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(1/0 Daniel Ellsberg:

By Sanford J. Ungar

Ungar is a Washington Post staff writer who covered Papers litigation last summer. The follow- ing excerpt from his book, "The Papers & The Papers," to be published by E.P. Dutton next month, traces Daniel Ellsberg's search for a way to make the Pentagon docit- ntente public.

N NOV. 6, 1969, during a visit to secret, Which had been prepared by O Washington, Daniel Ellsberg met the Institute for Defense Analyses. with Sen. .L W. Fulbright, chairman of Ellsberg urged that the Pentagon the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- Papers be made publi c, perhaps tee, and several committee staff mem- through full congressional release of bers. their contents, but Fulbright, who had Fulbright, by that time committed never met Ellsberg before, expressed to American withdrawal from Vietnam, caution. was notoriously angry over what had "I didn't know what to do with [the been established as the purposeful de- Papers]," Fulbright recalled later. "I ception of Congress during 1964 to ob- didn't want to get Ellsberg in trouble. tain passage of the Gulf of Tonkin res- I considered what to do with the por- olution, which became the "functional tions he gave me—having executive equivalent" of a declaration of war heaKings or something of that nature. against . Ellsberg But I decided that the best way would • played on that anger, not only telling be to get them officially. Anyway, it Be Ken Fell— Fulbright about the existence of, the wasn't clear then of what use they ac- Daniel Ellsberg holding a boxful but also turning over tually were in stopping the war." to him a brief portion that dealt with The excerpts from the Papers were of the government edition of the the Tonkin Gulf incident; he also gave tucked away in the safe in the Foreign Pentagon Papers. the senator notes on a separate com- Relations Committee's offices on the mand and control study of Tonkin, also fourth floor of the New Senate Office otommk.„ The Difficulties of Disclosure

Building, 'but Fulbright lost no time as a compilation of raw materials to be with Laird had "marked the beginning acting on his promise to Ellsberg that used at some unspecified, but distant, of a more cooperative attitude within • he 'Would try to do something about future date. On the basis of the under- the executive branch on problems 0.1 the study. Two days later he wrote to standing that access and use would be this nature." Defense Secretary : restricted, the documents were de- "The issue involved here," Fulbright "It is my understanding that the signed to contain an accumulaion of stressed, "is not merely that of allow Department of Defense prepared a .. data of the most delicate sensitivity, ing committee members access to th history of the decision-making process including NSC papers and other presi- documents but is far more fundamen on Vietnam policy covering the period dential communications which have al- tal, going to the heart of the contint: from 1940 to April 1968. The project, I ways been _considered privileged. In ing problem of striking the proper con was informed, began under Secretary addition, the papers included a variety stitutional balance between the legisla McNamara and was completed under of internal advice and comments cen- tive and executive branches, particu- Secretary Clifford and was confined to tral to the decision-making process. larly on foreign policy matters." a study of written data. It appears that Many of the contributions to this total That argunient might have been ex a study would be of significant value document were provided on the basis pected to appeal to Laird, himself a to the Committee in its review of Viet- of an expressed guarantee of confi- former congressman from Wisconsin: nam policy issues, and I would appre- dentiality. but he apparently paid absolutely no ciate your making it, as well as any "As intended from the start," Laird's attention. Except for a pro forma let- later studies of a similar nature, avail- letter continued, "access to and use of ter of confirmation sent to Fulbright able to, the Committee." this document' as been extremely lim- on Feb. 18, 1970, which promised to "be First Confirmation ited. It would clearly be contrary to back in touch with you on this matter the national interest to disseminate it as soon as practicable," Laird re- mill) PROMPTLY acknowledged more widely. However, the Depart- mained silent on the subject for L Fulbright's letter, but then took ment of Defense is naturally prepared months. more than a month to write back re- to provide the committee information Ellsberg, - meanwhile, was search- fusing the request for access to the with respect to executive branch activi- ing for other people holding high Pentagon Papers. The Secretary's let- ties in Vietnam for any portion of the office who might be willing to take ter of Dec. 