siapa yang mempunyai beban untuk membuktikan pengataan yang dibuat terhadap D1 berkaitan niat jahat dan perlanggaran rukun keadilan semula jadi. Dalam kes ini, permohonan plaintif disokong oleh afidavit-afidavit sahaja meskipun D1 telah meletakkan plaintif untuk membuktikan pengataan dengan ketat; dan (3) sama ada plaintif telah membuktikan niat jahat dan perlanggaran rukun keadilan semula jadi dalam siasatan yang dikendalikan oleh D1 — ia dihujahkan bahawa D1 telah memprejudiskan kes plaintif dan menyebabkan plaintif mengalami gangguan mental dan kerunsingan yang amat dengan melengah- lengahkan tempoh penggantungan.
Diputuskan, menolak saman pemula plaintif: (1) Budi bicara untuk membenar atau menolak kebenaran untuk representasi adalah budi bicara kehakiman atau quasi-kehakiman yang perlu digunakan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 57 secara adil berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip yang ditetapkan dan semua fakta dan keadaan dalam setiap kes (lihat perenggan 32). Kebenaran untuk direpresentasikan, setelah diberikan oleh pegawai penghukuman, hendaklah menjadi satu hak di bawah per 5(3), memandangkan pegawai polis ‘representasi’ yang dilantik oleh plaintif hendaklah bersedia untuk hadir ||Page 58>> semasa siasatan (lihat perenggan 33). Setelah kebenaran itu ditingkatkan di bawah per 5(1) kepada satu hak di bawah per 5(3), hak sedemikian adalah tertakluk kepada dua syarat yang berikutnya, di mana pertamanya representasi perlu bersetuju, iaitu bersedia, berupaya dan ingin mewakili plaintif dan keduanya ia tidak melengahkan untuk hadir mewakili plaintif semasa siasatan itu (lihat perenggan 34). Memandangkan fakta menunjukkan bahawa siasatan yang diadakan pada 31 Oktober 2000 dan bersambung pada 3 November 2000, plaintif tidak membuat apa-apa permohonan untuk kebenaran di bawah per 5(1), tiada persoalan tentang penafian plaintif terhadap haknya untuk representasi. Plaintif telah melalui perbuatannya tersebut gagal untuk mendapatkan kebenaran untuk direpresentasikan semasa siasatan oleh pegawai polis pilihannya (lihat perenggan 39). (2) Penolakan D1 terhadap permohonan plaintif untuk beberapa orang yang dinamakan sebagai representasi tidak bertentangan dengan per 5(1) atau (3) kerana ia akan melengah-lengahkan mereka untuk mewakili plaintif dalam siasatan tersebut, yang dalam apa keadaan tidak diteruskan seperti yang ditetapkan. Justeru itu, tiada penafian terhadap hak plaintif untuk representasi (lihat perenggan 40). (3) Pengataan plaintif adalah serius dan tidak boleh diselesaikan dengan afidavit-afidavit itu sahaja, terutamanya apabila mereka telah menafikan sekeras-kerasnya dalam afidavit-afidavit yang disahkan oleh D1. Seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguam plaintif yang bijaksana, tiada keraguan bahawa beban bukti terletak atas plaintif (lihat perenggan 47). (4) Pegawai penghukuman D1 telah melakukan apa yang dikehendaki oleh per 6(3)(b) dan per 6(6) dan telah memberikan plaintif peluang untuk membuat pliding semasa mitigasi sebelum hukuman diputuskan (lihat perenggan 58). Dalam ketiadaan keterangan viva voce yang perlu diuji dalam pemeriksaan balas dan pemeriksaan semula, yang mana satu penilaian dan penaksiran dapat diputuskan, agar dapat satu pertimbangan yang tepat, mahkamah tidak dapat mengatakan bahawa plaintif telah melepaskan beban membuktikan pengataan D1 yang berniat jahat dan perlanggaran rukun keadilan semula jadi itu atas imbangan kebarangkalian (lihat perenggan 59). (5) Memandangkan saman pemula plaintif dimulakan terhadap, antara lain, D1 kerana tindakan D1 yang dilakukan menurut atau berikutan penyempurnaan peraturan atau kewajipan awam atau kuasa beliau sebagai pegawai penghukuman, dan penghakiman telah diperoleh, antara lain, oleh D1, peruntukan nyata s 2(b) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa Awam 1948
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 58 melalui perkataan-perkataan ‘shall carry costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client’ menjadikan ia mandatori untuk membuat satu award untuk kos berdasarkan hubungan peguamcara-anakguam (lihat perenggan 64).] ||Page 59>>
Notes For cases on dismissal of public officer, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 671–673. For cases on rules of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 684–686. For cases on government proceedings generally, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) paras 2530–2544. For cases on solicitor and client cost, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) paras 1894–1902.
Cases referred to Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 (refd) Mohd Zaki bin Meon v Hj Mohd Said bin Fadzil & 3 Ors Johor Bahru High Court Civil Suit 22–144 of 1997 (unreported) (refd) Narinder Singh a/l Jaswant Singh v Ketua Palis Daerah Georgetown & Ors [1996] MLJU 246 (refd) Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd) Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 MLJ 673 (refd) Utra Badi K Perumal v Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 676 (refd) Yeap Seok Pen v Government of the State of Kelantan [1986] 1 MLJ 449 (refd)
Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 s 101 Federal Constitution arts 8(2) and 135(2) Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) Regulations 1970 sch 2(12), (32), (46), regs 3(4), 5, 6(3)(b), (6) Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) (Repeal) Regulations 2000 Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 s 2(b) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 GO 26(4)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 59 Sivenasan Achalingam (A Sivanesan & Co) for the plaintiff. Narkunavathy Sundareson (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendants.
[2005] 4 MLJ 433 TAN SRI ERIC CHIA v ATTORNEY GENERAL
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1–25–253 OF 2004 RAUS SHARIF J 26 DECEMBER 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application to quash decision of Attorney General — Attorney General requested foreign courts to take evidence of witness and production of documents — Whether respondent a public authority — Whether act of respondent in taking of evidence under Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 was part of prerogative under Article 145 (3) Federal Constitution thus not amendable to review by Courts — Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 — Federal Constitution art 145 (3)
Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Civil jurisdiction of High Court — Whether civil court has jurisdiction to review proceedings before sessions court in exercising of criminal jurisdiction
Criminal Procedure — Jurisdiction of court — Taking of evidence under Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 by the Public Prosecutor — Whether amounted to an intrusion or interference with judicial powers of sessions court — Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 s 8(1)
The applicant was charged at the session court in Kuala Lumpur under s 409 of the Penal Code. The charges alleged that the applicant had committed criminal breach of trust. In the midst of the trial, the deputy public prosecutor (‘respondent’) informed the sessions court, in relation to the respondent’s request to the judicial authority of Hong Kong, under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 (‘the Act’), to get the assistance of the Magistrates Court in Hong Kong to record the taking of oral evidence of witnesses and production of documents pertaining to the trail of payment. The respondent then applied to the sessions court for an adjournment in order to give way to the Hong Kong proceedings. At the same time, the respondent had also indicated that after Hong Kong, similar application may be made to the legal authority in Switzerland and Japan. This was an application by the applicant for leave to commence proceedings under O 53 r 3 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 60 1980’) for an order of certiorari to quash the request made by the respondent to the judicial authority at Hong Kong, Switzerland and Japan pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) Under O 53 r 2(4) of the RHC 1980, any person who was adversely affected by the decision of any public authority shall be entitled to make this application. The respondent being the Attorney General of Malaysia was a public authority. Section 8(1) of the Act related to the powers and discretion conferred and imposed on the Attorney General. The section ||Page 434>> used words or phrases ‘may’, ‘if he is satisfied’, ‘there are reasonable grounds’, ‘evidence would be relevant’ and ‘request’. All these words or phrases indicated discretionary decision needing to be made to result in the request. Therefore, the requests by the respondent to the judicial authority in Hong Kong, Switzerland and Japan were decisions within the requirements and meaning of O 53 of the RHC 1980 (see para 10). (2) The act of the respondent did not amount to an intrusion or interference with the judicial powers of the sessions court. The recording of evidence under s 8(1) of the Act was not a continuation of the applicant’s criminal trial at the sessions court in Kuala Lumpur. The applicant’s criminal trial had not shifted. It remained in Kuala Lumpur before the same sessions court. The sessions court judge’s powers were still intact. This was because under the scheme of the Act, any evidence collected would still be subjected to the sessions court scrutiny before such evidence can be admitted and considered (see para 17). (3) This court being a civil court has no jurisdiction to review the proceedings before the sessions court, in exercising of its criminal jurisdiction. Any challenge by the applicant to the respondent’s attempt to adduce the evidence recorded under s 8(1) of the Act should be made to the sessions court. Whether such evidence was admissible or inadmissible was for the sessions court to decide. Thus, to accede to the applicant’s application would tantamount to this court interfering with the jurisdiction of the sessions court (see para 19).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah didakwa di mahkamah sesyen Kuala Lumpur di bawah s 409 Kanun Keseksaan. Tuduhan tersebut mengatakan bahawa pemohon telah melakukan kesalahan pecah amanah. Semasa perbicaraan, timbalan pendakwa raya (‘responden’) memberitahu mahkamah sesyen, berkaitan permohonan responden kepada badan berkuasa kehakiman Hong Kong di bawah Akta Bantuan Bersama Dalam Perkara Jenayah 2002 (‘Akta tersebut’), bahawa Mahkamah Majistret di Hong Kong akan diminta merekodkan pengambilan keterangan lisan saksi-saksi serta pengemukaan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 61 dokumen berkaitan dengan sejarah pembayaran. Responden kemudian memohon kepada mahkamah sesyen untuk penangguhan sementara prosiding di Hong Kong diteruskan. Pada masa yang sama, responden telah memberitahu mahkamah bahawa permohonan yang serupa mungkin akan ditujukan kepada badan berkuasa kehakiman di negara- negara Switzerland dan Jepun. Ini merupakan permohonan dari pemohon untuk kebenaran memulakan prosiding di bawah O 53 r 3 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT 1980’) untuk perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan permohonan responden kepada badan berkuasa kehakiman di Hong Kong, Switzerland dan Jepun menurut peruntukan-peruntukan Akta tersebut. ||Page 435>>
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan itu: (1) Di bawah O 53 r 2(4) KMT 1980, mana-mana orang yang terjejas akibat keputusan mana-mana pihak berkuasa awam diberi hak untuk membuat permohonan sebegini. Pihak responden sebagai Peguam Negara Malaysia merupakan pihak berkuasa awam. Seksyen 8(1) Akta tersebut berkaitan dengan kuasa dan budi bicara yang diberikan serta dikenakan terhadap Peguam Negara. Seksyen tersebut menggunakan perkataan atau frasa seperti ‘may’, ‘if he is satisfied’, ‘there are reasonable grounds’, ‘evidence would be relevant’ serta ‘request’. Kesemua perkataan atau frasa tersebut menunjukkan bahawa keputusan menggunakan budi bicara perlu dibuat untuk menghasilkan permohonan tersebut. Oleh itu, permohonan responden kepada badan berkuasa kehakiman di Hong Kong, Switzerland dan Jepun merupakan keputusan-keputusan dalam kehendak dan maksud O 53 KMT 1980 (lihat perenggan 10). (2) Perbuatan responden tidak merupakan pencerobohan atau gangguan terhadap kuasa kehakiman mahkamah sesyen. Merekod bukti di bawah s 8(1) Akta tersebut tidak merupakan sambungan perbicaraan jenayah pemohon di mahkamah sesyen di Kuala Lumpur. Perbicaraan jenayah pemohon tidak beralih. Perbicaraan tersebut tetap di Kuala Lumpur di hadapan mahkamah sesyen yang sama. Kuasa yang terletak pada hakim mahkamah sesyen masih sempurna. Ini adalah kerana di bawah skim Akta tersebut, mana-mana bukti yang dikumpulkan masih perlu diperiksa dengan rapi oleh mahkamah sesyen sebelum bukti tersebut boleh diterima masuk dan dipertimbangkan (lihat perenggan 17). (3) Mahkamah ini yang merupakan mahkamah sivil tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mengkaji semula prosiding mahkamah sesyen yang melaksanakan bidang kuasa jenayah. Apa-apa cabaran dari pemohon terhadap cubaan responden untuk mengemukakan bukti yang direkodkan di bawah s 8(1) Akta tersebut perlu dibuat kepada mahkamah seksyen. Terpulang kepada mahkamah sesyen sama ada bukti tersebut boleh diterima masuk atau tidak. Oleh yang demikian, membenarkan permohonan pemohon adalah sama seperti mahkamah ini campur tangan dalam bidang kuasa mahkamah sesyen (lihat perenggan 19).]
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 62
Notes For a case on application for an order of certiorari, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) para 1490.
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Evidence Act 1950 Federal Constitution art 145(3) ||Page 436>> Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002 s 8(1), (4), 9 Penal Code s 409 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3
Mohd Shafee bin Abdullah (Azizan bin Harun with him) (Shafee & Co) for the applicant. Ummi Kalthum bte Abdul Majid (Abdul Rahim bin Uda and Azizah bte Hj Nawawi with her) (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
[2005] 5 MLJ 193 KELAB LUMBA KUDA PERAK v MENTERI SUMBER MANUSIA, MALAYSIA & ORS
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–61 OF 2001 MOKHTAR SIDIN, DENIS ONG JJCA AND ZULKEFLI MAKINUDIN J 14 APRIL 2005
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Trade Union — Application for recognition by trade union — Failure to give reasons for recognition of trade union — Automatic rejection of secret ballot exercise due to department’s policy — Whether breach of procedural fairness
Labour Law — Trade Union — Recognition — Membership in trade union — Whether by way of verification of membership or secret ballot — Whether breach of legitimate expectation in not conducting secret ballot exercise as requested by appellant club
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 63 Labour Law — Trade Union — Recognition — Membership in trade union — Whether temporary workers to be excluded from scope of representation of trade union
The second respondent, a trade union, sought recognition from the appellant in respect of employees of the appellant who had become its members. The appellant requested a secret ballot to be taken to establish whether a majority of its employees were members of the second respondent at the material time. The Director of Trade Union (‘DGTU’) however informed the appellant and the second respondent that a membership verification exercise would be undertaken instead to ascertain the percentage of members in the second respondent. No reasons were given as to why a secret ballot was not carried out. Pursuant to the verification exercise, the Director General of Industrial Relations (‘DGIR’) advised the appellant to accord recognition to the second respondent. The first respondent ordered the same. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s application for order of certiorari to quash the decision of the first respondent ordering the appellant to accord recognition to the second respondent as a trade union. The appellant relied on the following grounds in seeking an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the first respondent: (1) illegal exclusion of temporary employees from scope of representation of the second respondent; (2) breach of the principles of natural justice and procedural unfairness; (3) the deprivation of the appellant’s legitimate expectation; and (4) perverse and unreasonable exercise of discretion.
Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the order of recognition of the second respondent made by the first respondent: (1) The learned judge of the High Court had erred in law in holding that the appellant should have made both the DGTU and DGIR as parties to the proceedings. In the present instance the challenge was against the first respondent’s decision to accord recognition to the second respondent. In concluding that the action had been brought against the wrong party, ||Page 194>> the learned judge had erred in law in that the DGTU and DGIR have no power to accord recognition to the second respondent. Hence it would be erroneous to name them as parties to the action. The decision of the first respondent was premised on adopting the decisions of the DGTU and DGIR without actually applying his mind to the material before him. Accordingly if the decision-making process was flawed, then it was the decision of the first respondent that was opened to challenge (see para 3). (2) It would be illegal to exclude temporary employees from the scope of representation of the Union, in fact no distinction is made between temporary, casual or permanent employees. In light of the fact that the appellant had contended that temporary and casual workmen were to be included in the scope of representation of the second respondent’s and the union’s stance in adopting the opposite view, it was a condition precedent for the first respondent to ascertain the number and categories of workmen within the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 64 scope of representation of the second respondent before determining the secondary issue of whether to accord recognition (see para 10). (3) The DGTU had based its decision solely on the original incomplete list of employees and refused to consider the revised list submitted by the appellant when it had been directed to do so by the DGIR. Its refusal for doing so was premised on the second respondent’s assertion that temporary and casual employees were not within the scope of representation of the second respondent. Without even according the appellant the opportunity to be heard, the DGTU arbitrarily decided that the second respondent’s assertion must be accepted and dismissed the second list submitted by the appellant. At the very least, the DGTU was obligated statutorily to verify whether the employees in the amended list were employees within the scope of representation. The failure of the DGTU to include the temporary and casual employees in the verification exercise was an error committed in breach of the provisions of the Trade Unions Act 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and this nullified the entire recognition exercise (see para 13). (4) The fact that the DGTU automatically rejected the appellant’s request for a secret ballot on account of the fact that there was no joint request by the parties for a secret ballot was a perverse and unreasonable exercise of the discretion as to how to conduct the membership check. The provisions of the Trade Union Regulations 1959 do not prescribe that a secret ballot should only be undertaken if there was a joint request by the parties (see para 18). (5) The first respondent, in agreeing and adopting the decision of the DGTU, and in making an order of recognition under s 9 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 had acted in breach of the appellant’s legitimate ||Page 195>> expectation that a secret ballot be conducted to determine the membership of the second respondent (see para 21). It is of paramount importance to ensure that all the affected employees of the appellant have a right to state their choice through secret ballot as to whether they elect to be members of the second respondent and therefore assign their contracting right to the second respondent (see para 22). (6) The failure of the first respondent to give reasons for his order of recognition and for adopting the recommendations of the DGTU and the DGIR violated the rules of procedural fairness (see para 28), and was grossly inconsistent with the principles of fairness guaranteed under art 8 of the Federal Constitution. The decision of the first respondent was therefore, fundamentally flawed and should be quashed (see para 29).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden kedua, sebuah kesatuan sekerja, memohon pengiktirafan dari perayu berhubung dengan semua pekerja perayu yang telah menjadi ahlinya. Perayu meminta
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 65 agar satu undian rahsia diadakan untuk menentukan sama ada majoriti dari pekerja-pekerjanya adalah ahli responden kedua pada masa matan itu. Pengarah Besar Kesatuan Sekerja (‘PKS’) sebaliknya memberitahu perayu dan responden kedua bahawa satu penentusahan ahli akan diadakan untuk menentukan peratusan ahli di dalam responden kedua. Tiada sebab- sebab diberikan kenapa undian rahsia tidak diadakan. Mengikut penentusahan tersebut, Pengarah Besar Perhubungan Perindustrian (‘PBPI’) menasihatkan perayu untuk memberi pengiktirafan kepada responden kedua. Responden pertama oleh itu memberikan pengiktirafan tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan perayu untuk perintah certiorari membatalkan keputusan responden pertama yang memerintahkan perayu untuk memberi pengiktirafan kepada responden kedua sebagai sebuah kesatuan sekerja. Perayu bergantung kepada alasan-alasan berikut dalam memohon perintah certiorari membatalkan keputusan responden pertama: (1) pengecualian yang tidak sah berhubung dengan pekerja sementara dari skop representasi responden kedua; (2) pengingkaran prinsip keadilan asasi dan ketidakadilan prosedur; (3) kelucutan harapan sah perayu; dan (4) penggunaan budibicara yang tidak wajar.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dan membatalkan perintah pengiktirafan responden kedua yang dibuat oleh responden pertama: (1) Yang arif hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dalam memutuskan yang bahawa perayu patut menjadikan kedua-dua PKS dan PBPI sebagai pihak-pihak dalam prosiding ini. Dalam kes semasa, bantahan adalah terhadap keputusan responden pertama memberi pengiktirafan kepada responden kedua. Dalam memutuskan yang tindakan ini dibawa terhadap pihak yang salah, yang arif hakim telah khilaf dari segi pada undang-undang kerana PKS dan PBPI tidak mempunyai kuasa ||Page 196>> untuk memberi pengiktirafan kepada responden kedua. Dari itu, ianya salah untuk menamakan mereka sebagi pihak-pihak dalam tindakan ini. Keputusan responden pertama adalah berdasarkan keputusan PKS dan PBPI tanpa menggunapakai mindanya kepada material di hadapannya. Oleh yang demikian, jika proses membuat keputusan cacat maka keputusan responden pertama boleh juga dipertikaikan (lihat perenggan 3). (2) Adalah salah di sisi undang-undang untuk mengecualikan pekerja-pekerja sementara dari skop representasi Kesatuan Sekerja, malahan tiada perbezaan di antara pekerja-pekerja sementara, sambilan dan tetap. Berdasarkan fakta bahawa perayu telah menyatakan bahawa pekerja-pekerja sementara dan sambilan perlu dimasukkan di dalam skop representasi responden kedua dan pandangan kesatuan sekerja yang adalah sebaliknya, ianya menjadi satu pra-syarat kepada responden pertama untuk menentukan bilangan dan kategori pekerja di dalam skop representasi responden kedua sebelum memutuskan isu kedua sama ada untuk memberi pengiktirafan (lihat perenggan 10). (3) PKS telah membuat keputusannya hanya berdasarkan senarai asal pekerja-pekerja yang tidak lengkap dan tidak mahu menimbangkan senarai yang
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 66 dikemas kini yang dikemukakan oleh perayu apabila ia diarahkan berbuat demikian oleh PBPI. Keengganannya berbuat demikian adalah didasarkan kepada pernyataan responden kedua yang pekerja-pekerja sementara dan sambilan tidak termasuk di dalam skop representasi responden kedua. Tanpa memberi peluang kepada perayu untuk didengar, PKS sewenang-wenangnya memutuskan yang pernyataan responden kedua mestilah diterima dan menolak senarai kedua yang dikemukakan oleh perayu. Sekurang-kurangnya, PKS berkewajipan secara statutori untuk menentusahkan sama ada pekerja-pekerja di dalam senarai yang terpinda itu adalah pekerja-pekerja di bawah skop representasi. Kegagalan PBPI untuk memasukkan pekerja-pekerja sementara dan sambilan di dalam penentusahan itu adalah satu pengingkaran di bawah peruntukan- peruntukan Akta Kesatuan-Kesatuan Sekerja 1959 dan Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 dan ini telah membatalkan keseluruhan pengiktirafan tersebut (lihat perenggan 13). (4) Keputusan PKS yang secara automatik menolak permohonan perayu untuk undian rahsia kerana tiada terdapat permohonan bersama pihak- pihak untuk undian rahsia adalah satu penggunaan budi bicara yang tidak wajar berhubung dengan bagaimana keahlian ditentukan. Peraturan- peraturan Kesatuan Sekerja 1959 tidak memperuntukkan yang undian rahsia hanya boleh diadakan jika ada permohonan bersama pihak-pihak (lihat perenggan 18). (5) Responden pertama dalam bersetuju dan menggunapakai keputusan PKS, dan membuat perintah pengiktirafan di bawah s 9 Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 telah mengingkari harapan sah perayu bahawa undian ||Page 197>> rahsia akan diadakan untuk memutuskan keahlian responden kedua (lihat perenggan 21). Ianya sangat penting bagi memastikan yang kesemua pekerja perayu yang terlibat mempunyai hak untuk menyatakan pilihan mereka melalui undian rahsia sama ada mereka memilih untuk menjadi ahli responden kedua dan dengan itu menyerahhakkan hak-hak berkontrak mereka kepada responden kedua (lihat perenggan 22). (6) Kegagalan responden pertama memberi alasan-alasan bagi perintah pengiktirafan dan menggunapakaikan cadangan-cadangan PKS dan PBPI adalah bertentangan dengan rukun-rukun keadilan prosedur (lihat perenggan 28), dan ianya jelas tidak konsisten dengan prinsip-prinsip keadilan yang dijamin di bawah fasal 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Keputusan responden pertama dengan itu adalah cacat pada dasarnya dan wajar dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 29).]
Notes For cases on recognition of trade unions, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1502–1520. For cases on Trade Union, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 778–779.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 67 Cases referred to Hoh Kiang Ngap v Mahkamah Perusahaaan Malaysia & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 369 (refd) Hong Leong Equipment v Liew Fook Chuan [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Minister of Human Resources v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Wokers [1997] 3 MLJ 377 (refd) Rohana v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah [1988] 3 MLJ 289 (refd) Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 5, 8 Industrial Court Rules 1980 r 4(1)(c) Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 2, 9(1), (4C), 20(3) Industrial Relations Regulations 1980 reg 4(1)(c) Trade Union Act 1959 s 26(3) Trade Union Regulations 1959 regs 62, 63, 67
Appeal from Originating Motion No R2–25–44 of 2000 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
N Sivabalah (Suganthi Singam with him) (Shearn Delamore) for the appellant. Ishak bin Bakri (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the first respondent. LG Seah (Lobo & Associates) for the second respondent. ||Page 198>>
[2005] 6 MLJ 193 LINA JOY v MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN & ORS
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–29 OF 2001 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ MOHAMAD AND ARIFIN ZAKARIA JJCA 19 SEPTEMBER 2005
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 68 Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Decision or order of — National Registration Department — Refusal to delete word ‘Islam’ from national registration card without certificate or order from Syariah Court — Whether decision valid — National Registration Regulation 1990 reg 14
Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Conversion out of Islam — Proof of amendment of national registration identity card to delete the word ‘Islam’ — Whether certificate or order from Syariah Court necessary — National Registration Regulations 1990 reg 14
The appellant was born a Muslim and her name originally was Azlina bte Jailani. In 1990 she claimed to have believed fully in Christianity and was subsequently baptised. She applied to the National Registration Department (‘the NRD’) to have her name changed at first to Lina Lelani and later to Lina Joy on the grounds of her change of religion. Her change of name was subsequently allowed, but the word ‘Islam’ was stated in her National Registration Identity Card (‘NRIC’). She submitted proof of her change of religion and applied to the NRD to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC. However, the NRD requested for the appellant to submit a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. The issue was whether the NRD was right in law in rejecting the appellant’s application under reg 14 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 (‘the 1990 Regulations’) to have the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC and in requiring a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. The respondent relied on para (cc)(xiii) of reg 4 that the Director General is entitled to call for additional information from a person applying for a change of name under reg 14. Therefore, there was nothing illegal in the Director General requesting the appellant to produce a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. However, counsel for the appellant submitted that reg 4(cc)(xiii) only permits the Director General to request for information in respect of the particulars furnished by the appellant. So, in the present instance the Director General would have been entitled to ask the appellant to produce her baptismal certificate to show that she was in fact a Christian as stated in her application form. Accordingly, the request for the order from the Syariah Court was not a request authorised by reg 4(cc)(xiii). ||Page 194>>
Held, by majority dismissing the appeal: (1) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA, Arifin Zakaria JCA concuring) In the appellant’s application to NRD, she in effect stated that the error in her identity card was in the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’, which therefore she wanted removed. It amounted to her saying that she had renounced Islam. The NRD could therefore require her to produce documentary evidence to support the accuracy of her contention that she was no longer a Muslim (see para 31).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 69 (2) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA, Arifin Zakaria JCA concuring) The fact that whether a person had renounced Islam is a question of Islamic law that was not within the jurisdiction of the NRD and that the NRD was not equipped or qualified to decide. It was because renunciation of Islam was a matter of Islamic law on which the NRD was not an authority that it adopts the policy of requiring the determination of some Islamic religious authority before it could act to remove the word ‘Islam’ from a Muslim’s identity card. The policy was a perfectly reasonable one (see para 34). (3) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) An order from the Syariah Court would do nothing to support the accuracy of the particular that the appellant was a Christian. However the baptismal certificate dated 11 May 1998 produced by the appellant in evidence amply supported the accuracy of the particular that the appellant was a Christian. Regulation 14(2) requires an applicant to state in his or her statutory declaration the reason for the change of name. In the appellant’s case, she stated that her reason for the change of name was that she was now a Christian. Accordingly, there was nothing in reg 4(cc)(xiii) that supported the action of the Director General in this case (see para 58). It followed that an order or certificate from the Syariah Court was not a relevant document for the processing of the appellant’s application. It was not a document prescribed by the 1990 Regulations. Nor was it a particular that a registration officer was entitled to call for as a particular under reg 4(cc)(xiii) (see para 59). By requiring the production of the said order/certificate, the Director General took into account an irrelevant consideration when deciding not to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC. That, of course, vitiated the decision not to delete the word ‘Islam’ from the appellant’s NRIC (see para 60). (4) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) Where a public decision-maker takes extraneous matters into account his or her decision is null and void and of no effect. Therefore, the Director General’s decision in refusing to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC without an order/certificate of the Syariah Court was null and void and of no effect (see para 64). ||Page 195>> (4) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) It was conceded on behalf of the Director General that before 1 October 1999 there was no provision in the 1990 Regulations that mandated the statement of a person’s religion in his or her NRIC. So, if the Director General had approved the appellant’s application as he was bound by law to do at the time the appellant’s application to the NRD was made, the present problem would never have arisen (see para 65).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu dilahirkan sebagai seorang beragama Islam dan nama asalnya adalah Azlina bte
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 70 Jailani. Pada 1990 beliau mendakwa telah mempercayai sepenuhnya agama Kristian dan telah kemudiannya dibaptiskan. Beliau memohon kepada Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (‘JPN’) untuk menukar namanya pertama kali kepada Lina Lelani dan kemudiannya kepada Lina Joy atas dasar pertukaran agama. Pertukaran namanya kemudiannya telah dibenarkan, tetapi perkataan ‘Islam’ tertera pada Kad Pengenalan (‘KP’) beliau. Beliau telah mengemukakan bukti berkenaan pertukaran agamanya dan memohon kepada JPN untuk memadamkan perkataan ‘Islam’ daripada KP beliau. Walau bagaimanapun, JPN telah meminta perayu untuk mengemukakan sijil dan/atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah. Isunya adalah sama ada JPN betul dalam menolak permohonan perayu di bawah per 14 Peraturan Pendaftaran Kebangsaan 1990 (‘Peraturan 1990’) untuk kenyataan agamanya sebagai ‘Islam’ dipadamkan daripada KP beliau dan dalam meminta sijil dan/atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah. Pihak responden bergantung kepada perenggan (cc)(xiii) per 4 yang menyatakan Ketua Pengarah adalah berhak untuk meminta maklumat tambahan daripada seseorang yang memohon untuk pertukaran nama di bawah per 14. Oleh itu, tiada apa-apa yang menyalahi undang-undang bagi Ketua Pengarah untuk meminta perayu mengemukakan sijil dan/atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah. Walau bagaimanapun, peguamcara bagi perayu menghujahkan bahawa per 4(cc)(xiii) hanya membenarkan Ketua Pengarah untuk meminta maklumat berkenaan dengan butir-butir yang telah dikemukakan oleh perayu. Oleh itu, dalam kes sekarang ini, Ketua Pengarah berhak meminta perayu untuk mengemukakan sijil pembaptisan beliau untuk menunjukkan bahawa beliau dengan sebenarnya adalah seorang beragama Kristian seperti yang dinyatakan dalam borang permohonannya. Berikutan dengan itu, permintaan bagi perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah bukanlah merupakan permintaan yang sah di bawah per 4(cc)(xiii). ||Page 196>>
Diputuskan, dengan majoriti menolak rayuan itu: (1) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR, Arifin Zakaria HMR bersetuju) Dalam permohonan perayu kepada JPN, beliau telah menyatakan bahawa kesilapan pada kad pengenalannya adalah berkenaan dengan kenyataan agamanya sebagai ‘Islam’, yang mana beliau mahu dipadamkan. Ini adalah sama seperti beliau menyatakan bahawa beliau telah keluar daripada Islam. JPN oleh itu boleh meminta beliau untuk mengemukakan keterangan dokumentari untuk menyokong ketepatan kenyataan beliau bahawa beliau bukan lagi beragama Islam (lihat perenggan 31). (2) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR, Arifin Zakaria HMR bersetuju) Fakta sama ada seseorang itu telah keluar daripada Islam adalah merupakan persoalan undang-undang Islam yang bukan di bawah bidangkuasa JPN dan JPN adalah tidak berkebolehan atau layak untuk memberi keputusan. Ini adalah kerana keluar Islam adalah merupakan hal ehwal undang-undang Islam yang mana JPN bukanlah pihak yang berkuasa yang membuatkannya mengamalkan polisi untuk
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 71 meminta penetapan daripada pihak berkuasa agama Islam sebelum ia boleh bertindak untuk memadamkan perkataan ‘Islam’ daripada kad pengenalan seseorang yang beragama Islam. Polisi tersebut adalah sememangnya berpatutan (lihat perenggan 34). (3) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah tidak akan memberi apa-apa kesan untuk menyokong ketepatan berkenaan butir-butir bahawa perayu adalah seorang yang beragama Kristian. Walau bagaimanapun, sijil pembaptisan bertarikh 11 Mei 1998 yang dikemukakan oleh perayu dengan secukupnya telah menyokong ketepatan butir-butir bahawa perayu beragama Kristian. Peraturan 14(2) mengehendaki seseorang pemohon untuk menyatakan dalam akuan berkanunnya sebab bagi pertukaran nama tersebut. Dalam kes perayu, beliau telah menyatakan bahawa sebab pertukaran nama adalah kerana beliau sekarang adalah seorang Kristian. Berikutan dengan itu, tiada apa-apa dalam per 4(cc)(xiii) yang menyokong tindakan Ketua Pengarah dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 58). Oleh itu arahan atau sijil daripada Mahkamah Syariah bukan merupakan dokumen yang relevan untuk memproses permohonan perayu. Ia bukanlah dokumen yang ditetapkan dalam Peraturan 1990. Ia juga bukan merupakan butir-butir yang boleh diminta oleh pegawai pendaftar sebagai butir-butir di bawah per 4(cc)(xiii) (lihat perenggan 59). Dengan meminta perintah/sijil tersebut dikemukakan, Ketua Pengarah telah mengambil kira satu pertimbangan yang tidak relevan semasa membuat keputusan untuk tidak membuat pertukaran kepada KP perayu. Ini tentunya membuatkan keputusan untuk tidak memadamkan perkataan ‘Islam’ daripada KP perayu tidak sah (lihat perenggan 60). (4) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Di mana pembuat keputusan awam mengambil kira perkara yang tidak berkaitan keputusan beliau ||Page 197>> adalah tidak sah dan terbatal dan tidak mempunyai kesan. Oleh itu, keputusan Ketua Pengarah untuk menolak untuk membuat perubahan kepada KP perayu tanpa perintah/sijil daripada Mahkamah Syariah adalah tidak sah dan terbatal dan tidak mempunyai kesan (lihat perenggan 64). (5) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Adalah diakui bagi pihak Ketua Pengarah bahawa sebelum 1 Oktober 1999 tiada peruntukan dalam Peraturan 1990 yang memandatkan pernyataan agama seseorang di dalam kad pengenalannya. Jadi, sekiranya Ketua Pengarah telah meluluskan permohonan perayu sepertimana yang diwajibkan oleh undang-undang ke atas beliau semasa permohonan perayu kepada JPN dibuat, masalah sekarang ini tidak akan timbul (lihat perenggan 65).]
Notes For cases on exercise of administrative powers generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 28–90. For cases on freedom of religion, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 72 paras 1790–1800.
Cases referred to Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (refd) Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (refd) Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi v The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (refd) Ismail bin Suppiah v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R–1–24–31 of 1995) (refd) Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v State of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 142 (refd) Marathei v JG Containers (JV) Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 MLJ 337 (refd) R v The War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex p Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 (refd) Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (refd)
Legislation referred to Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territory) Act 1993 Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 s 141(2) Federal Constitution art 11 cl (1), art 160 cl (2), art 121 cl (1A) National Registration Regulations 1990 reg 4, (cc)(xiii), 5(2), 11(4), 14, (1), (2), (4), 28, First Schedule
Appeal from Originating Summons No R2–24–30 of 2000 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Cyrus Das (Benjamin John Dawson and Yapp Hock Swee with him) (Benjamin Dawson) for the appellant. ||Page 198>> Hj Sulaiman Abdullah (Halimatun Sa’diah Abu Ahmad with him) (Zain & Co) for the Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan. Umi Kalthum bte Abdul Majid (Azizah Hj Nawawi, Suzana Atan and Osman Affendi bin Mohd Shalleh with her) (Federal Counsels) for the Government of Malaysia and Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara. Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Haris Ibrahim with him) on watching brief for the Bar Council Malaysia.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 73 Arifin Zakaria JCA (concurring) [47] I have read the judgments of Gopal Sri Ram JCA and Abdul Aziz bin Mohammad JCA in draft, and I agree with Abdul Aziz bin Mohamad JCA that this appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.
Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering dissenting judgment) [48] This case first came before us as a fully blown constitutional appeal. The gist of the appellant’s complaint was that her constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of religion had been infringed by the Government. However, on closer scrutiny, there appeared to be a much narrower issue of administrative law of immediate importance that was at stake. It is whether the National Registration Department (‘the NRD’) had acted in accordance with law when it rejected the appellant’s request to remove the word ‘Islam’ from her National Registration Identity Card (‘NRIC’). We therefore had to address this directly relevant issue and not the wider irrelevant one. We had also to give certain directions for that purpose. I will explain what we did. But first, it is necessary to set out in brief the factual matrix against which this appeal rests. [49] The appellant was born a Muslim. On 11 May 1998, she was baptised a Christian. Her given name was Azalina bte Jailani. She wanted to change it at first to Lina Lelani and later to Lina Joy. That, of course, required the change of her name as it appeared in her NRIC. She therefore applied to the NRD to have that done. What actually transpired between her and the NRD in terms of chronology is set out in her affidavit dated 7 February 2005 and I find it unnecessary to go any further than to quote from the following portions that I have extracted from it:
7.1.1(a) — On 21 February 1997, I applied to the NRD for a change of name in my identity card from ‘Azlina bte Jailani’ to ‘Lina Lelani’ on the ground that I no longer profess Islam and have since embraced Christianity (‘the First Application’). The First Application was not approved by the Third Respondent. 7.1.2 — In an application dated 15 March 1999, I again applied to the NRD for a change of name in my identity card from ‘Azlina bte Jailani’ to ‘Lina Joy’ (the Second Application’). In support of the Second Application, I swore a statutory declaration on 15 March 1999 wherein I reiterated that I renounced the religion of Islam and have accepted the Christian faith. 7.1.3 — There was no response from the NRD is respect of the Second Application. On or around July 1999, I attended at the NRD at its branch in Petaling Jaya to inquire about the delay in the matter. 7.1.4 — The attending officer of the NRD, whose name I cannot recollect, advised me that since my application only relates to a change of name, I was requested by him, to avoid difficulty, not to mention in my statutory declaration the reason for the change of name being conversion of religion. He also requested me to resubmit the application form dated 15 March 1999 with a fresh statutory declaration. The ||Page 215>> aforesaid officer of the NRD informed me that if I did so, there would not be any difficulty in processing my application for a change of name in my identity card. 7.1.5 — Pursuant the aforesaid advice of the said officer, I accordingly swore a further statutory declaration on 2 August 1999 without any mention whatsoever of the reason of conversion of religion (the ‘new statutory declaration’).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 74
7.1.6 — I did so because under the Regulations as it was in force at that time, there was no requirement to mention a person’s religion in the identity card including that of Muslims. 7.1.7 — I did not know that by this time, the Regulations will undergo a change and that there will be a requirement for an entry of religion in the identity card for persons of the Muslim faith. 7.1.8 — I am advised by my solicitors whose advice I believe to be true, that prior to 1.10.1999, there was no provision in the Regulations requiring the word ‘Islam’ to be stated on the identity card. 7.1.9 — On 2 August 1999, 1 resubmitted to the NRD, the application form dated 15 March 1999 together with the new statutory declaration. 8.1 — By a letter dated 22 October 1999 I was informed by the NRD that my application for change of name has been approved. By the said letter I was required to apply for a identity card with the approved new name. 8.2 — As requested by the NRD, I had on 25 October 1999, completed a form of application for an identity card to be issued to me. In the said form I stated that inter alia the name to be stated in my identity card is ‘Lina Joy’ and particular of religion ‘Kristian’. 8.3 — I am advised by my solicitors whose advice I verify believe to be true that an amendment was made to the Regulations by the insertion of regulation 4(c) (iva). [This is an error, later corrected to regulation 5(2)]. This amendment was brought into effect by PU(A) 70/2000 which came into force on 1.10.1999. 8.4 — Regulation 4(c)(iva) provides that in the case of a Muslim, the particular ‘Muslim’ is to be stated in the identity card. 8.5 — It would appear that the Second Application dated 15 March 1999 and submitted on 2 August 1999 was only processed by the Third Respondent on 25 October 1999. 8.6 — On or around November 1999, I was issued with a new identity card (‘the new identity card’) a copy of which is found at p 207 of the Appeal Record. It will be seen that contrary to my stipulation in my application form dated 25 October 1999 that my religion is ‘Kristian’, the NRD had nevertheless inserted the word ‘Islam’ at the front of my identity card and my former name at the back of the identity card. … ||Page 216>> 10.0 — Shortly after receipt of the new identity card, I applied to the NRD to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted from it. The application form dated 3 January 2000 (the ‘Third Application’) and the supporting statutory declaration dated 3 January 2000 are found at pp 203 and 188 of the Appeal Record respectively. 10.1 — I attended the NRD at its Petaling Jay a branch on 3 January 2000 with my solicitor Kevin Chung Li Kien. I reiterate that the staff of the NRD, a female clerk, refused to accept my aforesaid application form which was submitted by me over the counter and gave the reason that the application is incomplete in that I was required to obtain an order from the Syariah Court. 10.2 — There was no reason for me not to have submitted to the NRD the aforesaid application form and the Statutory Declaration both dated 3 January 2000 which were already completed and prepared. Furthermore, I strongly desired to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted from my identity card to avoid being considered and treated as a Muslim when I am no longer one.
[50] As appears from her affidavit, the appellant was obviously dissatisfied with the position she found herself in. She took out an originating summons in which she claimed several interlocking declarations all based on the premise that her fundamental right to religious freedom enshrined in art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution had been infringed. The learned judge who heard the matter dismissed the summons for reasons that have since become
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 75 academic. [51] After hearing the initial argument of learned counsel for the appellant it became patently clear that justice will best be achieved if this matter was treated as a complaint in the administrative law environment. With the consent of the parties, my learned brothers and I therefore formulated the following question which we considered to be the only issue which we have to decide in this appeal: Whether the NRD was right in law in rejecting the appellant’s application under reg 14 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 (‘the 1990 Regulations’) to have the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC and in requiring a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. With the parties consent we then gave the following directions for the further conduct of this appeal: (i) that the Director General of the National Registration Department (‘the Director General’) be added as a respondent to these proceedings; (ii) that the originating summons be amended accordingly; (iii) that service of the amended cause papers be dispensed with; (iv) that the parties be at liberty to exchange affidavits only upon the issue as framed. Our directions were complied with and this appeal came on for further hearing on 7 March 2005. At the conclusion of arguments we reserved judgment. I now produce the reasons for the decision I have reached in this case. [52] In the course of argument our attention was drawn to following provisions of the 1990 Regulations which are of immediate relevance to this case. First, reg 4. This regulation requires a person who applies for a replacement identity card under reg 13 (irrelevant for present purposes) or reg 14 to take certain steps and to give certain particulars to the registration officer. Paragraph (cc) of reg 4 ||Page 217>> sets out the particulars that are required to be given. And sub-para (xiii) of para (cc) goes on to say this:
any other documentary evidence as the registration officer may consider necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars submitted. (Emphasis added.)
[53] Next there is reg 14. This was amended in 2001. Before its amendment, that is to say, at all times material to the present case, the relevant parts of sub- regs (1) and (2) of that Regulation read as follows:
(1) A person registered under these Regulations who: (a) changes his name; (b) …; and (c) …. shall forthwith report the fact to the nearest registration office and apply for a replacement identity card with the correct particulars. (2) Any person registered under these Regulations who applies for a change of name under sub-reg (1) shall: furnish the registration officer with a statutory declaration to the effect that he has absolutely renounced and abandoned the use of his former name and in lieu thereof has assumed a new name and the reason for such change of name shall also be stated in the statutory declaration. (Emphasis added).
[54] It is common ground between the appellant and the Director General that the issue
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 76 whether the latter acted in accordance with law turns upon the proper construction to be placed on the foregoing two Regulations. I agree that this is the correct approach to be adopted based on the facts of this case. So, this is yet another case which, to borrow the phraseology of Professor Taggart of the University of Auckland, has to be ‘thrown into the thicket or the bramble bush of statutory interpretation’. Whatever the expression used to describe the process, it is ultimately for the courts to grasp the nettle and to try and produce a just result according to law by interpreting the words used by the legislature or the subsidiary lawmaker. [55] I readily accept that there are no fixed rules for the interpretation of written law although the interpretive jurisdiction is that what is most exercised by the courts. That is why learned academics such as Professor Taggart find this area of the law to be a thicket. But I must say in defence that there are guidelines for statutory construction. And some of these guidelines have, over a period of time, acquired the force of principle. Some of them are quite easily identified. For example, it is a principle of statutory interpretation that Parliament is presumed not to legislate or empower the making of subordinate legislation that is not harmonious with the Constitution. This is also known as the presumption of constitutionality. See Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v State of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 142. Another is the principle that Parliament is presumed not to intend an unfair or an unjust result. See Marathei v JG Containers (JV) Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 MLJ 337 and the cases cited therein. ||Page 218>> [56] Now, I am entirely conscious that the written law that we have to interpret here is not an Act of Parliament but a piece of subsidiary legislation. But that does not mean that I am entitled to regard it as an inferior form of legislation. According to one of the leading texts on the subject, ‘ Statutory Interpretation in Australia’. (5th Ed) by Pearce & Geddes, para 1.2, broadly the same approach is to be adopted to the interpretation of both Acts of Parliament and to delegated legislation. In my judgment that is an entirely accurate view. It is with these matters in mind that I now turn to deal with the arguments of counsel, in particular as to the meaning to be given to regs 4 and 14 when they are read together. [57] The case for the Director General was admirably summed up by the learned senior federal counsel. She accepts that the 1990 Regulations in their unamended form do not require the appellant’s religion to be printed on the NRIC. However, she adds, relying on para (cc) (xiii) of reg 4, that the Director General is entitled to call for additional information from a person applying for a change of name under reg 14. Therefore, there was nothing illegal in the Director General requesting the appellant to produce a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. On the other side, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that reg 4 (cc) (xiii) only permits the Director General to request for information in respect of the particulars furnished by the appellant. So, in the present instance the Director General would have been entitled to ask the appellant to produce her baptismal certificate to show that she was in fact a Christian as stated in her application form. Accordingly, the request for the order from the Syariah Court was not a request authorised by reg 4 (cc) (xiii). [58] There is no necessity for much intellectual exercise to decide which of these two opposing arguments is correct. All I have to do is to look at the wording of reg 4(cc) (xiii) and see what it says. And it says that a request can be made ‘for any other documentary evidence
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 77 as the registration officer may consider necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars submitted’. There can be no quarrel, I think, that the words ‘particulars submitted’ refer to the particulars contained in the application already submitted by the appellant to the NRD. In her statutory declaration dated 21 February 1997 stated, among other matters: (i) that she had never professed or practised Islam as her religion since birth; (ii) that she had embraced Christianity in 1990; and (iii) that she intended to marry a Christian. Her later statutory declaration dated 15 March 1999 affirmed in support of her application dated 3 January 2000 adds little to what she had previously declared. The form she attempted to submit on 3 January 2000 makes it clear in column 31 that she no longer wished to be a Muslim. In these circumstances, an order from the Syariah Court does nothing to support the accuracy of the particular that the appellant is a Christian. However the baptismal certificate dated 11 May 1998 produced by the appellant in evidence amply supports the accuracy of the particular that the appellant is a Christian. This conclusion is amply supported by examining the way in which reg 14(2) is constructed. That sub-reg requires an applicant to state in his or ||Page 219>> her statutory declaration the reason for the change of name. In the appellant’s case, she stated that her reason for the change of name was that she was now a Christian. Accordingly, there is nothing in reg 4 (cc) (xiii) that supports the action of the Director General in this case. [59] It follows from what I have said thus far that an order or certificate from the Syariah Court is not a relevant document for the processing of the appellant’s application. It is not a document prescribed by the 1990 Regulations. Nor is it a particular that a registration officer is entitled to call for as a particular under reg 4 (cc) (xiii). I note that in the unreported case of Ismail bin Suppiah v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R–1–24–31 of 1995) Ahmad Fairuz J (now Chief Justice) after hearing argument of counsel granted an order the effect of which in substance was: (i) to declare that it was not necessary for the plaintiff in that case to obtain the consent of the Religious Department of Johor to convert out of Islam; and (ii) to strike down as ultra vires reg 14 of the 1990 Regulations, the Director General’s action in requiring the plaintiff to obtain the consent of the Religious Department of Johor for the purpose of processing his application to effect a change of his name. Of particular importance is the fact that that case was decided before the 1990 Regulations were amended in 1999. [60] Accordingly, it is my considered judgment, that by requiring the production of the said order/certificate, the Director General took into account an irrelevant consideration when deciding not to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC. That, of course, vitiates the decision not to delete the word ‘Islam’ from the appellant’s NRIC. As far as authority for this conclusion is concerned you have to go no further than Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 where Lord Greene said:
It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’.
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[61] In a case decided several years before Wednesbury the High Court of Australia in the joint judgment of Rich, Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in R v The War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex p Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 expressed the same principle in slightly different words:
It may be shown that the members of the tribunal have not applied themselves to the question which the law prescribes, or that in purporting to decide it they have in truth been actuated by extraneous considerations, or that in some other respect they have so proceeded that the determination is nugatory and void. ||Page 220>>
[62] In Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, Lord Reid re-stated the law in language that has been oft quoted by courts throughout the Commonwealth:
(T)here are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the inquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly.
[63] Mark you that some 19 years before Anisminic, Kania CJ propounded the same principle in the Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi v The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188:
Where the discretion is committed to any body or a tribunal exercising quasi- judicial functions which are not fettered by ordinary rule of law, the tribunal should in the absence of any provision to the contrary be deemed to have the final authority in the exercise of that discretion. We cannot sit in appeal over their decision and substitute our own discretion for theirs. Questions, however, may and do arise where such quasi-judicial body, attempts to usurp jurisdiction which it does not. It may assume jurisdiction under a mistaken view of law or refuse to exercise jurisdiction properly by adoption of extraneous or irrelevant considerations: or there may be cases where in its proceedings the tribunal violates the principles of natural justice. In all such cases the most proper and adequate remedy would be by writ of certiorari or prohibition and the court having authority may direct that the decision of the body or tribunal might be brought up to be quashed for lack of jurisdiction or for mistakes apparent on the face of it. (Emphasis added.)
[64] The principle that is to be distilled from these cases is that where a public decision-maker takes extraneous matters into account his or her decision is null and void and of no effect. So here, the Director General’s decision in refusing to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC without an order/certificate of the Syariah Court is null and void and of no effect.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 79 [65] There is a further point to be made in the appellant’s favour. It is to be found in para 7.18 of the appellant’s affidavit. The point was conceded on behalf of the Director General. Before 1 October 1999 there was no provision in the 1990 Regulations that mandated the statement of a person’s religion in his or her NRIC. So, if the Director General (acting of course through his subordinate, the registration officer) had approved the appellant’s application as he was bound by law to do the present problem would never have arisen. ||Page 221>> [66] To sum up, this is a simple and straightforward case calling for the application of well settled principles of administrative law. It is a case where a public decision-maker misconstrued the relevant law and took into account extraneous considerations. The appellant is entitled to have an NRIC in which the word ‘Islam’ does not appear. I would accordingly grant her a declaration in those terms and direct the Director General to forthwith comply with the terms of the said declaration. [67] A word about costs. This is a case which, if it had been presented in simple terms would have caused no difficulty to anyone. Least of all to the appellant. Unfortunately, she pursued a rather convoluted course as a result of which sight was lost of the core issue. In the circumstances of this case, although the appellant has succeeded, I would make no order for costs here and in the court below in respect of all parties before us. [68] So far as the Majlis Agama Islam, Wilayah Perseketuan (the Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territory) is concerned, in my view it was wrongly joined as a party and should be struck out as should the Government of Malaysia. Neither of these were necessary parties to the originating proceeding in the court below.
Appeal dismissed.
Reported by Loo Lai Mee
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[2005] 6 MLJ 371 TR LAMPOH AK DANA & ORS v GOVERNMENT OF SARAWAK
HIGH COURT (BINTULU) — SUIT NO 22–27 OF 2003 (BTU) ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHIM JC 15 OCTOBER 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration — Challenging order of acquisition by state authority of native customary rights land — Acquisition of native customary rights land — Whether must proceed by way of judicial review and not declaration
Civil Procedure — Declaration — Whether correct procedures in the circumstances — Challenging order of acquisition by state authority — Acquisition of native customary rights land — Whether must proceed by way of judicial review and not declaration
Native Law and Custom — Land dispute — Customary rights over land — Aboriginal peoples’ right over land — Compulsory acquisition of land by government — Whether acquisition could be challenged by way of declaration, and not judicial review — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
The plaintiffs claimed for a declaration of individual and communal native customary rights (‘NCR’) over communal native customary lands — created under Iban customs — at Rumah Lampoh and Rumah Kesiaw situate at about Km25 Bintulu-Tatau road (‘the said land’). The plaintiffs claimed that their NCR over the said land had been impaired by the act of the defendant in issuing a direction cited as ‘Arahan Tanah (Hak-Hak Adat Bumiputra (No 51) 2001’ (‘the Direction’) published in Sarawak Government Gazette which extinguished all the plaintiffs’ native customary rights over the said land. By the Direction the said land was reverted to, and acquired by, the Government of Sarawak. Therefore the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, for a declaration that they had NCR over the said land and were still the lawful proprietors thereof and the Direction was bad in law and therefore null and void for contravening arts 5(1), 8(1) and 13(2) of the Federal Constitution. The defendant entered a conditional appearance and applied to strike out the plaintiffs’ writ and statement of claim on the ground that the plaintiffs’ action was an abuse of process of the court, the reason being, the plaintiff was actually seeking public law
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 81 remedies and therefore ought to proceed by way of judicial review under O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), and not by way of declaration. The defendant submitted that the plaintiffs must apply to quash the Direction within 40 days after the grounds for the application arose or the Direction or Notification was communicated to the plaintiffs. In this case it was submitted that the Direction was made in May 2001 and gazetted in January 2002. The plaintiffs suit was filed on 14 July 2003 — well after the 40 days period allowable under O 53 r 3(6). It was argued that when the plaintiffs discovered that they were out of time for judicial review, the ||Page 372>> plaintiffs decided to proceed by way of ordinary writ action, and this therefore was an abuse of court process.
Held, striking off plaintiffs’ claim with costs: (1) The declaration sought by the plaintiffs on the NCR would be meaningless if the plaintiffs also did not set aside the Direction. Thus the challenge to the Direction becomes a core issue to the plaintiff case and not by a side wind. Since the issuing of the Direction is an act of a public body or authority in the form of the Minister for Planning and Resources Management the plaintiffs must proceed under O 53 of RHC 1980. In order to have the Direction quashed the plaintiffs must apply for an order of certiorari, the Direction being an administrative act of a public authority. It was wrong for the plaintiffs to seek a relief in a declaratory order for their NCR and then pray for a consequential order that the Minister’s Direction be quashed. To allow that means to allow the plaintiffs to circumvent O 53 of RHC 1980 and all the protections afforded by it to the defendants (see para 36). (2) The creation of O 53 in the RHC 1980 is to provide certain protections to the public body or authority when their public act or decision is being challenged, eg the time limit within which the challenge to the public act or decision must be made. The public decision maker must be able to know in the shortest possible time whether its decision is going to be challenged or not. Therefore if the plaintiffs choose to challenge the act or decision of the public body or public authority under a public law by resorting to other forms of action than an action for judicial review under O 53, it would be an abuse of process (see para 40). (3) In this instant case, the plaintiffs were deliberately attempting to circumvent the stringent mandatory requirements of O 53 by filing this suit to challenge the Ministerial Direction. It would seem so because it was obvious that the plaintiffs were clearly out of time as regard the 40 days time frame provided by the rules to file for judicial review at the time the suit was filed. Furthermore the plaintiffs had not obtained any leave, and neither have the plaintiffs applied and granted any extension of time to file for judicial review after the 40 days time limit (see para 41). (4) Insistence on strict compliance with O 53 in appropriate cases does not create rigidity and procedural exclusivity leading to dual system of law as submitted
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 82 by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. Order 53 is an adjectival law. It provides for procedures where a challenge is made against a public act or a public decision by a public body or authority. In this sense O 53 is no less exclusive when compare to the procedures for writ or originating summons. Moreover under the present O 53 the plaintiffs may obtain prayers which at one time could only be obtained through ordinary writs proceedings (see para 43). ||Page 373>> (5) It was obvious from the pleadings of the plaintiffs’ case that the plaintiffs grounded their claim on the allegations that the Minister had acted unconstitutionally and had breached the rules of natural justice in issuing the Ministerial Direction that formed the plaintiffs’ basis of complaint. This was clearly a direct challenge to the Minister’s authority to issue such direction under the relevant law. That challenge means a challenge to the validity of the Ministerial Direction itself. It was not therefore merely a collateral issue as submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiffs (see para 44).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif-plaintif telah menuntut satu deklarasi hak-hak adat (‘NRC’) secara individu dan komunal ke atas tanah adat komunal — diwujudkan di bawah adat orang Iban — di Rumah Lampoh dan Rumah Kesiaw yang terletak kira- kira KM25 Jalan Bintulu-Tatau (‘tanah tersebut’). Plaintif-plaintif menyatakan bahawa NCR mereka ke atas tanah tersebut telah dirosakkan/ diganggu oleh tindakan defendan dengan mengeluarkan satu arahan yang disebut sebagai ‘Arahan Tanah (Hak-Hak Adat Bumiputra (No 51) 2001’ (‘Arahan tersebut’) yang diterbitkan dalam Warta Kerajaan Sarawak yang menghapuskan semua hak-hak adat pihak plaintif ke atas tanah tersebut. Melalui Arahan tersebut, tanah tersebut dipulangkan dan diambil oleh kerajaan negeri Sarawak. Oleh itu plaintif-plaintif menuntut, inter alia, satu deklarasi bahawa mereka memiliki NCR ke atas tanah tersebut dan masih merupakan pemilik sah tanah dan bahawa Arahan tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan maka seterusnya terbatal dan tidak sah kerana melanggar art 5(1), 8(1) dan 13(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Defendan telah memasukkan kehadiran bersyarat dan telah memohon untuk membatalkan writ dan penyata tuntutan plaintif atas alasan bahawa tindakan plaintif-plaintif adalah merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah kerana plaintif sebenarnya sedang memohon remedi undang-undang awam dan oleh itu sepatutnya meneruskan dengan cara kajian semula kehakiman di bawah A 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), dan bukannya dengan cara deklarasi. Defendan menghujahkan bahawa plaintif-plaintif perlu memohon untuk membatalkan Arahan tersebut dalam masa 40 hari selepas alasan bagi permohonan itu timbul atau apabila Arahan atau Notifikasi tersebut disampaikan kepada plaintif-plaintif. Dalam kes ini, dihujahkan bahawa Arahan tersebut telah dibuat pada Mei 2001 dan diwartakan pada Januari 2002. Tindakan plaintif telah difailkan pada 14
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 83 Julai 2003 — selepas tamat jangkamasa 40 hari yang dibenarkan di bawah A 53 k 3(6). Ianya dihujahkan bahawa apabila plaintif menyedari bahawa mereka telah pun melebihi masa untuk kajian semula kehakiman, plaintif-plaintif telah membuat keputusan untuk meneruskan tindakan dengan cara writ biasa, dan ini merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. ||Page 374>>
Diputuskan, membatalkan tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Deklarasi yang dipohon oleh plaintiff berkenaan dengan NCR tidak memberi apa-apa makna sekiranya plaintif tidak mengetepikan Arahan tersebut. Oleh itu, cabaran terhadap Arahan tersebut menjadi satu isu utama bagi kes plaintif dan bukannya secara sepintas lalu. Memandangkan langkah mengeluarkan Arahan tersebut adalah satu tindakan oleh badan atau pihak berkuasa awam iaitu Menteri Perancangan dan Pengurusan Sumber plaintif perlu meneruskan tindakan di bawah A 53 KMT 1980. Bagi membatalkan Arahan tersebut, plaintif perlu memohon bagi satu perintah certiorari, kerana Arahan tersebut adalah tindakan pentadbiran oleh pihak berkuasa. Adalah salah bagi plaintif untuk memohon relif melalui perintah deklarasi bagi NCR mereka dan kemudiannya memohon perintah berbangkit bagi Arahan Menteri dibatalkan. Membenarkan perkara tersebut bermaksud membenarkan plaintif memintasi A 53 KMT 1980 dan juga perlindungan yang diberikannya kepada defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 36). (2) Peruntukan A 53 dalam KMT 1980 adalah untuk memberi perlindungan kepada badan awam atau pihak berkuasa apabila tindakan atau keputusan awam mereka dicabar/dipertikai, eg tempoh masa di mana sesuatu cabaran boleh dibawa terhadap tindakan atau keputusan awam itu perlu dibuat. Pembuat keputusan awam perlu mengetahui dalam tempoh masa sependek mungkin sama ada keputusannya akan dicabar atau tidak. Oleh itu, sekiranya plaintif memilih untuk mencabar tindakan atau keputusan badan awam atau pihak berkuasa di bawah undang-undang awam dengan dengan cara selain daripada tindakan bagi kajian semula kehakiman, ia adalah merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses (lihat perenggan 40). (3) Dalam kes ini, plaintif-plaintif dengan sengaja cuba untuk memintas keperluan mandatori yang ketat di bawah A 53 dengan memfailkan tindakan untuk mencabar Arahan Kementerian. Ianya kelihatan begitu kerana adalah jelas bahawa plaintif telahpun melepasi had masa 40 hari seperti yang telah diperuntukkan undang-undang bagi memfailkan untuk kajian semula kehakiman pada masa tindakan itu difailkan. Tambahan pula, plaintif tidak mendapat sebarang kebenaran, dan tiada di antara plaintif yang telah memohon dan mendapat sebarang lanjutan masa bagi memfailkan tindakan kajian semula kehakiman selepas had masa 40 hari (lihat perenggan 41). (4) Desakan bagi pematuhan yang ketat terhadap A 53 dalam kes-kes yang bersesuaian tidak mewujudkan kekerasan dan keeksklusifan prosedur yang
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 84 membawa kepada undang-undang dua sistem seperti yang telah dihujahkan oleh peguamcara yang arif bagi plaintif. Aturan 53 adalah merupakan satu undang-undang tatacara. Ia memperuntukkan prosedur- prosedur apabila sesuatu cabaran dibuat terhadap tindakan awam atau keputusan awam yang dibuat oleh badan awam atau pihak berkuasa. ||Page 375>> Dalam hal ini, A 53 adalah tidak kurang eksklusif apabila dibandingkan dengan prosedur untuk writ dan saman pemula. Tambahan pula, di bawah A 53 sekarang, plaintif boleh mendapatkan remedi yang mana sebelumnya hanya boleh diperolehi melalui prosiding writ biasa (lihat perenggan 43). (5) Adalah jelas daripada pliding bagi kes plaintif bahawa plaintif mengasaskan tuntutan mereka atas dakwaan bahawa Menteri telah bertindak bertentangan dengan Perlembagaan dan telah melanggar undang-undang keadilan asasi dengan mengeluarkan Arahan Kementerian yang telah membentuk asas kepada aduan plaintif. Ini adalah dengan jelas merupakan cabaran secara langsung terhadap kesahan Arahan Kementerian itu sendiri. Maka ia bukanlah sekadar isu sampingan seperti mana yang telah dibentangkan oleh peguamcara arif pihak plaintif (lihat perenggan 44).
Notes For cases on customary rights over land, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 632-639. Fo cases on whether correct procedure in the circumstances, se 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) para 2105.
Cases referred to An Board Bainne Co-operative Ltd (Irish Dairy Board) v Milk Marketing Board [1984] 2 CMLR 584 (refd) Asia Pacific Parcel Tankers Pte Ltd v The Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Normar Spendour’ [1999] 6 MLJ 652 (refd) Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corp [1947] 2 All ER 680 (refd) Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan Chik & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 620 (refd) Council of Civil Service Union & Ors v Minister for Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (refd) Davey v Spelthorne BC [1984] AC 262 (refd) Ladang Tai Tak (KT) Sdn Bhd v Suppiah Andy Thavar & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 257 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Berkerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungei Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin bin Ungku
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 85 Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425 (refd) O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (refd) O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1977] 3 WLR 86 (refd) R v Jenner [1983] 2 All ER 46 (refd) Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 All ER 705 (refd) Shaharuddin bin Ali & Anor v Superintendent of Lands and Surveys Kuching Division & Anor [2005] 2 MLJ 555 (refd) Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 413 (refd) Subramaniam a/l Vythilingam v The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) & Ors [2003] MLJU 94 (refd) ||Page 376>> Trustees of the Dennis Rye Pension Fund & Anor v Sheffield City Council [1997] 4 All ER 747 (refd) Wandworths London BC v Winder [1984] 3 All ER 976 (refd) Yahya Bin Kassim v Government of Malaysia [1997] 3 MLJ 749 (refd)
Legislation referred to Arbitration Act 1952 ss 6, 32 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25 Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 8(1), 13(2), 153, Pt II Land Settlement Ordinance 1933 s 66 Rules of High Court 1980 O 15 r 16, O 18 r 19, (1)(d), O 53, r 2(2), (3), r 3(6), O 92 r 4 Sarawak State Constitution art 39 Sarawak Land Code ss 5(1), (2), (3), (4), 212 Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41, 44–49, Chap VI of Pt 2, Chap VIII of Pt 2 Town and Country Planning Act 1971 [UK]
Paul Raja (See Chee Hua with him) (Paul Raja & Co) for the plaintiffs. Jonathan Jolly (Keiza with him) (State Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the defendant.
[2005] 7 MLJ 132 KANEKA PASTE POLYMERS SDN BHD v DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & ORS
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 86
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1–25–92 OF 2003 RAUS SHARIF J 18 APRIL 2005
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application to quash decision of Director General of Industrial Relation — Whether decision of DGIR subjected to review under O 53 r 32(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 — Industrial Relation Act 1967 ss 9(1) & (5)
Labour Law — Trade union — Recognition — Whether decision of DGIR subjected to review under O 53 r 32(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 — Industrial Relation Act 1967 ss 9(1) & (5)
This was an application for leave under O 53 r 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’) for an order of certiorari to quash a decision by the the Director General of Industrial Relation (‘DGIR’). The senior federal counsel for the Attorney General raised a preliminary objection against the applicant’s application on the ground that the application was premature and that the DGIR’s decision was merely an administrative process towards the Minister’s decision and therefore was not amendable to judicial review. The applicant contended that: (1) they were entitled to challenge the decision of the DGIR because the DGIR was the only person who had the power to make the decision; and (2) the decision of DGIR under s 9(4B)(b) of the Industrial Relation Act 1967 (‘the Act’) and the decision of the Minister under s 9(5) of the Act were two separate decisions.
Held, dismissing the application with cost: The decision which can be reviewed under O 53 of the RHC must be the decision of the Minister under s 9(5). Section 9(1) to s 9(4C) merely prescribes the procedures to be taken by the DGIR and the DGTU. But the power to grant recognition can only be made by the Minister under s 9(5). For a decision to be subjected to judicial review, it must go beyond what is merely administrative or procedural (see para 9).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah satu permohonan untuk kebenaran di bawah A 53 k 3(2) Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk satu perintah certiorari membatalkan keputusan Ketua Pengarah Perhubungan Perusahaan (‘DGIR’). Peguam kanan persekutuan bagi Peguam Negara telah membangkitkan satu bantahan permulaan terhadap permohonan pemohon atas dasar bahawa permohonan ||Page 133>> itu pra-masa dan keputusan DGIR hanya merupakan satu proses
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 87 pentadbiran kepada keputusan Menteri dan oleh itu tidak boleh dipinda melalui kajian semula kehakiman. Pemohon menuntut bahawa: (1) mereka berhak membantah keputusan DGIR kerana DGIR adalah orang yang mempunyai kuasa untuk membuat keputusan itu; dan (2) keputusan DGIR di bawah s 9(4B)(b) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (‘Akta tersebut’) dan keputusan Menteri di bawah s 9(5) merupakan dua keputusan berasingan.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan itu dengan kos: Keputusan yang boleh dikaji semula di bawah O 53 KMT adalah keputusan Menteri di bawah s 9(5) Akta itu. Seksyen 9(1) s 9(4C) Akta itu hanya memperuntukkan prosedur-prosedur yang patut diambil oleh DGIR dan DGTU. Tetapi kuasa untuk memberi pengiktirafan hanya boleh dibuat oleh Menteri di bawah s 9(5) Akta itu. Bagi satu keputusan dikaji semula kehakiman, ia mesti melebihi perkara pentadbiran dan prosedural (lihat perenggan 9).]
Notes For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185–393.
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 19679 s 9, (1), (2), (4B)(b), 4C, (5) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r (2)
A Ramadass (M Jothi Letchimy with him) (Ramadass & Associates) for the applicant. Azizah Haji Nawawi (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
[2005] 7 MLJ 548 SELVA KUMAR A/L TAMIL SELVOM v TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–67 OF 2004 ABDULL HAMID EMBONG J 10 APRIL 2005
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Judicial review — Whether court was barred from reviewing order of the Minister
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 88 Administrative Law — Remedies — Habeas corpus — Whether detention was unlawful
The applicant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking for his release from detention under s 4(1) of the Emergency Ordinance (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 1969 (‘the Ordinance’). The detention order of the Minister was dated 13 June 2002. Counsel for the applicant raised three issues, which were inter alia: (1) failure to comply with s 3(3)(b) of the Ordinance, in that a police officer with the rank of an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) had not authorised the detention of the applicant; (2) that the detention was not in conformity with the substantive procedural requirement under s 3(3)(a) of the Ordinance; and (3) delay. According to learned counsel, the respondent had only filed two affidavits under s 3(3)(a) and (c) pertaining to the authorisation of the applicant’s detention for more than 24 hours and more than 30 days under those respective sub-sections. As such the detention vide s 3(3)(b) was unlawful. Learned counsel also contended that the form made under s 3(3)(a) was not addressed to any particular person in authority in order to detain the applicant for a further 24 hours and that the Minister’s order was bad in law since there was an unexplained delay of 2½ months when the order was initially made in June 2002.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) Under s 3(3)(a) or (b) of the Ordinance, there is no requirement for the form of further detention to be addressed to any specific authority. Both sub-sections are purely enabling provisions, to authorise police officers of certain ranks to further detain a suspect. It would be stretching the interpretation of those sub-sections to say that the forms made under them need to be addressed to someone (see para 6); Rashid bin Kulop Mohamad (PJ 44–69–2003, (unreported)) not followed. (2) The administrative forms used need not be addressed to anyone as they are merely proof that these powers were indeed exercised by a proper ranking officer. Any defects in those forms are such, a mere technicality with no legal impact on the exercise of those powers. They cannot and should not be considered as a basis for censuring the legality of the pre-section 4 ||Page 549>> detention (see para 6); Rashid bin Kulop Mohamad (PJ 44–69–2003, (unreported)) not followed. (3) As the initial detention order was made some 2½ months after the last criminal activity of the applicant, there was therefore no delay which could be justiciary considered as staleness or remoteness of the ground of the detention (see para 9); Morgan a/l Perumal v KM Hussein bin Abdul Majid & Ors [1998] 3 MLJ 335 and Yip Hon Kit v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 638 not followed. (4) It was outside the court’s jurisdiction to now question the detention order of the Minister upon whom Parliament had made responsible for matter in securing public order, suppression of violence or prevention of crimes
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 89 involving violence (see para 15); Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 and Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 followed. (5) Once the detention order was made under s 4 of the Ordinance, this court, in view of the ouster clause under s 7C of that Ordinance, was barred from reviewing that order unless it can be shown that there had been non-compliance of any procedural requirement governing such detention. There was no non-compliance shown here (see para 15); Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 and Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 followed. (6) The detention by the police pending enquiries under s 3 of the Ordinance even if smudged with procedural irregularities formed no basis to the detention order of the Minister under s 4. The latter order superceded the former, with the effect that those previous irregularities could not now be a basis for this court’s consideration in determining whether the Minister’s order was illegal or not. The actions under ss 3 and 4 although linked were not inextricably connected and operate independently from each other (see para 16); Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & other appeals [2004] 4 CLJ 314 followed.
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk writ habeas corpus, untuk dilepaskan daripada tahanan di bawah s 4(1) Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Mencegah Jenayah) 1969 (‘Ordinan tersebut’). Perintah tahanan tersebut yang dikeluarkan oleh Menteri bertarikh 13 Jun 2002. Peguamcara pemohon telah membangkitkan tiga isu, iaitu inter alia, (1) kegagalan untuk mematuhi s 3(3)(b) Ordinan tersebut, iaitu seorang pegawai polis yang berpangkat ASP telah tidak memberi kuasa untuk tahanan pemohon; (2) tahanan tersebut adalah tidak menuruti keperluan prosedur yang substantif di bawah s 3(3)(a) Ordinan tersebut; dan (3) kelewatan. Mengikut peguamcara yang arif, responden telah hanya memfailkan dua affidavit di bawah s 3(3)(a) ||Page 550>> dan (c) berkenaan dengan pemberian kuasa untuk penahanan pemohon untuk lebih daripada 24 jam dan lebih 30 hari di bawah subseksyen-subseksyen berkenaan. Oleh yang demikian, tahanan tersebut melalui s 3(3)(b) adalah menyalahi undang-undang. Peguamcara yang arif juga telah berhujah bahawa borang di bawah s 3(3)(a) tidak dialamatkan kepada sesiapa yang mempunyai otoriti bagi tujuan menahan pemohon untuk 24 jam yang berikutnya dan bahawa perintah Menteri tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang memandangkan terdapat suatu kelewatan selama 2½ bulan yang tidak dijelaskan apabila perintah tersebut mula-mula dibuat pada Jun 2002.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Di bawah seksyen 3(3)(a) atau (b) Ordinan tersebut, tidak ada keperluan untuk
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 90 borang bagi tahanan selanjutnya dialamatkan kepada mana-mana otoriti tertentu. Kedua-dua sub-seksyen tersebut adalah semata-mata peruntukkan yang membolehkan, untuk memberi kuasa kepada pegawai- pegawai polis yang memegang pangkat-pangkat tertentu untuk menahan seseorang suspek untuk jangkamasa lebih lanjut. Ianya akan memperluaskan tafsiran sub-seksyen tersebut untuk mengatakan bahawa borang-borang yang dikeluarkan di bawah sub-seksyen tersebut perlu dialamatkan kepada seseorang (lihat perenggan 6); Rashid bin Kulop Mohamad (PJ 44– 69–2003, (unreported)) tidak diikut. (2) Borang-borang pentadbiran yang digunakan tidak perlu dialamatkan kepada sesiapa kerana borang-borang tersebut hanya merupakan bukti bahawa kuasa-kuasa ini telah sememangnya dijalankan oleh pegawai berpangkat yang sewajarnya. Sebarang kecacatan di dalam borang-borang tersebut adalah hanya suatu perkara teknikal yang tidak memberi kesan dari segi undang-undang dalam pelaksanaan kuasa-kuasa tersebut. Ianya tidak boleh dan tidak patut diberi pertimbangan sebagai asas untuk menyoal keesahan tahanan pra-seksyen 4 tersebut (lihat perenggan 6); Rashid bin Kulop Mohamad (PJ 44–69–2003, (unreported)) tidak diikut. (3) Memandangkan perintah tahanan yang pertama telah dibuat lebih kurang 2½ bulan selepas aktiviti jenayah yang terakhir, maka tidak ada kelewatan yang boleh dianggap sebagai alasan lapuk atau alasan diluar dugaan penahanan tersebut (lihat perenggan 9); Morgan a/l Perumal v KM Hussein bin Abdul Majid & Ors [1998] 3 MLJ 335 dan Yip Hon Kit v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 638 tidak diikut. (4) Ianya di luar bidang kuasa Mahkamah untuk kini menyoal perintah tahanan Menteri tersebut, yang telah diberi tanggungjawab oleh Parlimen dalam perkara-perkara bagi menjamin ketenteraman awam, penindasan keganasan atau menghalang jenayah yang melibatkan keganasan (lihat perenggan 15); Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 MLJ 81 dan Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 diikut. ||Page 551>> (5) Setelah perintah tahanan tersebut dibuat di bawah s 4 Ordinan tersebut, Mahkamah ini, dengan mengambil kira fasal penyingkiran di bawah s7C Ordinan tersebut, adalah dihalang daripada mengkaji semula perintah tersebut, melainkan jikalau ianya dapat ditunjukkan bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan apa-apa keperluan prosedur yang mentadbir tahanan sebegitu. Tidak ada apa-apa ketidakpatuhan yang ditunjukkan di sini. (lihat perenggan 15); Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 dan Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 diikut. (6) Tahanan tersebut oleh polis sementara menjalankan siasatan di bawah s 3 Ordinan tersebut walaupun dicemar dengan kesalahan aturan prosedur, tidak menjadi asas kepada perintah tahanan Menteri tersebut di bawah s 4. Perintah yang terkemudian itu akan mengambil alih daripada perintah yang terdahulu, dengan kesan bahawa kesalahan aturan yang terdahulu kini tidak boleh
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 91 dijadikan asas untuk pertimbangan Mahkamah ini dalam menentukan sama ada perintah Menteri tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang atau tidak. Tindakan-tindakan di bawah ss 3 dan 4 walaupun mempunyai kaitan, hubungannya boleh diasingkan dan ianya bertindak secara bebas daripada satu sama lain (lihat perenggan 16); Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & other appeals [2004] 4 CLJ 314 diikut.]
Notes For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 35–58.
Cases referred to Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 (not folld) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (not folld) Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara and other appeals [2004] 4 CLJ 314 (folld) Morgan a/l Perumal v KM Hussein bin Abdul Majid & Ors [1998] 3 MLJ 335 (not folld) Rashid bin Kulop Mohamad (PJ 44-69-2003, unreported) (not folld) Yip Hon Kit v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 638 (not folld)
Legislation referred to Emergency Ordinance (Public Order and the Prevention of Crime) 1969 ss 3(3)(a), (b), (c), 4(1), 7C(1) Internal Security Act 1960 ss 3, 8 ||Page 552>>
Najib bin Zakaria (Senior Federal Counsel) for the respondents. Abd Shukor (Shukor Baljit & Partners) for the applicant.
[2005] 7 MLJ 559 SHAYNE COREY CAHILL v KAKA SINGH DHALIWAL (SUED AS REGISTERED PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER MALAYSIAN RACING ASSOCIATION)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 92 HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO S1–24– 1148 OF 2003 JAMES FOONG J 6 JANUARY 2005
Administrative Law — Exercise of judicial functions — Domestic tribunal — Whether courts may judicially review decisions of domestic tribunals — Circumstances in which court may review correctness of tribunal’s decision
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Merits, consideration of — Domestic tribunal, decision of — Circumstances in which courts may review merits of domestic tribunal’s decision
The plaintiff, as a visiting jockey riding for the Selangor Turf Club, was bound by the Racing Rules of the Malaysian Racing Association (MRA). He was charged with two racing offences by the Stipendiary Stewards. In respect of the first offence, he was convicted and sentenced to one year’s suspension from racing. In respect of the second offence, he was convicted and sentenced to three year’s disqualification and fined RM50,000. The three-year disqualification was ordered to run consecutive to the one-year suspension imposed for the first offence. His appeal with regard to the first offence was heard and dismissed on 30 April 2003 whereas his appeal in connection with the second offence was heard and dismissed on 26 June 2003. Soon after their decision in respect of the appeal concerning the second offence, the Racing Stewards realised they had made an error. They wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors on 30 June 2003 stating that they wished to reconvene to reconsider their decision on sentence. The plaintiff was requested to attend the reconvened meeting to make submissions on the appropriate sentence. The plaintiff however brought an action against the MRA’s public officer. Confining his claim to the second offence, the plaintiff alleged inter alia: (1) he was not given an opportunity to mitigate before sentence was announced in the appeal; and (2) there was impropriety on the part of the Chief Stipendiary Steward and the Chairman of the Racing Stewards.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s action with costs: (1) Generally, the courts will not judicially review decisions of domestic tribunals except the correctness of the decision making process. The rational for this proposition is based on the principle that private or domestic tribunals derive their authority from the contract entered into between the parties in dispute. As such, if the terms of the contract specify the setting up of a tribunal to discipline a party to the contract ||Page 560>> then the party so called upon to be disciplined should not question the decision meted down by such tribunal (see para 11); Woon Kwok Cheng v HR Hochstadt & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 795 and Ng Kim Chor v HR
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 93 Hochstadt & Ors [1998] 7 MLJ 19 referred. (2) The court may examine the correctness of a decision when the matter in contention involves ‘the right to earn a livelihood’ and it is to see whether the tribunal has given a ‘correct interpretation of the rules’. Only when these conditions arise, the courts will proceed to examine the decision on its merits to see whether the tribunal has correctly interpreted the rules. Otherwise, the courts will only review the decision making process (see para 14); Lee v The Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329 referred. (3) The plaintiff and the Selangor Turf Club agreed to abide by the MRA Racing Rules, which formed part of their contract. Any breach of such rules, would therefore constitute a breach of the contract. Rule 18(2)(c) MRA Racing Rules permitted the Racing Stewards to review their previous decisions. Utilising this provision, they reconvened the hearing of the appeal and requested the plaintiff to attend. The plaintiff refused to cooperate or attend. When a provision under the agreement permits a party who has made a mistake to rectify the breach committed, and action is taken to attempt to rectify the mistake, then this party cannot be said to have breached any terms of the agreement when the aggrieved party refuses to allow such mistake to be corrected. In the instant case, the defendant admitted the Racing Stewards had committed an error. Immediately, the plaintiff was informed of this with a request to make arrangement to attend a reconvened meeting to rectify the mistake and to give the plaintiff a chance to address the Racing Stewards regarding the appropriate sentence to be passed. Since the plaintiff chose to ignore such move, the defendant could not be accused of having breached any of the terms of the contract to warrant the court to find that the decision making process was flawed (see para 21). (4) The plaintiff’s allegation of impropriety was only a bare allegation of impropriety. In any event, this allegation had become a non-issue since the Racing Stewards had decided to reconvene the appeal to review their decision on sentence. Since the plaintiff refused to accept this, the plaintiff could not use this issue to knock out the entire disciplinary proceedings (see para 24).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, sebagai penunggang joki pelawat bagi Kelab Lumba Kuda Selangor, adalah terikat dengan Peraturan Perlumbaan Persatuan Perlumbaan Malaya (‘MRA’). Beliau didakwa dengan dua kesalahan lumba oleh Stipendiary ||Page 561>> Stewards. Berkenaan dengan kesalahan pertama, beliau disabitkan kesalahan dan digantung daripada perlumbaan selama setahun. Berkenaan dengan kesalahan kedua, beliau disabitkan kesalahan dan dihukum dengan tiga tahun ketidaklayakan dan denda sebanyak RM50,000. Ketidaklayakan selama tiga tahun tersebut diarahkan berkuatkuasa secara berturutan dengan pergantungan selama
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 94 setahun yang dikenakan bagi kesalahan pertama. Rayuan beliau berkenaan dengan kesalahan pertama didengar dan ditolak pada 30 April 2003 dan rayuan berkenaan dengan kesalahan kedua didengar dan ditolak pada 26 Jun 2003. Sejurus selepas keputusan mereka berkenaan dengan kesalahan kedua, Racing Stewards menyedari bahawa mereka telah melakukan kesilapan. Mereka menulis kepada peguam plaintif pada 30 Jun 2003 menyatakan bahawa mereka berhajat untuk bersidang semula untuk menimbang semula keputusan mereka berkenaan dengan hukuman. Plaintif walau bagaimanapun, telah memulakan tindakan terhadap pegawai am MRA. Dengan membatasi tuntutannya kepada kesalahan kedua, plaintif mendakwa inter alia: (1) beliau tidak diberi peluang untuk mitigasi sebelum hukuman diumumkan dalam rayuan tersebut; dan (2) terdapat kelakuan yang tidak patut di pihak Ketua Stipendiary Steward dan Pengerusi Racing Stewards.
