(1/0 Daniel Ellsberg: By Sanford J. Ungar Ungar is a Washington Post staff writer who covered the Pentagon Papers litigation last summer. The follow- ing excerpt from his book, "The Papers & The Papers," to be published by E.P. Dutton next month, traces Daniel Ellsberg's search for a way to make the Pentagon docit- ntente public. N NOV. 6, 1969, during a visit to secret, Which had been prepared by O Washington, Daniel Ellsberg met the Institute for Defense Analyses. with Sen. .L W. Fulbright, chairman of Ellsberg urged that the Pentagon the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- Papers be made publi c, perhaps tee, and several committee staff mem- through full congressional release of bers. their contents, but Fulbright, who had Fulbright, by that time committed never met Ellsberg before, expressed to American withdrawal from Vietnam, caution. was notoriously angry over what had "I didn't know what to do with [the been established as the purposeful de- Papers]," Fulbright recalled later. "I ception of Congress during 1964 to ob- didn't want to get Ellsberg in trouble. tain passage of the Gulf of Tonkin res- I considered what to do with the por- olution, which became the "functional tions he gave me—having executive equivalent" of a declaration of war heaKings or something of that nature. against North Vietnam. Ellsberg But I decided that the best way would • played on that anger, not only telling be to get them officially. Anyway, it Be Ken Fell—The Washington Post Fulbright about the existence of, the wasn't clear then of what use they ac- Daniel Ellsberg holding a boxful Pentagon Papers but also turning over tually were in stopping the war." to him a brief portion that dealt with The excerpts from the Papers were of the government edition of the the Tonkin Gulf incident; he also gave tucked away in the safe in the Foreign Pentagon Papers. the senator notes on a separate com- Relations Committee's offices on the mand and control study of Tonkin, also fourth floor of the New Senate Office otommk.„ The Difficulties of Disclosure Building, 'but Fulbright lost no time as a compilation of raw materials to be with Laird had "marked the beginning acting on his promise to Ellsberg that used at some unspecified, but distant, of a more cooperative attitude within • he 'Would try to do something about future date. On the basis of the under- the executive branch on problems 0.1 the study. Two days later he wrote to standing that access and use would be this nature." Defense Secretary Melvin Laird: restricted, the documents were de- "The issue involved here," Fulbright "It is my understanding that the signed to contain an accumulaion of stressed, "is not merely that of allow most delicate sensitivity, Department of Defense prepared a .. data of the ing committee members access to th documents but is far more fundamen history of the decision-making process including NSC papers and other presi- on Vietnam policy covering the period dential communications which have al- tal, going to the heart of the contint: from 1940 to April 1968. The project, I ways been _considered privileged. In ing problem of striking the proper con was informed, began under Secretary addition, the papers included a variety stitutional balance between the legisla McNamara and was completed under of internal advice and comments cen- tive and executive branches, particu- Secretary Clifford and was confined to tral to the decision-making process. larly on foreign policy matters." a study of written data. It appears that Many of the contributions to this total That argunient might have been ex a study would be of significant value document were provided on the basis pected to appeal to Laird, himself a to the Committee in its review of Viet- of an expressed guarantee of confi- former congressman from Wisconsin: nam policy issues, and I would appre- dentiality. but he apparently paid absolutely no "As intended from the start," Laird's attention. Except for a pro forma let- ciate your making it, as well as any ter of confirmation sent to Fulbright later studies of a similar nature, avail- letter continued, "access to and use of able to, the Committee." this document' as been extremely lim- on Feb. 18, 1970, which promised to "be ited. It would clearly be contrary to back in touch with you on this matter First Confirmation the national interest to disseminate it as soon as practicable," Laird re- mill) PROMPTLY acknowledged more widely. However, the Depart- mained silent on the subject for L Fulbright's letter, but then took ment of Defense is naturally prepared months. more than a month to write back re- to provide the committee information Ellsberg, - meanwhile, was search- fusing the request for access to the with respect