ATTORNEY GENERAL of CANADA Respondents (Appellants by Cross-Appeal)
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Court File No.: 35945 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL) BETWEEN: HARRY DANIELS, GABRIEL DANIELS, LEAH GARDNER, TERRY JOUDREY and THE CONGRESS OF ABORIGINAL PEOPLES Appellants (Respondents by Cross-Appeal) AND HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN as represented by THE MINISTER OF INDl~""l AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents (Appellants by Cross-Appeal) FACTUM OF THE 11'11ERVENER ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN SASKATCHEWAN JUSTICE GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP ABORIGINAL LAW Barristers and Solicitors 820-1874 Scarth Street 2600, 160 Elgin Street REGINA, SK S4P 4B3 OTTAW'A,ON KlPIC3 Telephone: (306)787-7846 Telephone: (613)786-8695 Facsimile: (306)787-9111 Facsimile: (613)788-3509 Email: [email protected] Email: lynne.watt@gowlings .com P. Mitch McAdam, Q.C. D. Lynne Watt Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener Attorney General of Saskatchewan Attorney General of Saskatchewan TABLE OF CONTE1''TS Page I. OVERVIEW OF POSITION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 III.ARGUMENT 2 A. Not an "Either/Or Question" 2 B. Are the Metis of Western Canada Section 91(24) Indians? 3 C. Inter-Jurisdictional Immunity 7 D. Room for the Exercise of Provincial Jurisdiction 8 E. Blais is Still Good Law 8 F. Conclusion 9 IV. COSTS 10 V. DISPOSITION OF THE LEGAL ISSUES 10 VI. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 11 PART I- OVERVIEW OF POSITION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. The Attorney General for Saskatchewan has intervened in this appeal in order to address the issue concerning whether the Metis are "Indians" for the purposes of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 1 This is a significant issue for Saskatchewan because a large nwnber of Metis people live in the Province today and have historically lived here. The Attorney General intends to address only the situation of the Metis of Western Canada. He does not intend to comment on whether there are other Metis people in Canada or whether these people should be considered to be "Indians". Saskatchewan has consistently taken the position that the Metis of Western Canada are "Indians" for the purposes of section 91 (24 ). This issue has arisen in litigation in Saskatchewan and the Attorney General has conceded the point.2 The Province has also enacted The Metis Act which specifically provides in its preamble that nothing in the Act is to be construed as altering or affecting the Province's position that legislative authority in relation to Metis people rests with the Government of Canada under section 91(24).3 2. The Attorney General's position with respect io this issue is unique. rne Attorney General agrees with the submissions of Canada and Alberta that the Metis in Western Canada were not considered to be "Indians" in 1870 when Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory joined Confederation. Nevertheless, it is the Attorney General's position that section 91 (24) should be interpreted broadly and that these Metis can, therefore, still be considered to be "Indians". PART II-STATEMENT OF ISSUES 3. The Attorney General sought and was granted leave to intervene in this appeal in order to address the issue concerning whether Metis are "Indians" for the purposes of section 91(24). He does not, therefore, intend to address any of the other issues raised by this appeal. 1 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5. 2 R. v. Laviolette, 2005 SKQB 61, 260 Sask. R. 121; R. v. Grumbo, [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 172 (Sask. C.A.) at 18, 168 Sask. R. 78. 3 S.S. 2001, c. M-14.01. -2- PART Ill-ARGUMENT A. Not an "Either/Or" Question 4. At paragraph ten of the Court of Appeal judgment, Dawson J.A. indicates that the Appellants are seeking resolution of the issue as to which of Canada or the Provinces have jurisdiction over Metis and non-status Indian peoples. It is the position of the Attorney General that this is not an "either/or" question. Even if the Court concludes that Metis are not "Indians" for the purposes of section 91 (24 ), this does not mean that the provinces have jurisdiction over the Metis in tenns similar to Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians. 5. Federal jurisdiction over "Indians" under section 91(24) is a unique power. It provides jurisdiction over a specific group of people. It authorizes Parliament to legislate with respect to this group in an all-encompassing way. As this Court noted in Canard, section 91(24) authorizes Parliament to legislate for Indians with respect to matters that would otherwise fall within provincialjurisdiction.4 Therefore, unlike most of the other heads of power where there needs to be a line of demarcation between federal and provincial jurisdiction, section 91(24) authorizes Parliament to legislate in a way that could largely subsume provincial jurisdiction, if it wishes. 