20, 1969, included the first period covered by this compendium. I dramatic action to help end the war. formal confirmation by the Defense hope you will appreciate the reasons Late in 1969, after the massive Morato- Department that the study even ex- why we are unable to comply literally rium and Mobilization demonstrations isted. with your request." in Washington, a number of outspoken "In 1967, Secretary McNamara initi- Fulbright did not exactly appreciate legislators began to assert congres- ated a detailed history of the evolution Laird's reasons. The senator wrote sional prerogatives in foreign policy of the present-day situation in Viet- again on Jan. 19, 1970, noting that he for the first time in years. nam," Laird wrote. "It was conceived had hoped that previous experience See ELLSBERG, Page D4

Mgar. 6MtgaleftWOMMMWAVVY401...... }.,:s5t,ean...... voomPWOON9NOUNIMAW One of the earliest and most brash legislative proposals was offered by Course of action to hini: "I thought Charles E. Goodell—the moderate Re- there, would, be a big to-do by the ad- publican congressman from upstate ministration on the question of classi- New York who had undergone his own lieation, which might divert from the Conversion on the war after being ap- _-contents of the Papers. I thought that , pointed to fill the Senate seat of Rob- if we used them, without release, the ert F. Kennedy. He introduced legisla- big attack would be on,the procedure tion that would have required com- . . . If I had done it, this would have plete withdrawal by December 1970. •brought a good deal of criticism on the Goodell was unable to find a single co- _Committee; certain Republican mem- sponsor for his bill, but it became a bers would have raised hell . . . I still cause celebre in the peace movement. thought. tney should be the subject of Ellsberg was impressed, and he en- legitimate hearings." listed to help Goodell drum up As chairman of one of the most pres- support. tigious committees in the Congress, Working with a group of other con- ,Fulbright had a special problem and sultants to Goodell, but using his de- saw direct release as possibly counter-, tailed acquaintance with the Pentagon ;productive. Despite his frustrations, on Papers, Ellsberg helped draft the state- many occasions he does receive classi- ment which the New York senator used fied material frolic the executive as lead-off witness before the Foreign , branch in closed _sessions; any breach Relations Committee on Feb. 3, 19'70, of security, on his part could be used as when Sen. Fulbright opened a new se- :a basis for ,denying him such material ries of hearings on the war. In a few In the future.. Then he in turn might be answerable places, it was obvious that Goodell to his colleagues in the fudged while bending over backward to ,Senate for their inability to learn that little bit of the inside story avoid using classified material in the to which speech; but the testimony was laced they were accustomed. with reference and conclusions which And besides, whatever his policy • drew heavily on Ellsberg's point of views, Fulbright is a well-accepted member of,the Senate "club"; he is not view. one to breach the standards and the et- At no pant during his brief contact iquette under which it operates. He with the senator did Ellsberg tell Good- was in the bizarre position of having ell that he had a copy of the Pentagon seen the. Pentagon Papers but of feel- papers; in fact,, he never became ing constrained not to quote publicly aware of their existence until June 13, from them;. instead he simply contin- 1971. ued asking that they be made officially Goodell, who lost his Senate seat in . available. Fulbright wrote to Laird the 1970 election to Conservative again on :April 20, 1971. He got no James L. Buckley, later said he was reply. sorry that Ellsberg did not tell him , By then, however, Ellsberg was ex- about' the Papers, "because I think it ploring other means of getting the con- would have made quite a difference if Congress had that information." Good- ell ackrioWledged, though, that "I don't know what I would have done with them." In any event, Ellsberg felt that he must continue to work behind the 'scenes with the Foreign Relations 'Committee. Fulbright's Problem S THE MONTHS passed, Ellsberg A sought to prod Fulbright into ac- - tion on the Papers. Late in February -11970 he submitted a large ehunk of the -'contents—at least 3,000 pages photo- copied fram about 25 volumes of the study—to Norvill Jones, one of Ful- Lbright's aides 'on the Foreign Relations Committee staff. Some of it he simply mailed froin a post office in the Brent- wood section of Los Angeles. F u l bright reconsidered what he might properly do. But outright dis- einclire still seemed an unacceptable