Diputuskan, menolak tindakan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Secara amnya, mahkamah tidak akan membuat kajian semula kehakiman bagi keputusan tribunal domestik kecuali berkenaan dengan proses membuat keputusan yang betul. Rasional bagi usul ini adalah berdasarkan kepada prinsip bahawa tribunal persendirian atau domestik memperoleh autoriti daripada kontrak di antara pihak yang bertelingkah. Oleh itu, sekiranya terma kontrak memperuntukkan untuk mengadakan tribunal untuk mendisiplinkan sesuatu pihak kepada kontrak tersebut maka pihak tersebut tidak patut mempertikai keputusan yang dibuat oleh tribunal (lihat perenggan 11); Woon Kwok Cheng v HR Hochstadt & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 795 dan Ng Kim Chor v HR Hochstadt & Ors [1998] 7 MLJ 19 dirujuk. (2) Mahkamah boleh memeriksa betul atau tidak sesuatu keputusan apabila sesuatu perkara yang dipertikaikan melibatkan ‘hak untuk menyara hidup’ dan ianya adalah untuk melihat sama ada tribunal telah memberi ‘interpretasi yang betul kepada peraturan-peraturannya’. Hanya apabila keadaan ini timbul, mahkamah akan meneruskan untuk memeriksa keputusan berdasarkan meritnya untuk melihat sama ada tribunal telah mentafsir peraturan dengan betul. Sekiranya tidak, mahkamah hanya akan membuat kajian semula ke atas proses membuat keputusan (lihat perenggan 14); Lee v The Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329 dirujuk. (3) Plaintif dan Kelab Lumba Kuda Selangor bersetuju untuk mematuhi Peraturan Perlumbaan MRA, yang membentuk sebahagian daripada ||Page 562>> kontrak mereka. Sebarang perlanggaran kepada peraturan tersebut akan membentuk perlanggaran terhadap kontrak. Peraturan 18(2)(c) Peraturan Perlumbaan MRA membenarkan Racing Stewards untuk membuat kajian semula terhadap keputusan mereka yang lepas. Dengan menggunakan peruntukan ini, mereka bersidang semula bagi pendengaran rayuan tersebut dan telah meminta plaintif untuk hadir. Plaintif menolak untuk bekerjasama atau hadir. Apabila sesuatu peruntukan di bawah perjanjian membenarkan sesuatu pihak yang telah membuat kesilapan untuk memperbetulkan kesilapan tersebut,
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 95 dan tindakan telah diambil untuk membetulkannya, maka pihak itu tidak boleh dikatakan sebagai telah melanggar sebarang terma perjanjian itu apabila pihak yang terkilan telah menolak untuk membenarkan kesilapan tersebut diperbetulkan. Dalam kes ini, defendan telah mengakui bahawa Racing Stewards telah membuat kesilapan. Dengan segera, plaintif telah dimaklumkan berkenaan perkara ini dengan permintaan untuk membuat persediaan untuk menghadiri satu persidangan semula mesyuarat untuk memperbetulkan kesilapan dan untuk memberi plaintif peluang untuk mengajukan kepada Racing Stewards berkenaan dengan hukuman yang sesuai. Memandangkan plaintif telah memilih untuk mengabaikan tindakan tersebut, defendan tidak boleh dikatakan sebagai telah melanggar sebarang terma kontrak untuk membolehkan mahkamah untuk mendapati bahawa proses membuat keputusan adalah salah (lihat perenggan 21). (4) Dakwaan oleh plaintif berkenaan kelakuan yang tidak patut adalah hanya merupakan satu tuduhan ketidakpatutan tanpa sokongan. Dalam apa-apa hal pun, tuduhan ini tidak menjadi isu sejak Racing Stewards telah memutuskan untuk membuat persidangan semula bagi rayuan tersebut untuk mengkaji semula keputusan mereka berkenaan hukuman. Memandangkan plaintif telah menolak untuk menerimanya, plaintif tidak boleh menggunakan isu ini untuk menjatuhkan keseluruhan prosiding disiplin (lihat perenggan 24).]
Notes For cases on domestic tribunal, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 98–101. For cases on judicial review generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 162–178.
Cases referred to Chong Kok Lim & Ors v Yong Su Hian [1979] 2 MLJ 11 (refd) Lee v The Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329 (refd) Ng Kim Chor v HR Hochstadt & Ors [1998] 7 MLJ 19 (refd) Singapore Amateur Athletics Association v Haron bin Mundir [1994] 1 SLR 47 (refd) Woon Kwok Cheng v HR Hochstadt & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 795 (refd) ||Page 563>>
Legislation referred to Societies Act 1966 s 9
S Selvi (Gooi & Azura) for the plaitiff. G Rajasingam (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 96
[2004] 1 MLJ 34 RAJA SEGARAN A/L S KRISHNAN v BAR COUNCIL MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–93 OF 1999 (5) KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 10 NOVEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration —Whether applicant had locus standi to make application — Whether application was an attempt to avoid a penal sanction — Whether applicants suffered special injury
Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Court — Civil courts — Criminal jurisdiction of civil courts — Whether civil courts could declare proposed action seditious
Civil Procedure — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing that course of action seditious — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of the law — Whether individual must have suffered special injury
Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial Misconduct — Allegations of judicial misconduct — Discussion of judicial misconduct — Whether such discussion unconstitutional — Federal Constitution art 127
Legal Profession — Law Society/Malaysian Bar — Powers of the Bar — Allegations of judicial misconduct — EGM to discuss allegations of misconduct — Whether an attempt to by pass constitutional safeguard — Whether amounts to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of the Bar — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1)(d)
Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether position and standing of maker of statement relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous
The Malaysian Bar had resolved to hold an EGM to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice. The plaintiff, a member of the Bar, was concerned that the notice of the EGM, the resolution and the proposed meeting were ultra vires the powers and objects of the Malaysian Bar under the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’) on the grounds that they may be contemptuous, seditious and unconstitutional.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 97 The plaintiff argued that since he could be liable for any actions taken by the defendants. The plaintiff thus sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from holding the proposed EGM. Pending the disposal of the action, the court granted the plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction (see [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Since then the former Chief Justice, the subject of the Bar’s motion, retired and then Chief Justice, also since retired, had exhorted for better Bench/Bar relationship. Thus in reserving judgment in this case, the court urged the parties to settle their differences. Taking the advice of the court, the plaintiff sought leave to discontinue this action. The plaintiff’s application for leave to discontinue was allowed and the suit struck off and each party required to meet its own costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants’ appeal against this decision and directed that the court deliver its judgment on the substantive trial. The defendants argued, inter alia, that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a member of the Bar did not automatically confer any private law rights on him. In any event, the defendants argued that a civil court could not make a finding of contempt or sedition.
Held, allowing the plaintiff’s application and granting the declarations sought: (1) In deciding whether a statement was contemptuous, the court may consider the position and standing of the person making the statement. The Malaysian Bar must accept the fact that it is a voice that is heard by the public. It acts as a regulator. It must also act as a moderator; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 followed. If the impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest court in the land had acted on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, confidence in the administration of justice was bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that could be imagined (see paras 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 followed. (2) The Bar Council had asserted they were not concerned with the truth of the allegations as they did not have the power to investigate them. Such callous indifference to the truth of the allegations, coming from an august body, was totally unacceptable. It was a clear abrogation of its duty to the general public as its watchdog. This flagrant disregard to verify the truth of the allegations before calling for an EGM fell far short of the aspirations of a noble Bar (see paras 46–47). (3) Unlike countries like the UK, Australia, the USA and India, the Bar Council in Malaysia has been given statutory recognition. The LPA sets out the Bar as a corporate statutory body duly recognized by the Government. It is imperative that the Bar recognizes this fact and, because of its unique position, acts with concern when making statements. Since the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar are creatures of statute, their conduct must be confined within the provisions of the LPA. While the Bar sought to rely on s 42(1)(a), (e) or (g) of the LPA, s 42(1)(d) strictly confines the Bar to expressing its views on matters affecting the administration of law only if requested so to do (emphasis added). Since the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 98 Bar has not been requested to give its views on the state of the judiciary, the resolution and the motion were clearly in breach of that section ( see paras 27–28, 51–54). (4) The constitutional scheme envisages removal of a judge on proved misbehaviour or incapacity and the conduct of a judge is prohibited from discussion in Parliament or the State Legislative Assemblies. The call for the resolution on admitted hearsay evidence was far from the requirement of ‘proved misbehaviour’. It is absolutely essential that people who hold high office be fair and just in their criticisms and not open themselves, and the organizations they represent, to criticisms. It is clear that the Bar has no power to discuss the conduct of the Judiciary and that any attempt to do so was contrary to art 127 of the Constitution. It must be seen to be manifest that no external pressure is exerted against the Judiciary, whether from the executive or from any other sources, including the Bar Council (see paras 57, 59, 63). (5) Where the plaintiff showed he has the locus to make the application, and where he further showed that the conduct of the defendants was such as to put the plaintiff, in peril of such prosecution as the defendants could face if the defendant was allowed to act, the plaintiff need not wait to see the outcome of the defendant’s actions before acting. To protect his own interest a plaintiff can take out an injunction to restrain the defendant from acting and, if the court is satisfied that the act complained of could give rise to the plaintiff facing criminal prosecution, the plaintiff ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the defendant. Therefore, the argument that if the plaintiff did not attend the meeting, he could not be sued or punished and that he could have chosen not to attend, is unacceptable (see paras 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 distinguished, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 followed. (6) In resolving the motion as spelt out, the public needed no legal advice, assistance or representations. Besides, the Bar Council have not been able to show which section of the public in particular they intend to protect. Their act of moving the resolution and having the meeting for that purpose were both ultra vires the LPA (see paras 81–82); Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 and Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 referred.
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Badan Peguam Malaysia telah memutuskan supaya mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salahlaku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam, bimbang bahawa notis EGM, resolusi serta mesyuarat yang dicadangkan itu adalah ultra vires kuasa dan matlamat Badan Peguam di bawah Akta
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 99 Profession Undang-Undang 1976 (‘APU’) di atas alasan bahawa ia adalah menghina, hasutan dan melanggar perlembagaan. Plaintif berhujah bahawa, memandangkan beliau mungkin bertanggungjawab dalam sebarang tindakan yang diambil defendant, beliau memohon suatu perintah injunksi menahan defendant daripada mengadakan mesyuarat tersebut. Sebelum diputuskan tindakan itu, mahkamah telah membenarkan permohonan plaintif bagi injunksi sementara (lihat [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Sejak itu bekas Hakim Negara, yang menjadi tajuk usul Badan Peguam itu, telah bersara dan penggantinya, yang juga telah bersara, telah menegur hubungan yang lebit erat antara pihak peguam dan penghakiman. Sebelum mengumumkan penghakiman dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah mendesak pihak-pihak menyelesaikan perbezaan antara mereka. Dalam mengikut nasihat mahkamah, plaintif memohon kebenaran memberhentikan tindakannya. Permohonan plaintif memberhentikan tindakan ini telah dibenarkan dan tindakan ini dibatalkan dengan kos ditanggung oleh pihak-pihak sendiri. Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan rayuan defendan terhadap keputusan ini dan mengarahkan supaya Mahkamah Tinggi memberikan keputusannya ke atas perbicaraan substantif. Defendan-defendan telah berhujah, antara lain, bahawa hanya kerana plaintif merupakan seorang peguam tidak semestinya mengurniakan sebarang hak undang-undang peribadi ke atas plaintif. Malahan mahkamah sivil tidak dapat memutuskan mengenai penghinaan atau hasutan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dan memberikan deklarasi yang dipohon: (1) Dalam memutuskan sama ada sesuatu pernyataan adalah menghina, mahkamah dapat mengambil kira kedudukan orang yang membuat pernyataan tersebut. Badan Peguam harus menerima fakta bahawa ia adalah suara yang didengar oleh orang awam. Ia bertindak sebagai pengawalselia. Ia seharusnya juga bertindak sebagai kuasa redaan; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 diikut. Sekiranya tanggapan diberikan kepada orang awam bahawa hakim-hakim mahkamah teragung telah bertindak di atas pertimbangan yang tidak wajar, keyakinan dalam pentadbiran keadilan pasti dilemahkan dan tidak terdapat sebarang kecelakaan yang lebih berat (lihat perenggan-perenggan 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 diikut. (2) Majlis Peguam telah menerangkan mereka tidak berminat ke atas kebenaran dakawaan memandangkan mereka tiada kuasa menyiasatnya. Sikap tidak ambil peduli ke atas kebenaran dakwaan seperti ini, yang datang dari badan guaman agung ini, tidak dapat diterima. Ia sememangnya suatu pembantutan kewajipannya sebagai pengawal bagi orang awam. Keengganannya menentusahkan kebenaran dakwaan sebelum memanggil mesyuarat tidak memadai memandangkan aspirasi sebuah badan guaman seperti ini (lihat perenggan-perenggan 46–47). (3) Berbeza daripada negara-negara asing seperti UK, Australia, Amerika Syarikat and India, Majlis Peguam di Malaysia telah diberikan pengiktirafan statutori. APU mendirikan badan guaman sebagai suatu badan berkanun korporat yang diiktiraf kerajaan. Adalah wajar Badan Peguam mengenali fakta ini dan,
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 100 memandangkan kedudukannya yang unik, bertindak wajar apabila membuat pernyataan. Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan statut, maka tingkahlaku mereka harus dihadkan kepada peruntukan APU. Walaupun Badan Peguam ingin bergantung kepada s 42(1)(a), (e) atau (g) APU, s 42(1)(d) menghadkan Badan Peguam supaya menyuarakan pendapatnya ke atas perkara pentadbiran keadilan hanya sekiranya diminta berbuat demikian (penekanan ditambah). Memandangkan yang Badan Peguam tidak pernah diminta memberikan pendapatnya ke atas kedudukan badan kehakiman, maka resolusi dan usul jelas melanggar peruntukan itu (lihat perenggan-perenggan 27–28, 51–54). (4) Rancangan perlembagaan membayangkan penyingkiran seseorang hakim sekiranya salahlakunya yang dibuktikan atau disebabkan kurang upayanya dan tingkahlaku seseorang hakim dilarang dibincangkan di Parlimen atau Dewan Undangan Negeri. Permintaan bagi resolusi tersebut di atas keterangan dengar cakap jauh dari keperluan ‘proved misbehaviour’. Adalah mustahak orang yang memegang jawatan tinggi bertindak secara adil dan saksama dalam kritik mereka dan tidak menjadikan diri mereka, mahupun badan yang mereka wakil, terbuka kepada pengkritikan. Adalah jelas bahawa Badan Peguam tidak mempunyai kuasa bagi membincangkan tingkah laku Badan Kehakiman dan sebarang percubaan berbuat demikian melanggar perkara 127 Perlembagaan. Ia harus menjadi jelas bahawa tiada sebarang penekanan luar diberikan terhadap Badan Kehakiman, sama ada dari pihak exekutif mahupun daripada sumber lain, termasuk dari Majlis Peguam (lihat perenggan-perenggan 57, 59, 63). (5) Sekiranya seseorang plaintif dapat menunjukkan bahawa beliau mempunyai locus membuat sesuatu permohonan, dan jika beliau juga dapat menunjukkan bahawa tindakan yang diambil defendan akan membuka plaintif kepada pendakwaan yang mungkin dikenakan ke atas defendan sekiranya defendan dibenarkan terus bertindak, maka plaintif itu tidak perlu menunggu melihat akibat tindakan defendan sebelum bertindak. Bagi memelihara hak sendirinya seseorang plaintif dapat memohon perintah injunksi menahan defendan dari bertindak dan, sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu itu mungkin menyebabkan plaintif didakwa, maka plaintif harus dibenarkan menggunakan perintah injunksi bagi menahan defendan. Oleh yang demikian, hujah bahawa sekiranya plaintif tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, beliau tidak dapat didakwa atau hukum dan beliau dapat membuat keputusan tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, tidak dapat diterima (lihat perenggan-perenggan 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 dibezakan, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 diikut. (6) Dalam membuat ketetapan usul seperti dinyatakan, pihak awam tidak memerlukan sebarang nasihat, pertolongan atau representasi undang-undang. Lagipun Majlis Peguam gagal menunjukkan bahagian mana antara orang awam yang ingin mereka melindungi. Tindakan mereka mencadangkan resolusi itu
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 101 dan memanggilkan mesyuarat baginya kedua-duanya ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan-perenggan 81–82); Swain & Anor v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 dirujuk, Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 dirujuk.]
Notes For cases on the remedy of declaration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 321–382. For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3670–3672. For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924–3981. For cases on the Judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Law Society/Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.
Cases referred to Airport Restaurants, Ltd v Southend-On-Sea Corporation [1960] 2 All ER 888 (refd) Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 (folld) Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 (refd) Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman; Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman & Ors [1987] 2 MLJ 633 (refd) C Ravichandran Iyer v Justice AM Bhattacharjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Crown, The v A Rafique & Others 1950 37 AIR 1 (refd) Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 (folld) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 (refd) Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 (refd) Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (dist) Land Executive Committee of Federal Territory v Syarikat Harper Gilfillan Bhd [1981] 1 MLJ 234 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & 2 Lagi v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–47–00 dan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–48–00 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Ors v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 155 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 102 Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2001] 1 MLJ 472 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 3) [2001] 5 MLJ 305 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 4) [2001] 6 MLJ 166 (refd) Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 (refd) Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 (folld)
Legislation referred to Commissions of Enquiry Act [UK]1950 s 2(1)(d) Constitution [India] art 32 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 43 Evidence Act 1950 ss 123, 162(2) Federal Constitution arts 125(3), 127 Landlord and Tenant Act [UK] 1954 Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 32(d), 42(1), (a), (d), (e), (g), 46, 76(2) Post Office Act 1953 [UK] ss 38, 68 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33, r 2 Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(a), (c), 4(1)(a) Solicitors Act 1974 [UK] s 37 Solicitors’ Indemnity Rules 1975 [UK] Telegraph Act 1863 [UK] s 45
DP Vijandran (Raja Segaran & Assoc) for the plaintiff. YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Malik Imtiaz Ahmed bin Ghulam Sarwar, Gopal Sreenevasan, D Bhaskaran, Karina Yong, M Mogan and Michele N Kaur with him) (Sivananthan) for the defendants. Ahmad Kamal bin Mohd Shahid holding a watching brief for Attorney General.
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[2004] 1 MLJ 480 ZALI BIN SHARIFF v TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI, MALAYSIA & ANOR
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 103 HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–27 OF 2003 HELILIAH J 23 OCTOBER 2003
Administrative Law — Exercise of judicial powers — Detention — Non-compliance of detention order — Order of Minister — Whether made in compliance — Whether defect of form or substance — Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985, s 6(1) and Federal Constitution arts 149, 151
Preventive Detention — Detention order — Procedural requirement — Order of Minister — Whether made in compliance — Whether omission of certain words in recital rendered entire order defective — Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 s 6(1) and Federal Constitution arts 149, 151
The applicant/detainee in this case was being detained pursuant to an order made by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs under s 6(1) of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 (‘the 1985 Act’). The counsel for the applicant contended that the deputy minister could not make an order to detain a person under s 6(1) of the 1985 Act merely upon a satisfaction of the fact that the person had involvement with drug trafficking activity. According to the counsel, what the deputy minister must do first before he may exercise his powers was: (i) to satisfy himself that the applicant had connections with drug related activities; and (ii) to satisfy himself further that it was necessary in the interest of public order that such person be detained. It was submitted by the counsel that ‘the sting of s 6(1) is not so much in the first but instead the second obligation of the Minister, namely satisfying himself that there is the necessity to detain the detainee having satisfied himself that it is the interest of public order that he be so detained’.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) Mere surplusage of words or mere omission would not automatically render the order defective. In the instant case, the question was the effect of an alleged omission or the absence of words in the recital part or statement of purpose of the order. The omission to refer to the second part of the s 6(1) of the Act was purely a technical error that did not render the whole order as defective (see paras 35, 49). (2) The emphasis that was placed on two matters, namely that it was mandatory that the person who was to be detained to be given ‘the grounds’ and the allegations of fact. Thus, the existence and reality of the validity of the order was preconditioned by the existence of grounds and allegations of facts. The defect if any in the detention order in setting out the objects and purposes of the detention in the alternative was a defect of form only and not of substance and that it did not show that the executive had not adequately applied its need
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 104 to the desirability of detaining the appellant and therefore did not invalidate the order (see para 39); Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 MLJ 129 followed. ||Page 481>> (3) Article 151(l)(c) of the Federal Constitution postulates two rights: (a) the detaining authority must as soon as may be communicate to the detainee the grounds on which the order of detainee has been made; and (b) the detaining authority must afford the detainee the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. If the precondition for the exercise of the power was not complied with, no amount of additional words added on to the detaining order would render it valid. In communicating the purpose of the detention to the person to be detained, the purpose that was to be formulated by the Act was not to be frustrated by a mere procedural irregularity (see paras 44–45).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon/orang ditahan dalam kes ini telah ditahan menurut satu perintah yang dibuat oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri di bawah s 6(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 (‘Akta 1985’). Peguam bagi pihak pemohon berhujah bahawa timbalan menteri tidak boleh membuat satu perintah untuk menahan seorang di bawah s 6(1) Akta 1985 hanya dengan berpuas hati atas fakta bahawa seseorang itu terlibat dalam kegiatan pengedaran dadah. Menurut peguam, apa yang timbalan menteri perlu terlebih dahulu lakukan sebelum beliau boleh menggunakan kuasa-kuasanya adalah: (i) untuk berpuas hati bahwa pemohon mempunyai kaitan dengan kegiatan-kegiatan yang melibatkan dadah; dan (ii) untuk berpuas hati selanjutnya bahawa ia adalah perlu demi kepentingan ketenteraman awam bahawa seseorang itu ditahan. Ia dihujahkan oleh peguam bahawa ‘the sting of s 6(1) is not so much in the first but instead the second obligation of the Minister, namely satisfying himself that there is the necessity to detain the detainee having satisfied himself that it is the interest of public order that he be so detained’.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Hanya perkataan berlebihan atau hanya peninggalan tidak akan secara automatik menjadikan perintah tersebut defektif. Dalma kes semasa, persoalannya adalah akibat sautu peninggalan yang dikatakan atau ketiadaan perkataan-perkataan di bahagian permulaan atau pernyataan tujuan perintah tersebut. Peninggalan untuk merujuk kepada bahagian kedua s 6(1) Akta tersebut adalah semata-mata satu kesilapan teknikal yang tidak mengakibatkan keseluruhan perintah tersebut defektif (lihat perenggan-perenggan 35, 49). (2) Penekanan yang diletakkan ke atas dua perkara, terutamanya bahawa ia adalah mandatori bahawa seseorang yang akan ditahan hendaklah diberikan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 105 ‘alasan-alasan’ dan pengataan-pengataan fakta. Oleh itu, kewujudan dan kebenaran kesahihan perintah tersebut adalah pra syarat dengan kewujudan alasan-alasan dan pengataan-pengataan fakta. Kecacatan jika ada dalam perintah penahanan yang membutirkan objektif-objektif dan tujuan-tujuan penahanan secara alternatif adalah satu kecacatan dalam bentuk sahaja dan bukan pada amnya dan ia tidak menunjukkan bahawa eksekutif tidak dengan secukupnya ||Page 482>> menekankan keperluannya berhasrat untuk menahan perayu dan oleh itu tidak menjadikan perintah tersebut tidak sah (lihat perenggan 39); Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 MLJ 129 diikut. (3) Perkara 151(1)(c) Perlembagaan Persekutuan mempostulatkan dua hak: (a) pihak berkuasa yang menahan perlu secepat mungkin memaklumkan kepada orang yang ditahan alasan-alasan kepada perintah penahanan tersebut dibuat; dan (b) pihak berkuasa yang menahan perlu membenarkan orang yang ditahan peluang terawal untuk membuat satu representasi terhadap perintah tersebut. Jika pra syarat untuk menggunakan kuasa tersebut tidak dipatuhi, tiada tambahan perkataan atas perintah penahanan akan menjadikannya sah. Dalam memaklumkan tujuan penahanan ke atas seseorang yang akan ditahan, tujuan yang dibentuk oleh Akta tidak boleh dikecewakan oleh luar aturan prosedur semata-mata (lihat perenggan-perenggan 44–45).]
Notes For cases on exercise of judicial powers on detention, 1 see Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 125–126. For cases on procedural requirements of detention orders, 10 see Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 1363.
Cases referred to Aminah v Superintendent of Prison, Pengkalan Chepa Kelantan [1968] 1 MLJ 92 (refd) Attorney General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-Kut [1993] AC 951 (refd) Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121 (refd) Council of Civil Service Union & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1965] AC 374 (refd) East Riding County Council v Perk Estate (Bridlington) Ltd [1957] AC 223 (refd) Ex parte Johannes Choeldi & Ors [1960] MLJ 184 (refd) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (folld) Lim Hock Siew & Ors v The Minister of Interior & Defence [1968] 2 MLJ 219 (refd) Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 4 MLJ 449 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 106 Morgan a/l Perumal v K/I Hussein Abdul Majid [1998] 3 MLJ 335 (refd) Munnich v Godstone RDC [1966] 1 WLR 429 (refd) Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprises Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 (refd) Puvaneswaran v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 28 (refd) R v Brixton Prison (Governor), ex p Pitt-Rivers [1942] 1 All ER 207 (refd)
Legislation referred to Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 ss 3(2)(c), (3), 5(4), 6(1), 6A(2), 11C(1) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) (Advisory Board Procedures) Rules 1987 rr 2, 3 Defence (General) Regulations 1939 [UK] reg 18B ||Page 483>> Federal Constitution arts 5(1), (2), 43(2), 149, 150, 151(1)(a), 160(1) Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8(1A), 73 Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967
Gobind Singh Deo (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant. Noor Bahari bin Baharudin (Senior Federal Counsel, Ministry of Internal Affairs) for the respondents.
[2004] 1 MLJ 652 ELITE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD v ABDULLAH NAWAWI MOHAMED (KETUA PENGARAH BAHAGIAN PENGUATKUASA) KEMENTERIAN PERDAGANGAN DALAM NEGERI DAN HAL EHWAL PENGGUNA MALAYSIA
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R1–25–23 OF 2003 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 14 APRIL 2003
Administrative Law — Remedies — Mandamus — Goods seized in raid — No further steps
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 107 taken by respondent under the Optical Discs Act 2000 — Application for release and return of the goods — Specific Relief Act 1950 s 44; Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
The applicant applied for an order of mandamus for the release and return of goods seized and sealed by the respondent sometime in October 2002. The goods were seized and sealed by the respondent under the Optical Discs Act 2000 (‘the Act’). The respondent failed to make out any charges against the applicant despite a lapse of more than five months from the date of seizure. The respondent also failed to release the goods to the applicant. Meanwhile, the applicant suffered daily losses and had exposed itself to liability for damages to third parties for breach of contract. The applicant’s production was in danger of coming to a complete standstill.
Held, allowing the application: There had been no prosecution under the Act despite the fact that the said machines and accessories were seized by the respondent more than five months ago. The court found that the respondent had failed to exercise the powers given to him under s 46(3), (4) and (5) of the Act. This had resulted in the applicant continually suffering losses (see para 6).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pihak pemohon telah memohon untuk suatu perintah mandamus supaya barang-barang yang dirampas dan disita oleh responden pada bulan Oktober 2000 dilepaskan dan dikembalikan. Barang-barang tersebut telah dirampas dan disita oleh responden di bawah Akta Cakera Optik 2000 (‘Akta tersebut’). Responden telah gagal untuk membuat sebarang tuduhan terhadap pemohon meskipun lima bulan telah berlalu dari tarikh rampasan. Responden telah juga gagal untuk melepaskan barang-barang tersebut kepada pihak pemohon. Sementara itu, pihak pemohon telah mengalami kerugian harian dan telah mendedahkan dirinya kepada liabiliti untuk gantirugi kepada pihak-pihak ketiga untuk kemungkiran kontrak. Pengeluaran pihak pemohon berada dalam bahaya berhenti dengan seluruhnya.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan itu: Tidak terdapat sebarang dakwaan yang dibuat di bawah Akta tersebut ||Page 653>> walaupun fakta bahawa mesin-mesin tersebut telah dirampas oleh responden lebih daripada lima bulan yang lepas. Mahkamah telah mendapati bahawa responden telah gagal untuk melaksanakan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan kepada beliau di bawah seksyen 46 (3), (4) dan (5) Akta tersebut. Ini telah mengakibatkan pemohon mengalami kehilangan kerugian dengan tidak berhenti-henti (lihat perenggan 6).]
Notes
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 108
For cases on mandamus, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 554– 583.
Legislation referred to Optical Discs Act 2000 s 46(3), (4), (5), (6) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3 Specific Relief Act 1950 s 44(1), Chapter VIII
ST Lee (ST Lee & Partners) for the applicant.
[2004] 2 MLJ 288 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BHD v NIK RAMLI NIK HASSAN
FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–01 OF 2001(W) STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK), MOHTAR ABDULLAH FCJ, MOKHTAR SIDIN JCA 10 OCTOBER 2003
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari and mandamus — Whether review jurisdiction of review court included right of review court to decide for itself correctness of decision on merits — Rules of High Court 1980 O 53
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Dismissal — Constructive dismissal — Industrial Court dismissed respondent’s claim for unfair dismissal — Whether substantial flaws in reasoning or conclusions by Industrial Court — Whether findings of Industrial Court illegal or plainly irrational — Whether reviewing judge should disturb finding of Industrial Court
The Minister of Human Resources had referred the dispute between the respondent and the appellant to the Industrial Court under s 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The Industrial Court dismissed the respondent’s claim for unfair dismissal. Dissatisfied, the respondent moved the High Court for orders of certiorari and mandamus. The High Court held that the Industrial Court had committed an error of law in arriving at its conclusion and accordingly granted the orders prayed for. Against this decision, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal and held that a reasonable tribunal properly directing itself on the facts and law would have reached a conclusion that the respondent had been dismissed without just cause or excuse. The appellant was granted leave to appeal to the Federal Court on the following question: ‘Whether the review jurisdiction of the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 109 review court under O 53 of the Rules of High Court 1980, included a right of the review court to decide for itself the correctness of the decision on the merits’.
Held, answering the question in the affirmative and allowing the appellant’s appeal: (1) The views expressed by the majority in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia that, in judicial review proceedings, the courts had the powers to: (a) review the decision of a tribunal on the merits; (b) substitute a different decision in place of the tribunal’s decision without remitting it to the tribunal for re-adjudication; and (c) order consequential relief were not the product of ‘judicial excessivism’. On the contrary, they reflected the kind of controlled judicial activism that was needed in order to meet, in a supervisory context, the ever-widening powers conferred upon statutory tribunals or other bodies which had proliferated in modern times (see paras 9, 12); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 MLJ 145 followed. (2) Not every case was amenable to the Rama Chandran approach. It depended on the factual matrix and/or the legal modalities of the case. This was a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the reviewing judge (see para 14). ||Page 289>> (3) In the instant case, there were no substantial flaws in the reasoning or the conclusions by the Industrial Court. The award contained a sound analysis of the law as to what constituted constructive dismissal by an employer. The Industrial Court had conducted a detailed review of all facts and evidence, both oral and documentary and had drawn inferences from the conduct of the respondent and the relevant officers of the appellant before concluding that the appellant was not guilty of any breach which went to the root of the service contract. The Industrial Court further held that there was no breach which could justify the respondent’s resignation. The Industrial Court had also found the respondent to be impatient. A reviewing judge should not disturb such finding unless it could be shown to be based on grounds of illegality or plainly irrational. Here, there was no illegality in the finding of the Industrial Court, nor can it be said to be plainly irrational in all the circumstances. In government service or in a very large organization such as the appellant, having a PhD, like the respondent, did not necessarily guarantee a promotion. There were numerous imponderables involved. A long wait for promotion was not an uncommon feature in government service or statutory bodies (see para 17–20).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Menteri Sumber Manusia telah merujuk kepada pertikaian antara responden dan perayu kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan di bawah s 20(3) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah menolak tuntutan responden kerana pemecatan tidak adil. Berasa tidak puas hati, responden telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 110 untuk perintah-perintah certiorari dan mandamus. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah melakukan satu kesilapan dari segi undang-undang semasa membuat kesimpulan dan sewajarnya telah memberikan perintah-perintah yang dipohon. Terhadap keputusan ini, perayu telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayun telah menolak rayuan perayu dan memutuskan bahawa satu tribunal yang secara munasabah yang dengan betul telah mengendalikan berdasarkan fakta dan undnag-undang akan tiba kepada satu kesimpulan bahawa responden telah dipecat tanpa sebab atau alasan yang adil. Perayu telah dibenarkan membuat rayuan kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan berdasarkan persoalan berikut: ‘Whether the review jurisdiction of the review court under O 53 of the Rules of High Court 1980, included a right of the review court to decide for itself the correctness of the decision on the merits’.
Diputuskan, menjawab persoalan secara positif dan membenarkan rayuan perayu: (1) Pendapat-pendapat yang dinyatakan secara majoriti dalam R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia bahawa, dalam prosiding kajian semula kehakiman, mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk: (a) mengkaji semula keputusan tribunal atas merit; (b) menggantikan keputusan lain dengan keputusan tribunal tanpa meremitkannya kepada tribunal tersebut untuk penghakiman semula; dan (c) memerintahkan relif sampingan ||Page 290>> yang bukan akibat ‘judicial excessivism’. Sebaliknya, ia menggambarkan jenis aktivis kehakiman terkawal yang diperlukan bagi tujuan mencapai, dalam konteks pengawalan, kuasa-kuasa luas yang diberikan kepada tribunal statutori atau badan-badan lain yang wujud dengan pesat pada zaman moden (lihat perenggan-perenggan 9, 12); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 MLJ 145 diikut. (2) Bukan semua kes menerima pendekatan Rama Chandran. Ia bergantung kepada matriks faktual dan/atau modus undang-undang kes. Ini suatu perkara berkaitan budi bicara kehakiman di pihak hakim yang mengkaji semula (lihat perenggan 14). (3) Dalam kes semasa, tiada kelemahan substantial dalam alasan atau kesimpulan Mahkamah Perusahaan. Award tersebut mengandungi analisa yang kukuh berhubung apa yang membentuk pemecatan konstruktif oleh seorang majikan. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah mengendalikan satu kajian semula terperinci tentang semua fakta dan keterangan, secara lisan dan dokumentar dan telah tiba kepada satu inferens berdasarkan perlakuan responden dan pegawai-pegawai perayu yang berkaitan sebelum memutuskan bahawa perayu tidak bersalah untuk apa-apa perlanggaran yang menjejaskan kontrak perkhidmatan. Mahkamah Perusahaan seterusnya memutuskan bahawa tiada perlanggaran yang boleh menjustifikasikan pemberhentian kerja responden. Mahkamah Perusahaan juga mendapati bahawa responden seorang yang tidak penyabar. Seorang hakim yang mengkaji semula tidak sepatutnya mengganggu penemuan tersebut kecuali jika ia boleh menunjukkan bahawa ia berasaskan alasan-alasan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 111 yang menyalahi undang-undang atau dengan jelas tidak rasional. Di sini, tidak apa-apa yang menyalahi undang-undang dalam penemuan Mahkamah Perusahaan, mahupun boleh dikatakan ia nyata tidak rasional dalam apa jua keadaan. Dalam perkhidmatan kerajaan atau dalam satu organisasi yang besar seperti perayu, mempunyai PhD, seperti responden, tidak semestinya menjamin kenaikan pangkat. Terdapat pelbagai keputusan yang tidak boleh diduga. Satu penantian yang lama untuk kenaikan pangkat bukan satu ciri yang tidak biasa berlaku dalam perkhidmatan kerajaan atau badan berkanun (lihat perenggan-perenggan 17–20).]
Notes For cases on certiorari and mandamus, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 394–417. For cases on dismissal, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1308–1312. For certiorari and mandamus, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [16.117]– [160.146]. For dismissal, see 7 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2003 Reissue) para [120.093].
Cases referred to Amanah Butler (M) Sdn Bhd v Yike Chee Wah [1997] 1 MLJ 750 (refd) Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin [1997] 2 MLJ 17 (refd) ||Page 291>> Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid bin Haji Mohd Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (folld) Swedish Motor Assemblies Sdn Bhd v Haji Mohd Ison bin Baba [1998] 2 MLJ 372 (refd) Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] 2 WLR 344 (refd) Wong Chee Hong v Cathay Organisation (M) Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 92 (refd)
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 78 Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 20(1), (3), 30(4), (5), 33B Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 112
[2004] 2 MLJ 447 EXXON CHEMICAL (M) SDN BHD v MENTERI SUMBER MANUSIA, MALAYSIA & ORS
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–23 OF 1999 MOKHTAR SIDIN, ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN AND ABDUL AZIZ JJCA 11 DECEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Remedies — Certiorari, application for — Workman’s representation — Reference of dispute by minister to Industrial Court — Whether discretion properly exercised
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Discretion of Minister — Minister’s discretion to refer representation to Industrial Court — Whether meticulous examination of facts were undertaken — Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 20(3)
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Retrenchment benefits — Estoppel — Whether workmen estopped from referring representation under s 20(1) upon receiving retrenchment benefits — Whether estoppel applies to industrial adjudication
On 27 November 1997 the appellant company had issued letters to the second, third and fourth respondents (‘the three workmen’) giving them notice that their positions with the appellant had been made redundant with effect from 1 January 1998 due to the relocation of their terminal at South Port in Port Kelang, where the three workmen were engaged, to West Port in Pulau Lumut (now Pulau Indah). The appellant contended that it could not find alternative positions within the organization for the respondents. Dissatisfied with the redundancy exercise, the respondents raised the matter with the Director General for Industrial Relations (‘the DG’). Acting under s 20(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the Act’), the DG notified the Minister of Human Resources (‘the first respondent’) that he was satisfied that there was no likelihood of the dispute being settled. The first respondent referred the representation to the Industrial Court (‘the fifth respondent’) under s 20(3) of the Act. The appellant applied to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the first respondent’s decision, contending that he had acted outside his jurisdiction or without any jurisdiction. The appellant’s application was dismissed by the High Court with costs on the ground that the first respondent had made a proper decision to refer the representations to the Industrial Court. Hence, this appeal.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 113 (1) (per Mokhtar Sidin and Abdul Kadir Sulaiman JJCA) Section 20(3) of the Act provides the first respondent with the discretion to refer or to refuse the reference of representations made by a workman under s 20(1) to the fifth respondent for an award, upon receiving the notification of the Director-General that the latter is satisfied that there is no likelihood of the representation being settled. Accordingly, the first respondent’s discretion would be exercised in favor of referring such representations to the fifth respondent only ‘if he thinks fit’ to do so. Otherwise, he has every reason not to do so (see paras 3–4). ||Page 448>> (2) (per Mokhtar Sidin and Abdul Kadir Sulaiman JJCA) Finding of the existence of a serious issue to be resolved upon consideration of the facts presented to him pursuant to the notification of the Director-General of unlikelihood of the representations being settled, it is fitting of the first respondent to refer the representations to the fifth respondent for an award. Unless it is clear on the face of the records that a representation notified to him is of a frivolous or vexatious nature, the first respondent would have to examine the facts so as to enable him to decide one way or another on the fate of the representation. Evidence shows that there were indeed serious issues which could only be resolved by the fifth respondent. Hence, he had correctly referred the matter in the proper exercise of the powers given to the first respondent (see para 9). (3) (per Mokhtar Sidin and Abdul Kadir Sulaiman JJCA) Whether an estoppel operates in industrial cases of this nature is a legal issue which is not for the first respondent to decide, being an administrative body as opposed to the fifth respondent being a judicial body created by the Act to decide on legal issue such as this. In any event, this matter was never placed before the first respondent for his consideration for purpose of him making his decision under s 20(3) of the Act. Furthermore, in industrial matters such as this, estoppel does not apply to industrial adjudication in the light of s 30(5) of the Act (see paras 16 and 17); Marlin bte Rajiman & Ors v MAA Services Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 404 followed. (4) (per Abdul Aziz JCA dissenting) Whenever a question arises whether the first respondent has correctly exercised his discretion under s 20(3) of the Act, that is, his discretion to refer or not to refer, the court has to undertake a meticulous examination of the facts. The purpose of the meticulous examination is to see whether the representations of the workman are perverse, frivolous or vexatious. The meticulous examination of the facts that were available to the first respondent is required of the court not only when the Minister decided not to refer the representation to the Industrial Court but also when the Minister decided to refer the representations to the Industrial Court. The Minister, in arriving at his decision to refer the three workmen’s representations to the Industrial Court, had taken into account irrelevant
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 114 considerations, thereby failing to take into account the proper considerations that should have weighed on his mind. For that reason, his decision ought to have been quashed and that the appeal ought to be allowed. (see paras 26 and 51).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pada 27 November 1997 syarikat perayu telah mengeluarkan surat-surat kepada responden kedua, ketiga dan keempat (‘tiga pekerja tersebut’) dan memberi notis bahawa jawatan mereka di bawah perayu telah menjadi berlebihan bermula dari 1 Januari 1998 kerana penempatan semula terminal perayu dari South Port, yang terletak di Pelabuhan Kelang, di mana ketiga- ||Page 449>> tiga pekerja tersebut bekerja, ke West Port di Pulau Lumut (kini Pulau Indah). Syarikat perayu menegaskan bahawa ia tidak dapat mencari jawatan alternatif dalam organisasi bagi responden-responden. Responden-responden yang tidak berpuas hati dengan situasi lebihan pekerja (redundancy) telah mengemukakan perkara tersebut kepada Ketua Pengarah Perhubungan Perusahaan (‘KP’). Bertindak dibawah s 20(2) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (‘Akta tersebut’), KP telah memaklumkan Menteri Sumber Manusia (‘responden pertama’) bahawa ia puas hati bahawa tiada kebarangkalian pertikaian tersebut dapat diselesaikan. Responden pertama telah merujuk representasi tersebut kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan (‘responden kelima’) dibawah s 20(3) Akta tersebut. Perayu memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan responden pertama dengan menegaskan bahawa beliau telah bertindak di luar bidang kuasa atau tanpa sebarang bidang kuasa. Permohonan perayu telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dengan kos atas alasan bahawa responden pertama telah membuat keputusan yang betul dengan merujuk representasi-representasi tersebut kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan. Maka, rayuan ini dibuat.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) (oleh Mokhtar Sidin dan Abdul Kadir Sulaiman HHMR) Seksyen 20(3) Akta tersebut memberikan responden pertama budi bicara untuk merujuk atau menolak representasi-representasi yang dibuat oleh seorang pekerja dibawah s 20(1) kepada responden kelima bagi satu award setelah menerima notifikasi Ketua Pengarah bahawa ia berpuas hati bahawa tiada kebarangkalian representasi-representasi itu dapat diselesaikan. Oleh itu, budi bicara responden kelima akan digunakan hanya ‘jika difikirkan perlu’ untuk berbuat demikian. Jika tidak, beliau mempunyai setiap alasan untuk tidak berbuat begitu (lihat perenggan 3–4). (2) (oleh Mokhtar Sidin dan Abdul Kadir Sulaiman HHMR) Apabila mendapati bahawa wujud isu-isu serius yang perlu diselesaikan, setelah mempertimbangkan fakta-fakta yang dikemukakan kepadanya berikutan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 115 notifikasi Ketua Pengarah bahawa tidak wujud kebarangkalian bahawa pertikaian tersebut dapat diselesaikan, adalah wajar bagi responden pertama merujuk representasi-representasi tersebut kepada responden kelima untuk award. Melainkan ianya adalah jelas pada zahir rekod-rekod bahawa representasi yang dibuat adalah remeh dan menyusahkan, responden pertama perlu meneliti fakta-fakta untuk membolehkannya membuat keputusan satu cara atau lainnya tentang apa yang akan berlaku kepada representasi tersebut. Keterangan menunjukkan bahawa sememangnya wujud isu-isu serius yang hanya boleh diselesaikan oleh responden kelima. Oleh itu, beliau telah bertindak dengan betul dengan merujuk perkara tersebut dalam melaksanakan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan oleh responden pertama (lihat perenggan 9). (3) (oleh Mokhtar Sidin dan Abdul Kadir Sulaiman HHMR) Sama ada estoppel berfungsi dalam kes-kes perusahaan seperti ini merupakan isu perundangan yang tidak harus diputuskan oleh responden pertama, yang merupakan badan pentadbiran berbanding responden kelima yang merupakan badan penghakiman yang diwujudkan oleh Akta ||Page 450>> tersebut untuk menentukan isu perundangan seperti ini. Dalam apa jua keadaan, perkara ini tidak pernah dikemukakan kepada responden pertama untuk dipertimbangkan bagi tujuan membuat keputusannya dibawah s 20(3) Akta tersebut. Tambahan lagi, dalam hal-hal perusahaan seperti ini, estoppel tidak terpakai kepada adjudikasi perusahaan berikutan s 30(5) Akta tersebut. (lihat perenggan-perenggan 16 dan 17); Marlin bte Rajiman & Ors v MAA Services Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 404 diikut. (4) (oleh Abdul Aziz HMR menentang) Apabila soal timbul sama ada responden pertama telah bertindak dengan betul dalam melaksanakan budi bicaranya di bawah s 20 (3) Akta tersebut, yakni, budi bicaranya untuk merujuk atau tidak merujuk, mahkamah mesti membuat pemeriksaan yang teliti fakta-fakta. Tujuan pemeriksaan yang teliti adalah untuk melihat sama ada representasi-representasi yang dibuat oleh pekerja-pekerja adalah pemutarbalikan, remeh atau menyusahkan. Pemeriksaan fakta-fakta dengan teliti daripada responden pertama diperlukan daripada mahkamah bukan sahaja apabila Menteri memutuskan untuk tidak merujuk representasi kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan tetapi juga apabila Menteri memutuskan untuk merujuk representasi kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan. Menteri, dalam mencapai keputusannya untuk merujuk representasi-representasi kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan, telah mengambil kira pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang tidak relevan, dan oleh itu gagal mengambil kira pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang sepatutnya difikirkannya. Untuk alasan ini, keputusannya perlu dibatalkan dan rayuan ini perlu dibenarkan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 26 dan 51).]
Notes For cases on discretion of Minister, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1294–1307.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 116 For cases on remedies in judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 177–178. For cases on retrenchment benefits in Industrial Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 1406. For cases on judicial review, see 9 Halbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160.110]– [160.136]. For cases on Minister’s direction in refering a representation, see 17 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [290.129].
Cases referred to Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Bombay Union of Journalists v State of Bombay [1964] 1 LLJ 351 (refd) Marlin bte Rajiman & Ors v MAA Services Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 404 (folld) Minister of Labour, Malaysia v Lie Seng Fatt [1990] 2 MLJ 9 (refd)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 20(1), (2), (3), 30(5)
Appeal from Originating Motion No R2–25–110 of 1998 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) ||Page 451>>
Edward Saw (Andrew Saw with him) (Ng Yook Woon Andrew TC Saw & Co) for the appellants. Amarjeet Singh, SFC (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the first respondent.
[2004] 2 MLJ 504 DATO’ KANALINGAM A/L VELUPILLAI v BAR COUNCIL & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO R–17B–157 OF 2002 AZMEL, ZULKEFLI AND ZAINUN ALI JJ 29 FEBRUARY 2004
Administrative Law — Natural justice — Breach — Composition of Disciplinary Board — Presence of unqualified person — Whether breach of rules of natural justice — Legal
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 117 Profession (Disciplinary Board)(Procedure) Rules 1994 r 4
Civil Procedure — Appeal — Decision of Disciplinary Board — Appeal against — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 103E
The second defendant (the second respondent) made a decision that the two complaints made by the first defendant (the first respondent) had merit and decided to constitute an Investigating Tribunal to inquire into the said complaints pursuant to s 100(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976. The appellant’s appeal was based on the composition of the Disciplinary Board that had determined that there was merit in the complaint and decided to constitute an Investigating Tribunal to investigate the complaint against the appellant. The appellants’ argument was that since the Bar Council was the complainant, the president of the Bar Council was or his alternate should be a disqualified person to be a member of the Disciplinary Board. A preliminary issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision of the second respondent to appoint an Investigation Tribunal to investigate and report, since such decision was not a final decision on the merits of the complaint.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Section 103E(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 refers to ‘any decision or order of the Disciplinary Board which is appealable to the High Court’. The decision for the second respondent therefore to constitute an Investigating Tribunal to investigate the said complaints against the appellant was a decision within the meaning of s 103E(1). As such the High Court would have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal by the appellant against the decision of the second respondent in accordance with the clear and unambiguous wordings of s 103E(1) of the Act (see para 17). (2) Since the second respondent had refused to reveal the names of the members of the Disciplinary Board after having twice been requested by the appellant, the presumption under s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 is applicable (see para 21). (3) In the light of the invocation of s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 in that composition of the members of the second respondent was unlawful because of the presence of an unqualified person, the decision of the second respondent to constitute the Investigating Tribunal was void ab initio (see para 25). (4) With the presence of the Bar Council the provision of r 4 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 had been breached. The second respondent therefore had failed to observe the basic rules of natural justice when they deliberated on the complaint of the first respondent against the appellant (see para 26). ||Page 505>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 118
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Defendan pertama (responden kedua) telah membuat keputusan bahawa dua aduan yang dibuat oleh defendan pertama (responden pertama) mempunyai merit dan memutuskan untuk membentuk satu Tribunal Siasatan untuk menyiasat aduan-aduan tersebut menurut s 100(1) Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976. Rayuan perayu adalah berdasarkan pembentukan Lembaga Tatatertib yang perlu menentukan bahawa terdapat merit dalam aduan tersebut dan telah memutuskan untuk membentuk satu Tribunal Siasatan untuk menyiasat aduan terhadap perayu. Hujah perayu adalah memandangkan Majlis Peguam merupakan pengadu, presiden Majlis Peguam telah atau alternatifnya patut digugurkan sebagai ahli Lembaga Tatatertib. Satu persoalan awal adalah sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk melayan rayuan berhubung keputusan responden kedua untuk melantik Tribunal Siasatan untuk menyiasat dan melapor, memandangkan keputusan tersebut bukan keputusan muktamad berdasarkan merit pengadu.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Seksyen 103E(1) Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976 merujuk kepada ‘any decision or order of the Disciplinary Board which is appealable to the High Court’. Keputusan untuk responden kedua membentuk satu Tribunal Siasatan untuk menyiasat aduan-aduan tersebut terhadap perayu adalah satu keputusan dalam maksud s 103E(1). Oleh itu Mahkamah Tinggi akan mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar rayuan oleh perayu terhadap keputusan responden kedua bersesuaian dengan perkataan-perkataan yang jelas dan tak taksa s 103E(1) Akta tersebut (lihat perenggan 17). (2) Memandangkan responden kedua enggan untuk mendedahkan nama-nama ahli Lembaga Tatatertib selepas dua kali dipohon oleh perayu, andaian di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 adalah terpakai (lihat perenggan 21). (3) Berdasarkan penggunaan s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 berhubung pembentukan ahli-ahli responden kedua adalah menyalahi undang-undang kerana kehadiran seorang yang tidak layak, keputusan responden kedua untuk membentuk Tribunal Siasatan adalah terbatal ab initio (lihat perenggan 25). (4) Dengan kewujudan Majlis Peguam peruntukan k 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Profesyen Undang-Undang (Lembaga Tatatertib) (Prosedur) 1994 telah dilanggar. Responden kedua oleh itu telah gagal untuk meneliti kaedah-kaedah am keadilan semulajadi semasa meneliti aduan responden pertama terhadap perayu (lihat perenggan 26).]
Notes For cases on breach of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 180–181.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 119 For cases on appeals against decision of Disciplinary Board generally, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 558–623. For breach of natural justice, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160.091]– [160.108]. ||Page 506>>
Cases referred to Duport Steels Ltd & Ors v Sirs & Ors [1980] 1 WLR 142 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509 (refd)
Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 s 114(g) Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17 Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 r 4(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 93(3), 100(1), 103E
V Sithambaram (KT Wong with him) (V Siva & Partners) for the appellant. BP Vendargon (T Kunaseelan with him) (Gunaseelan & Assoc) for the first respondent. Kevin Wong (Tommy Thomas) for the second respondent.
[2004] 2 MLJ 516 HO KOOI SANG v UNIVERSITI MALAYA
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO R2–24–52 OF 2003 WAN AFRAH JC 20 AUGUST 2003
Criminal Procedure — Coroner’s inquiry — Duty of magistrate — Cause of death — Order for post-mortem to be conducted — Whether such inquiry conducted by magistrate necessary — Criminal Procedure Code ss 334, 335
Administrative Law —Remedies — Mandamus — Whether prerequisites for such order complied with — Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 44, 45
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 120
The plaintiff, the brother of the deceased alleged that the deceased had been detained by the police and that he died suddenly in the custody of the police/prison authorities. The cause of death of the deceased however was pronounced to be perforated ulcer. The plaintiff, believing that his brother was beaten up by the police authorities, made an application, under s 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 for, inter alia, a post mortem to be conducted on the deceased by the defendant. The issues for consideration were: (a) whether the plaintiff had established the requirements of s 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950; and (b) whether the defendant was under a duty in law to perform the post-mortem.
Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) There are four pre-requisites essential to the issue of an order under s 44 or of a mandamus: (a) whether the applicant has a clear and specific legal right to the relief sought; (b) whether there is a duty imposed by the law on the respondent; (c) whether such duty is of an imperative ministerial character involving no judgment or discretion on the part of the respondent; and (d) whether the applicant has any remedy, other than by way of mandamus, for the enforcement of the right which has been denied to him (see para 38). (2) The applicant must show not only that he has a legal right to have the act performed but that the right is so clear and well defined as to be free from any reasonable controversy. The order cannot issue when the right is doubtful, or is a qualified one or where it depends upon an issue of fact to be determined by the respondent (see para 38). (2) The application therefore must be founded on an affidavit of the person injured stating his right in the matter in question his demand of justice and the denial thereof. Nowhere in the affidavit of the plaintiff was it stated that he had such personal right and that his personal right would be injured if the order is not given (see para 40). (3) Based on s 335 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there lies a duty on the defendant to perform a post mortem should the magistrate order him to do so where there is an inquiry (see para 50). (4) Since there was no order of inquiry, the defendant was not under any legal duty to perform the post-mortem and the court cannot presume the existence of any legal duty on the part of the defendant unless it is pointed out how that duty existed (see para 51). ||Page 517>>
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, abang kepada si mati telah mengatakan bahawa si mati telah ditahan oleh pihak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 121 polis dan bahawa beliau telah meninggal dunia secara mengejut dalam tahanan pihak polis/pihak berkuasa penjara. Sebab kematian si mati bagaimanapun telah diisytiharkan sebagai ulser yang berlubang. Plaintif, yang mempercayai bahawa adik beliau telah dipukul oleh pihak polis, telah membuat satu permohonan, di bawah s 44 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950, untuk, antara lain, satu post mortem dijalankan ke atas si mati oleh defendan. Persoalan untuk dipertimbangkan adalah: (a) sama ada plaintif telah mematuhi keperluan-keperluan s 44 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950; dan (b) sama ada defendan mempunyai satu kewajipan di sisi undang-undang untuk melaksanakan post mortem tersebut.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Terdapat empat pra syarat penting untuk mengeluarkan satu perintah di bawah s 44 atau satu mandamus: (a) sama ada pemohon mempunyai hak sah yang jelas dan spesifik untuk memohon relif tersebut; (b) sama ada terdapat kewajipan dikenakan oleh undang-undang ke atas responden; (c) sama ada kewajipan tersebut bersifat ministerial imperatif yang tidak melibatkan apa-apa penghakiman atau budi bicara di pihak responden; dan (d) sama ada pemohon mempunyai apa-apa remedi, selain daripada melalui mandamus, untuk penguatkuasaan hak yang telah dinafikan terhadap beliau (lihat perenggan 38). (2) Pemohon hendaklah menunjukkan bukan sahaja beliau mempunyai hak yang sah untuk tindakan tersebut dilaksanakan tetapi juga bahawa hak tersebut adalah nyata dan jelas ditafsirkan sebagai bebas daripada apa-apa kontroversi yang munasabah. Perintah tersebut tidak boleh dikeluarkan jika hak tersebut diragui, atau bersyarat atau di mana ia bergantung kepada satu persoalan fakta yang perlu ditentukan oleh responden (lihat perenggan 38). (2) Permohonan tersebut oleh itu hendaklah diasaskan atas satu affidavit seorang yang mengalami kecederaan dengan menyatakan hak beliau berhubung perkara yang dipersoalkan tentang tuntutan keadilan beliau dan panafian terhadapnya. Tiada di mana-mana dalam afidavit plaintif dinyatakan bahawa beliau mempunyai hak peribadi tersebut dan bahawa hak peribadi beliau akan tercemar jika perintah tersebut tidak diberikan (lihat perenggan 40). (3) Berdasarkan s 335 Kanun Acara Jenayah, terdapat kewajipan ke atas defendan untuk melaksanakan satu post mortem sekiranya majistret memerintahkan beliau berbuat demikian di mana terdapat satu siasatan (lihat perenggan 50). (4) Memandangkan tiada perintah untuk siasatan, defendan tidak ada apa-apa kewajipan dari segi undang-undang untuk melaksanakan post mortem tersebut dan mahkamah tidak boleh mengandaikan kewujudan apa-apa kewajipan dari segi undang-undang di pihak defendan kecuali ia ditunjukkan bagaimana kewajipan tersebut wujud (lihat perenggan 51).] ||Page 518>>
Notes
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 122
For cases on duties of magistrate, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 1389. For cases on mandamus, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 554– 583. For mandamus, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160.137]–[160.156].
Cases referred to Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Koon Hoi Chow v Pretam Singh [1972] 1 MLJ 180 (folld) Metro Pacific Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja & Anor [2001] 4 MLJ 616 (refd) Ng Hee Thong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 29 (refd) Penang Han Chiang Associated Chinese School Association v National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, West Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 302 (refd) Thein Tham Sang v United States Army Medical Research Unit & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 97 (folld)
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25(2), Schedule Criminal Procedure Code ss 334, 335(2) Federal Constitution arts 5(1) and 11 Registration of Birth and Deaths (Speacial Provisions) Act 1975 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 7 r 12, O 53 r 1(1) Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 20(1)(b), 44(1)(a), (b) University of Malaya Act 1961 University Malaya Constitution Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 s 8
M Manoharan (P Uthayakumar, VK Sharma, N Surendran, Dev Anand, P Chandrasegar and Sri Murugan with him) (M Manoharan & Co) for the plaintiff. PS Ranjan (MS Dhillon with him) (PS Ranjan & Co) for the defendant.
[2004] 2 MLJ 576 JEBSEN & JESSEN ENGINEERING (M) SDN BHD v DAVID A/L SANDANASAMY & ORS
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 123
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVISION NO R2–25–59 OF 2002 WAN AFRAH JC 3 NOVEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Judicial review — High court — Whether can interfere with findings of the Industrial Court — Whether can reduce award of back wages — Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 30
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Judicial review — Industrial Court — Award — Error of law did not occasion great injustice — Arithmetical error — Whether entire award should be quashed
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Procedure — Pleadings — Whether issues outside pleadings could be considered
Labour Law — Employment — Resignation — Whether letter of resignation tendered voluntarily — Whether procured with threat of retrenchment — Whether exercise of retrenchment genuine
The first respondent was in the employment of the applicant since 14 August 1997 as an account assistant and the second respondent joined the applicant as a service supervisor on 10 March 1993. Both the respondents alleged that their last day with the applicant was on the 31 July 1998. The issue of determination before the Industrial Court (‘the IC’) was whether the letter of resignation of both the respondents were procured as a result of coercion and force and was not tendered voluntarily or as contended by the applicant that since it was in genuine retrenchment situation hence this dismissal was with just cause or excuse and/or the respondents resigned to avoid from being retrenched. The IC concluded that the resignation of the respondents came about at the initiative of the company and that the resignation was not tendered voluntarily and held that there was forced resignation and hence a dismissal. The IC proceeded to award back wages to the respondents. This was the applicant’s application for an order of certiorari to quash the award of the IC on the grounds that, inter alia, the IC erred in law and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Held, dismissing the application for certiorari: (1) It was important in a case to appraise the whole evidence as it was wrong to take bits and pieces of the award and criticize them. This was in fact spelt out in the case of Kaolin (M) Sdn Bhd v Samba Sirvang a/l Thanimalai [2001] l MLJ 120. As such, in this case, the court was satisfied that the IC had
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 124 considered the pleadings and the evidence duly tendered before it (see para 11). ||Page 577>> (2) The IC did not commit an error of law in its evaluation and finding of the initial meetings to come to a conclusion that ‘it triggers the likelihood of the absence or lack of free will on the part of the employees’. The High Court failed to see how the initial meetings and discussion the applicant had with the respondents when briefing the retrenchment were in compliance with the Industrial Code of Harmony, more so with the company pre prepared termination letter (see para 20). (3) The IC was not wrong to find that the company was not suffering losses as it does not tally with cost cutting exercise embarked by the company. If it was true that the position of the respondents were surplus that necessitated the need for retrenchment, then the applicant should have instead retrenched the respondents and pay nothing to them as the respondents were not entitled to any payments. The very action of the applicant in calling for meetings individually and giving them an option of either resigning or be dismissed, was by no stretch of imagination a compliance with the Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony (see paras 36, 40). (4) The IC chairwoman had sieved through evidence of both parties and had come to a finding of facts and this reviewing court here will not interfere with the trial court’s finding of fact unless they were completely unsupported by any evidence. Once there was evidence to support a finding of fact, the High Court should not interfere into it (see para 23); Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 followed. (5) Based upon the Federal Court’s decision of Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers & Anor [1980] 1 MLJ 109, if there was a legal basis for an award of back wages, the amount was very much a matter of the discretion which the IC was fully empowered under s 30 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (see para 48). (6) Arithmetical error committed by the IC when it computed the deduction of two and a half months salary of the first respondent as RM 3,000 instead of RM4,000 could be corrected by the High Court without quashing the entire award (see para 50). (7) Where there was an error of law, if such error did not occasion great injustice , the entire award should not been quashed (see para 55).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden pertama bekerja sebagai pembantu perakaunan pemohon sejak 14 Ogos 1997 dan responden kedua bekerja dengan pemohon sebagai penyelia servis sejak 10
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 125 Mac 1993. Kedua-dua responden menyatakan hari terakhir mereka dengan pemohon adalah pada 31 Julai 1998. Isu yang perlu diputuskan di Mahkamah Perusahaan (‘MP’) adalah sama ada surat perletakkan jawatan kedua-dua responden diperolehi secara paksaan dan tidak diberi secara rela atau seperti dinyatakan oleh pemohon kerana ia adalah keadaan pengurangan pekerja yang benar maka penamatan ini adalah dengan tujuan dan alasan ||Page 578>> yang adil dan/atau responden-responden meletak jawatan untuk mengelak dari ditamatkan pekerjaannya kerana pengurangan pekerjaan. MP memutuskan bahawa perletakkan jawatan responden-responden adalah kerana pemohon dan ia tidak diberi secara rela dan ia diperolehi secara paksaan maka terdapat penamatan pekerjaan. MP mengarahkan pemohon untuk membayar tunggakan gaji kepada responden-responden. Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk perintah certiorari untuk memansuhkan award MP atas alasan bahawa antara lain MP telah salah dari sisi undang-undang dan telah bertindak tanpa atau dengan bidang kuasa terlebih.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan pemohon untuk certiorari: (1) Ia adalah penting di dalam sesuatu kes untuk menilai keseluruhan keterangan kerana adalah salah untuk menilai sedikit demi sedikit dan mengkritiknya.Ini telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Kaolin (M) Sdn Bhd v Samba Sirvang a/l Thanimalai [2001] 1 MLJ 120. Oleh demikian di dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa MP telah menilai pliding dan keterangan yang dikemukakan padanya (lihat perenggan 11). (2) Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak melakukan kesalahan undang-undang dalam penilaian dan keputusannya mengenai mesyuarat awal untuk mencapai keputusan bahawa ‘ia bangkitkan peluang untuk ketidakrelaan terhadap pekerja’. Mahkamah Tinggi gagal untuk melihat bagaimana mesyuarat awal dan perbincangan pemohon adakan dengan responden-responden bila memberi maklumat mengenai penamatan pekerjaan adalah mematuhi Kanun Perusahaan bagi Kesejahteraan, lebih-lebih lagi dengan surat perletakkan jawatan yang disiapkan oleh syarikat (lihat perenggan 20). (3) Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak salah untuk membuat keputusan bahawa syarikat tidak mengalami kerugian kerana ia tidak besamaan dengan langkah pemotongan kos yang dibuat oleh syarikat. Kalau benar jawatan responden-responden adalah terlebih dan perlu ditamatkan, pemohon sepatutnya menamatkan pekerjaan mereka dan tidak bayar apa-apa kepada responden-responden kerana mereka tidak berhak untuk sebarang pembayaran. Tindakan pemohon memanggil untuk mesyuarat secara individu dan memberi mereka pilihan untuk sama ada meletak jawatan atau ditamatkan, adalah tidak mematuhi Kanun Perusahaan untuk Kesejahteraan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 36, 40). (4) Pengerusi MP telah menilai keterangan kedua-dua pihak dan telah mencapai keputusan fakta dan mahkamah kajian semula ini tidak akan masuk campur
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 126 dalam keputusan fakta mahkamah yang menjalankan perbicaraan kecuali ia tidak langsung disokong oleh sebarang keterangan. Sekali terdapat keterangan untuk menyokong keputusan fakta, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak akan masuk campur (lihat perenggan 23); Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 diikut. (5) Berdasarkan pada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers & Anor [1980] 1 MLJ 109, jika terdapat asas undang-undang untuk ||Page 579>> memberi award bagi tunggakan gaji, jumlahnya adalah satu perkara di dalam pertimbangan MP mengikut kuasa sepenuhnya yang diberikan oleh s 30 Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (lihat perenggan 48). (6) Kesalahan kira-kira yang dibuat oleh MP bila ia mengira pemotongan dua bulan setengah bulan gaji bagi responden pertama sebagai RM3,000 bila ia sepatutnya RM4,000 boleh dibetulkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi tanpa memansuhkan keseluruhan award (lihat perenggan 50). (7) Bila terdapat kesilapan undang-undang, jika kesilapan itu tidak melibatkan ketidakadilan yang besar, keseluruhan award tersebut tidak patut dimansuhkan (lihat perenggan 55).]
Notes For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 35–58. For cases on procedure, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1380–1390. For cases on resignation, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1003–1004. For judicial review, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [160.059]–[160.069]. For unjust dismissal, see 17 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [290.123]– [290.124].
Cases referred to Abdul Majid bin Hj. Nazardin & Ors v Paari Perumal [2002] 2 MLJ 640 (refd) Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow & Anor [1956] AC 14 (folld) Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 369 (folld) Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers & Anor [1980] 1 MLJ 109 (folld) Kaolin (M) Sdn Bhd v Samba Sirvang a/l Thanimalai [2001] l MLJ 120 (folld) Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 (folld)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 127 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; [1982] 3 All ER (folld) Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2002] MLJ 600 (folld) Southern Bank Bhd v Ng Keng Lian & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 514 (refd) Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia [1995] 2 MLJ 442 (folld) Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 75 3 (folld)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 20,30
TM Varughese (TM Varughese & Co) for the applicant. P Vickneswaren (Kavin Lim with him) (Murugavell Arumugam & Co) for the first and second respondents. ||Page 580>>
[2004] 3 MLJ 357 S VEERASINGAM v KERAJAAN MALAYSIA & ANOR
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–39 OF 2001 ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN, PAJAN SINGH GILL AND RAHMAH HUSSAIN JJCA 10 JUNE 2004
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Termination of service on public interest — Retirement from service — Whether officer punished twice when coupled with disciplinary action — Whether termination order and disciplinary action were separate — Police Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders (Cap ‘D’) 1980, General Order 44
Public Servants — Disciplinary proceedings — Procedure — Salary — Officer’s salary reduced based on findings by disciplinary proceedings — Plea in mitigation — Whether officer given opportunity of making representation before punishment meted out — Whether decision-making process flawed — Police Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders (Cap ‘D’) 1980, General Orders 25 and 36
The plaintiff was employed as a clerical officer by Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (‘KTMB’). Following an accident between two trains (‘the said accident’), the plaintiff received a show cause letter on 17 May 1990 from an inquiry committee (‘IC’) which was set up to investigate the said accident. On 29 October 1990, the Public Services
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 128 Commission (‘PSC’) invited the plaintiff to attend an interview for the post of station manager where he was to be on a one-year probation upon appointment. On 13 December 1990, the IC informed that the plaintiff that he was found guilty for the said accident which resulted in his salary being reduced by three points for a two-year period (‘the disciplinary action’). On 20 March 1991, the PSC appointed the plaintiff as a probationary station manager. However, on 10 January 1992, the PSC informed the plaintiff that the Government of Malaysia had decided to retire him on grounds of public interest, effective 26 January 1992 (‘the termination order’). Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced an action in the High Court against KTMB as the first defendant and the Government of Malaysia as the second defendant. He had also applied to add Perbadanan Aset Keretapi as the third defendant to the suit. He contended, amongst others, that the disciplinary action and termination order were ultra vires and wrong in law. The High Court dismissed his action, hence this appeal. The issues before this court were (i) whether the disciplinary action was erroneous in law and the decision-making process flawed, in absence of an opportunity for the plaintiff to make a plea in mitigation before he was “sentenced” to a salary reduction; (ii) whether the decision-making process was flawed because the charge sheet was issued by the disciplinary officer, whereas the subsequent punishment was meted out by the chairman of KTM Head Office Disciplinary Board for group ‘C’ officers; and (iii) whether PSC and KTM both had, by their actions, created a binding agreement which could not be arbitrarily revoked in offering him the post of station manager. ||Page 358>>
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal with costs: (1) The penalty to be imposed here was not a dismissal or reduction in rank, but a reduction of salary by three points under GO 36(g). Even though GO 36 provides seven alternative penalties including dismissal and reduction in rank, para 2 of the show cause letter dated 17 May 1990 indicated that reference was made to GO 25 which encompasses procedures for breach of discipline “which merits punishment lesser than dismissal or reduction in rank”. Thus, when the show cause letter was issued, the Disciplinary Authority had in mind any of the punishments under GO 36(a) to (g) but not a reduction in rank or dismissal, as in paras (h) and (i) which by virtue of GO 26(1) encompasses a different procedure as provided in GO 26(2) to (11) (see paras 18 and 20). (2) The show cause letter was issued pursuant to GO 25(1) to inform the plaintiff of the facts of the breach of discipline alleged against him and he had been given the opportunity of making a representation in writing, against the allegation. GO 25(2) provides that after considering the representation, the authority shall determine whether or not the officer is guilty of the alleged breach of discipline and if it determines that he is guilty thereof, it shall impose any or more of the punishments specified in GO 36. Therefore unlike GO 26, there is no pre-set “mental state of mind” of the authority issuing the show cause letter that the plaintiff was already guilty of the disciplinary charges. The
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 129 finding of guilt is only done by the authority in sub-para (2) after considering the representation of the plaintiff (see paras 25 and 26). (3) The third issue raised was a non-issue as the contract of the post of station manager did not exist between the parties. An important clause in the offer letter (cl 2(d)) specified that he must have served in that post for at least one year before being confirmed as a station manager. But his services were terminated before his eligibility date. Therefore he had to revert to his earlier post of “ pegawai kerani biasa” (see para 29). (4) A termination order under GO 44 is a distinct and separate matter altogether. In the present case since the disciplinary action related to the said accident only whereas the termination order relates to the “... condition of service, the usefulness of the officer thereto, the work and conduct of the officer and all the other circumstances of the case” (GO 44(2)), the plaintiff had not been punished twice. Further the letter of termination dated 10 January 1992 had specified that the plaintiff had been terminated from service pursuant to GO 44(1) and (2) (see para 33).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif memegang jawatan pegawai perkeranian di Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (‘KTMB’). Berikutan satu kemalangan di antara dua keretapi (kemalangan tersebut’), plaintif telah menerima surat tunjuksebab pada 17 Mei 1990 daripada jawatankuasa siasatan (‘JS’) yang ditubuhkan untuk menyiasat kemalangan tersebut. Pada 29 Oktober 1990, Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam (‘SPA’) telah menjemput plaintif menghadiri temuduga untuk jawatan pengurus stesyen dengan syarat beliau akan berada dalam ||Page 359>> tempoh percubaan untuk setahun selepas perlantikannya. Pada 13 Disember 1990, JS memaklumkan plaintif bahawa beliau didapati bersalah berkenaan kemalangan tersebut dan dengan itu gajinya dikurangkan sebanyak tiga poin bagi tempoh dua tahun (‘tindakan displin’). Pada 20 Mac 1991, JPA telah melantik plaintif sebagai pengurus stesyen. Akan tetapi, pada 10 Januari 1992, SPA mengumumkan kepada plaintif bahawa Kerajaan Malaysia telah memutuskan untuk menyarakan beliau atas kepentingan awam, berkuatkuasa 26 Januari 1992 (‘perintah tamatkerja’). Plaintif kemudiannya memulakan tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap KTMB sebagai defendan pertama dan Kerajaan Malaysia sebagai defendan kedua. Dia juga telah memohon untuk memasukkan Perbadanan Aset Keretapi sebagai defendan ketiga kepada tindakan berkenaan. Dia mengadu, antara lain, bahawa tindakan displin dan perintah tamatkerja adalah ultra vires dan khilaf di sisi undang-undang. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonannya, maka rayuan ini. Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada (i) tindakan displin salah dari segi undang-undang dan proses membuat keputusan cacat, dalam ketiadaan peluang untuk
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 130 plaintif membuat rayuan bagi mengurangkan hukuman sebelum beliau “dihukum” dengan pengurangan gaji; (ii) sama ada proses membuat keputusan cacat kerana surat tuduhan dikeluarkan oleh pegawai displin, manakala tindakan selanjutnya dilaksanakan oleh pengerusi badan displin ibu pejabat KTM untuk pegawai katergori ‘C’; dan (iii) sama ada SPA dan KTM kedua-duanya telah, melalui tindakan mereka, mewujudkan suatu perjanjian mengikat yang tidak boleh diketepikan sewenang-wenangnya setelah penawaran jawatan pengurus stesyen dibuat.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Penalti yang dilaksanakan di sini bukanlah pembuangan kerja atau penurunan pangkat tetapi pengurangan gaji sebanyak tiga poin di bawah PA 36(g). Walaupun PA 36 memperuntukkan tujuh penalti berlainan, termasuk pembuangan kerja dan penurunan pangkat, para 2 di surat tunjuksebab bertarikh 17 Mei 1990 menunjukkan bahawa rujukan telah dibuat kepada PA 25 yang merangkumi prosedur untuk perlanggaran displin “yang membenarkan hukuman wajar tidak sampai ke tahap pembuangan kerja atau penurunan pangkat.” Maka, bila surat tunjuksebab tersebut dikeluarkan, pemikiran pihak berkuasa disiplinari tertumpu kepada hukuman di bawah PA 36(a) ke (g) dan bukannya pembuangan kerja atau penurunan pangkat, seperti di dalam para (h) ke (i) yang mana di bawah PA 26(1) merangkumi prosedur berlainan seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah PA 26(2) ke (11) (lihat para 18 dan 20). (2) Surat tunjuksebab dikeluarkan di bawah PA 25(1) untuk memaklumkan plaintif akan fakta-fakta perlanggaran displin yang ditujukan terhadapnya dan dia telah diberi peluang untuk membuat representasi secara bertulis terhadap tuduhan tersebut. PA 25(2) memperuntukkan bahawa selepas menimbang representasi tersebut, pihak berkuasa akan memutuskan sama ada pegawai berkenaan didapati bersalah atas tuduhan perlanggaran displin dan jika diputuskan bahawa dia sememangnya bersalah, ia akan ||Page 360>> menjatuhkan mana-mana hukuman yang ditetapkan dalam PA 36. Maka, tidak seperti PA 26, tidak terdapat pemikiran di minda pihak berkuasa yang mengeluarkan surat tunjuksebab terlebih dahulu bahawa plaintif telah didapati bersalah atas tuduhan displin. Penemuan kesalahan hanya akan dilakukan oleh pihak berkuasa dalam sub-para (2) selepas menimbangkan representasi plaintif (lihat para 25 dan 26). (3) Isu ketiga yang dibangkitkan tidak terpakai kerana kontrak perkhidmatan untuk jawatan pengurus stesyen tidak terwujud antara pihak-pihak dalam kes ini. Klausa penting dalam surat tawaran (kl 2(d)) menyatakan bahawa dia mestilah berkhidmat dalam jawatan tersebut bagi tempoh sekurang-kurangnya setahun sebelum disahkan sebagai pengurus stesyen. Akan tetapi perkhidmatannya telah ditamatkan sebelum tarikh kelayakannya. Dengan itu, dia seharusnya kembali ke jawatan terdahulunya sebagai pegawai kerani biasa (lihat para 29). (4) Perintah tamatkerja di bawah PA 44 adalah suatu perkara yang terasing dan berlainan sama sekali. Dalam kes ini, oleh kerana tindakan displin berkaitan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 131 dengan kemalangan tersebut manakala perintah tamat kerja berkaitan dengan “ … keadaan perkhidmatan, kebergunaan pegawai padanya, pekerjaan dan kelakuan pegawai dan fakta-fakta lain kes yang berkenaan” (PA 44(2)), maka plaintif tidak dihukum dua kali. Tambahan pula, surat pemberhentian kerja bertarikh 10 Januari 1992 telah menyatakan bahawa plaintif telah diberhentikan kerja di bawah PA 44(1) dan (2) (lihat para 33).]
Notes For cases on termination of service of public servants on public interest, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) see paras 689–691 For cases on disciplinary proceedings involving public servants, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1792–1798 For legal proceedings involving public officers generally, see 7 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para 120.095
Cases referred to Balakrishnan v Ketua Pengarah Perkhidmatan Awam [1981] 2 MLJ 259 (folld) Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 114 (distd) Hngh Ah Leong v Inspector General of Police & 2 Ors [1995] 2 AMR 1993 (distd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 (distd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2000] 3 MLJ 281 (distd) Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 352 (distd) Utra Badi K Perumal v Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 676 (distd) ||Page 361>>
Legislation referred to Employment Act 1955 s 14 Federal Constitution Art 135(2) Police Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders (Cap ‘D’) 1980, GO 23, 25, (1), (2), 26(1), (2)–(11), 36, (a)–(i), 44(1), (2)
Karpal Singh (M Manoharan with him) (M/s Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant Azizah Nawawi SFC (Umi Kalthum Abdul Majid with her) (AG’s Chambers) for the first respondent
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 132 Tan Ming-Li (YM Chin, Jennifer Chandran & C Vilasini with him) (M/s Allen & Gledhill) for the second respondent
Appeal from: Civil Suit No S2–21–92–94(2) (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
[2004] 4 MLJ 18 OTHMAN BIN ALI v TELEKOM MALAYSIA BHD
HIGH COURT (KUALA TERENGGANU) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–27 OF 2000 AHMAD MAAROP J 4 MARCH 2004
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Right to be heard — Whether employee given opportunity to explain second reason in charge — Whether injustice occasioned
Labour Law — Employment — Dismissal — Law applicable — Employment Act 1955 or Telecommunication Services (Successor Company) Act 1985 — Employment Act 1955 ss 13(2) and 15(2) — Telecommunication Services (Successor Company) Act 1985 ss 2, 3(1), 9(1) and (2) — Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline)(Chapter "D") General Orders 1980, GO 21(1), (3), (4), 25 and 26(3)
Labour Law — Employment — Absenteeism — Absent without leave for more than two consecutive days — Work performance — Failure to improve — Whether dismissal valid — Employment Act 1955 ss 13(2) and 15(2) — Telecommunication Services (Successor Company) Act 1985 ss 2, 3 (1), 9(1) and (2)
The appellant/plaintiff (‘the appellant’) sued the respondent/defendant (‘the respondent’) for wrongfully dismissing him from service. The reason for the appellant’s termination was for his failure to provide proper explanation for his absence from work for more than two consecutive days. The sessions court judge dismissed the appellant’s claim. Hence this appeal against the decision. The issues before this court were: (a) whether the appellant’s absence and his subsequent dismissal for lack of proper explanation should be considered pursuant to the Employment Act 1955 (‘the EA’) or provisions under other laws; (b) (if the answer is the latter) whether the appellant’s dismissal was wrongful; and (c) whether the respondent violated the rules of natural justice when the respondent failed to provide an opportunity to the appellant to explain his absence from work.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 133 Held, allowing the appeal with costs: (1) The Telecommunication Services (Successor Company) Act 1985 (‘Act 322’) was enacted to facilitate the privatisation of the government’s Telecommunication Department as well as the employees whom opted to joint the respondent. The Minister in exercising the powers conferred under s 3(1) of Act 322 made the following orders, inter alia, that all property rights and liabilities in respect of telecommunication services, including all rights and liabilities relating to the staff were transferred to the respondent with effect from 1 January 1987 (see paras 15, 18 and 19). (2) Under General Order 21(1), absence without leave or prior permission or without reasonable cause renders a member of the public service of the Federation, like the appellant before the privatisation, liable to disciplinary action. General Order 21(4) provides that in situations of absence without leave or prior permission or without reasonable cause for a period exceeding seven working days, an officer shall be liable to disciplinary proceeding with a view to dismissal and reduction in rank ||Page 19>> in accordance with General Order 26. The offending officer still stood a chance for lesser punishment under General Order 26(3) upon his representation to the Disciplinary Authority. On the other hand, absence without leave or prior permission or without reasonable cause for a period not exceeding seven working days does not necessarily result in the dismissal. Under General Order 21(3), the Disciplinary Authority is empowered to initiate disciplinary action not with a view to dismissal and may impose such penalty as it may deem fit (see paras 24 and 25). (3) The terms and conditions of service under s 9(2) of Act 322 cover a number of aspects governing the relationship between the respondent and the former employees of the Telecommunication Department, Malaysia, including their rights and duties in matters of discipline, leave and medical benefits, which included the legal provisions relating to the same. Matters of discipline included the procedures to be applied when an employee is absent from work without leave. As such, by s 9(2) of Act 322, the appellant must be employed by the respondent ‘on terms and conditions of service not less favourable than the terms and conditions of service to which he was entitled to’ immediately before joining the respondent (see paras 21 and 22). (4) In applying the provisions under ss 13 and 15 of the EA in dealing with the appellant’s absence from work and entitling and employer to dismiss an employee without notice for absence without leave for two consecutives days, the respondent failed to comply with the mandatory standard provided under s 9(2) of Act 322, the appellant was made subject to procedures which were less favourable than the procedures relating to the same matter which he was entitled to immediately before joining the respondent. Such failure rendered the decision to dismiss the appellant illegal and/or procedurally improper (see para 30); Council of Civil Service Unions & Others v Minister for the Civil Service
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 134 [1985] AC 374 referred. (5) Adhering to the ordinary words of s 15(2) of the EA in interpreting the requirement to inform provided thereunder would result in absurdity or repugnance. The language of the section must be varied or modified to give it ‘force and life’ and to achieve what must have been the intention of the legislature. It was not the intention of the legislature that the requirement to inform under s 15(2) of the EA must be fulfilled even if the employee concerned is incapable of doing so because of his unstable physical or mental condition (see para 45). (6) The rules of natural justice and fair play demanded that the material facts supporting the second actual reason for the appellant’s dismissal be included in the charge against the appellant. As far as the appellant was concerned, from the respondent’s letters dated 10 May 1993, 11 May 1993 and 11 June 1993, the only charge against him was being absent from work on the four material days. He had given his explanation to the said ‘charge’ which was found by the respondent to be unreasonable. As far as the appellant was concerned, he was dismissed on the said ‘charge’. The charge did not mention anything about the facts relating to the second reason for his dismissal. It was obvious that the appellant was dismissed for something he was not ‘charged’ with, and in respect of which he was not given the chance to explain. This clearly amounted ||Page 20>> to a violation of the rules of natural justice which had occasioned injustice and grave prejudice to the appellant (see para 56); Board of Trustees of the Maradana Mosque v Badiuddin Mahmud & Another [1967] 1 AC 13 and Lau Liat Meng v Disciplinary Committee [1968] AC 391 referred.