6. The Appellants argue that the principle of exhaustiveness - that all legislative 5 power in Canada is divided between Parliament and the provincial legislatures - warrants the conclusion that if Metis are not section 91(24) Indians, then they must fall within provincial jurisdiction. The Attorney General submits that this would not be an appropriate application of the principle. Taking the Appellants' argument to its logical end, the failure to mention other groups in section 91, such as Mennonites, would give the provinces all-encompassing jurisdiction over these people. Clearly, that would be an absurd result. It is submitted that the 4 Attorney General ofCanada v. Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 [Canard]; Brown v. British Columbia (1980), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 705, [1980) 3 W.W.R. 360 (B.C. C.A.); K.M. Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 513; Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 5th ed. Supplemented (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at 28-4.1-28.5. 5 Attorney General ofOntario v. Attorney General ofCanada (References Case), [1912] A.C. 581; see also Hogg, supra note 4 at 12-4 - 12-5. -3- power to enact legislation with respect to a specific group of people in an all~encompassing fashion akin to section 91(24) must be set out explicitly in the Constitution and should not be implied. Furthermore, the mischief that the exclusivity principle is aimed at is a jurisdictional gap. 6 Not applying the principle in this case does not lead to a gap. B. Are the Metis of Western Canada Section 91(24) Indians? 7. The Attorney General submits that, as noted in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., constitutional provisions like section 91(24) should be interpreted purposively and in light of their linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts. 7 This approach was recently described by LeBel J. in CSN v. Canada with respect to the interpretation of section 91(2A) of the Constitution Act, 1867 as follows: "The power in question must be interpreted generously, but in a manner consistent with its legal context, having regard to relevant historical elements."8 8. The Court can also draw guidance from the decision in the Eskimo Reference.9 In order to determine whether Eskimos are "Indians" for the purposes of section 91 (24), the Court looked at how the term "Indian" was used in common parlance in 1867 and referred to things like dictionary definitions, government reports, correspondence from missionaries and other sources of information that were likely known to the Fathers of Confederation. It is submitted that the similar evidence adduced in this case can cast some light on whether the Fathers of Confederation intended the reference to "Indians" in section 91(24) to embrace the Metis. 9. However, the Attorney General submits that some caution is warranted in the use of this material as an interpretive guide to a head of power in our Constitution. It must be kept in mind, as the Court noted in Hunter v. Southam, th~t the task of expounding a Constitution is 6 Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 7 [1985] 1S.C.R.295 at344, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321. 8 Confederation des syndicates nationaux v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 SCC 68 at para. 30; [2008] 3 S.C.R. 511. See also Ross River Dene Council v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 YKSC 4 at paras. 15-23, [2012] 2 C.N.L.R. 276. 9 Reference re: Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 417. -4- "crucially different" than that of construing a statute. 10 A Constitution is drafted with an eye to the future and must be sufficiently flexible to allow governments to address future policy issues that were unimaginable to the framers.11 Accordingly, a broad, liberal and generous interpretation of constitutional terms is always warranted. 10. This caution manifests itself in this case in two ways. First, while obviously the views of the Fathers of Confederation about the scope of a particular power are an important consideration, they are not determinative. 12 In this case, the evidence established that jurisdiction over Indians was not discussed during the debates leading up to Confederation. Therefore, there is no direct evidence about what any of the Fathers of Confederation thought concerning the scope of the term "Indian" in section 91 (24 ). In the absence of direct evidence, speculation about what the Fathers of Confederation may or may not have thought about this issue is, it is submitted, entitled to little weight. Second, it is submitted that it would be an error to place too much weight on statutory sources and government reports from the time.