to executive branch activi- ing for other people holding high Pentagon Papers. The Secretary's let- ties in Vietnam for any portion of the office who might be willing to take ter of Dec. 20, 1969, included the first period covered by this compendium. I dramatic action to help end the war. formal confirmation by the Defense hope you will appreciate the reasons Late in 1969, after the massive Morato- Department that the study even ex- why we are unable to comply literally rium and Mobilization demonstrations isted. with your request." in Washington, a number of outspoken "In 1967, Secretary McNamara initi- Fulbright did not exactly appreciate legislators began to assert congres- ated a detailed history of the evolution Laird's reasons. The senator wrote sional prerogatives in foreign policy of the present-day situation in Viet- again on Jan. 19, 1970, noting that he for the first time in years. nam," Laird wrote. "It was conceived had hoped that previous experience See ELLSBERG, Page D4 ,:s5t,ean.......voomPWOON9NOUNIMAW Mgar. 6MtgaleftWOMMMWAVVY401............}. One of the earliest and most brash legislative proposals was offered by Course of action to hini: "I thought Charles E. Goodell—the moderate Re- there, would, be a big to-do by the ad- publican congressman from upstate ministration on the question of classi- New York who had undergone his own lieation, which might divert from the Conversion on the war after being ap- _-contents of the Papers. I thought that , pointed to fill the Senate seat of Rob- if we used them, without release, the ert F. Kennedy. He introduced legisla- big attack would be on,the procedure tion that would have required com- . If I had done it, this would have plete withdrawal by December 1970. •brought a good deal of criticism on the Goodell was unable to find a single co- _Committee; certain Republican mem- sponsor for his bill, but it became a bers would have raised hell . I still cause celebre in the peace movement. thought. tney should be the subject of Ellsberg was impressed, and he en- legitimate hearings." listed to help Goodell drum up As chairman of one of the most pres- support. tigious committees in the Congress, Working with a group of other con- ,Fulbright had a special problem and sultants to Goodell, but using his de- saw direct release as possibly counter-, tailed acquaintance with the Pentagon ;productive. Despite his frustrations, on Papers, Ellsberg helped draft the state- many occasions he does receive classi- ment which the New York senator used fied material frolic the executive as lead-off witness before the Foreign , branch in closed _sessions; any breach Relations Committee on Feb. 3, 19'70, of security, on his part could be used as when Sen. Fulbright opened a new se- :a basis for ,denying him such material ries of hearings on the war. In a few In the future.. Then he in turn might be answerable places, it was obvious that Goodell to his colleagues in the fudged while bending over backward to ,Senate for their inability to learn that little bit of the inside story avoid using classified material in the to which speech; but the testimony was laced they were accustomed. with reference and conclusions which And besides, whatever his policy • drew heavily on Ellsberg's point of views, Fulbright is a well-accepted member of,the Senate "club"; he is not view. one to breach the standards and the et- At no pant during his brief contact iquette under which it operates. He with the senator did Ellsberg tell Good- was in the bizarre position of having ell that he had a copy of the Pentagon seen the. Pentagon Papers but of feel- papers; in fact,, he never became ing constrained not to quote publicly aware of their existence until June 13, from them;. instead he simply contin- 1971. ued asking that they be made officially Goodell, who lost his Senate seat in . available. Fulbright wrote to Laird the 1970 election to Conservative again on :April 20, 1971. He got no James L. Buckley, later said he was reply. sorry that Ellsberg did not tell him , By then, however, Ellsberg was ex- about' the Papers, "because I think it ploring other means of getting the con- would have made quite a difference if Congress had that information." Good- ell ackrioWledged, though, that "I don't know what I would have done with them." In any event, Ellsberg felt that he must continue to work behind the 'scenes with the Foreign Relations 'Committee. Fulbright's Problem S THE MONTHS passed, Ellsberg A sought to prod Fulbright into ac- - tion on the Papers. Late in February -11970 he submitted a large ehunk of the -'contents—at least 3,000 pages photo- copied fram about 25 volumes of the study—to Norvill Jones, one of Ful- Lbright's aides 'on the Foreign Relations Committee staff.