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu/plaintif (‘perayu’) telah mendakwa responden/defendan (‘responden’) kerana telah memecat perayu daripada perkhidmatannya dengan salah. Alasan bagi pemecatan perayu adalah kegagalan perayu untuk memberi penjelasan yang sesuai bagi ketidakhadiran perayu ke kerja lebih dari dua hari berturut-turut. Hakim mahkamah sesyen telah menolak tuntutan perayu. Rayuan ini adalah berdasarkan keputusan tersebut. Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah (a) sama ada ketidakhadiran perayu dan pemecatannya selepas itu kerana kegagalan perayu memberikan penjelasan yang sesuai harus dipertimbangkan berdasarkan peruntukan Akta Kerja 1955 (‘AK’) atau peruntukan-peruntukan akta-akta lain; (b) (sekiranya jawapan adalah yang kemudiannya) sama ada pemecatan perayu adalah salah; dan (c) sama ada responden telah melanggar rukun keadilan asasi apabila responden gagal memberikan peluang kepada perayu untuk memberi penjelasan mengenai ketidakhadirannya.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos: (1) Akta Perkhidmatan Telekomunikasi (Syarikat Pengganti) 1985 (‘Akta 322’)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 135 telah digubal untuk membantu penswastaan Jabatan Telekomunikasi kerajaan termasuk menjaga kepentingan kakitangan-kakitangan di bawah jabatan tersebut yang telah memilih untuk bekerja bersama responden. Menteri, dalam melaksanakan kuasanya yang diberikan dibawah s 3(1) Akta 322, telah membuat perintah-perintah seperti berikut, antara lain, kesemua hak harta dan liabiliti yang berkaitan perkhidmatan telekomunikasi, termasuk kesemua hak dan liabiliti kakitangan-kakitangan yang berkaitan perkhidmatan telekomunikasi akan dipindahkan kepada responden dari 1 Januari 1987 (lihat perenggan 15, 18 dan 19). (2) Di bawah Perintah Am 21(1), ketidakhadiran tanpa kebenaran atau keizinan awal atau tanpa sebab yang munasabah akan menyebabkan kakitangan awam Persekutuan, seperti perayu sebelum penswastaan, boleh dikenakan tindakan disiplin. Perintah Am 21(4) memperuntukkan bahawa ketidakhadiran tanpa kebenaran atau keizinan awal atau tanpa sebab yang munasabah untuk tempoh masa lebih daripada tujuh hari bekerja, kakitangan tersebut hendaklah dikenakan tindakan disiplin dengan pandangan untuk pemecatan dan penurunan pangkat menurut Perintah Am 26. Pegawai yang bersalah masih mempunyai satu peluang untuk hukuman yang ringan dibawah Perintah Am 26(3) atas representasinya kepada Pihak Berkuasa Disiplin. Sebaliknya, ketidakhadiran tanpa kebenaran atau keizinan awal atau tanpa sebab yang munasabah untuk tempoh masa kurang daripada tujuh hari bekerja tidak semestinya mengakibatkan pemecatan. Di bawah Perintah Am 21(3) Pihak Berkuasa Disiplin, mempunyai kuasa untuk memulakan tindakan disiplin tanpa pandangan untuk pemecatan dan boleh mengenakan penalti yang dianggap sesuai (lihat perenggan 24 dan 25). ||Page 21>> (3) Terma-terma dan syarat-syarat perkhimatan dibawah s 9(2) Akta 322 merangkumi beberapa aspek yang menguasai perhubungan antara responden dan kakitangan-kakitangan dahulu Jabatan Telekomunikasi, Malaysia, termasuk hak-hak dan kewajipan dalam perkara-pekara disiplin, cuti dan faedah perubatan, yang merangkumi peruntukan undang-undang terhadap perkara tersebut. Perkara-perkara disiplin merangkumi prosedur-prosedur yang harus dipakai apabila seseorang kakitangan tidak hadir untuk kerja tanpa kebenaran. Maka, menurut s 9(2) Akta 322, responden hendaklah mengambil perayu untuk bekerja ‘on terms and conditions of service not less favourable than the terms and conditions of service to which he was entitled to’ sejurus sebelum perayu bersama responden (lihat perenggan 21 dan 22). (4) Dalam memakai peruntukan di bawah ss 13 dan 15 AK kepada ketidakhadiran perayu untuk kerja tanpa kebenaran dan membolehkan sesuatu majikan memecat pekerjanya tanpa notis untuk ketidakhadiran tanpa kebenaran selama dua hari berturut-turut, responden telah gagal untuk memenuhi standard mandatori yang diperuntukkan di bawah s 9(2) Akta 322, perayu telah tertakluk kepada prosedur yang kurang baik berbanding prosedur yang sama
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 136 yang mana perayu berhak sejurus sebelum bersama responden. Kegagalan seumpama itu menyebabkan keputusan untuk memecat perayu menyalahi undang-undang dan/atau tidak betul dari segi prosedur (lihat perenggan 30); Council of Civil Service Unions & Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 dirujuk. (5) Berpegang kepada perkataan biasa s 15(2) AK dalam mentafsirkan keperluan untuk memaklumkan yang telah diperuntukkan, akan menyebabkan kemustahilan atau ketidaksesuaian. Bahasa seksyen tersebut hendaklah diubah atau diubahsuai untuk memberi ‘force and life’ dan mencapai apa yang diniatkan oleh pengubal undang-undang. Bukan niat penggubal undang-undang bahawa keperluan untuk memberitahu di bawah s 15(2) AK tersebut hendaklah dipenuhi sungguhpun pekerja tersebut tidak berupaya berbuat demikian memandangkan keadaan fizikal atau mentalnya adalah tidak stabil (lihat perenggan 45). (6) Kaedah-kaedah keadilan asasi dan keadilan yang saksama mewajibkan bahawa fakta-fakta material yang menyokong alasan kedua sebenar dalam pemecatan perayu seharusnya dimasukkan dalam tuduhan terhadap perayu. Setakat penglibatan perayu, surat-surat responden yang bertarikh 10 Mei 1993, 11 Mei 1993 dan 11 Jun 1993, hanya terdapat tuduhan ketidakhadiran perayu untuk kerja selama empat hari. Perayu telah memberi penjelasannya kepada ‘tuduhan’ tersebut yang telah didapati oleh responden sebagai tidak munasabah. Mengikut perayu, perayu telah dipecat bedasarkan ‘tuduhan’ tersebut. Tuduhan tersebut langsung tidak menyatakan fakta-fakta yang berkaitan alasan kedua pemecatannya. Adalah jelas bahawa perayu telah dipecat untuk sesuatu yang mana perayu tidak dituduh, dan di mana perayu langsung tidak diberi peluang untuk menjelaskannya. Ini jelas adalah pelanggaran kaedah-kaedah keadilan asasi yang telah menyebabkan ketidakadilan dan prejudis yang teramat kepada perayu (lihat perenggan 56); Board Of Trustees Of the Maradana Mosque v Badiuddin Mahmud & Another [1967] 1 AC 13 dan Lau Liat Meng v Disciplinary Committee [1968] AC 391 dirujuk]. ||Page 22>>
Notes For cases on breach of the rules of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 712–722. For cases on dismissal, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 849– 873. For dismissal, see 7 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para [120.087]. For breach of the rules of natural justice, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para [160.107].
Cases referred to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 137 Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M&W 191 (refd) Board Of Trustees Of The Maradana Mosque v Badiuddin Mahmud & Another [1967] 1 AC 13 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions & Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Lau Liat Meng v Disciplinary Committee [1968] AC 391 (refd) Lim Moh Joo v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 113 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 2 MLJ 241 (refd)
Legislation referred to Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance [Sing] s 30(7) Assisted Schools & Training Colleges (Special Provision) Act 1960 [UK] s 6(i) Assisted Schools & Training Colleges (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1961 [UK] s 4 Employment Act 1955 ss 13, (2), 15, (1), (2), Pt III Evidence Act 1950 s 57(1)(a) Federal Constitution art 132(2) Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks and Compensation) Ordinance 1960 [Sing] s 17(2), (3) Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan Dan Tatatertib) 1993 Postal Services (Successor Company) Act 1991 s 8(2) Public Officer (Conduct & Discipline) (Chapter “D”) General Orders 1980 G O 21, (1), (3), (4), 25, 26, (3) Railway (Successor Company) Act 1991 s 8(2) Telecommunication Services (Successor Company) Act 1985 ss 2, 3, (1), (6), 9, (1), (2)
Dato’ Victor Isaacs (Isaacs & Partners) for the appellant Saifudin Osman (Wan Abd Muttalib & Co) for the respondent
[2004] 4 MLJ 67 BANK MUAMALAT MALAYSIA BHD v CHE’ RUS BIN HUSIN & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R1–25–108 OF
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 138 2002 RAUS J 18 MAY 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application for — Whether Industrial Court erred in law — Whether decision to be quashed
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Jurisdiction — Collective agreement — Dispute arising as to termination of service — Whether could be heard under s 56 of Industrial Relations Act 1967 — Whether tantamount to error of law — Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 2, 56
The applicant is the former Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd (‘BBMB’), now known as the Bank Muamalat Sdn Bhd. In 1999 BBMB mergered with Bank of Commerce Malaysia Bhd (‘BOC’), under an agreement where BBMB transferred their conventional banking assets to BOC and only maintain the Islamic banking assets. Subsequently, BBMB was renamed Bank Muamalat and BOC became Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd (‘BCB’). After the merger, BOC offered some of the employees continuing employment. with BOC. Those who accepted the offer, brought an action against BBMB after 19 months after their acceptance of BOC’s offer. The respondents claimed the following: (i) that BBMB failed to comply with s 56 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967; (ii) BBMB had not complied with art 11 of the collective agreement which relates to the requirement of termination notice by the terminating party; and (iii) that BBMB should have paid three months salary in lieu of the relevant notice (art 11). However, the applicant on the other hand disputed that the alleged termination and claimed that the respondents were the ones who left the employment by accepting the offers of continued employment in BCB. The Industrial Court found in favour of the respondents. Hence this application by the applicant for a certiorari to quash the said award.
Held, allowing the application with costs: (1) Since there was a clear and fundamental dispute as to whether the applicant had terminated the respondents’ services, the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the trade dispute under s 56. Furthermore, s 56 of the Act does not empower the Industrial Court to interpret a term of a collective agreement to determine the scope, nature and intention of parties in respect of the said terms. However, s 56 is intended by Parliament to be a summary enforcement procedure for a clear-cut case of non-compliance of a term of an award or collective agreement. When the facts are in dispute, such powers could only be exercised under s 33(2) of the Act (see para 23). ||Page 68>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 139 (2) The Industrial Court had interpreted the scope of art 11 of the collective agreement between the parties before reaching the conclusion that the applicant had breached the aforesaid art 11. By doing so, it had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction (see para 26). (3) The finding of Industrial Court that the services of the respondents were terminated by BBMB was not supported by evidence. There was no evidence that BBMB had ever issued any letters of termination to any of the respondents when the merger between BBMB and BOC took place. The offer to the respondents for continued employment came from BOC. Nevertheless, a meeting was held between KEPAK (trade union representing the employees) and BBMB and an agreement was reached whereby BOC on the same date issued a letter to provide clarification on the original offer letter. The offers were accepted by the respondents (see para 30). (4) No evidence was placed before the Industrial Court to support the conclusion that BBMB had terminated the services of the respondents. The action of the respondents claiming three months salary in lieu of notice was done not in good faith. This was because they had accepted the offers of continued employment, after negotiating a settlement with BBMB and BOC and became the employees of BOC on exactly the same terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by them with BBMB. To complain now, some 19 months after accepting the offers of continued employment by BOC, that the applicant did not give them the required three month’s notice and thus seeking compensation in lieu thereof, was clearly an act in bad faith on the part of the respondents (see para 31).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon dahulunya adalah Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd (‘BBMB’), kini dikenali sebagai Bank Muamalat Sdn Bhd. Pada tahun 1999, BBMB telah bergabung dengan Bank of Commerce Malaysia Bhd (‘BOC’), dalam suatu perjanjian di mana BBMB memindahkan aktiviti aset perbankan konvensional kepada BOC dan hanya mengekalkan aset perbankan Islam. Selepas itu, BBMB ditukarkan nama kepada Bank Muamalat dan BOC menjadi Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd (‘BCB’). BOC menawarkan beberapa pekerja untuk terus bekerja dengan BOC selepas penggabungan tersebut. Mereka yang menerima tawaran tersebut mengambil tindakan guaman terhadap BBMB selepas 19 bulan tawaran tersebut diterima. Pihak responden menuntut yang berikut: (i) bahawa BBMB gagal mematuhi s 56 Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967; (ii) BBMB gagal mematuhi perkara 11 kepada perjanjian kolektif yang berkaitan dengan notis penamatan oleh pihak yang menamatkan servis; dan (iii) BBMB seharusnya membayar gaji untuk tiga bulan sebagai ganti notis berkenaan (perkara 11).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 140 Pemohon pula menyangkal penamatan kerja tersebut dan mengadu bahawa pihak respondenlah yang telah meninggalkan kerja mereka selepas menerima ||Page 69>> tawaran pekerjaan dalam BCB. Mahkamah perusahaan memihak kepada kepada responden. Maka, permohonan ini dimajukan oleh pemohon untuk perintah certiorari membatalkan award tersebut.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos: (1) Oleh kerana terdapat pertikaian yang asasi dan jelas berkaitan dengan isu sama ada pemohon telah menamatkan servis responden, mahkamah perusahaan tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membicarakan pertikaian perusahaan tersebut di bawah s 56. Lagipun, s 56 Akta berkenaan tidak memberi kuasa kepada mahkamah perusahaan untuk mentafsir terma perjanjian kolektif untuk menentukan skop, sifat dan keinginan pihak dalam terma tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun s 56 adalah diinginkan oleh Parlimen untuk dijadikan prosedur penguatkuasaan terus untuk kes yang jelas tidak mematuhi terma award atau perjanjian kolektif. Bila, fakta dipertikaikan, kuasa tersebut hanya boleh digunakan di bawah s 33(2) Akta tersebut (lihat perenggan 23). (2) Mahkamah perusahaan telah mentafsirkan skop artikel 11 yang terkandung dalam perjanjian kolektif di antara pihak berkenaan sebelum membuat keputusan bahawa pemohon telah mungkir artikel 11. Dengan membuat demikian, mahkamah perusahaan telah melampaui bidang kuasanya (lihat perenggan 26). (3) Keputusan mahkamah perusahaan bahawa servis responden-responden telah ditamatkan oleh BBMB tidak disokong oleh keterangan. Tiada bukti wujud bahawa BBMB telah memberikan surat penamatan kepada responden-responden apabila penggabungan di antara BBMB dan BOC berlaku. Walau bagaimanapun, mesyuarat di antara KEPAK (kesatuan sekerja yang mewakili pekerja-pekerja) dan BBMB telah berjaya mewujudkan satu perjanjian di mana BOC pada hari yang sama memberikan surat untuk menjelaskan surat tawaran asal. Tawaran tersebut diterima oleh pihak responden (lihat perenggan 30). (4) Tiada sebarang keterangan yang diberikan kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan untuk menyokong bahawa BBMB menamatkan servis responden. Aksi responden menuntut tiga bulan gaji sebagai ganti notis tidak dibuat dengan suci hati. Ini kerana mereka telah menerima tawaran untuk meneruskan kerja selepas merunding suatu penyelesaian dengan BBMB dan BOC dan menjadi pekerja di BOC di atas terma dan syarat yang sama dengan BBMB. Maka, untuk membuat aduan selepas 19 bulan selepas menerima tawaran tersebut bahawa pemohon tidak memberi tiga bulan notis atau pampasan adalah jelas dilakukan dengan niat jahat oleh pihak responden (lihat perenggan 31).]
Notes
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 141
For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 165– 173. ||Page 70>> For cases on jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1323–1375. For certiorari generally, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160.117]– [160.129]. For jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, see 7 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [120.1060].
Cases referred to All Malayan Estates Staff Union v Benta Plantations Bhd Sabai Estate, Karak, Pahang [1981] 1 MLLR 634 (refd) Dragon Phoenix Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan Membuat Tekstil dan Pakaian Pulau Pinang & Anor [1991] 1 MLJ 89 (refd) Dunlop Industries Employees Union v Dunlop Malaysian Industries Bhd & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 81 (refd) Goh & Dom Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Union of Employees of Port Ancillary Services Supplier P Klang [1987] 1 ILR 338 (refd) Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance (M) Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers & Anor [2000] 7 MLJ 503 (refd) Holiday Inn, Kuala Lumpur v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers [1998] 1 MLJ 306 (refd) PSC-Naval Dockyard Sdn Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Naval Dockyard Sdn Bhd & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 364 (refd) Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 (refd)
Legislation referred to Companies Ordinance 1940 s 15(1) Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 2, 33(2), 56
N Sivabalah (Raymond TC Low with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the appellant. P Vickneswaran (G Kavitha with him) (Murugavell Arumugam & Co) for the respondent.
[2004] 4 MLJ 86 AHMAD AZAM BIN MOHAMAD SALLEH & ORS v
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 142 JABATAN PEMBANGUNAN KOPERASI MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO RI– 25–77 OF 2002 RAUS SHARIF J 30 APRIL 2004
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Decision or order — Registrar-General of Cooperatives Registrar ordered inspection to be conducted against cooperative and issued direction to remedy defects — Whether decision reviewable — Right to be heard — Whether to be accorded before decision made — Whether notice of findings to be given
The applicants are members and shareholders of Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd (‘the third respondent’). The Registrar-General of Cooperatives (‘the second respondent’) received several complaints in relation to the transactions and workings of the third respondent. Accordingly, the second respondent authorised four officers in the first respondent’s department to conduct an inspection against the third respondent. The inspection was conducted and a report was produced. Based on the report on 6 December 2001, the second respondent issued a direction by way of letter to the third respondent to remedy the defects disclosed as a result of the inspection. Further, the applicants’ share investment was disputed by other members. The dispute was referred to the Cooperative Tribunal. Before the tribunal, based on the result of the inspection and written order of the second respondent, an order was sought by the third respondent to nullify the share order investment which was previously approved by the third respondent. The applicants applied under O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC’) for an order for certiorari to quash ‘the result of inspection’ of the first respondent and the written direction of the second respondent on the premise that they were not given the right to be heard before the findings and direction were made by the second respondent and, that they were not given notice of the findings made by the second respondent. The main issue in this application is whether or not ‘the result of the inspection and written order’ of the second respondent was reviewable by way of judicial review.
Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) In dealing with matters relating to the exercise of discretion by a public body, the power of the High Court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority but as a judicial authority to see whether the local authority had contravened the law (see para 7). ||Page 87>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 143 (2) The content of the letter issued on 6 December by the second respondent to the third respondent pursuant to s 67 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1993 (‘the Act’) was not reviewable under O 53 RHC because the first respondent conducted the inspection on the third respondent on the direction of the second respondent which was merely exercising a function under s 64 of the Act. To hold such process of inspection reviewable would open up the investigation process of all enforcement agencies to constant judicial review (see para 12). (3) The directions of the second respondent to the third respondent was also not reviewable because the second respondent in giving the directions was exercising his statutory function pursuant to s 67 of the Act, as a public body entrusted by Parliament to oversee the workings of registered societies under the Act and to ensure that registered societies were working efficiently and were successfully managed (see para 13). (4) Under the scheme of the Act, there is no requirement for applicants to be given the right to be heard before the second respondent made his findings and directions to the third respondent. There is also no requirement for the applicants to be given notices on the findings of the second respondent (see para 14).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon-pemohon adalah ahli-ahli dan pemegang-pemegang saham Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd (‘responden ketiga’). Ketua Pendaftar Koperasi (‘responden kedua’) telah menerima aduan terhadap transaksi and cara kerja responden ketiga. Berikutan itu, responden kedua memberi kuasa kepada empat pegawai daripada jabatan responden pertama untuk membuat pemeriksaan terhadap responden ketiga. Pemeriksaan berkenaan dikendalikan dan seterusnya laporan dikemukakan. Berdasarkan laporan yang bertarikh 6 Disember 2001, responden kedua mengeluarkan arahan melalui surat kepada responden ketiga untuk meremedikan kecacatan yang dikemukakan oleh laporan tersebut. Seterusnya, pelaburan saham oleh pemohon dipertikaikan oleh ahli-ahli yang lain. Pertikaian tersebut dirujuk kepada Tribunal Koperasi. Di hadapan Tribunal Koperasi, berdasarkan hasil pemeriksaan dan laporan daripada responden kedua, responden ketiga memohon perintah untuk membatalkan perintah pelaburan saham yang terdahulunya telah diluluskan oleh responden ketiga. Pemohon-pemohon memohon perintah certiorari di bawah A 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) supaya keputusan pemeriksaan responden pertama serta arahan bertulis responden kedua dibatalkan kerana pemohon tidak diberikan peluang untuk didengar sebelum keputusan dan arahan dikemukakan oleh responden kedua, dan kerana pemohon tidak diberikan notis tentang keputusan yang dikemukakan oleh responden kedua. Isu utama di dalam permohonan ini adalah sama ada, keputusan pemeriksaan dan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 144 perintah bertulis responden kedua boleh disemak semula melalui semakan kehakiman. ||Page 88>>
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan dengan kos; (1) Dalam urusan perkara yang berkait dengan budibicara pihak perbadanan awam, kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi untuk campur tangan bukanlah sebagai mahkamah rayuan yang mempunyai kuasa untuk menolak keputusan pihak berkuasa, tetapi sebagai badan kehakiman untuk melihat sama ada undang-undang dilanggar oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan (lihat perenggan 7). (2) Kandungan surat yang dikeluarkan pada 6 Disember 2001 oleh responden kedua kepada responden ketiga menurut s 67 Akta Pertubuhan Koperasi 1993 (‘Akta itu’) tidak boleh disemak di bawah A 53 KMT 1980 kerana responden pertama menjalankan pemeriksaan ke atas responden ketiga di atas arahan responden kedua yang merupakan fungsi di bawah s 64 Akta itu. Jikalau proses pemeriksaan tersebut boleh disemak semula ini akan membolehkan semakan kehakiman sering berlaku ke atas proses pemeriksaan semua agensi penguatkuasa (lihat perenggan 12). (3) Arahan dari responden kedua kepada responden ketiga tidak boleh disemak semula kerana semasa responden kedua memberi arahan, beliau melaksanakan fungsi undang-undang beliau di bawah s 67 Akta itu sebagai badan awam yang diamanahkan oleh Parlimen untuk menyelia cara kerja pertubuhan yang didaftarkan di bawah Akta tersebut dan memastikan bahawa pertubuhan yang didaftar bekerja dengan cekap dan diurus dengan betul (lihat perenggan 13). (4) Di bawah skim Akta berkenaan, tiada keperluan untuk pemohon-pemohon diberikan peluang untuk didengar sebelum responden kedua membuat keputusan serta arahan beliau kepada responden ketiga. Juga tiada keperluan untuk pemohon diberi notis berkenaan keputusan responden kedua (lihat perenggan 14) .]
Notes For cases on exercise of administrative powers, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 8. For application for certiorari, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para [160.113].
Cases referred to: Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417 (refd) Mohd Yusof bin Mohamed v Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 286 (refd)
Legislation referred to: Cooperative Societies Act 1993 ss 64, 66, 67
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 145 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
Jacob Goldie (Jacob Goldie & Toh) for the applicants. Suzana Atan (AG’s Chambers) for the first and second respondents. ||Page 89>> Dato’ Mohd Arif Mahinder (Sahadin with him) (Sahadin & Co) for the third respondent.
[2004] 4 MLJ 153 MALAYSIAN BAR v DATO’ KANAGALINGAM A/L VELUPPILLAI
FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–19 OF 2003 (W) PS GILL, RAHMAH HUSSAIN FCJJ AND HASHIM YUSOFF JCA 24 AUGUST 2004
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Disciplinary proceedings — Non-disclosure of minutes of meeting and refusal to reveal names of members of board — Whether such refusal arouses reasonable suspicion of disqualified members being present during proceedings
Evidence — Adverse inference — Failure to produce material evidence — Non-disclosure of material information — Whether presumption applies — Evidence Act 1950 s 114(g)
Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings — Disciplinary Board — Findings of — Whether appeallable to High Court — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 103E
Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Literal approach — Section 103E of Legal Profession Act 1976 — Whether wordings of provision are plain and unambiguous
The appellant had lodged two complaints against the respondent with the Disciplinary Board (‘DB’) which found merit in the said complaints and decided to constitute an Investigating Tribunal to enquire into the said complaints. The respondent’s appeal to the High Court, against the DB’s decision was allowed with costs. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to this court. The issues before this court were: (i) whether the High Court had the jurisdiction under s 103E of the Legal Profession Act 1979 to hear an appeal against DB’s
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 146 decision; and (ii) whether the respondent’s alleged breaches of natural justice and bias by the DB were justified.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) There was no ambiguity in s 103E, since the wordings used are ‘Any party aggrieved by any decision or order made by the Disciplinary Board shall have the right to appeal to the High Court.’ The DB’s decision was therefore appeallable to the High Court under s 103E (see paras 13 and 18); Duport Steels Ltd & Ors v Sirs & Ors [1980] 1 WLR 142 followed. (2) The DB’s reply, that it was not in a position to disclose the names requested by the respondent, aroused a strong suspicion. Therefore, the High Court was correct to invoke s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the appellant under the circumstances, thus raising the presumption that the President of the Bar Council or his alternate was present at the said meeting. Rule 4(1) of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 provides that the President of the Bar Council or his alternate is disqualified to be a member of the DB for the purposes of the quorum where the Bar Council is the complainant (see paras 15 and 17). ||Page 154>>
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu telah memajukan dua aduan terhadap responden kepada Lembaga Tatatertib (‘LT’) yang mendapati merit dalam aduan-aduan tersebut dan memutuskan untuk mewujudkan suatu tribunal siasatan untuk mempertimbangkan aduan-aduan tersebut. Rayuan responden terhadap keputusan LT telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dengan kos. Terkilan dengannya, pihak perayu membuat rayuan ke mahkamah ini. Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah: (i) sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai bidang kuasa di bawah s 103E Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976 untuk membicarakan suatu rayuan terhadap keputusan LT; dan (ii) sama ada aduan pelanggaran keadilan asasi dan berat sebelah oleh LT terbukti.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Tidak terdapat taksa dalam s 103E, kerana perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan adalah ‘Any party aggrieved by any decision or order made by the Disciplinary Board shall have the right to appeal to the High Court.’ Maka, keputusan LT boleh dirayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi di bawah s 103E (lihat perenggan 13 dan 18); Duport Steels Ltd & Ors v Sirs & Ors [1980] 1 WLR 142 diikut. (2) Alasan LT, bahawa ia tidak berkedudukan untuk mendedahkan nama-nama yang dipohon oleh responden, menimbulkan syak wasangka yang cukup tinggi.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 147 Oleh itu, Mahkamah Tinggi tepat dalam menggunapakai s 114(g) Akta Keterangan terhadap perayu dalam keadaan sedemikian, dengan itu menimbulkan andaian bahawa Presiden Majlis Peguam atau ahli silih gantinya turut hadir semasa penghimpunan tersebut. Kaedah 4(1) Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 memperuntukkan bahawa Presiden Majlis Peguam atau ahli silih gantinya hilang kelayakan untuk menjadi ahli dalam LT untuk tujuan korum di mana Majlis Peguam ialah pengadu (lihat perenggan 15 and 17).]
Notes For cases on disciplinary proceedings, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1559–1560. For cases on failure to produce material evidence, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 184–186. For cases on literal approach, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1756–1779. For cases on rules of natural justice applied in disciplinary proceedings, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 726–737. ||Page 155>>
Cases referred to Duport Steels Ltd & Ors v Sirs & Ors [1980] 1 WLR 142 (folld) DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 11 (refd) Ngeow Yin Ngee v Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2004] 5 CLJ 467 (refd) Palm Oil Research & Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 CLJ 265 (refd) Wong Pot Heng & Anor v Zainal Abidin Putih [1990] 1 MLJ 410 (refd)
Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 s 114(g) Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17A Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 r 4(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 93(3), 103E
Appeal from High Court (Kuala Lumpur) Civil Appeal No R–17B–157 of 2002
Dato’ Bastian Vendargon (T Gunaseelan & Asha Anandan with him) (Vendargon & Partners) for the appellant.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 148 Dato’ V Sivaparanjothi (KT Wong & VK Lashmi with him) (Siva & Partners) for the respondent.
[2004] 4 MLJ 201 KAMARUDIN BIN MAMAT v KETUA POLIS NEGARA & ANOR
HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–7 OF 1996 LOW HOP BING J 30 JUNE 2004
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Disciplinary action — Whether there is procedural unfairness — Whether doctrine of autrefois convict applicable — Whether there is bias on witness
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Dismissal — Whether dismissal of police officer valid — Whether dismissal procedure unfair — Whether doctrine of autrefois convict applicable
Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Departure from — Unpleaded issues — No reference of unpleaded issues in statement of claim or agreed facts — Counsel tries to adduce unpleaded issues — When can unpleaded issues be raised
The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants for a declaration that the plaintiff’s dismissal was unlawful, unconstitutional, void and of no effect and that the plaintiff was still a Chief Inspector in the Police Force and entitled to all its salaries, benefits and perks. The main issue for determination was whether the dismissal of the plaintiff was valid. It was argued by the plaintiff that his dismissal was in violation of art 135(2) Federal Constitution and general order 26 Chapter D. The plaintiff’s counsel also tried to adduce evidence relating to his alleged reduction in rank and transfer, when these issues had never been pleaded. It was also contended that by the plaintiff that the alleged unpleaded issues and the dismissal proceedings contravened the rule against double jeopardy. Further, the plaintiff also argued that there was bias on the part of DW1.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with costs: (1) The procedural approach adopted by the plaintiff’s counsel to persuade the court to consider unpleaded issues could not be upheld. The trial judge was not
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 149 obliged to consider unpleaded issues and where a judge had decided on unpleaded issues, the judgment could be set aside and new trial ordered (see para 23). (2) In the instant case, neither the statement of claim nor the parties agreed facts made any reference whatsoever to the unpleaded issues. Further, all materials which the defendants had taken into account had been made available to the plaintiff and so there was no denial of any rule of natural justice or procedural fairness (see para 28); Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 308 distinguished. (3) The doctrine of double jeopardy had no application to the instant case since the dismissal proceedings were the only disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff. Further, there was no evidence that the dismissal proceedings were based on the same facts as those in the unpleaded issues (see paras 30, 33– 34). ||Page 202>> (4) On the facts, the court was unable to find any ‘real danger of bias’ on the part of DW1, not even any reasonable suspicion of bias (see para 44). (5) Applying the principles in Utra Budi to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the defendants had occasioned no procedural unfairness in the entire decision which led to the dismissal of the plaintiff (see para 63); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 followed.
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif memulakan tindakan terhadap defendan untuk satu deklarasi bahawa pemecatan plaintif menyalahi undang-undang, tidak berperlembagaan, batal dan tidak berkesan dan bahawa plaintif masih lagi Ketua Inspektor di dalam pasukan polis dan berhak ke atas semua penggajian, faedah dan keistimewaan. Isu utama untuk diputuskan ialah sama ada pemecatan plaintif adalah sah. Plaintif mengatakan bahawa pemecatan beliau mencabuli perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan perintah am 26 Bab D. Peguam plaintif cuba untuk mengemukakan keterangan berkait dengan penurunan pangkat plaintif, walaupun isu ini tidak pernah dirayu. Plaintif juga menegaskan bahawa isu-isu yang tidak dirayu itu dan pemecatan itu bercanggah dengan rukun ‘double jeopardy’. Seterusnya, plaintif juga mengatakan bahawa terdapat kecenderungan berat sebelah memihak kepada DW1.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Pendekatan prosedur yang diambil oleh peguam plaintif untuk meyakinkan mahkamah untuk menimbang isu yang tidak dirayu tidak dapat diterima oleh mahkamah. Hakim perbicaraan tidak wajar menimbang isu-isu yang tidak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 150 dirayu dan sekiranya seseorang hakim itu membuat keputusan berdasarkan isu-isu yang tidak dirayu, penghakiman tersebut boleh diketepikan dan perbicaraan baru akan diperintahkan (lihat perenggan 23). (2) Dalam kes semasa, tiada sebarang rujukan kepada isu-isu yang tidak dirayu dalam pernyataan tuntutan dan juga fakta yang dipersetujui. Seterusnya, kesemua bahan yang telah dipertimbangkan oleh defendan di dalam membuat keputusannya telah didedahkan kepada plaintif. Maka dari itu tiada percanggahan dengan rukun keadilan asasi atau keadilan prosedur (lihat perenggan 28); Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 308 dibeza. (3) Rukun ‘double jeopardy’ tidak terpakai di dalam kes semasa kerana prosiding pemecatan adalah satu-satunya prosiding disiplin terhadap plaintif. Selanjutnya, tiada keterangan bahawa prosiding pemecatan berdasarkan pada fakta yang sama seperti dalam isu-isu yang tidak dirayu tersebut (lihat perenggan 30, 33–34). (4) Berdasarkan fakta, mahkamah tidak mendapati sebarang ‘bahaya nyata kewujudan kecenderungan berat sebelah’ yang memihak kepada DW1, malahan tiada terdapat sebarang syak kecenderungan sebelah (lihat perenggan 44). ||Page 203>> (5) Menggunapakai prinsip-prinsip dalam kes Utra Budi kepada fakta dan keadaan kes semasa, defendan tidak melakukan sebarang ketidakadilan prosedur dalam membuat keputusan memecat plaintif (lihat perenggan 63); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 diikut.]
Notes For cases on departure from pleadings, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4525–4534. For cases on disciplinary actions generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 637–639. For cases on dismissal of police officers, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 640–673. For pleadings, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002 Reissue) paras [10.3-128]– [10.3-208].
Cases referred to Ang Seng Wan v Suruhanjaya Polis Di Raja Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 131 (refd) B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 151 Chartered Bank, The v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 (refd) Commodore Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustee [1984] 1 NZLR 324 De Souza Lionel Jerome v Attorney General [1993] 1 SLR 882 (refd) Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 302 (refd) Harry Lee Wee v Law Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Jamali bin Adnan v PP [1986] 1 MLJ 162 (refd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 (folld) Lye Pong Fong v PP [1998] 6 MLJ 304 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (refd) Mohamed Yusoff bin Samadi v Attorney-General [1975] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Muniandy & Anor v Muhammad Abdul Kader & Ors [1989] 2 MLJ 416 (refd) R v Gough [1993] AC 646 (refd) Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 308 (distd) Singh Kalpanath, Re [1992] 2 SLR 639 (refd) Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd) Wisma Punca Emas Sdn Bhd v Dr Donal R O’Holohan [1987] 1 MLJ 393 (refd) Wong See Leng v C Saraswathy Ammal [1954] MLJ 141 (refd) Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 (refd) Zakaria bin Abdul Rahman v Ketua Polis Negara Malaysia & Anor [2001] 3 MLJ 385 (refd) ||Page 204>>
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 7(2), 135(2) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 general order 26 Restricted Residence Act 1933 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18
Marisa Regina (Aris Rizal Christopher Fernando & Co) for the plaintiff. Mohd Naser bin Disa (Jabatan Peguam Negara) for the defendants.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 152
[2004] 4 MLJ 415 SUBRAMANIAN A/L SANNASY v SAC II SYED ALWI BIN SYED HAMID & ANOR
HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL SUIT NO [MT4] 22–257 OF 2003 SYED AHMAD HELMY JC 2 JULY 2004
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Procedural fairness — Plaintiff convicted under Penal Code and fined — Disciplinary proceedings were taken against plaintiff under Reg 37 of Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 — Whether plaintiff’s dismissal based on wrong regulation — Whether contravened procedural fairness — Whether dismissal null and void — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 Regs 33, 33(a), 37 and 38(g)
The plaintiff was a member of a Malaysian Police Force and was charged for an offence under s 222 of the Penal Code for falsifying documents to release three Indonesians detained from the police lock-up in Batu Pahat. The plaintiff was convicted and fined. The plaintiff paid the fine and did not appeal against the sentence. Upon the plaintiff’s conviction, a report was submitted by the plaintiff’s head of department to the Disciplinary Authority recommending a disciplinary action against the plaintiff under Reg 33(a) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 (‘the 1993 Regulations’). The Disciplinary Authority after considering the fact of the conviction and the recommendation of the head of department dismissed the plaintiff pursuant to Reg 37 of the 1993 Regulations. The counsel for the plaintiff argued that Reg 37 was the proper provision that was applicable. The issue before this court was whether the plaintiff’s dismissal based upon a wrong provision of the law contravened procedural fairness and hence was null and void.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) Pursuant to proviso (a) of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution, where a member of a public service is dismissed on the ground of conduct in respect of which a criminal charge has been proved such dismissal shall be without a right to be heard. A criminal charge has been proved against the plaintiff and the plaintiff was convicted under s 222 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the plaintiff lost his right to be heard by virtue of the above said proviso (see para 14). (3) Procedural fairness is much more than merely quoting the wrong section or provision of the law. Procedural unfairness and/or procedural irregularity must
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 153 affect the rights of the plaintiff and in that the plaintiff’s right is affected by the mistake in the legal provision. The disciplinary authority had taken into account Reg 37 in this case. The plaintiff herein has not suffered any injustice over the decision to dismiss him under Reg 38(g) instead of Reg 37 of the 1993 Regulations. There was nothing in the affidavit of the plaintiff to show that he had been prejudiced by the misstatement of the regulations. Further, the dismissal letter also showed that the disciplinary authority duly considered the criminal conviction and the recommendations of ||Page 416>> the head of department before dismissing the plaintiff. It is clear that the intention of the disciplinary authority as per the recommendation of the Ketua Jabatan was to dismiss the plaintiff because of the criminal conviction. Further, since the sentence of dismissal is provided under both provisions, that is, Regs 37 and 38(g) the end result would have been the same (see paras 18, 20 and 21). (3) In the exercise of its discretionary powers to grant declaratory reliefs there are occasions where the court must look at the justice as a whole and not simply decide that there is simply an error of law (see para 25).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif adalah ahli Polis Diraja Malaysia dan telah dituduh untuk kesalahan di bawah s 222 Kanun Keseksaan kerana telah memalsukan dokumen-dokumen untuk melepaskan tiga warga Indonesia yang telah ditahan di dalam lokap Balai Polis Batu Pahat. Plaintif telah di sabitkan dan dikenakan denda. Plaintif membayar denda tersebut tetapi tidak merayu terhadap hukuman tersebut. Setelah sabitan tersebut, satu laporan telah diserahkan oleh ketua jabatan plaintif kepada pihak berkuasa Disiplin mengesyorkan satu tindakan disiplin terhadap plaintif di bawah Peraturan 33(a) Peraturan-peraturan am (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) Pegawai-Pegawai Awam 1993 (‘Peraturan 1993 tersebut’). Pihak berkuasa disiplin selepas mempertimbangkan fakta sabitan tersebut dan syor ketua jabatan memecat plaintif mengikut Peraturan-Peraturan 37 Peraturan 1993 tersebut. Peguam plaintif berkata bahawa Peraturan yang patut digunakan adalah Peraturan 37. Isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada pemecatan plaintif yang berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang yang salah bercanggah dengan keadilan prosedur dan menyebabkan pemecatan plaintif batal dan tidak sah.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Menurut proviso (a) kepada perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, apabila seseorang penjawat awam dipecat atas alasan kelakuan yang satu pertuduhan jenayah telah dibuktikan, pemecatan sedemikian adalah tanpa hak untuk didengar. Satu pertuduhan jenayah telah dibuktikan terhadap plaintif dan plaintif telah disabitkan dibawah s 222 Kanun Keseksaan. Oleh yang demikian, plaintif telah kehilangan hak untuk didengar menurut proviso tersebut (lihat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 154 perenggan 14). (2) Keadilan prosedur adalah lebih daripada pemetikkan seksyen atau peruntukkan undang-undang yang salah. Ketidakadilan prosidur dan/atau salah aturan prosedur hendaklah menjejaskan hak plaintif dan hak plaintif hendaklah terjejas disebabkan oleh kesilapan peruntukkan undang-undang. Pihak berkuasa disiplin telah mempertimbangkan Peraturan 37 di dalam kes ini. Plaintif tidak mengalami sebarang ketidakadilan di atas keputusan untuk memecat beliau di bawah Peraturan 38(g) dan bukan Peraturan 37 Peraturan 1993. Tiada apa-apa ||Page 417>> di dalam afidavit plaintif yang menunjukkan bahawa plaintif telah diprejudiskan oleh penggunaan Peraturan yang silap. Lagipun, surat pemecatan menunjukkan bahawa pihak berkuasa disiplin telah mempertimbangkan sabitan jenayah dan syor ketua jabatan sebelum memecat plaintif. Ia jelas bahawa niat pihak berkuasa disiplin seperti di dalam syor Ketua Jabatan adalah untuk memecat plaintif sebab sabitan jenayah itu. Memandangkan hukuman pemecatan telah diperuntukkan oleh kedua-dua peruntukan, iaitu Peraturan-Peraturan 37 dan 38(g), hasilnya akan menjadi sama (lihat perenggan 18, 20 dan 21). (3) Dalam melaksanakan kuasa budibicara mahkamah dalam membenarkan relif-relif deklarasi, terdapat situasi-situasi di mana mahkamah hendaklah melihat keadilan kes secara keseluruhannya dan tidak hanya memutuskan bahawa terdapatnya kesilapan undang-undang (lihat perenggan 25).]
Notes For cases on procedural fairness, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed 2002 Reissue) paras 758-759. For breach of natural justice, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, paras [160.091] to [160.109].
Cases referred to Deputy Chief of Police Officer, Perak & Anor v Ramesh a/l Thangaraju [2001] 1 MLJ 161 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 369 (refd) R Kandasamy v Kempas (Malaya) Bhd [1981] 1 MLJ 148 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 135(2), proviso (a) Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 16A
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 155 Penal Code s 222 Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 regs 33, 33(a)-(d), 37, 37(1), 38, 38(g), s 33 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 14, O 33
Gobind Singh Deo (Zamri Idrus with him) (Karpal Singh & Company) for the plaintiff. Azizah Hj Nawawi (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney-General’s Chambers, Putrajaya). ||Page 418>>
[2004] 4 MLJ 562 PELANGI ENTERPRISES SDN BHD v OH SWEE CHOO & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1– 25–33 OF 2001 RAUS J 15 JANUARY 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Award of Industrial Court — Finding of fact that employee constructively dismissed — Whether finding based on totality of evidence adduced — Whether Industrial Court took irrelevant matters into consideration
Evidence — Hearsay — Statement made by person not called — Whether object of evidence to establish truth of statement or fact that it was made
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Award — Application to quash — Constructive dismissal — Whether finding based on totality of evidence adduced — Whether Industrial Court took irrelevant matters into consideration
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Claim for back wages — Industrial Court awarded back wages for duration of 44 months Considerable delay in concluding case before Industrial Court — Delay not caused by parties — Whether delay constitute reason to reduce amount of back wages payable
The first respondent joined the services of Taman Desa Medical Centre (‘TDMC’) in
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 156 the capacity of General Manager in February 1995. At that time, the first respondent was 53 years of age. By letter dated 13 July 1995, TDMC offered to sponsor the first respondent to a part-time two-year course leading to the Master of Science in Healthcare Management. Under the terms of the sponsorship, the first respondent was to continue working full time for TDMC as the classes were conducted in the evenings. The first respondent was also obliged to serve TDMC for a period of three years on completion of her course, by which time the first respondent would be 56 years old. Subsequently, the first respondent received a letter dated 7 October 1996 from the applicant informing her that she had to retire upon reaching her 55th birthday in accordance with the ‘service regulations for confirmed employees’ and freeing her of any obligation to serve in TDMC on the completion of her course (‘the retirement letter’). On 31 October 1995, which was the first respondent’s 55th birthday, the applicant issued a letter titled ‘re-employment’ to the first respondent offering her employment on a contractual basis as ‘General Manager (Marketing and Special Projects)’ on a month-to-month basis for a maximum of 12 months (‘the re-employment letter’). The first respondent sent a letter to the applicant in which she stated that she was unable to sign and accept the terms as contained in the re-employment letter and requested that the retirement letter and the re-employment letter be withdrawn failing which she would consider herself dismissed by the applicant. The applicant did not reply but instead sent another letter of re-employment to the first respondent. The first respondent, in a letter dated 8 November 1996 to the ||Page 563>> applicant, treated herself as having been constructively dismissed and filed a complaint before the Industrial Relations Department pursuant to s 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The Minister of Human Resources referred the complaint to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court handed down an award in favour of the first respondent and held that the first respondent was entitled to treat herself as being constructively dismissed and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent back wages and compensation in lieu of reinstatement. This was the applicant’s application for an order for certiorari to quash the decision of the Industrial Court.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) There were two burdens of proof involved in this case. The first burden of proof was the onus of proving that the first respondent was constructively dismissed by the applicant. In this regard, the first respondent had to prove two elements, namely, that the applicant’s conduct was guilty of a breach which went to the root of the contract or evinced an intention no longer to be bound by it and that the first respondent had made up his mind and had acted at the appropriate time soon after the conduct of which the complaint had taken place. In the instant case, the Industrial Court was satisfied that, in the absence of any retirement age of 55 years in the second respondent’s contract of employment, the applicant’s conduct in purporting to retire the first respondent upon her reaching 55 years old was a serious breach of her contract of employment. The Industrial Court was also satisfied that the first respondent
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 157 had left the applicant’s services in response to the aforesaid breach by the applicant and had acted at the appropriate time. Accordingly, the Industrial Court ruled that the first respondent had succeeded in proving the above two elements. Therefore, the Industrial Court did not commit any error to justify intervention of this court (see paras 15–20). (2) The second burden of proof was the burden of proving that the first respondent was bound by a compulsory retirement age of 55 years under the terms of her contract of employment. This burden or onus of proof rested on the applicant because it was the applicant who sought to rely on the existence of such contractual terms in its case before the Industrial Court. The applicant had failed to do so (see paras 21–22); HSS Integrated Sdn Bhd v Lew Yew Onn [2000] 3 ILR 31 followed. (3) Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who was not himself called as a witness would be hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence was to establish the truth of what was contained in the statement. On the other hand, it would not be hearsay and was admissible when it was proposed to establish by evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. Hence, the first respondent’s evidence that she had been assured by TDMC’s then managing director (‘Dr Wong’) that there was no retirement age was not hearsay evidence, although Dr Wong did not testify (see para 23). ||Page 564>> (4) The Industrial Court made a finding of fact that Dr Wong had given the second respondent the assurance that there was no retirement age and there was no reason to disturb such finding. Although the first respondent had attempted to subpoena Dr Wong to support her testimony, this did not in any way absolve the applicant from discharging its burden of proof on the retirement age as a term of contract, which it had evidently failed to do (see para 25). (5) The Industrial Court found that the issue of retirement age had been pleaded by the first respondent and there was no reason to disagree with that finding. The applicant cannot claim that it was taken by surprise by the first respondent’s contention that there was no retirement age of 55 years in her contract (see paras 26–27). (6) The Industrial Court made a finding of fact that at the time the first respondent left the applicant’s services, the ‘Employees’ Handbook’ and the ‘Confirmed Employees Service Regulation Handbook’ (‘the handbooks’), which stipulated the retirement age of the employees, had not been issued. The Industrial Court also found that the first respondent cannot be deemed to be bound by the provisions in the handbooks. There was no reason to disagree with the Industrial Court’s findings (see paras 32–33). (7) There was no basis to the applicant’s submission that it was only giving effect to the letter of 13 July 1995 by retiring the second respondent and thereafter offering her continued employment on a contractual basis. The applicant’s
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 158 letter of 13 July 1995 clearly stated that on completion of the course, the second respondent would be obliged to serve the applicant for a period of three years in an appointment to be determined by TDMC. It was not disputed that when the applicant had attempted to forcibly ‘retire’ the second respondent, she had still not completed her course. Furthermore, evidence was led by the first respondent to show that the two letters of re-employment offered to the first respondent by the applicant contained less favourable terms and conditions of employment and were therefore, rejected by the first respondent. The Industrial Court consequently made a finding of fact that the two letters of re-employment offered were in fact on less favourable term. There was no error of law justifying any intervention by way of judicial review (see paras 36–38). (8) The Industrial Court had awarded back wages for a total duration of 44 months. The applicant’s contention was that the Industrial Court in awarding the maximum quantum of back wages, had failed to appreciate that the delay in this matter had nothing to do with the applicant. There was no doubt that there was a considerable delay in concluding this case before the Industrial Court. However, this cannot be a reason to reduce amount of back wages payable to the first respondent. This was because none of the causes of the delay were caused by the first respondent. In any event, the Industrial Court had already reduced ||Page 565>> the back wages due to first respondent by 30% on account of her post-dismissal employment (see paras 39–42). (9) The Industrial Court’s finding that the second respondent had been constructively dismissed was a finding of fact. The finding was based on the totality of evidence adduced before it. The Industrial Court had scrutinized the evidence of both parties and applied the law to the facts and made a reasonable conclusion. It was not the task of this court to scrutinize every piece of evidence adduced before the Industrial Court and make another finding of fact. What was important to consider was whether the findings of the Industrial Court were well supported by evidence adduced in the course of trial and whether it had taken irrelevant matters into consideration in making the award. In the instant case, the Industrial Court findings were well supported by evidence and it did not take irrelevant matters into consideration. The award was neither perverse nor unreasonable and the grounds of challenge raised by the applicant did not disclose any error of law warranting intervention by this court by way of judicial review (see paras 43–44).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden pertama telah mula berkhidmat dengan Pusat Perubatan Taman Desa (‘PPTD’) dalam kapasiti seorang Ketua Pengarah dalam bulan Februari 1995. Pada
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 159 masa itu, responden pertama berumur 53 tahun. Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 13 Julai 1995, PPTD telah menawar untuk menaja responden pertama mengambil kursus secara sambilan selama dua tahun untuk memperoleh Ijazah Sarjana Muda dalam Pengurusan Kesihatan. Di bawah terma tajaan tersebut, responden pertama harus terus bekerja sepenuh masa untuk PPTD kerana kelas hanya dikendalikan di sebelah petang. Responden pertama juga diwajibkan berkhidmat dengan PPTD untuk tempoh tiga tahun selepas tamat kursusnya, yang man responden pertama akan berumur 56 tahun. Berikutan itu, responden pertama telah menerima sepucuk surat bertarikh 7 Oktober 1996 daripada pemohon memaklumkan beliau bahawa beliau perlu bersara apabila mencapai umur 55 tahun menurut ‘service regulations for confirmed employees’ dan melepaskan beliau daripada apa-apa kewajipan untuk berkhidmat dalam PPTD selepas tamat kursusunya (‘surat persaraan tersebut’). Pada 31 Oktober 1995, yang merupakan hari jadi ke-55 responden pertama, pemohon telah mengeluarkan sepucuk surat bertajuk ‘re-employment’ kepada responden pertama menawarkan pekerjaan secara kontrak kepada beliau sebagai ‘General Manager (Marketing and Special Projects)’ secara bulanan selama 12 bulan maksimum (‘surat pengambilan bekerja semula’). Responden pertama telah menghantar sepucuk surat kepada pemohon menyatakan beliau tidak dapat menandatangani dan menerima terma-terma yang terkandung dalam surat pengambilan bekerja semula dan memohon agar surat persaraan dan surat pengambilan bekerja semula tersebut ditarik balik dan jika gagal berbuat demikian beliau akan menganggap dirinya dipecat oleh pemohon. Pemohon tidak menjawab tetapi sebaliknya menghantar sepucuk surat pengambilan ||Page 566>> bekerja semula yang lain kepada responden pertama. Responden pertama, dalam sepucuk surat bertarikh 8 November 1996 kepada pemohon, menganggap beliau dipecat secara konstruktif dan memfailkan satu aduan di hadapan Jabatan Perhubungan Perusahaan menurut s 20 Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967. Menteri Sumber Manusia telah merujuk aduan tersebut ke Mahkamah Perusahaan. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah memberi award bagi pihak responden pertama dan memutuskan responden pertama berhak menganggap dirinya telah dipecat secara konstruktif dan memerintahkan pemohon membayar responden pertama gaji tunggakan dan pampasan menggantikan pengembalian semula jawatan. Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Terdapat dua beban bukti yang terlibat dalam kes ini. Beban bukti pertama adalah beban membuktikan responden pertama telah dipecat secara konstruktif oleh pemohon. Sehubungan itu, responden pertama perlu membuktikan dua elemen, iaitu, bahawa perlakuan pemohon adalah salah kerana melakukan satu perlanggaran kontrak atau memperlihatkan niat bahawa ia tidak terikat dengannya dan bahawa responden pertama telah membuat keputusan dan telah bertindak pada masa yang sesuai sejurus selepas perlakuan yang mana aduan dibuat. Dalam kes semasa, Mahkamah Perusahaan telah berpuas hati bahawa, ketiadaan umur persaraan pada 55 tahun dalam kontrak pekerjaan responden
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 160 kedua, perlakuan pemohon yang bermaksud agar responden pertama bersara apabila beumur 55 tahun merupakan satu perlanggaran kontrak pekerjaan yang serius. Mahkamah Perusahaan juga berpuas hati bahawa responden pertama telah meninggalkan perkhidmatan pemohon akibat daripada perlanggaran tersebut oleh pemohon dan telah bertindak pada masa yang tepat. Sewajarnya, Mahkamah Perusahaan memutuskan bahawa responden pertama telah berjaya membuktikan dua elemen di atas. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak melakukan apa-apa kesilapan untuk menjustifikasikan apa-apa campur tangan mahkamah ini (lihat perenggan 15–20). (2) Beban bukti kedua adalah beban untuk membuktikan bahawa responden pertama terikat dengan umur persaraan wajib pada 55 tahun di bawah terma kontrak pekerjaan. Beban bukti terletak atas pemohon kerana pemohonlah yang meminta untuk bergantung kepada kewujudan terma kontraktual dalam kesnya di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan. Pemohon telah gagal berbuat demikian (lihat perenggan 21–22); HSS Integrated Sdn Bhd v Lew Yew Onn [2000] 3 ILR 31 diikut. (3) Keterangan kenyataan yang dibuat kepada saksi oleh seorang yang bukan sendirinya seorang saksi adalah dengar cakap dan tidak boleh diterima jika tujuan keterangan adalah untuk membuktikan kebenaran tentang apa yang terkandung dalam kenyataan tersebut. Sebaliknya, ia bukan dengar cakap dan boleh diterima jika ia bercadang untuk ||Page 567>> membuktikan melalui keterangan, bukan kebenaran kenyataan, tetapi hakikat bahawa ia telah dibuat. Oleh itu, keterangan responden pertama bahawa beliau telah diberi jaminan oleh pengarah urusan PPTD masa itu (‘Dr Wong’) bahawa tiada umur persaraan yang buken keterangan dengar cakap, meskipun Dr Wong tidak memberi testimoni (lihat perenggan 23). (4) Mahkamah Perusahaan telah membuat penemuan fakta bahawa Dr Wong telah memberi jaminan kepada responden kedua bahawa tidak terdapat umur persaraan dan tiada sebab untuk mengganggu penemuan sedemikian. Walaupun responden pertama telah cuba untuk menyampaikan sepina kepada Dr Wong untuk menyokong testimoni beliau, ini tidak langsung membebaskan pemohon daripada terlepas daripada beban bukti berkaitan umur persaraan sebagai satu terma kontrak, yang mana ia dengan jelas ia telah gagal untuk berbuat demikian (lihat perenggan 25). (5) Mahkamah Perusahaan mendapati bahawa persoalan tentang umur persaraan telahpun diplidkan oleh responden pertama dan tiada sebab untuk tidak bersetuju dengan penemuan tersebut. Pemohon tidak boleh mendakwa bahawa beliau terkejut dengan hujah responden pertama bahawa tidak terdapat umur persaraan pada 55 tahun dalam kontrak beliau (lihat perenggan 26–27). (6) Mahkamah Perusahaan telah membuat satu penemuan fakta bahawa pada masa itu responden pertama meninggalkan perkhidmatan pemohon, ‘Employees’ Handbook’ dan ‘Confirmed Employees Service Regulation Handbook’ (‘buku-buku panduan tersebut’), yang menetapkan umur persaraaan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 161 pekerja-pekerja, tidak dikeluarkan. Mahkamah Perusahaan juga mendapati bahawa responden pertama tidak boleh dianggap terikat dengan peruntukan-peruntukan dalam buku-buku panduan tersebut. Tiada sebab untuk tidak bersetuju dengan penemuan-penemuan Mahkamah Perusahaan (lihat perenggan 32–33). (7) Tiada asas terhadap hujah pemohon bahawa ia hanya memberi efek terhadap surat 13 Julai 1995 dengan memecat responden kedua dan selepas itu menawarkannya untuk bekerja terus secara kontraktual. Surat pemohon bertarikh 13 Julai 1995 dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa selepas selesai kursus tersebut, responden kedua diwajibkan berkhidmat dengan pemohon untuk satu tempoh tiga tahun dalam jawtan perlantikan yang akan ditentukan oleh PPTD. Ia tidak dipertikaikan bahawa apabila pemohon cuba untuk memaksa responden kedua ‘bersara’, beliau masih belum selesai kursusnya. Tambahan pula, keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh responden pertama menunjukkan bahawa dua pucuk surat pengambilan bekerja semula ditawarkan kepada responden pertama oleh pemohon mengandungi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat pekerjaan yang kurang memuaskan dan oleh itu, ditolak oleh responden pertama. Mahkamah Perusahaan berikutan itu membuat satu penemuan fakta bahawa dua pucuk surat pengambilan semula bekerja sebenarnya ||Page 568>> tidak menguntungkan. Tiada kesilapan di sisi undang-undang yang menjustifikasikan apa-apa campur tangan melalui kajian semual kehakiman (lihat perenggan 36–38). (8) Mahkamah Perusahaan telah mengawardkan gaji tunggakan bagi tempoh sejumlah 44 bulan. Hujah pemohon adalah bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan dalam mengawardkan kuantum gaji tunggakan yang maksimum, telah gagal untuk menyedari bahawa kelewatan dalam perkara ini tiada kaitan dengan pemohon. Tiada keraguan bahawa terdapat kelewatan yang melampau dalam memutuskan kes ini di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan. Namun begitu, ini tidak boleh dijadikan alasan untuk mengurangkan jumlah gaji tunggakan responden pertama. Ini adalah kerana tiada antara sebab-sebab kelewatan tersebut diakibatkan oleh responden pertama. Dalam apa keadaan, Mahkamah Perusahaan telahpun mengurangkan gaji tunggakan yang perlu dibayar kepada repsonden pertama sebanyak 30% berdasarkan pra pemecatan pekerjaaan beliau (lihat perenggan 39–42). (9) Penemuan Mahkamah Perusahaan bahawa responden kedua telah dipecat secara konstruktif adalah satu penemuan fakta. Penemuan tersebut adalah berdasarkan keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah meneliti keterangan kedua belah pihak dan menggunapakai undang-undang kepada fakta tersebut dan membuat kuputusan yang munasabah. Ia bukan tugas mahkamah ini untuk meneliti setiap keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan dan membuat penemuan fakta lain. Apa yang penting untuk dipertimbangkan adalah sama ada penemuan Mahkamah Perusahaan disokong oleh keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 162 perbicaraan dan sama ada ia telah menimbangkan perkara-perkara yang tidak relevan in making the award. Dalam kes semasa, penemuan-penemuan Mahkamah Perusahaan disokong oleh keterangan dan ia tidak mengambil perkara-perkara yang tidak relevan untuk dipertimbangkan. Award tersebut adalah sama sekali tidak berlawanan atau tidak munasabah dan alasan-alasan untuk mencabar ditimbulkan oleh pemohon tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kesilapan undang-undang yang mewarankan campur tangan mahkamah ini dengan cara kajian semula kehakiman (lihat perenggan 43–44).]
Notes For cases on awards of Industrial Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1241–1288. For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185– 393. For cases on claim for back wages, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 1289. For cases on statement made by persons not called, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1599–1600. ||Page 569>>
Cases referred to Booi Kim Lee v Menteri Sumber Manusia & Anor [1999] 3 MLJ 515 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417 (refd) HSS Integrated Sdn Bhd v Lew Yew Onn [2000] 3 ILR 31 (folld) Malayan Banking Bhd v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 204 (refd) Michael Lee Fook Wah v Minister of Human Resources Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 305 (refd) Swedish Motor Assemblies Sdn Bhd v Haji Mohd Ison bin Baba [1998] 2 MLJ 372 (refd) Wong Chee Hong v Cathay Organisation (M) Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 92 (refd)
Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 s 101 Industrial Relation Act 1967 s 20
T Thavalingan (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the applicant.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 163 LG Seah (Lobo & Associates) for the first respondent.
[2004] 5 MLJ 70 GOLDART SDN BHD v YONG TOONG WAH
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO 25–7 OF 2003 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 19 NOVEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Remedies — Application for certiorari — Industrial Court — Whether Industrial Court erred in its decision — Whether decision to be quashed
Labour Law — Employment — Termination of services — Performance — Whether allegation of poor work performance substantiated
Labour Law — Employment — Termination of services — Refusal to accede to transfer order — Whether employer has absolute discretion to implement order for transfer — Whether such order tainted with bad faith
Labour Law — Employment — Termination of services — Resignation — Whether letter of resignation falsely procured
The respondent was an employee of the applicant at the material time. The former alleged that he had been unfairly dismissed by the applicant. Three grounds were advanced by the applicant in attempting to justify the respondent’s dismissal, ie: (i) that the respondent had refused to comply with a valid transfer order; (ii) that the respondent had voluntarily resigned upon tendering his resignation letter; and (iii) that the respondent was an under-achiever. Regarding the first allegation, the respondent submitted that the applicant had not settled moneys owing to him prior to the transfer order and attempts to clarify this matter were ignored. On the second allegation, the respondent testified that the company had previously asked him sign on a blank sheet of paper and had used it to insert his intention to resign without his knowledge. Regarding the third allegation, the issue that was raised concerned the applicant’s intention to send the respondent for training prior to his dismissal. The matter was heard by the Industrial Court which held that the claimant had been unfairly dismissed. Dissatisfied, the applicant applied to the High Court for order of certiorari to quash the said decision.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 164 Held, dismissing the application: (1) If the applicant was sincere in its transfer order with no malicious intent motivating it, then there was no reason to withhold the respondent’s due commissions and salary, besides asking the respondent to advance first the employer’s share of the EPF contribution. Any ambiguity must be construed in the respondent’s favor. The respondent was justified in refusing to go on the transfer until all his dues had been paid more so upon the ambiguous letters of the applicant to the respondent which failed to state with clarity that all dues due to the respondent would be paid when he reported for duty at Johor Bahru (see paras 3, 5). ||Page 71>> (2) Based on the facts, the applicant had used the respondent’s pre-signed blank sheet of paper as the respondent’s resignation letter. Therefore, the respondent had not resigned voluntarily but that he was dismissed (see para 14). (3) As the applicant admitted to issuing the transfer order to Johor Bahru because to facilitate the respondent’s training there, the plea that the poor work performance of the respondent was one of the grounds for dismissal was wholly inconsistent. The applicant was willing to continue to employ the respondent, albeit, in Johor Bahru. The Industrial Court was correct rejecting the allegation of poor performance as it was only given as a possible excuse of why the claimant had resigned. The question of the respondent’s non-performance is certainly not an issue for dismissal in this case (see para 15, 17).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden adalah seorang pekerja pemohon pada masa matan. Responden telah mendakwa bahawa beliau telah dipecat dengan tidak adil oleh pemohon. Tiga sebab telah dikemukakan oleh pemohon dalam percubaan untuk menjustifikasikan pemecatan responden, iaitu: (i) bahawa responden telah enggan mematuhi satu perintah pemindahan yang sah; (ii) bahawa responden telah dengan suka rela berhenti kerja setelah menenderkan surat berhenti kerja; dan (iii) bahawa responden seorang pekerja berprestasi rendah. Berhubung pengataan pertama, responden telah berhujah bahawa pemohon tidak menyelesaikan wang yang terhutang kepadanya sebelum perintah pemindahan tersebut dan percubaan untuk menjelaskan perkara ini tidak diendahkan. Berhubung pengataan kedua, responden telah membuat keterangan bahawa syarikat telah sebelum ini meminta beliau menandatangani satu kertas kosong dan telah menggunakannya untuk memasukkan hasratnya untuk berhenti kerja tanpa pengetahuannya. Berhubung pengataan ketiga, persoalan yang telah ditimbulkan adalah berkaitan hasrat pemohon untuk menghantar responden untuk latihan sebelum pemecatannya. Perkara tersebut telah didengar oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan yang memutuskan bahawa penuntut telah dipecat secara tidak adil. Berasa tidak puas hati, pemohon telah memohon ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan tersebut.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 165
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Jika pemohon jujur dalam perintah pemindahannya tanpa niat jahat yang mendorongnya, maka tiada sebab untuk tidak memberikan komisen dan gaji responden yang perlu dibayar, selain daripada meminta responden untuk mendahulukan bahagian sumbangan KWSP majikan. Apa-apa ketaksaan harus ditafsirkan menyebelahi responden. Responden telah menjustifikasikan keengganannya untuk dipindahkan sehingga semua wang yang perlu dibayar kepadanya dibayar berdasarkan surat-surat yang taksa pemohon kepada responden yang telah gagal untuk menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa semua wang yang terhutang kepada responden akan dibayar apabila beliau melaporkan diri untuk bertugas di Johor Bahru (lihat perenggan-perenggan 3,5). ||Page 72>> (2) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta berikut, pemohon telah menggunakan kertas kosong yang telah ditandatangani oleh responden sebagai surat berhenti kerja responden. Oleh itu, responden tidak berhenti kerja secara suka rela tetapi beliau telah dipecat (lihta perenggan 14). (3) Memandangkan pemohon telah mengaku mengeluarkan perintah pemindahan ke Johor Bahru kerana dapat memberikan responden latihan di sana, pli bahawa prestasi kerja lemah responden adalah salah satu daripada alasan untuk pemecatan adalah tidak konsisten langsung. Pemohon bersedia untuk terus menerima responden bekerja, walaupun, di Johor Bahru. Mahkamah Perusahaan bertindak betul menolak pengataan prestasi lemah tersebut kerana ia hanya diberikan sebagai alasan yang mungkin kenapa penuntut telah berhenti kerja. Persoalan tentang prestasi kerja lemah responden sememangnya bukan satu persoalan untuk pemecaan dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan-perenggan 15, 17).]
Notes For cases on remedies for judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 177–178. For cases on termination of services, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1141–1179.
Case referred to Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753 (folld)
Mathews George (Danaraj Mathews Jimmy & Sara) for the applicant. N Shanmugam (Shanmugam & Gooi) for the respondent.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 166
[2004] 5 MLJ 179 KEJURUTERAAN SAMUDRA TIMUR SDN BHD v SELI A/K MANDOH & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–10 OF 1999 RAUS J 10 OCTOBER 2003
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Remedies — Application for certiorari — Industrial Court — Whether Industrial Court erred in its decision — Whether decision to be quashed
Civil Procedure — Certiorari — Application for an order of certiorari to quash award of Industrial Court — Court’s jurisdiction to issue orders of certiorari — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25
Labour Law — Employment — Reduction in salaries — Whether unilaterally exercised — Whether a repudiation of service contract — Constructive dismissal — Whether established
The first respondent was the technical manager of the applicant, earning a monthly salary of RM4,200. On 21 August 1998, the manager of the applicant called for a meeting attended by the first respondent, its consultant, the mechanist and the sales manager, where they were informed of a reduction in pay by 30%. The first respondent considered such unilateral decision to reduce his salary amounted to a repudiation of his contract of employment. The first respondent’s representation was referred to the Industrial Court (‘the IC’) and the IC found that such a reduction in pay amounted to a variation of the terms of the first respondent’s employment, which was a fundamental breach and amounted to a repudiation. Therefore, the first respondent was held to be constructively dismissed and ordered the applicant to pay backwages and compensation in the total sum of RM86,950. The applicant being unsatisfied with the award filed for an order of certiorari in the High Court to quash the IC’s award.
Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) The High Court only has extraordinary original jurisdiction, i.e, it cannot arrogate the powers of the Court of Appeal by substituting its own judgment for that of the IC on questions of fact and cannot review the evidence. Therefore, it is vital to note that when dealing with an application for certiorari, the High Court does not act as an appeal court (see paras 8–9).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 167 (2) In the instant case, the applicant made the certiorari application concluding that the IC committed errors of law and as such acted without and/or in excess of jurisdiction on five grounds. The learned judge detailed each ground and dismissed them because the IC’s award did not suffer from any of the infirmities of ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’, or ‘procedural impropriety’ which warranted a judicial review. The award was neither perverse nor unreasonable and the findings of fact by the learned chairman were supported by evidence (see paras 10 and 23). ||Page 180>>
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden pertama adalah pengurus teknikal pemohon, dengan gaji bulanan sebanyak RM4,200. Pada 21 Ogos 1998, pengurus pemohon telah memanggil satu mesyuarat yang dihadiri oleh responden pertama, perunding-perundingnya, ahli mekanik dan pengurus jualan, di mana mereka dimaklumkan tentang pengurangan bayaran sebanyak 30%. Responden pertama menganggap keputusan satu pihak tersebut yang mengurangkan gaji beliau membentuk pembatalan kontrak pekerjaannya. Representasi responden pertama telah dirujuk kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan (‘MP’) dan MP mendapati pengurangan dalam bayaran membentuk pengubahan terma-terma pekerjaan responden pertama, yang merupakan satu perlanggaran utama dan membentuk satu pembatalan. Oleh itu, responden pertama telah dipecat secara konstruktif, satu pemecatan tanpa sebab atau alasan adil dan pemohon diperintahkan membayar tunggakan gaji dan pampasan berjumlah RM86,950. Pemohon tidak berpuas hati dengan award tersebut telah memfailkan satu perintah certiorari di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk membatalkan award MP tersebut.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan dengan kos: (1) Mahkamah Tinggi hanya mempunyai bidang kuasa asal yang luar biasa, iaitu, ia tidak boleh mengambil kuasa Mahkamah Rayuan dengan menggantikan penghakimannya sendiri dengan MP atas persoalan-persoalan fakta dan tidak boleh mangkaji semula keterangan. Oleh itu, adalah penting semasa mengendalikan permohonan certiorari, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak bertindak seperti Mahkamah Rayuan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 8–9). (2) Dalam kes semasa, pemohon telah membuat permohonan certiorari mengatakan bahawa MP telah melakukan kesilapan undang-undang dan oleh demikian bertindak tanpa dan/atau melampaui bidang kuasa berdasarkan lima alasan. Hakim yang arif telah meneliti setiap alasan dan menolak kesemuanya kerana award MP tidak mengalami apa-apa kelemahan ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’, atau ‘procedural impropriety’ yang mewarankan kajian semula. Award tersebut tidak berlawanan atau munasabah dan fakta-fakta penemuan oleh pengerusi yang bijaksana disokong oleh keterangan (lihat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 168 perenggan-perenggan 10 dan 23).]
Notes For cases on applications for an order of certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 1382. For cases on remedies for judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 177–178
Cases referred to Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Malayan Banking Bhd v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 204 (refd) Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 (refd) R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v S Balasingam [2000] 7 MLJ 1 (refd) Dr Rayanold Pereira v Minister of Labour Malaysia & Anor [1997] 5 MLJ 336 (refd) ||Page 181>>
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25 Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 20(1), (3)
Kumar (Suria Kumar & Co) for the applicant. P Kuppusamy (P Kuppusamy & Co) for the first respondent.
[2004] 5 MLJ 255 MOHD RADZI BIN ABU BAKAR v KERAJAAN MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S5–21–105 OF 1996 ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J 18 NOVEMBER 2003
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 169 Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Dismissal from service — Police force — No oral hearing held — Whether breach of natural justice — Whether proceedings conducted in accordance with natural justice — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 general order 26
Labour Law — Employment — Dismissal — Employee a chief inspector — Dismissed by Inspector General of Police in connection with three charges — Whether show cause letter spelt out with sufficient clarity — Whether there was an issue of condonation — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 general order 26
Before his dismissal, the plaintiff was a Chief Inspector in the Royal Malaysian Police. While he was serving at that station, he received a letter dated 13 March 1992 from Haji Ahmad Ragib bin Mohd Salleh (‘Haji Ragib’) who held the post of Penolong Ketua Urusetia KPN (Tatatertib), acting on behalf of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (‘DIGP’) to the effect that the DIGP has decided to institute disciplinary proceedings for dismissal against the plaintiff under the general order 26 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 (‘the General Orders’). It was indicated to the plaintiff that he was guilty of unsatisfactory work or misconduct which in the opinion of the DIGP merited a dismissal. The plaintiff was given 16 days to make his representation. The plaintiff by a letter dated 13 March 1992 made a representation to the DIGP denying all the three charges against him. And in response thereto and by way of a reply, the plaintiff was informed that upon considering the plaintiff’s written representation, the DIGP was satisfied that the plaintiff had failed to exculpate himself from the three charges preferred against him and that the DIGP has decided to dismiss the plaintiff on all the three charges. Dissatisfied with the decision of the DIGP, the plaintiff wrote a letter dated 14 July 1992 seeking to re-open his case and requested the IGP to convene a Committee of Inquiry to inquire into the charges levelled against him. The plaintiff sent that letter to the DIGP about two months after being dismissed from service. On 12 August 1992, the plaintiff was informed that his dismissal was in accordance with the General Orders and that the General Orders makes no provision for appeal against the decision of the disciplinary authority. The plaintiff sought for declarations: (i) that he be re-instated to his original post in the Royal Malaysian Police; and (ii) that he be given all the salaries, benefits, incentives, allowances, and any other reliefs which this court deemed fit that he ought to receive during the period of his dismissal.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) The show cause letter had spelt out with sufficient clarity the grounds on which it was proposed to dismiss the plaintiff and the opportunity ||Page 256>> that was accorded to the plaintiff to answer the three charges by way of a written representation. It would be appropriate to say that the DIGP has ‘assiduously’ complied with general order 26(2) of the General Orders (see para 16).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 170 (2) The decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff was made by the DIGP and it was the very same DIGP who had finally dismissed the plaintiff from the services of the first defendant. Haji Ragib and the IGP were not instrumental in dismissing the plaintiff as alleged. They were not the principal protagonists. The DIGP played a prominent role and was instrumental in dismissing the plaintiff. Haji Ragib was merely performing a mechanical exercise when he communicated the decision of the DIGP to the plaintiff (see para 26). (3) There was no issue of condonation. The secretariat handling disciplinary matters had to wait for the outcome of the investigations by the Criminal Investigations Department in regard to five police reports pertaining to the case at hand. This constituted justifiable delay (see para 42). (4) The plaintiff did not, at any time before his dismissal, request for the Committee of Inquiry to be convened to inquire into the three charges levied against him. General order 26(5) of the General Orders states that when and only when the DIGP considers that the case against the plaintiff requires further clarification then the DIGP has a discretion to appoint a Committee of Inquiry to inquire into the three charges where the plaintiff would be given the right to examine the witnesses and the documents and at the same time be represented. Until that scenario happens, the 1980 General Orders accords the plaintiff no such right at all. Incidentally there was also no evidence before this court that the DIGP has found that the case against the plaintiff required further clarification so as to bring the provision of general order 26(5) of the General Orders into play (see para 43).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Sebelum pemecatan beliau, plaintif merupakan Ketua Inspektor dalam angkatan Polis di-Raja Malaysia. Semasa berkhidmat di sana, beliau telah menerima sepucuk surat bertarikh 13 Mac 1992 daripada Haji Ahmad Ragib bin Mohd Salleh (‘Haji Ragib’) yang memegang jawatan Penolong Ketua Urusetia KPN (Tatatertib), yang bertindak bagi pihak Timbalan Ketua Inspektor Polis (‘TKIP’) yang mana TKIP telah memutuskan untuk memulakan prosiding tatatertib untuk memecat plaintif di bawah peraturan am 26 Perintah-perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 (‘Perintah Am tersebut’). Ia telah dimaklumkan kepada plaintif bahawa beliau bersalah kerana kerja tidak memuaskan atau salah laku yang pada pendapat TKIP memeritkan satu pemecatan. Plaintif telah diberikan 16 hari untuk membuat representasi beliau. Plaintif melalui surat bertarikh 13 Mac 1992 telah membuat satu representasi kepada TKIP menafikan kesemua tiga-tiga pertuduhan terhadap beliau. Dan sebagai maklum balas dan ||Page 257>> jawapan, plaintif memaklumkan bahawa setelah menimbangkan representasi bertulis plaintif, TKIP berpuas hati bahawa plaintif telah gagal untuk
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 171 membebaskan diri beliau daripada ketiga-tiga pertuduhan tersebut. Berasa tidak puas hati dengan keputusan TKIP, plaintif telah menulis sepucuk surat bertarikh 14 Julai 1992 memohon agar kes beliau dibuka semula dan memohon Jawatankuasa Siasatan menyiasat pertuduhan-pertuduhan yang dikenakan ke atas beliau. Plaintif telah menghantar surat tersebut kepada KIP lebih kurang dua bulan selepas dipecat daripada perkhidmatan. Pada 12 Ogos 1992, plaintif telah dimaklumkan tentang pemecatan beliau menurut peraturan am tersebut dan peraturan am tersebut tidak memberi peruntukan untuk rayuan terhadap keputusan pihak berkuasa tatatertib. Plaintif telah memohon deklarasi-deklarasi tersebut: (i) agar beliau dikembalikan jawatan asalnya dalam angkatan Polis di-Raja Malaysia; dan (ii) agar beliau diberikan semua gaji, faedah, insentif elaun, dan apa-apa relif lain yang Mahkamah Tinggi fikirkan sesuai beliau patut terima semasa tempoh pemecatan beliau.
Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: (1) Surat tunjuk sebab tersebut telah menyatakan dengan jelas alasan-alasan yang telah dicadangkan untuk memecat plaintif dan peluang telah diberikan kepada plaintif untuk menjawab ketiga-tiga pertuduhan melalui representasi bertulis. Adalah sesuai untuk menyatakan bahawa TKIP telah ‘assiduously’ mematuhi peraturan am 26(2) Perintah Am tersebut (lihat perenggan 16). (2) Keputusan untuk memulakan prosiding tatatertib terhadap plaintif telah dibuat oleh TKIP dan ia adalah TKIP yang sama yang telah akhirnya memecat plaintif daripada perkhidmatan defendan pertama. Haji Ragib dan IGP tersebut tidak terlibat dalam pemecatan plaintif seperti yang dikatakan. Mereka bukan protagonis utama. TKIP memainkan peranan utama dan penting dalam pemecatan plaintif. Haji Ragib hanya melaksanakan tugas secara mekanikal apabila beliau memaklumkan tentang keputusan TKIP kepada plaintif (lihat perenggan 26). (3) Tiada persoalan pemaafan di sini. Sekretariat yang mengendalikan perkara tatatertib tersebut perlu menunggu keputusan siasatan oleh Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah berkaitan lima laporan polis berhubung kes tersebut. Ini dianggap kelewatan yang dijustifikasikan (lihat perenggan 42). (4) Plaintif tidak, pada bila-bila masa sebelum pemecatan beliau, memohon kepada Jawatankuasa Siasatan mengadakan siasatan ke atas ketiga-tiga pertuduhan yang dikenakan ke atas beliau. Peraturan am 26(5) Perintah Am tersebut menyatakan bahawa apabila dan bila TKIP menimbang suatu kes terhadap plaintif memerlukan penjelasan lanjut maka TKIP mempunyai budi bicara untuk melantik satu Jawatankuasa Siasatan untuk menyiasat ketiga-tiga pertuduhan yang mana plaintif akan diberi hak untuk memeriksa saksi-saksi dan dokumen-dokumen dan pada masa yang sama diwakilkan. Sehingga senario tersebut berlaku, Perintah Am 1980 tidak akan memberikan langsung kepada plaintif hak sedemikian. Tambahan pula, tiada juga keterangan di hadapan ||Page 258>> Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa TKIP telah mendapati bahawa kes terhadap plaintif memerlukan penjelasan lanjut dengan menggunakan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 172 peruntukan peraturan am 26(5) Perintah Am tersebut (lihat perenggan 43).]
Notes For cases on dismissal from service, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 28-31. For cases on dismissal, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 849-873.
Cases referred to Abbott v Sullivan & Ors [1952] 1 KB 189 (refd) Astrovlanis Compania Naviera SA v Linard [1972] 2 QB 611, [1972] 2 All ER 647 (refd) Austen v Collins (1886) 54 LT 903 (refd) Azman bin Abdullah v Ketua Polis Negara [1997] 1 MLJ 263 (refd) Berens, Re, Berens v Berens (1888) WN 95 (refd) British Association of Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd v Forster & Sons Ltd (1917) 86 LJ Ch 489 (refd) Burghes v Attorney-General [1911] 2 Ch 139 (refd) Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680, [1970] 3 All ER 593 (refd) Byrne v Herbert and another [1966] 2 QB 121, [1965] 3 All ER 705 (refd) Co-operative Central Bank Ltd (in receivership) v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 829 (refd) Dyson v AG (1911) 1 KB 410 (refd) Edwards v SOGAT [1971] Ch 354 (refd) Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd and another [1971] Ch 591 (refd) Faber v Gosworth Urban Council (1903) 88 LT 549 (refd) Ganasan a/l Marimuthu v Public Services Commission & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 280 (refd) Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 114 (refd) Grand Junction Waterworks Co v Hampton Urban Council [1898] 2 Ch 331 (refd) Gray v Spyer [1922] 2 Ch 22 (refd) Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co (1915) 113 LT 98 (refd) Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] 2 Ch 490 (refd) Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v. Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 173 Honour v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States [1900] 1 Ch 852 (refd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 41 (refd) Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120 (refd) Markwald v Attorney-General [1920] 1 Ch 348 (refd) Mellstrom v Garner & Ors [1970] 2 All ER 9, [1970] 1 WLR 603 (refd) Najar Singh v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1976] 1 MLJ 203 (refd) North Eastern Marine Engineering Co v Leeds Forge Co [1906] 1 Ch 324 (refd) Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha ||Page 259>> Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Smeeton v The Attorney-General [1920] 1 Ch 85 (refd) State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490 (refd) Spedding v Fitzpatrick (1888) 38 Ch D 410 (refd) Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat v Mohamed bin Ismail [1982] 2 MLJ 177 (refd) Thomson v Birkley (1882) 31 WR 230 (refd) Thompson Brothers & Co v Amis [1917] 2 Ch 211 (refd) Zainal bin Hashim v Government of Malaysia [1979] 2 MLJ 276 (refd)
Legislation referred to Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 general orders 4(2)(g), 24, 25(1), (2), 26(2), (4), (5) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 15, r 16 Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 Service Commissions Act 1957 s 3
Muhammad Hisham Segaran (Rajindar Singh with him) (Morthi, Segaran & Co) for the plaintiff. Asmabi bte Mohamad (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the defendants.
[2004] 5 MLJ 495 KANAWAGI A/L SEPERUMANIAM v DATO’ ABDUL HAMID BIN MOHAMAD
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 174 HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–96 OF 2002 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 27 MARCH 2003
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Participation and role of Attorney-General’s Chambers and respondents — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
The applicant is an advocate and solicitor. The third respondent who was a former client of the applicant had lodged a complaint against the applicant to the Legal Profession Disciplinary Board (‘DB’). The second respondent constituted an Investigating Tribunal (‘IT’) against the applicant. The applicant applied ex parte for leave to apply for judicial review to quash the decision of the DB in constituting an IT against him. At the hearing date, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (‘AG’) and the first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents opposed the application for leave.
Held, allowing the application with costs against the first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents: (1) When an applicant files an application for leave for a judicial review remedy, he has to serve all the papers on the AG. The rule is based on the principle that judicial review is a principal tool of ‘public law’ applicable to ‘public’ bodies. As public bodies impliedly attract public interest and the guardian of public interest is the AG, this rule makes the AG a nominal party in all judicial review applications (see paras 3–4). (2) The intention of the rule is to ensure that the AG vets all judicial review applications in order to ascertain if his participation is warranted. Whether the AG elects to appear or not is solely at his discretion. If the AG does elect to appear, the court is bound to give a hearing. The court has no jurisdiction not to hear the AG. It is for the AG to show the public element involved in the application. The AG in electing to appear in a judicial review application must be cautious that his appearance is only in relation to matters of public interest (see paras 4 and 7). (3) The applicant was complaining that the second respondent in exercising its statutory powers by constituting an IT against him has infringed his rights. The applicant was asking the court to quash the decision of the second respondent. There was no question of public element arising in the applicant’s complaint. The wrong was purely a wrong done to the applicant in his personal capacity or in the capacity that only attracted private law (see para 8). (4) It was an adversity to logic to say that the action of the DB in setting up an IT was not a decision that could be amenable to judicial review. There is no doubt that the action of the DB taken under s 100(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 was a decision which was susceptible to judicial review (see paras 17–18).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 175 ||Page 496>> (5) The DB created under pt VII of the Legal Profession Act 1976 is a public body created to exercise discipline over the legal profession. Order 53 r 2(4) enables an aggrieved advocate and solicitor to seek redress from the court on the decision of the DB in setting up an IT (see para 20). (6) It is clear from the wordings of O 53 r 3(1) and (2) that the application for leave is only ex parte which means that the respondent does not have a right of appearance. The proper procedure for the respondents would be for them to appear only when the court has granted ex parte leave to the applicant and that order extracted and served on them. It is the service of the ex parte order together with the cause papers on the respondents that makes the respondents parties to the proceedings (see paras 25, 27). (7) Section 100 governs the power of the second respondent in constituting an IT whereas s 103 applies to the end stage of the disciplinary proceedings when the IT has made its findings to the DB and which then sets up a disciplinary committee. The requirement for the aggrieved party to appeal pursuant to s 103E is only confined to the decisions taken by the DB under s 103 and is independent from s 100. Applying the maxim generalibus specilia derogant, the requirement to appeal under s 103E does not apply to the remedy sought by a party aggrieved by a decision the DB made under s 100(1) and therefore giving the aggrieved party a right to seek judicial review (see para 36).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon merupakan seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Responden ketiga yang merupakan bekas anak guam/klien pemohon telah membuat aduan terhadap pemohon kepada Lembaga Tatatertib Profesion Undang-undang (‘LT’). Responden kedua menubuhkan sebuah Tribunal Siasatan (‘TS’) terhadap pemohon. Pemohon kemudiannya membuat permohonan ex parte untuk mendapatkan kebenaran untuk memohon suatu kajian semula kehakiman bagi membatalkan keputusan LT yang menubuhkan sebuah TS terhadap beliau itu. Pada hari pembicaraan, Jabatan Peguam Negara (‘JPN’) dan responden pertama, kedua, keempat, kelima dan keenam membangkang permohonan untuk mendapatkan kebenaran berkenaan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos terhadap responden pertama, kedua, keempat, kelima dan keenam: (1) Apabila seseorang pemohon memfailkan suatu permohonan untuk mendapatkan kebenaran bagi mendapatkan remedi kajian semula kehakiman, pemohon berkenaan mestilah menyampaikan semua kertas kepada PN. Kaedah ini berdasarkan prinsip kajian semula kehakiman yang merupakan suatu alat utama ‘public law’ yang terpakai kepada badan-badan ‘public’. Oleh sebab badan-badan awam secara tersurat menggamit kepentingan awam dan PN
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 176 merupakan penjaga/pelindung kepentingan awam, kaedah ini menjadikan PN sebagai suatu pihak pada nama/nominal dalam semua permohonan kajian semula kehakiman (lihat perenggan-perenggan 3–4). ||Page 497>> (2) Kaedah berkenaan berhasrat memastikan supaya PN menyemak dan memeriksa semua permohonan untuk mendapatkan kajian semula kehakiman untuk melihat sama ada penglibatannya itu wajar atau tidak. Sama ada PN kemudiannya memilih untuk hadir atau tidak adalah suatu hal yang semata-mata terletak pada budi bicara beliau. Jika PN memilih untuk hadir, mahkamah terikat untuk mendengarnya. Mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk tidak mendengar PN. Menjadi tugas PN untuk memperlihatkan bahawa permohonan berkenaan membabitkan elemen awam. Dalam membuat pilihan sama ada untuk hadir dalam permohonan kajian semula kehakiman atau tidak, PN mestilah waspada bahawa kehadiran beliau itu hanya berkaitan dengan perkara-perkara yang membabitkan kepentingan awam sahaja (lihat perenggan-perenggan 4 dan 7). (3) Pemohon mengadu bahawa dalam menjalankan kuasa-kuasa berkanunnya dengan menubuhkan sebuah TS terhadap beliau, responden kedua telah melanggar hak beliau. Pemohon meminta mahkamah supaya membatalkan keputusan responden kedua itu. Tidak timbul soal elemen awam dalam aduan pemohon. Yang salah hanyalah suatu kesalahan yang telah dilakukan kepada pemohon atas sifat dirinya atau atas sifat yang hanya menggamit undang-undang persendirian (lihat perenggan 8). (4) Merupakan suatu kesusahan untuk menjadikannya logik untuk mengatakan bahawa tindakan LT menubuhkan sebuah TS bukan merupakan suatu keputusan yang mahu mengalah terhadap kajian semula kehakiman. Tidak diragui bahawa tindakan LT yang diambil di bawah s 100(1) Akta Profesion Undang-undang 1976 itu merupakan suatu keputusan yang boleh dikaji semula (lihat perenggan-perenggan 17–18). (5) LT yang diwujudkan di bawah Bahagian VII Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 merupakan sebuah badan awam yang diwujudkan untuk mengawal disiplin dalam profesion undang-undang. Aturan 53 k 2(4) membolehkan seseorang peguambela dan peguamcara yang terkilan untuk mendapatkan jalan keluar daripada mahkamah terhadap keputusan LT menubuhkan sesebuah TS (lihat perenggan 20). (6) Daripada susunan kata-kata dalam A 53 k 3(1) dan (2), jelaslah bahawa permohonan untuk mendapatkan kebenaran hanya secara ex parte sahaja dan ini bermakna bahawa responden tidak ada hak untuk hadir. Prosedur yang betul bagi responden-responden ialah bahawa mereka perlu hadir hanya jika mahkamah telah memberi kebenaran ex parte kepada pemohon dan cabutan perintah pula telah dibuat dan disampaikan kepada mereka. Penyampaian perintah ex parte bersama-sama dengan kertas-kertas guaman kepada responden-responden itulah yang menjadikan para responden sebagai
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 177 pihak-pihak kepada prosiding berkenaan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 25 dan 27). (7) Seksyen 100 mentadbir kuasa responden kedua dalam membentuk sebuah TS manakala s 103 pula terpakai kepada peringkat akhir prosiding tatatertib setelah TS membuat dapatan kepada LT dan yang kemudiannya menubuhkan sebuah jawatankuasa tatatertib. Syarat untuk membolehkan ||Page 498>> pihak yang terkilan itu merayu menurut s 103E hanya terbatas kepada keputusan yang diambil oleh LT di bawah s 103 dan bebas daripada s 100. Memakai pepatah generalibus specilia derogant, syarat untuk membuat rayuan di bawah s 103E itu tidak terpakai kepada remedi yang dipohon oleh pihak yang terkilan dengan sesuatu keputusan yang dibuat oleh LT di bawah s 100(1) dan oleh yang demikian memberi pihak yang terkilan itu hak untuk mendapatkan kajian semula kehakiman (lihat perenggan 36).]