the Defense Department for refusing tents of the Papers into the public do- to make studies of past events public. The senator complained of the mystery main. He attended a conference on surrounding the command and control "war crimes" sponsored by Columbia study of Tonkin compiled by the Insti- University law professor Telford Tay- tute for Defense Analyses: "Here is a lor and stressed to the international study made at government expense, lawyers there that if any trial, or even paid for by the taxpayers, and with- mock trial, on the issue should be in- held from the Committee. I don't see any justification for such classifica- itiated, he know of the existence of pa- tion." pers that Corresponded—in his mind, at least—to the Nuremberg documents Ellsberg accommodatingly replied: "It is important that such few attempts used after WOrld War IL at learning- from our experiences Ellsberg went as far as describing should be exploited, be understood by the Pentagon Papers to some of the those people who are involved in de- lawyers and suggested that he could cision-making. I would wish, first of all, be named personally as a defendant that President Nixon could have access or a witness in an attempt to get the to the information in that study and in Papers subpoenaed. He urged other con- other studies that, were done directly stitutional lawyers to initiate civil suits for Mr. McNamara of our involvement. and attempts to obtain court injunc- I would doubt very , much whether any- tions against the conduct of the war, one on the National Security Council offering the Papers as a dramatic staff has taken advantage of those." piece of evidence. But no one was in- Fulbright concurred knowingly: "I terested enough to pursue it. can't subscribe to this extension of the The Cambodian Protest concept of classification to prevent our MAY 1970 American forces knowing about the past . . . It doesn't give an opportunity to func- I crossed into Cambodia with South tion at all." Vietnamese troops on a mission that the Nixon administration promised Fulbright Tries Again would wipe out "enemy" sanctuaries AUHILE HE WAITED for the hear- within 30 days. The upheaval of pro- ings that he felt certain Fulbright test throughout the nation was enor- would call for the specific purpose of mous. The American troops would in- examining and exposing the lessons of deed withdraw into the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg also after 30 days, but vast numbers of peo- made them available, through interme- ple refused to believe the administra- diaries, to scholars from the Institute tion's proud declarations that the in- for Policy Studies, a radical-left think cursion had been a total "success." tank in Washington. They had been Daniel Ellsberg testified before the Foreign Relations Committee at Ful- bright's invitation on May 13, 1970, and working since February 1970 on a two- his message was a gloomy one. He said volume study of the planning of the he was proud of the protest over Cam- . A team of interviewers bodia, "but I am afraid that we cannot helping Ralph Staving prepare the sec- go on like this, as seems likely unless tion entitled "Washington Determines Congress soon commits us to total the Fate of Vietnam: 1954-1965" re- withdrawal, and survive as Americans. ceived some documents from Kennedy There would still be a' country here and Johnson advisers with whom they and it might have the same name, but spoke, but the availability of the Pap- it would not be the same country. I ers meant that assertions could be reli- think that what might be at stake if ably checked against an existing his- his involvement goes on is a change in torical study. our society as radical and ominous as For about a could be brought about by our occupa- year the institute would tion by a foreign power." make free use of the Pentagon Papers without any controversy. They were Ellsberg pointed to the continuity of not hidden away in any peculiarly se- U.S. policy in Vietnam over the years cretive manner; visitors remember and, in an exchange with Fulbright, having no trouble seeing them. But said that "having studied the docu- preparation of the book would take a ments of a number of administrations long time—one volume was scheduled and found the internal rationales in for release in the summer of 1971 and terms of strategic interests palpably a second in the spring of 1972—and in inadequate, I have more and more any event this was not the kind of dra- come to look at the domestic political matic war-stopping disclosure that contexts in which those decisions were Ellsberg had in mind. made year after year." The interchange between Fulbright and Ellsberg in- Fulbright, a man of delicate and gen- evitably turned to the , and they jointly chastised tlemanly persistence, was still trying. about the war and wanted to make He wrote to Laird again on July 10, sure it was read by the people he was, 1970, asking that the Papers be made criticizing, he would, like other East Coast intellectuals, write a letter to available to the committee. "It