Notes For cases on application for judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 162–164. For judicial review, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160.059]– [160.061].
Cases referred to Andrew v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [1998] 1 All ER 14 (refd) Automated Plastic Systems (M) Sdn Bhd v Menteri Sumber Manusia & Anor Kuala Lumpur High Court case No R2–25–25 of 2001 (refd) British Steel pic v Customs of excise Commrs [1997] 2 All ER 366 (refd) Corks v Thanet DC [1983] 2 AC 286 (refd) Council of Civil Service Union v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Dr Amir Hussein bin Baharuddin v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 3 MLJ 298 (refd) Dr Chandra Muzaffar v Universiti Malaya [2000] 1 MLJ 173 (refd) Goein v Board of Education of School District of Fremount, Dodge County 343, NW Zd 718, 723, 216, Neb 158 (refd) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435 (refd) Haji Laugan Tarki bin Mohd Noor v Mahkamah Anak Negeri Penampang [1988] 2 MLJ 85 (refd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam, Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal [2000] 3 MLJ 281 (refd) Lim Kit Siang v United Engineers (M) Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1988] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 178 Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General of Communications [1996] 1 WLR 48 (refd) Parrel v Alexander [1976] 2 All ER 721 (refd) Roy v Kensington [1992] 1 AC 624 (refd) South Johore Omnibus Sdn Bhd v Damai Ekspres [1983] 1 MLJ 101 (refd) Sykt Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Business Chinese Directory Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 420 (refd) Trustees of the Dennis Rye Pension Fund v Sheffield City Council [1997] 4 All ER 747 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 5(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 93(3), (4), 94(3), 100(1), 103A, 103B, 103C, 103D, 103E(1), 103F, 103J, pt VII ||Page 499>> Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board)(Procedure) Rules 1994 r 6 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 rr 2(2), (3), (4), 3(1), (2)
Kanawagi Superumaniam (Khana & Co) for the applicant. N Nadkarni (Lambert Rasaratnam and SC Cheah with him) (Lee Hishammuddin) for the first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents. Nizam Zakaria for the Attorney-General’s Chambers.
[2004] 5 MLJ 526 MBF UNIT TRUST MANAGEMANT BHD v MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVISION NO R1–25–107 OF 2000 RAUS J 24 AUGUST 2003
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Certiorari — Application for — Whether decision by Industrial Court to be reviewed or quashed
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 179
Labour Law — Employment — Dismissal — Constructive dismissal — Test for constructive dismissal
The second respondent was a Senior Vice President of Research and Development Unit of the applicant with Grade SE1. Around March 1995, the applicant group of companies decided to streamline its Research and Development Unit of which the second respondent at that material time was the head, into two separate units. These units were to be headed by two senior officers of the applicant company of which the second respondent was selected to hold the position of Head of Production Development Unit. At the same time, the applicant group of companies had engaged Hay Management Consultant (‘Hay’) to conduct an extensive job evaluation exercise in all the companies under MBf group which includes the applicant. As the result of Hay’s evaluation exercise, the second respondent’s post of Product Development Unit was graded at Grade 15. Hence, to the second respondent, it was as a demotion. The second respondent protested against his demotion and vide a letter dated 6 October 1995 to the applicant he considered himself to be constructively dismissed by the applicant. The Industrial Court (‘IC’) found that the second respondent was right in considering himself dismissed without just cause or excuse and ordered reinstatement with backwages. This was an application by the applicant to quash the award of the IC for errors of law on the ground among others that the IC used and applied the wrong test for constructive dismissal.
Held, dismissing the application for certiorari: (1) The learned chairman was not applying the unreasonable test. He applied the correct test, that is the contract test. The learned chairman, based on the evidence adduced by looking at the whole chain of events as part of one continuous story, found as a fact that the applicant was guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment (see paras 12, 18). (2) Under s 33B of the Industrial Relations Act, decisions that are properly arrived by the IC in the exercise of its fact finding duty are sheltered from being quashed or reviewed by the superior courts (see para 21). ||Page 527>>
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden kedua adalah Naib Presiden Kanan Unit Kajian dan Pembangunan bagi pemohon dengan Gred SE1. Sekitar bulan Mac 1995, kumpulan syarikat pemohon membuat keputusan untuk mengatur semula Unit Kajian dan Pembangunannya di mana responden kedua pada masa yang material adalah ketua kepada dua unit yang berlainan. Unit-unit ini akan diketuai oleh dua pegawai kanan pemohon yang mana
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 180 responden dipilih untuk memegang jawatan Ketua Unit Pembangunan Pengeluaran. Pada masa yang sama, kumpulan syarikat pemohon telah melantik Hay Management Consultant (‘Hay’) untuk membuat penilaian pekerjaan untuk semua syarikat di bawah kumpulan MBf termasuk pemohon. Akibat daripada latihan penilaian Hay, jawatan responden kedua di Unit Pembangunan Pengeluaran dinilai sebagai Gred 15. Maka ia merupakan satu penurunan pangkat kepada responden kedua. Responden kedua membantah terhadap penurunan pangkatnya dan melalui surat bertarikh 6 Oktober 1995 kepada pemohon beliau menganggap dirinya dipecat secara konstruktif oleh pemohon. Mahkamah Perusahaan (‘MP’) membuat keputusan bahawa responden kedua adalah betul untuk menganggap dirinya dipecat tanpa tujuan atau alasan yang adil dan memerintahkan untuk responden kedua diambil kerja semula dengan tunggakan gaji. Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk membatalkan award MP kerana kesilapan undang-undang atas alasan antara lain bahawa MP menggunakan dan menerimapakai ujian yang salah untuk pemecatan konstruktif.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan untuk certiorari: (1) Pengerusi yang bijaksana tidak menggunakan ujian tidak munasabah. Beliau menggunakan ujian yang betul iaitu ujian kontrak. Pengerusi yang bijaksana, mengikut keterangan yang diberi dan dengan melihat semua kejadian sebagai satu cerita yang bersambung mendapati secara fakta bahawa pemohon adalah bersalah atas perbuatan yang membawa kepada kemungkiran yang merupakan asas kontrak pekerjaan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 12 dan 18). (2) Menurut s 33B Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan tersebut, keputusan yang dicapai dengan betul oleh MP dalam tanggungjawabnya untuk mencari fakta adalah dilindung dari dimansuhkan atau dikajisemula oleh mahkamah yang lebih tinggi (lihat perenggan 21).]
Notes For cases on dismissal, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 849– 873.
Legislation refered to Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 33B
Edward Saw (Ng Yook Woon, Andrew, TC Saw & Co) for the appellant. Ramdhari JB (Lobo & Assoc) for the respondent. ||Page 528>>
[2004] 6 MLJ 53
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 181 TA WU REALTY SDN BHD v KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI & ANOR
HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO MT1–13– 4 OF 2003 LOW HOP BING J 6 MAY 2004
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Duplicity of proceedings — Whether application to court would render policy of appeal to the Special Commissioners futile — Income Tax Act 1967, s 99
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Whether exceptional circumstances exist to grant leave — Principles governing application for leave for judicial review — Rules of the High Court 1980, O 53 r3
By a sale and purchase agreement dated 27 September 1991, the plaintiff bought three pieces of land in the Mukim of Cheng in the state of Melaka (‘Cheng land’) at the price of RM2,771,423.33 for the purpose of setting up an integrated steel mill, against which the local residents there had protested. Consequently, the applicant built the steel mill on another piece of land in Ayer Keroh, Melaka. On 5 March 1997, vide three agreements, the applicant disposed of the ‘Cheng land’ at RM9,489,577.86. The applicant submitted to the Inland Revenue Board the relevant notification in respect of real property gains tax for the disposal. Subsequently, the first respondent issued the notice of assessment for the purpose of subjecting to income tax the gains accrued from the sale thereof. On 17 January 2002, the applicant wrote to the first respondent stating that the gains on the disposal of ‘Cheng land’ should not attract income tax liability. On 20 August 2003, the applicant wrote to the first respondent requesting the respondent to review the decision. On 29 August 2003, applicant filed a notice of appeal in Form Q under s 99 of the Income Tax Act 1967. Simultaneously, the applicant applied for leave to commence proceedings under O 53 r 3 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for an order of certiorari to quash and set aside the notice of assessment on the ground that it contained an error of law on the face of it. The respondent objected to the application on the ground that the application is frivolous and vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court because there was an alternative remedy of appeal to the Special Commissioners under the Income Tax Act 1967, s 99, which the applicant had already invoked by filing the notice of appeal in Form Q, and that there are no exceptional circumstances to grant leave for judicial review. It was further contended that in view of this application and the appeal to the Special Commissioners, there was duplicity of proceedings.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 182
Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) The grant or refusal of leave in an application must necessarily depend on the facts of the case. There are certain classes of cases such as planning and tax cases where a statute provides for a specialized appeal procedure, and so the courts understandably may not grant judicial review save in ||Page 54>> exceptional cases, for example, where an applicant is able to demonstrate an excess or abuse of power, or breach of the rules of natural justice (see paras 24 and 25). (2) In this application, the validity or otherwise of the impugned notice of assessment or the existence or otherwise of an error of law may be raised as an issue in the hearing of the application’s appeal before the Special Commissioners, which is an additional platform or forum for the applicant to ventilate its views, in line with the fundamental rules of natural justice whereby the applicant is given every opportunity to present its case in the tribunal of the first instance (see paras 27 and 28 ). (3) The aggrieved party is given the statutory right of appeal by way of case stated, which will be heard in the High Court pursuant to para 34, Schedule 5 to the Income Tax Act 1967. Subject to the rules governing such appeals, the entire matter and proceedings may finally and conclusively be determined by the Federal Court as the apex court (see para 29). (3) The concurrent filing of the instant application and applicant’s appeal before the Special Commissioners certainly constituted a duplicity of proceedings and was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court (see para 30).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Melalui perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 27 September 1991, plaintif telah membeli tiga bidang tanah di Mukim Cheng di negeri Melaka (‘tanah Cheng’) dengan harga RM2,771,423.33 untuk membina kilang keluli bersepadu yang dibantah oleh penduduk setempat. Akibatnya, pemohon membina kilang besi bersepadu di atas sebidang tanah di Ayer Keroh, Melaka. Pada 5 Mac 1997, melalui tiga perjanjian, pemohon telah menjual ‘tanah Cheng’ dengan harga RM9,489,577.86. Pemohon menyerahkan kepada Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri notifikasi yang berkaitan dengan cukai keuntungan harta tanah untuk dijual. Selepas itu, responden pertama mengeluarkan notis taksiran untuk mencukaikan pendapatan dari keuntungan yang diperolehi dari penjualan ini. Pada 17 Januari 2002, pemohon menulis kepada responden pertama bahawa keuntungan daripada jualan ‘tanah Cheng’ tidak patut dicukaikan. Pada 20 Ogos 2003, pemohon telah menulis kepada responden pertama meminta responden mengkaji semula keputusan itu. Pada 29 Ogos 2003, pemohon telah memfailkan notis rayuan melalui Borang Q di bawah s 99 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967. Pada masa yang sama, pemohon memohon kebenaran untuk memulakan perbicaraan di bawah A 53 k 3
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 183 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 untuk satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan dan menepikan notis taksiran berdasarkan kesilapan undang-undang atas fakta. Responden membantah permohonan itu atas alasan permohonan itu adalah remeh dan menyusahkan dan adalah penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang kerana terdapat remedi alternatif untuk membuat rayuan kepada Pesuruhjaya Khas di bawah Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967, s 99, yang mana pemohon sudah membuat permohonan dengan memfailkan ||Page 55>> notis rayuan dalam Borang Q, dan tiada keadaan luar biasa bagi memberi kebenaran untuk semakan kehakiman. Selanjutnya berdasarkan pada permohonan ini dan rayuan kepada Pesuruhjaya Khas terdapat kependuaan perbicaraan.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan dengan kos: (1) Untuk memberi atau menolak kebenaran sesuatu permohonan semestinya berdasarkan kepada fakta kes. Ada beberapa golongan kes seperti kes perancangan dan cukai di mana statut memperuntukkan proses rayuan khas, dan oleh itu mahkamah boleh menolak permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman kecuali kes luar biasa, contohnya di mana pemohon boleh menunjukkan kelampauan atau penyalahgunaan kuasa, atau melanggar rukun keadilan asasi (lihat perenggan 24 dan 25). (2) Dalam permohonan ini, kesahan atau sebaliknya mengenai notis taksiran atau kewujudannya atau sebaliknya atas kesilapan undang-undang boleh dibangkitkan semasa pembicaraan rayuan pemohon kepada Pesuruhjaya Khas, tempat tambahan atau forum untuk pemohon menyuarakan pendapat seiring dengan rukun keadilan asasi di mana pemohon diberi peluang untuk mengemukakan kes kepada tribunal permulaan (lihat perenggan 27 dan 28). (3) Pihak yang terkilan diberi hak di bawah statut untuk merayu melalui kes yang akan didengar oleh Mahkamah Tinggi berdasarkan perenggan 34, Jadual 5 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967. Tertakluk kepada peraturan-peraturan tertentu, keseluruhan perkara tersebut dan perbicaraan mungkin diselesaikan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan sebagai mahkamah apeks (lihat perenggan 29). (4) Pemfailan serentak permohonan ini dan rayuan pemohon kepada Pesuruhjaya Khas sememangnya membentuk kependuaan perbicaraan dan ia remeh dan menyusahkan dan adalah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (lihat perenggan 30).]
Notes For cases on application for judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 162–164. For application for judicial review, 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para [160.061].
Cases referred to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 184 Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228 (refd) Badat bin Drani v Tan Kheat [1953] MLJ 67 (refd) Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224 (refd) Government of Malaysia & Anor v Jagdis Singh [1987] 2 MLJ 185 (refd) Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ipoh v Rent Tribunal For Ulu Kinta & Ors [1972] 1 MLJ 70 (refd) ||Page 56>> Lim Kui Siam & Anor, (Representing all the members of Persatuan Penduduk-Penduduk Kawasan Hj Manan, Kluang) v Pentadbir Tanah, Daerah Kluang [1995] 1 CLJ 846 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Melayu Raya Press Limited v WL Blythe The Colonial Secretary [1951] MLJ 89 (refd) National Land Finance Co-operative Society Ltd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [1998] 4 CLJ Supp 232 (refd) R v Chief Immigration Officer Gatwick Airport; ex p Kharrazi [1980] 3 All ER 373 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (dist) Sykt Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) T Mohan a/l Ellen & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Petaling [2000] 2 MLJ 431 (refd) Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442 (refd)
Legislation referred to Income Tax Act 1967 ss 99-102, para 34, Schedule 5 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3, Town and Country Planning Act 1976 s 23
Suzana bte Atan (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the respondents Ahmad Musthafi bin Mohamad (Koh Kim Leng & Co) for the applicant
[2004] 6 MLJ 235
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 185 DATUK AMAR JAMES WONG KIM MIN & ANOR v PENDAFTAR PERTUBUHAN
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1–25–137 OF 2002 RAUS SHARIF J 28 APRIL 2004
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Inspection of documents — Application to inspect documents in judicial review proceedings — Whether application must refer to specific documents — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 24 & O 53 r 6
Civil Procedure — Discovery — Inspection of documents — Application to inspectdocuments in judicial review proceedings — Whether application must refer to specific documents — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 24 & O 53 r 6
The respondent had cancelled the registration of Parti Kebangsaan Sarawak (‘SNAP’) on the ground that there was a dispute among the office bearers, causing doubt as to the identity of the same. Pursuant to this decision, the applicants, who were office bearers of SNAP, applied for a certiorari order to quash the respondent’s decision. Later, the applicants requested the Attorney-General’s Chambers to disclose all correspondence pertaining to the appointment and/or election of office bearers of SNAP, whether from the applicants or from any other parties and all memorandum, minutes of meeting, notes, correspondence between the respondent and any party in relation to or in connection with the registration of SNAP. The respondent refused to make the disclosure and claimed that they had furnished all the documents requested by the applicants or in any event, the internal documents of the respondent and the Ministry of Home Affairs were classified as ‘secret’ and ‘confidential’. The applicants then filed this application to the court under O 53 r 6 and O 24 of the Rules of the High Court 1980.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) On the facts, it was improper to allow the application as discovery was not relevant since the respondent had averred that all documents pertaining to his decision-making process were before the court and there was no evidence adduced by the applicants to show that the materials put before the court were inaccurate or false (see para 12). (2) In the instant case, the applicants’ application for discovery was a fishing expedition because they had failed to be specific as to the documents they were requesting for disclosure (see para 13).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 186
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden telah membatalkan pendaftaran Parti Kebangsaan Sarawak (‘SNAP’) atas alasan kewujudan pertelingkahan di antara pemegang-pemegang jawatan dan ianya menimbulkan kesangsian identiti berkenaan. Berikutan keputusan ini, pemohon-pemohon, yang merupakan pemegang jawatan dalam SNAP, memohon untuk perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan keputusan responden. Kemudiannya, pemohon-pemohon menggesa Jabatan Peguam ||Page 236>> Negara untuk mendedahkan kesemua surat-surat yang berhubung dengan pelantikan dan/atau pemilihan pemegang-pemegang jawatan di dalam SNAP, sama ada dari pemohon-pemohon atau dari orang lain dan semua memorandum, minit mesyuarat, nota, surat-surat di antara responden dan mana-mana pihak berhubung atau berkait dengan pendaftaran SNAP. Responden tidak mahu membuat pendedahan dan mendakwa bahawa mereka telah memajukan segala dokumen yang diminta oleh pemohon-pemohon atau walau bagaimanapun, dokumen dalaman responden dan Kementerian Dalam Negeri adalah diklasifikasikan sebagai ‘rahsia’ dan ‘sulit’. Pemohon-pemohon kemudiannya memfailkan permohonan ini ke mahkamah di bawah A 53 k 6 dan A 24 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Berdasarkan fakta kes, adalah tidak wajar untuk membenarkan permohonan penzahiran dokumen kerana ianya tidak relevan oleh sebab responden telah menegaskan bahawa segala dokumen berhubung dengan proses membuat keputusan telah dimajukan ke mahkamah dan tidak terdapat keterangan dikemukakan oleh pemohon-pemohon yang menunjukkan bahan-bahan tersebut adalah tidak betul atau palsu (lihat perenggan 12). (2) Di dalam kes semasa, permohonan penzahiran dokumen yang dibuat oleh pemohon-pemohon adalah satu ekspedisi memancing kerana mereka gagal untuk menyatakan dengan khusus dokumen mana yang mereka mahu dedahkan (lihat perenggan 13).]
Notes For cases on inspection of documents, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2079–2082. For discovery and inspection of documents, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [10.3-256]–[10.3-364].
Cases referred to: McGulgan’s Application, Re [1994] NI 143 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 187 Glor Na Ngael’s Application, Re [1991] NI 117 (refd)
Legislation referred to: Rules of the High Court 1980 O 24, 53 r 6 Societies Act 1966 ss 13(1)(c)(ix), (2), 16(1) Supreme Court Rules 1977 [UK] O 53 r 8
Khoo Guan Huat (Skrine) for the applicants. Azizah Hj Nawawi SFC (AG’s Chambers) for the respondent.
[2004] 6 MLJ 457 NGEOW YIN NGEE v MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO R–17B–5 OF 2002 AZMEL MAAMOR, ZULKEFLI MAKINUDIN AND ZAINUN ALI JJ 29 DECEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Breach of — Disciplinary proceedings — Presence of vice president at disciplinary board meetings — Whether ultra vires r 4(1) of Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 — Whether decision to be set aside — Whether in breach of principles of natural justice
Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings — Disciplinary Board — Presence of vice president at meeting of disciplinary board — Whether ultra vires r 4(1) of Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 — Whether decision to be set aside
A complaint had been forwarded against the appellant in that he had placed himself in a position of conflict of interest when he acted as counsel in a land transaction. The complaint was later withdrawn. The disciplinary board (‘DB’) of the Bar Council (‘BC’) however, pursued the complaint by virtue of r 8(1) of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994 (‘the DC Rules’), but the investigating tribunal recommended that a formal inquiry was unnecessary. Dissatisfied, the DB appointed a disciplinary committee (‘DC’) to review the complaint and it too found the complaint was not substantiated. The DB however took disciplinary action against the appellant by ordering him to pay a fine. This was the appellant’s appeal against the said decision.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 188 Held, setting aside order of the disciplinary board: (1) The facts proved that the vice president of the BC, as an ‘alternate’, was present at the meetings of the DB where the recommendations or findings of the IT and the DC were discussed and deliberated upon and where decisions were taken to reject such recommendations or findings, contravened r 4(1) of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 (‘the DB rules’) which prohibits or disqualifies the vice president from attending the said board meetings, and he was also in breach of the principles of natural justice (see paras 26 and 29). (2) Based on the facts it would be difficult to accept that there had been no opportunity for members of the DB to be influenced in their judgment, even assuming that the vice president was merely present at the said meeting and did not take part in the deliberations. It would appear that justice may seem not to have been done (see para 30).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Suatu aduan telah dimajukan terhadap perayu dalam mana beliau dikatakan telah meletakkan dirinya dalam keadaan yang mempunyai kepentingan bercanggah apabila beliau bertindak sebagai peguam dalam satu transaksi hartanah. Aduan tersebut kemudiannya telah ditarik balik. Akan tetapi, lembaga tatatertib (‘LT’) Majlis Peguam (‘MP’) telah meneruskan siasatan terhadap ||Page 458>> aduan tersebut melalui k 8 Kaedah-Kaedah Amalan Guaman (Prosiding Tatatertib) (Tribunal Siasatan dan Jawatankuasa Tatatertib) 1994 (‘Kaedah JT’), namun tribunal siasatan (‘TS’) telah mengesyorkan bahawa suatu siasatan rasmi tidak diperlukan. Terkilan, LT telah melantik jawatankuasa tatatertib (‘JT’) untuk mengkaji aduan tersebut dan ia juga telah mendapati bahawa aduan tersebut tidak berasas. Namun begitu, LT telah mengambil tindakan tatatertib terhadap perayu dengan memerintahkannya untuk membayar saman. Ini adalah rayuan perayu terhadap keputusan tersebut.
Diputuskan, menepikan perintah lembaga tatatertib: (1) Fakta membuktikan bahawa naib presiden MP turut hadir dalam perhimpunan LT di mana pendapat atau keputusan JT dan TS dibincangkan dan dipertimbangkan dan bilamana keputusan dibuat untuk menolak saranan, melanggar k 4(1) Amalan Guaman (Lembaga Tatatertib) (Prosedur) 1994 (‘Kaedah LT’) yang melarang atau tidak melayakkan naib presiden untuk menghadiri perhimpunan-perhimpunan lembaga yang berkenaan, dan beliau juga telah melanggar prinsip-prinsip keadilan asasi (lihat perenggan 26 dan 29). (2) Berdasarkan fakta, adalah sukar untuk menerima bahawa tidak terdapat peluang untuk ahli-ahli LT terpengaruh dalam membuat keputusan, walaupun
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 189 diandaikan bahawa naib presiden hanya hadir di perhimpunan tersebut dan tidak mengambil bahagian dalam pertimbangan berkenaan. Maka, timbullah anggapan bahawa keadilan tidak dilaksanakan (lihat perenggan 30).]
Notes For cases on breach of rules of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 712–722. For cases on disciplinary proceedings, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1559–1560. For breach of natural justice, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [160]092]– [160.109].
Cases referred to Cooper v Wilson [1937] 2 KB 309 (folld) Rohana Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (folld)
Legislation referred to Legal Profession (Disciplinary Board) (Procedure) Rules 1994 r 4(1) Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994 r 8(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 s 103E
Zainur Zakaria (Zainur Zakaria & Co) for the appellant. Cheah Soo Chuan (Lee Hishammuddin) for the respondent. ||Page 459>>
[2004] 6 MLJ 463 MALAYSIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM EMPLOYEES’ UNION v SISTEM PENERBANGAN MALAYSIA BERHAD AND ANOTHER
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1–25–114 OF 2001 RAUS J 4 MARCH 2004
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 190 Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Industrial Court — Application to quash decision — Whether to be granted — Whether there were errors of law
The union applied to this court for a certiorari to quash the decision of the Industrial Court that found no merits in the Union’s claims that the workers in question were entitled to retrenchment pay and indemnity, termination benefits and indemnity, and secondment allowance after a company re-structuring exercise.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) The chairman’s finding of facts, that the 438 workers were never terminated but continued to be in the employment of MAS at the date of hearing at the Industrial Court, was well supported by evidence (see para 13). (2) The union had failed to show that the chairman of the Industrial Court had committed any errors or that he had misconstrued the terms of the relevant statute or misapplied a principle of the general law (see para 14).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pihak kesatuan telah memohon untuk perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan yang menyatakan bahawa tiada merit dalam tuntutan kesatuan bahawa pekerja-pekerja yang berkenaan berhak kepada pembayaran penghematan dan indemniti, faedah pembuangan kerja dan indemniti, dan elaun peminjaman selepas pembentukan semula syarikat.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Penemuan fakta oleh pengerusi mahkamah, bahawa 438 pekerja tidak diberhentikan kerja tetapi masih berada di bawah MAS pada tarikh perbicaraan di Mahkamah Perusahaan, disokong oleh keterangan (lihat perenggan 13). (2) Pihak kesatuan gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan telah terkhilaf atau telah tersalah tafsir perundangan berkenaan atau tersilap dalam menggunakan prinsip undang-undang am (lihat perenggan 14).] ||Page 464>>
Notes For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185– 393
Cases referred to Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417 (refd) Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 600 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 191
Legislation referred to Employment (Termination and Lay-off Benefits) Regulations 1980 Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 26(2)
K Paramanathan (P Shyamala with him)(Rozaini, Paramanathan & Assoc) for the applicant A Ramadas (R Usha Devi with him)(Ramadass & Assoc) for the respondent
[2004] 7 MLJ 95 RAMATEX TEXTILES INDUSTRIAL SDN BHD v MENTERI SUMBER MANUSIA, MALAYSIA & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1-25-40 OF 2001 RAUS SHARIF J 3 AUGUST 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Trade union — Recognition — Minister’s decision to accord recognition to union — Membership check — Whether was failure to consider suitability — Whether minister under duty to provide reasons for decision — Director-General of Trade Unions — Discretion — Decision to conduct membership check by way of verification — Whether exercised reasonably
Labour Law — Trade union — Recognition — Membership check — By way of verification — Whether contravenes arts 5, 8 and 10 of Federal Constitution — Whether invalid under art 4 of Federal Constitution — Director-General of Trade Unions — Discretion — Decision to conduct membership check by way of verification — Whether exercised reasonably
This was an application by the applicant for a certiorari to quash the Minister’s decision in directing the applicant to recognise its union. The grounds advanced were that (i) the Minister had committed an error of law and failed to consider a membership check by way of verification exercise was not suitable in the circumstances of the matter and the Director General of Trade Unions (‘the DGTU’) should have resorted to the membership check by way of secret ballot under the Trade Union Regulations 1959; and (ii) the minister acted in breach of procedural fairness when he failed to provide any reasons to support his decision.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 192 Held, dismissing the application: (1) In seeking to be accorded recognition, a trade union must prove, among other things, that it has sufficient members to represent the employees. This is ascertained by way of a membership check, in the form of a secret ballot and a verification check (see para 10). (2) The DGTU had informed the applicant that a membership verification exercise would be conducted but the applicant failed to object to it then. Thus, the minister cannot be faulted when he decided to adopt the recommendations of the Director General of Industrial Relations (‘DGIR’) and the Director General of Trade Unions (‘DGTU’) who had carried out the membership check by verification exercise. Furthermore, the applicant had not proven that the DGIR, the DGTU or the Minister had acted outside the scope of the power conferred by the Trade Unions Act 1959 and the rules made thereunder (see paras 13 and 15). (3) The minister is under no duty to give reasons when making his decision and therefore this could not be a reason for its nullification (see para 20). ||Page 96>>
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan ketetapan menteri memerintahkannya mengikhtirafkan kewujudan kesatuan sekerjanya. Alasan-alasan yang dimajukan olehnya adalah (i) bahawa menteri telah khilaf di sisi undang-undang dan gagal mengambil-kira yang penilaian keahlian melalui proses penentusahan tidak sesuai dalam keadaan semasa dan ketua pengarah kesatuan sekerja (KPKS) sepatutnya membuat penilaian keahlian melalui undi rahsia di bawah Peraturan-peraturan Kesatuan Sekerja 1959; dan (ii) menteri telah melanggar keadilan prosedur bila dia gagal memberi sebab-sebab yang menyokong keputusannya.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Dalam memohon untuk pengikhtirafan, kesatuan sekerja mesti membuktikan, antara lain, bahawa ia mempunyai ahli yang mencukupi untuk mewakili pekerja. Ini diputuskan melalui penilaian keahlian, dalam bentuk undi rahsia dan penentusahan (lihat perenggan 10). (2) KTKS telah memaklumkan kepada pemohon bahawa penentusahan keahlian akan dikendalikan, akan tetapi pemohon gagal membuat bantah pada masa tersebut. Maka, menteri tidak boleh dipersalahkan bilamana beliau menerimapakai cadangan ketua pengarah perhubungan perusahaan (KPPP) dan KPKS yang telah melaksanakan penilaian keahlian melalui penentusahan. Tambahan pula, pemohon gagal membuktikan bahawa KPPP, KPKS dan menteri telah bertindak di luar bidangkuasa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 193 Kesatuan Sekerja dan perintah-perintah yang dibuat di bawahnya (lihat perenggan 13 dan 15). (3) Tugas Menteri tidak memerlukannya untuk memberi alasan bila membuat keputusan dan dengan itu tidak boleh diterima sebagai alasan untuk pembatalannya (lihat perenggan 20).]
Notes For cases on certiorari generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185–393 For cases on locus standi, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4276–4285 For cases on recognition of trade unions, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1502–1520
Cases referred to Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Joseph Puspam v Menteri Sumber Manusia, Malaysia & Anor [2001] 4 AMR 4181 (folld) ||Page 97>> Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Menteri Sumber Manusia v Association of Bank Officers Peninsular Malaysia [1999] 2 MLJ 337 (refd) Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia & another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Senja (M) Sdn Bhd v Minister of Human Resources & Anor (OM No 25-92-2001) (dist)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 4, 5, 8, 10 Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 9(2), (5) Industrial Relations Regulations 1980 reg 4(1)(c) Trade Unions Regulations 1959 regs 62, 63, 65(1)
Raymond TC Low (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the appellant Aslam Zainuddin (Jabatan Peguam Negara Malaysia) for the first respondent S Muhendaran (Muhendaran Sri) for the second respondent
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 194
[2004] 7 MLJ 109 ASSOCIATION OF BANK OFFICERS, PENINSULAR MALAYSIA v KETUA PENGARAH KESATUAN SEKERJA, MALAYSIA & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1-25-10 OF 2000 AND R1-25-15 OF 2000 RAUS SHARIF J 24 JULY 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application for — Trade union — Registration of union in replacement of existing unions — Whether decision tantamount to error of law
Administrative law — Remedies — Exhaustion of remedies — Application to quash decision to register union — Whether applicants must exhaust remedies available under Trade Unions Act — Appeal — Whether applicants could pursue remedies under public law despite existence of statutory appeal procedure — Trade Unions Act 1959 s 71A
Civil Procedure — Parties — Locus standi — Trade union — Registration — Whether applicants have legal interest in matter to challenge registration of new union
Labour Law — Trade Union — Registration — Registration of union in replacement of existing unions — Whether there was overlap of scope of membership — Whether would result in industrial unrest — Right to be heard — Whether existing unions be given right to be consulted and heard — Director-General of Trade Unions — Discretion — Whether exercised reasonably — Trade Unions Act 1959 s 12(3)(a)
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd (‘BMB’) merged with Bank of Commerce Malaysia Berhad (‘BOC’) to become Bumiputra Commerce Malaysia Berhad (‘BCB’) and Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad. There were already two registered unions in BOC, namely Kesatuan Kakitangan Eksekutif Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Berhad (‘BOCESU’), an in-house union which represented officers in Grades 35 and 36, and Persatuan Pegawai-Pegawai Bank Semenanjung Malaysia(‘ABOM’), a national union which represented officers in Grade 34. BBMB had its own union, ie, KEPAK-BBMB, that represented officers in Grade 34 to 39. Subsequently, the former employees of BBMB currently employed by BCB received
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 195 acceptance by the Director-General of Trade Unions (‘the first respondent’) to register a new in-house union (‘the second respondent’) in BCB on the ground that it would be in the best interests of all parties to come under a single union. BOCESU and ABOM (the ‘applicants’) applied separately to this court for a certiorari to quash the decision of the first respondent on the ground that he had erroneously exercised his discretion. The second respondent contended that the applicants have not availed themselves of the remedies available to them under the Trade Unions Act 1959 and they have no locus to make the applications. The parties agreed that the suits would be jointly heard. ||Page 110>>
Held, allowing both applications with costs: (1) Section 15(2) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 (‘the Act’) provides no avenue for the applicants to apply to quash the first respondent’s certificate of registration made in respect of the second respondent. It relates to a situation where it is the first respondent who initiates certain steps or gives notice to the affected trade union regarding a cancellation of its certificate of registration or ordering the said trade union to remove members from its membership register. Clearly, there is no remedy available to the applicants under this section (see para 11). (2) There is no dispute that ABOM did not appeal against the decision of the first respondent. Although BOCESU’s appeal to the minister was still pending, it did not preclude the applicants from making these applications. Section 71A of the Act uses the word ‘may’ and not ‘shall’ and, as such, the applicants do not have to pursue the remedy under the Act before proceeding with these applications. In any event, even where there is a statutory appeal procedure available to the applicants in public law, the applicants are not precluded from resorting to judicial review on the ground of excess of jurisdiction or in cases involving the exercise of power by public authorities (see para 14). (3) The applicants at the material time were representing certain categories of officers of BCB. Registering the second respondent and opening the membership of the second respondent to all officers in BCB, would affect the position of the applicants. They have the legal interest and locus standi to challenge the registration of the second defendant in BCB (see para 15). (4) The first respondent had not properly exercised his statutory discretion under s 12(2) of the TUA in that he failed to consider the fact that there was an overlap in the scope of membership between the second respondent and the applicants. Section 12(2) discourages multiplicity of unions within the same industry or trade or establishment or occupation. By allowing the second respondent to be registered, the first respondent failed to realise that his action would cause industrial unrest in the establishment. This is because the existing unions, ie ABOM and BOCESU, had been accorded recognition by BCB and were already representing employees. The first respondent also failed to state that he had taken into consideration the interests of the workmen in Grades
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 196 34–36 in BCB who were within the scope of representation of BOCESU and ABOM. Being interested parties, the applicants should have been consulted and given the right to be heard (see paras 17 and 18).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd (‘BMB’) telah bergabung dengan Bank of Commerce Malaysia Berhad (‘BOC’) untuk menjadi Bumiputra Commerce Malaysia Berhad (‘BCB’) dan Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad. Telah terwujud dua kesatuan berdaftar dalam BOC, iaitu BOCESU, sebuah kesatuan dalaman yang mewakili pegawai-pegawai ||Page 111>> dalam gred 35 dan 36, dan ABOM, sebuah kesatuan kebangsaan yang mewakili pegawai-pegawai dalam gred 34. BBMB mempunyai kesatuannya sendiri, iaitu KEPAK-BBMB, yang mewakili pegawai-pegawai dalam gred 35 hingga 39. Sejurus kemudian, bekas pekerja-pekerja BBMB yang sekarangnya diambil kerja oleh BCB menerima persetujuan daripada ketua pengarah kesatuan sekerja (‘responden pertama’) untuk mendaftar sebuah kesatuan dalaman yang baru (‘responden kedua’) dalam BCB atas alasan adalah baik untuk kepentingan semua pihak supaya diwakili oleh satu kesatuan. BOCESU dan ABOM (‘pemohon’) memohon berasingan ke mahkamah ini untuk perintah certiorari membatalkan keputusan responden pertama atas alasan beliau telah khilaf dalam melaksanakan budi bicaranya. Responden kedua mengadu bahawa pemohon tidak menyempurnakan remedi-remedi yang sedia-ada di bawah Akta Kesatuan Sekerja (‘Akta tersebut’) dan mereka tidak mempunyai locus untuk membuat permohonan tersebut. Pihak-pihak telah bersetuju untuk perbicaraan ini dijalankan sekali gus.
Diputuskan, membenarkan kedua-dua permohonan dengan kos: (1) Seksyen 15(2) Akta tersebut tidak memberi jalan untuk pemohon memohon membatalkan sijil pendaftaran yang dikeluarkan oleh responden pertama berkenaan dengan responden kedua. Ia merujuk kepada keadaan di mana responden pertamalah yang mengambil langkah atau memberi notis kepada kesatuan sekerja berkenaan berkaitan dengan pembatalan sijil pendaftarannya atau memerintah kesatuan tersebut membuang ahli-ahlinya daripada daftar keahlian. Jelas sekali tidak terdapat apa-apa remedi yang boleh dipakai oleh pemohon di bawah seksyen tersebut (lihat perenggan 11). (2) Tidak dipertikaikan bahawa ABOM tidak merayu terhadap keputusan responden pertama. Walaupun rayuan BOCESU kepada menteri masih lagi berterusan, ia tidak menghalang kedua-dua pemohon daripada membuat permohonan ini. Seksyen 71A Akta tersebut menggunakan perkataan ‘may’ dan bukannya ‘shall’ dan dengan itu pemohon tidak perlu mengguna pakai remedi di bawah seksyen tersebut sebelum memajukan permohonan ini. Walau
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 197 bagaimanapun, wujudnya prosedur rayuan berkanun di bawah undang-undang awam untuk diguna pakai oleh pemohon bukan suatu pembatasan untuk memohon untuk semakan kehakiman atas alasan terdapat keterlanjuran bidang kuasa atau kes-kes yang melibatkan penggunaan kuasa oleh pihak berkuasa awam (lihat perenggan 14). (3) Pemohon pada masa berkenaan mewakili segolongan pegawai-pegawai BCB. Mendaftarkan responden kedua dan membuka keahlian untuknya kepada semua pegawai di BCB, akan memberi kesan kepada pemohon. Semestinya, mereka mempunyai kepentingan undang-undang dan locus standi untuk mempertikaikan pendaftaran responden kedua di BCB (lihat perenggan 15). ||Page 112>> (4) Responden pertama tidak memakai budi bicaranya dengan betul di bawah s 12(2) Akta tersebut dalam mana beliau gagal untuk mempertimbangkan bahawa terdapat persamaan dalam skop keahlian responden kedua dan pemohon. Seksyen 12 tidak menyokong kewujudan pelbagai kesatuan dalam industri, perusahaan atau tempat kerja atau pekerjaan yang sama. Dengan membenarkan responden kedua didaftar, responden pertama gagal mengambil kira bahawa tindakannya akan mengakibatkan pertikaian perusahaan di tempat kerja. Ini adalah kerana kesatuan-kesatuan yang sedia-ada, iaitu ABOM dan BOCESU, telah diberi pengiktirafan oleh BCB dan telah mewakili pekerja-pekerjanya. Responden pertama juga gagal untuk menyatakan bahawa beliau telah mengambil kira kepentingan pekerja-pekerja di gred 34-36 dalam BCB yang berada dalam skop representatif BOCESU dan ABOM. Sebagai pihak yang mempunyai kepentingan, rundingan sepatutnya dibuat dengan pemohon dan diberikan hak untuk bersuara (lihat perenggan 17 dan 18). ]
Notes For cases on certiorari generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185–393 For cases on exhaustion of remedies, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 488–493 For cases on locus standi, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4276–4285 For cases on registration of trade unions, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1522–1524
Cases referred to Kesatuan Sekerja Pembuatan Barangan Galian Bukan Logam v Director General of Trade Unions & Ors [1990] 2 MLJ 231 (refd) Lai Cheng Cheong v Sowaratnam [1983] 2 MLJ 113 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 198 Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Persatuan Pegawai-Pegawai Bank Semenanjung Malaysia v Minister of Labour, Malaysia & Ors [1989] 1 MLJ 30 (folld)
Legislation referred to Trade Unions Act 1959 ss 15(2), 71A
LG Seah (Lobo & Associates) for the applicant in Application for Judicial Review No R1-25-10 of 2000 N Mahalingam (Maha & Peri) for the applicant in Application for Judicial Review No R1-25-15 of 2000 Azizah Hj Nawawi SFC (AG’s Chambers) for the first respondent P Kuppusamy (VK Raj with him) (P Kuppusamy & Co) for the second respondent ||Page 113>>
[2004] 7 MLJ 120 EXXONMOBIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION MALAYSIA INC v KESATUAN PEKERJA-PEKERJA EXXONMOBIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION MALAYSIA INC & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1-25-191 OF 2003 RAUS SHARIF J 12 JULY 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application quash decision of Industrial Court — Whether decision tainted with irregularities
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Jurisdiction — Complaint of non-compliance — Whether court seized with jurisdiction to hear matter — Whether complaint involved was a trade dispute or application for interpretation
The applicant applied to this court for a certiorari to quash the decision of the Industrial Court in deciding to hear the complaint of non-compliance lodged by the union (the first respondent) under s 56 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the Act’) without first hearing and determining the application for interpretation of article 45 of
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 199 the collective agreement.
Held, allowing the application: (1) The real issue before the Industrial Court was the interpretation of article 45 of the collective agreement read with s 6 of the Act and the application for leave form set out in the Fourth Schedule. This was a trade dispute between the employee and the union which is connected with the terms of the employment of the workmen who are eligible to union leave and should be resolved through the trade dispute resolution process as provided by ss 18 and 26 of the Act. Thus, the first respondent should not have lodged a complaint of non-compliance under s 56 of the Act. This is because s 56 is a summary enforcement procedure for clear cut cases of non-compliance of a term of an award or collective agreement (see paras 11, 13 and 14). (2) The Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear the complaint of non-compliance under s 56 of the Act as the matter should have proceeded either as a trade dispute or an application for interpretation (see para 20).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah memohon ke mahkamah ini untuk perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan dalam memutuskan untuk membicarakan aduan ketidakpatuhan di bawah s 56 Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan (‘Akta tersebut’) tanpa mendengar atau memutuskan permohonan untuk penterjemahan artikel 45 perjanjian bersama terlebih dahulu. ||Page 121>>
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan itu: (1) Isu sebenar di hadapan mahkamah Perusahaan melibatkan interpretasi artikel 45 perjanjian bersama dibaca bersama s 6 Akta tersebut dan borang permohonan cuti seperti yang terkandung dalam jadual ke-empat. Ini adalah satu pertikaian perdagangan di antara pekerja dan kesatuan yang berkait dengan terma-terma pekerjaan pekerja yang berhak kepada cuti kesatuan dan seharusnya diputuskan melalui proses penyelesaian pertikaian perdagangan di bawah ss 18 dan 26 Akta tersebut. Oleh itu, responden pertama tidak sepatutnya membuat aduan ketidakpatuhan di bawah s 56 Akta tersebut. Ini adalah kerana s 56 merupakan prosedur penguatkuasaan terus untuk kes-kes yang jelas menunjukkan ketidakpatuhan suatu terma award atau perjanjian bersama (lihat perenggan 11, 13 and 14). (2) Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membicarakan aduan berkenaan di bawah s 56 Akta tersebut kerana ia sepatutnya diteruskan sebagai suatu pertikaian perdagangan atau permohonan untuk interpretasi (see
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 200 para 20).]
Notes For cases on certiorari generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185–393 For cases on jurisdiction of Industrial Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1323–1375
Cases referred to Dragon & Phoenix Bhd v Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan Membuat Tekstil dan Pakaian Pulau Pinang & Anor [1991] 1 MLJ 89 (refd) Dunlop Industries Employees Union v Dunlop Malaysian Industries Bhd & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 81 (refd) Holiday Inn, Kuala Lumpur v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers [1988] 1 MLJ 306 (refd) Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1995] 3 MLJ 217, CA (refd)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 6, 18, 26, 56
Lim Heng Seng (Peter Chater with him) (Lee Hishamuddin) for the appellant R Sivarasa (Daim & Gamany) for the respondent
[2004] 7 MLJ 260 TEONG KOK KONG v YOAHAN MARKETING (M) SDN BHD & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R2-25-35 OF 2002 WAN AFRAH JC 6 APRIL 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari and mandamus — Industrial Court refused to hear joinder application during non-compliance complaint proceedings — Whether Industrial Court committed error of law — Whether Industrial Court acted in excess of jurisdiction —
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 201 Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 29(a), 56
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Joining of parties — Joinder application made during non-compliance proceedings — Whether Industrial Court allowed to hear application for joinder made during non-compliance proceedings — Whether words ‘in any proceedings before it’ in s 29(a) Industrial Relations Act 1967 encompassed non-compliance proceedings under s 56 of Industrial Relations Act 1967 — Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 29(a), 56
Words and Phrases — ‘in any proceedings before it’ — Meaning of — Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 29(a)
The Industrial Court found that the applicant had been dismissed without just cause or excuse by the first respondent and awarded him a sum of RM110,000 as backwages and compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Subsequently, when the first respondent failed to comply with the order to pay the sum of RM110,000, the applicant filed non-compliance proceedings pursuant to s 56(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the Act’) and thereupon, made an application to join the directors of the company and the holding company as parties pursuant to s 29(a) of the Act. At the inter-partes hearing, counsel for the proposed joined parties objected to the joinder application and contended that the Industrial Court should hear and determine a preliminary point of law, namely, whether there could be a joinder of parties during the non-compliance complaint proceedings. The Industrial Court, after hearing submissions on the issue mentioned above, held that the applicant could not apply to join parties at the non-compliance complaint proceedings stage (‘the said award’). Dissatisfied with the Industrial Court’s refusal to hear the joinder application on its merit, the applicant filed this application for judicial review to quash the said award on the ground that the Industrial Court had erred in law pertaining to its jurisdiction and failed to take into account relevant factors and cases submitted before it. The issues for determination in the instant application were whether: (a) the Industrial Court committed an error of law and acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the applicant’s joinder application that was made during the non-compliance proceedings; and (b) the Industrial Court committed an error of law and acted in excess of jurisdiction when it decided on a preliminary issue and dismissed the joinder application without hearing the same on it merits. ||Page 261>>
Held, allowing the application: (1) By virtue of s 29(a) of the Act, which provided that ‘the Court may in any proceedings before it: (a) order that any party be joined, substituted or struck off …’, the Industrial Court was allowed to hear the application for joinder made by the applicant even during non-compliance proceedings under s 56 of the Act. The words ‘in any proceedings before it’ as contained in s 29(a) of the Act encompassed all proceedings under the Act, which clearly included
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 202 non-compliance proceedings under s 56 of the Act (see paras 11– 14); Marathaei Sangulullai & Anor v Syarikat JG Containers (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 337 followed; Melewar Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd & Melewar Guangdong Trade & Development Corporation v Mariam bte Sheikh Mohd Shafi [1991] ILR 160 not followed. (2) As such, there was no reason why the Industrial Court should not have heard the joinder application before him as there was nothing in either s 29(a) or s 56 of the Act that prohibited a joinder application from being made at non-compliance proceedings. The Industrial Court had obviously committed an error of law. Further, the Industrial Court was wrong and had acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it decided the matter on a preliminary issue and dismissed the joinder application without hearing the merits of the same (see paras 14 and 15). (3) Accordingly, the said award was quashed and the case was remitted for re-adjudication before another Chairman of the Industrial Court for a proper hearing on the merits of the application for joinder (see para 16).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Mahkamah Perusahaan telah memutuskan bahawa pemohon telah dibuang kerja tanpa sebab-sebab yang adil atau sah oleh pihak responden yang pertama dan telah memerintahkan pemohon dibayar sebanyak RM110,000 sebagai tunggakkan gaji dan pampasan sebagai ganti diterima bekerja semula. Apabila pihak responden pertama gagal membayar wang tersebut, pemohon telah memfailkan prosiding ketidakpatuhan di bawah s 56(1) Akta Industri 1967 (Akta tersebut) dan telah membuat permohonan untuk percantuman ahli lembaga pengarah syarikat dan syarikat induk yang lain sebagai pihak responden mengikut s 29(A) Akta tersebut. Dalam pembicaraan interpartes, peguam bagi pihak-pihak responden telah membantah cadangan percantuman pihak, beliau juga menegaskan bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan sepatutnya mendengar dan memutuskan isu fakta perundangan iaitu bolehkah pihak-pihak responden bercantum dalam permohonan prosiding ketidakpatuhan. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah memutuskan bahawa pemohon tidak boleh memohon untuk percantuman pihak dalam prosiding ketidakpatuhan. Pemohon tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan dan telah memfailkan permohonannya terhadap kajian kehakiman untuk membatalkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan atas alasan bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah melakukan kesilapan dalam fakta undang-undang dalam bidang kuasanya ||Page 262>> dan tidak mengambil kira faktor-faktor yang relevan dan kes-kes lain yang dikemukakan sebelum ini. Isu yang diambil kira di sini adalah sama ada: (a) Mahkamah Perusahaan telah melakukan kesilapan fakta perundangan dan telah melampau bidang kuasa bila mahkamah tersebut telah menolak permohonan pemohon untuk percantuman pihak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 203 semasa prosiding ketidakpatuhan dan (b) Mahkamah Perusahaan telah melakukan kesilapan fakta perundangan dan telah melampau bidang kuasanya apabila membuat keputusan berhubungan dengan isu permulaan dan menolak permohonan percantuman pihak tanpa mendengar merit permohonan tersebut.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan: (1) Mengikut s 29(a) Akta tersebut, mahkamah dapat membuat keputusan mengenai prosiding sebelum ia (a) membuat aturan bahawa mana-mana pihak boleh dibicarakan atau diganti atau dibatalkan bersama. Mahkamah Perusahaan dibenarkan mendengar permohonan untuk permohonan percantuman semasa pendengaran isu ketidakpatuhan prosiding seperti s 56 Akta tersebut. Perkataan ‘in any proceedings before it’ seperti tertera dalam s 29 Akta tersebut merujuk kepada kesemua prosiding dalamAktaitu termasuk prosiding ketidakpatuhan dalam s 56 (lihat perenggan 11–14); Marathaei Sangulullai & Anor v Syarikat JG Containers (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 337 diikut; Melewar Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd & Melewar Guangdong Trade & Development Corporation v Mariam bte Sheikh Mohd Shafi [1991] ILR 160 tidak diikut. (2) Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak mempunyai sebab untuk tidak membicarakan permohonan percantuman pihak memandangkan s 29 dan s 56 tidak melarang permohonan percantuman pihak dibuat di prosiding ketidakpatuhan. Mahkamah Perusahaan juga telah membuat kesilapan dalam fakta perundangan. Tambahan pula, keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan salah dan telah melampau bidang kuasanya apabila membuat keputusan atas isu permulaan dan menolak permohonan percantuman pihak tanpa mengambil kira meritnya (lihat perenggan 14 dan 15). (3) Award yang diterima pemohon telah dibatalkan dan kes tersebut di dengar semula di hadapan Pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan yang lain untuk pembicaraan yang lebih tepat atas merit permohonan percantuman pihak (lihat perenggan 16).]
Notes For cases on certiorari and mandamus, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 394-417. For cases on joining of parties, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1321-1322. For certiorari and mandamus, see 9 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [16.117]- [160.146]. ||Page 263>>
Cases referred to Marathaei Sangulullai & Anor v Syarikat JG Containers (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 337 (folld)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 204 Melewar Trading Corporation Sdn Bhd & Melewar Guangdong Trade & Development Corporation v Mariam bte Sheikh Mohd Shafi [1991] ILR 160 (not folld)
Legislation referred to Industrial Court Act 1967 s 29(a) Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 20(3), 27(1), 56(1) Industrial Relations Rules 1967 r 3(1)
Jaspal Singh Gill (Raghbir Singh Norizan & Co) for the applicant P Thavaselvi (Zul Rafique & Partners) for the first to fourth respondents
[2004] 7 MLJ 441 BUMIPUTRA COMMERCE BANK BERHAD v MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R1-25-13 OF 2000 RAUS SHARIF J 22 MARCH 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Domestic inquiry conducted prior to dismissal — Whether Industrial Court had jurisdiction to hear matter de novo — Whether Industrial Court committed error of law in deciding matter without regard to notes of domestic inquiry
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Award — Application to quash — Industrial Court made finding that charges preferred against second respondent were not proven despite employee’s admission in domestic inquiry — Whether Industrial Court misconstrued and misapplied principles of law pertaining to domestic inquiry — Whether Industrial Court committed error of law
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Jurisdiction — Domestic inquiry conducted prior to dismissal — Whether Industrial Court had jurisdiction to hear matter de novo — Whether Industrial Court committed error of law in deciding matter without regard to notes of domestic inquiry
The second respondent was dismissed by the applicant after a domestic inquiry found
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 205 him guilty of the following charges: (a) that the second respondent had abused his position as an officer of the applicant when he deliberately arranged for the granting of overdraft facilities to certain customers and after approval thereof, utilised the said facilities either by operating and/or exercising control over the operation of the accounts; (b) that by utilising the facilities, the second respondent had directly or indirectly received the facilities for his personal pecuniary benefit; and (c) that with intent to deceive, the second respondent added another signature on the specimen card of the said customers and caused a false entry to be made in the applicant’s documents. At the domestic inquiry, the second respondent admitted that he had kept the cheque book of the said customers and that he had added the third signature to the specimen card. The second respondent filed a representation under s 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the Act’). Pursuant to s 20(3) of the Act, the Minister of Human Resources referred the matter to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court made a finding that all the charges preferred against the second respondent were not proven and accordingly decided in favour of the second respondent. This was the applicant’s application for an order of certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court. The applicant’s main complaint was that the Industrial Court was wrong to hear the matter de novo.
Held, allowing the application: (1) When a domestic inquiry was conducted by an employer prior to a dismissal, the Industrial Court was under a duty to first consider and determine whether the inquiry was proper. Upon such consideration and if the Industrial Court arrived at a finding that due inquiry had been ||Page 442>> carried out, the Industrial Court should not proceed to hear the matter de novo but, instead, consider whether a prima facie case had been made out against the employee. Thus, where due inquiry had been held, the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction was limited to considering whether there was a prima facie case against the employee (see paras 9 and 18). (2) In the instant case, the Industrial Court did not address the issue of whether a proper domestic inquiry had been held and whether the conclusion reached by the inquiry panel was perverse. In cases of this nature, the Industrial Court should first consider whether or not the domestic inquiry was valid and whether the inquiry notes were accurate. In the absence of such consideration and a finding on the validity of the domestic inquiry and accuracy of the inquiry notes, the Industrial Court’s action in proceeding to decide the matter without any regard to the notes of inquiry cannot be described as anything more than an error of law. Accordingly, the conclusion of the Industrial Court that all charges preferred against the second respondent were not proven could not be supported and in fact, contrary to evidence (see paras 21 and 22); Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another Appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753 and Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen [1995] 3 MLJ 537
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 206 distinguished. (3) The Industrial Court’s conclusion, that all charges preferred against the second respondent were not proven, was contrary to clear evidence. It was apparent from the records that the Industrial Court had misconstrued and misapplied the principles of law pertaining to the relevance of a valid domestic inquiry. Therefore, the applicant had demonstrated ample proof of errors of law and as such, this court was compelled to exercise its judicial review powers to issue an order of certiorari to quash the award (see paras 28 and 29).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden kedua telah dibuang kerja oleh pemohon selepas siasatan domestik mendapati responden kedua bersalah atas tuduhan-tuduhan berikut: (a) responden kedua telah menyalahgunakan kuasanya sebagai seorang pegawai di syarikat pemohon apabila responden kedua telah dengan sengajanya membuat persediaan untuk memberikan perkhidmatan overdraf kepada pelanggan-pelanggan tertentu dan selepas mendapatkan kelulusan, telah menggunakan kemudahan tersebut sama ada melalui pengendalian atau melaksanakan kuasa ke atas pengendalian akaun-akaun berkenaan; mengaturkan perkhidmatan apabila beliau menguruskan perkhidmatan overdraf untuk beberapa pelanggan tanpa kelulusan pihak bank , beliau juga telah menggunakan kuasa yang melebihi bidangnya; (b) responden kedua telah menggunakan kemudahan-kemudahan yang disediakan oleh bank secara langsung atau tidak langsung untuk kepentingan dirinya; dan (c) responden kedua mempunyai niat untuk memperdaya apabila beliau telah menambahkan satu lagi ruang tandatangan dalam kad spesimen bagi pelanggan tertentu dan menyebabkan kenyataan palsu dibuat dalam dokumen pemohon. Ketika siasatan domestik dilakukan, responden kedua mengakui bahawa beliau menyimpan buku cek bagi pelanggan-pelanggan tersebut dan telah menambahkan tandatangan ketiga di kad-kad spesimen. ||Page 443>> Responden kedua telah memfailkan representasi di bawah s 20(1) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (Akta tersebut). Mengikut s 20(3) Akta tersebut, Menteri Sumber Manusia telah merujuk perkara ini kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan. Mahkamah Perusahaan berpendapat bahawa kesemua tuduhan yang dibuat ke atas responden kedua tidak dapat dibuktikan dan telah membuat keputusan yang menyebelahi responden kedua. Ini merupakan permohonan perayu untuk memperoleh perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan award yang telah diberi oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan. Aduan utama perayu adalah bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar hujahan secara de novo.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Apabila majikan menggunakan penyiasatan domestik sebagai asas untuk
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 207 memecat pekerjanya, Mahkamah Perusahaan mestilah mempertimbangkan sama ada siasatan yang dibuat adalah betul. Selepas mempertimbangkan semua aspek dan setelah mendapati bahawa siasatan domestik telah berjalan dengan lancar, Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak perlu meneruskan pendengaran de novo tetapi mempertimbangkan sama ada kes prima facie dapat di diwujudkan menentang pekerja tersebut. Bidang kuasa Mahkamah Industri adalah dalam kes siasatan domestik cuma terhad kepada memastikan sama ada kes prima facie menentang pekerja (lihat perenggan 9 dan 18). (2) Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Industri tidak mempertimbangkan isu sama ada siasatan domestik yang telah dilakukan dengan betul, dan jika kesimpulan yang telah diperolehi oleh panel siasatan domestik itu boleh dibantah. Mahkamah Perusahaan mesti mengambil kira sama ada siasatan domestik itu sah dan jika prosiding siasatan itu betul. Dalam ketiadaan pertimbangan dan sokongan sedemikian mengenai kesahan siasatan domestik dan ketepatan nota siasatan, tindakan Mahkamah Perusahaan untuk terus memutuskan isu tersebut tanpa mengambil kira nota siasatan pada keseluruhannya tidak boleh disifatkan sebagai lebih dari suatu kekhilafan di sisi undang-undang. Maka dengan itu, keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan bahawa kesemua tuduhan menentang responden kedua tidak boleh dibuktikan dan tidak mengikut bukti yang dikemukakan (lihat perenggan 21 dan 22), Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another Appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753 and Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen [1995] 3 MLJ 537 dibeza. (3) Kesimpulan Mahkamah Perusahaan, bahawa kesemua tuduhan yang dikemukakan terhadap responden kedua tidak boleh dibuktikan, bertentangan dengan bukti yang nyata. Jelas di sini bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah salah tafsir prinsip undang-undang mengenai prosedur siasatan domestik. Perayu telah mengemukakan bukti bahawa terdapat kesilapan fakta undang-undang dan mahkamah berhak menggunakan kuasanya untuk memerintahkan satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan award tersebut (lihat perenggan 28 dan 29).] ||Page 444>>
Notes For cases on certiorari and mandamus, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 394-417. For cases on Industrial Court’s awards, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1241-1288. For cases on jurisdiction of Industrial Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1323-1375.
Cases referred to Dreamland Corp (M) Sdn Bhd v Choong Chin Sooi & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 111 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 208 Ganesan G Suppiah v Mount Pleasure Corp Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 CLJ 637 (refd) Metroplex Administration Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Elias [1998] 5 CLJ 467 (refd) Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen [1995] 3 MLJ 537 FC (distd) Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah (formerly known as Dharmalingam a/l Renganathan v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 352 (refd) UMW Toyota (M) Sdn Bhd v Chow Weng Thiem [1996] 5 MLJ 678 (refd) Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another Appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753 FC (distd) Workmen of the Motipur Sugar Factory Private Limited v The Motipur Sugar Factory Private Limited AIR 1965 SC 1803 (refd)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 14(1), 20(1), 20(3)
A Selvamalar (Skrine) for the applicant P Vickneswaren (Kavin Lim with him) (Murugavell Arumugam & Co) f or the second respondent
[2004] 7 MLJ 451 ABDUL RAHIM BIN ABDUL MANAF v HICOM HOLDINGS BERHAD & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2-25-4 OF 99 WAN AFRAH JC 17 MARCH 2004
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Material evidence before Industrial Court showed that applicant was asked to resign by respondent — Industrial Court made finding of fact that applicant not asked to resign — Whether Industrial Court considered material evidence — Whether Industrial Court committed error of law in deciding that applicant not asked by respondent to resign
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Award — Application to quash — Material evidence before Industrial Court showed that applicant was asked to resign by respondent — Industrial Court made finding of fact that applicant not asked to resign — Whether Industrial Court
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 209 considered material evidence — Whether Industrial Court committed error of law in deciding that applicant not asked by respondent to resign — Whether award should be quashed
The applicant’s service was terminated by the respondent on the grounds of misconduct for insubordination when the applicant refused to obey an order issued by the respondent to go on transfer following the respondent’s restructuring exercise. The applicant contended that the reason for his refusal to go on transfer was because it was actuated by mala fide on the respondent’s part who had earlier asked him to resign. The issue before the Industrial Court was whether the applicant was asked to resign by the respondent. The Industrial Court made a finding of fact that the applicant was not asked to resign. This was the applicant’s application for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Industrial Court on the grounds that the Chairman of the Industrial Court had erred in law and had acted beyond his jurisdiction. The applicant contended that there was material evidence before the Industrial Court to show that the applicant was asked to resign by the respondent, namely, a letter written by the applicant and addressed to the respondent titled ‘Resignation letter as requested’ (‘the said letter’). The applicant further alleged that when he refused to resign, the respondent deliberately withheld his bonus and sidelined his assignments and duties.
Held, allowing the application with costs: (1) The title of the said letter and the first paragraph therein implied that the applicant had been coaxed into resigning. Although the rest of the said letter did not explicitly refer to the subject matter, nonetheless, the title of the said letter was sufficient to suggest that the applicant was asked to resign. In any case, if it were true that the respondent did not ask the applicant to resign, the respondent should have responded to the said letter. The respondent’s inaction in not rebutting the said letter immediately suggested that the respondent did request ||Page 452>> the applicant to resign. Since the Industrial Court had failed to scrutinise the said letter, the court was duty bound to review such a finding (see paras 7, 10 and 13). (2) The statement by the Chairman of the Industrial Court that the issue of the applicant being asked to resign was first raised in the Industrial Court was puzzling in the light of the documentary and oral evidence presented before him. The failure by the Chairman to properly consider the said letter before concluding that the issue of the applicant being asked to resign was first raised in the Industrial Court amounted to an error of law (see paras 18 and 19); Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 AMR 1628 followed. (3) The Chairman of the Industrial Court merely acknowledged the respondent’s reason for the delay in the payment of bonus as an administrative problem but did not make a finding on it. There seemed to be an act of mala fide by the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 210 respondent towards the applicant because it was only upon the applicant’s threat that the respondent paid the bonus to the applicant. The failure by the Chairman of the Industrial Court to make a finding as to whether the delay in making the bonus payment amounted to suppression on respondent’s part constituted an error of law (see paras 21 and 22). (4) At the Industrial Court, the applicant did not challenge the bona fide of the respondent’s restructuring exercise. Therefore, the Industrial Court was entitled to assume that the restructuring exercise was bona fide. The court was satisfied with the respondent’s explanation that upon the restructuring exercise, the applicant’s job responsibility was taken over by another officer in the department as an additional portfolio. This was a legitimate act by the respondent. Nonetheless, even if the Chairman of the Industrial Court did not make a finding on whether the transfer ordered by the respondent was bona fide or otherwise, this was not so fatal as to amount to an error of law warranting this court’s interference (see paras 28–30). (5) Therefore, on the issue of whether the applicant was first asked to resign, the answer was in the affirmative. As such, his dismissal was without just cause and excuse and the Industrial Court’s award was quashed, with costs (see paras 33 and 34).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Khidmat pemohon telah ditamatkan oleh responden atas alasan salah laku kerana keingkaran apabila pemohon enggan mematuhi arahan yang diberikan oleh responden untuk berpindah berikutan dengan latihan penstrukturan semula organisasi. Pemohon memberitahu keenganan beliau untuk berpindah adalah kerana pemindahan itu adalah berdasarkan sifat mala fide responden yang sebelum itu telah meminta pemohon meletak jawatan. Isu di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan adalah sama ada pemohon diminta meletakkan jawatan oleh responden. Mahkamah Perusahaan memutuskan bahawa pemohon tidak diminta meletakkan jawatan. ||Page 453>> Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan atas alasan bahawa Pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan telah melakukan kesilapan perundangan dan telah bertindak di luar bidang kuasanya. Pemohon telah menegaskan bahawa terdapat bukti yang material di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan yang menunjukkan bahawa pemohon telah diminta oleh responden untuk meletakkan jawatan, iaitu surat yang ditulis oleh pemohon dan dialamatkan kepada responden yang bertajuk ‘Resignation letter as requested’ (‘surat tersebut’). Pemohon seterusnya mendakwa apabila beliau enggan meletak jawatan, responden secara sengaja menggantung bonus pemohon dan mengetepikan segala tugasannya
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 211 Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos: (1) Tajuk dan perenggan pertama surat tersebut jelas mengandaikan bahawa pemohon telah diminta meletakkan jawatan. Walaupun perenggan lain dalam surat tersebut tidak jelas merujuk kepada perkara tersebut, tetapi tajuk surat tersebut adalah mencukupi untuk menunjukkan bahawa pemohon diminta meletakkan jawatan. Di dalam sesuatu kes, sekiranya benar responden tidak meminta pemohon meletakkan jawatan, responden sepatutnya bertindak balas terhadap surat tersebut. Tiada tindakan daripada responden untuk menentang surat itu menunjukkan bahawa responden memang meminta pemohon meletakkan jawatan. Oleh kerana Mahkamah Perusahaan juga gagal meneliti surat tersebut mahkamah mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk meneliti keputusan tersebut. (lihat perenggan 7, 10 dan 13). (2) Kenyataan Pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan mengenai isu pemohon diminta meletakkan jawatan telah dikemukakan buat pertama kalinya dalam Mahkamah Perusahaan adalah pelik walaupun terdapat banyak keterangan lisan dan dokumentar yang dikemukakan. Kegagalan Pengerusi untuk mempertimbangkan dengan sewajarnya surat tersebut sebelum memutuskan bahawa isu pemohon diminta meletak jawatan dikemukakan buat pertama kali di Mahkamah Perusahaan jelas menunjukkan kesilapan perundangan (lihat perenggan 18 dan 19); Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 diikut. (3) Pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan hanya mengiktirafkan alasan responden lambat membayar bonus kerana masalah pentadbiran tetapi tidak membuat sebarang penelitian ke atasnya. Jelas terdapat tindakan mala fide dari responden kepada pemohon oleh kerana hanya selepas pemohon membuat ugutan bonus telah dibayar kepada pemohon. Kegagalan Pengerusi membuat penyiasatan sama ada kelewatan pembayaran bonus itu adalah satu penindasan di pihak responden merupakan satu kesalahan perundangan (lihat perenggan 21 dan 22). (4) Di Mahkamah Perusahaan, pemohon tidak mencabar bona fide pihak responden untuk penstrukturan semula organisasinya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Perusahaan berhak membuat andaian bahawa penstrukturan semula organisasi itu adalah bona fide. Mahkamah berpuas hati dengan keterangan responden bahawa selepas penyusunan semula organisasi tersebut tanggungjawab kerja pemohon kini telah diambil alih oleh pegawai lain di dalam jabatan sebagai portfolio tambahan. Walaubagaimanapun, walaupun ||Page 454>> sekiranya Pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak mengambil kira sama ada pemindahan tempat kerja tersebut adalah adalah bona fide, ini tidaklah serius dan bukan kesalahan perundangan yang mewajarkan campur tangan mahkamah ini. (lihat perenggan 28–30). (5) Oleh yang demikian, berkenaan isu sama ada pemohon diminta meletakkan jawatan, jawapannya adalah benar. Oleh itu, pemohon telah dibuang kerja tanpa sebab yang wajar dan award yang diberi oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan telah dibatalkan, dengan kos (lihat perenggan 33 dan 34).]
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 212
Notes For cases on Industrial Court’s awards, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1241-1288. For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 394-417.
Cases referred to Airspace Management Services Sdn Bhd v Col (R) Harbans Singh a/l Chingar Singh [2000] 3 MLJ 714 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 (folld)
Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 1(2)
Suria Kumar DJ Paul (Mohd Idris & Associates) for the applicant Edward Saw Keat Leong (Ng Yook Woon, Andrew TC Saw & Co) for the respondent
[2004] 7 MLJ 547 ASSUNTA HOSPITAL v YB MENTERI SUMBER MANUSIA, MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1-25-01 OF 2002 RAUS SHARIF J 25 SEPTEMBER 2003
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari and prohibition — Reference of matter to Industrial Court under s 26(2) of Industrial Relations Act 1967 — Whether minister exercised discretion fairly
The applicant had given a special salary increment to employees recruited from Sarawak. The union questioned the merits of the said act, contending that all employees should be given the same. The matter was brought before the Industrial
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 213 Relations Department and eventually to the minister when the parties could not reach an amicable settlement. The minister found that there was a trade dispute and accordingly referred the matter to heard by the Industrial Court under s 26(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. This was the applicant’s application for a certiorari to quash the Minister’s decision and a prohibition to prevent the Industrial Court from hearing the matter.
Held, dismissing the application: The minister had identified that a trade dispute existed between the applicant and the union relating to the special increment given to the employees from Sarawak. He had based his decision on an objective assessment of the facts and materials before him and fairly concluded that the trade dispute between the applicant and the union was not frivolous or vexatious and hence merits a reference under s 26(2) of the Act (see para 9).
[ Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah memberikan satu kenaikan gaji khas kepada pekerja yang diambil kerja dari Sarawak. Pihak kesatuan telah menyoalkan merit tindakan tersebut, sambil mengadu bahawa semua pekerja harus diberikan yang sama. Perkara tersebut dihadapkan ke Jabatan Perhubungan Perusahaan dan seterusnya kepada menteri bilamana pihak-pihak gagal mendapatkan penyelesaian damai. Menteri telah mendapati bahawa wujudnya satu pertikaian perdagangan dan telah merujukkan perkara tersebut ke mahkamah perusahaan di bawah s 26(2) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan. Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan menteri dan satu larangan untuk menghalang Mahkamah Perusahaan daripada membicarakan perkara tersebut.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: Menteri telah berpendapat bahawa satu pertikaian perdagangan wujud antara pemohon dan pihak kesatuan berkenaan kenaikan khas yang telah diberikan kepada pekerja dari Sarawak. Dia telah mendasarkan ||Page 548>> keputusannya atas penilaian fakta di hadapannya dengan objektif dan dengan adilnya memutuskan bahawa pertikaian perdagangan di antara pemohon dan kesatuan tidak remeh dan menyusahkan dan oleh itu mengharuskan satu rujukan dibuat di bawah s 26 Akta tersebut (lihat perenggan 9). ]
Notes For cases on certiorari and prohibition, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 185–418
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 214 Cases referred to National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers v Minister of Labour and Manpower [1980] 2 MLJ 189 (refd)
Legislation referred to Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 2, 26(2)
Gan Khong Aik (Lee Hishamuddin) for the applicant Umi Kalthom Binti Abdul Majid SFC (AG’s Chambers) for the first respondent Vickneswaren (Murugavell Arumugam & Co) for the third respondent
[2003] 1 MLJ 18 Abd Rauf bin Alif v Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Anor
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–289 OF 1996 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN AND ALAUDDIN JJCA 14 JUNE 2002
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Termination of service of member of public service — Distinction between termination of service and dismissal — Whether such distinction recognized in Malaysia
Labor Law — Employment — Termination of service — Distinction between termination of service and dismissal — Whether such distinction recognized in Malaysia
The appellant was engaged as a probationer with the rank of assistant superintendent of police. His contract of employment provided for the termination of service during the probationary period by either one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice. He was subsequently asked to show cause why his services should not be terminated and called upon to make representations in answer. Although he made representations, the appellant’s services were terminated and he was paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The appellant’s action for reinstatement was dismissed in the High Court and he appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Held, dismissing the appeal: This was a case of termination simpliciter. Under the laws of Malaysia, a distinction between dismissal and termination of services exists. The law also recognizes a
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 215 distinction between a probationer and a permanent employee, be it in the public or private sector. The appeal was thus devoid of merit (see p 20D–F, H–I); Government of Malaysia v Lionel [1974] 1 MLJ 3 followed and Lionel v Government of Malaysia [1971] 2 MLJ 172 referred.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu telah diambil kerja sebagai seorang pegawai dalam percubaan dengan pangkat timbalan penguasa polis. Perjanjian pekerjaan beliau memperuntukkan penamatan perkhidmatan semasa tempoh percubaan dengan notis satu bulan ataupun gaji satu bulan sebagai ganti notis. Beliau kemudiannya diminta menunjukkan sebab kenapa perkhidmatannya tidak patut diberhentikan dan telah diminta membuat representasi-representasi dalam jawapan. Walaupun beliau membuat representasi-representasi, perkhidmatan perayu telah ditamatkan dan beliau telah dibayar gaji satu bulan sebagai ganti notis. Tindakan perayu untuk mengembalikan semula pangkatnya telah ditolak di Mahkamah Tinggi dan beliau telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. ||Page 19>>
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: Kes ini merupakan kes penamatan kerja simpliciter. Di bawah undang-undang Malaysia, terdapat perbezaan di antara pemecatan dan penamatan perkhidmatan. Undang-undang juga mengiktirafkan perbezaan di antara seorang pegawai dalam percubaan dan seorang pekerja tetap, sama ada di dalam sektor awam ataupun sektor swasta. Rayuan tersebut tidak mempunyai merit (lihat ms 20D–F, H–I; Government of Malaysia v Lionel [1974] 1 MLJ 3 diikut dan Lionel v Government of Malaysia [1971] 2 MLJ 172 dirujuk.
Notes For cases on termination of service of member of public service, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 723–725. For cases on termination of service, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1082–1119.
Cases referred to Government of Malaysia v Lionel [1974] 1 MLJ 3 (folld) Lionel v Government of Malaysia [1971] 2 MLJ 172 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 135(2)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 216
Appeal from: Civil Suit No S7–21–219 of 1990 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant. Dato’ Mary Lim Thiam Suan (Aliza Jamaluddin and Anita Mary Fernandez with her) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents.
[2003] 1 MLJ 98 Wong Koon Seng v Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–90 OF 2002 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 28 OCTOBER 2002
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Mandamus — Refusal by special administrators to accept applicant’s offer for purchase of assets — Special administrators appointed under Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act — Whether special administrators were public authorities within scope of O 53 r 2(4) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 — Whether decisions of special administrators had character of public law — Whether decisions of special administrators were subject to judicial review
Civil Procedure — Time — Certiorari — Application for judicial review — Ex parte application for leave not filed within time — Whether application was regular — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3(6)
Public Authorities — Remedies — Certiorari — Mandamus — Refusal by special administrators to accept applicant’s offer for purchase of assets — Special administrators appointed under Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act — Special administrators deemed the agents of first respondent pursuant to s 32 of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act — First respondent was a private entity — Whether special administrators were public authorities within scope of O 53 r 2(4) of the Rules of the High Court 1980
The borrower (‘first respondent’) was granted credit facilities by a syndication of lenders (‘the lenders’) pursuant to a facility agreement. The first respondent had defaulted under the said credit facilities and pursuant to the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998 (‘the Danaharta Act’) and the vesting certificate, all the rights, assets and interests of the lenders in connection with the first respondent’s said credit facilities and security documents were acquired by and vested into Pengurusan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 217 Danaharta Nasional Bhd (‘Danaharta’). Consequent upon such vesting, Danaharta appointed the second to fourth respondents as special administrators of the first respondent. Thereafter, the second to fourth respondents invited potential investors to attend a briefing on the procedure for submission of their proposals to restructure and/or acquire the first respondent’s assets (‘the first invitation’). The first respondent’s assets to be acquired included, inter alia, its mining lease and related assets (‘the assets concerned’). Following the first invitation, various interested parties, including the applicant, attended the scheduled briefing. At the said briefing, copies of the information memorandum dated 1 March 2002 (‘the first MOI’) were given to various interested parties, including the applicant. The first MOI expressly stated that the first MOI did not constitute an offer by the second to fourth respondents and the second to fourth respondents were not bound to accept any of the proposals submitted. On the closing date, a total of six proposals were received by the second to fourth respondents offering to purchase a variety of the first respondent’s assets. The applicant’s proposal dated 18 March 2002 was offered for the acquisition of the assets concerned with an offer price of RM6,003,000 (‘the applicant’s offer’). After due deliberation, the third respondent on behalf of the first respondent rejected the applicant’s officer and returned therewith the applicant’s bankers cheque for the sum of RM120,060. The reason for the rejection was that the applicant’s offer was too low for the assets concerned. The applicant then requested the second to fourth respondents to reconsider their decision to reject its offer. The second to fourth respondents were however not prepared to do so, despite the applicant’s meeting with them and with Danaharta on various occasions. Subsequent to the aforesaid rejection of the applicant’s offer, a further briefing was fixed whereby the applicant and others were invited to submit fresh offers for the acquisition of the assets concerned. The said briefing was however cancelled. Thereafter, an advertisement was placed in the newspapers by the second to fourth respondents wherein all interested parties were invited to submit their offers for the acquisition of the first respondent’s operating tin mine with a right to enter, occupy and mine on an ‘as is where is basis’. It was not disputed that these assets were the same as the assets concerned. In addition to the aforesaid advertisement, the second to fourth respondents had by their letter of 5 July 2002 extended their invitation to the applicant to submit his fresh offer for the acquisition of the assets concerned. On 18 July 2002, a total of three proposals were received by the second to fourth respondents including a proposal from Fook Wan Thye Credit & Leasing Sdn Bhd with an offer price of RM14,000,300 (‘Fook Wan Thye’s offer’). The applicant did not submit any offer. The other two offers made were for RM12,000,888.99 and RM11,500,000 respectively. The second to fourth respondents accepted the Fook Wan Thye’s proposal. This was the applicant’s application for: (a) an order of certiorari to quash the respondents’ rejection of the applicant’s offer; (b) an order of certiorari to quash the respondents’ acceptance of Fook Wan Thye’s offer; (c) an order of mandamus that the mining lease and related assets of the first respondent be awarded to the applicant pursuant to the terms of the first MOI; or (d) an order of mandamus that the respondents reconsider the applicant’s offer.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 218
Held, dismissing the application: (1) This application was irregular because the ex parte application for leave for the same was not filed within the time prescribed under O 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’). The applicant’s offer was rejected by the second to fourth respondents by a letter dated 30 April 2002. Accordingly, the application herein ought to have been filed on or before 9 June 2002 instead of 9 August 2002 as was done in the instant case. In the absence of any court order allowing for extension of time, the application herein was misconceived and ought to be dismissed outright (see p 107E–G); Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54 and Ravindran v Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168 followed. (2) The first respondent (which was an ‘affected person’ pursuant to s 21(a) of the Danaharta Act), was a private entity and not a public authority as it was a limited company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act 1965. Since the second to fourth respondents were deemed to be acting as the agents of the first respondent pursuant to s 32 of the Danaharta Act, they were agents of a private entity. Accordingly, the second to fourth respondents were not ‘public authority’ within the scope of O 53 r 2(4) of the RHC (see p 108D). (3) Although the second to fourth respondents had been appointed under the provisions of the Danaharta Act and thereby had the powers specified in the Second Schedule thereto, their decisions in rejecting the applicant’s offer and accepting Fook Wan Thye’s offer were commercial decisions taken for and on behalf of the first respondent as a private or ‘business’ entity. Those decisions were made in the field of ‘private law’ in accordance with the spirit of ‘freedom to contract’ and did not have any character of public law. Therefore, their decisions were not and should not be subject to judicial review (see p 108E–G). (4) The application for an order of mandamus to compel the second to fourth respondents to award the mining lease and related assets to the applicant was clearly an attempt by the applicant to enforce his purported contractual or ‘private right’ against the respondents. If the applicant maintained that there was a contract, then his claim ought to have been for damages for breach of contract. The applicant’s prayers for a mandamus and certiorari were in essence prayers for specific performance and an injunction, which remedies were available in private law. Judicial review applied to matters relating to public law and should not be made available for enforcement of private rights. Accordingly, the application herein was misconceived and ought to be dismissed by this court (see p 110A–C). (5) The filing of this application contravened s 39A of the Danaharta Act as it sought to ‘obstruct or hinder’ the exercise of the right and power conferred on the second to fourth respondents as special administrators. Further, the court was unable to grant the orders as prayed because an order of court quashing
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 219 the second to fourth respondents’ decisions would certainly ‘restrain or affect action taken by … the special administrators’, which was expressly prohibited by s 72(b) of the Danaharta Act. Also, an order of mandamus to compel the second to fourth respondents to award the mining lease and related assets to the applicant would contravene s 72(c) of the Danaharta Act. Accordingly, the prayers sought for in this application were absolutely barred by s 72 of the Danaharta Act (see pp 111I–112B, F); Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 720 followed. (6) This application was mala fide and hindered the ongoing disposal of assets exercise undertaken by the second to fourth respondents. This would defeat the intention of Parliament which had decreed that Danaharta and the special administrators must be permitted to realize the borrowers’ assets without hindrance and express statutory provisions were enacted towards this effect. This application was exactly the kind of proceedings that the Danaharta Act sought to bar. The success of Danaharta depended on speed. Danaharta and the special administrators were given wide powers as Parliament recognized the need for special powers in the interest of the public (see p 112F–H).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Peminjam (‘responden pertama’) diberikan kemudahan kredit oleh satu sindiket pemberi pinjaman (‘pemberi-pemberi pinjaman’) menurut satu perjanjian kemudahan kredit. Responden pertama telah ingkar di bawah kemudahan kredit tersebut dan menurut Akta Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd 1998 (‘Akta Danaharta’) dan sijil letakhak, segala hak, aset dan kepentingan pemberi-pemberi pinjaman berhubung dengan kemudahan kredit dan dokumen cagaran responden pertama diperolehi oleh dan diletakhak dalam Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd (‘Danaharta’). Berikutan letakhak demikian, Danaharta melantik responden kedua hingga keempat sebagai pentadbir khas responden pertama. Selepas itu, responden kedua hingga keempat menjemput bakal pelabur untuk menghadiri satu taklimat mengenai prosedur penyerahan cadangan penyusunan semula dan/atau memperolehi aset responden pertama (‘jemputan pertama’). Aset responden pertama yang hendak diperolehi termasuk, antara lain, pajakan perlombongan dan aset-aset yang berkaitan dengannya (‘aset-aset berkaitan tersebut’). Susulan dari jemputan pertama, pelbagai pihak yang berkepentingan, termasuk pemohon, telah menghadiri taklimat yang dijadualkan. Di taklimat tersebut, salinan-salinan memorandum maklumat bertarikh 1 Mac 2002 (‘MM pertama’) diberikan kepada pelbagai pihak yang berkepentingan, termasuk pemohon. MM pertama jelas menyatakan bahawa MM pertama tidak membentuk satu tawaran oleh responden kedua hingga keempat dan responden kedua hingga keempat tidak diikat untuk menerima mana-mana cadangan yang diserahkan. Pada tarikh tutup, sebanyak enam cadangan diterima oleh responden kedua hingga keempat yang menawarkan untuk membeli pelbagai aset responden pertama. Tawaran pemohon bertarikh 18 Mac 2002 ditawarkan untuk pemerolehan aset tersebut dengan satu harga
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 220 tawaran sebanyak RM6,003,000 (‘tawaran pemohon’). Selepas pertimbangan yang wajar, responden ketiga bagi pihak responden pertama menolak tawaran pemohon dan memulangkan kembali cek pemohon yang berjumlah RM120,060. Alasan penolakan tersebut adalah kerana tawaran pemohon adalah terlalu rendah untuk aset tersebut. Pemohon kemudiannya meminta responden kedua hingga keempat agar menimbangkan semula keputusan mereka untuk menolak tawarannya. Walau bagaimanapun, responden kedua hingga keempat tidak bersedia untuk berbuat demikian, meskipun pemohon telah berjumpa dengan mereka dan Danaharta beberapa kali. Berikutan penolakan tawaran pemohon, taklimat lanjut ditetapkan di mana pemohon dan orang lain dijemput untuk menyerahkan tawaran baru bagi pemerolehan aset tersebut. Namun demikian taklimat tersebut dibatalkan. Selepas itu, satu iklan diletakkan di dalam akhbar-akhbar oleh responden kedua hingga keempat dalam mana semua pihak yang berkepentingan dijemput untuk menyerahkan tawaran mereka bagi pemerolehan lombong timah responden pertama yang aktif dengan hak untuk memasuki, menduduki dan melombong pada dasar ‘as is where is’. Ia tidak dipertikaikan bahawa aset-aset ini adalah sama dengan aset tersebut. Sebagai tambahan kepada iklan tersebut, responden kedua hingga keempat telah menerusi surat mereka bertarikh 5 Julai 2002 melanjutkan jemputan mereka kepada pemohon supaya menyerahkan tawaran baru bagi memperolehi aset tersebut. Pada 18 Julai 2002, sebanyak tiga cadangan diterima oleh responden kedua hingga keempat termasuk satu cadangan dari Fook Wan Thye Credit & Leasing Sdn Bhd dengan harga tawaran sebanyak RM14,000,300 (‘tawaran Fook Wan Thye’). Pemohon tidak menyerahkan apa-apa tawaran. Dua tawaran yang lain dibuat untuk jumlah RM12,000,888.99 dan RM11,500,000 masing-masing. Responden kedua hingga keempat telah menerima tawaran Fook Wan Thye. Ini merupakan permohonan pemohon untuk: (a) satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan penolakan responden ke atas tawaran pemohon; (b) satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan penerimaan tawaran Fook Wan Thye oleh responden-responden; (c) satu perintah mandamus bahawa pajakan perlombongan dan aset responden pertama tersebut diawardkan kepada pemohon menurut terma MM pertama; atau (d) satu perintah mandamus bahawa responden-responden menimbangkan semula tawaran pemohon.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Permohonan ini di luar aturan kerana permohonan ex parte untuk kebenaran yang sama tidak difailkan dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan di bawah A 53 k 3(6) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Tawaran pemohon ditolak oleh responden kedua hingga keempat melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 30 April 2002. Oleh itu, permohonan di sini sepatutnya difailkan pada atau sebelum 9 Jun 2002 dan bukannya pada 9 Ogos 2002 seperti yang dilakukan dalam kes ini. Dalam ketiadaan apa-apa perintah mahkamah yang membenarkan perlanjutan masa, permohonan di sini adalah salah faham dan seharusnya ditolak sekaligus (lihat ms 107E–G); Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54 dan Ravindran v Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168 diikut.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 221 (2) Responden pertama (yang merupakan ‘affected person’ menurut s 21(a) Akta Danaharta), adalah satu entiti persendirian dan bukan pihak berkuasa awam kerana ia adalah sebuah syarikat berhad yang diperbadankan dengan wajar di bawah peruntukan Akta Syarikat 1965. Oleh kerana responden kedua hingga keempat dianggap bertindak sebagai ejen responden pertama menurut s 32 Akta Danaharta, mereka merupakan ejen-ejen entiti persendirian. Oleh itu, responden kedua hingga keempat bukanlah ‘public authority’ dalam lingkungan A 53 k 2(4) KMT (lihat ms 108D). (3) Walaupun responden kedua hingga keempat telah dilantik di bawah peruntukan Akta Danaharta dan dengan itu mempunyai kuasa yang dinyatakan dalam Jadual Kedua Akta Danaharta, keputusan mereka dalam menolak tawaran pemohon dan menerima tawaran Fook Wan Thye merupakan keputusan perniagaan yang dibuat untuk dan bagi pihak responden pertama sebagai satu entiti persendirian atau ‘perniagaan’. Keputusan tersebut dibuat di dalam bidang ‘private law’ menurut semangat ‘freedom to contract’ dan tidak memiliki apa-apa sifat undang-undang awam. Oleh yang demikian, keputusan mereka bukan dan tidak seharusnya tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman (lihat ms 108E–G). (4) Permohonan untuk satu perintah mandamus bagi mewajibkan responden kedua hingga keempat mengaward pajakan perlombongan dan aset tersebut kepada pemohon jelas merupakan satu percubaan oleh pemohon untuk menguatkuasa hak kontraktual atau ‘private right’ beliau terhadap responden-responden. Sekiranya pemohon berkeras bahawa wujudnya kontrak, maka tuntutannya seharusnya dibuat untuk ganti rugi atas kemungkiran kontrak. Permohonan pemohon untuk mandamus dan certiorari pada dasarnya adalah permohonan untuk pelaksanaan spesifik dan injunksi, yang mana remedinya terletak dalam undang-undang persendirian. Kajian semula kehakiman terpakai kepada perkara yang berhubung dengan undang-undang awam dan tidak harus tersedia untuk penguatkuasaan persendirian. Justeru itu, permohonan di sini adalah salah faham dan harus ditolak oleh mahkamah ini (lihat ms 110A–C). (5) Pemfailan permohonan ini melanggar s 39A Akta Danaharta kerana ia bertujuan ‘obstruct or hinder’ pelaksanaan hak dan kuasa yang dikurniakan ke atas responden kedua hingga keempat sebagai pentadbir khas. Seterusnya, mahkamah tidak dapat memberi perintah seperti yang dipohon kerana satu perintah mahkamah yang membatalkan keputusan responden kedua hingga keempat sudah tentu akan ‘restrain or affect action taken by … the special administrators’, yang dilarang secara nyata oleh s 72(b) Akta Danaharta. Juga, satu perintah mandamus untuk mewajibkan responden kedua hingga keempat supaya mengaward pajakan perlombongan dan aset tersebut kepada pemohon akan melanggar s 72(c) Akta Danaharta. Justeru itu, rayuan-rayuan yang dibuat dalam permohonan ini dihalang secara mutlak oleh s 72 Akta Danaharta (lihat ms 111I–112B, F); Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramly v Pengurusan Danaharta Sdn Bhd & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 720 diikut.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 222 (6) Permohonan ini dibuat secara mala fide dan merintangi pelaksanaan pelupusan aset yang masih dijalankan oleh responden kedua hingga keempat. Ini akan menewaskan hasrat Parlimen yang telah memerintahkan bahawa Danaharta dan pentadbir khas mesti dibenarkan merealisasikan aset peminjam-peminjam tanpa gangguan dan peruntukan berkanun nyata digubalkan untuk tujuan ini. Permohonan inilah yang merupakan jenis prosiding yang ingin dihalang oleh Akta Danaharta. Kejayaan Danaharta bergantung pada kepantasan. Danaharta dan pentadbir khas diberi kuasa luas oleh kerana Parlimen mengiktirafkan keperluan untuk kuasa khusus demi kepentingan masyarakat awam (lihat ms 112F–H).]
Notes For cases on certiorari, remedies, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1575–1577. For cases on time, certiorari, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 6323.
Cases referred to Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd & Anor [2002] 6 MLJ 186 (refd) Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54 (folld) R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin Plc & Anor (Norton Opax Plc and another intervening) [1987] 1 All ER 564 (refd) Ravindran v Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168 (folld) Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 720 (folld) Woon Kwok Cheng v Tan Sri Datuk Chang Min Tat & Ors [1993] MLJU 551 (refd) Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 174 (refd)
Legislation referred to Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998 ss 21(a), 30, 31, 32, 39A, 72 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 2(4), O 53 r 3(6)
M Puravalen (Jeev Anand and Mazlan Mohd Nor with him) (How Zul & Low) for the applicant. Dato’ Dr Cyrus Das (Yoong Sin Min and Lau Kee Sern with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the respondents.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 223
[2003] 2 MLJ 219 DEWITH B GAMBUT @ GOMBOT v LAWRENSIUS ALOYSIUS AS ACLR & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KOTA KINABALU) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO K24–209 OF 2002 IAN CHIN J 10 FEBRUARY 2003
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Land acquisition — Whether a chief minister could change the decision of a previous chief minister whose decision was not implemented
Land Law — Acquisition of land — Acquisition by state authority — Residents of Kg Pulau Penampang in occupation of state land due to encouragement of chief ministers — Whether residents of Kg Pulau Penampang could be evicted
The plaintiffs, the residents of Kampung Pulau Penampang, sued the assistant collector of land revenue and the Government of the State of Sabah for the following declarations: (1) that the eviction letter dated 29 April 2002 issued against them is null and void; (2) that the 30 acres site on which Kampung Pulau Penampang is situated is an approved kampung reserve and be gazetted; and (3) that the residents of Kampung Pulau Penampang have a legitimate expectation and are entitled to a peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the kampung reserve. There are currently 101 houses in the area and the plaintiffs have been in occupation of the land for a long period of time with the encouragement of certain quarters. There have been several chief ministers who had either expressly supported and directed that Kg Pulau Penampang be gazetted or who had not decided otherwise until the chief ministership of Datuk Osu Sukam. The question before the court was could a chief minister change the decision of a previous chief minister whose decision was not implemented since the legal process of gazetting and of obtaining the approval of His Excellency the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah was not done.
Held, declining to make the declarations prayed for but declaring the letter dated 29 April 2002 as not valid: (1) The residents there had been encouraged to be there by a former chief minister, who, after he left office, also canvassed for the water supply to be connected to this kampung. He also procured an agreement to have electricity supplied to them. There were also the acts of appointing the ‘ketua kampung’, a fact not
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 224 disputed though the official appointment letter was not produced (see p 224C–D). (2) It was conceded that the successive chief minister can change the policy of his predecessor, but such a power would be illusory if the change could not be carried out. It cannot be carried out if the ||Page 220>>residents are allowed to continue to stay there and therefore renders the power to change a policy illusory (see p 224E). (3) The solution lay in compensating whatever rights the residents had acquired as a result of the action of the previous chief ministers. Their rights are only to compensation but not to remain on the land because the Land Ordinance does not recognize such a right, though equity recognizes such (see p 224F–G). (4) The court declined to make the declarations prayed for but declared that the letter dated 29 April 2002 which sought to evict the residents of Kg Pulau Penampang from the land as being not valid because there was no offer to pay compensation to the residents for the expenses they have been put to in building their houses on their land (see p 224H). (5) The State Government brought about this affair by encouraging the residents to move to Kg Pulau Penampang and to build thereon. They cannot simply turn the residents out. They must be held to account for the past actions of the said chief ministers. The residents can only be evicted after they have been fairly compensated for the buildings that they have erected (see pp 224H–225A).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif-plaintif, penghuni-penghuni Kg Pulau Penampang, telah menyaman penolong pemungut hasil tanah dan Kerajaan Negeri Sabah untuk deklarasi-deklarasi berikut: (1) bahawa surat usiran bertarikh 29 April 2002 yang dikeluarkan terhadap mereka adalah batal dan tidak sah; (2) bahawa tanah seluas 30 ekar di mana Kg Pulau Penampang terletak adalah tanah rizab kampung yang diluluskan dan diwartakan; dan (3) penghuni-penghuni Kg Pulau Penampang mempunyai jangkaan sah dan berhak menikmati ketenteraman dan ketenangan rizab kampung. Kini terdapat 101 buah rumah di kawasan tersebut dan plaintif-plaintif telah lama menghuni tanah tersebut dengan galakan pihak-pihak tertentu. Terdapat beberapa orang ketua menteri yang sama ada telah nyata menyokong dan mengarah supaya Kg Pulau Penampang diwartakan atau belum memutuskan sebaliknya sehinggalah Datuk Osu Sukam menjadi ketua menteri. Soalan di hadapan mahkamah adalah sama ada seseorang ketua menteri dapat menukar keputusan ketua menteri terdahulu yang belum dikuatkuasakan memandangkan bahawa proses undang-undang mewartakan dan untuk memperolehi kelulusan Tuan Yang Terutama Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah belum dilakukan.
Diputuskan, enggan membuat deklarasi yang dipohon tetapi membuat deklarasi
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 225 bahawa surat bertarikh 29 April 2002 tidak sah: (1) Penghuni-penghuni telah digalakkan untuk menghuni tanah tersebut oleh seorang ketua menteri terdahulu, yang, setelah ||Page 221>>menamatkan perkhidmatan beliau, juga telah merayu supaya bekalan air dibekalkan kepada kampung ini. Beliau juga telah mendapatkan suatu perjanjian untuk membekalkan bekalan elektrik untuk mereka. Terdapat juga perlantikan ketua kampung, fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan walaupun surat rasmi perlantikan tersebut tidak dikemukakan (lihat ms 224C–D). (2) Ia telah diakukan bahawa ketua menteri berikutnya boleh menukar polisi ketua menteri sebelum beliau, tetapi kuasa sebegitu hanya illusi jika penukaran tidak dapat dikuatkuasakan. Ia tidak dapat dikuatkuasakan jika penghuni-penghuni dibenarkan menghuni di sana dan oleh itu ini membuatkan kuasa untuk menukar polisi suatu illusi (lihat ms 224E). (3) Penyelesaian adalah dengan memberi pampasan kepada hak-hak yang diperolehi penghuni-penghuni akibat tindakan-tindakan ketua-ketua menteri terdahulu. Mereka hanya berhak mendapatkan pampasan dan bukan untuk menghuni di atas tanah tersebut kerana Ordinan Tanah tidak mengiktirafkan hak sedemikian, walaupun ia diikitirafkan oleh ekuiti (lihat ms 224F–G). (4) Mahkamah enggan membuat deklarasi-deklarasi yang dipohon tetapi telah membuat deklarasi bahawa surat yang bertarikh 29 April 2002 yang berniat mengusir penghuni-penghuni Kg Pulau Penampang dari tanah tersebut adalah tidak sah kerana tiada tawaran untuk membayar pampasan kepada penghuni-penghuni untuk perbelanjaan untuk membina rumah-rumah mereka di atas tanah tersebut (lihat ms 224H). (5) Kerajaan Negeri memulakan perkara ini dengan menggalakkan penghuni-penghuni untuk pindah ke Kg Pulau Penampang dan untuk membina di atas tanah tersebut. Kerajaan Negeri tidak boleh mengusir penghuni-penghuni dari tanah tersebut. Kerajaan Negeri mesti bertanggungjawab untuk tindakan-tindakan ketua-ketua menteri. Penghuni-penghuni boleh diusir setelah diberi pampasan yang wajar untuk bangunan-bangunan yang dibina (lihat ms 224H–225A).
Notes For cases on exercise of administrative powers in land acquisition matters, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue), paras 43–44. For cases on acquisition of land by state authority, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), para 1528.
Cases referred to A-G of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346 (refd) Inwards & Ors v Baker [1965] 1 All ER 446 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 226 ||Page 222>> Preston v IRC [1985] 2 All ER 327 (refd)
Legislation referred to Land Ordinance s 28
Datuk Douglas Primus ( Lee & Thonh) for the plaintiffs. Mohd Bazain Idris (State Attorney-General) ( Julita Gumbil (State Counsel) with him) (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the defendants.
[2003] 2 MLJ 337 MARATHAEI D/O SANGULULLAI (SUING ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF THANGAYAH AUPULLEY) & ANOR v SYARIKAT JG CONTAINERS (M) SDN BHD & ANOR
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–554 OF 1998 GOPAL SRI RAM, PS GILL AND RAHMAH HUSSAIN JJCA 28 FEBRUARY 2003
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Procedural fairness — Industrial Court denied representation to one party and allowed representation to the other — Whether principles of procedural fairness were breached
Labor Law — Industrial Court — Procedure — Representation — Whether workman precluded from having representation in non-compliance hearing under s 56 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 — Industrial Relations Act 1967, s 27(1)(d)
Words and Phrases — ‘In any proceedings before the Court’ — Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 27(1)(d)
The appellant, now deceased, had been in the employment of the respondent. In July 1989, the Industrial Court had made an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent paid part of the award to the appellant but withheld the balance. The reason it gave was that the appellant had agreed to waive the balance. The appellant, being unhappy, moved the Industrial Court under s 56 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the Act’) by way of a complaint of non-compliance. At the hearing, the respondent objected to the appellant being represented and the president ruled that the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 227 appellant was required to represent himself (the respondent had the advantage of representation). The appellant’s legal representatives subsequently moved the High Court for certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court denying the appellant representation and for a consequential order of mandamus. The High Court dismissed the application and the present appeal was directed against that order. The central question in this appeal was whether s 27(1)(d) of the Act precludes a workman who had obtained an award in his favor from having representation in a non-compliance hearing under s 56 of the Act.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The opening words of s 27(1), ‘In any proceedings before the Court’, are very clear and wide and must be taken to mean what they say. ‘Any proceedings’ must mean ‘any proceedings under the Act’ and must include non-compliance proceedings under s 56 of the Act. Nothing in para (d) of s 27(1) whittles down or cuts back on the width of the opening words of the section. Paragraph (d) merely identifies proceedings under s 20(3) of the ||Page 338>>Act as one of those cases in which there may be representation with leave (see p 341F–H). (2) Sections 27 and 56 do not remove or curtail the common law right of a litigant to representation by counsel of his choice. The Act is silent on the issue. Parliamentary silence on a point of such importance enables the court to read such a right into the Act. The primary approach of a court to all written law is to act upon the presumption that Parliament does not intend an unfair or unjust result, that is to say, that it accords with the rule of law in art 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. Applying this presumption to the present case, there was no intention whatsoever on the part of Parliament to exclude the right of an individual workman to representation at the hearing of a non-compliance complaint (see pp 341I–342A, D, 344C–F). (3) The Industrial Court as an adjudicatory tribunal must accord procedural fairness to those who appear before it. In the present case, it permitted the respondent to be represented but insisted on the workman being unrepresented. The decision of the Industrial Court denying the appellant the right to representation went against the fundamental principles of procedural fairness (see p 344F–G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu, kini simati, telah bekerja untuk responden. Pada Julai 1989, Mahkamah Perusahaan telah membuat suatu award memihak perayu. Responden telah membayar sebahagian daripada award itu tetapi tidak mejelaskan bakinya. Alasan yang diberikan adalah bahawa perayu telah bersetuju melepaskan baki tersebut. Perayu tidak berpuas hati dan telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan di bawah s 56 Akta
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 228 Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (‘Akta tersebut’) atas aduan ketidakpatuhan. Pada perbicaraan, responden telah membantah kerana perayu telah diwakili dan presiden telah memutuskan bahawa perayu dikehendaki mewakili dirinya sendiri (responden mempunyai perwakilan). Wakil undang-undang perayu telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk certiorari untuk membatalkan award Mahkamah Perusahaan yang tidak membenarkan perayu mendapatkan perwakilan dan untuk perintah mandamus. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonan tersebut dan rayuan ini adalah terhadap perintah tersebut. Soalan utama di dalam kes ini adalah sama ada s 27(1)(d) Akta tersebut mengecualikan seorang pekerja yang telah memperoleh suatu award yang memihak kepadanya daripada mendapatkan perwakilan di dalam suatu pembicaraan ketidakpatuhan di bawah s 56 Akta tersebut.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) Pembuka kata s 27(1), ‘In any proceedings before the Court’, adalah sangat jelas dan luas dan mesti dibaca sebagai ||Page 339>> bermakna seperti apa yang ditulis. ‘Any proceedings’ mesti bermakna ‘any proceedings under the Act’ dan mesti termasuk prosiding-prosiding ketidakpatuhan di bawah s 56 Akta tersebut. Tiada apa-apa di dalam perenggan (d) s 27(1) yang mengurangkan keluasan pembuka kata seksyen tersebut. Perenggan (d) hanya mengenalpasti prosiding-prosiding di bawah s 20(3) Akta tersebut sebagai salah satu daripada kes-kes di mana mungkin terdapat perwakilan dengan kebenaran mahkamah (lihat ms 341F–H). (2) Seksyen-seksyen 27 dan 56 tidak menyingkirkan atau mengurangkan hak common law seorang litigan untuk diwakil oleh seorang peguam pilihannya. Akta tersebut tidak menyebutkan isu tersebut. Sikap berdiam diri Parlimen di atas hak sepenting ini membolehkan mahkamah membaca hak sedemikian ke dalam Akta tersebut. Pendekatan utama mahkamah kepada segala undang-undang bertulis adalah untuk bertindak di atas anggapan bahawa Parlimen tidak berniat untuk memperolehi suatu keputusan yang tidak adil, iaitu, ianya mestilah mengikut kepatuhan perundangan seperti di dalam perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Memakai anggapan tersebut di dalam kes ini, tidak terdapat sebarang niat bagi Parlimen untuk menyekat hak seorang pekerja dari diwakili di dalam perbicaraan aduan ketidakpatuhan (lihat ms 341I–342A, D, 344C–F). (3) Mahkamah Perusahaan sebagai suatu tribunal kehakiman mestilah memberi keadilan prosedur kepada orang yang menghadapnya. Di dalam kes ini, ia telah membenarkan responden diwakili tetapi telah menegaskan bahawa pekerja tersebut tidak boleh diwakili. Keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan yang tidak membenarkan perayu diwakili melanggar prinsip-prinsip asasi keadilan prosedur (lihat ms 344F–G).
Notes For cases on procedural fairness, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 229 606. For cases on procedure in the Industrial Court, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1302–1310.
Cases referred to ‘Boucraa, The’ [1994] 1 All ER 20 (refd) Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 143 ER 414 (refd) Doresamy v Public Services Commission [1971] 2 MLJ 127 (refd) Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 All ER 1278 (refd) McCawley v R [1920] AC 691 (refd) PP v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 (refd) Pesuruhjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public Trustee & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 30 (refd) ||Page 340>> Pierson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577 (refd) R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms and another [1999] 3 All ER 400 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 8(1) Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 20, (3), 27, (1), (d), 56 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
Originating Motion No R1–25–111 of 1993 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Sivarasa Rasiah ( M Mogannambal and Lateefa Koya with him) ( Daim & Gamany) for the appellants. S Ravichandran ( Gomez & Associates) for the respondents.
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[2003] 4 MLJ 332 TANG KWOR HAM & ORS v PENGURUSAN DANAHARTA NASIONAL BHD & ORS
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 230 HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO 13–2 OF 2002 LOW HOP BING J 25 JUNE 2003
Administrative Law — Remedies — Judicial review — Acceptance by special administrators of offer for purchase of assets — Special administrators appointed under Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 — Whether special administrators were public authorities within scope of O 53 r 2(4) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 — Whether decisions of special administrators had character of public law — Whether decisions of special administrators were subject to judicial review
Civil Procedure — Locus standi — Shareholder — Derivative action brought by majority shareholder — Procedure to be followed in bringing derivative action — Whether provisions for representative action to be followed — Rules of the High Court O 15 r 12
Companies and Corporations — Derivative action — Applicaton for preliminary issues to be tried — Whether majority shareholders could bring derivative action — Whether de facto control of litigation machinery in hands of another
Public Authorities — Remedies — Judicial review — Acceptance by special administrators of offer for purchase of assets — Special administrators appointed under Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 — Special administrators deemed the agents of first respondent pursuant to s 32 of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 — First respondent was a private entity — Whether special administrators were public authorities within scope of O 53 r 2(4) of the Rules of the High Court 1980
Words and phrases — ‘public authority’ — Source as opposed to character of power — Rules of the High Court 1980 — O 53 r 2(4) of the Rules of the High Court 1980
The applicants were three of the four directors of Tang Kwor Ham Realty Sdn Bhd, (‘the company’), and held a total of 60% of the shares therein. The first respondent (‘Danaharta’) was a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, while the second, third and fourth respondents (‘the special administrators’) were special administrators appointed by Danaharta under the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 (‘the Danaharta Act’). The fifth respondent was an independent adviser appointed by Danaharta under the Danaharta Act, while the company was a nominal sixth respondent. The company owned the land and property on which the Grand Hill Hotel was situated (‘the subject land’). The company also had a non-performing loan (‘NPL’) of about RM26m pursuant to credit facilities granted to it and this NPL was acquired by Danaharta under the Danaharta Act and a vesting certificate. A workout proposal prepared and submitted by the special administrators
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 231 to Danaharta (‘the workout proposal’), together with the report of the fifth ||Page 333>> respondent, was approved both by Danaharta and by a majority of the secured creditors of the company. The workout proposal recommended the sale of the subject land at RM7.6m. The applicants claimed that the correct value of the subject land was not less than RM15m. Thus the applicants, on behalf of themselves and also by way of representative and derivative action on behalf of the company, sought leave to apply for judicial review of the workout proposal. The applicants claimed that the workout proposal was infused with public elements and was thus amenable to judicial review. The respondents contended that a derivative action was maintainable only in respect of an enforcement of a private law remedy and not a public law remedy. The action had thus been wrongly or improperly initiated by the applicants, who were the majority shareholders of the company. The subject matter of the suit was not amenable to judicial review as the respondents did not come within the meaning of a ‘public authority’.
Held, dismissing the application for leave to seek judicial review: (1) While a representative action is regulated by O 15 r 12 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), a derivative action is not specifically provided for in the rules. Nevertheless, being, in a sense, a representative action, the same provisions may be invoked in appropriate cases. While a derivative action is intended to protect the rights of minority shareholders, the test of its applicability is in the element of de facto control over the litigation machinery of the company (see pp 340D–E, 341C–D); United Engineers (M) Bhd (suing on behalf of UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd) v Seow Boon Cheng & Anor [2001] 6 MLJ 511 followed. (2) No support could be garnered by the applicants for commencing a derivative action for the purpose of seeking a public law remedy by way of judicial review. The authorities relied on by the applicants were all decided in the context of corporate matters and the remedies sought therein were private law remedies, quite dissimilar from the instant case which focused on remedies in public law. The application could be dismissed on this ground alone (see p 342A–C); Ting Chong Maa v Chor Sek Choon [1989] 1 MLJ 477 and Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No 2) [1980] 2 All ER 841 distinguished. (3) The crucial question for determination was whether the workout proposal was a decision of a ‘public authority’. This question was to be determined by reference to the provisions of O 53 r 2(4) of the RHC, which touch on and concern the source rather than the character of the power. Danaharta, a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, was a private entity and not a public authority and that the special administrators are deemed in law as its agents. The workout proposal was not a decision of a ‘public authority’ but concerned commercial ||Page 334>>transactions made by private entities. The infusion of a public
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 232 element and the public interest in the Danaharta Act did not make the decision by Danaharta a decision of a public authority (see pp 343C–F); Wong Koon Seng v Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd & Ors [2002] 1 MLJ 98 followed; OSK & Partners Sdn v Tengku Noone Aziz & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 179 and Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 174 distinguished.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon-pemohon adalah tiga daripada empat orang pengarah syarikat Tang Kwor Ham Realty Sdn Bhd, (‘syarikat itu’), dan memegang sejumlah 60% saham dalam syarikat itu. Responden pertama (‘Danaharta’) adalah sebuah syarikat yang ditubuhkan di bawah Akta Syarikat 1965, dan responden kedua, ketiga dan keempat adalah pengurus khas (‘pengurus khas itu’) yang dilantik oleh Danaharta di bawah Akta Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad 1998 (‘Akta Danaharta’). Responden kelima adalah sebuah badan penasihat yang dilantik Danaharta di bawah Akta Danaharta, manakala syarikat itu adalah responden keenam yang nominal. Syarikat itu adalah tuan punya hartanah yang diduduki Grand Hill Hotel (‘hartanah itu’). Syarikat itu juga mempunyai pinjaman yang tidak aktif (‘PTA’) sejumlah RM26j di bawah kemudahan kredit kepadanya dan PTA ini telah di ambil alih oleh Danaharta di bawah Akta Danaharta dan suatu sijil letakhak. Suatu cadangan penyelesaian yang disediakan dan diserahkan oleh pengurus khas itu kepada Danaharta (‘cadangan penyelesaian itu’), bersama-sama dengan laporan responden kelima, diluluskan oleh Danaharta dan oleh sebahagian majoriti si piutang bercagar syarikat itu. Cadangan penyelesaian itu mencadangkan penjualan hartanah pada harga RM7.6j. Pemohon mendakwa hartanah itu bernilai tidak kurang daripada RM15j. Maka pemohon, bagi pihak diri mereka sendiri dan juga dalam tindakan perwakilan dan tindakan terbitan bagi pihak syarikat itu, memohon kebenaran untuk kajian semula kehakiman cadangan penyelesaian itu. Pemohon mendakwa cadangan penyelesaian itu mengandungi elemen awam maka tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman. Responden-responden behujah bahawa suatu tindakan terbitan hanya dapat dikekalkan bagi penguatkuasaan remedi undang-undang persendirian dan bukannya suatu remedi undang-undang awam. Tindakan itu telah dimulakan secara salah oleh pemohon yang menjadi pemilik majoriti saham syarikat itu. Kandungan tindakan ini tidak wajar bagi kajian semula kehakiman memandangkan responden bukannya suatu ‘badan awam’.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan bagi kebenaran untuk kajian semula kehakiman: ||Page 335>> (1) Walaupun suatu tindakan perwakilan dikawalselia oleh A 15 k 12 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), suatu tindakan terbitan tidak diperuntukkan dalam kaedah-kaedah tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, memandangkan yang suatu tindakan terbitan boleh dikatakan suatu tindakan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 233 perwakilan, maka peruntukan yang sama dapat digunakan dalam kes-kes yang sesuai. Walaupun suatu tindakan terbitan bertujuan melindungi hak pemilik saham minoriti, ujian applikasinya adalah dalam elemen kawalan de facto alat litigasi sesebuah syarikat (lihat ms 340D–E, 341C–D); United Engineers (M) Bhd (suing on behalf of UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd) v Seow Boon Cheng & Anor [2001] 6 MLJ 511 diikut. (2) Tiada sebarang autoriti dapat diberikan pemohon bagi menyokong pemulaan suatu tindakan terbitan bagi mendapatkan remedi undang-undang awam melalui kajian semula kehakiman. Pemohon bergantung kepada autoriti yang kesemuanya diputuskan dalam konteks hal perbadanan dan remedi yang dipohon adalah remedi undang-undang persendirian, tidak sama dengan kes ini yang menumpukan kepada remedi dalam undang-undang awam. Permohonan ini dapat ditolak di atas alasan ini sahaja (lihat ms 342A–C); Ting Chong Maa v Chor Sek Choon [1989] 1 MLJ 477 dan Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No 2) [1980] 2 All ER 841 dibezakan. (3) Persoalan yang genting yang perlu ditentukan adalah sama ada cadangan penyelesaian itu suatu keputusan ‘public authority’. Persoalan ini harus ditentukan dengan rujukan kepada peruntukan A 53 k 2(4) KMT, yang menyentuh kepada dan berkaitan sumber dan bukannya sifat sesuatu kuasa. Danaharta, sebuah syarikat berhad yang ditubuhkan di bawah Akta Syarikat 1965, adalah suatu entiti persendirian dan bukannya suatu badan awam dan pengurus khas itu dari undang-undang dianggap agen mereka. Cadangan penyelesaian itu bukannya suatu keputusan sesuatu ‘public authority’ tetapi berkaitan transaksi kommersial yang dibuat oleh entiti persendirian. Penyeduhan elemen umum dan kepentingan awam dalam Akta Danaharta tidak menjadikan keputusan Danaharta suatu keputusan badan awam (lihat ms 343C–F); Wong Koon Seng v Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd & Ors [2002] 1 MLJ 98 diikut; OSK & Partners Sdn v Tengku Noone Aziz & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 179 dan Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 174 dibeza.
Notes For cases on remedies in administrative law, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue), paras 135–501. For cases on locus standi of shareholder, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), paras 3967–3968. ||Page 336>> For cases on application for preliminary issues to be tried under a derivative action, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue), para 101. For cases on remedies under public authorities, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue), paras 1575–1584.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 234 Cases referred to Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & 5 Ors [1995] 3 MLJ 417, [1995] 4 CLJ 551 (refd) Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228 (refd) Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224 (refd) Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (refd) Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189 (refd) Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 174 (distd) OSK & Partners Sdn v Tengku Noone Aziz & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 179 (distd) Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1980] 2 All ER 841 (distd) Tan Guan Eng & Anor v Ng Kweng Hee & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Ting Chong Maa v Chor Sek Choon [1989] 1 MLJ 477 (distd) Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442 (refd) United Engineers (M) Bhd (suing on behalf of UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd) v Seow Boon Cheng & Anor [2001] 6 MLJ 511 (folld) Wong Koon Seng v Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd & Ors [2002] 1 MLJ 98 (folld)
Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 ss 4, 132C, (1), Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 ss 5(1), 9, 22(2), 24, 26(2), 30, 32, 33(4), 36(4), 37(6), 38(4), 39(3), 39A, 44(1), 66(2), second sch para 8 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 15 r 12, O 53 rr 2(4), 3(1), (2),
Lim Whei Chun (Lim Whei Chun) for the applicants. Dato Mary Lim Thiam Suan (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the Attorney-General. Jeyanthini Kannaperan (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the first respondent. ||Page 337>>
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[2003] 5 MLJ 128
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 235 YAM Tunku Dato’ Seri Nadzaruddin Ibni Tuanku Ja’afar v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO R1–25–108 OF 2001 RAMLY ALI J 25 SEPTEMBER 2002
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Whether the applicant had locus standi to make an application for leave to apply for certiorari — Whether the application was frivolous and vexatious — Whether the first respondent failed to give reasons for his decision — Whether the grounds in the applicant’s application were serious grounds — Whether the first respondent’s decision amounted to a breach of the applicant’s legitimate expectation — Whether the first respondent acted contrary to the principle of proportionality
This concerned an ex parte application (encl 1) made pursuant to O 53 r 3 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) for leave to apply for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the first respondent (Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur) dated 11 September 2001 which approved the development to the land adjacent to the applicant’s land by the second respondent (Selangor Properties Bhd) which involved the building of two blocks of 20 storey apartments with 107 units with the density of 285 persons per acre. The applicant raised the following grounds, inter alia, that the applicant had locus standi; that the application was not frivolous or vexatious; that the first respondent failed to give reasons for the decision; that the grounds for the application were serious; that there would be an increase in the density ratio in the area; that the decision amounted to a breach of the applicant’s legitimate expectation and that the first respondent had acted contrary to the principle of proportionality.
Held, granting the applicant’s application for leave as well as for stay of proceedings as prayed for in encl 1: (1) The law on the exercise of discretion in granting leave is trite. ‘The guiding principles ought to be that the applicants must show prima facie that the application is not frivolous or vexatious and that there is some substance in the ground supporting the application’ (Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228). In dealing with an application for leave to apply for an order of certiorari, the court shall not go further than the leave stage and shall not embark on substantial issues on merit. The application for leave is not frivolous or vexatious when ‘there are grounds to consider the allegations made by the applicant and which could only be properly heard and determined on the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 236 substantive application for an order of certiorari after leave has been granted’; Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228 (see p 135E–H); George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319 followed. (2) On the issue of ‘locus standi’, the court was satisfied that the applicant was not a mere ‘busybody’ as he would have been adversely affected by the decision of the first respondent to develop the land adjacent to his land as approved. The notice dated 22 August 2000 issued by the first respondent to the applicant requesting for his views on the development was sufficient evidence to show that the applicant had locus standi in respect of the application (see p 135H); George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319 followed. (3) Having gone through the list of grounds relied upon by the applicant (as contained in the applicant’s affidavit in support), the court was fully satisfied that the present application was not prima facie frivolous or vexatious. There was ample substance in the grounds supporting the application. There were grounds to consider the allegations made by the applicant and which could only be properly heard and determined on the substantive application for an order of certiorari after leave had been granted (see p 140A–B). (4) The applicant contended that the first respondent failed to give any or adequate reason for his decision to approve the development. The ‘only reason’ (if the court could call it a reason) given for the approval was that the units had been reduced from 181 to 107 units with the density of 285 persons per acre. The so-called reason given by the first respondent in approving the planning permission was highly insufficient and amounted to ‘no reason at all’. Without an adequate reason, the applicant had no way of knowing whether all his objections had been taken into consideration (see pp 140B–C, H–141A). (5) The issue relating to population density in the locality of the land to be developed was a material consideration to be considered by the the first respondent in dealing with an application for planning permission, as provided under s 22(4)(b) of the Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982. The increase of density from 30 persons per acre to 285 persons per acre was unreasonable. The first respondent should have given evidence via affidavit (in the hearing of the substantial application for certiorari) to explain the reasons for his decision. The increase of density of population in the area in question, if not rebutted would obviously be burdensome on the applicant and could be an infringement of the doctrine of proportionality. The doctrine of proportionality as raised by the applicant may have been applicable to the present application. That doctrine could only be heard, considered and determined during a full hearing of the substantive application for certiorari (see pp 141F–H, 142F); Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 and Niarchos (London) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1977) 35 P & CR 259 followed.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 237 (6) The issue of legitimate expectation was raised by the applicant in the present application. In light of the decision in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1, there are two forms of legitimate expectation, namely, the applicant was capable of having a legitimate expectation of a right to be heard before a decision is made (procedural legitimate expectation) and the applicant was also capable of having a legitimate expectation that the first respondent when making his decision, would not renege on his previous assurance or reverse his previous policy (substantive legitimate expectation). All these issues and novel points of law had to be considered and determined at the hearing of the substantial motion for certiorari (see pp 142F, 143A–B). (7) The applicant also prayed for a stay order as per para 2 of the application and such a stay order is permissible under O 53 r 3(5) of the RHC. If the court did not direct a stay of proceedings, it meant that the second respondent could proceed to develop the said land as approved by the first respondent. This would mean that the applicant’s substantive motion for certiorari would be rendered nugatory in the event he succeeded in his application (see p 143G–H).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini berkaitan permohonan ex parte (kandungan 1) yang dibuat menurut A 53 k 3 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk kebenaran untuk memohon perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan responden pertama (Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur) yang bertarikh 11 September 2001 yang meluluskan pembangunan tanah yang bersempadan dengan tanah pemohon oleh responden kedua (Selangor Properties Bhd) yang melibatkan pembinaan dua buah pangsapuri 20 tingkat dengan 107 buah unit dengan kepadatan 285 orang seekar. Pemohon telah membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut, antaranya, bahawa pemohon mempunyai locus standi; permohonan tersebut tidak remeh dan menyusahkan; responden pertama gagal memberi alasan-alasan untuk keputusannya; alasan-alasan permohonan adalah serius; kepadatan di kawasan tersebut akan meningkat; keputusan tersebut merupakan pelanggaran harapan sah pemohon dan responden pertama telah bertindak bercanggah dengan prinsip keseimbangan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan pemohon untuk kebenaran memohon dan membenarkan penangguhan prosiding seperti yang dipohon di dalam kandungan 1: (1) Undang-undang berkenaan perlaksanaan budibicara untuk membenarkan permohonan adalah jelas. ‘The guiding principles ought to be that the applicants must show prima facie that the application is not frivolous or vexatious and that there is some substance in the ground supporting the application’ (Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228). Semasa menimbang
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 238 permohonan untuk kebenaran untuk memohon certiorari, mahkamah tidak patut melebihi peringkat memohon kebenaran dan tidak patut menimbang isu-isu merit. Permohonan untuk kebenaran tidak remeh dan menyusahkan memandangkan ‘there are grounds to consider the allegations made by the applicant and which could only be properly heard and determined on the substantive application for an order of certiorari after leave has been granted’ (lihat ms 135E–H); Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228; George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319 diikut. (2) Pada isu ‘locus standi’, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa pemohon bukan merupakan ‘busybody’ kerana beliau akan terjejas oleh keputusan responden pertama untuk membangunkan tanah yang bersempadan dengan tanah pemohon seperti yang diluluskan (lihat ms 135H); George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 319 diikut. (3) Setelah meneliti alasan-alasan yang dipakai oleh pemohon (seperti yang terdapat di dalam afidavit sokongan pemohon), mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa permohonan ini tidak prima facie remeh dan menyusahkan. Terdapat alasan yang amat kukuh yang menyokong permohonan tersebut. Terdapat alasan untuk menimbang pengataan yang dibuat oleh pemohon yang hanya dapat didengar dan diputuskan di dalam permohonan substantif untuk satu perintah untuk certiorari setelah kebenaran telah diberi (lihat ms 140A–B). (4) Pemohon telah berhujah bahawa responden pertama gagal memberi sebarang alasan atau alasan yang mencukupi untuk keputusan beliau meluluskan pembangunan tersebut. Alasan yang diberi untuk kelulusan tersebut (sekira mahkamah berpendapat ia adalah alasan) adalah unit-unit tersebut telah dikurangkan daripada 181 kepada 107 unit dengan kepadatan 285 orang seekar. Alasan yang dikatakan tersebut yang diberi oleh responden pertama tidak mencukupi dan merupakan ‘no reason at all’. Tanpa alasan yang mencukupi, pemohon tidak dapat tahu sama ada kesemua bantahan beliau telah dipertimbangkan atau tidak (lihat ms 140B–C, H–141A). (5) Isu yang berkaitan kepadatan populasi di dalam kawasan tanah yang akan dibangunkan merupakan pertimbangan yang patut dipertimbangkan oleh responden pertama dalam memutuskan permohonan untuk keizinan perancangan, seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah s 22(4)(b) Akta (Perancangan) Wilayah Persekutuan 1982. Peningkatan kepadatan daripada 30 orang seekar kepada 285 orang seekar tidak munasabah. Responden pertama patut memberi keterangan melalui afidavit (di dalam pendengaran permohonan substantif untuk certiorari) untuk memberi alasan bagi keputusan beliau. Peningkatan kepadatan populasi kawasan tersebut, jika tidak dipatahkan akan membebankan pemohon dan mungkin melanggar doktrin keseimbangan. Doktrin keseimbangan, seperti yang dibangkitkan oleh pemohon, mungkin terpakai di dalam permohonan ini. Doktrin tersebut hanya dapat didengar, diberi pertimbangan dan diputuskan dalam pendengaran yang penuh
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 239 permohonan substantif untuk certiorari (lihat ms 141F–H, 142F); Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 dan Niarchos (London) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1977) 35 P & CR 259 diikut. (6) Isu harapan sah telah dibangkitkan oleh pemohon di dalam prosiding ini. Mengikut keputusan di dalam Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1, terdapat dua jenis harapan sah, iaitu, pemohon boleh mempunyai harapan sah hak untuk didengar sebelum suatu keputusan dibuat (harapan sah berprosedur) dan pemohon juga boleh mempunyai harapan sah bahawa responden pertama, apabila membuat keputusan, tidak akan memungkiri jaminan terdahulunya ataupun kebalikan polisi terdahulunya (harapan sah substantif). Kesemua isu-isu dan perkara undang-undang yang baru ini perlu diberi pertimbangan dan diputuskan di dalam pendengaran usul substantif untuk certiorari (lihat ms 142F, 143A–B). (7) Pemohon juga memohon satu perintah penangguhan seperti di dalam perenggan 2 permohonan tersebut dan perintah seperti itu dibenarkan di bawah A 53 k 3(5) KMT. Jikalau mahkamah tidak mengarah penangguhan prosiding, ini akan bermakna responden kedua boleh terus membangunkan tanah tersebut seperti yang diluluskan oleh responden pertama. Ini bermakna usul substantif pemohon untuk certiorari tidak berguna jikalau beliau berjaya di dalam permohonan beliau (lihat ms 143G–H).]
Notes For cases on the remedy of certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue), paras 135–306.
Cases referred to Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228 (folld) Datin Azizah bte Abdul Ghani v Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal [1992] 2 MLJ 393 (refd) Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin [1997] 2 MLJ 17 (refd) George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319 (folld) Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1982] AC 617 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (folld) Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v Attorney-General, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68 (refd) Niarchos (London) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1977) 35 P & CR
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 240 259 (folld) R v Devon CC; ex p Baker & Anor [1995] 1 All ER 73 (refd) R v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food; ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714 (refd) R v Secretary of State for Education and Science, ex p Avon County Council [1991] 1 All ER 282 (refd) Yian Sdn Bhd v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [1999] 3 MLJ 605 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982 s 22, (4)(b), (5) Planning Development Rules 1970 rr 5, (3)(a), (5), 6 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 rr 2(4), 3, (a), (2), (3), (5)
Jack Yow (G Rajasingam with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the applicant. Lee Yeok Choo (Thangaraj & Assoc) for the first respondent. Steven Thiruneelakandan (Shook Lin & Bok) for the second respondent. (2003) 5 MLJ 241 - Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato' Peh Teck Quee
[2003] 5 MLJ 241 MESSRS KUMAR JASPAL QUAH & AISHAH v DATO’ PEH TECK QUEE
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO D6–22–1405 OF 2000 MOHD HISHAMUDIN J 17 FEBRUARY 2003
Civil Procedure — Affidavits — Cross-examination of person not a deponent to affidavit — Application to cross-examine the defendant’s secretary — No affidavit affirmed by defendant’s secretary filed by either party — Whether court could order the attendance of defendant’s secretary for cross-examination — Rules of the High Court 1980 O38 r 2(3)
The plaintiff claimed against the defendant for unpaid legal fees and applied for summary judgment. The defendant in opposing the application, denied having agreed to pay the plaintiff any legal fees. The defendant averred that the first time he saw the plaintiff’s notes of professional charges was when he read the plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the summary judgment application. The plaintiff, in reply averred that the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 241 notes of professional charges were sent by hand to the defendant’s secretary — one Ms Teh Li Li (‘Ms Teh’). The defendant maintained he had never seen such notes. Neither plaintiff nor defendant filed any affidavit sworn or affirmed by the said Ms Teh. The plaintiff filed an application under O 38 r 2(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the ‘RHC’) to cross-examine Ms Teh, which application was dismissed by the senior assistant registrar. The plaintiff appealed.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) The application by the plaintiff to cross-examine Ms Teh was misconceived because by reason of the words in O 38 r 2(3) of the RHC, the court was empowered to order the attendance of Ms Teh for cross-examination only if she had sworn an affidavit. In the present case, Ms Teh had not deposed any affidavit. Therefore, the court had no power to order her attendance for cross-examination. In fact, since she had not deposed any affidavit, the question of cross-examination did not arise at all. A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. In the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross-examine (see pp 244G–245A); Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228, Leiserach v Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 and William Horace Sault v Noriah bte Osman [1950] 16 MLJ 207 distinguished. (2) None of the affidavits filed by the defendant in the present case exhibited any letter, note or memo written by Ms Teh. Despite the fact that several affidavits were filed by both sides, there was only a brief mention of Ms Teh and her role, and even then it was only in a single two-sentence paragraph (see p 247B–C). ||Page 242>>
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif telah menuntut terhadap defendan yuran guaman yang belum dibayar dan telah memohon penghakiman terus. Defendan dalam menentang permohonan tersebut, telah menafikan bersetuju untuk membayar plaintif apa-apa yuran guaman. Defendan menegaskan bahawa pertama kali beliau melihat nota-nota caj profesional plaintif adalah apabila beliau membaca afidavit sokongan plaintif yang menyokong permohonan penghakiman terus. Plaintif, dalam jawapannya telah menegaskan bahawa nota-nota caj profesional telah diserahkan melalui tangan kepada setiausaha defendan — Ms Teh Li Li (‘Ms Teh’). Defendan menegaskan beliau tidak pernah melihat nota-nota tersebut. Kedua-dua plaintif maupun defendan tidak memfailkan apa-apa afidavit yang telah diangkat sumpah atau disahkan oleh Ms Teh. Plaintif telah memfailkan satu permohonan di bawah A 38 k 2(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut’) untuk memeriksa balas Ms Teh, di mana permohonan tersebut telah ditolak oleh penolong kanan pendaftar. Plaintif telah
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 242 membuat rayuan.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Permohonan oleh plaintif untuk memeriksa balas Ms Teh disalahtafsirkan kerana oleh sebab perkataan-perkataan dalam A 38 k 2(3) KMT, mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk memerintahkan kehadiran Ms Teh untuk pemeriksaan balas hanya jika beliau telah mengangkat sumpah satu afidavit. Dalam kes semasa, Ms Teh tidak mendeposkan apa-apa afidavit. Oleh itu, mahkamah tiada kuasa untuk memerintahkan kehadiran beliau untuk pemeriksaan balas. Bahkan, memandangkan beliau tidak mendeposkan apa-apa afidavit, persoalan tentang pemeriksaan balas tidak perlu timbul langsung. Satu pihak kepada satu prosiding tidak boleh memohon untuk memeriksa balas seseorang jika seseorang itu tidak memberikan apa-apa keterangan sama ada dalam bentuk keterangan lisan atau dalam bentuk keterangan afidavit. Dengan ketiadaan keterangan terdahulu sedemikian, tiada bahan untuk membuat pemeriksaan balas (lihat ms 244G–245A); Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228, Leiserach v Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 dan William Horace Sault v Noriah bte Osman [1950] 16 MLJ 207 dibeza. (2) Tiada daripada afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan oleh defendan dalam kes semasa mengekshibitkan apa-apa surat, nota atau memo yang ditulis oleh Ms Teh. Walaupun hakikatnya beberapa afidavit telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua pihak, hanya sepintas disebutkan tentang Ms Teh dan peranan beliau, dan itupun hanya dalam perenggan dua ayat (lihat ms 247B–C).] ||Page 243>>
Notes For cases on cross-examination of person not a deponent to affidavit, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 338.
Cases referred to Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 (distd) Leiserach v Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 (distd) William Horace Sault v Noriah bte Osman [1950] MLJ 207 (distd)
Legislation referred to Supreme Court Rules [Eng] O LII r 4 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 14, O 38 r 2(3) Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 O 38 r 1
V Ravindran ( Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah) for the plaintiff.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 243 K Ramesh ( Chellam Wong) for the defendant.
[2003] 5 MLJ 248 OOI CHAI KAT lwn PENDAKWA RAYA
MAHKAMAH TINGGI (KUALA LUMPUR) — PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO 42–38 TAHUN 2001 AUGUSTINE PAUL H 24 JANUARI 2003
Acara Jenayah — Hukuman — Faktor-faktor peringanan — Kesalahan menggunakan dokumen yang palsu — Kad kredit — Pesalah pertama — Kepentingan awam — Sama ada hukuman sesuai
Keterangan — Anggapan memudaratkan — Kegagalan memanggil saksi — Sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan kesnya tanpa memanggil saksi-saksi lain — Sama ada anggapan memudaratkan dibangkitkan — Akta Keterangan 1950 s 114(g)
Keterangan — Keterangan terbaik — Tanggungjawab pihak pendakwaan untuk mengemukakan segala keterangan di hadapan mahkamah — Sama ada terdapat lompang di dalam keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan
Keterangan — Piawai pembuktian — Pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan unsur-unsur kesalahan melampaui keraguan munasabah — Sama ada hakim mahkamah sesyen menggunakan piawai yang salah
Atas maklumat yang diterima berkenaan penggunaan kad kredit palsu di Stesyen Minyak Shell, Henry Shell Servicing Sdn Bhd, Damansara Endah Kuala Lumpur, pegawai tangkapan dan dua orang pegawai bank telah membuat intipan di tempat tersebut. Lebih kurang jam 6.00 petang, sebuah kereta telah memasuki stesyen minyak tersebut dan terus pergi ke pam minyak nombor enam. Seorang lelaki Cina telah keluar dari kereta itu dan mulai mengisi minyak ke dalam kereta tersebut. Pegawai tangkapan dan pasukannya telah bergegas pergi ke tempat lelaki Cina itu. Lelaki Cina itu adalah tertuduh. Pegawai tangkapan telah memberitahu tertuduh bahawa beliau disyaki menggunakan kad kredit palsu. Daripada geledahan yang dilakukan terhadap badan tertuduh dijumpai dari kocek hadapan baju tertuduh satu kad kredit Visa Gold Standard Chartered Bank (P1). Kemudiannya, pegawai tangkapan merampas satu resit (P2) yang keluar daripada pam nombor enam apabila muncung pam tersebut dikembalikan ke tempat asalnya. Selepas siasatan, tertuduh telah dituduh di bawah s 471 Kanun Keseksaan. Tertuduh telah disabit bersalah oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 244 dan dihukum penjara selama dua tahun. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, tertuduh telah merayu ke mahkamah ini terhadap sabitan dan hukuman.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan bukti yang mencukupi berkenaan penggunaan P1. Kegagalan memanggil saksi lain yang bersama pegawai tangkapan tidak menjejaskan kes pendakwaan dan anggapan memudaratkan di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak berbangkit. Atas prinsip-prinsip di dalam kes Public ||Page 249>>Prosecutor v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705, kegagalan memanggil mereka sebagai saksi tidak menjejaskan kes pendakwaan; Public Prosecutor v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705 diikut (lihat ms 256G, 257H). (2) Kehadiran barang kes yang lain tidak menjejaskan kes pendakwaan kerana ianya bukan barang kes di mana kes pendakwaan diasaskan. Jika sekalipun terdapat barang-barang kes yang lain selain daripada yang dirampas oleh pegawai tangkapan di tempat kejadian, ianya tidak berkaitan perkara pokok tuduhan yang dihadapi tertuduh. Oleh itu ia tidak memprejudiskan tertuduh dan menyebabkan salah laksana keadilan (lihat ms 258G–H). (3) Perkataan ‘tanpa keraguan yang munasabah’ membawa erti dengan tiada keraguan munasabah sedangkan ‘melebihi atau melampaui keraguan munasabah’ hanya melewati atau melebihi had keraguan munasabah. Semestinya ‘tanpa keraguan yang munasabah’ adalah suatu piawai yang lebih tinggi daripada ‘melebihi atau melampaui keraguan yang munasabah’ dan bukannya lebih rendah. Jikapun hakim mahkamah sesyen telah menggunakan piawai yang lebih tinggi daripada keperluan undang-undang, maka tertuduh lebih beruntung kerana beban pembuktian yang ditanggung pihak pendakwaan bertambah berat. Dalam keadaan ini, tidak boleh dikatakan tertuduh telah diprejudiskan dan berlakunya salah laksana keadilan. Apapun alasan penghakiman, hakim mahkamah sesyen yang arif jelas menunjukkan beliau telah memakai piawai pembuktian yang betul ke atas kes pembelaan iaitu tertuduh telah gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan (lihat ms 259E–H). (4) Tidak dinafikan bahawa dewasa ini kesalahan melibatkan kad kredit palsu telah meningkat dengan mendadak sehingga dilaporkan di dalam akhbar-akhbar tempatan bahawa Malaysia menjadi pusat pengeluaran dan pengedaran kad kredit palsu. Mahkamah mengambil pengiktirafan kehakiman bahawa kesalahan semacam ini berleluasa pada masa ini dan mengancam keselamatan dan kesejahteraan ekonomi Malaysia. Jika tidak dibendung akan memudaratkan ekonomi serta nama baik negara. Oleh itu, kepentingan awam mengkehendaki kesalahan seumpama ini diberi hukuman bersifat pengajaran dan faktor peringanan tertuduh perlu ditimbangkan dengan latarbelakang kepentingan awam yang perlu dilunaskan ini. Setelah menimbangkan kepentingan awam dan kehendak tertuduh, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hukuman yang telah
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 245 dijatuhkan oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen dikekalkan. Hukuman penjara dua tahun itu adalah berpadanan dengan kes ini (lihat ms 261A–D). ||Page 250>>
English summary
On information received pertaining to the use of false credit card at the Shell Station, Henry Shell Servicing Sdn Bhd, Damansara Endah Kuala Lumpur, the arresting officer and two bank officers inspected the said place. At about 6pm, a car entered the petrol station and headed straight for petrol pump number six. A Chinese man got out of the car and started to fill the car with petrol. The arresting officer and his team headed towards the Chinese man. The Chinese man was the accused. The arresting officer informed the accused that he was suspected of using a false credit card. From a search made upon the accused’s person, a Visa Gold Standard Chartered Bank credit card (P1) was found in the accused’s front shirt pocket. Subsequently, the arresting officer confiscated a receipt (P2) that had come from pump six after the nozzle had been replaced. After the investigation, the accused was charged under s 471 of the Penal Code. The accused was convicted by the sessions court judge and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Aggrieved by this decision, the accused appealed to this court against the conviction and sentence.
Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The prosecution had presented sufficient evidence on the use of P1. The failure to call other witnesses that were with the arresting officer did not affect the prosecution’s case and the adverse inference under s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 did not arise. On the principles of Public Prosecutor v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705, the failure to call the other people as witnesses did not affect the prosecution’s case; Public Prosecutor v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705 (see pp 256G, 257H). (2) The presence of other case items did not affect the prosecution’s case because they were not case items on which the prosecution’s case was based on. Even if there were other items than those confiscated by the arresting officer at the scene of the crime, they were not connected to the subject matter faced by the accused. Thus, this did not prejudice the accused and occasion a miscarriage of justice (see p 258G–H). (3) The words ‘tanpa keraguan yang munasabah’ meant no reasonable doubt while ‘melebihi atau melampaui keraguan munasabah’ only exceeded reasonable doubt. Indeed ‘tanpa keraguan yang munasabah’ is a standard that is higher than ‘melebihi atau melampaui keraguan yang munasabah’ and not a lower standard. Even if the learned sessions court judge had used a higher standard than the one provided by the law, the accused benefited because the burden of proof on the prosecution was heavier. In this situation, it cannot be said that
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 246 the accused was prejudiced and there occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Whatever the grounds of the judge’s decision, the learned ||Page 251>>sessions court judge clearly showed that he had used the correct standard of proof on the defence’s case, ie that the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case (see p 259E–H). (4) It is not denied that lately, crimes involving false credit cards have increased so much that there have been reports in the local newspapers that Malaysia has become a centre for producing and distributing false credit cards. The court took judicial notice that such crimes were rampant nowadays and threatened the safety and prosperity of Malaysia’s economy. If not curbed, this would affect the economy and the country’s reputation. Thus, public interest demands that such crimes be given deterrent sentences and the mitigating factors have to be considered with the background of public interest that has to be executed. After considering the public interest and the accused’s needs, the court was of the opinion that the sentence passed by the sessions court judge should be upheld. The imprisonment sentence of two years was proper for the case (see p 261A–D).
Nota-nota Untuk kes-kes mengenai faktor-faktor peringanan, lihat 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), perenggan-perenggan 3273–3295. Untuk kes-kes mengenai kegagalan memanggil saksi, lihat 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), perenggan-perenggan 146–163. Untuk kes-kes mengenai tanggungjawab pihak pendakwaan untuk mengemukakan segala keterangan di hadapan mahkamah, lihat 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), perenggan 255. Untuk kes-kes mengenai pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan unsur-unsur kesalahan melampaui keraguan munasabah, lihat 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), perenggan 2073. Rayuan dari:Kes Tangkap No 2–62–76 tahun 2001 (Mahkamah Sesyen, Kuala Lumpur)
Kes-kes yang dirujuk Abdul Karim v Regina [1954] MLJ 86 (dirujuk) Chang Cheng Hoe & Ors, Re [1966] 2 MLJ 252 (dirujuk) Chua Keem Long v PP [1996] 1 SLR 510 (dirujuk) Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors v PP [1978] 1 MLJ 240 (dirujuk) Ishak Shaari v PP [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 223 (dirujuk) Jazuli bin Mohsin v PP [1990] 2 MLJ 190 (dirujuk) Khoo Chye Hin v PP [1961] MLJ 105 (dirujuk)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 247 Kuek Ah Lek v PP [1995] 3 SLR 252 (dirujuk) Lee Chow Meng v PP [1976] 1 MLJ 287 (dirujuk) Lim Young Sien v PP [1994] 2 SLR 257 (dirujuk) Namasiyiam & Ors v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 336 (dirujuk) PP v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705 (diikut) PP v Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 (dirujuk) ||Page 252>> PP v Kadir bin Awang [1989] 2 MLJ 33 (dirujuk) PP v Lee Tak Keong [1989] 1 MLJ 307 (dirujuk) PP v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 (dirujuk) PP v Yap Chong Fatt [1963] MLJ 136 (dirujuk) Philip Lau Chee Heng v PP [1988] 3 MLJ 107 (dirujuk) R v Kenneth John Ball 35 Cr App R 164 (dirujuk) Seneviratme v Rex [1936] 3 All ER 36 (dirujuk) Teoh Hoe Chye v PP; Yeap Teong Tean v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 220 (dirujuk) Zaidon bin Shariff v PP [1996] MLJU 159, [1996] 4 CLJ 441 (dirujuk)
Undang-undang yang dirujuk Akta Keterangan 1950 s 114(g) Kanun Keseksaan ss 471
[2003] 5 MLJ 262 M VASAGAM A/L MUTHUSAMY v KESATUAN PEKERJA-PEKERJA RESORTS WORLD, PAHANG & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–39 OF 1999 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 12 DECEMBER 2002
Administrative Law — Judicial remedies — Judicial review — Procedural impropriety — Allegation that first respondent’s decision not to renew applicant’s contract was procedurally wrong and unlawful — Whether first respondent’s decision-making process can be called into question in application for judicial review before High Court
Labor Law — Employment — Contract of employment — Contract for fixed term — Non-renewal of contract on expiry of fixed term — Whether contract was genuine fixed term
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 248 contract or a contract of employment — Whether first respondent had right not to renew the said contract upon expiry
Labor Law — Industrial Court — Award — Application to quash — Findings of fact made by Industrial Court based on credibility of witness — Whether High Court must accept findings of fact made by Industrial Court as true — Whether High Court should interfere
By a letter dated 15 April 1993, the first respondent offered the applicant employment as its executive secretary for a period of one year with effect from 15 April 1993. At the first respondent’s council meeting held on 8 January 1994, the first respondent resolved to extend the applicant’s contract of employment for a further one year period from 15 April 1994 to 15 April 1995. The applicant was not consulted on the extension and no letter was given by the first respondent to the applicant confirming the extension of his contract of employment. The applicant continued working for the first respondent after his contract of employment expired on 15 April 1994. By a letter dated 17 April 1995, the first respondent informed the applicant that it had decided to renew the applicant’s contract for a further year from 15 April 1995 to 15 April 1996. Then, by a letter dated 14 April 1996, the secretary of the first respondent informed the applicant that it was not renewing the applicant’s contract of employment upon its expiry on 15 April 1996. No reasons were given in the said letter as to why the applicant’s contract of employment would not be renewed. Being dissatisfied with his termination from service, the applicant lodged representations at the Industrial Relations Department to seek the remedy of reinstatement under s 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. As the applicant’s dispute with the first respondent could not be resolved, the Minister of Human Resources referred the applicant’s dispute with the first respondent to the Industrial Court (the second respondent) for adjudication. The applicant’s complaint at the Industrial Court was that the first respondent’s decision not to renew the applicant’s contract was ||Page 263>> procedurally wrong and that the said decision was made unlawfully. The Industrial Court reached the conclusion that even if there were such an irregularity, the ultimate issue to be determined was whether the contract was a genuine fixed term contract or otherwise. The Industrial Court held that there was a genuine fixed term contract and the first respondent had a right not to renew the said contract upon expiry. The Industrial Court accordingly dismissed the applicant’s action. This was the applicant’s application for an order of certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) The court was of the opinion that it should be slow to interfere with the findings of the Industrial Court made on the facts of the case based on the credibility of witnesses. In the instant case, the applicant’s contention that the Industrial Court had erred in law when it doubted the testimony of the applicant’s witness had no place in an application for judicial review. It is trite
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 249 law that finding of facts based on credibility of witnesses cannot be challenged. The applicant therefore should not challenge the Industrial Court’s findings of facts, which were based on credibility of witnesses (see p 272B–D). (2) The applicant had failed to show how the Industrial Court committed an error of law in its decision making process on the issue of whether there was a genuine fixed term contract. The applicant’s contention was that due to the nature of his duties as an executive secretary, his contract was not a genuine fixed term contract. This was a clear example of the applicant challenging a finding of fact to quash the Industrial Court’s award in the guise of an application for judicial review (see p 272E–G); Han Chiang School, Penang Han Chiang Associated Chinese Schools Association v National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, W Malaysia (1988) 1 ILR 611 distinguished. (3) The applicant’s complaint was that the decision of the first respondent not to renew the applicant’s contract was procedurally wrong and that the said decision was made unlawfully. Procedural impropriety can only be a ground for judicial review where the procedural error was committed by the Industrial Court in making the award. Therefore, the first respondent’s decision making process could not be called into question in an application for judicial review before a High Court. It was only the Industrial Court’s decision which can be challenged in such an application (see p 273A–D). (4) The first respondent was under no obligation to state any reasons for the non-renewal of a fixed term contract as it was clear to both parties that the fixed term contract was to expire by a specified date. The fact that a finding was reached that there was a genuine fixed term contract between the first respondent and the applicant, ||Page 264>> the issue of whether or not there were good reasons not to renew the contract was irrelevant (see pp 273H–274B). (5) The burden was on the applicant to prove that the president of the first respondent had ulterior motive or harbored ill-will against him, which resulted in the non-renewal of his contract. Therefore, it was not for the first respondent to produce its president as a witness at the Industrial Court. The burden on the first respondent was limited to only establishing before the Industrial Court that the contract in question was a genuine fixed term contract and that the expiry of the same was not a termination of the applicant’s services without just cause or excuse (see p 274D–G). (6) The Industrial Court had correctly addressed the issue in this case by first determining whether the contract in question was a genuine fixed term contract or otherwise. Only if the Industrial Court made a finding that it was not a genuine fixed term contract but a contract of employment, would the Industrial Court then be required to ask whether there was a dismissal or not and if so, whether it was with just cause or excuse. In the instant case, since a finding was reached that the contract concerned was a genuine fixed term contract, the question of there being a dismissal or not did not arise. Once it was established
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 250 that there was a genuine fixed term contract, the worker’s tenure with the relevant company ended upon the expiry of the fixed term (see pp 274H–275A).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 15 April 1993, responden pertama telah menawarkan pemohon pekerjaan sebagai setiausaha eksekutifnya untuk tempoh satu tahun bermula daripada 15 April 1993. Dalam mesyuarat jawatankuasa responden pertama yang diadakan pada 8 Januari 1994, responden pertama membuat resolusi untuk melanjutkan kontrak pekerjaan pemohon untuk tempoh satu tahun lagi daripada 15 April 1994 hingga 15 April 1995. Pemohon tidak dirujuk tentang lanjutan tersebut dan tiada surat telah diberikan kepada responden pertama kepada pemohon yang mengesahkan lanjutan kontrak pekerjaan beliau. Pemohon terus bekerja untuk responden pertama selepas kontrak pekerjaan beliau tamat pada 15 April 1994. Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 17 April 1995, responden pertama memaklumkan kepada pemohon bahawa ia telah membuat keputusan untuk memperbaharui kontrak pekerjaan pemohon apabila ia tamat pada 15 April 1996. Tiada apa-apa sebab diberikan dalam surat tersebut tentang kenapa kontrak pekerjaan pemohon tidak diperbaharui. Berasa tidak puas hati dengan penamatan beliau daripada perkhidmatan, pemohon telah membuat bantahan kepada Jabatan Perhubungan Perusahaan untuk memohon remedi bagi pengembalian kedudukan jawatan di bawah s 20 Akta Perhubungan ||Page 265>> Perusahaan 1967. Oleh kerana pertikaian pemohon dengan responden pertama tidak boleh diselesaikan, Menteri Sumber Manusia telah merujuk pertikaian pemohon dengan responden pertama kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan (responden kedua) untuk diadili. Aduan pemohon di Mahkamah Perusahaan adalah bahawa keputusan responden pertama untuk tidak memperbaharui kontrak pemohon secara prosedurnya adalah salah dan bahawa keputusan tersebut telah dibuat menyalahi undang-undang. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah tiba kepada satu kesimpulan di mana jikapun terdapat satu luar aturan, persoalan utama untuk ditentukan adalah sama ada kontrak tersebut merupakan satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli dan responden pertama mempunyai hak untuk tidak memperbaharui kontrak tersebut selepas ia tamat. Mahkamah Perusahaan sewajarnya telah menolak tindakan pemohon. Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk satu perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan award Mahkamah Perusahaan.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa ia sepatutnya tidak cepat untuk campur tangan dalam penemuan Mahkamah Perusahaan yang dibuat dari fakta-fakta kes berdasarkan kebolehpercayaan saksi-saksi. Dalam kes semasa, hujah pemohon bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang bila mana ia meragui testimoni seorang saksi pemohon adalah tidak bertempat di
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 251 dalam suatu permohonan kajian semula kehakiman. Ia adalah undang-undang tetap bahawa penemuan fakta berdasarkan kebolehpercayaan saksi-saksi tidak boleh dicabar. Pemohon oleh itu tidak sepatutnya mencabar penemuan fakta Mahkamah Perusahaan, yang berdasarkan kebolehpercayaan saksi-saksi (lihat ms 272B–D). (2) Pemohon telah gagal menunjukkan bagaimana Mahkamah Perusahaan melakukan kesilapan undang-undang dalam membuat keputusan berhubung persoalan sama ada terdapat satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli. Hujah pemohon adalah oleh kerana sifat tugas beliau adalah sebagai seorang setiausaha eksekutif, kontrak pekerjaan beliau bukanlah satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli. Ini adalah satu contoh jelas di mana pemohon mencabar satu penemuan fakta untuk membatalkan award Mahkamah Perusahaan dalam bentuk satu permohonan untuk kajian semula kehakiman (lihat ms 272E–G); Han Chiang School, Penang Han Chiang Associated Chinese Schools Association v National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, W Malaysia (1988) 1 ILR 611 dibeza. (3) Aduan pemohon adalah bahawa keputusan responden pertama untuk tidak memperbaharui kontrak pemohon adalah mengikut prosedur yang salah dan bahawa keputusan tersebut telah dibuat ||Page 266>> menyalahi undang-undang. Kesalahan tidak mengikut prosedur hanya boleh menjadi satu alasan untuk kajian semula kehakiman jika mana kesilapan prosedur tersebut telah dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan dalam membuat award. Oleh itu, proses membuat keputusan responden pertama tidak boleh dipersoalkan dalam satu permohonan untuk kajian semula kehakiman di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi. Hanya keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan yang boleh dicabar dalam permohonan sedemikian (lihat ms 273A–D). (4) Responden pertama tidak mempunyai sebarang obligasi untuk menyatakan sebab-sebab kontrak bertempoh tetap tidak diperbaharui kerana ia adalah jelas kepada kedua-dua pihak bahawa kontrak bertempoh tetap tersebut akan tamat pada tarikh yang ditetapkan. Hakikat bahawa satu penemuan telah dibuat di mana terdapat satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli antara responden pertama dan pemohon, isu sama ada atau tidak terdapat sebab-sebab kukuh untuk tidak memperbaharui kontrak tersebut adalah tidak relevan (lihat ms 273H–274B). (5) Beban terletak atas pemohon untuk membuktikan bahawa presiden responden pertama mempunyai motif lain atau mempunyai niat jahat terhadap beliau, yang menyebabkan kontrak beliau tidak diperbaharui. Oleh itu, ia bukan untuk responden pertama untuk mengemukakan presidennya sebagai saksi di Mahkamah Perusahaan. Beban yang terletak atas responden pertama terbatas hanya untuk membuktikan di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan bahawa kontrak yang dipersoalkan adalah satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli dan penamatan kontrak tersebut bukanlah satu penamatan perkhidmatan pemohon tanpa sebab atau alasan yang adil (lihat ms 274D–G).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 252 (6) Mahkamah Perusahaan telah dengan betul mengutarakan persoalan dalam kes ini dengan pertamanya menentukan sama ada kontrak yang dipersoalkan adalah satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli atau sebaliknya. Hanya jika Mahkamah Perusahaan membuat satu penemuan bahawa ia bukan satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli tetapi satu kontrak pekerjaan, barulah Mahkamah Perusahaan akan dikehendaki untuk bertanya sama ada terdapat satu pemecatan atau tidak dan jika ada, sama ada pemecatan tersebut dilakukan dengan sebab atau alasan yang adil. Di dalam kes semasa, satu penemuan telah dibuat bahawa kontrak berkaitan adalah satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli, persoalan wujudnya pemecatan atau tidak, tidak timbul. Setelah dibuktikan bahawa terdapat satu kontrak bertempoh tetap yang asli, pemegangan jawatan pekerja dengan syarikat yang relevan tamat dengan luputnya tempoh yang ditetapkan (lihat ms 274H–275A).] ||Page 267>>
Notes For cases on award of Industrial Court, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001Reissue) paras 1178–1214. For cases on contract of employment, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 765–781. For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 76–83.
Cases referred to Han Chiang School, Penang Han Chiang Associated Chinese Schools Association v National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, W Malaysia (1988) 1 ILR 611 (distd) Hotel Equatorial (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 363 (refd) Malayan Banking Bhd v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 204 (refd) Minister of Home Affairs v Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara [1990] 1 MLJ 351 (refd) Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 600 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 143 (refd) Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753 (refd)
Legislation referred to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 253 Evidence Act 1950 ss 101(1), 103 Industrial Relations Act 1967 ss 20, 33B(1)
P Jayasingam ( Zul Rafique & Partners) for the applicant. A Ramadass ( Ramadass & Assoc) for the respondent.
[2003] 6 MLJ 49 AUN HUAT & BROTHERS SDN BHD & ORS v SIME DARBY BHD & ANOR
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO D5–24–22 OF 1999 KANG HWEE GEE J 2 JUNE 2003
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Discretion — Defendants obtained approval to acquire 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Minister of Finance approved acquisition by defendants of additional 5.01% of issued capital of financial institution from plaintiffs — Approval withdrawn after defendants completed acquisition of 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Whether Minister of Finance was functus officio by the time approval was withdrawn
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Right to be heard — Defendants obtained approval to acquire 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Minister of Finance approved acquisition by defendants of additional 5.01% of issued capital of financial institution from plaintiffs — Approval subsequently withdrawn — Whether withdrawal of approval was valid exercise of Minister of Finance’s power — Whether Minister of Finance had conferred upon plaintiffs a legitimate expectation that defendants would be obliged to undertake mandatory general offer of plaintiffs’ shares — Whether plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation was sufficiently well entrenched as to require a right to be heard before a decision was made by the Minister of Finance — Whether reversal of Minister of Finance’s approval without considering plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation constituted procedural impropriety
Banking — Licensed bank — Sale of shares in a licensed bank — Defendants obtained approval to acquire 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Minister of Finance approved acquisition by defendants of additional 5.01% of issued capital of financial institution from plaintiffs — Bank Negara subsequently withdrew consent of Minister of Finance — Whether function of Bank Negara under Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 was purely to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 254 transmit defendants’ application to Minister of Finance with its recommendation and not to take upon itself the task of making decision — Whether Bank Negara acted outside limit of its jurisdiction — Whether Bank Negara acted ultra vires
Companies and Corporations — Take-over and merger — Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers — Defendants obtained approval to acquire 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Securities Commission approved defendants’ application to make restricted mandatory general offer for remaining 5.01% of plaintiffs’ shareholding in bank — Defendants failed to make mandatory general offer after having acquired 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Defendants publicly censured by Securities Commission — Whether there was breach of statutory duty on the part of defendants in failing to make mandatory general offer — Whether plaintiffs had cause of action for breach of statutory duty against defendants for failing to make mandatory general offer notwithstanding public censure
Companies and Corporations — Take-over and merger — Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers — Defendants obtained approval to acquire 60.35% of issued ||Page 50>> capital of bank — Securities Commission approved defendants’ application to make restricted mandatory general offer for remaining 5.01% of plaintiffs’ shareholding in bank — Minister of Finance subsequently prohibited defendants from acquiring 5.01% of plaintiffs’ shareholding in bank — Defendants failed to make mandatory general offer after having acquired 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Whether defendants protected from having to perform their statutory obligation to plaintiffs under Securities Commission Act 1993 by virtue of Minister of Finance’s prohibition
Public Authority — Bank Negara — Statutory regulations on share ownership of financial institutions — Defendants obtained approval to acquire 60.35% of issued capital of bank — Minister of Finance approved acquisition by defendants of additional 5.01% of issued capital of financial institution from plaintiffs — Bank Negara subsequently withdrew consent of Minister of Finance — Whether function of Bank Negara under Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 was purely to transmit defendants’ application to Minister of Finance with its recommendation and not to take upon itself the task of making decision — Whether Bank Negara acted outside limit of its jurisdiction — Whether Bank Negara acted ultra vires
The plaintiffs were individual minority shareholders of United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd (‘UMBC’), who collectively held 16,713,554 shares or 5.01% of the issued and paid up voting shares of UMBC. The controlling shareholders of UMBC at the material time were Dato’ Keramat Holdings Bhd and its wholly owned subsidiary, UMBC Holdings Sdn Bhd (collectively ‘the UMBC Group’). The UMBC Group held 60.35% of the issued and paid up voting shares of UMBC. The other substantial shareholders were Petroleum Nasional Bhd (‘Petronas’) and Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (‘Pernas’). The first defendant, Sime Darby Bhd, and its wholly owned subsidiary, the second defendant or Sime Darby Financial Services Holdings Sdn Bhd (collectively ‘Sime Darby Group’) were desirous of acquiring the entire issued and paid up voting
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 255 shares of UMBC from the UMBC Group. As UMBC was a commercial bank, the prior written approval of the Minister of Finance (‘MOF’) had to be obtained: (a) under s 45 of the Banking and Financial Institution Act 1989 (‘the BAFIA’) to enter into an agreement or arrangement to acquire 5% or more of its shares; (b) under s 46 of the BAFIA for approval to hold more than 20% of its shares; (c) under s 49 of the BAFIA for approval to enter into an agreement or arrangement which would result in the change in its control, the sale, disposal or transfer of its business, its amalgamation, merger or reconstruction; and (d) under s 118 of the BAFIA for any exemption from the application of any of the provisions of the BAFIA. On 10 November 1995, the defendants obtained the approval of the MOF allowing: (a) the first defendant to acquire and hold 60.35% of the issued capital of UMBC; and (b) the first defendant, the second defendant, SD Holdings Bhd (the second defendant’s immediate holding company) and Pernas, pursuant to s 118 of the BAFIAof the BAFIA, to hold an interest in UMBC shares over and above the limits set down under s 46 of the BAFIA. Following the approval, on 11 November 1995 the first defendant announced that the Sime Darby Group had entered into a ||Page 51>> conditional share sale agreement with the UMBC Group to acquire the latter’s entire shareholding of 60.35% in UMBC for a cash consideration of RM1.3 billion or approximately RM6.46 per share. However, on 18 January 1996, Bank Negara Malaysia (‘BNM’) informed the defendants by letter that the MOF would not allow them to acquire any additional shares of UMBC over and above the permitted 60.35% approved earlier. In consequence thereof, on 20 January 1996 the defendants through their adviser Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd (‘Amanah’) applied to the Securities Commission (‘SC’) to waive the requirement of having to make the mandatory general offer (‘MGO’) which they were liable to make under r 34.1 of the 1987 Code on Take-overs and Mergers (‘the Code’) for the remaining shares in UMBC should they proceed to complete the acquisition. The SC by a letter dated 16 February 1996 rejected the defendants’ application but intimated that it would be prepared to consider a restricted MGO on the shareholdings of a number of private non-institutional investors who were essentially the plaintiffs. Accordingly, on the 28 March 1996, the defendants (through Amanah) made another application to the SC on the term as suggested. The defendants received a favourable reply from the SC on 19 April 1996 approving their application to make a restricted MGO for 16,713,554 ordinary shares of UMBC, representing the 5.01% of the plaintiffs’ shareholding at the price of RM6.46 per share. Three days after receiving the approval from the SC, the defendants proceeded to acquire the 60.35% issued shares from the UMBC Group. The acquisition triggered r 34.1(a) of the Code, which obliged the defendants to make the MGO to acquire the remaining shares of the other shareholders that they did not own at the acquisition price of RM6.46 per share. But after having completed the acquisition of 60.35% of UMBC’s issued shares from the UMBC Group, the defendants did not act to commence the MGO. On 1 August 1996, they wrote, through their adviser Amanah, to the SC to seek guidance as to how they should implement the MGO. On 3 October 1997, that the defendants proposed to the SC a scheme to undertake the MGO in the following manner: (a) the general offer was to be
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 256 implemented by placing the entire share capital in UMBC on a new company called Prolayer Holdings Bhd; and (b) the minority shareholders of UMBC could then at their option choose whether to take up the new shares in Prolayer or to accept a cash offer of the UMBC shares that they hold (‘the Prolayer scheme’). On 3 October 1997, the defendants, through Amanah, wrote to BNM, outlining the terms of the Prolayer scheme. In addition, they sought the approval of the MOF under ss 45 and 49 of the BAFIA to, inter alia, allow the first defendant and its subsidiary Consolidated Plantations Bhd through the second defendant to acquire the remaining 39.65% of the issued and paid up capital of UMBC not held by them (including the 5.01% of the issued and paid up capital of UMBC held by the plaintiffs). The proposal was approved by the MOF through BNM on 17 October 1997 (‘BNM’s ||Page 52>> third letter’). The SC gave its approval on 20 October 1997. Therefore, the stage was set for the defendants to discharge its statutory duty to make the MGO of the plaintiffs’ 5.01% shareholding. Due to the sudden economic downturn of 1997, the defendants found themselves unable to perform what they had set to do. On 26 December 1997, Amanah wrote to the SC again, this time to defer the proposed offer and to request the SC to consider a revised offer. On 10 March 1998, the first defendant announced that it had disposed its entire 60.35% shareholding in UMBC (which by now was known as Sime Bank Bhd) to Rashid Hussein Bhd (‘RHB’) without implementing the MGO on the terms which had been approved by both SC and MOF. On 31 March 1998, the SC wrote to the defendants giving them 14 days to explain what course they had proposed to take on the MGO which the SC had restricted to apply to the plaintiffs’ 5.01% shareholding. Upon receiving the letter from the SC, the defendants by a letter dated 3 April 1998, sought the view of BNM on the implication of SC’s letter. In response, BNM informed the defendants by a letter dated 9 April 1998 (‘BNM’s fourth letter’), that it had withdrawn its approval (given vide BNM’s third letter) in respect of the defendants’ acquisition of the balance of 39.65% shareholding in UMBC (which included the plaintiffs’ 5.01% interest) through the Prolayer scheme. In BNM’s fourth letter, BNM also stated that the restriction it originally imposed vide its letter of 18 January 1996 prohibiting the defendants from acquiring any more shares of UMBC other than the 60.35% that had been approved was still in force. The decision of BNM was conveyed to the SC by a letter dated 13 April 1998 from Amanah. By a letter dated 12 May 1998, the SC wrote to the first defendant reiterating the first defendant’s obligation to carry out the MGO. The first defendant was asked to show cause within 14 days as to why action should not be taken against it under s 33(10) of the Securities Commission Act 1993 (‘the SCA’) in respect of its failure to carry out the MGO. The first defendant replied by a letter dated 22 May 1998 explaining that the MGO had not been implemented due to, inter alia, the economic downturn. On 17 July 1998, the SC issued a public reprimand under s 33(10) of the SCA wherein the SC also made it clear that the censure notwithstanding, the defendants were still obliged to make the MGO. It also expressed its view that under s 33(9) of the SCA, an aggrieved party would be entitled to commence legal proceeding against the defendants. The sale of the entire UMBC shares of the defendants to RHB was completed in June 1999 with the consequence that the latter
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 257 came to own more than 90% of the entire shareholding of UMBC. The plaintiffs’ minority shareholdings were accordingly compulsorily acquired by RHB at a much reduced price of RM1.70 per share. As the defendants had failed to make the MGO, the plaintiffs filed these originating summons to seek, inter alia: (1) a declaration that the first defendant (acting in concert with or through the second defendant) and the second defendant had a legal duty to extend an offer to the ||Page 53>> plaintiffs to acquire the number of ordinary shares of RM1 each in Sime Bank Bhd (formerly known as UMBC) owned by the plaintiffs (‘the Mandatory Offer’) at the offer price of not less than RM6.46 for each ordinary share, such Mandatory Offer to be made in accordance with the SCA and the Malaysian Code on Take-Over and Mergers 1987/1998; and (2) an order that the first defendant (acting in concert with or through the second defendant) and the second defendant do forthwith extend the Mandatory Offer to the plaintiffs in accordance with the SCA and the Malaysian Code on Take-Over and Mergers 1987/1998. The defendants’ defence was that the plaintiffs did not have a private cause of action against them under the SCA but that even if the plaintiffs had such a private cause of action, MOF’s refusal to approve the acquisition of additional shares (vide BNM’s fourth letter) had lawfully excused the defendants from their obligation to carry out the MGO. BNM’s fourth letter, it was submitted, had made it clear that the defendants were prohibited from acquiring any more shares of UMBC other than the 60.35% that had been approved earlier by BNM’s letter of 18 January 1996.