seems the Times. On Nov. 26, 1970, for exam- to me that the [Defense] Department ple he wrote a bristling attack on the has had ample time to consider this Nixon administration's Indochina pol- matter," he said. On July 21, a full six icy. "Nixon's clearly announced and months after Fulbright had asked re- consideration of the decision not to demonstrated strategy entails not only make the study available, Laird wrote prolonging but vastly expanding this immoral, illegal, and unconstitutional back to say no. He gave no additional reasons, nor did he answer Fulbright's war," he said in a letter endorsed by point about sharing power over foreign other MIT faculty members. affairs in the legislative and executive In the meantime, Ellsberg had con- branches. tinued to work with the Pentagon Pa- pers and hardly made a secret of that "My letter of Dec. 20, 1969," Laird fact. In September, 1970, at the 66th said, "indicated that access to and annual meeting of the American Politi- use of this document, as intended cal Science Association in Los Angeles, from the start, has been and remains he delivered a 70-page paper called extremely limited. For the reasons ex- "Escalating in a Quagirlire." In a long pressed in that letter, I have again con- footnote to the paper Ellsberg said cluded that it would be clearly con- that his "assertions and speculations trary to the national interest to dis- ' on U.S. decision-making" reflected his seminate the compendium more long experience in Defense and State widely." That, under the rules permit- Department jobs as well as "research ting Cabinet officers an extraordinary since that time, in part as a consultant degree of latitude in classification mat- with official access." He apologized for ters, was that. making "generalizations . • . without Still stirring no public attention and specific citation," but said that ap- being careful not to breach security proach was less unsatisfactory than "to himself, Fulbright took the Senate rely entirely on the public record or to floor on Aug. 7, 1970, and denouneed pretend to do so, to forego generaliza- Laird's decision on the Papers. "The tions or to subscribe to wrong ones." executive branch—in what has become The paper, which would later be a reflex action—has again slammed awarded a $250 prize as the best one the door on Congress," Fulbright, said. delivered at the meeting, attracted He warned, though, that "as the old widespread attention and later ap- saw goes: "Nothing is secret for long peared in revised and abridged form in in Washington." I hope that the first Public Policy. It was perhaps the most enterprising reporter who obtains a cogent statement of Ellsberg's conclu- copy of this history will share it with sions about the decades of American the committee." involvement in Southeast Asia. "Making News" In his paper Ellsberg disputed the HORTLY AFTER becoming a re- widely accepted notion—advanced, S search fellow at MIT in the fall, of among others, by Arthur Schlesinger 1970, Ellsberg attended a seminar on Jr., the historian who had served as a. "making news" given by Edwin Dia- mond, a former Newsweek writer' lec- White House aide to John F. Kennedy turing on political science at the uni- —that the United States had stumbled versity; afterward he pumped Dia- mond with questions about The New unknowingly into a "quagmire" in York Times: "Where is power at the Vietnam and simply never knew how Times? Who runs what?" Diamond re- to get out. On the contrary, Ellsberg sponded by mentioning the often-publi- said, the "internal record" indicates cized rivalries between the daily news that each successive American Presi- operation of the Times, the editorial dent was "striding with his eyes open page, and the Sunday edition. - into what he sees as quicksand, renew- ing efforts and carrying his followers Others recall similar conversations deeper in, knowingly." He went back with Ellsberg at the time, conversa- to a speech on the House floor on tions in which he expressed more than Jan. 25, 1949, when then Rep. John F. his usual amount of curiosity about the internal structure and operation of Kennedy urged his colleagues to "as- newspapers, especially the Times. On sume the responsibility of preventing occasion Ellsberg even called Ben the onrushing tide of communism from Bagdikian, assistant managing editor engulfing all of Asia." of The Washington Post, to ask him As an alternate model of the "quag- how to get information concerning mire" theory, Ellsberg suggested that Vietnam to the appropriate reporters what had been operating was the at the Times. "stalemate machine," a policy that in volved doing "what was necessary at When Ellsberg had something to say . _ any given time to avoid losing, and , not, at that time, much more." He in- "options," Ellsberg said, "I know the ferred that a crucial "rule of the option game, Dr. Kissinger ... can't game" had been operating for all