Held, allowing prayer (1): (1) The issue of whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action for breach of statutory duty against the defendants for failing to make the MGO, had been settled by the Supreme Court in Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan when the Supreme Court held that the acquirer was still bound to make the MGO notwithstanding the public censure. In handing down the decision, the Supreme Court in Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan had assumed that the acquirer had a statutory duty to make the MGO and the breach thereof entitled the aggrieved minority shareholders to enforce as a right. The public censure provision served the purpose of conveying the disapproval of the SC of the errant acquirer and to put its integrity on notice to the investing community at large. It also served the purpose of notifying persons aggrieved providing them with a starting point to consider the option whether to commence civil action to enforce their right (see pp 73B–D, H–I, 80D–E); Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan [1994] 1 MLJ 657 followed. (2) Neither the SCA nor the Code provided in any definite statutory form any civil remedy against the errant acquirer who refused to undertake the MGO. Although s 33(9) of the SCA per se would not be sufficient to warrant a construction that the SCA imposed a liability to civil act upon the plaintiffs, it supplied a clear index of the intent of the legislature to expose any errant party who failed to observe the code to both criminal and civil proceedings.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 258 Therefore, to succeed, the plaintiffs must establish not only that the relevant provisions of the SCA and the Code were enacted to protect a class of individuals to which they belonged but also that it was intended by the legislature that the breach thereof would ||Page 54>>confer upon them a private right of action. Having examined the SCA as a whole, it was clear that the SCA was enacted for the ultimate protection of investors in general and specifically under Part IV thereof, the protection of the existing shareholders of the company affected by a take-over or merger. Section 33(9) of the SCA had specifically exempted the errant acquirer from criminal prosecution under the SCA, and as such, it would appear all the more likely that the legislature had not intended to preclude the right of shareholders aggrieved by the failure to make the MGO to seek legal redress under the SCA. Therefore, there was a breach of statutory duty on the part of the defendants in failing to make the MGO and the breach gave rise to a private cause of action. The position may now be different with the deliberate amendment in 1999 to the SCA by providing a new provision in s 33B(4) to make any non-compliance of the Code a criminal offence, which by contrast would now provide a strong indicator that the legislature had now had a change of mind to disallow a private cause of action (see pp 75C–G, 79C, F); Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor (No 2) [1982] AC 173 followed. (3) Further, for all the risks that the minority shareholders had to bear by the intrusion of the acquirer upon the status quo of their shareholdings, there must surely accrue to them some corresponding right to make a choice of whether to stay or to leave and the failure of the acquirer to make a MGO could not be construed as anything less than an actionable wrong under the SCA which had infringed the right of the remaining shareholders to make that choice (see pp 79I–80A). (4) BNM’s fourth letter purporting to withdraw consent, not being a decision of the MOF, had violated a cardinal principle of public law that the exercise of a statutory power may only be exercised in the way the legislature had intended. The power to approve any application under s 45 or 46 or to grant any exemption or to revoke any approval under s 118 of the BAFIA was vested exclusively with the MOF. The function of BNM under BAFIA was purely to transmit the application of the defendants to the MOF with its recommendation and not to take upon itself the task of making the decision. The delineation of functions between BNM and the MOF can be clearly seen in ss 45(2), 49(5) and 118 of the BAFIA. Where a statutory body acted outside the limit of its jurisdiction such as in the instant case, it was acting ultra vires and regardless of motive, its act was unlawful. Where an agency had been assigned a specific and independent role to play in the decision making process other than making the decision itself, it was not competent for that agency to step into the shoes of its master to make a decision in its own right and capacity, as BNM had done in this case. The role of BNM was specifically to make a recommendation to the MOF. The decision itself must be
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 259 ||Page 55>> made by the MOF and not by BNM. By the words ‘Bank Negara Malaysia telah memutuskan’ (or ‘Bank Negara Malaysia has decided’) appearing in para 3 of BNM’s fourth letter, it was clear that BNM was acting in its own capacity (as opposed to acting on behalf of the MOF) to withdraw the approval granted earlier by MOF on 17 October 1997. It was in this instance purporting to exercise a power which it clearly did not have and was therefore acting ultra vires (see pp 85F–H, 86A, C, G–I); Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 distinguished. (5) Having offended the principle of substantive ultra vires, BNM’s decision purporting to withdraw the consent of MOF was an exercise in futility. It followed that BNM’s fourth letter cannot be relied upon by the defendants to argue that MOF had prohibited them from undertaking the MGO and consequently, to excuse them from making the MGO as mandated by the SC (see p 88A–B). (6) Even assuming that BNM’s fourth letter was to be construed as a letter of the MOF to revoke or cancel the previous approval which the MOF had made, that order was still an invalid exercise of the MOF’s power. Firstly, by having approved (vide BNM’s letter of 17 October 1997) the defendants’ application to undertake the MGO of the balance of the shares still not owned by the defendants under the Prolayer scheme, including the plaintiffs’ 5.01% shareholding, the MOF had conferred upon the plaintiffs a legitimate expectation that the defendants would be obliged under the Code to undertake the MGO of their shareholdings if and when the defendants acquired the shares of the UMBC Group. The plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation in the instant case was sufficiently well entrenched so as to amount to almost a right and was substantial enough to require a right to be heard before a decision was made on the MGO. Hence, the reversal of the MOF’s approval (assuming that he had made it) without considering the plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation, constituted a failure to consider a relevant consideration, and thereby subjecting the decision to judicial review on ground of ‘procedural impropriety’ or ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. Secondly, when BNM’s fourth letter was issued, the MOF was already functus officio. This was because the defendants had completed the acquisition and their obligation to undertake the MGO had already been triggered under the SCA. Although it may be argued that the MOF remained competent to revoke the approval with respect to the MGO given on 17 October 1997 so long as the defendants failed to carry out the Prolayer scheme, that argument may hold only if the approval of the MGO was made conditional upon the defendants implementing the Prolayer scheme, which was not the case here. A decision made while the decision maker was functus officio was liable to be reviewed for substantive ultra ||Page 56>> vires (see pp 88B–D, 90C–F, 91I, 92B–D); Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1; R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 and Civil Service Unions & Ors
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 260 v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 followed. (7) Generally, a challenge on an administrative decision was normally made by a public law action for judicial review where the decision itself may be quashed by the court. But an administrative act may be impeached in the course of a collateral proceeding, where its impropriety was quite obvious as in the instant case. The invalidity of BNM’s action had the effect of leaving the approval of the MOF contained in BNM’s third letter intact and subsisting. Therefore, the defendants’ obligation under the Prolayer scheme remained unperformed and outstanding (see p 92F, H–I). (8) Even assuming that MOF’s prohibition was perfectly valid, having elected to acquire the 60.35% shareholdings of the UMBC shares from the UMBC group, the defendants would not be protected from having to perform their statutory obligation to the plaintiffs under the SCA. The prohibition imposed by the MOF on the defendants from acquiring any additional shares of UMBC, even if valid, had in fact left them with a Hobson’s choice, that is, either to forestall the acquisition altogether or to seek exemption from the SC from having to undertake the MGO. Having failed to obtain the exemption from the SC, the defendants were at liberty not to proceed to acquire the shares. But once the defendants acquired them they assumed an obligation to undertake the MGO and a failure to do so constitute an actionable wrong exposing them to civil liability under the SCA. BAFIA only served to prohibit the defendants from undertaking the MGO but it did not provide them with a statutory defence from any civil liability under the SCA arising from their failure to undertake the MGO should they proceed with the acquisition (see p 93B–E). (9) Accordingly, there shall be an order in term of prayer (1) and an order that the defendants pay to the plaintiffs damages to be assessed and costs (see p 94B).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif-plaintif merupakan individu pemegang-pemegang saham minoriti United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd (‘UMBC’), yang secara kolektifnya memegang 16,713,554 saham-saham atau 5.01% dari saham-saham mengundi UMBC yang berbayar dan diterbitkan. Pemegang-pemegang saham menguasai UMBC pada waktu yang material itu adalah Dato’ Keramat Holdings Bhd dan subsidiarinya ||Page 57>> yang dimiliki sepenuhnya, iaitu, UMBC Holdings Sdn Bhd (secara kolektifnya dikenali sebagai ‘Kumpulan UMBC’ tersebut ). Kumpulan UMBC tersebut memegang 60.35% dari saham-saham mengundi UMBC yang berbayar dan diterbitkan . Pemegang-pemegang saham substansial yang lain adalah Petroleum Nasional Bhd (‘Petronas’) dan Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (‘Pernas’). Defendan pertama, Sime Darby Bhd, dan subsidiarinya yang dimiliki sepenuhnya, defendan kedua atau Sime Darby Financial Services Holdings Sdn Bhd (secara kolektifnya dikenali sebagai ‘Kumpulan Sime Darby’) ingin untuk memperoleh keseluruhan saham-saham mengundi UMBC
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 261 yang berbayar dan diterbitkan daripada Kumpulan UMBC. Oleh sebab UMBC merupakan sebuah bank komersial, kelulusan bertulis terdahulu Menteri Kewangan (‘MOF’) haruslah diperoleh: (a) di bawah s 45 Akta Institusi Kewangan dan Perbankan 1989 (‘BAFIA’) untuk memasuki satu perjanjian atau pengaturan untuk memperoleh 5% atau lebih dari saham-sahamnya; (b) di bawah s 46 BAFIA untuk kelulusan bagi memegang lebih daripada 20% dari saham-sahamnya; (c) di bawah s 49 BAFIA untuk kelulusan bagi memasuki satu perjanjian atau pengaturan yang akan menyebabkan penukaran dalam pengawalannya, penjualan, pelupusan atau pemindahan perniagaannya, pencantumannya, penyatuan atau penyusunan semulanya; dan (d) di bawah s 118 BAFIA untuk sebarang pengecualian daripada pemakaian akan mana-mana dari peruntukan-peruntukan BAFIA. Pada 10 November 1995, defendan-defendan telah memperoleh kelulusan MOF yang membenarkan: (a) defendan pertama untuk memperoleh dan memegang 60.35% daripada modal diterbit UMBC; dan (b) defendan pertama, defendan kedua, SD Holdings Bhd (syarikat induk terdekat defendan kedua) dan Pernas, selaras dengan s 118 BAFIA, hendaklah memegang satu kepentingan dalam saham-saham UMBC di atas dan melebihi had-has yang ditetapkan di bawah s 46 BAFIA. Berikutan dengan kelulusan itu, pada 11 November 1995 defendan pertama telah mengumumkan bahawa Kumpulan Sime Darby telah memasuki satu perjanjian penjualan saham bersyarat dengan Kumpulan UMBC untuk memperoleh keseluruhan pemegangan saham pihak terkemudian itu sebanyak 60.35% di dalam UMBC bagi satu balasan wang tunai sebanyak RM1.3 bilion atau lebih kurang RM6.46 sesaham. Walau bagaimana pun, pada 18 Januari 1996, Bank Negara Malaysia (‘BNM’) telah memaklumkan defendan-defendan melalui surat bahawa MOF tidak akan membenarkan mereka memperoleh sebarang saham-saham tambahan UMBC di atas dan melebihi 60.35% yang telah diluluskan pada awalnya. Akibatnya, pada 20 Januari 1996 defendan-defendan melalui penasihat mereka Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd (‘Amanah’) telah memohon kepada Suruhanjaya Sekuriti (‘SC’) mengenepikan syarat perlu membuat tawaran umum mandatori (‘MGO’) yang mana mereka bertanggungan untuk membuatnya di bawah k 34.1 Kanun Tahun 1987 mengenai Pengambilan Alih dan Pencantuman (‘Kanun tersebut’) untuk ||Page 58>> saham-saham selebihnya dalam UMBC sekiranya mereka meneruskan untuk menyempurnakan perolehan tersebut. SC melalui surat bertarikh 16 Februari 1996 telah menolak permohonan defendan-defendan tetapi telah memberitahu bahawa ia bersedia untuk mempertimbangkan satu MGO terhad ke atas pemegangan-pemegangan saham sebilangan pelabur-pelabur bukan institusi persendirian yang mana secara pentingnya merupakan plaintif-plaintif. Sehubungan itu, pada 28 Mac 1996, defendan-defendan (melalui Amanah) membuat satu lagi permohonan kepada SC atas syarat seperti mana yang disarankan. Defendan-defendan telah menerima jawapan daripada SC pada 19 April 1996 yang meluluskan permohonan mereka untuk membuat satu MGO terhad bagi 16,713,554 saham-saham biasa UMBC, yang mewakili 5.01% dari pemegangan saham plaintif-plaintif pada harga sebanyak RM6.46 sesaham. Tiga haris selepas menerima kelulusan tersebut daripada SC, defendan-defendan telah meneruskan bagi memperoleh 60.35% saham-saham diterbitkan daripada Kumpulan UMBC. Perolehan telah mencetuskan k
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 262 34.1(a) Kanun tersebut, yang mana mewajibkan defendan-defendan untuk membuat MGO tersebut demi untuk memperoleh saham-saham yang selebihnya akan pemegang-pemegang saham yang lain yang mereka tidak miliki pada harga perolehan sebanyak RM6.46 sesaham. Tetapi selepas menyempurnakan perolehan 60.35% saham-saham diterbitkan UMBC daripada Kumpulan UMBC, defendan-defendan tidak bertindak untuk memulakan MGO tersebut. Pada 1 Ogos 1996, mereka telah menulis, melalui penasihat mereka Amanah, kepada SC untuk mendapatkan bimbingan berhubung dengan bagaimana mereka harus melaksanakan MGO tersebut. Pada 3 Oktober 1997, defendan-defendan telah mencadangkan kepada SC satu skim untuk menjalankan MGO tersebut menurut cara yang berikut: (a) tawaran umum tersebut haruslah dilaksanakan dengan meletakkan keseluruhan modal saham dalam UMBC pada sebuah syarikat baru yang dikenali sebagai Prolayer Holdings Bhd; dan (b) pemegang-pemegang saham minoriti UMBC boleh selepas itu atas opsyen mereka sendiri memilih untuk menerima saham-saham baru tersebut dalam Prolayer atau untuk menerima tawaran wang tunai bagi saham-saham UMBC yang mereka pegang (‘skim Prolayer tersebut’) Pada 3 Oktober 1997, defendan-defendan, melalui Amanah, telah menulis kepada BNM, memberi ringkasan terma-terma skim Prolayer tersebut. Tambahan pula, mereka memohon kelulusan bagi MOF tersebut di bawah ss 45 dan 49 BAFIA untuk, antara lainnya, membenarkan Defendan pertama dan subsidiarinya Consolidated Plantations Bhd untuk memperoleh melalui defendan kedua baki 39.65% akan modal berbayar dan dikeluarkan UMBC yang tidak dipegang oleh mereka (termasuk 5.01% dari modal berbayar dan dikeluarkan UMBC yang dipegang oleh plaintif-plaintif). Cadangan tersebut telah diluluskan oleh MOF melalui BNM pada 17 Oktober 1997 (‘surat ketiga BNM’). SC telah memberikan kelulusannya pada ||Page 59>> 20 Oktober 1997. Oleh itu, keadaan tersebut untuk defendan-defendan melaksanakan kewajipan berkanunnya untuk membuat MGO akan 5.01% pemegangan saham-saham plaintif- plaintif. Disebabkan oleh kemelesetan ekonomi yang mengejut pada tahun 1997, defendan-defendan mendapati mereka tidak dapat melaksanakan apa yang mereka telah bercadang untuk lakukan. Pada 26 Disember 1997, Amanah telah menulis kepada SC sekali lagi, kali ini untuk menundakan tawaran yang dicadangkan dan untuk meminta SC mempertimbangkan satu tawaran semakan. Pada 10 Mac 1998, defendan pertama mengumumkan bahawa ia telah melupuskan keseluruhan 60.35% pemegangan sahamnya di dalam UMBC (yang mana kini dikenali sebagai Sime Bank Bhd) kepada Rashid Hussein Bhd (‘RHB’) tanpa melaksanakan MGO tersebut atas terma-terma yang telah diluluskan oleh kedua-duanya SC dan MOF. Pada 31 Mac 1998, SC telah menulis kepada defendan-defendan dengan memberikan mereka tempoh selama 14 hari untuk menerangkan jalan apakah yang mereka cadangkan untuk diambil ke atas MGO tersebut yang mana telah dihadkan oleh SC untuk dipakai kepada 5.01% pemegangan saham plaintif-plaintif. Setelah menerima surat tersebut daripada SC, defendan-defendan melalui surat bertarikh 3 April 1998, meminta pandangan BNM mengenai implikasi surat SC. Bagi menjawabnya, BNM telah memaklumkan defendan-defendan melalui surat bertarikh 9 April 1998 (‘surat keempat BNM’), bahawa ia telah menar9ik balik kelulusannya (yang telah diberikan melalui surat ketiga BNM) berhubung dengan perolehan oleh defendan-defendan akan baki pemegangan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 263 saham sebanyak 39.65% dalam UMBC (yang mana termasuk kepentingan 5.01% plaintif-plaintif) melalui skim Prolayer tersebut. Dalam surat keempat BNM, BNM juga menyatakan bahawa sekatan yang dikenakan pada asalnya melalui suratnya bertarikh 18 Januari 1996 melarang defendan-defendan daripada memperoleh sebarang saham UMBC lagi yang selain dari 60.35% yang telah diluluskan masih berkuat kuasa. Keputusan BNM telah disampaikan kepada SC melalui surat bertarikh 13 April 1998 daripada Amanah. Melalui surat bertarikh 12 Mei 1998, SC telah menulis kepada defendan pertama dengan menegaskan kewajipan defendan pertama untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut. Defendan pertama telah diminta untuk menunjukkan sebab dalam tempoh 14 hari berhubung dengan mengapa tindakan tidak seharusnya diambil terhadapnya di bawah s 33(10) Akta Suruhanjaya Sekuriti 1993 (‘SCA’) berhubung dengan kegagalannya untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut. Defendan pertama telah menjawab melalui surat bertarikh 22 Mei 1998 yang menerangkan bahawa MGO tersebut telah tidak dilaksanakan kerana, antara lainnya, kemelesetan ekonomi. Pada 17 Julai 1998, SC telah mengeluarkan satu teguran umum di bawah s 33(10) SCA tersebut di mana SC juga memperjelaskan bahawa meskipun adanya teguran tersebut, defendan-defendan masih wajib untuk membuat MGO tersebut. Ia juga menyatakan pandangannya di bawah s 33(9) SCA ||Page 60>> tersebut, sesuatu pihak yang terkilan berhak untuk memulakan prosiding undang-undang terhadap defendan-defendan. Penjualan keseluruhan saham-saham defendan-defendan dalam UMBC kepada RHB telah siap sempurna dalam bulan Jun 1999 yang mengakibatkan pihak terkemudian itu memiliki lebih daripada 90% dari keseluruhan pemegangan saham UMBC. Pemegangan saham minoriti plaintif-plaintif adalah sehubungan itu diperoleh secara wajib oleh RHB pada harga yang amat dikurangkan sebanyak RM1.70 sesaham. Oleh sebab defendan-defendan telah gagal untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut, plaintif-plaintif telah memfailkan saman pemula ini untuk mendapatkan, antara lainnya: (1) satu pengisytiharan bahawa defendan pertama (yang bertindak bersama-sama dengan atau melalui defendan ke-2) dan defendan kedua mempunyai kewajipan di sisi undang-undang untuk melanjutkan satu tawaran kepada plaintif-plaintif untuk memperoleh bilangan saham-saham biasa sebanyak RM1 setiap satu dalam Sime Bank Bhd (yang dahulunya dikenali sebagai UMBC) yang dimiliki oleh plaintif-plaintif (‘Tawaran Mandatori tersebut’) pada harga tawaran yang tidak kurang daripada RM6.46 bagi setiap saham biasa, Tawaran Mandatori sedemikian hendaklah dibuat menurut SCA dan Kod Malaysia mengenai Pengambilan-Alih dan Pencantuman 1987/1998; dan (2) satu perintah bahawa defendan pertama (yang bertindak bersama-sama dengan atau melalui defendan kedua) dan defendan kedua hendaklah segera melanjutkan Tawaran Mandatori tersebut kepada plaintif-plaintif menurut SCA dan Kod Malaysia mengenai Pengalihan-Alih dan Pencantuman 1987/1998. Pembelaan defendan-defendan adalah bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan persendirian terhadap mereka di bawah SCA tersebut tetapi bahawa walaupun jika plaintif-plaintif mempunyai kausa tindakan persendirian yang sedemikian, Keengganan MOF untuk meluluskan perolehan saham-saham tambahan tersebut (melalui surat keempat BNM) telah secara sah mengecualikan defendan-defendan dari kewajipan mereka untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut . Surat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 264 BNM keempat, dihujahkan, telah memperjelaskan bahawa defendan-defendan dilarang daripada memperoleh sebarang saham-saham UMBC lagi selain daripada 60.35% yang telah diluluskan pada awalnya oleh surat BNM bertarikh 18 Januari 1996.
Diputuskan, membenarkan poermohonan (1): (1) Isu sama ada plaintif-plaintif mempunyai satu kausa tindakan kerana keingkaran kewajipan berkanun terhadap defendan-defendan kerana gagal untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut, had telah diselesaikan oleh Mahkamah Agong dalam Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan di mana Mahkamah Agong telah memutuskan bahawa pihak peroleh masih terikat untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut meskipun adanya kritikan awam tersebut. Dalam menyampaikan keputusan tersebut, Mahkamah Agong dalam Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan telah beranggapan bahawa ||Page 61>> pihak peroleh tersebut mempunyai kewajipan berkanun untuk melaksanakan MGO dan keingkarannya memberi hak kepada pemegang-pemegang saham minoriti yang terkilan berkuat kuasa sebagai satu hak. Peruntukan celaan umum bermaksud untuk menyampaikan keputusan tidak berkenan SC akan peroleh yang tersesat dan memaklumkan akan keutuhannya kepada masyarakat melabur pada amnya. Ia juga bertujuan untuk memberitahu orang yang terkilan dengan memberikan mereka titik permulaan untuk mempertimbangkan opsyen tersebut sama ada untuk memulakan tindakan sivil untuk menguatkuasakan hak mereka (lihat ms 73B–D, H–I, 80D–E); Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan [1994] 1 MLJ 657 diikut. (2) SCA tersebut mahupun Kod tersebut tidak memperuntukkan dalam sebarang bentuk statutori yang mutlak sebarang remedi sivil terhadap peroleh tersesat yang enggan melaksanakan MGO tersebut. Meskipun s 33(9) SCA per se tidak memadai untuk mewajarkan satu pembentukan supaya SCA mengenakan suatu tanggungan kepada tindakan sivil ke atas plaintif-plaintif tersebut, ia memberikan suatu indeks yang jelas akan niat perundangan tersebut untuk mendedahkan sebarang pihak tersesat yang gagal untuk mematuhi kod tersebut kepada prosiding jenayah dan juga sivil. Oleh itu, demi untuk mencapai kejayaan, plaintif-plaintif tersebut mestilah menetapkan bukan sahaja bahawa peruntukan-peruntukan relevan SCA dan Kod tersebut telah digubal untuk melindungi satu kelas individu kepada yang siapa ia ditujukan tetapi juga adalah diniatkan oleh perundangan tersebut bahawa keingkaran terhadapnya akan memberikan mereka hak tindakan persendirian. Setelah memeriksa SCA tersebut secara keseluruhan, adalah jelas bahawa SCA telah digubal untuk perlindungan mutlak pelabur-pelabur secara amnya dan secara khususnya di bawah Bahagian IV nya, perlindungan akan pemegang-pemegang saham sedia ada akan syarikat yang terjejas oleh pengambilan-alih atau pencantuman. Seksyen 33(9) SCA telah secara khususnya mengecualikan peroleh tersesat daripada pendakwaan jenayah di bawah SCA tersebut, dan oleh yang demikian, adalah lebih berkemungkinan ianya kelihatan bahawa perundangan tersebut
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 265 tidak berniat untuk menghalang hak pemegang-pemegang saham terkilan dengan kegagalan untuk MGO tersebut untuk mendapatkan tebus rugi undang-undang di bawah SCA tersebut. Oleh itu, terdapat keingkaran kewajipan berkanun di pihak defendan-defendan kerana gagal untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut dan keingkaran tersebut membangkitkan kausa tindakan persendirian. Kedudukannya kini mungkin berbeza dengan pindaan yang disengajakan dalam tahun 1999 kepada SCA dengan memperuntukkan satu peruntukan baru dalam s 33B(4) yang menjadikan sebarang ketidakpatuhan Kod tersebut suatu kesalahan jenayah, yang mana secara bertentangan akan kini memberikan satu tanda yang kukuh ||Page 62>> bahawa badan perundangan tersebut kini mempunyai perubahan pemikiran untuk tidak membenarkan kausa tindakan persendirian (lihat ms 75C–G, 79C–F); Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor (No 2) [1982] AC 173 diikut. (3) Selanjutnya, bagi kesemua risiko yang harus ditanggung oleh pemegang saham minoriti dengan kemasukan oleh peroleh atas status quo pemegangan saham mereka, tentu sekali akan terakru kepada mereka sebilangan hak yang selaris untuk membuat pilihan sama ada untuk kekal atau beredar dan kegagalan peroleh untuk melaksanakan suatu MGO tidak boleh ditafsirkan sebagai apa sekali pun yang kurang daripada suatu kesilapan salah yang boleh diambil tindakan di bawah SCA tersebut yang telah melanggari hak pemegang-pemegang saham yang selebihnya untuk membuat pilihan itu (lihat ms 79I–80A). (4) Surat keempat BNM yang bermaksud untuk menarik balik kebenaran, yang bukannya suatu keputusan MOF, telah melanggari prinsip kardinal undang-undang awam bahawa perlaksanaan suatu kuasa berkanun hanya boleh dilaksanakan menurut cara yang telah diniatkan oleh perundangan tersebut. Kuasa untuk meluluskan sebarang permohonan di bawah s 45 atau 46 atau untuk memberikan sebarang kekecualian atau untuk membatalkan sebarang kelulusan di bawah s 118 BAFIA terletak secara eksklusifnya pada MOF tersebut. Fungsi BNM di bawah BAFIA adalah semata-mata untuk menyampaikan permohonan defendan-defendan MOF dengan syornya dan bukan untuk melaksanakan usaha untuk membuat keputusan ke atas dirinya sendiri. Penerangan fungsi-fungsi antara BNM dan MOF dapat dilihat dengan jelasnya dalam ss 45(2), 49(5) dan 118 BAFIA. Di mana sesebuah pertubuhan berkanun telah bertindak di luar had bidang kuasanya seperti mana dalam kes ini, ia bertindak secara ultra vires dan tanpa hiraukan tujuan/motif, perbuatannya adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Di mana sesebuah ejensi telah diberi peranan yang bebas dan khusus untuk dilaksanakan dalam proses membuat keputusan selain daripada membuat keputusan itu sendiri, ia adalah tidak kompeten bagi ejensi itu untuk melaksanakan tugas pihak yang melantiknya untuk membuat sesuatu keputusan menurut haknya yang tersendiri serta keupayaannya, seperti mana yang telah dilakukan oleh BNM dalam kes ini. Peranan BNM adalah khususnya untuk membuat syor kepada MOF.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 266 Keputusan itu sendiri mestilah dibuat oleh MOF dan bukannya oleh BNM. Dengan perkataan-perkataan ‘Bank Negara Malaysia telah memutuskan’ yang terdapat dalam perenggan 3 surat keempat BNM, adalah jelas bahawa BNM sedang bertindak akan keupayaannya sendiri (bertentangan dengan bertindak bagi pihak MOF) untuk menarik balik kelulusan yang telah diberikan pada awalnya oleh MOF pada 17 Oktober 1997. Ia telah pada ketika ini bertujuan untuk melaksanakan suatu kuasa yang ianya jelas tidak punyai ||Page 63>> dan adalah dengan itu bertindak secara ultra vires (lihat ms 85F–H, 86A, C, G–I); Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 dibeza. (5) Setelah menyalahi prinsip ultra vires substantif, keputusan BNM yang bermaksud untuk menarik balik persetujuan MOF adalah suatu usaha yang sia-sia. Didapati bahawa surat keempat BNM tidak boleh diharapkan oleh defendan-defendan untuk berhujah bahawa MOF telah melarang mereka daripada melaksanakan MOF tersebut dan akibatnya, untuk mengecualikan mereka daripada membuat MGO tersebut seperti mana yang diberi mandat oleh SC (lihat ms 88A–B). (6) Walaupun menjangkakan bahawa surat keempat BNM harus ditafsirkan sebagai surat MOF untuk membatalkan kelulusan yang terdahulu yang telah dibuat oleh MOF, arahan itu adalah masih merupakan suatu usaha tidak sah akan kuasa MOF. Pertamanya, dengan meluluskan (melalui surat BNM bertarikh 17 Oktober 1997) permohonan defendan-defendan untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut akan saham-saham yang masih tidak dimiliki oleh defendan-defendan di bawah skim Prolayer, termasuk pemegangan saham 5.01% plaintif-plaintif, MOF telah memberikan plaintif-plaintif harapan yang sah bahawa defendan-defendan akan berkewajipan di bawah Kos tersebut untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut akan pemegangan saham mereka jika dan apabila defendan-defendan peroleh saham-saham Kumpulan UMBC. Tanggapan sah plaintif-plaintif dalam kes semasa adalah diperkukuhkan dengan secukupnya hingga membawa kepada hampir suatu hak dan cukup substansial untuk memerlukan satu hak didengar sebelum satu keputusan dibuat mengenai MGO tersebut. Oleh itu, pengakasan kelulusan MOF (menjangkakan bahawa beliau telah laksanakannya) tanpa menimbangkan tanggapan sah plaintif-plaintif, membentuk satu kegagalan untuk mempertimbangkan suatu pertimbangan yang relevan, dan dengan itu menjadikan keputusan itu tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman atas alasan ‘procedural impropriety’ atau ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. Keduanya, apabila surat keempat BNM dikeluarkan, MOF tersebut telah pun functus officio. Ini adalah kerana defendan-defendan telah menyiapkan perolehan tersebut dan kewajipan mereka untuk melaksanakan MGO telahpun digerakkan di bawah SCA tersebut. Meskipun boleh dihujahkan bahawa MOF tetap kompeten untuk membatalkan kelulusan tersebut berhubung dengan MGO tersebut yang diberikan pada 17 Oktober 1997 asalkan defendan-defendan gagal untuk melaksanakan skim Prolayer tersebut, hujahan itu hanya boleh dipertahankan jika kelulusan MGO dipersyaratkan ke
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 267 atas defendan-defendan mengimplementasikan skim Prolayer tersebut, yang mana bukannya keadaannya di sini. Suatu keputusan yang dibuat ketika pembuat keputusan functus officio bertanggungan untuk dikaji ||Page 64>> semula untuk ultra vires substantif (lihat ms 88B–D, 90C–F, 91I, 92B–D); Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1; R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 dan Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 diikut. (7) Secara amnya, sesuatu cabaran ke atas keputusan pentadbiran telah selalunya dibuat melalui tindakan undang-undang umum untuk kajian semula kehakiman di mana keputusan itu sendiri boleh dibatalkan oleh mahkamah. Tetapi sesuatu tindakan pentadbiran boleh dicabar dalam perjalanan satu prosiding kolateral, di mana ketidakwajarannya adalah agak jelas dalam kes ini. Tindakan tidak sah BNM mempunyai kesan membiarkan kelulusan MOF yang terkandung di dalam surat BNM kekal tidak berganjak dan berkuatkuasa. Oleh itu, kewajipan, defendan-defendan di bawah skim Prolayer kekal tidak dilaksanakan dan tertangguh (lihat ms 92F, H–I). (8) Walaupun menjangkakan larangan MOF adalah sesungguhnya sah, setelah memilih untuk memperoleh 60.35% pemegangan saham-saham UMBC saham-saham daripada kumpulan UMBC, defendan-defendan tidak akan terlindung daripada kena melaksanakan kewajipan berkanun mereka kepada plaintif-plaintif di bawah SCA tersebut. Larangan yang dikenakan oleh MOF ke atas defendan-defendan daripada memperoleh sebarang saham-saham tambahan UMBC, walaupun sah sekalipun, telah pada hakikatnya melepaskan mereka dengan suatu pilihan Hobson, iaitu, sama ada untuk menangguhkan perolehan itu sama sekali atau cuba untuk mendapatkan pengecualian daripada SC daripada kena melaksanakan MGO tersebut. Setelah gagal untuk mendapatkan pengecualian tersebut daripada SC, defendan-defendan adalah bebas untuk tidak meneruskan bagi memperoleh saham-saham tersebut. Tetapi sebaik sahaja defendan-defendan memperolehnya mereka mengambil suatu tanggungjawab untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut dan kegagalan untuk melakukan sedemikian membentuk suatu kesalahan yang boleh diambil tindakan yang mendedahkan mereka kepada tanggungan sivil di bawah SCA tersebut. BAFIA hanya bertindak untuk melarang defendan-defendan daripada melaksanakan MGO tersebut tetapi ia tidak memberi mereka suatu pembelaan berkanun daripada sebarang tanggungan sivil di bawah SCA yang berbangkit daripada kegagalan mereka untuk melaksanakan MGO tersebut sekiranya mereka meneruskan perolehan tersebut (lihat ms 93B–E). (9) Sehubungan itu, akan terdapat perintah seperti yang dipohon oleh pohonan (1) dan satu perintah bahawa defendan-defendan membayar kepada plaintif-plaintif ganti rugi yang akan ditetapkan dan kos (lihat ms 94B).] ||Page 65>>
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 268 Notes For cases on the discretion to exercise administrative powers, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 21–23. For cases on the right to be heard, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 609–617. For cases on the sales of shares in a licensed bank, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 1421. For cases on the Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 746. For cases on the statutory regulations on share ownership of financial institutions, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1526.
Cases referred to Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 All ER 203 (refd) Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 (distd) Chin Yew Loy Holdings Sdn Bhd lwn AU Metalvest (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 117 (refd) Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (folld) Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council [1996] 4 All ER 129 (refd) Fadzil bin Mohamed Noor v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 196 (refd) Francis v Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur [1962] MLJ 407 (refd) Ganad Media Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Bandar Kuala Lumpur (No 1) [2001] 683 MLJU 1 (refd) Karuppan Bhoomidas v Port of Singapore Authority [1978] 1 MLJ 49 (refd) Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor (No 2) [1982] AC 173 (folld) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (folld) Monk v Warbey [1935] 1 KB 75 (refd) Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657 (folld) Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 1 KB 53 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (folld) Wu Siew Ying v Gunung Tunggal Quarry & Construction Sdn Bhd & Ors [1999] 4 MLJ 9 (refd)
Legislation referred to Banking and Financial Institution Act 1989 ss 45(2), 46, 48, 49(1), (5), 118(1), (5) Companies Act 1965 s 179(7A)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 269 ||Page 66>> Factories Acts [UK] Road Traffic Act 1930 [Eng] s 35(1) Securities Commission Act 1993 ss 15(1)(d), 33(1), (3), (9), (10), 33B(4) Straits Settlements Port Ordinance 1912 by-law 26 Town and Country Planning Act 1976 s 24(5) Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 s 7(2)
Millie Chan Wai Yen ( R Jayasingam and Reena Kaura Chuah with her) ( WY Chan & Roy) for the plaintiffs in Originating Summons No D5–24–22 of 1999. Ranjit Singh ( Ooi Huey Ling and Richard Yeoh Kar Hoe with him) ( Abdul Aziz Ong & Co) for the plaintiffs in Originating Summons No D5(D4)–24–163 of 1999. Robert Lazar ( G Rajasingam and RS Nathan with him) ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants.
[2003] 6 MLJ 353 LAM ENG RUBBER FACTORY (M) SDN BHD v TRIBUNAL RAYUAN LEMBAGA GETAH MALAYSIA (SAFIC-ALCAN (M) SDN BHD, INTERVENER)
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVISION NO 25–48 OF 2000 MOHD NOOR ABDULLAH J 9 JUNE 2003
Administrative Law — Judicial review — Jurisdiction of High Court — Finding of facts by tribunal — Whether such finding of facts of tribunal ought to be reviewed by High Court
Administrative Law — Natural justice — Rules of natural justice — Procedural requirements — Component items of rules of natural justice — Whether satisfied — Whether substantive and qualitative analysis of decision could be reviewed
Arbitration — Procedure — Appeal — Statutory provision for resolution of disputes and appeals — Applicability of the Arbitration Act 1952 and Rules of the High Court 1980 O 69 procedure to such appeals
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 270 Safic-Alcan (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (‘Safic-Alcan’) had entered into five different contracts with the applicant for the sale and delivery of raw rubber. These contracts were subject to the Malaysian Rubber Exchange Rules and Bye Laws. A dispute arising in relation to the said contracts, the dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators found the applicant in breach of the said contracts and liable to compensate Safic-Alcan damages of RM1,228,731.70. The applicant’s appeal lodged with the Malaysian Rubber Board Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) was dismissed. The applicant sought a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal. The applicant argued that the Malaysian Rubber Exchange and the Malaysian Rubber Board were both established by their respective statutes. The panel of arbitrators were appointed under these statutes. The arbitrators performed a public function and their powers were regulated by bye-laws and statutes. The arbitrators thus had a duty to act judicially and were subject to judicial review. The applicant further argued that the arbitrators had erred when they found the applicant liable for the awards as they had variously failed to take into account that Safic-Alcan had failed to give directions as to delivery within the agreed period or the extended period, Safic-Alcan had cancelled certain orders at the very last minute, Safic-Alcan had been paid certain sums as profits from the ‘selling off’ of a delivery and that there had been was ‘force majeure’ and the applicant had been prepared to meet its obligations thereafter. Safic-Alcan, as Interveners, raised a preliminary objection on the jurisdiction of the court. Counsel for the Interveners contended that an applicant to set aside an arbitrator’s award ought to be filed O 69 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) read together with s 24(2) Arbitration Act 1952. Such an ||Page 354>>application had to be filed within six weeks after the publication of the award to the parties.
Held, dismissing the application for judicial review: (1) The Arbitration Act 1952 relates to arbitration generally and O 69 of the RHC provides for arbitration proceeding in court. However, the Malaysian Rubber Exchange (Incorporation) Act 1962 provides specifically for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, the establishment of an Arbitration Tribunal to deal with disputes and for appeals to an Appeal Tribunal. Since the Malaysian Rubber Exchange (Incorporation) Act 1952 is a special statute, which provides for arbitration and appeal, the Arbitration Act 1952 and O 69 of the RHC had no application in the present action (see pp 358H–359A). (2) Over the years, judicial review had made inroads in the supervision of various statutory bodies, clubs, societies and associations. These bodies were expected to follow procedural fairness when they took actions which affected the rights and interests of their members. However, the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue certiorari was supervisory, it is neither appellate nor revisionary. Certiorari was not issued as a matter of right but only on limited grounds. Because of its supervisory role, the court did not interfere with tribunals merely because a decision was perceived to be erroneous (see pp 360B–C, 361F, H).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 271 (3) What the applicant was in effect is asking was a re-evaluation of findings of facts. Whether there had been deliveries or not were findings of facts. Again, whether there had been a cancellation of orders or a lack of instructions in relation to certain deliveries were finding of facts, based on documentary evidence and witnesses. Once the Tribunal made an evaluation and arrived at a finding of fact, that finding, right or wrong, was immune from judicial review (see p 362D–E, G–H); Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 followed. (4) Natural justice was a procedural concept and did not impose any substantive restriction on the decision-making body. It did not dictate the quality of the decision and furnished no basis to probe the merits of a decision made by an authority. The first component of the principle of natural justice, audi alterem partem, ie the rule that no one is to be condemned unheard, had been fully complied with. The applicant had had the right to be heard and even heard on appeal before the respondent. Although one of the managers was on the panel of arbitrators, he was not the one who heard the dispute. Thus, the application of the second component here, nemo judex in cuasa sua, ie no one may be a judge in his own cause, was merely a suspicion, unfounded and unsubstantiated. To proceed to hear this application would be to enlarge the ||Page 355>>supervisory powers of this court beyond the ambit of judicial review (see p 363A–D).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Safic-Alcan (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (‘Safic-Alcan’) telah menandatangani lima kontrak berasingan dengan pemohon bagi penjualan dan penghantaran getah mentah. Kontrak-kontrak tersebut tertakluk kepada Undang-undang Kecil dan Kaedah Bursa Getah Malaysia. Dengan wujudnya suatu pertikaian berkaitan dengan kontrak-kontrak tersebut, pertikaian tersebut telah dirujukkan kepada penimbangtaraan. Penimbangtara mendapati pemohon telah memungkiri kontrak-kontrak tersebut dan bertanggungjawab memberikan pampasan sebanyak RM1,228,731.70 kepada Safic-Alcan. Rayuan pemohon kepada Tribunal Rayuan Lembaga Getah Malaysia (‘Tribunal tersebut’) telah ditolak. Pemohon memohon writ certiorari membatalkan keputusan Tribunal tersebut. Pemohon mendakwa bahawa Bursa Getah Malaysia dan Lembaga Getah Malaysia kedua-duanya ditubuhkan dibawah statut masing-masing. Panel penimbangtara dilantik di bawah statut-statut tersebut. Penimbangtara melaksanakan suatu majlis awam dan kuasa mereka di kawalselia oleh undang-undang kecil dan statut. Jadi penimbangtara berkewajipan bertindak secara kehakiman dan tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman. Pemohon terus mendakwa penimbangtara tersilap apabila mendapati pemohon bertanggungjawab bagi award-award tersebut memandangkan mereka gagal mengambilkira bahawa Safic-Alcan telah gagal memberi arahan berkaitan dengan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 272 penghantaran dalam tempoh masa yang dipersetujui atau tempoh masa yang dilanjutkan, Safic-Alcan telah membatalkan beberapa pesanan pada saat-saat terakhir, Safic-Alcan telah dibayar beberapa amaun sebagai untung daripada penjualan suatu penghantaran dan wujud ‘force majeure’ dan kemudian itu pemohon telah bersedia memenuhi obligasinya. Safic-Alcan, sebagai Pencelah, menimbulkan suatu bantahan awal di atas bidangkuasa mahkamah. Peguam bagi Pencelah mendakwa sesuatu permohonan mengenepikan award penimbangtaraan harus difailkan di bawah A 69 k 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) dibaca dengan s 24(2) Akta Timbangtaraan 1952. Permohonan seperti itu wajib difailkan dalam masa enam minggu selepas pengisyhtiharan award kepada pihak-pihak.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan bagi kajian semula kehakiman: (1) Akta Timbangtaraan 1952 berkuatkuasa ke atas penimbangtaraan secara amnya dan A 69 KMT memberi peruntukan bagi prosiding penimbangtaraan di mahkamah. Walaubagaimanapun Akta Bursa Getah Malaysia (Perbadanan) 1962 memberi peruntukan secara khas bagi penyelesaian pertikaian melalui penimbangtaraan, penubuhan suatu tribunal penimbangtaraan bagi menangani ||Page 356>>pertikaian dan bagi rayuan kepada suatu tribunal rayuan. Memandangkan yang Akta Bursa Getah Malaysia Exchange (Penubuhan) 1952 adalah statut khas, yang memberi peruntukan bagi penimbangtaraan dan rayuan, maka Akta Timbangtaraan Akta 1952 dan A 69 tidak beraplikasi dalam tindakan ini (lihat ms 358H–359A). (2) Sejak kebelakangan ini, kajian semula kehakiman telah menerokai beberapa jalan baru dalam penyeliaan badan-badan berkanun, kelab, persatuan dan pertubuhan. Badan-badan ini dikehendaki mengikuti prosedur keadilan semasa mengambil tindakan yang membawa kesan pada hak dan kepentingan ahli mereka. Walau bagaimanapun, bidangkuasa Mahkamah Tinggi mengeluarkan certiorari adalah secara penyeliaan, ia bukan secara rayuan mahupun secara kajian semula. Certiorari tidak dikeluarkan secara hak tetapi di atas sebab-sebab tertentu. Memandangkan peranan penyeliaan, mahkamah tidak campur tangan dengan tribunal semata-semata kerana sesuatu keputusan dianggap salah (lihat ms 360B–C, 361F, H). (3) Pemohon secara kebetulan memohon penilaian semula pendapatan fakta. Samada penghantaran telah dibuat atau tidak adalah suatu pendapatan fakta. Juga, samada wujudnya pembatalan sesuatu pesanan atau ketiadaan arahan berkaitan sesuatu penghantaran adalah pendapatan fakta, berasaskan keterangan-keterangan dokumentari dan saksi. Sebaik sahaja sesuatu Tribunal membuat penilaian dan sampai ke pendapatan fakta, maka pendapatan itu, betul atau tidak, adalah kebal daripada kajian semula kehakiman (lihat ms 362D–E, G–H); Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 diikut. (4) Keadilan semulajadi merupakan suatu konsep prosedur dan tidak mengenakan sebarang rintangan substantif pada badan yang membuat keputusan tersebut. Ia
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 273 tidak menentukan kualiti keputusan tersebut dan tidak boleh dijadikan asas meneliti merit keputusan yang dibuat sesuatu autoriti. Komponen pertama prinsip keadilan semulajadi, audi alterem partem iaitu perintah bahawa seseorang tidak akan dihakimi tanpa diberi pendengaran, telah dipatuhi sepenuhnya. Pemohon telah berhak diberi pendengaran dan juga telah didengar dalam rayuannya di hadapan responden. Walaupun salah seorang pengurus menduduki panel penimbangtaraan, dia bukannya ahli yang telah mendengar pertikaian tersebut. Maka aplikasi komponen di sini, nemo judex in causa sua, iaitu tiada sesiapa yang dapat menghakimi tindakannya sendiri, hanyalah suatu kesangsian, yang tidak terbukti dan berasas. Meneruskan dengan pendengaran permohonan ini hanya akan membawa membesarkan kuasa penyeliaan mahkamah ini melebihi tahap kajian semula kehakiman (lihat ms 363A–D).] ||Page 357>>
Notes For cases on appeal procedures in arbitration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1252–1254. For cases on judicial reviews generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 162–178. For cases on natural justice generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 180–184.
Cases referred to Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors v South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd [1976] 2 MLJ 67 (refd) OSK & Partners Sdn v Tengku Noone Aziz & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 179 (refd) Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657 (refd) Petroliam Nasional Bhd v Nik Ramli bin Nik Hassan [2000] 2 MLJ 272 (refd) Quah Swee Khoon v Sime Darby Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 600 (refd) Rex v Medical Appeal Tribunal, ex p Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574 (refd) Sangram Singh v Election Tribunal AIR 1955 SC 425 (refd) Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 (refd) William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v S Balasingam [2000] 7 MLJ 1 (refd)
Legislation referred to Arbitration Act 1952 ss 23, 24(2) Companies Act 1965 Malaysian Rubber Exchange (Incorporation) Act 1962 s 94
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 274 Malaysian Rubber Exchange Rules and Bye Laws bye law 7, Part C, s 1 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 69 r 4 Securities Act 1966
Nicholas Tan (Gan Teik Chee & Ho) for the applicant. Manjit Singh Saini (Harun Idris, Yeoh & Partners) for the respondent. CH Low (Sidek, Teoh Wong & Dennis) for the intervener.
[2002] 1 MLJ 7 Rajasingam a/l VS Rasiah v Government of Malaysia
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–54 OF 1987 JEFFREY TAN J 28 SEPTEMBER 2001
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Termination — Termination of service in public interest — Application to declare termination void — Whether officer had been dismissed — Whether officer had right to be heard
Constitutional Law — Public servants — Termination of service ‘in the public interest’ — Whether amounting to dismissal — Whether officer had right to be heard — Federal Constitution art 135(2)
Public Servants — Termination of service — Retirement from public service under s 10(5)(d) of Pensions Act 1980 on ground of public interest — Whether officer had been dismissed — Whether officer had right to be heard — Federal Constitution art 135(2)
This was the plaintiff’s action for a declaration that the defendant’s decision requiring the plaintiff to retire from public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Pensions Act 1980 (‘the Act’) was a nullity and of no effect in law. The plaintiff was a federal officer in the service of the defendant in its Immigration Department since 6 November 1964. In September 1982, the plaintiff was charged at the magistrate’s court with the commission of a criminal offence. The charges were however dismissed and the plaintiff was acquitted and discharged without his defence being called. After his acquittal on or about 20 December 1982, the plaintiff resumed full duty with the defendant. By a letter dated 27 July 1984, the plaintiff was informed that his service was terminated under O 44(3) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders 1980 (‘the General Orders’) and he was required by the Yang di Pertuan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 275 Agong to retire from the public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Act on the ground of public interest.
Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application: (1) Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution provided that a public servant shall not be dismissed without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard but by virtue of proviso (b) therein, the right to be heard was not applicable in the case where the service of the public servant was terminated in the public interest. Such termination did not constitute dismissal, whether or not the decision to terminate was connected with the misconduct or the unsatisfactory performance of duty by the public servant. Further, general order 44(3) of the General Orders provided that the officer ‘may not be given any opportunity of being heard’ where the officer’s services had been terminated in the public interest. It was an agreed fact that in the instant case, the plaintiff’s service ||Page 8>>was terminated under general order 44(3) of the General Orders and that the plaintiff was required by the Yang di Pertuan Agong to retire from the public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Act on the ground of public interest. As such, the plaintiff could not demand the opportunity of being heard (see pp 13D, 15F, 16D–E); Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 followed. (2) General order 44 of the General Orders did not offend or circumvent the Federal Constitution. In fact, general order 44 of the General Orders merely echoed proviso (b) to art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution (see p 16F, I). (3) The proviso to s 10(5)(f) of the Act provided that retirement under s 10(5)(f) shall not be effected unless the officer had been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations thereon to the Yang di Pertuan Agong or the State Authority as the case may be. Here, the plaintiff was retired under s 10(5)(d) and not s 10(5)(f) of the Act. As for s 11 of the Act, the section provided that with the consent of the officer, the Yang di Pertuan Agong or the State Authority as the case may be, may require the officer to retire at any age on the ground of national interest or in the interest of the public service. Similarly, s 11 of the Act was not applicable, as the plaintiff was required by the Yang di Pertuan Agong to retire from the public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Act on the ground of public interest (see p 17B–D). (4) The plaintiff was a federal officer from 6 November 1964 to 16 August 1984 and his pension granted under s 13 of the Act could not exceed the amount calculated on that actual length of reckonable service. There was never any deduction of the plaintiff’s pension as alleged by the plaintiff’s counsel. In any event, since the plaintiff was retired under s 10(5)(d) of the Act, he was not entitled to demand for any pension for whatever amount because pursuant to s 13 of the Act, the matter regarding the plaintiff’s pension and the amount were in the hand of the Yang di Pertuan Agong (see pp 17H–18A). (5) Further, based on the decision in Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 276 Pendidikan, it followed that the doctrine of procedural fairness did not require that a public servant be afforded the right to make representations upon the issue of the pension in a case to which proviso (b) of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution applied (see p 19A). (6) The court could not interfere with the punishment meted against the plaintiff, in that the court could not substitute the view of the defendant as to what was the appropriate penalty with its own view. In the instant case, the plaintiff had not shown that the termination was not done in compliance with the law in force. The result therefore, was that the termination must stand. Even if the decision of the disciplinary authority, if it had acted arbitrarily ||Page 9>>or unfairly or had imposed a punishment that was disproportionate to the misconduct, were liable to be quashed or set aside, there was no material or sufficient material for the court to review the decision (see p 20D, F, H); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [198] 2 MLJ 153 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah tindakan plaintif untuk satu pengisytiharan bahawa keputusan defendan yang menghendaki plaintif bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta Pencen 1980 (‘Akta tersebut’) adalah suatu pembatalan dan tidak berkesan di sisi undang-undang. Plaintif adalah seorang pegawai persekutuan di dalam perkhidmatan defendan dalam Jabatan Imigresen sejak 6 November 1964. Dalam bulan September 1982, plaintif telah dipertuduh di mahkamah majistret atas melakukan satu kesalahan jenayah. Pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut walau bagaimanapun telah dibatalkan dan plaintif dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. Selepas pembebasan beliau pada atau lebihkurang pada 20 Disember 1982, plaintif telah memulakan semula tugas sepenuhnya dengan defendan. Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 27 Julai 1984, plaintif telah dimaklumkan bahawa perkhidmatan beliau telah ditamatkan di bawah A 44(3) Perintah-perintah Am Pegawai-Pegawai Awam (Perlakuan dan Disiplin) 1980 (‘Perintah Am tersebut’) dan beliau telah dikehendaki oleh Yang di Pertuan Agong untuk bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut atas alasan kepentingan awam.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif: (1) Perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’) memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang pegawai perkhidmatan awam tidak akan diberhentikan tanpa diberikan peluang untuk didengar dengan sewajarnya tetapi menurut peruntukan (b) perkara tersebut, hak untuk didengar tidak terpakai dalam kes di mana perkhidmatan sebarang pegawai perkhidmatan awam ditamatkan demi kepentingan awam. Penamatan yang sedemikian tidak membentuk pemecatan, sama ada keputusan untuk memberhentikan dikaitkan dengan salah laku tersebut atau prestasi tugas yang tidak memuaskan oleh
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 277 pegawai perkhidmatan awam itu atau pun tidak. Selanjutnya, perintah am 44(3) Perintah Am tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa pegawai tersebut ‘tidak diberikan sebarang peluang didengar’ di mana perkhidmatan pegawai tersebut telah diberhentikan demi kepentingan awam. Adalah fakta yang dipersetujui bahawa dalam kes semasa, perkhidmatan plaintif telah ditamat di bawah perintah am 44(3) Perintah Am tersebut dan bahawa plaintif telah dikehendaki oleh Yang di Pertuan ||Page 10>>Agong untuk bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut demi kepentingan awam. Oleh yang demikian, plaintif tidak boleh menuntut untuk didengar (lihat ms 13D, 15F, 16D–E); Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 diikut. (2) Perintah Am 44 Perintah Am tidak menyalahkan atau memintas Perlembagaan tersebut. Pada hakikatnya, perintah am 44 Perintah Am hanya mengulangi peruntukan (b) kepada perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 16F, I). (3) Peruntukan kepada s 10(5)(f) Akta tersebut memperuntukan bahawa persaraan di bawah s 10(5)(f) tidak akan dikuatkuasakan melainkan pegawai tersebut telah diberikan peluang yang sempurna untuk membuat representasi ke atasnya kepada Yang di Pertuan Agong atau Pihak Berkuasa Negeri seperti mana keadaannya. Di sini, plaintif telah diberhentikan di bawah s 10(5)(d) dan bukan s 10(5)(f) Akta tersebut. Berhubung s 11 Akta tersebut, seksyen tersebut memperuntukan bahawa dengan kebenaran pegawai tersebut, Yang di Pertuan Agong atau Pihak Berkuasa Negeri seperti mana keadaannya, mungkin akan menghendaki pegawai tersebut untuk bersara pada sebarang umur atas alasan kepentingan negara atau demi kepentingan perkhidmatan awam. Begitu juga, s 11 Akta tersebut tidak boleh dipakai, kerana plaintif telah dikehendaki oleh Yang di Pertuan Agong untuk bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut demi kepentingan awam (lihat ms 17B–D). (4) Plaintif telah menjadi pegawai persekutuan daripada 6 November 1964 hingga 16 Ogos 1984 dan pencen beliau yang diberikan di bawah s 13 Akta tersebut tidak boleh melebihi jumlah yang dikira pada jangka tempoh perkhidmatan yang boleh diambilkira. Tidak pernah terdapat sebarang penolakan akan pencen plaintif seperti mana yang didakwa oleh peguam plaintif. Dalam sebarang keadaan, oleh kerana plaintif telah diberhentikan di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut, beliau tidak berhak kepada tuntutan bagi sebarang pencen untuk apa jumlah sekalipun kerana selaras dengan s 13 Akta tersebut, perkara berhubung pencen plaintif dan jumlah tersebut terletak dalam tangan Yang di Pertuan Agong (lihat ms 17H–18A). (5) Selanjutnya, berdasarkan keputusan di dalam Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan, didapati bahawa keadilan doktrin prosedur tidak menghendaki seorang pegawai awam diberi hak untuk membuat representasi atas isu pencen dalam kes kepada di mana peruntukan (b) perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan tersebut dipakai (lihat ms 19A). (6) Mahkamah tidak boleh campur tangan dengan hukuman yang dijatuhkan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 278 terhadap plaintif, iaitu mahkamah tidak boleh menggantikan pandangan defendan berhubung dengan apakah ||Page 11>>penalti yang wajar dengan pandangannya sendiri. Dalam kes semasa, plaintif telah tidak menunjukkan bahawa penamatan tersebut telah tidak dilakukan dalam pematuhan undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa. Keputusannya adalah dengan itu, bahawa penamatan tersebut semestinya kekal. Walaupun jika keputusan pihak berkuasa disiplin — sekiranya ia telah bertindak secara sewenang-wenangnya atau secara tidak adil atau telah menjatuhkan hukuman yang tidak wajar kepada salah laku tersebut — haruslah dibatalkan atau diketepikan, tidak terdapat bahan atau bahan yang mencukupi untuk mahkamah mengkaji semula keputusan tersebut (lihat ms 20D, F, H); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 2 MLJ 153 diikut.]
Notes For cases on termination of public servants generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 554–556.For cases on termination of service ‘in the public interest’, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1772–1773.For cases on termination of service, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1777–1778.
Cases referred to Hong Leong Equipment v Liew Fook Chan [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Mahan Singh v Government of Malaysia [1978] 2 MLJ 133 (refd) Merdeka University Bhd v Government of Malaysia [1982] 2 MLJ 243 (refd) Mohd Yusof Mohamad v Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 286 (refd) Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 2 MLJ 153 (folld) R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) Rajikishore v State of UP AIR 1954 All 343 (refd) Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (folld)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 8(1), 135(2) Pensions Act 1980 ss 3(2), 9, 10, 10(5)(d), 11, 13 Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 general order 44(1), (2), (3), (4)
V Sithambaram (Kumar & Co) for the plaintiff. Mazni Buang for the defendant.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 279
[2002] 2 MLJ 131 Ang Seng Wan v Suruhanjaya Polis Di Raja Malaysia & Anor
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO N–02–29 OF 1997 MOKHTAR SIDIN, MOHD SAARI AND ALAUDDIN JJCA 31 DECEMBER 2001
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Dismissal from service — Police force — Natural justice — Whether omission to hold oral hearing tantamount to failure on to afford appellant reasonable opportunity of being heard — Whether proceedings conducted in accordance with natural justice
Police — Disciplinary proceedings — Dismissal — Natural justice — Oral hearing — Whether omission to hold oral hearing tantamount to failure to afford appellant reasonable opportunity of being heard — Whether proceedings conducted in accordance with natural justice
In the suit before the Seremban High Court, the appellant had claimed, inter alia, for a declaration that his dismissal from the police force was unlawful, unconstitutional, void and of no effect. The suit was dismissed by the High Court, hence this appeal by the appellant. The first respondent had caused summary of facts, report and statement of witnesses (‘the documents’) to be circulated to the members of the first respondent for the purpose of determining whether there was a prima facie case against the appellant. The documents were however not made available to the appellant. Subsequently, a show cause letter was sent to the appellant, which contained the four charges preferred against the appellant. In response to the letter, the appellant made a representation to the first respondent vide his letter of 23 July 1995 (‘the letter’). Upon receipt of the letter, the first respondent convened a meeting to deliberate over the alleged disciplinary offences committed by the appellant. At that meeting, by majority decision, the members decided to dismiss the appellant and that decision was conveyed to the appellant by letter. No committee of inquiry was set up.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) In the letter, the appellant denied receiving any bribe in answer to the first and second charges and made reference to a statutory declaration sworn by Sanmugam in which Sanmugam denied receiving the money or giving it to the appellant. Sanmugam was a police personnel who served under the appellant. Based on the unchallenged evidence of Sanmugam in the court below, Sanmugam did not give any money to the appellant (see p 135G–H). (2) In respect of another charge, the appellant was accused for failing to report
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 280 about illegal gambling activities in Seremban. In the ||Page 132>>letter, the appellant denied having any information about illegal gambling activities in Seremban as he was not in charge of criminal investigation (see pp 135I–136A). (3) In applying O 26(4) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 to the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellant had, by the letter, given sufficient exculpatory statement to rebut all the four charges. On the other hand, there was no evidence whatsoever by the defence to substantiate the four charges. Further, there was no evidence whatsoever to rebut or contradict the appellant’s exculpatory statement (see p 136B–C, E–F). (4) The trial judge had misdirected himself when he held that, having regard to the appellant’s complete denial of the charges, the commission did not err in its discretion not to proceed further by way of an oral hearing (see p 136F–G); Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 114 distinguished. (5) Since there was no evidence whatsoever to contradict the appellant’s exculpatory statement, it would be justifiable to hold an oral hearing or enquiry. As such, the omission to hold an oral hearing was tantamount to a failure on the part of the first respondent to afford the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Further, the documents were not supplied to the appellant. That being the case, it became all the more necessary for the oral hearing to be held (see pp 136H–137A, C). (6) Therefore, the proceeding, which resulted in the dismissal of the appellant, was not conducted in accordance with natural justice as enshrined under art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution (see p 137H).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Dalam guaman di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban, perayu menuntut, antara lain, untuk satu deklarasi bahawa pemecatan beliau daripada perkhidmatan polis adalah menyalahi undang-undang, tidak mengikut perlembagaan, batal dan tidak berkuatkuasa. Guaman tersebut telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi, justeru itu rayuan ini. Responden pertama telah menyebabkan ringkasan fakta, laporan dan kenyataan saksi-saksi (‘dokumen-dokumen tersebut’) diedarkan kepada ahli-ahli responden pertama bagi tujuan menentukan sama ada wujud satu kes prima facie terhadap perayu. Dokumen-dokumen tersebut walau bagaimanapun tidak disediakan untuk perayu. Berikutan itu, sepucuk surat tunjuk sebab telah dihantarkan kepada perayu, yang mengandungi empat pertuduhan yang dibuat terhadap perayu. Sebagai jawapan kepada surat tersebut, perayu telah membuat satu representasi kepada responden pertama melalui surat beliau bertarikh 23 Julai 1995 (‘surat tersebut’). Setelah menerima ||Page 133>>surat tersebut, responden pertama telah mengadakan satu mesyuarat untuk mempertimbangkan pendakwaan kesalahan tata tertib yang telah dilakukan oleh
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 281 perayu. Dalam mesyuarat tersebut, melalui keputusan majoriti, ahli-ahli tersebut telah memutuskan untuk memecat perayu dan keputusan tersebut telah disampaikan kepada perayu melalui surat. Tiada jawatankuasa siasatan ditubuhkan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Dalam surat tersebut, perayu telah menjawab pertuduhan-pertuduhan pertama dan kedua dengan menafikan menerima apa-apa rasuah dan telah membuat rujukan kepada satu deklarasi statutori yang telah diangkat sumpah oleh Sanmugam di mana Sanmugam telah menafikan menerima wang atau memberinya kepada perayu. Sanmugam adalah seorang polis perjawatan yang telah berkhidmat di bawah perayu. Berdasarkan keterangan Sanmugam yang tidak dicabar di mahkamah bawahan, Sanmugam tidak memberikan apa-apa wang kepada perayu (lihat ms 135G–H). (2) Berhubung pertuduhan yang lain, perayu telah dituduh gagal untuk melaporkan tentang kegiatan perjudian haram di Seremban. Di dalam surat tersebut, perayu telah menafikan mempunyai apa-apa maklumat tentang kegiatan perjudian haram di Seremban kerana beliau tidak dipertanggungjawabkan untuk siasatan jenayah (lihat ms 135I–136A). (3) Dalam menerapkan A 26(4) Perintah Am Pegawai-Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab ‘D’) 1980 kepada fakta-fakta dan keadaan kes ini, perayu telah, melalui surat tersebut, memberikan kenyataan pembelaan yang mencukupi untuk mematahkan semua empat pertuduhan tersebut. Sebaliknya, tiada keterangan langsung oleh pembelaan untuk mengesahkan empat pertuduhan tersebut. Tambahan pula, tiada keterangan langsung untuk mematah atau menyangkal kenyataan pembelaan perayu (lihat ms 136B–C, E–F). (4) Hakim perbicaraan telah salah arah apabila beliau memutuskan bahawa, berdasarkan penafian sepenuhnya perayu terhadap pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut, suruhanjaya tersebut tidak terkhilaf dalam budi bicaranya untuk tidak meneruskan selanjutnya melalui satu perbicaraan secara lisan (lihat ms 136F–G); Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 114 dibeza. (5) Memandangkan tiada keterangan langsung untuk mematahkan kenyataan pembelaan perayu, terdapat justifikasi untuk mengadakan satu perbicaraan atau siasatan secara lisan. Oleh itu, peninggalan untuk mengadakan satu perbicaraan secara lisan telah terjumlah kepada satu kegagalan di pihak responden pertama bagi memberi perayu satu peluang yang munasabah untuk didengar. Tambahan pula, dokumen-dokumen tersebut ||Page 134>>telah tidak disediakan untuk perayu. Jika demikian kesnya, memang patut untuk satu perbicaraan secara lisan diadakan (lihat ms 136H–137A, C). (6) Oleh itu, prosiding tersebut, yang mengakibatkan pemecatan perayu, tidak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 282 dikendalikan mengikut keadilan asasi sebagai mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat ms 137H).]
Notes For cases on dismissal of a public servant, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 21–23.For cases on dismissal of a police officer, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1095–1119.
Cases referred to B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 28 MLJ 169 (refd) Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 114 (distd) Hotel Equotarial (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 363 (refd) Mak Sing Kwong v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia (No 2) [1975] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 308 (refd)
Legislation referred toFederal Constitution art 135(2)Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general order 26(4)
Appeal from: Civil Suit No 22–141–1994 (High Court, Seremban)
Aris Rizal C Fernando (Maniam Raja and Marisa Regina with him) (Aris Rizal Christopher Fernando & Co) for hte appellant. Mary TS Lim (Suzana with her) (Senior Federal Counsels) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
[2002] 3 MLJ 230 Yong Teck Lee v Harris Mohd Salleh & Ors
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO S-04-75 OF 2001 ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, MOHD SAARI AND KC VOHRAH JJCA 6 JUNE 2002
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 283 Administrative Law — Exercise of judicial functions — Judicial review — Whether the ‘election court’ is a tribunal inferior to the High Court — Whether decision of an election judge is a decision of a tribunal inferior to the High Court
Civil Procedure — Appeal — Election judge, from — Whether a decision of an election judge in an election petition is appealable to the appellate courts
Election — Election court — Nature of — Whether election court inferior to High Court — Whether decision of an election judge is a decision of a High Court judge
This appeal arose from two election petitions. Both petitions concerned the general election for the state assembly for the constituency of Likas, known as ‘N13’. The present appellant was the second respondent in Election Petition No K5 of 1999 and third respondent in Election Petition No K11 of 1999. The present respondent was the petitioner in both petitions. They were both candidates in the said election, which was won by the appellant. In the court below, both the petitions were consolidated. The learned election judge declared that the 1998 Electoral Roll for Likas Constituency (N13) was illegal and that the said election was null and void. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal which directed the parties to decide on the issue of whether a decision of an election judge in an election petition is appealable to the Court of Appeal.
Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) (per Abdul Hamid Mohammad JCA) For the purpose of judicial review the ‘election court’ is not a tribunal inferior to the High Court, the orders of which are susceptible to judicial review. That is a very sensible view to take, because, when the Chief Judge himself sits as an ‘election judge’, it is unimaginable that his decision will be subject to judicial review by a High Court judge. Similarly, when a High Court judge is nominated by the Chief Judge to try an election petition, he sits as a judge and not as a chairman or member of a tribunal. Therefore it is perfectly correct to treat the decision of an election judge not as a decision of a tribunal inferior to the High Court for the purpose of judicial review. However, a decision of an election judge is not a decision of a High Court or a judge thereof (see pp 239I–240B, 241A). ||Page 231>> (2) (per Abdul Hamid Mohammad JCA) All the appellate courts in this country, be it the former Court of Appeal, the former Federal Court, the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and the present Court of Appeal, have unanimously over the years held that the decision of an election judge is not subject to appeal. Thus, the decision of an election judge is not appealable to the Court of Appeal (see pp 241A–B, 244F). (3) (per KC Vohrah JCA dissenting) The primary jurisdiction conferred under art
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 284 121(1B)(a) of the Federal Constitution upon the Court of Appeal is to hear appeals from decisions of the High Court or of a judge thereof. While the primary jurisdiction may be enlarged by virtue of art 121(1B)(b), it is not to be abrogated, limited or restricted and any attempt to abrogate, limit or restrict the primary jurisdiction is void for inconsistency under art 4(1) of the Federal Constitution (see p 249B–C). (4) (per KC Vohrah JCA dissenting) The application for leave is not to be left to the executive to decide but to judges who have to judicially consider on the material put before them that there is an arguable case. For the leave application the several criteria to be judicially considered arise through judicial decisions, rules of court, federal and state law and may for example include time bars to prevent stale cases from being brought up. Federal law may regulate the leave system not so much as to prevent or deny completely an aggrieved litigant from appealing but to give him an opportunity to first show in some time tested areas where appeals do not normally succeed that he has an arguable case. Thus, to the extent that s 36 of the Act purports to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear an appeal from a final order of an election judge, it is void and of no effect by operation of art 4(1), it being inconsistent with art 121(1B)(a) of the Federal Constitution. Similarly, para (d) of s 68 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which purports to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal by providing that where by any written law for the time being in force, the judgment or order of the High Court is expressly declared to be final no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal, is void and of no effect (see pp 251H–252A, D–E).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Rayuan ini berbangkit daripada dua petisyen pilihanraya. Kedua-dua petisyen tersebut berhubung dengan pilihanraya umum untuk Dewan Undangan Negeri bagi kawasan pilihanraya Likas, yang dikenali sebagai ‘N13’. Perayu semasa adalah responden kedua dalam Petisyen Pilihanraya No K5 Tahun 1999 dan responden ketiga dalam Petisyen Pilihanraya No K 11 Tahun 1999. Responden adalah pempetisyen di dalam kedua-dua petisyen. Kedua-dua mereka adalah ||Page 232>>calon di dalam plihanraya tersebut, yang mana telah dimenangi oleh perayu. Dalam mahkamah di bawah, kedua-dua petisyen tersebut telah digabongkan. Hakim Pilihanraya yang bijaksana telah mengisytiharkan bahawa Daftar Pemilih 1998 untuk Kawasan Pilihanraya Likas (N13) adalah tidak sah dan bahawa pilihanraya tersebut adalah batal dan tidak sah. Perayu telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan yang telah mengarahkan pihak-pihak tersebut memutuskan atas isu sama ada keputusan seorang hakim pilihanraya di dalam sesuatu petisyen pilihanraya boleh dirayui di Mahkamah Rayuan.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 285 Diputuskan menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) (oleh Abdul Hamid Mohammad HMR) Bagi tujuan kajian semula kehakiman ‘election court’ bukannya sebuah tribunal yang lebih rendah daripada Mahkamah Tinggi, perintah-perintahnya boleh dikenakan kaji semula kehakiman. Itu adalah pandangan waras yang seharusnya dibuat, kerana, apabila seorang Ketua Hakim sendiri bersidang sebagai ‘election judge’, adalah tidak dapat dibayangkan bahawa keputusan beliau akan tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman oleh seorang Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Begitu juga, apabila seorang Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dipilih oleh Ketua Hakim untuk membicarakan suatu petisyen pilihanraya, beliau bersidang sebagai seorang hakim dan bukan sebagai seorang pengerusi atau ahli sesebuah tribunal. Oleh itu ianya adalah sesungguhnya betul untuk menganggapkan keputusan seorang hakim pilihanraya bukannya sebagai satu keputusan sebuah tribunal yang lebih rendah dari Mahkamah Tinggi bagi tujuan kajian semula kehakiman. Walau bagaimanapun, keputusan seorang hakim pilihanraya bukannya keputusan sebuah Mahkamah Tinggi atau seorang hakim Mahkamah Tinggi (lihat ms 239I–240B, 241A). (2) (oleh Abdul Hamid Mohammad HMR) Kesemua mahkamah-mahkamah rayuan di dalam negara ini, sama ada ianya Mahkamah Rayuan yang dahulu, Mahkamah Persekutuan yang dahulu, Majlis Privi, Mahkamah Agong dan Mahkamah Rayuan semasa, telah sebulat suara sepanjang masa yang berlalu memutuskan bahawa keputusan seorang hakim pilihanraya tidak tertakluk kepada rayuan. Oleh itu, keputusan hakim pilihanraya tidak dapat dirayui di Mahkamah Rayuan (lihat ms 241A–B, 244F). (3) (oleh KC Vohrah HMR menentang) Bidang kuasa utama yang diberikan di bawah per 121(1B)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan ke atas Mahkamah Rayuan adalah untuk mendengar rayuan-rayuan daripada keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi atau oleh hakimnya. Sementara bidang kuasa utama tersebut mungkin boleh diperluaskan menurut per 121(1B)(b) ianya tidak boleh dibatalkan, dihadkan atau disekat dan sebarang percubaan untuk membatalkan, menghadkan atau menyekat bidang kuasa utama ||Page 233>>tersebut adalah tak sah kerana tidak bersesuaian di bawah per 4(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat ms 249B–C). (4) (oleh KC Vohrah HMR menentang) Permohonan untuk kebenaran tidak seharusnya dibiarkan untuk diputuskan oleh eksekutif tetapi kepada hakim-hakim yang haruslah mempertimbangkan secara kehakiman atas bahan-bahan yang dikemukakan di hadapan mereka bahawa terdapatnya satu kes yang boleh dihujahkan. Untuk permohonan kebenaran beberapa kriteria yang harus dipertimbangkan secara kehakiman berbangkit melalui keputusan-keputusan kehakiman, kaedah-kaedah mahkamah, undang-undang persekutuan dan negeri dan boleh contohnya termasuk halangan-halangan masa untuk mencegah kes-kes lama dari dikemukakan. Undang-undang persekutuan boleh melaraskan sistem kebenaran bukan semata-mata untuk mencegah atau
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 286 sesungguhnya menafikan seorang litigan yang terkilan daripada membuat rayuan tetapi untuk memberikan beliau satu peluang untuk pertamanya menunjukkan dalam beberapa lingkungan yang telah diuji di mana rayuan-rayuan tidak selalunya berjaya bahawa beliau mempunyai satu kes yang boleh dihujahkan. Oleh itu, hingga kepada had bahawa s 36 Akta tersebut bertujuan untuk mengecualikan bidang kuasa Mahkamah Rayuan bagi mendengar sesuatu rayuan daripada perintah muktamad seorang Hakim Pilihanraya, ianya tak sah dan tidak berkesan dengan pengendalian per 4(1), ianya tidak konsisten dengan per 121(1B)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan tersebut. Begitu juga, perenggan (d) s 68 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 yang bertujuan untuk mengecualikan bidang kuasa Mahkamah Rayuan dengan memperuntukkan bahawa di mana melalui sebarang undang-undang bertulis yang ketika ini berkuatkuasa, penghakiman atau perintah Mahkamah Tinggi adalah secara nyata diisytiharkan sebagai muktamad maka tiada rayuan seharusnya dibawa kepada Mahkamah Rayuan adalah tidak sah dan tidak berkesan (lihat ms 251H–252A, D–E).]
Notes For cases on election judge, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 717. For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 76–83.
Cases referred to AJ Arzu v AE Arthurs & Anor [1965] 1 WLR 675 (refd) Dason Gaban v Zulkifle bin Majun & 21 Ors Cases [1982] 1 MLJ 315 (refd) Dato’ Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato’ Ombi Syed Ahir bin Syed Darus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) ||Page 234>> Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) DYTM Tengku Idris Shah ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 57 (refd) Edward Lionel Sennayake v Herath Mudiyanselage Navaratne [1954] AC 640 (refd) Ignatius Stephen Malanjun v Election Judge Sabah & Anor (Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 03–42–89 (refd) Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Ptd Ltd [2000] 4 MLJ 1 (refd) Megat Najmuddin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 (refd) Merdeka University Bhd v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356 (refd) Perting Timor Election, Re (No 2) [1962] MLJ 333 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 287 Selvanathan a/l Savarimuthu v Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia (Permohonan Sivil No W–08–417–1998) (refd) Tengku Razaleigh bin Tengku Mohd Hamzah v Election Judge for Election Petition No 33–6–1995 & Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 66 (refd) Tunku Abdullah v Ali Amberan [1971] 1 MLJ 25 (refd) Wee Choo Keong v Lee Chong Meng [1998] 1 MLJ 434 (refd)
Legislation referred to Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994 (Act A885) Courts of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1972 s 67(1) Courts of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1994 (Act A886) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 24, 50, 67, 68(1)(a), (2), (3) Courts Ordinance 1948 s 37(c), (d) Election Offences (Amendment) Act 1986 Election Offences Act 1954 ss 2, 11(c), (d), 28, 29, 32, 33(1), (4), 34, 36, 37 Election Petition Rules 1954 Federal Constitution arts 4(1), 118, 121(1B)(a), (b), (2), 128(3) Malaysia Act 1963 s 14
Gavan Griffith QC (Alex Decena, PK Lim, John Sikayun and Lawrence Dhong with him) (Luping & Co) for the appellant. Ansari Abdullah (Rezuan Borhan with him) (Ansari & Co) for the respondents.
[2002] 3 MLJ 326 Law Pang Ching & Ors v Tawau Municipal Council
HIGH COURT (TAWAU) — JUDICIAL REVIEW NO T 01 OF 2001 RICHARD MALANJUM J 26 MARCH 2002
Administrative Law — Judicial remedies — Judicial review — Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the respondent’s decision — Whether court should grant discretionary remedies applied for
ATS Lands Sdn Bhd (‘ATS Lands’) was the registered owner of certain plots of land
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 288 whereon it operated or managed a market known as Fuji Market with the approval of the Tawau Municipal Council (‘the respondent’). The applicants were the stall operators that operated their business under license from stalls in the said market. ATS Lands had to pay the respondent a sum of money as fees payable for licenses to operate the stalls. However, the obligation to pay was passed to the stall operators of the market. No license was ever issued to ATS Lands or to any one of the stall operators. The respondent subsequently indicated its decision to terminate the operation of the market through a letter to ATS Lands. The applicants appealed to the respondent to reconsider its decision. However, a letter was issued to the stall operators including the applicants requesting them to move out. The applicants applied for judicial review wherein they contended: (i) that there was a failure by the respondent to adhere to the principle of natural justice and fairness in making its decision to terminate the operation of the market; (ii) no reasons were given for the termination; (iii) the applicants were not given any real opportunity to make representations; and (iv) the respondent failed to take into account the seriousness of the decision and its effects on the applicants.
Held, dismissing the application for judicial review with costs: (1) The applicants had not been prevented or prohibited by the respondent to carry out their business activities. The applicants also had not rebutted to the assertion that they had been offered places at another market. The court, therefore, could not accept the contention that they would be deprived of their livelihood with the termination of the operation of the market (see pp 333I–334A); Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 and Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 not followed. (2) The contentions by the applicants that there was no reason given for the decision to terminate the operation of the market and that they were not given any or adequate opportunity to make representations before the termination were misconceived (see p 334B–C). ||Page 327>> (3) ATS Lands had never commenced an action to compel the respondent to issue a trading licence. Neither did the applicants apply to be issued with individual licenses to operate stalls in the market. Furthermore, ATS Lands found it not necessary to file an affidavit explaining the position. Therefore, the court found that if the prayers sought for by the applicants were granted, it would tantamount to allowing trading to be carried out by the applicants while not in possession of valid trading licenses. The applicants had come to court seeking for discretionary remedies with unclean hands and the court should not render such assistance (see pp 335A–B, G–H); Teng Meow Chong v Chia Ngim Fong & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 45 and Abdul Malik bin Abdul Majid v Asnah bte Hamid [1985] 2 MLJ 459 followed.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 289
Bahasa Malaysia summary
ATS Lands Sdn Bhd (‘ATS Lands’) adalah tuanpunya berdaftar bagi beberapa bidang tanah tertentu di atas yang mana ianya mengendalikan atau menguruskan sebuah pasar yang dikenali sebagai Fuji Market dengan kelulusan Tawau Municipal Council (‘responden tersebut’). Pemohon-pemohon adalah pengendali-pengendali gerai yang menjalankan perniagaan mereka di bawah lesen untuk gerai-gerai di dalam pasar tersebut. ATS Lands terpaksa membayar kepada responden satu jumlah wang sebagai fee yang kena dibayar untuk lesen-lesen bagi mengendalikan gerai-gerai tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, kewajipan untuk membayar telah diberikan kepada pengendali-pengendali gerai pasar tersebut. Lesen tidak pernah dikeluarkan kepada ATS Lands atau mana-mana daripada pengendali-pengendali gerai tersebut. Responden kemudiannya menyatakan keputusannya untuk menamatkan operasi pasar tersebut melalui surat kepada ATS Lands. Pemohon-pemohon merayu kepada responden supaya mempertimbangkan semula keputusannya. Walau bagaimanapun, satu surat telah dikeluarkan kepada pengendali-pengendali gerai termasuk pemohon-pemohon meminta supaya mereka berpindah keluar. Pemohon-pemohon telah membuat permohonan bagi mendapatkan kajian semula kehakiman yang mana mereka telah menegaskan bahawa: (i) terdapat kegagalan oleh responden untuk mematuhi prinsip keadilan asasi dan keadilan dalam membuat keputusannya untuk menamatkan operasi pasar tersebut; (ii) tiada alasan diberikan bagi penamatan tersebut; (iii) pemohon-pemohon tidak diberikan peluang sebenar untuk membuat representasi-representasi; dan (iv) responden gagal untuk mengambilkira sifat serius keputusan tersebut dan kesannya terhadap pemohon-pemohon.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan untuk kajian semula kehakiman dengan kos: (1) Pemohon-pemohon tidak dihalang atau dilarang oleh responden untuk menjalankan aktiviti–aktiviti perniagaan mereka. Pemohon- ||Page 328>>pemohon juga telah tidak mematahkan penegasan bahawa mereka telah ditawarkan tempat-tempat di sebuah pasar yang lain. Mahkamah, oleh itu tidak dapat menerima penegasan bahawa hak mereka untuk mencari sara hidup akan terlucut dengan penamatan operasi pasar tersebut (lihat ms 333I–334A); Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 dan Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 tidak diikuti. (2) Penegasan-penegasan oleh pemohon-pemohon bahawa tidak terdapat alasan yang diberikan bagi keputusan untuk menamatkan operasi pasar tersebut dan bahawa mereka telah tidak diberikan sebarang atau peluang yang secukupnya untuk membuat representasi-representasi sebelum penamatan itu adalah disalahtafsirkan (lihat ms 334B–C). (3) ATS Lands tidak pernah memulakan tindakan untuk memaksa responden supaya mengeluarkan lesen perniagaan. Pemohon-pemohon juga tidak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 290 memohon supaya lesen-lesen individu dikeluarkan untuk mengendalikan gerai-gerai dalam pasar tersebut. Lagipun, ATS Lands mendapati adalah tidak perlu untuk memfailkan satu afidavit untuk menerangkan kedudukan tersebut. Oleh itu, mahkamah mendapati bahawa jika permohonan-permohonan yang dipohon oleh pemohon-pemohon diberikan, ianya adalah sama dengan membenarkan perniagaan dijalankan oleh pemohon-pemohon ketika tidak mempunyai lesen perniagaan yang sah. Pemohon-pemohon telah ke mahkamah untuk memohon bagi mendapatkan remedi budi bicara dengan tidak mengakui keadaan sebenarnya dan mahkamah tidak seharusnya memberikan bantuan yang sedemikian (lihat ms 335A–B, G–H); Teng Meow Chong v Chia Ngim Fong & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 45 dan Abdul Malik bin Abdul Majid v Asnah bte Hamid [1985] 2 MLJ 459 diikuti.]
Notes For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 111–129.
Cases referred to Abdul Malik bin Abdul Majid v Asnah bte Hamid [1985] 2 MLJ 459 (folld) Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (not folld) Samsuri bin Hj Dullah v Sandakan Municipal Council [1988] 1 CLJ 581 (refd) Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (not folld) ||Page 329>> Teng Meow Chong v Chia Ngim Fong & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 452 (folld)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 8(1) Local Government Ordinance 1961 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3(2) Sabah Trade Licensing Ordinance s 3(1)
Chung Jiun Dau (Liew Hon Min with him) (Chung & Assoc) for the applicants. Amin Jaafar (Amin Jaafar & Co) for the respondent. Rosslin Peter Rosen (Ting Rosen & Co) for Renung Abadi Sdn Bhd. Ang Tian Soo for ATS Lands Sdn Bhd.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 291
[2002] 4 MLJ 49 Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Lembaga Rayuan Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor
HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO 25–116 OF 1997 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 14 AUGUST 2002
Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Local authority — Planning permission for development — Appeal against directive of applicant — Whether applicant had powers to issue directive and whether appealable — Whether direction was ultra vires — Town and Country Planning Act 1976 ss 21, 23
The applicant was a local authority incorporated pursuant to the Local Government Act 1976 and was the local authority for Penang island. The applicant was also the local planning authority for Penang island pursuant to the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (‘the TCPA’). The first respondent was constituted under s 36 of the TCPA to hear appeals pursuant to s 23 of the TCPA against decisions of the Local Planning Authority made under s 22(3) of the TCPA. The second respondent was a developer. The second respondent made an application for planning permission for development. The applicant had made a certain directive (‘the said directive’) and directed that the second respondent amend its plan accordingly in order to comply with the said directive of the applicant and to re-submit the application for its consideration. However, the second respondent filed a notice of appeal against the said directive of the applicant under s 23 of the TCPA. The first respondent heard the said appeal. The applicant raised a preliminary objection at the hearing to the effect that the said directive was not an appealable matter under s 23 of the TCPA. After hearing the appeal on the merits, the first respondent allowed the second respondent’s appeal and held that the applicant had no powers to issue the said directive. Dissatisfied with the decision of the first respondent, the applicant sought judicial review by way of certiorari to quash the decision of the first respondent.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) The decision referred to in s 23 of the TCPA must of necessity be taken to include any direction or ruling made by the applicant in relation to any matter that concerned the application for planning permission made pursuant to s 21(1) of the TCPA. The words ‘written directions’ in s 21(3) of the TCPA must by reason of legislative framework considerations be taken also to mean a decision of the local planning authority as provided under s 23(1) of the TCPA. A written direction was also a decision (see p 56E–G).
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 292 ||Page 50>> (2) The problem in this case was one of casus omissus, ie that a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute, rather than one of being precise and unambiguous. The TCPA was both a consolidating as well as a comprehensive Act in respect of planning law in this country. The fact that s 36 of the TCPA provided for the establishment of an appeal board was sufficient to suggest that aggrieved parties involved in the process of planning should be given the right of an appeal. If the literal approach was to be adopted then quite clearly it could result in an oppressive and capricious situation where a local planning authority for any one of several reasons could impose intolerable and improper written directions and an aggrieved applicant would not have any recourse to a remedy or an appeal (see p 57E–G). (3) The applicant had failed to recognize that s 22(2) of the TCPA was only applicable for the purposes of granting either absolutely or subject to conditions, or for refusal to grant planning permission. It was implicit that for the purposes of s 21(3) of the TCPA, there was no such requirement to take into account the provisions of the structure plan and therefore for that limited purpose the provisions of the structure plan were for all intents and purposes totally irrelevant. In other words, for the purposes of issuing or giving written directions pursuant to s 21(3), matters like historical and architectural significance as well as preservation of buildings could not be the subject matter of ‘written directions’. Compatibility with architecture, character or appearance of buildings located in the surrounding area of a new building could only be the subject matter of conditions imposed under s 22(5) (i) of the TCPA. Therefore, the said direction was ultra vires the TCPA (see pp 61G–62A).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pihak pemohon merupakan pihak berkuasa tempatan yang diperbadankan menurut Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976 dan adalah pihak berkuasa untuk perbandaran Pulau Pinang. Pihak pemohon juga merupakan pihak berkuasa perancangan tempatan untuk Pulau Pinang menurut Akta Perancangan Bandar dan Negara 1976 (‘APBN’). Penentang pertama dibentuk di bawah s 36 APBN untuk mendengar rayuan menurut s 23 APBN terhadap keputusan Pihak Berkuasa Tempatan yang dibuat di bawah s 22(3) APBN. Penentang kedua merupakan pihak pemaju. Penentang kedua mengemukakan satu permohonan untuk kebenaran perancangan untuk kemajuan. Pihak pemohon telah membuat satu arahan tertentu (‘arahan tersebut’) dan mengarah supaya penentang kedua meminda pelan dengan sewajarnya untuk mematuhi arahan tersebut oleh pihak pemohon dan untuk menyerah semula permohonan untuk pertimbangan. Walau bagaimanapun, penentang kedua memfailkan ||Page 51>>notis rayuan terhadap arahan tersebut oleh pihak pemohon di bawah s 23 APBN. Penentang pertama telah mendengar rayuan tersebut. Pihak pemohon
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 293 membangkitkan bantahan permulaan di pembicaraan berlandaskan alasan bahawa arahan tersebut bukanlah satu perkara yang boleh dirayu di bawah s 23 APBN. Selepas mendengar rayuan atas merit, penentang pertama membenarkan rayuan penentang kedua dan memutuskan bahawa pihak pemohon tidak berkuasa untuk mengeluarkan arahan tersebut. Pihak pemohon tidak puas hati dengan keputusan penentang pertama lalu memohon kajian semula kehakiman melalui certiorari untuk membatalkan keputusan penentang pertama.
Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Keputusan yang dirujuk dalam s 23 APBN mestilah secara perlu dianggap termasuk apa-apa arahan atau keputusan yang dibuat oleh pihak pemohon berhubung dengan mana-mana perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk kebenaran perancangan yang dibuat menurut s 21(1) APBN. Disebabkan pertimbangan rangka perundangan perkataan-perkataan ‘written directions’ dalam s 21(3) mestilah juga dianggap sebagai bermaksud satu keputusan pihak berkuasa perancangan tempatan seperti diperuntukkan di bawah s 23(1). Arahan bertulis juga merupakan satu keputusan (lihat ms 56E–G). (2) Masalah dalam kes ini adalah satu berkaitan casus omissus, iaitu suatu perkara yang seharusnya telah tetapi tidak diperuntukkan dalam kanun, daripada bermaksud sesuatu yang bersifat tepat dan amat jelas. APBN merupakan Akta yang memperkukuh serta komprehensif berkaitan dengan undang-undang perancangan di negara ini. Hakikat bahawa s 36 APBN mengandungi peruntukan untuk penubuhan satu Lembaga Rayuan adalah mencukupi untuk mencadangkan pihak terkilan yang terlibat dalam proses perancangan haruslah diberi hak rayuan. Sekiranya pendekatan literal diterimapakai maka dengan jelas ia boleh mengakibat dalam keadaan menindas dan tidak menentu di mana pihak berkuasa tempatan atas mana-mana daripada pelbagai alasan boleh mengenakan arahan bertulis yang tidak boleh diterima dan tidak wajar dan pihak pemohon yang terkilan tidak akan mempunyai sebarang remedi atau rayuan (lihat ms 57E–G). (3) Pihak pemohon gagal menyedari bahawa s 22(2) APBN hanya terpakai untuk tujuan memberi secara mutlak atau tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat, atau untuk keengganan memberi kebenaran perancangan. Adalah tersirat bahawa untuk tujuan s 21(3) APBN, tiada keperluan untuk mengambil kira peruntukan pelan struktur dan dengan itu untuk tujuan terhad itu, peruntukan pelan struktur sebenarnya tidak relevan pada keseluruhannya. Dalam ertikata lain, untuk tujuan mengeluar atau memberi arahan bertulis menurut s 21(3), perkara seperti peri pentinganya ||Page 52>>sejarah dan seni bina serta pengekalan bangunan tidak boleh membentuk perkara ‘arahan bertulis’. Keadaan kebersesuaian dengan seni bina, sifat atau rupa bangunan-bangunan yang terletak di kawasan sekeliling bangunan baru hanya boleh membentuk perkara syarat-syarat yang dikenakan di bawah s 22(5)(i) APBN. Maka, arahan tersebut adalah ultra vires APBN
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 294 (lihat ms 61G–62A).]
Notes For cases on local authority, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 48–54.
Cases referred to Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging Malaysia Bhd v YC Chin Enterprises Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 754 (refd) Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin [1997] 2 MLJ 17 (refd) Kesultanan Pahang v Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 MLJ 513 (refd) Krishnadas a/l Achutan Nair & Ors v Maniyam Samykano [1997] 1 MLJ 94 (refd) Kumpulan Kamunting Sdn Bhd v Rajoo & Ors [1983] 2 MLJ 400 (refd) Lucy v W T Henleys Telegraph Works Co Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 456 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Berkerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungei Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Magor & St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation [1950] 2 All ER 1226 (refd) Maunsell v Olins & Anor [1975] 1 All ER 16 (refd) Muhammed bin Hassan v PP [1998] 2 MLJ 273 (refd) Northam v London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 All ER 1243 (refd) Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 (refd) Rethina Development Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai Butterworth [1990] 2 MLJ 111 (refd) Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher [1949] 2 All ER 155 (refd) Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Sungai Gelugor v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1996] 2 MLJ 697 (refd) Tan Kim Chuan & Anor v Chandu Nair [1991] 2 MLJ 42 (refd)
Legislation referred to Town and Country Planning Act 1976 ss 21(3)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), 22(2), (3), (5)(i), 23(1), 24(3)
Gurubachan (L Andrew with him) (Andrew & Co) for the applicant. Mazni Buang (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the first respondent.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 295 Balasundaram (Balasundaram) for the second respondent. ||Page 53>>
[2002] 4 MLJ 105 Md Aris bin Zainal Abidin v Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Anor
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO P–01–136 OF 1995 GOPAL SRI RAM, MOHD SAARI AND ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN JJCA 14 MAY 2002
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Application for leave filed more than six weeks after decision was made — Whether it was a fair procedure to require an applicant for certiorari to move the court for leave within six weeks from the date of the decision — Whether O 53 r 1A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 should be read harmoniously with art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution so that time would only begin to run from the date the decision was communicated — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 1A, Federal Constitution art 5(1)
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Certiorari — Whether rule requiring an applicant to make his application for leave for certiorari within six weeks from the date of a decision contrary to rules of natural justice — Whether O 53 r 1A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 should be read harmoniously with art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution so that time would only begin to run from the date the decision was communicated — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 1A, Federal Constitution art 5(1)
Civil Procedure — Certiorari — Application for leave to apply — Application for leave to issue certiorari to quash decision — Application for leave filed more than six weeks after decision was made — Whether High Court was right in dismissing application for leave on the basis of delay in filing application — Whether it was a fair procedure to require an applicant for certiorari to move the court for leave within six weeks from the date of the decision — Whether O 53 r 1A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 should be read harmoniously with art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution so that time would only begin to run from the date the decision was communicated — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 1A, Federal Constitution art 5(1)
The appellant was a police inspector. On 28 December 1992, he was dismissed from service. The decision dismissing him was communicated to him on 16 January 1993
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 296 but it was not until 11 February 1993 that he filed his application for leave to issue certiorari to quash the decision dismissing him. Leave was granted on 29 March 1993. However, at the hearing of the substantive motion, the federal counsel at the outset took a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter. The argument was that the application having been filed more than six weeks after the date of the decision, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion, by virtue of O 53 r 1A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) (as it stood before the order was replaced vide PU(A) 342/2000). Following Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor, the judge upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the substantive motion in limine. The appellant appealed. The appellant’s contention was that O 53 r 1A of the RHC, insofar as it required the application for leave to be made within six weeks from the date of the decision, provided for an unfair procedure.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The pertinent question that arose in the instant appeal was whether it was a fair procedure to require an applicant for certiorari to move the court for leave within six weeks from the date of the decision. For example, it would be possible for an administrator to make a decision, keep it to himself for more than six weeks and then release it to the person who was adversely affected by the decision. Based on the wording of O 53 r 1A of the RHC, it would mean that that person would be out of time before making any application to court. Hence, it was contrary to the rules of natural justice to require an applicant to make his application for leave for certiorari within six weeks from the date of a decision (see pp 109I, 110A–C). (2) Procedural provisions were no longer to be regarded as mandatory. Rather, the true question to be considered was whether on the facts of a given case, the particular non-observance had occasioned injustice or prejudice. O 53 r 1A of the RHC should be read harmoniously with art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution and when this was done the words ‘…after the date of the proceedings …’ must be interpreted so that time would only begin to run from the date the decision was communicated to the appellant (see p 111F, H); Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54 not followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu merupakan seorang inspektor polis. Pada 28 Disember 1992, beliau telah dipecat dari perkhidmatan. Keputusan untuk memecatnya disampaikan kepada beliau pada 16 Januari 1993 tetapi hanya pada 11 Februari 1993 barulah beliau memfailkan permohonan meminta kebenaran untuk mengeluarkan perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan keputusan memecatnya. Kebenaran diberikan pada 29 Mac 1993. Namun
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 297 demikian, di pembicaraan usul substantif tersebut, peguam persekutuan telah mengambil bantahan awal terhadap bidang kuasa mahkamah untuk mendengar perkara tersebut. Hujahnya adalah oleh kerana permohonan difailkan lebih daripada enam minggu selepas keputusan untuk memecat perayu dibuat, maka mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk melayan usul ini, menurut A 53 k 1A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) (pada masa itu sebelum Aturan tersebut diganti melalui PU(A) 342/2000). Dengan mengikut keputusan di dalam kes Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor, hakim mengesahkan bantahan awal tersebut dan menolak usul substantif in limine. Perayu telah merayu. Hujah perayu adalah bahawa A 53 k 1A KMT, sejauhmana ia menghendaki permohonan meminta kebenaran dibuat dalam tempoh enam minggu dari tarikh keputusan, memperuntukkan satu prosedur yang tidak adil.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Persoalan utama yang timbul dalam rayuan ini adalah sama ada ia adalah satu prosedur yang adil yang mana pemohon certiorari dikehendaki memohon kepada mahkamah untuk kebenaran mengeluarkan certiorari dalam tempoh enam minggu dari tarikh keputusan tersebut. Misalnya, adalah mungkin untuk seorang pentadbir membuat keputusan, merahsiakannya lebih dari enam minggu dan kemudiannya barulah memaklumkannya kepada orang yang terjejas oleh keputusan tersebut. Berdasarkan susun kata A 53 k 1A KMT, ia akan bermaksud bahawa orang itu kesuntukan masa sebelum membuat apa-apa permohonan kepada mahkamah. Justeru itu, adalah bertentangan dengan rukun keadilan asasi untuk menghendaki seseorang pemohon membuat permohonan kebenaran untuk certiorari dalam tempoh enam minggu dari tarikh keputusan (lihat ms 109I, 110A–C). (2) Peruntukan prosedur tidak lagi dianggap mandatori. Sebaliknya, soalan sebenar yang harus ditimbangkan adalah sama ada berdasarkan fakta-fakta satu kes tertentu, ketidakpatuhan yang khusus ini telah menyebabkan ketidakadilan atau prasangka. Aturan 53 k 1A KMT haruslah dibaca selaras dengan perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan apabila ini dilakukan kata-kata ‘… after the date of the proceedings …’ mestilah ditafsirkan supaya masa hanya bermula dari tarikh keputusan disampaikan kepada perayu (lihat ms 111F, H); Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54 tidak diikut.
Notes For cases on certiorari, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 508–509 and 577–578. For cases on application for leave to apply for certiorari, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1368–1369.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 298 Cases referred to Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associations v Chai Yen [1980] 1 MLJ 198 (refd) Dunlea v Attorney General [2000] 3 NZLR 136 (refd) Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj v AG of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 385 (refd) Mersing Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 54 (not folld) Nilabati Bahera v State of Orissa 1993 AIR SC 1960 (refd) R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Jeyeanthan [1999] 3 All ER 231 (refd) Secretary of State for Defence v Warn [1970] AC 394 (refd) Simpson v Attorney General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd)
Legislation referred to Courts Judicature Act 1964 s 16 Federal Constitution art 4(1), Part II
Appeal from: Originating Summons No 25–3 of 1993 (High Court, Pulau Pinang)
Mohd Ismail Mohamed (Ismail Khoo & Assoc) for the appellant. Asmabi Mohamad (Senior Federal Counsel, AG’s Chambers) for the respondents.
[2002] 4 MLJ 364 Chai Kok Choy v Ketua Polis Negara & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–21–112 OF 1995 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 20 SEPTEMBER 2002
Administrative Law — Natural justice — Breach — Failure of disciplinary authority to consider whether breaches of discipline complained of merited dismissal or reduction in rank — Disciplinary authority focused only on dismissal — Whether disciplinary authority acted ultra vires its powers — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 general orders 28 and 38
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 299
The plaintiff was a Police Inspector in the Royal Malaysian Police Force under the control of the first defendant and employed by the third defendant. By a letter dated 3 May 1995, the first defendant informed the plaintiff of his intention to dismiss the plaintiff and directed the plaintiff to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed pursuant to general order 28 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 and punishable by general order 38 of the same Regulations. The plaintiff faced three charges and responded by making his representations to the show cause notice within the stipulated time. The plaintiff was found guilty of all the charges and was dismissed from service. The plaintiff filed a writ and sought, inter alia, a declaration that the dismissal was unlawful, unconstitutional, void and of no effect and that an enquiry be held to determine the salaries, emoluments and benefits due to him.
Held, granting an order in terms of the plaintiff’s prayers: The defendants had clearly breached all semblance of natural justice. It was clear from the Regulations that the disciplinary authority had to consider whether each of the breaches complained of merited a punishment of dismissal or reduction in rank and consider all the available information. After such consideration if it appeared to the disciplinary authority that such information clearly presented a prima facie case against the plaintiff, then the plaintiff could either be dismissed or reduced in rank. Here, the disciplinary authority’s focus was only on dismissal and it had acted ultra vires its powers as contained in general order 28(1) (see pp 368H, 369E–G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif merupakan seorang Inspektor Polis dengan Polis DiRaja Malaysia di bawah pengawasan defendan pertama dan diambil bekerja oleh defendan ketiga. Melalui surat yang bertarikh 3 Mei 1995, defendan pertama telah memberitahu plaintif niatnya untuk memecat plaintif dan telah mengarahkan plaintif supaya menunjuk ||Page 365>>sebab kenapa plaintif tidak patut dipecat menurut perintah am 28 Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993 dan boleh dihukum di bawah perintah am 38 Peraturan-Peraturan tersebut. Plaintif menghadapi tiga pertuduhan dan telah membuat representasi-representasi beliau kepada notis tunjuk sebab di dalam tempoh masa yang diperuntukkan. Plaintif telah didapati bersalah di atas semua pertuduhan tersebut dan telah dipecat. Plaintif telah memfailkan writ dan memohon, antara lain, deklarasi bahawa pemecatan tersebut menyalahi undang-undang, menyalahi Perlembagaan, tak sah dan tidak berkesan dan untuk satu siasatan diadakan untuk menetapkan gaji, emolumen-emolumen dan faedah-faedah beliau.
Diputuskan, memberi suatu perintah seperti yang dipohon: Defendan-defendan telah melanggar keadilan asasi dengan jelasnya. Adalah jelas
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 300 daripada Peraturan-Peraturan bahawa pihak berkuasa tatatertib perlu menimbangkan sama ada setiap perlanggaran yang dikatakan memeritkan hukuman pemecatan atau penurunan pangkat dan perlu menimbang segala maklumat yang terdapat. Setelah membuat pertimbangan itu, jikalau pihak berkuasa tatatertib berpendapat bahawa maklumat tersebut menunjukkan kes prima facie terhadap plaintif, plaintif boleh dipecat ataupun diturun pangkat. Di sini, fokus pihak berkuasa tatatertib adalah hanya pada pemecatan dan ia telah bertindak ultra vires kuasanya di dalam perintah am 28(1) (lihat ms 368H, 369E–G).
Notes For cases on breaches of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 133.
Cases referred to Inspector-General of Police & Anor v Alan Noor bin Kamat [1988] 1 MLJ 260 (folld)
Legislation referred to General Orders, Chapter D, 30 para (2) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 general orders 28, (1), 38
Haresh Mahadevan (Aris Rizal Christopher Fernando & Co) for the plaintiff. Amarjeet Singh (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendant. ||Page 366>>
[2002] 4 MLJ 529 Juraimi bin Husin v Pardons Board, State of Pahang & Ors
FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 1 OF 2001(W) WAN ADNAN PCA, AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA), SITI NORMA YAAKOB, HAIDAR FCJJ AND DENIS ONG JCA 4 FEBRUARY 2002
Administrative Law — Judicial remedies — Judicial review — Plaintiff’s petition for clemency to the Sultan of Pahang rejected — Whether decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang justiciable — Whether making decision making process justiciable would have the same effect as having the decision itself justiciable — Federal Constitution art 42, Laws of the Constitution of Pahang art 15
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 301
Constitutional Law — Remedies — Prerogative of mercy — Judicial review — Plaintiff’s petition for clemency to the Sultan of Pahang rejected — Whether decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang justiciable — Whether making decision making process justiciable would have the same effect as having the decision itself justiciable — Federal Constitution art 42, Laws of the Constitution of Pahang art 15
The plaintiff, together with two others, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the High Court at Temerloh. His appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court had been dismissed. On 30 June 1999, he petitioned for clemency to the Sultan of Pahang. His petition was rejected on 4 April 2001. By way of an originating summons filed in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur, the plaintiff applied for several declaratory orders pertaining to the rejection of the clemency petition. Meanwhile, the defendants applied under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for the originating summons to be dismissed on the ground that the decision of the Pardons Board was not justiciable. During the hearing of the defendants’ application, the plaintiff’s counsel urged the court to remit the matter to the Federal Court under s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’) for the Federal Court to decide on the constitutional issues raised. The High Court, however, dismissed the plaintiff’s application. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and ordered the hearing of the originating summons in the High Court to be stayed and directed the High Court to remit to the Federal Court the question of whether the decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang under art 15 of the Laws of the Constitution of Pahang, read together with art 42 of the Federal Constitution, was justiciable. Counsel for the plaintiff stated that although there could be no judicial review or justiciability of the decision of the Pardons Board on the merits, the decision making process resorted to by the Board could be examined to consider whether it was in line with the spirit of the relevant constitutional provisions. According to counsel for the plaintiff, the inordinate delay between the presentation of the clemency petition and the decision making process leading to the rejection of the said ||Page 530>>petition amounted to a contravention of arts 5(1), 42(4)(b) and (8) and s 38 in the 11th Sch of the Federal Constitution.
Held: (1) In stating that the power under art 42 of the Federal Constitution was not susceptible or amenable to judicial review, the Supreme Court in Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 was then relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935. The Supreme Court and the House of Lords had referred to this power under art 42 as the prerogative of mercy. The prerogative of mercy was amongst the powers that was not susceptible to judicial review because its nature and subject matter was such as
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 302 not to be amenable to the judicial process (see p 537A–B); Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 and Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 followed. (2) The effect of making the decision making process justiciable would have the same effect as having the decision itself justiciable. Consequently, any attempt to make the decision making process justiciable would indirectly make the decision itself justiciable. Accordingly, the decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang under art 15 of the Laws of the Constitution of Pahang, read together with art 42 of the Federal Constitution, was not justiciable (see pp 533D, 537F–G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, bersama dua orang lain, telah disabit atas kesalahan membunuh dan dan dijatuhkan hukuman mati oleh Mahkamah Tinggi di Temerloh. Rayuan beliau kepada Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Persekutuan telah ditolak. Pada 30 Jun 1999, plaintif telah mengemukakan rayuan memohon belas kasihan kepada Sultan Pahang. Petisyen beliau ditolak pada 4 April 2001. Melalui satu saman pemula yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, plaintif memohon pelbagai perintah perisytiharan berkaitan penolakan petisyen memohon belas kasihan. Sementara itu, defendan-defendan memohon di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 agar saman pemula ditolak atas alasan bahawa keputusan Lembaga Pengampunan tidak boleh diadili. Semasa pembicaraan permohonan defendan-defendan, peguam plaintif menyeru mahkamah supaya meremit perkara tersebut ke Mahkamah Persekutuan di bawah s 84 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’) untuk Mahkamah Persekutuan membuat keputusan atas isu-isu berkenaan perlembagaan yang dibangkitkan. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan plaintif. ||Page 531>>Atas rayuan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan, Mahkamah Rayuan membenarkan rayuan plaintif dan memerintah supaya pembicaraan saman pemula di Mahkamah Tinggi digantung dan mengarah Mahkamah Tinggi meremit ke Mahkamah Persekutuan persoalan sama ada proses membuat keputusan berhubung dengan keputusan oleh Sultan Pahang di bawah perkara 15 Undang-Undang Perlembagaan Pahang, dibaca bersama perkara 42 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, boleh diadili. Peguam bagi pihak plaintif menyatakan bahawa sungguhpun tiada persoalan tentang kajian semula kehakiman atau kebolehadilan berhubung dengan keputusan Lembaga Pengampunan di atas merit, proses membuat keputusan yang digunakan oleh Lembaga tersebut boleh diteliti untuk menimbang sama ada ia selaras dengan hasrat peruntukan perlembagaan yang relevan. Menurut peguam bagi plaintif, kelewatan melampau di antara pengemukaan petisyen memohon belas kasihan dan proses membuat keputusan yang membawa kepada penolakan petisyen tersebut merupakan perlanggaran perkara-perkara 5(1), 42(4)(b) dan (8) dan s 38 dalam Jadual 11 Perlembagaan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 303 Persekutuan.
Diputuskan: (1) Dalam menyatakan bahawa kuasa di bawah perkara 42 Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak mudah terpengaruh oleh atau tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman, Mahkamah Agung dalam Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 pada ketika itu bergantung kepada keputusan House of Lords dalam Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935. Mahkamah Agung dan House of Lords telah merujuk kepada kuasa ini di bawah perkara 42 sebagai prerogatif belas kasihan. Prerogatif belas kasihan adalah di antara kuasa-kuasa yang tidak mudah terpengaruh oleh kajian semula kehakiman kerana sifat dan isinya adalah sedemikian hinggakan tidak tertakluk kepada proses kehakiman (lihat ms 537A–B); Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 dan Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 diikut. (2) Kesan menjadikan proses membuat keputusan boleh diadili akan mempunyai kesan yang sama seolah-olah keputusan itu sendiri boleh diadili. Akibatnya, sebarang usaha untuk menjadikan proses membuat keputusan boleh diadili akan menjadikan keputusan itu sendiri boleh diadili secara tidak langsung. Oleh itu, proses membuat keputusan berkaitan keputusan oleh Duli Yang Maha Mulia Sultan Pahang di bawah perkara 15 Undang-Undang Perlembagaan Pahang, dibaca bersama perkara 42 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, tidak boleh diadili (lihat ms 533D, 537F–G).] ||Page 532>>
Notes For cases on judicial review under judicial remedies, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 130–132. For cases on judicial review under the prerogative of pardon, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1721.
Cases referred to Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (folld) Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Kehar Singh v Union of India AIR 1989 SC 653 (refd) PP v Soon Seng Sia Heng & Ors [1979] 2 MLJ 170 (refd) Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 (folld) Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 (refd) Tan Boon Liat @ Allen & Anor et al, Re; Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 304 Negeri & Ors; Chuah Han Mow v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors; Subramaniam v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors [1977] 2 MLJ 108 (refd)
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 84, (1) Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 42, (4)(b), (8), s 38 of the 11th Schedule Indian Constitution art 72(1) Laws of the Constitution of Pahang art 15 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19
Reference from: Originating Summons No R2–24–26–01 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo, Gobind Singh Deo & Ram Karpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant/plaintiff. Dato’ Azhar Mohamad (Mohd Yusof Zainal Abiden, Dato’ Mary Lim, Tun Abd Majid Tun Hamzah & Dato’ Halim Aman with him) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents/defendants.
[2002] 5 MLJ 37 Goh Keah Hock v Mahkamah Perusahaan, Malaysia & Anor
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO R2–25–19 OF 2000 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 19 JULY 2001
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Industrial Court award — Whether Industrial Court erred in law — Failure to take into account relevant considerations — Taking into account irrelevant considerations — Failure to take into account applicant’s written submission — Whether High Court should interfere with decision of Industrial Court
Labour Law — Industrial Court — Jurisdiction — Finding of facts — Whether High Court should interfere — Whether Industrial Court’s ultimate decision was correct
This was the applicant’s application for an order of certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court on the grounds that the Industrial Court had: (a) erred in law by not
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 305 taking into account relevant considerations and by taking into account irrelevant consideration, namely, the applicant’s fight with another co-worker; and (b) acted unreasonably by failing to take into account the evidence tendered therein and failing to consider the applicant’s written submission. Before the Industrial Court, the issue for consideration was whether the applicant had been dismissed with just cause and excuse. The company pleaded various grounds to support the dismissal and at the conclusion of the hearing, the Industrial Court found that the termination was with just cause and excuse.
Held, dismissing the application: (1) The applicant had not shown what was the irrelevant consideration that the Industrial Court had considered. Both parties had led evidence before the Industrial Court, and the Industrial Court had heard and decided the case on the evidence and the pleaded issues. The applicant had not at any time during the proceedings objected to the issues raised and the evidence led and his counsel had cross examined the evidence on all the issues. Further, the applicant’s grounds for judicial review were not on jurisdictional facts but on the matters of finding of facts. Therefore, the grounds did not fall under the purview of judicial review. Certiorari should not be used as a disguise to appeal from findings of facts. Once there was evidence to support a finding of fact, the reviewing court would not interfere with it (see p 42C–E). (2) It was also trite that it was not the reviewing court’s function to interfere on the sufficiency of evidence. The conclusion of finding ||Page 38>>was purely left to the Industrial Court and the reviewing court would not interfere merely because the latter might come to different conclusions (see p 43F–G). (3) The Industrial Court did not decide in favour of the company purely on the issue of fighting. Independently of the issue of fighting, the Industrial Court found in favour of the company on other grounds. The fight was in issue because it supported the company’s contention that the applicant had the motive to act and behave in the way that he did. On evidence, the Industrial Court found that the applicant became insubordinate to his superior, refused to carry out his duties and instigated his co-workers to leave the company. Therefore, even though the Industrial Court’s decision was partly based on the issue of fighting, that alone did not make its whole decision perverse. The Industrial Court found in favour of the company independently on other grounds, which justified the applicant’s dismissal. Further, the deliberation on the issue of fighting by the Industrial Court did not amount to a miscarriage of justice. Its ultimate decision was still correct (see pp 44A, D–F, 48C). (4) The applicant did not plead, either in this application or in the affidavit in support, that there was breach of natural justice. Although the company’s letters of warning to the applicant did not specifically state in detail the applicant’s insubordination, the applicant knew the reasons for the issue of the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 306 warning letters. The applicant was given the second warning letter one month before his dismissal. As such, the applicant had many opportunities before and after the letters of warning to ask why he was warned but the applicant did not do so. All these pointed to his knowledge. Although the applicant denied knowing what the insubordination was about, the Industrial Court did not believe him and made a finding in favour of the company. The Industrial Court’s finding of facts was based on evidence and was therefore not perverse (see pp 45B–D). (5) There was no factual support for the applicant to say that the Industrial Court did not consider his written submission. The company did not file its written submission because the Industrial Court had handed down its decision before the time for the company to file its reply had expired. The non filing of a replying affidavit cannot be a ground for allowing the judicial review. In Industrial Court matters, there were rules and practice on giving evidence and record of evidence. Affidavits were not called for and all evidence adduced was recorded in the notes of evidence (see pp 45H–I, 46B, 47C); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 not followed. (6) If a replying affidavit were necessary, then the presiding chairman of the Industrial Court must affirm and file the replying affidavit. The affidavit, in order to amount to a satisfactory rebuttal, must ||Page 39>>be affirmed by the person who had personal knowledge of the facts in issue. In cases where the exercise of the discretion by a public decisionmaker was challenged, the rebuttal must come from the decision-maker. The company should not be penalized for the Industrial Court’s failure to file a replying affidavit. In any event, the contentions in the applicant’s affidavit can be countered by way of submission and not by replying affidavit (see p 47D–G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ini adalah permohonan pemohon untuk satu perintah certiorari bagi membatalkan award Mahkamah Perusahaan atas alasan bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah: (a) tersalah pertimbangan di sisi undang-undang dengan tidak mengambilkira pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang relevan, dan mengambilkira pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang tidak relevan iaitu, pergaduhan pemohon dengan seorang pekerja lain; dan (b) bertindak secara tidak wajar dengan gagal untuk mengambilkira keterangan yang telah diberi dan gagal untuk mempertimbangkan hujahan bertulis pemohon. Di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan, isu untuk dipertimbangkan adalah sama ada pemohon telah dipecat dengan alasan dan sebab yang adil. Syarikat tersebut memplid pelbagai alasan bagi menyokong pemecatan tersebut dan pada kesimpulan perbicaraan, Mahkamah Perusahaan memutuskan bahawa penamatan tersebut adalah dengan alasan yang adil dan saksama.
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Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Pemohon telah tidak menunjukkan apakah pertimbangan tidak relevan yang telah dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan. Kedua-dua pihak telah mengemukakan keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah Perusahaan, dan Mahkamah Perusahaan telah mendengar dan memutuskan kes tersebut atas keterangan dan isu-isu yang diplid. Pemohon telah tidak pada bila-bila masa ketika prosiding itu membantah kepada isu-isu yang dibangkitkan dan keterangan yang dikemukakan dan peguam telah memeriksa balas keterangan ke atas semua isu. Selanjutnya, alasan-alasan pemohon untuk kajian semula kehakiman bukannya atas fakta-fakta budi bicara tetapi atas perkara-pekara pendapat fakta. Oleh itu, alasan-alasan tersebut tidak terlingkung di bawah lingkungan kajian kehakiman. Certiorari tidak seharusnya digunakan sebagai samaran untuk merayu daripada keputusan fakta-fakta. Apabila adanya keterangan untuk menyokong sesuatu keputusan fakta, mahkamah yang mengkaji semula tidak akan mencampurinya (lihat ms 42C–E). (2) Adalah mantap bahawa bukan merupakan fungsi mahkamah kajian semula untuk mencampuri dalam hal kecukupan ||Page 40>>keterangan. Kesimpulan pendapat adalah terpulang semata-mata kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan dan mahkamah kajian semula tidak akan mencampuri semata-mata kerana pihak yang terkemudian mungkin akan mencapai kesimpulan yang berasingan (lihat ms 43F–G). (3) Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak membuat keputusan semata-mata atas isu pergaduhan. Tanpa mengambilkira isu pergaduhan tersebut, Mahkamah Perusahaan telah membuat keputusan yang memihak kepada syarikat tersebut atas alasan-alasan yang lain. Pergaduhan tersebut telah dijadikan isu kerana ia menyokong penegasan syarikat tersebut bahawa pemohon mempunyai motif untuk bertindak dan berkelakuan seperti mana yang telah dilakukan. Menurut keterangan, Mahkamah Perusahaan mendapati bahawa pemohon menentang pegawai atasannya, enggan untyuk menjalankan tugas-tugasnya dan menghasut pekerja-pekerja bersamanya untuk berhenti atau meninggalkan syarikat tersebut. Oleh itu, meskipun keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan adalah sebahagiannya berdasarkan ke atas isu pergaduhan tersebut, itu sahaja tidak menjadikan keseluruhan keputusannya salah. Mahkamah Perusahaan telah membuat keputusan yang memihak kepada syarikat tersebut bebas daripada alasan lain, yang mewajarkan pemecatan pemohon tersebut. Selanjutnya, perdebatan atas isu pergaduhan tersebut oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan tidak membawa kepada ketidakadilan. Keputusannya yang muktamad masih betul (lihat ms 44A, D–F, 48C). (4) Pemohon tidak memplid, sama ada dalam permohonan ini atau di dalam afidavit sokongan, bahawa terdapatnya keingkaran keadilan asasi. Walaupun surat amaran syarikat tersebut kepada pemohon tidak menyebut dengan khususnya sifat keengkaran pemohon terhadap pegawai atasannya, pemohon
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 308 mengetahui sebab-sebab bagi pengeluaran surat amaran tersebut. Pemohon telah diberikan surat amaran kedua satu bulan sebelum pemecatan beliau. Oleh yang demikian, pemohon mempunyai peluang yang banyak sebelum dan sesudah surat-surat amaran tersebut untuk menanyakan mengapa beliau telah diberi amaran tetapi pemohon tidak melakukan yang sedemikian. Semua perkara ini menunjukkan pengetahuan beliau. Meskipun pemohon menafikan mengetahui apakah keengkaran pemohon terhadap pegawai atasannya itu, Mahkamah Perusahaan enggan mempercayai beliau dan telah membuat keputusan yang memihak kepada syarikat tersebut. Keputusan fakta oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan adalah berdasarkan keterangan dan adalah dengan itu tidak salah (lihat ms 45B–D). (5) Tidak terdapat sokongan faktual bagi pemohon menyatakan bahawa Mahkamah Perusahaan telah tidak mempertimbangkan penghujahan bertulis beliau. Syarikat tersebut telah tidak memfailkan penghujahan bertulisnya kerana Mahkamah ||Page 41>>Perusahaan telah menyampaikan keputusannya sebelum masa untuk syarikat tersebut memfailkan jawapannya luput. Tindakan tidak memfailkan satu afidavit jawapan tidak boleh dijadikan alasan untuk membenarkan kajian semula kehakiman. Dalam perkara-perkara Mahkamah Perusahaan, terdapatnya kaedah-kaedah dan amalan memberikan keterangan dan rekod keterangan. Afidavit-afidavit telah tidak diminta untuk dikemukakan dan semua keterangan yang diberikan telah dicatatkan dalam nota-nota keterangan (lihat ms 45H–I, 46B, 47C); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 tidak dikut. (6) Sekiranya satu afidavit jawapan adalah perlu, maka pengerusi yang bertindak untuk Mahkamah Perusahaan mesti mengesah dan memfailkan afidavit jawapan tersebut. Afidavit tersebut, untuk menjadi satu pematahan yang memuaskan, mestilah disahkan oleh seseorang yang mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi tentang fakta-fakta yang dipersoalkan. Di dalam kes-kes di mana penggunaan budi bicara oleh seorang pembuat keputusan awam telah dicabar, pematahan tersebut mestilah datang daripada pembuat keputusan tersebut. Syarikat tersebut tidak sepatutnya dihukum kerana kegagalan Mahkamah Perusahaan untuk memfailkan satu afidavit jawapn. Dalam apa keadaanpun, pertikaian-pertikaian di dalam afidavit pemohon boleh dipatahkan melalui penghujahan dan bukan melalui afidavit jawapan (lihat ms 47D–G).]
Notes For cases on certiorari generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 135–306.For cases on jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1248–1298.
Cases referred to Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin [1997] 2 MLJ 17
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 309 (refd) Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia [1995] 3 MLJ 369 (refd) Kewal Krishnan v Minister for Local Bodies & Ors AIR 1959 J & K 17 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (not folld) Yamamori (HK) Ltd v Davidson & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 410 (refd)
Harjinder Singh (Pereira Ng & Din) for the applicant. Saw Lip Khai (Ooi Lee & Co) for the respondent. ||Page 42>>
[2002] 5 MLJ 369 Dr Chandra Muzaffar v Universiti Malaya
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–36 OF 1999 KC VOHRAH J 9 FEBRUARY 2002
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Failure of university to renew employment contract of professor — Representation that applicant would be employed on year to year basis and subsequently made permanent staff — Whether failure to renew contract amounted to dismissal — Whether applicant was public servant and must be given right of hearing — Whether applicant had legitimate expectation of continuing employment — Balance of public and private interest
The applicant’s service as a professor in the University of Malaya (‘UM’) came to an end when UM decided not to renew his contract of employment when it expired on 28 February 1999. The applicant in this certiorari application complains that he had been dismissed from employment and had not been accorded a hearing before he was dismissed. Alternatively, he says that UM did not give him the benefit of continued employment which was founded on the representations of UM to him, and which induced him to leave University Science Malaysia (‘USM’) where he was a permanent staff, that the applicant would be made a permanent staff of UM although he was to be employed on a year to year basis because of administrative requirements; that he had a legitimate expectation to continue to be employed as a professor at UM until he retires and that there was also a legitimate expectation to be heard before UM made its decision not to renew his contract, and these legitimate expectations had been breached.
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Held: (1) The applicant was in the service of UM, a statutory entity, separate from the public services (which included the education service) whose members were under the jurisdiction of the Education Service Commission constituted under art 141A of the Federal Constitution (‘the FC’). He was thus not a holder of a public office, ie the education service, within the meaning of art 132(1)(h) of the FC, and he was therefore not entitled to constitutional protection under art 135(2) of the FC which provided that no member of such a service shall be dismissed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard (see p 376F–I). (2) This was not a case of dismissal from service. The applicant’s status was that of an employee whose contract of service had come to an end and which was not renewed. On the other hand, there was the principle that while a public body, which had lawfully entered into a contract was bound by it and had the same power under it as any other contracting party, however, in exercising the contractual power, it might also be restricted by its public law responsibilities. Thus, a decision taken by a public body could not be treated as purely in the realm of contract, it might, at the same time, be a decision governed by statute; Webster v Auckland Harbour Board (1983) 142 CR 646. This principle would have to be viewed in the context with what the applicant claimed was a legitimate expectation to be heard before UM made its decision not to renew his contract and a legitimate expectation to continue (see p 378F–H). (3) The applicant had a legitimate expectation of continuing to be employed as a contract professor by the vice chancellor on behalf of the UM from year to year until he was confirmed as a permanent staff member. The vice chancellor, on behalf of the UM, had a discretionary power on such appointments (and for the renewal of contracts for one year at a time). After the representations had been made to him, then the applicant had a right to expect that UM would act in accordance with that representations of at least renewing his contract on a year to year basis until he became confirmed as a permanent staff member. While there was a concomitant legitimate expectation to be heard as to why the contract could not be renewed on a year to year basis, until he was so confirmed, the benefit of being confirmed for another year by the vice chancellor who had such power should be given unless there was an overreaching public interest against frustrating the legitimate expectation of the applicant (see p 387F–H). (4) The court had to see that there was a proper balance between the public interest and private interest in the light of the representations made to the applicant on which he acted to his grave detriment, and the public interest arising from a directive from the Ministry of Education directing UM to optimize its internal resources and also the financial constraints on the resources of UM. In regard to the public interest aspect, the reliance by the
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 311 university on economic factors which it gave was vague and unhelpful and the reference to the government directive which in reality gave its discretion on the non-renewal of contract officers (and the university in fact renewed the term of some lecturers) did not show that there was an overriding public interest for UM to renege on its representations to the applicant and to him alone that the vice chancellor would continue to employ him on a year to year basis until he was placed on the permanent staff by the relevant university authority (see p 388F–H). (5) The applicant expected to be a member of the permanent staff, but that expectation could not be fulfilled because the power to emplace him on a permanent basis has not been exercised by the relevant authority. That legitimate expectation could not be fulfilled and could not be enforced. So it could not form the basis for a monetary claim till the date he retires. It was a year to year contract which was renewable by the UM through the vice chancellor, and in fact his term had been renewed earlier by the vice chancellor, and what subsequently took place was that he had been denied the legitimate expectation of being continued in service for another year as was explained earlier. It would be fair and just to compensate him for that one year which he had expected and what was not given to him (see p 390E–F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perkhidmatan pemohon sebagai seorang profesor di Universiti Malaya (‘UM’) tamat apabila UM membuat keputusan tidak membaharui kontrak pekerjaan beliau ketika ia luput pada 28 Februari 1999. Pemohon dalam permohonan certiorari ini mengadu bahawa beliau telah dipecat daripada pekerjaan dan telah tidak diberi suatu pembicaraan sebelum beliau dipecat. Secara alternatifnya, beliau berkata bahawa UM tidak memberikan beliau manfaat pekerjaan diteruskan yang diasaskan pada representasi-representasi UM kepada beliau, dan yang mana mendorong beliau meninggalkan Universiti Sains Malaysia (‘USM’) di mana beliau adalah kakitangan tetap, bahawa pemohon akan dijadikan kakitangan tetap UM meskipun beliau akan diambil bekerja atas dasar tahun ke tahun kerana syarat-syarat pentadbiran, bahawa beliau mempunyai jangkaan sah untuk terus bekerja sebagai seorang profesor di UM sehingga beliau bersara dan bahawa terdapat juga jangkaan sah untuk didengar sebelum UM membuat keputusannya untuk tidak memperbaharui kontrak beliau, dan jangkaan sah ini telah dimungkiri.
Diputuskan: (1) Pemohon berkhidmat dengan UM, sebuah entiti berkanun, berasingan daripada perkhidmatan-perkhidmatan awam (yang mana termasuk perkhidmatan pendidikan) yang mana ahli-ahlinya adalah di bawah bidang kuasa Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan yang dibentuk di bawah perkara 141A Perlembagaan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 312 Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’). Beliau dengan itu bukannya pemegang jawatan awam, iaitu perkhidmatan pendidikan di dalam lingkungan maksud perkara 132(1)(h) Perlembagaan yang memperuntukkan bahawa ahli daripada perkhidmatan sedemikian tidak boleh dipecat atau diturunkan pangkat tanpa diberi peluang yang berpatutan untuk pembicaraan (lihat ms 376F–I). (2) Ini bukannya merupakan kes pemecatan. Kedudukan pemohon adalah sebagai seorang pekerja yang mana kontrak perkhidmatannya telah tamat dan tidak dibaharui. Sebaliknya, terdapat prinsip bahawa sementara sebuah pertubuhan awam, yang telah secara sah di sisi undang-undang memasuki sesuatu kontrak adalah terikat olehnya dan mempunyai kuasa yang sama di bawahnya seperti mana pihak berkontrak yang lain, namun begitu, dalam melaksanakan kuasa kontraktual itu, ia mungkin juga terhad oleh tanggungjawab undang-undang awamnya. Oleh itu, sesuatu keputusan yang dibuat oleh sebuah pertubuhan awam tidak boleh dianggap sebagai semata-mata dalam lingkungan kontrak tersebut, ia mungkin, pada masa yang sama, merupakan satu keputusan yang dikuasai oleh statut: Webster v Auckland Harbour Board (1983) 142 CR 646. Prinsip ini haruslah dikaji menurut konteks apa yang dituntut oleh pemohon sebagai suatu jangkaan sah untuk didengar sebelum UM membuat keputusannya untuk tidak memperbaharui kontrak beliau dan satu jangkaan sah untuk terus berkhidmat (lihat ms 378F–H). (3) Pemohon mempunyai jangkaan sah untuk terus diambil bekerja sebagai profesor kontrak oleh timbalan canselor bagi pihak UM dari tahun ke tahun sehingga beliau disahkan sebagai seorang ahli kakitangan yang disahkan. Timbalan canselor, bagi pihak UM, mempunyai kuasa budi bicara atas perlantikan-perlantikan yang sedemikian (dan bagi pembaharuan kontrak untuk satu tahun setiap kali). Selepas representasi-representasi dibuat kepada beliau, maka pemohon mempunyai hak untuk menjangkakan bahawa UM akan bertindak menurut representasi-representasi itu untuk sekurang-kurang memperbaharui kontrak beliau atas dasar tahun ke tahun sehingga beliau disahkan sebagai seorang ahli kakitangan yang tetap. Sementara adanya jangkaan sah untuk didengar berhubung dengan mengapa kontrak tersebut tidak boleh diperbaharui atas dasar dari tahun ke tahun, sehingga beliau disahkan sedemikian, manfaat disahkan selama satu tahun lagi oleh timbalan canselor yang mempunyai kuasa sedemikian haruslah diberikan melainkan terdapatnya kepentingan awam melampau yang mengecewakan jangkaan sah pemohon tersebut (lihat ms 387F–H). (4) Mahkamah haruslah memastikan bahawa terdapatnya imbangan yang sempurna antara kepentingan awam dan kepentingan persendirian memandangkan representasi-representasi yang dibuat kepada pemohon di atas yang mana beliau telah bertindak dengan amat merugikannya, dan kepentingan awam yang berbangkit daripada arahan yang diterima daripada Kementerian Pendidikan yang mengarahkan UM untuk mengoptimumkan sumber-sumber dalamannya dan juga desakan kewangan ke atas sumber-sumber UM. Berhubung aspek
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 313 kepentingan awam, penggantungan universiti kepada faktor-faktor ekonomi yang diberikan olehnya adalah tidak jelas dan tidak membantu dan rujukan kepada arahan kerajaan yang pada hakikatnya memberikan budi bicaranya atas ketidak-pembaharuan kontrak pegawai-pegawai (dan universiti tersebut pada hakikatnya memperbaharui tempoh sebilangan pensyarah-pensyarah) tidak menunjukkan bahawa adanya kepentingan awam yang mengatasi untuk UM memungkiri representasi-representasinya kepada pemohon tersebut dan kepada beliau sahaja di mana timbalan canselor akan terus menggajikan beliau atas dasar tahun ke tahun sehingga beliau dimasukkan sebagai kakitangan tetap oleh pihak berkuasa universiti yang berkenaan (lihat ms 388F–H). (5) Pemohon telah menjangkakan untuk menjadi seorang ahli kakitangan tetap, tetapi jangkaan itu tidak dapat dicapai kerana kuasa untuk meletakkan beliau atas dasar tetap telah tidak dilaksanakan oleh pihak berkuasa yang relevan. Jangkaan sah tersebut tidak boleh disempurnakan dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. Oleh itu ia tidak boleh membentuk asas untuk satu tuntutan wang sehingga tarikh beliau bersara. Ia adalah kontrak dari tahun ke tahun yang mana boleh diperbaharui oleh UM melalui timbalan canselornya, dan malahan tempoh perkhidmatan beliau telah diperbaharui pada awalnya oleh timbalan canselor, dan apa yang berlaku kemudiannya adalah bahawa beliau telah dinafikan jangkaan sah untuk terus berkhidmat selama satu tahun lagi seperti mana yang telah diterangkan pada awalnya. Adalah adil dan saksama untuk memberi pampasan kepada beliau untuk tempoh satu tahun yang beliau jangkakan dan apa yang telah tidak diberikan kepada beliau (lihat ms 390E–F).]
Notes For cases on rules of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 557–622.
Cases referred to Associated Provincial Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (refd) Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 (refd) Fadzil bin Mohamed Noor v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 196 (refd) Findlay, Re [1985] AC 318 (refd) JP Berthelsen v Director General of Immigration, Malaysia & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 134 (refd) Lori Malaysia v Arab Malaysia Finance Bhd [1999] 3 AMR 3161 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 All ER 1278 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 314 McInnes v Onslow-Fane & Anor [1978] 1 WLR 1520 (refd) O’Reilly & Ors v Mackman & Ors [1983] 2 AC 237 (refd) R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714 (refd) R v North and East Devon HA; ex p Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622 (refd) R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906 (refd) Reg v Secretary of State for Transport; ex p Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [1994] 1 WLR 74 (refd) R Rama Chandran v the Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) Schmidt & Anor v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 (refd) Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd) Tay Bok Choon v Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 433 (refd) Webster v Auckland Harbour Board (1983) 142 CR 646 (refd)
Legislation referred to Court of the Judicature Act 1964 s 25, Sch para 1 Constitution of the University of Malaya ss 2, 6(1), 15(1), 23, 48(1)(d), (2), (4) Federal Constitution arts 132(1)(h), 135(2), 141A Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 1(3) Rules of the High Court (Amendment) 2000 O 53 r 2(3) Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 ss 2, 7 University of Malaya Act 1961
Tommy Thomas (Ambiga Sreenevasan with him) (Skrine) for the applicant. Wong Kian Kheong (BH Yap with him) (Lee Hishammuddin) for the respondent.
[2002] 6 MLJ 65 Nasharuddin bin Nasir v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors
HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — PERMOHONAN JENAYAH NO 44-11-2002 SURIYADI J 18 JUNE 2002
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Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Right to be represented — Whether denial of access was justified by the police by reasons of early stages of investigation and as to avoid any derailment to a smooth investigation — Inability to discharge duties by solicitors — Federal Constitution arts 5(3), 151(3), Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 16
The detainee was arrested on 17 April 2002 with access to his solicitors being denied by the police. The denial of access was justified by the police by reasons of that the investigation of the detainee was at the early stages and to avoid any derailment to a smooth investigation in matters of internal security. With that refusal, the solicitors alleged that their work was impeded due to their inability to obtain precise instructions and hence unable to discharge their duty to the detainee. The solicitors had prayed for the right to access to see the detainee under the first prayer and also an order of habeas corpus. Due to the consequential effect of the first prayer, the applicant had applied that the first prayer be dealt with first before proceeding with other prayers.
Held, allowing the application: (1) Under art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution a detainee having being arrested is entitled to legal representation. The next question that follows would be where or at what stage may his lawyers meet with him in order to put into effect that constitutional right. The right of legal representation would be meaningless if a detainee were to be denied of professional assistance caused by some overzealous but ill-informed administrator. Having scrutinized art 5(3), the court failed to identify anywhere in the article expressed or inferred which authorizes the police to deny that access. The honourable court found that in the event an access was rejected, to expect the police to adduce cogent evidence would mean that the burden of proof would have shifted to them to support the objection. Therefore, there is no necessity for the authorities to justify the rejection of the access application. The onus still remains on the detainee to prove mala fide on the part of the police (see pp 69E–G, 70B, 71E–F); Ooi Ah Phua v Officer In Charge of Criminal Investigation Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 and Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of Police [1998] 1 MLJ 293 followed; Saul Hamid v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 76 not followed and Karam Singh v Minister of Home Affairs [1969] 2 MLJ 129 distinguished. (2) It is the view of the court that art 151(3) of the Federal Constitution and s 16 of the Internal Security Act 1960 are provisions that bestow a privilege on the authority whether to release or not the information subject to it not being against ||Page 66>>national interest. The issue of disclosure of information vis-a-vis the constitutional right of a detainee to have access to counsel is two totally separate and distance matters. Article 5(3) distinctly deals with the constitutional right of a detainee to consult a lawyer while art 151(3) and s 16
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 316 of the Internal Security Act 1960 deal with the right of authorities to disclose information which will not be against national interest (see p 70G–H); Mohd Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481 not followed; Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of Police [1998] 1 MLJ 293 followed. (3) The court found after sifting through the evidence that the calculative selection and motive of the police was questionable. The police had deprived him of prompt professional advice at such a crucial moment bearing in mind that the incarceration of a person not in accordance with the law however short must not be condoned. Furthermore, the honourable court failed to find any presumption or conclusion that lawyers have a higher propensity to be meddlesome and a greater threat to the security of the country at that stage of the police investigation (see p 72A–B).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Orang tahanan tersebut telah ditangkap pada 17 April 2002 di mana akses kepada peguambela beliau dinafikan oleh pihak polis. Penafian akses telah dijustifikasikan oleh pihak polis dengan sebab-sebab bahawa siasatan terhadap orang tahanan tersebut masih di peringkat awal dan untuk mengelakkan daripada apa-apa penyimpangan satu siasatan yang lancar berhubung perkara-perkara keselamatan dalam negeri. Dengan keengganan tersebut, peguambela tersebut mengatakan bahawa kerja mereka telah terhalang akibat daripada ketidakupayaan mereka untuk memperoleh arahan-arahan terperinci dan justeru itu tidak berupaya untuk melaksanakan kewajipan mereka terhadap orang tahanan tersebut. Peguambela telah memohon hak akses untuk berjumpa orang tahanan tersebut dalam permohonan pertama dan juga satu perintah habeas corpus. Akibat daripada kesan penting permohonan pertama tersebut, pemohon telah pemohon agar permohonan pertama tersebut diuruskan terlebih dahulu sebelum meneruskan dengan permohonan-permohonan lain.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Di bawah perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, seorang tahanan yang telah ditangkap berhak mendapat wakil di sisi undang-undang. Persoalan kedua adalah di mana atau di peringkat apa peguam beliau boleh berjumpa dengan beliau bagi tujuan melaksanakan hak perlembagaan tersebut. Hak mendapat wakil di sisi undang-undang tidak akan bererti jika seorang tahanan dinafikan bantuan profesional yang akibat daripada ||Page 67>>pentadbir yang terlalu bersemangat tetapi tidak dimaklumkan secukupnya. Setelah meneliti perkara 5(3), mahkamah gagal untuk mengenalpasti di mana-mana dalam perkara tersebut secara nyata atau inferens yang memberi kuasa kepada pihak polis untuk menafikan akses tersebut. Mahkamah yang mulia mendapati bahawa dalam keadaan satu akses ditolak,
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 317 untuk mengharapkan pihak polis mengemukakan keterangan yang meyakinkan akan bermakna bahawa beban bukti akan berpindah kepada mereka untuk menyokong bantahan tersebut. Oleh itu, tiada keperluan untuk pihak berkuasa menjustifikasikan penolakan permohonan akses tersebut. Beban masih kekal pada orang tahanan tersebut untuk membuktikan mala fide di pihak polis (lihat ms 69E–G, 70B, 71E–F); Ooi Ah Phua v Officer In Charge of Criminal Investigation Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 dan Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of Police [1998] 1 MLJ 293 diikut; Saul Hamid v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 76 tidak diikut dan Karam Singh v Minister of Home Affairs [1969] 2 MLJ 129 dibeza. (2) Ia adalah pandangan mahkamah bahawa perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan s 16 Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 adalah peruntukan-peruntukan yang mengurniakan satu hak keistimewaan ke atas pihak berkuasa sama ada untuk mendedahkan atau tidak maklumat tersebut tertakluk kepadanya tidak bercanggah dengan kepentingan negara. Persoalan pendedahan maklumat melalui hak perlembagaan seorang tahanan untuk mendapat akses kepada peguam adalah dua persoalan yang berasingan dan perkara yang tidak sama. Perkara 5(3) secara terperinci berbincang tentang hak-hak perlembagaan seorang tahanan untuk mendapat nasihat peguam sementara perkara 151(3) dan s 16 Akta Keselematan Dalam Negeri 1960 berbincang tentang hak pihak berkuasa untuk mendedahkan maklumat yang tidak akan bercanggah dengan kepentingan negara (lihat ms 70G–H); Mohd Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481 tidak diikut; Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of Police [1998] 1 MLJ 293 diikut. (3) Mahkamah mendapati selepas meneliti keterangan bahawa pilihan dan motif kalkulatif pihak polis boleh dipersoalkan. Pihak polis telah mengilankan beliau daripada mendapat nasihat profesional dengan segera pada saat yang genting dengan mengambilkira bahawa penahanan seseorang yang tidak menurut undang-undang walau bagaimana singkatpun tidak boleh diterima. Tambahan pula, mahkamah yang mulia telah gagal untuk menemui apa-apa andaian atau kesimpulan yang peguam-peguam mempunyai kecenderungan yang lebih suka menyibuk dan adalah ugutan kepada keselamatan negara di peringkat siasatan polis tersebut (lihat ms 72A–B).] ||Page 68>>
Notes For cases on right to be represented, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 618.
Cases referred to Ooi Ah Phua v Officer in Charge Criminal Investigation Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 (folld)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 318 Saul Hamid v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 736 (not folld) Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of Police [1998] 1 MLJ 293 (folld) Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481 (not folld) Karam Singh v Minister of Home Affairs [1962] 2 MLJ 129 (distd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 5(3), 151(3) Internal Security Act ss 8, 16
[2002] 6 MLJ 148 Theempalenged Ouseph Thomas v Sarjit Singh Khaira
HIGH COURT (KUCHING) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO KG 24–388 OF 2001–I RICHARD MALANJUM J 26 JUNE 2002
Administrative Law — Remedies — Certiorari — Consequential relief — Whether court could award consequential relief
Civil Procedure — Costs — Solicitor and client — Whether plaintiff was entitled to costs in subsequent civil suit — Whether defendant should pay plaintiff his costs as between solicitor and his client
The plaintiff, an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak, was retained by the defendant to act for him in connection with his dismissal from the State Civil Service by the Sarawak State Public Service Commission in 1989. The retainer concerned an application for an order of certiorari. A warrant to act was executed and an agreed fee of RM25,000 was entered into between the parties. The defendant also agreed to pay for disbursements. In the interim, another civil suit, Civil Suit No KG 126 of 1989 (‘civil suit’), was launched. No warrant to act was executed for that civil suit. It was the contention of the defendant that the subsequent civil suit was part and parcel of the application for an order of certiorari. It was the fee for the subsequent civil suit that was the heart of the dispute between the parties. The plaintiff applied for, inter alia: (i) a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to costs of the civil suit; (ii) an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff his costs as between solicitor and his client in the matter of the said civil suit; and (iii) costs. The question was whether the professional fee paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in connection with the application
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 319 for certiorari included the fee for the said civil suit.
Held, allowing the application and varying the orders: (1) An examination of the warrant to act and the receipts issued for the instalment payments of the fee in respect of the application for an order of certiorari disclosed that it was made very clear that the fee of RM25,000 was meant for that application only. There was nothing to indicate that it was also for such other actions as might be taken while the plaintiff was retained as the solicitor for the defendant (see p 152C–D). (2) The court could not accept that the defendant was ignorant of the manner or description of the fee that was paid to the plaintiff. The defendant would have been able to discern what was written in the receipts or at least enquired about their contents. In any event, the civil suit was for the benefit of the defendant without which he could not have claimed the items stated therein. The practice and the law then as regards an application for an order for certiorari ||Page 149>>was that no ancillary relief could be added in such an application (see p 152D–F); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif, seorang peguambela dan peguamcara di Mahkamah Tinggi di Sabah dan Sarawak, telah dilantik oleh defendan untuk bertindak bagi pihak beliau berhubung pemecatan beliau daripada Perkhidmatan Awam Negeri oleh Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Negeri Sarawak pada 1980. Perlantikan (retainer) tersebut adalah berkenaan satu permohonan untuk satu perintah certiorari. Satu waran untuk bertindak telah dilaksanakan dan satu yuran yang telah dipersetujui berjumlah RM25,000 telah disempurnakan antara pihak-pihak tersebut. Defendan juga telah bersetuju untuk membayar wang pendahuluan tersebut. Sementara itu, satu guaman lain, Guaman Sivil No KG 126 tahun 1989 (‘guaman sivil tersebut’), telah dimulakan. Tiada waran untuk bertindak telah dilaksanakan untuk guaman sivil tersebut. Adalah pendapat defendan bahawa guaman sivil yang berikutnya adalah sebahagian daripada permohonan untuk satu perintah untuk certiorari. Ia adalah yuran untuk guaman sivil berikut tersebut yang menjadi isu utama pertikaian antara pihak-pihak tersebut. Plaintif telah memohon untuk, antara lain: (i) satu deklarasi bahawa plaintif berhak mendapat kos untuk guaman sivil tersebut; (ii) satu perintah bahawa defendan membayar kepada plaintif kos beliau sebagai peguamcara dan anakguam beliau berhubung perkara dalam guaman sivil tersebut; dan (iii) kos. Persoalan yang ditanyakan adalah sama ada yuran profesional yang dibayar oleh defendan kepada plaintif berhubung dengan permohonan certiorari termasuk yuran untuk guaman sivil tersebut.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut dan meminda perintah-perintah
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 320 tersebut: (1) Satu pemeriksaan berhubung waran untuk bertindak dan resit-resit yang dikeluarkan untuk pembayaran ansuran yuran tersebut berkaitan permohonan untuk satu perintah untuk certiorari telah mendedahkan dengan jelas bahawa yuran sebanyak RM25,000 tersebut adalah bagi maksud permohonan tersebut sahaja. Tiada apa-apa yang menunjukkan bahawa ia juga adalah untuk tindakan-tindakan lain yang mungkin dimulakan semasa plaintif dilantik sebagai peguamcara bagi pihak defendan (lihat ms 152C–D). (2) Mahkamah tidak dapat menerima yang defendan tidak mengetahui tentang cara atau jenis yuran yang telah dibayar kepada plaintif. Defendan boleh menganggap apa yang tertulis di atas resit-resit tersebut atau sekurang-kurangnya bertanya tentang kandungannya. Dalam apa keadaanpun, guaman sivil tersebut membawa faedah kepada defendan kerana tanpanya beliau tidak ||Page 150>>dapat menuntut butir-butir yang dinyatakan di dalamnya. Amalan dan undang-undang pada masa itu berhubung satu permohonan untuk satu perintah certiorari adalah di mana tiada relif sampingan yang boleh ditambah dalam permohonan sedemikian (lihat ms 152D–F); R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 diikut.]
Notes For cases on certiorari generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 135–306. For cases on solicitor and client, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1794–1801.
Cases referred to R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (folld) Sarjit Singh Khaira v The Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 251 (refd)
Theempalengad Ouseph Thomas (TO Thomas & Co) representing himself as the plaintiff. Sarjit Singh Khaira representing himself as the defendant.
[2001] 1 MLJ 161 Deputy Chief Police Officer, Perak & Anor v Ramesh a/l Thangaraju
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 321
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–60 OF 1997 GOPAL SRI RAM, DENIS ONG AND HAIDAR JJCA 27 NOVEMBER 2000
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Procedural fairness — Disciplinary proceedings — Proceedings taken under Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables Regulations) 1970 — Allegation of breach of orderly room procedure — Statement of witness used in proceedings — Opportunity to cross examine witnesses — Whether wrongfully dismissed
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Disciplinary proceedings — Proceedings taken under Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables Regulations) 1970 — Allegation of breach of orderly room procedure — Statement of witness used in proceedings — Opportunity to cross examine witnesses — Whether wrongfully dismissed
Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the respondent, a police officer, for accepting a bribe from one Shanmugam. The incident had been witnessed by two officers of the Anti Corruption Agency (‘the ACA officers’), who were called as witnesses at the inquiry. Shanmugam and another witness, Detective Kamaruddin, had died in the meantime. The respondent was represented by a police officer and was given the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses throughout the disciplinary proceedings. Shanmugam’s statement was not used, but Detective Kamaruddin’s statement was read out. The respondent was found guilty and dismissed from the police force. The judge found for the respondent as there had been a breach of the rules governing the orderly room procedure. The respondent’s dismissal was struck down as being void due to the use of statements by deceased witnesses, ie Detective Kamaruddin’s statement. The appellant appealed.
Held, allowing the appeal with costs: (1) The respondent had the benefit of a full inquiry, at which he was represented by an officer. The most material witnesses, namely the ACA officers who witnessed the incident in question, gave their evidence in his presence. He was given the opportunity to cross examine them. So far as Detective Kamaruddin’s statement was concerned, the reading of it into the proceedings did not produce any procedural unfairness since the respondent was given the opportunity to contradict it. It transpires from the evidence that he did not choose that course (see p 167E–F). (2) It is clear from the respondent’s pleaded case and the arguments presented before the learned judge that the substantive merits of the decision were never
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 322 challenged. It was not the respondent’s ||Page 162>>case that the decision to dismiss him was unreasonable. His complaint was limited to procedural fairness. No material was therefore placed before the judge by way of evidence to show that the tribunal here had acted unreasonably in arriving at its decision. The respondent did, in all circumstances of the case, receive procedural fairness (see p 167F–H).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Prosiding disiplin dikenakan ke atas responden, seorang pegawai polis, kerana menerima rasuah dari seorang bernama Shanmugam. Kejadian itu disaksi oleh dua orang pegawai dari Badan Pencegah Rasuah (‘pegawai-pegawai BPR tersebut’), yang dipanggil sebagai saksi ketika siasatan itu. Shanmugam dan seorang saksi yang lain, Detektif Kamaruddin, telah meninggal dunia sementara itu. Responden diwakili seorang pegawai polis dan diberi peluang memeriksa balas saksi-saksi sepanjang prosiding disiplin tersebut. Pernyataan Shanmugam tidak digunakan, tetapi pernyataan Detektif Kamarudin dibacakan. Responden didapati bersalah dan dilucutkan dari angkatan polis. Hakim menyebelahi responden kerana terdapatnya pelanggaran peraturan mengenai prosedur tatatertib mahkamah. Pelucutan responden dibatalkan sebagai tidak sah disebabkan kegunaan pernyataan saksi yang telah meninggal, iaitu pernyataan Detektif Kamaruddin. Perayu telah merayu.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Responden mendapat faedah siasatan penuh di mana beliau diwakili seorang pegawai polis. Saksi-saksi utama, iaitu pegawai-pegawai BPR tersebut yang telah menyaksikan kejadian tersebut, memberi keterangan dalam kehadiran responden. Beliau diberi peluang memeriksa balas mereka. Berkenaan pernyataan Detektif Kamaruddin, pembacaannya semasa prosiding tidak mengakibatkan apa-apa ketidakadilan prosedur kerana responden diberi peluang menyangkalnya. Dapat dilihat daripada keterangan bahawa beliau tidak membuat pilihan tersebut (lihat ms 167E–F). (2) Adalah jelas daripada kes yang dirayu oleh responden dan hujahan yang dikemukakan di hadapan hakim yang arif bahawa merit substantif keputusan tersebut tidak dipertikaikan. Bukan kes responden bahawa keputusan melucutkan kedudukannya itu tidak wajar. Aduannya cuma terhad kepada keadilan prosedur. Tiada material dikemukakan di hadapan hakim dari segi keterangan untuk menunjukkan bahawa tribunal tersebut telah bertindak secara tidak wajar dalam mencapai keputusannya. Responden, dalam semua keadaan kes tersebut, mendapat keadilan prosedur (lihat ms 167F–H).] ||Page 163>>
Notes
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 323 For cases on disciplinary proceedings, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 580–586. For a case on procedural fairness, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 606.
Cases referred to Abdul Raub v The Attorney General [1983] 1 MLJ 10 (refd) Government of Malaysia v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 (refd) Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Phang Moh Shin v Commissioner of Police [1967] 2 MLJ 186 (refd) Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd)
Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 8(1) Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables Regulations) 1970 reg 6(3)
Appeal from: Civil Suit No S5–21–331–89 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Ahmad Kamal bin Md Shahid (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the appellant. Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the respondents.
[2001] 1 MLJ 208 Muhammad Atam bin Abdul Wahab v Minister of Home Affairs & Anor
HIGH COURT (KOTA BHARU) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO MT (3) 44–19 OF 2000 SURIYADI J 8 NOVEMBER 2000
Administrative Law — Remedies — Habeas corpus — Detention in drug rehabilitation
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 324 centre — Non specification of supervising officer upon release from detention centre — Whether disclosure of identity of supervising officer is a right of the detainee — Whether habeas corpus should be granted
The applicant had been detained under the Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Act 1983 (‘the Act’) pursuant to an order pronounced by the magistrate under s 6(1)(b) of the Act. The applicant applied for an order of habeas corpus on the ground that the order of the magistrate was void because of the non-specification of the relevant party that was supposed to supervise him after his release from the detention centre.
Held, allowing the application: (1) The statutory format that requires adherence by the presiding magistrate expands the scope of the terminology ‘officer’ to encompass a rehabilitation officer, a police officer, a provost officer and a commanding officer. In the present case, due to the failure of the magistrate to administratively delete the relevant portion of the typed order, the relevant supervising officer was not identified, thus jeopardizing the applicant’s well being after his release. Had the deletion taken place, the unscathed required supervisor could easily have been identified (see pp 212E–213F). (2) The magistrate had not applied his mind over the matter of supervision, particularly on the factor of the relevant officer when he failed to delete the irrelevant portion. Thus the supervising officer had not been identified. By this failure to identify that officer, the applicant would not know to whom to report after his release. The disclosure of the identity of the supervising officer was not just to assist but a right entrenched in the Act to enable him to locate that officer (see pp 214I–215A). (3) As the detention was not in accordance with the procedure established by the law in that it was founded on a defective order, the applicant thus was entitled to his freedom (see p 215D).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah ditahan di bawah Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) (Pindaan) 1983 (‘Akta tersebut’) menurut satu perintah ||Page 209>>oleh majistret di bawah s 6(1)(b) Akta tersebut. Pemohon telah memohon satu perintah habeas corpus atas alasan bahawa perintah majistret tersebut adalah tidak sah kerana spesifikasi yang tidak diikuti oleh pihak relevan yang sepatutnya mengawas beliau setelah pembebasan beliau daripada pusat penahanan tersebut.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut:
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 325 (1) Format statutori yang memerlukan kepatuhan oleh majistret yang bersidang memperluaskan skop terminologi ‘pegawai’ agar merangkumi seorang pegawai pemulihan, seorang pegawai polis, seorang pegawai provos dan seorang pegawai pemerintah. Di dalam kes ini, kegagalan majistret untuk melaksanakan pemotongan bahagian berkaitan perintah yang bertaip menyebabkan pegawai penyelia berkaitan tidak dikenalpasti, oleh itu menjejaskan kesejahteraan pemohon selepas pembebasan beliau. Sekiranya pemotongan tersebut dilaksanakan, penyelia berkaitan mungkin mudah dikenalpasti (lihat ms 212E, 213F). (2) Majistret tidak menggunakan minda beliau berhubung perkara pengawasan, terutamanya mengenai faktor pegawai berkaitan ketika beliau gagal untuk memotong bahagian yang tidak berkaitan. Oleh itu, pegawai penyelia tidak dapat dikenalpasti. Dengan kegagalan untuk mengenalpasti pegawai tersebut, pemohon tidak akan mengetahui kepada siapa beliau harus melaporkan diri selepas beliau dibebaskan. Pendedahan identiti pegawai penyelia tersebut bukan sahaja berfungsi sebagai suatu bantuan tetapi merupakan satu hak yang termaktub di dalam Akta tersebut untuk membolehkan beliau mengesan pegawai tersebut (lihat ms 214I–215A). (3) Memandangkan penahanan tersebut tidak menurut prosedur yang ditentukan oleh undang-undang iaitu perintah tersebut telah didapati tidak sah, pemohon oleh demikian berhak ke atas pembebasan beliau (lihat ms 215D).]
Notes For cases on habeas corpus generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 390–437.
Cases referred to Al Annamalai & Anor v Cjhandrasekaran a/l Thangavelu & Anor [1999] 3 AMR 2912 (refd) Aw Ngoh Leang v Inspector General of Police & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 65 (refd) Cheow Siong Chin v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 95 (refd) Datuk James Wong Kim Min; Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors v Datuk James Wong Kim Min [1976] 2 MLJ 245 (refd) ||Page 210>> Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (refd) Lee Weng Kin v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1991] 2 MLJ 472 (refd) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor v Lee Gee Lam and another application [1993] 3 MLJ 673 (refd) Mok Han Liang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1996] 5 MLJ 74 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 326 Onkar Shrian, Re [1970] 1 MLJ 28 (refd) Ram Manohar Lohia & Ors v State of UP & Ors [1968] Cr LJ 281 (refd) Zahir Ahmad v Ganja Prasad & Ors AIR 1963 All 4 (refd)
Legislation referred to Criminal Procedure Code s 394 Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Act 1983 ss 2, 6(1)(a), (b), (2), (3), Form 3 Federal Constitution art 5(2)
Wan Jawahir bte Hj Harun (Wan Jawahir & Co) for the applicant. Mohamed Abazafree bin Mohd Abbas (Federal Counsel, Home Affairs Ministry) for the respondents.
[2001] 2 MLJ 177 R Ramachandran v Koperasi Perumahan Kuala Lumpur
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–111 OF 1999 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 19 SEPTEMBER 2000
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Breach of — Claim for wrongful expulsion from co-operative society membership — Whether respondent had failed to prove that the applicant had acted in contravention of the respondent’s by law — Right to be heard — Not given opportunity to be heard by relevant disciplinary authority upon issue of punishment — Whether there was a breach of natural justice
Civil Procedure — Appeal to High Court — Appeal from the decision of the co-operative tribunal — What the correct procedure is in filing an appeal from a tribunal’s decision to the High Court — Whether leave to appeal required
The applicant was a member of the respondent and his wife was a tenant of the respondent’s flat. The applicant’s wife had referred a dispute between herself and the respondent to the Pendaftar Koperasi Negeri, which was eventually settled in December 1998. On 21 May 1998, the respondent’s board had made allegations against the applicant that he had contravened by law 22(1)(c) of the respondent’s by
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 327 law based on the applicant’s letter dated 5 January 1998. As a result of the allegations of the respondent, on 4 October 1998, an EGM was held resulting the respondent giving the applicant an ultimatum either to apologize within 14 days or failing which he would be expelled. On 7 October 1998, the applicant was informed of his expulsion. The applicant referred the decision of the respondent to the co-operative tribunal, who unanimously rejected the applicant’s claim with costs. The applicant appealed against the tribunal’s decision. The issues for determination were: (i) what is the correct procedure in filing an appeal from a tribunal’s decision to the High Court; (ii) whether the respondent had failed to prove that the applicant had acted in contravention of the respondent’s by law; and (iii) whether the respondent failed to follow the rules of natural justice before expelling the applicant.
Held, allowing the applicant’s appeal with damages to be assessed: (1) The correct procedure in the instant appeal is O 55 r 13 of the Rules of High Court 1980 (‘RHC’), which shall be by way of an originating motion. Leave of the court is not required as the procedure regarding an originating motion in O 8 r 3 RHC is silent on whether leave is required (see p 181A, F). (2) The respondent had failed to reply to all the applicant’s ground for appeal as stated in the originating motion. The respondent failed to reply that by law 22(1)(c) of the respondent’s by laws has ||Page 178>>three limbs, the third being ‘hereby splitting the members to term cliques’. The respondent had failed to prove that the applicant had formed ‘cliques’ amongst its members. The word ‘clique’ as defined in Webster’s College Dictionary is defined as ‘a small or exclusive group of people’. The respondent had only proved that only the applicant’s wife had been acting on the applicant’s allegation. The onus to prove this charge is on the respondent. The respondent never proved this, and the tribunal ignored this salient and vital fact to the detriment of the applicant. To regard a husband and a wife as a group in the circumstances of the case would be absurd and unjust (see p 183F–I). (3) The decision was made in the absence of the applicant whilst the entire board members were present. Thereby, the rule of natural justice was violated (see p 183I).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon adalah seorang ahli kepada responden dan isteri beliau adalah seorang penyewa kepada rumah pangsa responden. Isteri pemohon telah merujuk satu pertikaian antaranya dengan responden kepada Pendaftar Koperasi Negeri, yang akhirnya telah diselesaikan dalam bulan Disember 1998. Pada 21 Mei 1998, lembaga responden telah membuat dakwaan terhadap pemohon bahawa beliau telah melanggar undang-undang kecil 22(1)(c) undang-undang kecil responden berdasarkan surat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 328 pemohon bertarikh 5 Januari 1998. Akibat daripada dakwaan responden, pada 4 Oktober 1998, satu EGM telah diadakan di mana responden telah memberi pemohon kata dua sama ada memohon maaf dalam masa 14 hari ataupun jika gagal beliau akan dipecat. Pada 7 Oktober 1998, pemohon telah dimaklumkan tentang pemecatannya. Pemohon telah merujuk keputusan responden kepada tribunal koperasi, yang dengan sebulat suara telah menolak tuntutan pemohon dengan kos. Pemohon telah merayu terhadap keputusan tribunal tersebut. Persoalan-persolan yang perlu ditentukan adalah: (i) apakah prosedur yang betul di dalam memfailkan satu rayuan daripada satu keputusan tribunal kepada Mahkamah Tinggi; (ii) sama ada responden telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa pemohon telah bertindak melanggar undang-undang kecil responden; dan (iii) sama ada responden telah aggal untuk mengikuti peraturan-peraturan keadilan asasi sebelum memecat pemohon.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan pemohon dengan ganti rugi untuk ditaksirkan: (1) Prosedur yang betul di dalam rayuan ini adalah A 55 k 13 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), yang hendaklah melalui satu usul pemula. Kebenaran mahakmah tidak diperlukan kerana prosedur berhubung satu usul pemula dalam ||Page 179>>A 8 k 3 KMT tidak menyebutkan apa-apa sama ada kebenaran diperlukan (lihat ms 181A, F). (2) Responden telah gagal untuk membalas semua alasan rayuan pemohon sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di dalam usuk pemula. Responden telah gagal untuk menjawab bahawa undang-undang kecil 22(1)(c) kepada undang-undang kecil responden mempunyai tiga cabang, yang ketiganya iaitu ‘hereby splitting the members to term cliques’. Responden telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa pemohon telah membentuk ‘cliques’ antara ahli-ahlinya. Perkataan ‘clique’ sepertimana ditafsirkan di dalam Webster’s College Dictionary bermaksud ‘a small or exclusive group of people’. Responden telah hanya membuktikan bahawa isteri pemohon sahaja yang telah bertindak sebagaimana dakwaan pemohon. Beban membukti tuduhan ini terletak atas responden. Responden tidak membuktikan ini, dan tribunal tidak memperdulikan fakta yang menonjol dan penting ini yang mendatangkan mudarat kepada pemohon. Untuk menganggap seorang suami dan seorang isteri sebagai satu kumpulan di dalam keadaan di dalma kes ini adalah tidak munasabah dan tidak adil (lihat ms 183F–I). (3) Keputusan tersebut telah dibuat dengan ketiadaan pemohon tatkala kesemua ahli lembaga hadir. Oleh itu, peraturan keadilan asasi telah dicabuli (lihat ms 183I).]
Notes For cases on rules of natural justice generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 557–622.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 329 For cases on appeal to the High Court, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 424–431.
Cases referred to Malaysia Shipyard and Engineering Sdn Bhd v Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 359 (refd) Sundaram v Chew Choo Khoon [1968] 2 MLJ 40 (refd) Yong Yoke Sung & Ors v Sungei Way Estate [1966] 1 MLJ 175 (refd)
Legislation referred to Co-operative Societies Act 1993 (Act 502) ss 36, 40(2), 82, 83, (7) Peraturan-Peraturan Koperasi (Fee) (Pindaan) 1999 Peraturan-Peraturan Tribunal Koperasi 1998 Rules of High Court 1980 O 8 r 3, 53 r 1(1), r 13, (2) Subordinate Court Rules 1980 O 49
Thayakugan (Rajadevan & Associates) for the applicant. S Ashok Kandiah (Zahari, Kanapathy & Thulasi) for the respondent. ||Page 180>>
[2001] 2 MLJ 257 Mohd Noor bin Abdullah v Nordin bin Haji Zakaria & Anor
COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–85 OF 1999 GOPAL SRI RAM, HAIDAR AND ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD JJCA 24 MARCH 2001
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Rules of natural justice — Dismissal from police force, whether dismissal wrongful — Appellant was not informed of possibility of dismissal if found guilty — Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officer and Constables) Regulations 1970 — Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) Regulations 1993, reg 28
Public Servants — Dismissal — Natural justice — Appellant was not informed of possibility of dismissal if found guilty — Procedural fairness — Breach of — Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officer and Constables) Regulations 1970 — Public Officers
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 330 (Conduct & Discipline) Regulations 1993, reg 28
Statutory Interpretation — Subordinate legislation — Repeal of — Addendum — Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officer and Constables) Regulations 1970 — Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) Regulations 1993, reg 28
The appellant was a lance corporal in the police force. He was dismissed from the force upon being convicted of three charges of misconduct. He brought an action for a declaration that the dismissal was void because he did not get a fair procedure. However, the application was dismissed by the learned trial judge. The appellant’s case comes under the Police (Conduct and Discipline) (Junior Police Officers and Constables) Regulations 1970 (‘the 1970 Regulations’). The respondents did not, at the time they served the charges on the appellant, inform him that he might be dismissed from service. The 1970 Regulations do not contain any express provision requiring the respondents to so inform a junior police officer but reg 28 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 (‘the 1993 Regulations’) does contain such a requirement. The 1993 Regulation finds its origins in The Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter ‘D’) General Order (‘Cap D’). The 1993 Regulations (which repealed and replaced Cap D) do not apply to junior police officers. Before the 1993 Regulations came into force, the discipline of senior police officers was governed by Cap D. But an Addendum A 207 (‘the Addendum’) in the Inspector General’s Standing Orders provided where certain provision under General Orders Cap D are not expressly provided for under the 1970 Regulations, such provisions under General Orders Cap D shall be applicable to junior police officers and constables. The appellant argues that the beneficial provisions in the 1993 Regulations, in particular reg 28, should be extended to junior police officers as well.