Pres- you just give us an answer or tell us idents: "Do not lose the rest of Viet- you don't have such estimates?" nam to Communist control before the The meeting was broken up, and the next election." next day South Vietnamese troops en- tered Laos on operations heavily sup- Meetings With Kissinger ported by American troops from the EFORE HE ultimately took things air—a showpiece of . Binto his own hands, Ellsberg made a last flirtation with the actual deci- sion-making process in government. Early in August 1970, he had lunch in The Laos operations became the sub- Washington with and ject of one of Ellsberg's angriest pub- Lloyd Shearer, the roving editor of Pa- lic attacks on American policy, rade magazine. Kissinger indicated his ,an arti- interest in talking, with Ellsberg alone cle in the New York Review in March about the war. Several subsequentap- 1971. He wrote of "a coherent inner Pointments were made (including one logic" to American policy: the old rule that interrupted the Ellsbergs' honey- of "a decent interval" between Ameri- moon in Hawaii), but according to Ells- can troop withdrawal and the fall of berg they were canceled each time by the Saigon government. "How many Kissinger at the last moment. will die in Laos?" Ellsberg asked. They did meet for half an hour at "What is 's best estimate the Western White House in San Cle- of the number of Loatian people - 'enemy' and 'non-enemy' — that U.S. mente in September, and as Ellsberg firepower will kill in the' next 12 recounts it their conversation focused months? He does not have an estimate. on the Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg He has not asked Henry Kissinger for learned that Kissinger had been one one, and Kissinger has not asked the of the original advisers on the stuc- Pentagon; and none of these officials ture of the war history and that a copy has ever seen an answer, to this or any of the final version was available to comparable question on the expected him. But Kissinger said he had not impact of war policy on human life. read the Papers, because they had And none of them differs in this from little relevance to formulation of his predecessors." current policy. Ellsberg, citing his own reading of Trying McGovern the Papers, disagreed. He pressed Kis- WHENEVER Ellsberg consulted singer, urging him to assign at least VV lawyers, they advised him that he one person the task of reading and an- would be in a much safer position le- alyzing the entire' study. Kissinger gally if he persuaded a member of promptly offered that job to his visi- Congress—protected by legislative im- . Ellsberg refused: "My feeling was munity—to disclose the Pentagon Pa- that I'd been through all that before pers rather than doing it himself. As he and I wasn't going to get in the posi- became discouraged over the prospects tion of 'being a staff worker for him." with Fulbright—some of whose staff Later, when the Pentagon Papers members began advising against hold- were disclosed, Kissinger was quoted ing hearings based on the Pentagon as denying any knowledge of them. Papers — Ellsberg next chose Sen. The last confrontation between Ells- George McGovern, sponsor of a major berg and Kissinger came in late Jan- end-the-war amendment and the first uary 1971 at a weekend conference in declared candidate for the 1972 Demo- suhurban sponsored by MIT cratic presidential nomination. and several businessmen to discuss "the Ellsberg called on the senator in foreign policy crisis." Kissinger, one of January 1971, saying he had classified • the main siSeakers, told the group that material that would expose American' "there are no good choices left in Viet- policy in Vietnam so thoroughly as to nam" and that "this administration has end the war. According to Ellsberg's been the best' protection of those who version of the story, McGovern agreed most loudly deplore our policy." After that he would accept the Papers bi.t several other people asked Kissinger later backed down after consultkig questions, Ellsberg stood and pressed with Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), a him to say whether the administration good friend of McGovern and a lawyer. had estimated the number of Asian Later Ellsberg would attack McGovern dead and wounded that might result for not having the courage to help from "Vietnamization," just as it had flush out the truth on the war. estimates of expected American casual- But McGovern's recollection of their . ties. When Kissinger began to speak of relationship is substantially different. "I concluded after talking with him for a while that he was a hawk with a bad conscience," McGovern says. "I've nad a dozen professors and preachers and foreign service officers give me memo- randa in the past that they said would end the war if disclosed ... I had no idea what he had, and I didn't know if his judgment was good or bad. I didn't even know whether he was ra- tional."