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The intention of the relevant authority was to ensure that the same extent of procedural fairness that was available to senior police officers was made available to junior police officers. There was, therefore, at all material times, a legitimate expectation vested in junior police officers that the beneficial provisions of the former equipollent of reg 28(1) of the 1993 Regulations would continue to be extended to them (see pp 263I–264A). (2) Procedural fairness would continue to be ensured only if the procedure prescribed by reg 28 of the 1993 Regulations is continued to be made available to all junior police officers. Once a particular practice has been adopted, discontinuance of it without prior consultation with those adversely affected by such discontinuance fatally flaws a determination arrived at in consequence thereof. Any other conclusion would offend the joint operation of arts 5(1), 8(1) and 135(2) of the Federal Constitution and there would be an unfair deprivation of procedural fairness (see p 264F–G). (3) The fact that the plaintiff in Ekambaram a/l Savarimuthu v Ketua Polis Daerah
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 331 Melaka Tengah & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 454 pleaded guilty whereas the instant appellant claimed trial was not a distinguishing factor of any significance upon the issue as to whether procedural fairness was meted out. What came across is that the letter to the appellant in the present instance did not bring to his attention the contemplated punishments to make him appreciate the gravity of the situation, and thus enabling him to give a satisfactory explanation as best as he could. That in itself amounts to deprivation of procedural fairness (see pp 264I–265B). (4) Cap D was introduced in 1980 with General O 26 therein (similar to regulation 28 of the 1993 Regulations). On 15 November 1993, the 1980 Cap D was repealed and superseded by the 1993 Cap D. The provision of General O 26 in the new 1993 Cap D is similar to the provision of General O 26 in the 1980 Cap D. According to section 35(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, as a matter of interpretative deduction any reference to Cap D in the Addendum must now refer to the later 1993 Cap D (see p 265C–F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu merupakan seorang lans koporal polis. Beliau dipecat kerana disabit kesalahan tiga dakwaan salah laku. Beliau mengambil tindakan untuk mendapatkan deklarasi bahawa pemecatan tersebut tidak sah kerana beliau tidak mendapat prosedur yang adil. Walau bagaimanapun, permohonan tersebut ditolak oleh hakim perbicaraan. Kes perayu berada di bawah Peraturan-peraturan Polis (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) (Pegawai Polis Junior dan Konstabel) 1970 (‘Peraturan-peraturan 1970’). Responden-responden tidak, pada ketika mereka mendakwa beliau, memberitahu beliau bahawa beliau mungkin dipecat. Peraturan-peraturan 1970 tidak mengandungi apa-apa peruntukan nyata yang memerlukan responden-responden memberitahu seorang pegawai junior sedemikian, tetapi peraturan 28 dari Peraturan-peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) 1993 (‘Peraturan-peraturan 1993’) mempunyai keperluan tersebut. Peraturan-peraturan 1993 berpunca dari Perintah Umum Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) (Bab D) (‘Bab D’). Peraturan-peraturan 1993 (yang meminda dan menggantikan Bab D) tidak boleh dipakai terhadap pegawai polis junior. Sebelum Peraturan-peraturan 1993 mula dikuatkuasakan, disiplin pegawai polis senior ditadbir oleh Bab D. Tetapi satu Tambahan A 207 (‘Tambahan tersebut’) dalam Peraturan-peraturan Majlis Mesyuarat Inspektor Jeneral memperuntukkan bahawa di mana terdapat peruntukan di bawah Perintah Umum Bab D yang tidak diperuntukkan secara nyata di bawah Peraturan-peraturan 1970, peruntukan-peruntukan sedemikian di bawah Perintah Umum Bab D boleh dipakai terhadap pegawai polis junior dan konstabel. Perayu berhujah bahawa peruntukan bermanfaat dalam Peraturan-peraturan 1993, secara khususnya per 28, harus dilanjutkan juga kepada pegawai polis junior.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 332 (1) Niat pihak berkuasa adalah untuk memastikan bahawa tahap keadilan prosedur yang sama dengan pegawai polis senior diberi juga kepada pegawai polis junior. Oleh itu, pada semua waktu yang material, satu harapan yang sah ada pada pegawai polis junior bahawa peruntukan bermanfaat peraturan 28(1) Peraturan-peraturan 1993 akan terus dilanjutkan kepada mereka (lihat ms 263I–264A). (2) Keadilan prosedur hanya akan terus dipastikan jika prosedur yang ditentukan oleh peraturan 28 Peraturan-peraturan 1993 terus diberi kepada semua pegawai polis junior. Sebaik sahaja satu amalan khusus dipakai, pemberhentiannya tanpa terlebih dahulu membincangnya dengan mereka yang akan terjejas oleh pemberhentiannya akan menjejaskan keputusan yang dicapai sebagai akibat. Apa-apa kesimpulan yang lain akan menyalahi operasi bersama artikel-artikel 5(1), 8(1) dan 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan akan terdapatnya penafian keadilan prosedur yang tidak adil (lihat ms 264F–G). (3) Hakikat bahawa plaintif dalam Ekambaram a/l Savarimuthu v Ketua Polis Daerah Melaka Tengah & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 454 mengaku tidak bersalah manakala perayu dalam kes ini meminta bicara bukanlah satu faktor perbezaan yang penting bagi isu sama ada terdapatnya keadilan prosedural. Apa yang jelas ialah bahawa surat kepada perayu dalam kes ini tidak memberitahunya hukuman-hukuman yang dirancang yang menyedarkannya akan seriusnya keadaan semasa, dan dengan itu membolehkannya memberikan penjelasannya sebaik yang mungkin. Ini merupakan satu penafian keadilan prosedur (lihat ms 264I–265B). (4) Bab D diperkenalkan pada tahun 1980 dengan Perintah Umum 26 di dalamnya (serupa dengan peraturan 28 Peraturan-peraturan 1993). Pada 15 November 1993, Bab D 1980 dipinda dan digantikan oleh Bab D 1993. Peruntukan Perintah Umum 26 dalam Bab D 1993 yang baru serupa dengan peruntukan Perintah Umum 26 dalam Bab D 1980. Menurut seksyen 35(2) Akta-akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967, sebagai satu perkara tafsiran deduktif, apa-apa rujukan kepada Bab D di dalam Tambahan sekarang mestilah merujuk kepada Bab D 1993 yang kemudian (lihat ms 265C–F).
Notes For cases on dismissal of public servants, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1525–1563. For cases on rights and liabilities of public servants, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 502–556. For cases on statutory interpretation of subordinate legislation, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1632–1647.
Cases referred to Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 333 Ekambaram a/l Savarimuthu v Ketua Police Daerah Melaka Tengah [1997] 2 MLJ 454 (folld) Inspector General of Police v Alan Noor bin Kamat [1988] MLJ 260 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) R v Brent LBC ex parte Gunning [1985] 84 LGR 168 (refd) R v British Coal Corporation, ex parte Vardy [1993] ICR 720 (refd) Selvaras v Aziz Ariarasa Abdullah & Anor (Civil Suit No S1–21–170–98, unreported) (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 135(2), 5(1), 8(1) Human Rights Act 1998 [Eng] Police (Conduct & Discipline) (Junior Police Officers & Constables) Regulations 1970 Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) Regulations 1993 The Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) (Chapter ‘D’) General Orders 1980
Appeal from: Suit No S2–21–166–1997 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)
Karpal Singh (Gobind Singh Deo and Ram Karpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant. Ahmad Kamal bin Md Shahid (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents.
[2001] 2 MLJ 417 Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi a/l K Perumal
FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 01–2 OF 2000(P) STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD AND AHMAD FAIRUZ FCJJ 24 APRIL 2001
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Termination — Termination of service of member of public service — Steps taken in disciplinary process — Whether show cause letter issued by the disciplinary authority to public servant amounted to giving reasonable opportunity of being heard — Whether public servant has the right to be
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 334 given an oral hearing — Whether disciplinary authority acted in breach of natural justice — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 general order 26(4) — Federal Constitution art 135(2)
The respondent was employed as a hospital attendant at the Penang General Hospital. The first appellant issued him a show cause letter dated 31 January 1991 to institute disciplinary proceedings for dismissal or reduction in rank on the ground that the respondent’s urine sample was positive of morphine in breach of para (2)(d) of the general order 4 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 (‘the General Orders’). In his letter dated 7 February 1991, the respondent denied that he was a drug addict. On 20 March 1991, the first appellant forwarded to the respondent a letter informing him that he had been dismissed under para (i) of general order 36 of the General Orders. The respondent was also informed that he had the right to appeal to the Disciplinary Board. This the respondent did by a letter dated 26 March 1991 where he repeated what he had said in his letter dated 7 February 1991. His appeal was dismissed by a letter dated 4 July 1991. The respondent instituted proceedings against the appellants for wrongful dismissal. The High Court decided in his favour. The appellants’ appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal whereby the court held that the respondent had been deprived of his right to make representations on punishment. Secondly, there was failure of procedural fairness as the respondent was deprived of an oral hearing. Leave had been granted on the following questions: (i) whether a show cause letter issued by a public service disciplinary authority which directed a member of a public service’s attention to the possibility of punishment of dismissal or reduction in rank sufficiently complied with the provisions of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) that no member of a public service shall be dismissed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; and (ii) does art 135(2) of the Constitution require the relevant disciplinary authority to afford the public officer an oral hearing. ||Page 418>>
Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Article 135(2) of the Constitution prescribes that the respondent can only be dismissed if he has been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The letter to the respondent to show cause dated 31 January 1991 conveyed with sufficient clarity and certainty the contemplated punishment namely dismissal or reduction in rank. In essence, the undoubted overall effect of the show cause letter illustrated that the respondent had at the earliest available moment been informed of the two possible punishments under consideration should he not be able to exculpate himself of the charge made. He had been accorded every opportunity to defend himself. This was in fact what the respondent did by a letter dated 7 February 1991. However he made no representation as regards punishment though he had been made aware of the two possibilities (see p
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 335 432A, C–D). (2) The words ‘it shall then proceed to consider and decide on the dismissal or reduction in rank of the officer’ in para (4) of general order 26 of the General Orders do not mean that there should be another separate hearing just to consider that after asking for the officer’s views again. The General Orders, in detailing the procedures therein have sufficiently complied with art 135(2) of the Constitution and in the process are in accord with the concept of natural justice and procedural fairness. There is no separate right to make representations upon the punishment that ought to be meted out to the officer to be dismissed or reduced in rank. In fact, under para (4) of general order 26 of the General Orders, the first appellant was not even required to make a finding of guilt which strongly indicate that there there is only one hearing for a show cause letter issued under that General Order. Therefore, the court found that no injustice had been occasioned to the respondent by the failure to hear his mitigation separately (see pp 439C–D, 440D–F). (3) Based on authorities, the right to be heard given by art 135(2) of the Constitution does not require that the person concerned be given an oral hearing and it could not be argued that the failure to give the appellant an oral hearing was a denial of justice. The court may have fallen into error in granting leave on the second question. Especially so when it has been decided in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd (In receivership) v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 829 that it was necessary for each lower tier to accept loyally the decision of the higher tiers and chaotic consequences would follow should the lower tier fail in this duty. It was therefore not open to an intermediate court of appeal, such as the Court of Appeal in this country, to disregard a judgment of a final court of appeal such as the Federal Court on the ground that it was given per incuriam. The court had to answer the second question in the negative (see pp 447H, 449F–H). ||Page 419>>
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Responden telah diambil bekerja sebagai seorang atendan hospital di Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang. Perayu pertama telah memberikan kepada beliau sepucuk surat tunjuk sebab bertarikh 31 Januari 1991 bagi memulakan prosiding tatatertib untuk pemecatan atau penurunan pangkat atas alasan bahawa ujian kencing responden adalah positif mengandungi morfin yang melanggar perenggan (2)(d) Perintah Am 4 kepada Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai-Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 (‘Perintah Am tersebut’). Di dalam surat beliau bertarikh 7 Februari 1991, perayu pertama menafikan bahawa beliau seorang penagih dadah. Pada 20 Mac 1991, perayu pertama telah mengemukakan kepada responden sepucuk surat memaklumkan kepada beliau bahawa beliau telah dipecat di bawah perenggan (i) kepada perintah am 36
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 336 Perintah Am tersebut. Responden juga telah dimaklumkan bahawa beliau mempunyai hak untuk merayu kepada Lembaga Tatatertib. Ini responden berbuat demikian melalui sepucuk surat bertrikh 26 Mac 1991 di mana beliau telah mengulangi apa yang beliau telah katakan di dalam surat beliau bertarikh 26 Mac 1991. Rayuan beliau telah ditolak melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 4 Julai 1991. Responden memulakan prosiding terhadap perayu-perayu kerana pemecatan salah. Mahkamah Tinggi telah membuat keputusan menyebelahi beliau. Rayuan perayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di mana mahkamah memutuskan bahawa responden telah terkilan haknya untuk membuat representasi berhubung hukuman. Kedua, terdapat kegagalan menjalankan prosedur keadilan kerana responden terkilan haknya terhadap satu perbicaraan lisan. Kebenaran telah diberikan berhubung persoalan-persoalan berikut: (i) sama ada sepucuk surat tunjuk sebab yang dikeluarkan oleh satu pihak berkuasa tatatertib perkhidmatan awam yang mengarahkan perhatian seorang ahli daripada perkhidmatan awam mengenai kemungkinan hukuman pemecatan atau penurunan pangkat dipatuhi secukupnya dengan peruntukan perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan bahawa tiada ahli perkhidmatan awam patut dipecat atau diturunkan pangkat tanpa diberi peluang munasabah untuk didengar; dan (ii) adakah perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan menghendaki pihak berkuasa tatatertib untuk memberi pegawai awam tersebut satu perbicaraan lisan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan bahawa responden hanya boleh dipecat jika beliau telah diberikan satu peluang munasabah untuk didengar. Surat kepada responden untuk tunjuk sebab bertarikh 31 Januari 1991 menyampaikan dengan kejelasan dan kepastian yang mencukupi hukuman yang fikirkan terutamanya pemecatan atau penurunan pangkat. Pada dasarnya, akibat yang tidak boleh diragukan lagi tentang surat tunjuk sebab tersebut menggambarkan bahawa responden telah pada saat paling awal lagi telah dimaklumkan ||Page 420>>tentang dua kemungkinan hukuman yang dipertimbangkan sekiranya beliau tidak mampu membebaskan diri beliau terhadap tuduhan yang dibuat. Beliau telah diberikan apa-apa peluang yang ada untuk membela diri. Ini adalah apa yang responden telah buat melalui surat bertarikh 7 Februari 1991. Namun begitu beliau tidak membuat apa-apa representasi berhubung hukuman tersebut walaupun beliau telah dimaklumkan tentang dua kemungkinan tersebut (lihat ms 432A, C–D). (2) Perkataan-perkataan ‘ia hendaklah kemudian seterusnya mempertimbang dan memutuskan tentang pemecatan atau penurunan pangkat pegawai tersebut’ di perenggan (4) perintah am 26 Perintah Am tersebut tidak bermaksud bahawa sepatutnya diadakan satu lagi perbicaraan yang berasingan hanya untuk mempertimbangkannya setelah menanyakan sekali lagi pendapat pegawai tersebut. Perintah Am tersebut, di dalam meneliti prosedur-prosedur yang terkandung telah mematuhi secukupnya perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 337 Persekutuan dan di dalam proses telah mematuhi konsep keadilan asasi dan keadilan tatacara. Tidak terdapat hak berasingan untuk membuat representasi terhadap hukuman tersebut yang patut dilaksanakan ke atas pegawai yang akan dipecat atau diturunkan pangkat tersebut. Pada hakikatnya, di bawah perenggan (4) perintah am 26 Perintah Am tersebut, perayu pertama tidak langsung dikehendaki membuat penemuan bersalah yang jelas menunjukkan bahawa terdapat hanya satu perbicaraan untuk sepucuk surat tunjuk sebab dikeluarkan di bawah Perintah Am tersebut. Oleh itu, mahkamah mendapati bahawa tidak berlaku ketidakadilan kepada responden dengan kegagalan untuk mendengar mitigasi beliau secara berasingan (lihat ms 439C–D, 440D–F). (3) Berdasarlan autoriti-autoriti tersebut, hak untuk didengar yang diberikan oleh perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak menghendaki individu yang berkaitan diberikan satu perbicaraan lisan dan tidak boleh disangkal bahawa kegagalan untuk memberi perayu satu perbicaraan lisan adalah satu penafian keadilan. Mahkamah mungkin telah khilaf dalam memberi kebenaran berhubung persoalan kedua. Terutama sekali apabila ia telahpun diputuskan dalam Co-operative Central Bank Ltd (In receivership) v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 829 bahawa ia adalah perlu untuk setiap tingkat bawahan menerima dengan taat keputusan tingkat atasan dan akibat kelam kabut akan timbul sekiranya tingkat bawahan gagal dalam kewajipan ini. Oleh demikian ia tidak terbuka kepada satu perantaraan mahkamah rayuan, seperti Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam negara ini, untuk tidak menghiraukan satu penghakiman muktamad mahkamah rayuan seperti Mahkamah Persekutuan atas alasan bahawa ia diberikan per incuriam. Mahkamah perlu menjawab persoalan kedua secara negatif (lihat ms 447H, 449F–H).] ||Page 421>>
Notes For cases on rights and liabilities of public servants generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 502–556.
Cases referred to Alan Noor bin Kamat v Inspector-General of Police & Anor [1987] 1 CLJ 51 (refd) Attorney-General, Singapore, The v Lee Keng Kee [1982] 2 MLJ 6 (refd) B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (refd) Co-operative Central Bank Ltd (In receivership) v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 829 (folld) Ganasan a/l Marimuthu v Public Services Commission & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 280 (refd) Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 11 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 338 Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 513 (refd) High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v IM Lall AIR 1948 PC 121 (refd) Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (refd) Najar Singh v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1974] 1 MLJ 138 (refd) Samsuddin bin Mohd Saad v Pengarah Hospital Bahagia, Ulu Kinta & Anor [1998] 7 MLJ 785 (refd) VC Jacob v Attorney General [1970] 2 MLJ 33 (refd) Yap Jack Keet v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2000] 7 CLJ 74 (refd) Zainal bin Hashim v Government of Malaysia [1979] 2 MLJ 27 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 110(3), 135(2) Government of India Act 1935 s 240(3) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 general order 4 para (2)(d), general order 26(4), general order 36 para (i)
Appeal from: Civil Appeal No P–01–185 of 1996 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)
Azahar Mohamed (Asmabi Mohamad with him) Senior Federal Counsels for the appellants. Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the respondent.
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[2001] 3 MLJ 385 Zakaria bin Abdul Rahman v Ketua Polis Negara Malaysia & Anor
HIGH COURT (ALOR SETAR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–04 OF 1997 ARIFIN ZAKARIA J 22 APRIL 2001
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 339 Administrative Law — Exercise of judicial functions — Judicial review — Power of court to interfere with punishment meted out — Police officer dismissed from service — Whether court may judicially review order of dismissal
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Dismissal — Disciplinary proceedings — Application of principle of autrefois convict and acquit to disciplinary proceedings — Whether disciplinary action could be taken against police officer for the second time based on same facts after he had been convicted or acquitted in earlier disciplinary proceedings — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap D) General Orders 1980
Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Requirement of permission for superior officer prior to second marriage — Whether unconstitutional for disciplinary authority to require member of police force to obtain prior permission from his superior officer before entering into a polygamous marriage
The plaintiff prior to his dismissal was a police officer with the rank of Chief Inspector. On 1 June 1991, the plaintiff wrote to the first defendant seeking permission to marry one Cik Puziah bte Ariffin as his second wife. The first defendant rejected the said application and by a letter dated 17 August 1991 the plaintiff was strongly advised to terminate his relation with Cik Puziah. In para 3 of the said letter a warning was sounded that, in the event the plaintiff failed to do so, disciplinary action would be taken against him. Subsequently, disciplinary action was taken against him (‘the first proceedings’) wherein he was charged under general order 4(2)(i) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap D) General Orders 1980 for insubordination. The plaintiff was found guilty and fined and reprimanded. The plaintiff proceeded to marry Cik Puziah on 3 September 1991. This led to further disciplinary action being taken against him (‘the second proceedings’). The plaintiff was charged with two breaches of discipline, namely for conducting himself in such a manner as to bring the public service into disrepute under general order 4(2)(d) and for insubordination by committing polygamy under general order 4(2)(i). The plaintiff was found guilty of both charges and was dismissed from the police with effect from 4 May 1993. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the said disciplinary action in the second proceedings and hence this action for inter alia a declaration that his dismissal was invalid and that he be reinstated to his original position and costs. The issues for determination were: (i) whether disciplinary action could be taken against any one for the second time based on the same facts after he had been convicted or acquitted in the earlier disciplinary proceedings, and whether the holding that one of the ||Page 386>>charges in the second proceedings was invalid would not vitiate the punishment imposed on the plaintiff since the punishment was in respect of two separate charges; (ii) whether the second charge in the second proceedings was unsustainable as it goes against the plaintiff’s right to practice his religious belief as enshrined in art 11 of the Federal Constitution; and (iii) whether the sentence imposed by the first defendant in the circumstances of the case was excessive.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 340
Held, allowing plaintiff’s application in part: (1) The plaintiff was, in the first and the second proceedings, charged with breaches of discipline under the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap D) General Orders 1980 which is a statutory code of conduct governing public services in Malaysia, a code enacted under cl (2) of art 132 of the Federal Constitution. In the circumstances, the principle sets out in the case of Harry Lee Wee v Law Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 which held that the doctrine of autrefois convict and acquit is applicable to disciplinary proceedings under a statutory code by which a profession is governed, was apt to apply to the present case (see pp 394B, 395C–D). (2) The court agreed with the plaintiff that in substance the two charges, ie the charge brought in the first proceedings and the first charge in the second proceedings, were in respect of the same conduct of the plaintiff in relation to Cik Puziah. Therefore, in all fairness there should have been only one charge as far as that was concerned. To charge the plaintiff twice for the same conduct clearly goes against the principle as stated by the Privy Council in Harry Lee Wee’s case. Therefore, on that score the first charge in the second proceedings ought to be set aside (see p 396A–B). (3) It was not open to speculate as to the likely punishment that the first defendant would impose had there been only one charge before him. Once the first charge was found to be unsustainable in law, then the punishment needs to be set aside. There is no procedure for the court to remit the case to the disciplinary authority nor is there any power vested in the court to substitute its own punishment. It was the court’s finding that the order of dismissal made against the plaintiff was wrong in law and accordingly, ordered to be set aside (see p 396D–E). (4) Polygamous marriage is merely permissible in Islam. A Muslim is therefore not required as a matter of religious obligation to take upon more than one wife. On that premise it is not fundamentally wrong for the disciplinary authority to require any member of the police force to obtain prior permission from his superior officer before entering into a polygamous marriage. Such a condition could not be construed as infringing the constitutional guarantee to profess and practice his religion as contained in art 11(1) of the ||Page 387>>Federal Constitution. The plaintiff had clearly acted contrary to good discipline in marrying his second wife after his request for permission to do so was turned down by his superior officer (see p 397A–C). (5) It is not open to the court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority as the disciplining of a public officer by his department head is part of the function of the executive branch of the government and any usurpation by a court will be viewed with something very much more than disfavour. A court intervenes only on the nature and manner of accusation against a public officer as distinct from a consequential punishment (see p
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 341 397H–398A); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 405 followed. Obiter dictum: Article 7(2) of the Federal Constitution, which protects any person from being placed in ‘double jeopardy’, has no application to disciplinary matter. This is clear from the wordings of the said article (see p 392B–C).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif sebelum pemecatannya merupakan seorang pegawai polis dengan pangkat Ketua Inspektor. Pada 1 Jun 1991, plaintif telah menulis kepada defendan pertama memohon kebenaran untuk mengahwini seorang bernama Cik Puziah bte Ariffin sebagai isteri keduanya. Defendan pertama telah menolak permohonan tersebut dan dengan sepucuk surat bertarikh 17 Ogos 1991, plaintif telah dengan tegasnya dinasihatkan supaya menamatkan perhubungan beliau dengan Cik Puziah. Dalam perenggan 3 surat tersebut, suatu amaran telah diberi bahawa, sekiranya plaintif gagal berbuat sedemikian tindakan tatatertib akan diambil terhadap beliau. Berikutan itu tindakan tatatertib telah diambil terhadap beliau (‘prosiding pertama’) di mana beliau telah dituduh di bawah perintah am 4(2)(i) Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) (Bab D) Perintah-Perintah Am 1980 kerana pengingkaran. Plaintif telah didapati bersalah dan didenda serta ditegur. Plaintif telah meneruskan untuk berkahwin dengan Cik Puziah pada 3 September 1991. Ini telah membawa kepada tindakan tatatertib diambil terhadap beliau (‘prosiding kedua’). Plaintif telah dituduh dengan dua kemungkiran disiplin, iaitu kerana berkelakuan sedemikian dengan membawa nama buruk kepada perkhidmatan awam di bawah perintah am 4(2)(d) dan kerana keingkaran dengan melakukan poligami di bawah perintah am 4(2)(i). Plaintif telah didapati bersalah atas kedua-dua pertuduhan dan telah dipecat daripada pasukan polis yang berkuatkuasa pada 4 Mei 1993. Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan tindakan tatatertib dalam prosiding kedua dan dengan itu ||Page 388>>mengakibatkan tindakan ini untuk antara lainnya, satu pengisytiharan bahawa pemecatan beliau adalah tidak sah dan bahawa beliau hendaklah ditempatkan semula ke jawatan asal beliau dan kos. Isu-isu untuk ditentukan adalah: (i) sama ada tindakan tatatertib seharusnya diambil terhadap sesiapa buat kali keduanya berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang sama selepas beliau telah disabitkan atau dilepaskan dalam prosiding tatatertib yang lebih awal dan sama ada keputusan bahawa salah satu pertuduhan dalam prosiding kedua adalah tidak sah akan tidak menjadikan tidak sah hukuman yang dikenakan ke atas plaintif oleh kerana hukuman tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan dua pertuduhan yang berasingan; (ii) sama ada pertuduhan kedua dalam prosiding kedua tidak boleh dipertahankan kerana ianya bertentangan dengan hak plaintif untuk mengamalkan kepercayaan agamanya seperti yang termaktub di dalam perkara 11 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; dan (iii) sama ada hukuman yang dikenakan oleh defendan pertama dalam keadaan tersebut adalah melampau.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 342
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan plaintif sebahagiannya: (1) Plaintif telah, dalam prosiding pertama dan kedua, dituduh dengan melanggar tatatertib di bawah Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Tingkah Laku dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 yang mana adalah kanun mengawal tingkah laku pegawai awam statutori di Malaysia, suatu kanun yang digubalkan di bawah fasal (2) perkara 132 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Dalam keadaan tersebut, prinsip-prinsip yang dibentangkan dalam kes Harry Lee Wee v Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 yang memutuskan bahawa doktrin autrefois pensabitan dan pembebasan boleh digunakan pada prosiding tatatertib di bawah sesuatu kanun statutori melalui yang mana sesuatu profesyen itu dikuasai, tepat sekali dipakai kepada kes semasa (lihat ms 394B, 395C–D). (2) Mahkamah bersetuju dengan plaintif bahawa menurut substans, kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut iaitu pertuduhan yang dimulakan dalam prosiding semasa dan pertuduhan kedua dalam prosiding kedua, adalah berhubung dengan tingkah laku plaintif berkaitan dengan Cik Puziah. Oleh itu, demi keadilan, haruslah hanya terdapat satu pertuduhan sejauh mana ia berkaitan dengan perkara tersebut. Untuk menuduhkan plaintif dua kali bagi tingkah laku yang sama jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia bertentangan dengan prinsip sepertimana yang dinyatakan oleh Majlis Privi dalam kes Harry Lee Wee. Oleh itu, atas perkara itu pertuduhan kedua dalam prosiding kedua haruslah diketepikan (lihat ms 396A–B). (3) Ia tidak terbuka untuk dispekulasikan berhubung dengan hukuman yang berkemungkinan akan dilaksanakan oleh defendan pertama jika hanya terdapat satu pertuduhan di hadapnya. Sebaik sahaja pertuduhan pertama didapati tidak boleh dipertahankan di sisi undang-undang, maka hukuman ||Page 389>>tersebut perlu diketepikan. Tidak terdapat sebarang prosedur untuk mahkamah kemukakan kes tersebut kepada pihak berkuasa tatatertib dan tidak terdapat sebarang kuasa yang diletakhak dalam mahkamah untuk menggantikan hukumannya yang tersendiri. Ianya merupakan keputusan mahkamah bahawa perintah pemecatan yang dibuat terhadap plaintif adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan sehubungan itu, diperintahkan supaya diketepikan (lihat ms 396D–E). (4) Perkahwinan berpoligami adalah hanya dibenarkan dalam Islam. Seseorang muslim adalah dengan itu tidak diperlukan demi kewajipan agama untuk berkahwin lebih dari seorang isteri. Atas premis itu, adalah secara asasnya tidak salah bagi pihak berkuasa tatatertib untuk mempersyaratkan mana-mana daripada ahli pasukan polis untuk mendapatkan kebenaran daripada pegawai kanannya sebelum memasuki perkahwinan berpoligami. Keadaan yang sedemikian tidak boleh ditafsirkan sebagai melanggari jaminan perlembagaan untuk menganut dan mengamalkan agamanya sepertimana yang terkandung di dalam perkara 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Plaintif telah dengan jelasnya bertindak secara bertentangan dengan tatatertib yang baik dengan mengahwini
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 343 isteri keduanya selepas permohonan beliau untuk kebenaran ditolak oleh pegawai kanan beliau (lihat ms 397A–C). (5) Tidak terletak kepada mahkamah untuk menggangu hukuman yang dikenakan oleh pihak berkuasa-tatatertib kerana mendisiplinkan seseorang pegawai awam oleh ketua jabatannya adalah merupakan sebahagian daripada fungsi bahagian eksekutif kerajaan dan sebarang rampasan fungsi ini oleh mahkamah akan dipandang dengan serong. Mahkamah akan mencelah hanya atas sifat dan cara tuduhan terhadap seseorang pegawai awam dan bukannya atas hukuman yang diakibatkan (lihat ms 397H–398A); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & yang lain [1998] 1 MLJ 405 diikut. Obiter diktum: Atrikel 7(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, yang melindungi sebarang orang daripada diletakkan dalam ‘double jeopardy’, tidak terpakai kepada perkara-perkara tatatertib. Ini jelas daripada perkataan artikel tersebut (lihat ms 392B–C).]
Notes For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 76–83.For cases on dismissal, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 519–543. For cases on freedom of religion, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1536–1544. ||Page 390>>
Cases referred to Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 (refd) Ekambaram a/l Savarimuthu v Ketua Polis Daerah Melaka Tengah [1997] 2 MLJ 454 (refd) Harry Lee Wee v Law Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 (folld) Mohamed Yusoff bin Samadi v Attorney General [1975] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 405 (folld) R v Hogan; R v Tompkins [1960] 2 QB 513 (refd) Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 7(2), 11(1), 132(2) Penal Code s 213 Prison Rules 1949 rr 42(13), 44 Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 344 orders 4(2)(d), (i) Public Service (Disciplinary Proceeding) Regulations 1970 reg 11
Mohd Ismail bin Mohamed (Ismail Khoo & Associates) for the plaintiff. Azman bin Abdullah (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendant.
[2001] 3 MLJ 458 Juraimi bin Husin v Lembaga Pengampunan, Negeri Pahang & Ors
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO R2–24–26 OF 20001 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 22 MAY 2001
Administrative Law — Remedies — Prerogative of mercy — Clemency proceedings — Prolonged delay in execution of death sentence — No acceptable reasons given — Whether breach of constitutional right to life — Whether court can adjudicate on power of clemency of the Ruler
The plaintiff filed an originating summons praying, inter alia, for a declaration that the rejection of his petition for clemency dated 30 June 1999 by the first defendant was unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect. He further sought a declaration that the dehumanising factor of prolonged delay in the execution of the sentence of death imposed on him had the constitutional implication of depriving him of his life in an unjust, unfair and cruel manner so as to offend the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty save in accordance with law as guaranteed under the provisions of art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. The plaintiff’s clemency petition dated 30 June 1999 was only heard and rejected by the first defendant on 4 April 2001 and not expeditiously for no apparent nor acceptable reason. The defendants applied for an order that the plaintiff’s summons for declarations ought to be struck out under the provisions of O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on the grounds: (i) the matters raised in the summons were non-justiciable and/or outside the jurisdiction of the court; (ii) the death sentence imposed on the plaintiff by the High Court and confirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court was final and conclusive; and (iii) the plaintiff’s summons was an abuse of the process of court.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 345 Held, striking out the plaintiff’s originating summons: (1) Mercy is not the subject of legal rights. It begins where legal rights end. The death sentence imposed on the plaintiff was constitutionally valid and permissible by law. The legality of a delayed execution cannot be questioned. By its very nature, the prerogative of mercy is not an act susceptible or amendable to judicial review. The question raised by the plaintiff’s originating summons was not justiciable. The plaintiff had exhausted all his legal rights and remedies. The death sentence pronounced by the High Court and confirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court was final and conclusive and could not in any event be reversed. Since the issues raised by the plaintiff was non-justiciable and were outside the jurisdiction of the court, the action of the plaintiff was frivolous, vexatious and clearly an abuse of the process of the court (see pp 468E–F, 470E, 471D). ||Page 459>> (2) The exercise of a royal prerogative of mercy by His Royal Highness the Sultan of Pahang cannot be varied or confirmed because there being no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore proceedings in court such as by the plaintiff in the originating summons aimed at questioning the propriety or otherwise of such a decision by His Royal Highness the Sultan of Pahang was not justiciable. By the same token a contention of any violations of fundamental rights which rested wholly on or dependent upon such an allegation was also not justiciable. The power of mercy is a high prerogative exercisable by His Royal Highness the Sultan of Pahang who acts with the greatest conscience and care without fear and influence from any quarter. The court cannot adjudicate on the power of clemency of His Royal Highness the Sultan of Pahang otherwise it becomes an extra-curial retrial (see pp 471H–472B).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif telah memfailkan satu saman pemula memohon, antara lain, untuk satu deklarasi agar penolakan petisyen beliau untuk mendapat rayuan belas kasihan bertarikh 30 Jun 1999 oleh defendan adalah tidak berperlembagaan, batal dan tidak sah dan tidak mempunyai kesan. Beliau selanjutnya memohon satu deklarasi bahawa faktor tidak berperikemanusian terhadap kelewatan berpanjangan pelaksanaan hukuman mati yang dikenakan ke atas beliau mempunyai implikasi perlembagaan yang mengambil nyawa beliau dalam cara yang tidak adil dan kejam sehingga melanggar jaminan perlembagaan di mana tiada seorangpun boleh diambil nyawanya atau dilucutkan kebebasan dirinya kecuali menurut undang-undang sebagaimana yang dijaminkan di bawah peruntukan perkara 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Petisyen plaintif yang merayu untuk memohon belas kasihan bertarikh 30 Jun 1999 hanya didengar dan ditolak oleh defendan pertama pada 4 April 2001 dan tidak secepat mungkin atas sebab yang tidak jelas atau boleh diterima. Defendan-defendan memohon satu perintah agar
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 346 saman deklarasi-deklarasi plaintif patut dibatalkan di bawah peruntukan A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atas alasan: (i) perkara-perkara yang ditimbulkan dalam saman tersebut tidak dapat diadili dan/atau di luar bidang kuasa mahkamah; (ii) hukuman mati yang dikenakan ke atas plaintif oleh Mahkamah Tinggi adalah muktamad dan tidak dapat dipertikaikan; dan (iii) saman plaintif tersebut menyalahgunakan proses mahkamah.
Diputuskan, membatalkan saman pemula plaintif: (1) Belas kasihan bukan satu perkara berhubung hak undang-undang. Hukuman mati yang dikenakan ke atas plaintif adalah sah mengikut perlembagaan dan diterima oleh undang-undang. Kesahihan satu pelaksanaan yang ditangguhkan tidak boleh dipersoalkan. Melalui sifatnya, prerogatif memberikan belas ||Page 460>>kasihan bukan satu perbuatan yang mudah atau boleh dipinda oleh kajian semula kehakiman. Persoalan yang ditimbulkan oleh saman pemula plaintif tidak boleh diadili. Plaintif telah menggunakan semua hak undang-undang dan remedi beliau. Hukuman mati yang diisytiharkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan yang telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan adalah muktamad dan tidak boleh dipertikaikan dan tidak boleh dalam apa keadaanpun dimansuhkan. Memandangkan persoalan-persoalan yang ditimbulkan oleh plaintif tidak boleh diadili dan di luar bidang kuasa mahkamah, tindakan plaintif adalah remeh, menyusahkan dan jelas satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (lihat ms 468E–F, 470E, 471D). (2) Penggunaan satu prerogatif belas kasihan diraja oleh Yang Mulia Sultan Pahang tidak boleh diubah atau disahkan kerana tiada bidang kuasa untuk berbuat demikian. Oleh itu prosiding mahkamah seperti mana oleh plaintif dalam saman pemula tersebut yang bertujuan untuk menyoalkan empunya atau sebaliknya keputusan Yang Mulia Sultan Pahang adalah tidak boleh diadili. Dengan sebab yang sama satu perbalahan tentang apa-apa perlanggaran hak-hak asasi yang berdasarkan secara menyeluruh atau bergantung kepada suatu dakwaan juga tidak boleh diadili. Kuasa memberi belas kasihan adalah satu prerogatif yang tinggi yang digunakan oleh Yang Mulia Sultan Pahang yang bertindak dengan hati nurani dan tanggungjawab tanpa rasa takut dan pengaruh sesiapa. Mahkamah tidak boleh mengadili atas kuasa belas kasihan Yang Mulia Sultan Pahang, jika tidak ia akan menjadi satu perbicaraan semula yang berupa ‘extra curial’ (lihat ms 471H–472B).]
Cases referred to Alloy Automotive Sdn Bhd v Perusahaan Ironfield Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 382 (refd) Cheah Soon Hoong v PP [1972] 2 MLJ 170 (refd) Collector Land Revenue South West District Penang v Kam Gin Paik and Ors [1986] 1 WLR 412 (refd) Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin & Ors [1998] 1 SLR 374
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 347 (refd) Jabar v PP [1995] 1 SLR 617 (refd) Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281 (refd) Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Daerah Barat Daya, Pulau Pinang v Ong Gaik Kee [1983] 2 MLJ 35 (refd) PP v Mah Chuen Lim & Ors [1975] 1 MLJ 9 (refd) Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd) ||Page 461>> Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 (refd) Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Liau Nyun Fui [1991] 1 MLJ 350 (refd) Wee Choo Keong v Lee Chong Meng & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 41 (refd)
Legislation referred to Constitution of the State of Pahang art 15 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 84(1) Federal Constitution arts 4(1), 5(1), 15, 42(4)(b), (8) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19
Karpal Singh (Gobind Singh Deo with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Abdul Gani Patail (Mohd Azahar, Majid Hamzah and Mary with him) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendant.
[2001] 4 MLJ 122 Glen Waverley Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Negeri Selangor & Anor
HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO 25–37 OF 1996 LOW HOP BING J 20 JULY 2001
Administrative Law — Remedies — Mandamus — Order requiring Petaling District Land
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 348 Administrator to deliver separate issue documents of title — Whether first respondent under obligation to issue individual titles to applicant — Whether applicant could compel first respondent to issue individual titles by obtaining order of mandamus — Whether applicant has sufficient interest and locus to apply for and obtain order of mandamus — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 O 53, Schedule para 1 — Specific Relief Act 1950 s 44
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Right to be heard — Modification of applicant’s rights without applicant’s consent or without giving applicant opportunity to present its views — Whether breach of the doctrine of legitimate expectation — Whether constituted breach of rules of natural justice
Land Law — Ownership — Title to land — Registration and issue of documents of title in favour of applicant pursuant to joint venture agreement and letter of alienation — Whether ownership of land vested in applicant — Whether land ceased to be state land — Formal surrender of block title to first respondent for same land to be realienated to applicant — Whether applicant was entitled to titles for subdivided portions — Whether land revested in state
The applicant entered into a joint venture agreement (‘the JVA’) with the Selangor state government to develop a piece of land measuring 50 acres (‘the land’). Pursuant to cl 14 of the JVA, the state government was required to register and issue the documents of title for the land in favour of the applicant and the applicant was required to pay all rates and taxes for the land. The land was alienated to the applicant and the conditions of alienation were set out in the letter of alienation, which was annexed to the JVA. Para 1.4 of the letter of alienation mandated the formal surrender of the block title to the first respondent for the same land to be realienated to the applicant according to the layout plan as approved by the planner and thereafter, individual titles were to be issued for the individual lots as found in the layout plan with the conditions for payment of dues as prescribed therein. The subject matter of the dispute involved two of the subdivided portions, namely, the school and clinic portion and the community portion (‘the subdivided portions’). According to the applicant, when it sought the title for the school portion, the land office advised the applicant to ‘appeal’ to the Selangor Menteri Besar. The first respondent treated that ‘appeal’ as an application for alienation or variation of the conditions of alienation. The applicant claimed that it was the owner of the subdivided portions but according to the first respondent, the applicant was not the owner because the premium payable had not been stipulated in the letter of alienation ||Page 123>>and as such, no title could be issued. Meanwhile, the school portion was alienated to the Federal Lands Commissioner (‘the second respondent’). The second respondent however, had not taken any steps in the instant proceedings. The applicant contended that the first respondent had acted ultra vires and in breach of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in denying title to the applicant for the subdivided portions and applied, inter alia, for an order of mandamus directing the Petaling District Land
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 349 Administrator to deliver to the applicant the separate issue documents of title in respect of the subdivided portions. The parties agreed that the issues for determination by the court were whether: (a) the applicant was entitled to the titles for the subdivided portions; (b) the applicant had applied for a new alienation of the school portion; (c) the state authority was entitled to impose new conditions in the applicant’s ‘appeal’ for the school portion; (d) the state authority acted lawfully in alienating the school portion to the second respondent; and (e) the remedy of mandamus was available and ought to be issued in the instant case.
Held, allowing the application: (1) Upon the applicant paying the relevant dues, the issue document of title for the land was given to the applicant to whom the land had been alienated. It followed that ownership of the land had thereby been vested in the applicant and therefore ceased to be state land. Any alienated land could only revert to the state in accordance with the law, for example, by acquisition, surrender or forfeiture for breach of conditions but this was not the situation in the instant case. The provisions in para 1.4 of the letter of alienation further strengthened the vesting of ownership in the applicant. Therefore, upon a proper construction of the JVA and the letter of alienation, ownership of the land had undoubtedly been vested in the applicant. Accordingly, the reply to issue (a) was that the applicant was entitled to the titles for the subdivided portions (see pp 132E–G, 133B). (2) The JVA and the letter of alienation required a formal surrender of the block title by the applicant to the state government for the purpose of effecting a realienation of the same land to the applicant. In the event of any purported change of the obligations created by the first respondent, the applicant should be given adequate prior notice in line with the doctrine of legitimate expectation, particularly so where the first respondent purported to deprive the applicant of the ownership of the land. In the instant case, the purported attempt by the first respondent to modify the applicant’s rights without the applicant’s consent or without giving the applicant the opportunity to present its views, ran counter to the doctrine of legitimate expectation and constituted a breach of the rules of natural justice (see pp 133E–F, 134H). ||Page 124>> (3) The ‘appeal’ to the Menteri Besar did not deprive the applicant of its ownership or proprietary interest in the land. The concepts of waiver or abandonment were not applicable in public law or to matters governed by a statutory regime such as the alienation or ownership of land under the National Land Code 1965. Accordingly, the ‘appeal’ to the Menteri Besar did not and could not revest the applicant’s land in the state. There was no question of new alienation. The true legal position was a realienation of the same piece of land to the applicant with all the individual titles for all the individual lots contained in the layout plan. Therefore, the reply to issue (b) was that the applicant had
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 350 not applied for a new alienation of the school portion (see p 135A–C). (4) In respect of issue (c), since the applicant did not apply for a new alienation or variation of the conditions, the state authority was not entitled to impose new conditions or new premium at current evaluation (see p 135D–E). (5) Since the ownership of the land had been vested in the applicant, and therefore ceased to be state land, the purported alienation to the second respondent was not legal or lawful. Therefore, in regard to issue (d), the state authority did not act lawfully in alienating the school portion to the second respondent (see pp 135G–H, 136B). (6) Pursuant to the letter of alienation, the first respondent was under an obligation to issue individual titles to all the approved subdivided lots to the applicant. As such, the applicant could compel the first respondent to do so by obtaining an order of mandamus under para 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and O 53 or pursuant to s 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. The applicant had sufficient interest and locus to apply for and obtain an order of mandamus. Therefore, the remedy of mandamus was available and ought to be issued in the instant case (see p 136B–C, G).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Pemohon telah menyempurnakan satu perjanjian usahasama (‘PU tersebut’) dengan kerajaan negeri Selangor untuk membangunkan sebidang tanah berukuran 50 ekar (‘tanah tersebut’). Menurut kl 14 PU tersebut, kerajaan negeri dikehendaki mendaftar dan mengeluarkan dokumen hakmilik untuk tanah tersebut yang menyebelahi pemohon dan pemohon dikehendaki membayar semua kadar dan cukai untuk tanah tersebut. Tanah tersebut telah diberimilik kepada pemohon dan syarat-syarat pemberimilikan tersebut dinyatakan dalam surat pemberimilikan, yang dilampirkan dalam PU tersebut. Perenggan 1.4 surat pemberimilikan memandatkan penyerahan rasmi blok hakmilik kepada responden pertama untuk tanah yang sama diserahkan semula kepada pemohon ||Page 125>>menurut pelan susun atur dengan syarat-syarat pembayaran hutang sebagaimana yang dinyatakan. Perkara pokok pertikaian melibatkan dua bahagian yang dibahagikan, terutamanya, bahagian-bahagian sekolah dan klinik dan bahagian komuniti (‘bahagian-bahagian yang dibahagikan tersebut’). Menurut pemohon, apabila ia memohon hakmilik bahagian sekolah, pejabat tanah menasihati pemohon untuk ‘merayu’ kepada Menteri Besar Selangor. Responden pertama menganggap ‘rayuan’ tersebut sebagai satu permohonan pemberimilikan atau perubahan kepada syarta-syarat pemberimilikan tersebut. Pemohon mendakwa bahawa ia adalah pemilik bahagian-bahagian yang dibahagikan tersebut tetapi menurut responden pertama, pemohon bukan pemiliknya kerana premium yang perlu dibayar tidak dinyatakan di dalam surat pemberimilikan tersebut dan oleh itu, tiada hakmilik boleh dikeluarkan. Sementara itu, bahagian sekolah tersebut diberimilik kepada Pesuruhjaya Tanah-Tanah Persekutuan (‘responden kedua’). Responden kedua bagaimanapun, tidak mengambil
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 351 apa-apa langkah dalam prosiding ini. Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa responden pertama telah bertindak ultra vires dan melanggar doktrin jangkaan sah (legitimate expectation) apabila menafikan hakmilik kepada pemohon untuk bahagian-bahagian yang dibahagikan tersebut dan memohon, antara lain, untuk satu perintah mandamus mengarahkan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Petaling menyerahkan pemohon dokumen hakmilik keluaran berasingan berhubung bahagian-bahagian yang dibahagikan tersebut. Pihak-pihak bersetuju bahawa persoalan-persoalan yang perlu ditentukan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada: (a) pemohon berhak terhadap hakmilik-hakmilik bahagian-bahagian yang dibahagikan tersebut; (b) pemohon telah memohon satu pemberimilikan baru untuk bahagain sekolah tersebut; (c) pihak berkuasa negeri berhak untuk mengenakan syarat-syarat baru dalam ‘rayuan’ pemohon untuk bahagian sekolah tersebut; (d) pihak berkuasa negeri bertindak dengan sah apabila memberimilik bahagian sekolah tersebut kepada responden kedua; dan (e) remedi mandamus sedia ada dan sepatutnya diberikan dalam kes ini.
Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Apabila pemohon membayar hutang-hutang berkaitan, dokumen hakmilik keluaran untuk tanah tersebut telahpun diberimilik. Ini bermaksud bahawa pemilikan tanah tersebut telah diletakhakkan kepada pemohon dan oleh itu bukan lagi tanah kerajaan. Mana-mana tanah pemberimilikan hanya boleh dikembalikan kepada kerajaan menurut undang-undang, contohnya, melalui perolehan, penyerahan atau perlucuthakan kerana pelanggaran syarat-syarat tetapi ini bukan keadaannya dalam kes ini. Peruntukan dalan perenggan 1.4 surat pemberimilikan seterusnya mengukuhkan peletakhakan pemilikan pemohon. Oleh itu, dengan satu pentafsiran yang betul PU tersebut dan surat pemberimilikan, pemilikan tanah tersebut tanpa diragui terletakhak pada ||Page 126>>pemohon. Sewajarnya, jawapan kepada persoalan (a) adalah pemohon berhak kepada hakmilik-hakmilik bahagian-bahagian yang dibahagikan tersebut (lihat ms 132E–G, 133B). (2) PU tersebut dan surat pemberimilikan menghendaki satu penyerahan rasmi blok hakmilik oleh pemohon kepada kerajaan negeri bagi tujuan menguatkuasakan satu pemberimilikan semula tanah yang sama kepada pemohon. Dalam keadaan apa-apa perubahan obligasi-obligasi yang dibentuk oleh responden pertama, pemohon hendaklah diberikan notis mencukupi terlebih dahulu sejajar dengan doktrin jangkaan sah, terutama sekali di mana responden pertama bermaksud untuk mengkilankan pemohon daripada pemilikan tanah tersebut. Di dalam kes ini, percubaan yang dimaksudkan oleh responden pertama untuk mengubah hak-hak pemohon tanpa kebenaran pemohon atau tanpa memberikan pemohon peluang untuk mengemukakan pendapatnya, adalah bertentangan dengan doktrin jangkaan sah dan membentuk satu pelanggaran rukun keadilan asasi (lihat ms 133E–F, 134H). (3) ‘Rayuan’ kepada Menteri Besar Selangor tidak mengkilankan pemohon terhadap pemilikan atau kepentingan pemilikannya dalam tanah tersebut.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 352 Konsep-konsep penepian (waiver) atau peninggalan (abandonment) tidak digunakan dalam undang-undang awam atau berhubung perkara-perkara yang dikawal oleh regim statutori seperti pemberimilikan atau pemilikan tanah di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara 1965. Sewajarnya, ‘rayuan’ kepada Menteri Besar tersebut tidak boleh meletakhak semula tanah pemohon dalam negeri. Tiada persoalan tentang pemberimilikan baru. Kedudukan sebenar yang sah adalah satu pemberimilikan semula sebidang tanah yang sama kepada pemohon dalam pelan susun atur. Oleh itu, jawapan kepada persoalan (b) adalah pemohon tidak memohon untuk satu pemberimilikan baru untuk bahagian sekolah tersebut (lihat ms 135A–C). (4) Berhubung persoalan (c), memandangkan pemohon tidak memohon satu pemberimilikan atau perubahan baru untuk syarat-syarat tersebut, pihak berkuasa negeri tidak berhak untuk mengenakan syarat-syarat baru atau premium baru dalam penilaian semasa ini (lihat ms 135D–E). (5) Memandangkan pemilikan tanah tersebut diletakhak pada pemohon, dan oleh demikian bukan lagi tanah kerajaan, pemberimilikan yang dimaksudkan kepada responden kedua tidak sah di sisi undang-undang. Oleh itu, berhubung persoalan (d), pihak berkuasa negeri tidak bertindak dengan sah apabila memberimilikan bahagian sekolah tersebut kepada responden kedua (lihat ms 135G–H, 136B). (6) Menurut surat pemberimilikan tersebut, responden pertama adalah di bawah satu obligasi untuk mengeluarkan hakmilik-hakmilik berasingan untuk semua lot yang dibahagikan yang telah ||Page 127>>diluluskan kepada pemohon. Oleh itu, pemohon boleh mendesak responden pertama untuk berbuat demikian dengan mendapatkan satu perintah mandamus di bawah perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dan A 53 atau menurut s 44 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950. Pemohon mempunyai kepentingan yang mencukupi dan locus untuk memohon dan mendapatkan satu perintah mandamus. Oleh itu, remedi mandamus sedia ada dan sepatutnya diberikan dalam kes ini (lihat ms 136B–C, G).]
Notes For cases on right to be heard, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 609–617.For cases on mandamus, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 443–468.For a case title to land, see 8(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 2945.
Cases referred to A-G for New South Wales v Quin [1990] 3 All ER 1 (refd) Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346, [1983] 2 AC 629 (refd) Government of Malaysia & Anor v Jagdis Singh [1987] 2 MLJ 185 (refd)
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 353 Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 (refd) Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Kuluwante (an infant) v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 9 (refd) Land Executive Committee of Federal Territory v Syarikat Harper Gilfillan Bhd [1981] 1 MLJ 234 (refd) Lim Kui Siam & Anor (Representing All the Members of Persatuan Penduduk-penduduk Kawasan Hj Manan, Kluang) v Pentadbir Tanah, Daerah Kluang [1995] 1 CLJ 846 (refd) Liverpool Taxi Owners’ Association, Re [1972] 2 All ER 589, [1972] 2 QB 299 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugur Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41 (refd) O’Reilly v Mackman & Ors and other cases [1982] 3 All ER 1124, [1983] 2 AC 237 (refd) Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1984] 2 EGLR 183 (refd) R v Devon County Council; ex p Baker & Anor [1995] 1 All ER 73 (refd) R v Rochdale Metropolitan BC; ex p Schemet [1993] 1 FCR 306 (refd) ||Page 128>> R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p Khan [1985] 1 All ER 40, [1984] 1 WLR 1337 (refd) R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept; ex p Ruddock & Ors [1987] 2 All ER 518, [1987] 1 WLR 1482 (refd) R v Secretary of State for The Home Department; ex p Swati [1986] 1 All ER 717 (refd) Schmidt & Anor v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 1 All ER 904, [1960] 2 Ch 160 (refd) Semantan Estate (1952) Sdn Bhd v Collector of Land Revenue Wilayah Persekutuan [1987] 2 MLJ 346 (refd) Tan Chiw Thoo v Tee Kim Kuay [1997] 1 CLJ 541 (refd)
Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Schedule para 1 Income Tax Act 1967 National Land Code 1965 ss 16, 116(4)(d), 418 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 354 Specific Relief Act 1950 s 44
RR Sethu (RR Sethu) for the applicant. Kamarolzaman bin Abideen (Selangor State Assistant Legal Adviser) for the respondent.
[2001] 5 MLJ 596 Loh Yoon Thong v Malaysian Institute of Accountants
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO R2–25–92 OF 1999 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 21 SEPTEMBER 2000
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Breach of — Disciplinary Committee — Whether facts alleged against appellant for misconduct have been established — Appellant not informed of the ground of rules or procedure that governs the manner of hearing — Appellant not allowed attendance to hearing of investigation committee — Charge against appellant has not been established — Whether decision of Disciplinary Committee made in breach of rules of natural justice
Civil Procedure — Mode of commencement — Declaration, application for — Declaration that the decision of the Disciplinary Committee is null and void — Whether properly made by originating motion — Accountants Act 1967 s 21
Civil Procedure — Mode of commencement — Non compliance with procedure — Whether application commenced by wrong mode — Whether proccedings should have been commenced by way of notice of appeal and not by originating motion — Whether non compliance a mere irregularity — Accountants Act 1967 s 21 — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 2
The appellant was a member of the respondent association and had been practising as an auditor and an accountant for 25 years. The appellant had been found guilty of a charge that he had withheld the audited accounts of PIE Healthcare Sdn Bhd (‘the company’) for the year ending 30 June 1995. The appellant filed an originating motion applying, inter alia, for an order that the decision of the Disciplinary Committee (‘DC’) be declared ultra vires and null and void and that the said decision be set aside. The appellant had taken it upon himself to inform the respondent during the DC hearing that the appellant as a ‘gatekeeper of financial truths’ had given a more than
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 355 satisfactory explanation to justify his actions. Further, the set of accounts was not audited as yet for failure of the complainant to furnish information relating to ‘post balance sheet date events’. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the procedure that ought to have been adopted in the instant appeal under s 21 of the Accountant Act 1967 (‘the Act’) was to file a notice of appeal and not an originating motion.
Held, granting order in terms of the originating motion: (1) There is no statutory definition that the respondent is a court of law. Therefore, the originating motion that was filed by the appellant was the correct procedure. The provisions of s 21(1) of the Act is only permissive in nature and not mandatory if a member is not happy with the decision of the DC of the respondent because of the word ‘may’ in the provision. Therefore, if there is any procedure which has not been complied with the appellant ||Page 597>>can still make an application through this originating motion to set aside the respondent’s decision (see pp 602E, 603C, F). (2) Section 21(2) of the Act only covers the manner of hearing of the court proceeding in an appeal against the decision of the DC of the respondent. The sentence ‘the procedure governing such appeals’ in the provision is referring to or determining an appeal and not the manner in which the filing was made. Where the procedure on filing an appeal does not comply with the provision of the Act, the non-compliance if any, is only an irregularity and can be overcome by O 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (see p 602H–I). (3) The court found that there was no such accounts for the period ending 30 June 1995 as stated in the charge. The DC should have first decided whether the facts alleged in the charge had been proved beyond reasonable doubt and then whether on those facts the appellant was guilty of such conduct. The respondent had decided the case based on flimsy assumptions that never existed and thereby victimized the appellant without any basis whatsoever. The respondent accepted the mere allegations by the complainant in toto without even verifying the truth and validity of the facts by calling him to give evidence since the charge was serious. It was so glaring that the allegations in the complaint letter by the complainant were totally unfounded (see p 606D–E, 607G). (4) The DC never informed the appellant of the ground rules or procedures that would govern the manner of the hearing. The appellant had an inalienable fundamental right to question the person who had complained against him. The DC’s rejection of the appellant’s right clearly was an attempt to dominate, suppress and intimidate the appellant. The conduct of the respondent could not be condoned at all (see p 608F, G–H). (5) The failure of the investigation committee to allow the appellant’s attendance at the session conducted by the committee amounted to a contravention of r 44(6) of the Accountant Rules 1972 (‘the Rules’). It was for the appellant to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 356 decide whether he wished to attend to give further explanation and clarification to the investigation committee’s session or not and it was certainly not for the said committee to decide so or on behalf of the appellant (see pp 609E, 610B). (6) Besides the defective date of 30 June 1995 in the charge document against the appellant, another very evident and important defect was that the respondent’s charges stated ‘withheld the audited accounts’. At all material times there was no such statement of accounts that had been audited by the appellant. Thus the question of ‘withheld audited accounts’ did not exist at all. On the other hand, if the statement of accounts had not been completed or audited, then the question of ‘withheld’ could not arise at all. ||Page 598>>Accordingly the appellant was accused of facts that were not only extremely dubious and errorneous but which did not exist at all. The respondent’s decision had no basis and should be set aside (see p 622F–H). (7) The charge against the appellant had not been established. The manner in which the DC of the respondent went about its inquiry was clearly against the rules of natural justice and therefore ultra vires and thus void (see p 624D).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu adalah seorang ahli persatuan responden dan telah mengamal sebagai juruaudit dan seorang akauntan selama 25 tahun. Perayu telah didapati bersalah dalam pertuduhan bahawa beliau tidak mengemukakan akaun PIE Healthcare Sdn Bhd yang diauditkan (‘syarikat tersebut’) untuk tahun berakhir 30 Jun 1995. Perayu telah memfailkan saman pemula, memohon, antara lain, untuk suatu perintah bahawa keputusan jawatankuasa disiplin (‘JD’) diisytiharkan sebagai ultra vires dan batal serta tak sah dan keputusan tersebut diketepikan. Perayu telah memberitahu responden semasa perbicaraan JD bahawa perayu sebagai ‘pengawal kebenaran kewangan’ telah memberi penjelasan yang lebih daripada memuaskan untuk menjustifikasikan tindakan-tindakannya. Selanjutnya, set akaun-akaun tersebut belum lagi diauditkan oleh kerana kegagalan pengadu untuk mengemukakan maklumat berkenaan dengan ‘selepas tempoh tarikh kunci kira-kira’. Responden telah membangkitkan bantahan awal bahawa prosedur yang patut diterima pakai di dalam rayuan ini di bawah s 21 Akta Akauntan 1967 (‘Akta tersebut’) adalah untuk memfailkan notis rayuan dan bukannya saman pemula.
Diputuskan, membenarkan perintah seperti yang dipohon dalam saman pemula tersebut: (1) Tiada definasi statutori bahawa responden adalah suatu badan perundangan. Oleh itu, saman pemula yang difailkan oleh perayu adalah prosedur yang betul. Peruntukan s 21(1) Akta tersebut hanyalah bersifat membenarkan dan bukanlah mandatori jika seseorang ahli tidak puas hati dengan keputusan JD responden kerana perkataan ‘mungkin’ di dalam peruntukan. Oleh itu, jika terdapat
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 357 sebarang prosedur yang belum dipatuhi, perayu masih boleh membuat permohonan melalui saman pemula untuk mengenepikan keputusan responden (lihat ms 602E, 603C, F). (2) Seksyen 21(2) Akta tersebut hanya meliputi cara prosiding perbicaraan mahkamah di dalam suatu rayuan terhadap keputusan JD responden. Ayat ‘prosedur yang mengawal rayuan-rayuan sedemikian’ di dalam peruntukan adalah merujuk kepada menentukan suatu rayuan dan bukan cara di mana pemfailan ||Page 599>>dibuat. Di mana suatu prosedur di dalam memfailkan rayuan tidak mematuhi peruntukan Akta, ketidakpatuhan, jika ada, hanyalah salah aturan dan boleh diatasi oleh A 2 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (lihat ms 602H–I). (3) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat akaun sedemikian bagi tempoh berakhir 30 Jun 1995 seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam pertuduhan. JD sepatutnya memutuskan dahulu sama ada fakta yang dikatakan di dalam pertuduhan telah dibuktikan melampaui keraguan munasabah dan kemudian sama ada di atas fakta-fakta tersebut perayu adalah bersalah untuk perbuatan sedemikian. Responden telah memutuskan kes tersebut berdasarkan andaian yang tidak kukuh yang tidak wujud dan dengan menjadikan perayu sebagai mangsa tanpa sebarang asas sekalipun. Responden telah menerima pengataan semata-mata oleh pengadu secara penuh tanpa mengesahkan kebenaran dan kesahan fakta-fakta dengan memanggilnya untuk memberikan keterangan oleh kerana pertuduhan adalah serius. Ia adalah begitu jelas bahawa pengataan-pengataan di dalam surat pengadu oleh pengadu tidak boleh disokong sepenuhnya (lihat ms 606D–E, 607G). (4) JD tidak memberitahu perayu mengenai peraturan-peraturan atau prosedur-prosedur yang asas yang akan mengawal cara perbicaraan dijalankan. Perayu mempunyai hak asas yang tidak boleh dipisahkan untuk menyoal orang yang membuat aduan terhadapnya. Penolakan jawatankuasa displin akan hak dengan jelas merupakan suatu cubaan untuk mendominasikan, menekan dan memperkecilkan perayu. Tindakan responden tidak boleh dimaafkan langsung (lihat ms 608F, G–H). (5) Kegagalan jawatankuasa siasatan untuk membenarkan kehadiran perayu di sesi yang dijalankan oleh jawatankuasa merupakan percanggahan k 44(6) Kaedah-kaedah Akauntan 1972 (‘Kaedah-kaedah tersebut’). Ia adalah untuk perayu untuk memutuskan sama ada beliau ingin menghadiri untuk memberikan penerangan dan penjelasan yang selanjutnya kepada sesi siasatan jawatankuasa atau tidak dan ia sudah tentu bukan bagi jawatankuasa untuk memutuskan sedemikian atau memutuskan bagi pihak perayu (lihat ms 609E, 610B). (6) Selain daripada tarikh yang defektif pada 30 Jun 1995 di dalam dokumen pertuduhan terhadap perayu, suatu lagi kecacatan yang jelas dan penting adalah bahawa pertuduhan responden menyatakan ‘tidak mengemukakan akaun-akaun yang diauditkan’. Pada semua masa, tidak terdapat akaun-akaun yang
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 358 sedemikian yang telah diaudit oleh perayu. Oleh itu persoalan ‘tidak mengemukakan akaun-akaun yang diauditkan’ tidak timbul langsung. Sebaliknya, jika kenyataan-kenyataan akaun belum diselesaikan atau diaudit, maka persoalan ‘tidak mengemukakan’ tidak terbangkit langsung. Dengan itu perayu telah dituduh untuk ||Page 600>>fakta-fakta yang bukan sahaja disangsikan dan silap tetapi tidak wujud langsung. Keputusan responden tidak berdasar dan patut diketepikan (lihat ms 622F–H). (7) Pertuduhan terhadap perayu belum lagi dibuktikan. Cara di mana JD responden menjalankan siasatannya adalah dengan jelas bercanggah dengan keadilan asasi dan dengan itu adalah ultra vires dan tak sah (lihat ms 624D).]
Notes For cases on mode of commencement generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3123–3151. For cases on breach of rules of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 569–576.
Cases referred to Chong Ket Sui David v Datuk Chau Tet On [1993] 2 MLJ 509 (refd) Dr Chua Kaw Bing v Majlis Perubatan Malaysia [1997] 5 MLJ 596 (refd) Hong Kong Bank (M) Bhd v Nor Harizan bte Mohd All [1999] 5 MLJ 629 (refd) Kok Seng Chong v Bukit Turf Club [1993] SLR 388 (refd) Lai Cheng Cheong v Sowaratnam [1983] 2 MLJ 113 (refd) Lee Soo Chuan v Lai Ah Yan & Anor [1972] 2 MLJ 33 (refd) Lim Ko & Anor v Board of Architects [1965] 2 MLJ 203 (refd) Nothman v Bamet London Borough Council [1978] 1 WLR 220 (refd) R v Sussex Justices, ex parte Me Carthy [1924] 1 KB 256 (refd) R Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 28 MLJ 169 (refd) Re Lim Chor Pee [1991] 2 MLJ 154 (refd) Rhina Bhar v Malaysian Bar [1994] 1 MLJ 24) (refd) Sundaram v Chew Choo Khoon [1968] 2 MLJ 40 (refd) The Matter of An Advocate & Solicitor [1978] 2 MLJ 7 (refd) Wong Kok Chin v Singapore Society of Accountants [1990] 1 MLJ 456 (refd) Woodworth & anor v Conroy & ors Conroy v Woodworth & anor [1976] 1 All ER 107 (refd)
Legislation referred to
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 359 Accountant Act 1967 s 21, (1), (2) Accountants Rules 1972 rr 44, (b), (1), (6), (a)(ii), (b), 45(l)(c), (1), 47, (1), 49, 50, 55 Companies Act 1965 ss 174, (4), (5), (9), 274, 364(2) Court of Judicature Act 1964 ss 3, 4 Interpretation Act 1967 s 3 Mining Enactment (FMS 147) s 96(i) ||Page 601>> Rules of the High Court 1980 O 2, 55 rr 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Subordinate Court Rules 1980 O 49, r 2(6)
Chen Cheong Heng (Chen & Co) for the appellant. T Kuhendran (Zul Rafique & Partners) for the respondent.
[2001] 5 MLJ 736 Taat Yik Plantations Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Hilir Perak & Ors
HIGH COURT (IPOH) — ORIGINATING MOTION NO 21–25 OF 1999 SU GEOK YIAM JC 21 SEPTEMBER 2000
Administrative Law — Rules of natural justice — Audi alterem partem — Whether order of land administrator void for failure to give a right to be heard to the plaintiff — Creation of right of way on adjoining land
Land Law — Land Administrator’s right of way — Creation — Land administrator’s discretion in granting such right — Alternative route available — Whether land administrator had exercised his discretion properly in granting such right — Whether land administrator ought to have granted right of way — National Land Code s 390
The plaintiff who is the registered owner of land GB 15994 Lot 1616 (Lot Baru 16412) (‘the land’) was dissatisfied with the creation of a collector’s private right of way (‘the right of way’) dated 30 January 1999 over his land by the first defendant, the Land Administrator of Hilir Perak in favour of the third defendant whose land adjoins the plaintiff’s land. The second defendant is at all material times a director and manager of the third defendant. Both the plaintiff’s and the third defendant’s lands
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 360 comprise oil palm estates. The third defendant had applied to the first defendant under s 390 of the National Land Code 1965 (‘the NLC’) for the creation of the right of way in Form 28A in order to enable its vehicles to transport oil palm produce from its land to a public terminal once or twice a day. It was not disputed that Lot 2089 (‘the third defendant’s land’) adjoins Sungei Perak and that the third defendant’s boats had been using the river to transport the oil palm produce from its estate to the oil palm factory. The third defendant has said that there is sufficient evidence to show that the Sungei Perak is hazardous and therefore cannot be used as an alternative route. The plaintiff on the other hand disagreed on the ground that it, too, uses the Sungei Perak to transport its oil palm produce and there are others who also use the Sungei Perak to transport their produce.
Held: (1) Bearing in mind the principle of inviolateness of land, it is clear from s 390(2) of the NLC that it is incumbent on the first defendant to either hold an enquiry or make such other investigation as he thinks appropriate upon receiving an application for a private right of way. In the absence of compelling evidence, the court was not satisfied that the Sungei Perak was not an alternative route in the sense that it was not possible, practical nor easily available to the third defendant. On the contrary the court was satisfied that it constituted an existing reasonable alternative route and that the third defendant merely wanted the right of way because it was more convenient for its workers to transport its oil palm produce using lorries as a mode of transportation as opposed to using sampans which would require a different kind of skill to operate. The situation in the present case did not partake ‘of gravity or cogent necessity’. The third defendant has failed to discharge this onus at the enquiry. In the absence of compelling evidence that the existing public terminal, which is Sungei Perak, is dangerous and therefore cannot rightfully be described as a public terminal, the first defendant was acting ultra vires s 390 of the NLC read together with ss 389(3) and 387 of the NLC when he made the order (see pp 746D–F, I–747A); Si Rusa Inn Sdn Bhd & Ors v The Collector of Land Revenue, Port Dickson & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 147 followed. (2) Although the first defendant was entitled, in accordance with s 390 (2)(a) of the NLC, to endeavour to find and create a suitable right of way over the plaintiff’s land for the benefit of the third defendant and in that process to abandon any plan if found to be unsuitable and to rely on another plan or other plans, the plaintiff should be given every opportunity to object and present its view before the proposed route in the plan is approved. After comparing the third plan with the plaintiff’s plan, the court was of the view that the third plan involved the creation of an additional stretch of road which would involve the plaintiff having to concede a certain portion of its palm fields for the creation of the additional stretch and this was never dealt with by the first defendant at the enquiry including the question of compensation and, therefore, the said
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 361 order should be set aside (see p 748B–D). (3) The first defendant has misdirected himself as to what the term ‘expedient for a private right of way to be created’ means. He went on the assumption that all that was required to establish that term was the bare statement from the third defendant that Sungei Perak was a dangerous route because its sampan had capsized twice causing its produce to fall into the river and endangering the lives of its captains and workers. The failure to give detailed reasons in this case also renders the said order suspicious and, therefore, bad because there were three different versions which were advanced as to why the said order was made (see p 749E–F); Liew Peck Lian & Ors v The Conservator of Forests, Johor [1961] MLJ 117 followed. (4) Having considered the unchallenged evidence that the enquiry which had commenced on 30 September 1998 had ended on 15 October 1998 and the first defendant had cancelled the second plan which had formed the basis of the enquiry, the court was of the opinion that the enquiry should have been reopened or a new enquiry held to enable the plaintiff to give its views on the proposed route as set out in the third plan before the first defendant made the final order. The failure to do so constituted a breach of one of the rules of natural justice, that is, the right to be heard and the order was bad because the plaintiff was not given a fair hearing (see p 751D–F).
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif adalah pemilik berdaftar sebidang tanah BG 15994 Lot 1616 (Lot Baru 16412) (‘tanah tersebut’) yang tidak berpuas hati dengan pembentukan satu hak lalu-lalang persendirian pemungut (‘hak lalu-lalang’) bertarikh 30 Januari 1999 ke atas tanah beliau oleh defendan pertama, Pentadbir Tanah Hilir Perak yang menyebelahi defendan ketiga yang mempunyai tanah yang bersempadan dengan tanah plaintif. Defendan kedua adalah pada setiap masa matan pengarah dan pengurus kepada defendan ketiga. Kedua-dua bidang tanah plaintif dan defendan ketiga terdiri daripada estet-estet kelapa sawit. Defendan ketiga telah memohon kepada defendan pertama di bawah s 390 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (‘KTN tersebut’) untuk pembentukan satu hak lalu-lalang dalam Borang 28A bagi membolehkan kenderaan-kenderaannya membawa hasil kelapa sawit daripada tanahnya kepada satu terminal awam sekali atau dua kali sehari. Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa Lot 2089 (‘tanah defendan ketiga’) bersempadan dengan Sungei Perak dan bahawa bot-bot defendan ketiga telah menggunakan jalan sungai untuk membawa hasil kelapa sawit daripada estetnya kepada kilang kelapa sawit. Defendan ketiga telah mengatakan bahawa terdapat keterangan yang mencukupi untuk menunjukkan bahawa Sungei Perak adalah berbahaya dan oleh itu tidak boleh digunakan sebagai jalan alternatif. Plaintif sebaliknya tidak bersetuju atas alasan bahawa ia, juga, menggunakan Sungei Perak untuk membawa hasil kelapa sawitnya dan ada juga yang lain yang menggunakan Sungei Perak untuk mengangkut hasil
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 362 mereka.
Diputuskan: (1) Dengan mengambilkira prinsip tdak mencemarkan tanah, adalah jelas daripada s 390(2) KTN tersebut bahawa ia adalah kewajipan defendan pertama untuk sama ada mengadakan satu siasatan atau membuat apa-apa siasatan lain yang beliau fikirkan patut tatkala menerima permohonan untuk satu hak lalu-lalang persendirian. Dengan ketiadaan keterangan yang mendorong, mahkamah tidak berpuas hati bahawa Sungei Perak bukan satu jalan alternatif dalam maksud bahawa ia adalah tidak mungkin, praktikal maupun senang digunakan kepada defendan ketiga. Sebaliknya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa ia membentuk satu jalan alternatif yang sedia ada yang munasabah dan bahawa defendan ketiga hanya mahukan hak lalu-lalang kerana ia adalah lebih senang untuk pekerja-pekerjanya untuk membawa hasil kelapa sawitnya dengan menggunakan lori sebagai satu cara pengangkutan jika dibandingkan dengan menggunakan sampan yang akan menghendaki kepakaran tersendiri untuk pengendalian. Keadaan di dalam kes ini tidak turut serta dalam ‘graviti atau keperluan yang meyakinkan’. Defendan ketiga gagal untuk menunjukkan beban ini semasa siasatan. Dengan ketiadaan keterangan yang mendorong bahawa terminal awam yang sedia ada iaitu Sungei Perak, adalah berbahaya dan oleh itu tidak boleh dengan betulnya ditakrifkan sebagai satu terminal awam, defendan pertama telah bertindak ultra vires s 390 KTN tersebut dibaca bersama ss 389(3) dan 387 KTN tersebut apabila beliau membuat perintah tersebut (lihat ms 746D–F, I–747A); Si Rusa Inn Sdn Bhd & Ors v The Collector of Land Revenue, Port Dickson & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 147 diikut. (2) Walaupun defendan pertama berhak, menurut s 390(2)(a) KTN tersebut, untuk berusaha untuk mencari dan membentuk satu hak lalu-lalang yang sesuai atas tanah plaintif untuk faedah defendan ketiga dan di dalam proses tersebut membiarkan apa-apa pelan jika mendapati ia tidak sesuai dan untuk bergantung kepada pelan lain atau lain-lain pelan, plaintif hendaklah diberikan setiap peluang yang ada untuk membantah dan mengemukakan pandangannya sebelum jalan yang dicadangkan di dalam pelan tersebut diluluskan. Setelah membandingkan pelan ketiga dengan pelan plaintif, mahkamah berpandangan bahawa pelan ketiga melibatkan pembentukan satu tambahan jalan yang akan menyebabkan plaintif menyerahkan sebahagian daripada ladang sawitnya untuk pembentukan jalan tambahan tersebut dan ini tidak pernah dibincangkan oleh defendan pertama dalam siasatan termasuklah persoalan mengenai pampasan dan, oleh itu, perintah tersebut hendaklah diketepikan (lihat ms 748B–D). (3) Defendan pertma telah dengan sendirinya salah arah terhadap apa maksud terma ‘wajar untuk satu hak lalu-lalang persendirian dibentuk’. Beliau beranggapan bahawa apa yang dihendaki untuk memenuhi maksud terma tersebut adalah penyataan yang sebenarnya daripada defendan ketiga bahawa
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 363 Sungei Perak adalah satu jalan berbahaya kerana sampannya telah terbalik dua kali menyebabkan hasil kutipannya jatuh ke dalam sungai dan membahayakan nyawa kaptan dan pekerja-pekerjanya. Kegagalan untuk memberikan sebab-sebab terperinci di dalam kes ini juga akan menyebabkan perintah tersebut sebagai satu yang menimbulkan kesangsian dan, oleh itu tidak baik kerana terdapat tiga versi berbeza yang telah dikemukakan berhubung kenapa perintah tersebut dibuat (lihat ms 749E–F); Liew Peck Lian & Ors v The Conservator of Forests, Johor [1961] MLJ 117 diikut. (4) Setelah mempertimbangkan keterangan yang tidak dicabar bahawa siasatan yang bermula pada 30 September 1998 telah berakhir pada 15 Oktober 1998 dan defendan pertama telah membatalkan pelan kedua yang telah membentuk asas siasatan, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa siasatan tersebut hendaklah dibuka semula atau satu siasatan batu diadakan untuk membolehkan plaintif memberikan pandangannya berhubung jalan yang dicadangkan sebagaimana yang dilampirkan di dalam pelan ketiga sebelum defendan pertama membuat perintah yang muktamad. Kegagalan untuk berbuat demikian telah membentuk satu pelanggaran salah satu daripada peraturan keadilan asasi, iaitu, hak untuk didengar dan peritah tersebut adalah tidak baik kerana plaintif tidak diberikan satu perbicaraan yang adil (lihat ms 751D–F).]
Notes For cases on land administrator’s right of way generally, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 2198–2200. For cases on rules of natural justice, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 557–622.
Cases referred to Che Nik bte Bakar v Pentadbir Tanah, Kuala Krai [1997] 5 MLJ 516 (refd) Liew Peck Lian & Ors v The Conservator of Forests, Johor [1961] MLJ 117 (folld) Liow Tow Thong & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Alor Gajah & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 79 (refd) Si Rusa Inn Sdn Bhd & Ors v The Collector of Land Revenue, Port Dickson & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 147 (folld) Vadivelu a/l Palanisamy v M Radhakrishnan [1996] 1 CLJ 224 (refd)
Legislation referred to National Land Code 1965 ss 387, 390(2)(a), (3), Form 28A
John Concisom (Concisom & Co) for the plaintiff. Mohd Jazamuddin bin Hj Ahmad Nawawi (Assistant Legal Adviser, Perak) for the first defendant.
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 364 S Ravichandaran (S Ravichandaran & Assoc) for the second and third defendant.
[2001] 6 MLJ 750 Mohd Daud bin Mahmood v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2(S8)–21–152 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 29 AUGUST 2001
Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Dismissal — Failure to give grounds for dismissal — Whether disciplinary board required to make finding of guilt
Constitutional Law — Public servants — Dismissal — Failure to hear mitigation upon punishment — Whether infringement of Federal Constitution art 135(2) — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general order 23
The plaintiff was at all material times the Assistant Cultural Officer of the Culture, Arts and Tourism Centre of Kelantan. The first defendant was at all material times the disciplinary authority of the plaintiff and was acting as the servant and/or agent of the second defendant, namely, the government of Malaysia. The plaintiff was informed by the first defendant that pursuant to O 26 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 (‘the General Orders’), the first defendant had to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff with a view to dismissing him from service. The plaintiff then duly made his representations. The first defendant then informed the plaintiff that upon considering the plaintiff’s case in its entirety, the first defendant had decided to dismiss him from service. The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that there has been an infringement of the provisions of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) and O 23 of the General Orders in that the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to mitigate, the defendant did not give any grounds or reasons for the dismissal and that the plaintiff’s dismissal was null and void and of no effect and therefore prayed for a declaration that the dismissal was wrong in law, an order that all arrears of salaries, etc, be calculated and paid to the plaintiff, and for damages, interest on the adjudged sum, costs and any further relief deemed fit and proper by the court. The defendants maintained that the dismissal was in order and prayed for the suit to be dismissed with costs.
Held, dismissing the suit with costs:
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 365 (1) The Federal Court had held that the General Orders, in detailing the procedures therein, had sufficiently complied with art 135(2) of the Constitution and, in the process, were in accord with the concept of natural justice and procedural fairness. There was certainly no separate right to make representations upon the punishment that ought to be meted out to the officer to be dismissed or reduced in rank. Therefore there was no injustice by the failure of the first defendant to hear the plaintiff’s mitigation ||Page 751>>separately (see p 756C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 followed. In the circumstances, bound as the court was by this decision, it must find against the plaintiff on this ground (see p 756F). (2) The case before the court was not one that was decided on appeal. There was no reason, therefore, for the defendants to give their reasons. In fact, as found by the Federal Court in Utra Badi, under general order 26(4), the disciplinary board was not even required to make a finding of guilt. The board was only required to decide whether the plaintiff’s explanation had exculpated him to the satisfaction of the board (see p 757C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 and Hajah Halimatussaadiah bte Haji Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 followed. In any case, so long as there was no requirement to even make a finding of guilt, there was therefore no requirement to give reasons (see p 757F); Selvaraju a/l Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 678 and Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 followed.
Bahasa Malaysia summary
Plaintif pada setiap masa matan adalah Pegawai Penolong Kebudayaan, Pusat Kebudayaan, Seni dan Pelancongan Kelantan. Defendan pertama pada setiap masa matan adalah pihak berkuasa tatatertib plaintif dan bertindak sebagai pekerja dan/atau ejen kepada defendan kedua, iaitu, kerajaan Malaysia. Plaintif telah dimaklumkan oleh defendan pertama bahawa menurut A 26 Peintah Am Pegawai-Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab ‘D’) 1980 (‘Perintah Am’), defendan pertama telah mengambil tindakan tatatertib terhadap plaintif dengan tujuan untuk memecat beliau daripada perkhidmatan. Plaintif kemudiannya telah membuat representasi beliau. Defendan pertama kemudiannya telah memaklumkan kepada plaintif bahawa setelah mempertimbangkan kes plaintif keseluruhannya, defendan pertama telah memutuskan untuk memecat beliau daripada perkhidmatan. Plaintif menghujahkan, antara lain, bahawa terdapat perlanggaran peruntukan-peruntukan perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’) dan A 23 Perintah Am tersebut di mana plaintif tidak
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 366 diberikan peluang untuk mitigasi, defendan tidak memberikan apa-apa alasan atau sebab untuk pemecatan tersebut dan pemecatan plaintif tersebut adalah batal dan tidak sah dan tidak berkuatkuasa dan oleh itu memohon untuk satu deklarasi bahawa pemecatan tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang, satu perintah agar semua tunggakan gaji, dan lain- ||Page 752>>lain, dikira dan dibayar kepada plaintif, dan untuk ganti rugi, faedah atas jumlah, kos yang diadili dan apa-apa relif lain yang difikirkan sesuai dan betul oleh mahkamah. Defendan-defendan telah mengekalkan bahawa pemecatan tersebut adalah betul dan memohon agar guaman tersebut ditolak dengan kos.
Diputuskan, menolak guaman tersebut dengan kos: (1) Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa Perintah Am tersebut, di dalam mengamati prosedur di dalamnya, telah mematuhi secukupnya dengan perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan dan, dalam pada itu, telah menepati konsep keadilan asasi dan keadilan prosedur. Sememangnya tiada hak berasingan untuk membuat representasi terhadap hukuman yang sepatutnya dilaksanakan ke atas pegawai yang dipecat atau diturunkan pangkat. Oleh itu, tidak berlaku ketidakadilan dengan kegagalan defendan pertama untuk mendengar mitigasi plaintif secara berasingan (lihat ms 756C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 diikut. Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah terikat dengan keputusan ini, dan mesti berpihak terhadap plaintif atas alasan ini (lihat ms 756F). (2) Kes di hadapan mahkamah bukan satu yang diputuskan atas rayuan. Tiada sebab, oleh itu, untuk defendan-defendan memberikan sebab-sebab mereka. Bahkan, sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Utra Badi, di bawah perintah am 26(4), lembaga tatatertib tidakpun dikehendaki untuk membuat satu penemuan bersalah. Lembaga hanya dikehendaki untuk memutuskan sama ada penjelasan plaintif telah membebaskan beliau dan telah memuaskan hati lembaga tersebut (lihat ms 757C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 dan Hajah Halimatussaadiah bte Haji Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 diikut. Dalam apa-apa keadaan, selagi tiada apa-apa keperluan untuk membuat satu penemuan bersalah, tiada akan terdapat keperluan untuk memberikan sebab (lihat ms 757F); Selvaraju a/l Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 678 dan Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 diikut.]
Notes For cases on dismissal of a public servant, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 367 Reissue) paras 519–543 and 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1739–1748. ||Page 753>>
Cases referred to Hajah Halimatussaadiah bte Haji Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (folld) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2000] 3 MLJ 281 (refd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 (folld) Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Selvaraju a/l Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 678 (folld) Utra Badi a/l K Perumal v Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 676 (distd)
Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 135(2) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general orders 23, 26, (4), (5)
Karpal Singh (Ramkarpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Ahmad Kamal bin Md Shahid (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendants.
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Endnotes 1 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)
Mohd Daud bin Mahmood v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [2001] 6 MLJ 750
For full ruling text Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778.