Br Bob Burchette—The Washington Post United Press International Two of the senators ElIsbell approached were Charles Goodell and• George McGovern, D4 it4t4ay. April30,1972 TEE WASHINGTON' POST here about what happened in Vietnam, and if you apply the laws of war to American conduct there, then the lead- ers of the United States for the past McGovern says he also pointed out six- years at least, including the incum- to Ellsberg–that it would berbetter to bent President, Richard Milhoua Nix- approach someone other than 'a indi- on, may well be guilty of war crimes." date for President, in order to avoid That was enough for Daniel Ells. the impression that the release wairfor berg. Neil 'Sheehan and his wife, Su- purely partisan political purposes, san, a writer for The New Yorker, McGovern, who was proud of .a Tong visited Cambridge late in March, 1971; record of voting against the war in the after a brief stay at the Treadway Senate, resented Ellsberg's argument Motel there, they returned to Wash- that everyone should be willing to go ington with an enormous bundle of to jail in order to end the war: "I fig: disorganized photocopies 'of govern- ured that it anybody was to go to jail, ment documents, the Pentagon Papers. it would be better for him to go than me, since I was a United States sena- On March 7, 1971, the Sunday.edition tor, doing what I think is important of the' Boston Globe carried a front- work." page story by Thomas Oliphant de- John Holum, McGovern's legislative scribing the nature of the study Mc- assistant, did not like Ellsberg. "There Namara had commissioned. The heats are a lot of people you encounter who line read: "Only 3 Have Read Secret are recent converts on the war," Indochina Report; All Urge Pullout." Holum observes with the passion of a The three people to whom Oliphant longtime believer. "They usually don't referred were Morton 'Halperin, Leslie have much to offer.". He and other Gelb and Daniel Ellsberg. The last, de- staff members were offended by Ells- scribed by Oliphant as "by far the berg's manner and the information most vocal in his opposition to the that he had already "told off" Sen. war," told the reporter in an interview Nelson. that during his six years in govern- McGovern denies that he ever en- ment and consulting jobs "I was par- couraged Ellsberg or even looked at ticipating in a criminal conspiracy to the Papers before making his decision. wage aggressive war." There were According to McGovern, he urged Ells- quotes from' Ellsberg's scathing article berg to go instead to a large newspa- in the New York Review of ,Books, but per, such as or not from the Pentagon Papers them- The Washington Post. In retrospect, selves. Still it was quite a scoop; ex- however, he concedes that if a member cept for a brief mention in the Oct 25, of Congress had been willing to act, the 1970, issue of Parade magazine, Oli- press and the people might have been phant was the first' to write publicly able to obtain and digest the informa- about the Papers. But no one else tion in the Pentagon Papers much picked it up. more easily. There would be a long wait. Daniel Ellsberg, who had paid attention to Enter little else for a year and a half, was uLLSBERG felt that he had ex- near despair. hausted the major prospects in The Washington Post (C) 1972, Sanford J. Ungar Congress. The press seemed to be the Fulbright and the published papers. only solution, and the Times was his natural choice. It was simply a matter of choosing the right person to receive the material. That became easier when Ellsberg learned that Neil Sheehan—a former UPI correspondent whom Ells- berg had met in Vietnam and who was now working in the Washington bu- reau of the Times—was preparing an essay on 33 antiwar books for the Times' book review section. Sheehan's piece, entitled "Should We Have War. Crime Trials?", air peared in the newspaper on March 28, 1971. The men directing the war in Washington and Saigon, Sheehan ob- served, had "never read the laws gov- erning the conduct of war . . . or if they did, they interpreted them rather loosely." Looking at the 33 books, he said, "If you credit as factual only a fraction of the information assembled