Vol 02 Issue 2

Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Ralph E. Havens

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J, Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirlland

Professional Staff Hugh Rii hardson. Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Editor and

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on m ilitary doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permis- sion. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL SUMMER 1988, Vol. II, No. 2 AFRP 50-2

Editorial— My Friend Mich and the Dual-Track System 2 The SIOP: What Kind of War Plan? Dr Stephen J. Cimbala 4

The Strategic Defense Initiative in the Military Context Lt Col G. E. Myers, USAF 12

World War I from the Viewpoint of American Airmen ClC W. Kevin Durden, USAFA 28

Technology, Air Power, and the Modern Theater Battlefield Maj Robert M. Chapman, Jr., USAF 42

Getting a Grip on Careerism Maj Michael L. Mosier, USAF 52

The Soviet Spetsnaz Threat to NATO Capt Erin E. Campbell, USAF 61

Nordic NATO in Transition: Toward Turbulence in the 1990s? Lt Col Lawrence R. Nilssen, USAF 68

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 79 Notams Notices of Interest 93 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL

M y Friend Mich and the Dual-Track System

Y friend Mich is a fighter pilot. He a few years later. By the time individuals M flies Mirages for the Belgian air force. reach the 12- to 15-year point, they have a He is a very good fighter pilot, well re- much better feel for what they really want spected by his peers and his superiors for out of the rest of their career. In the mean- his abilities. In addition, he serves his unit time, young officers need to stay on a single as a NATO exercise evaluation officer, plan- track, learning their jobs and preparing for ning and conducting the exercises that keep the future, whichever path they choose. the unit in top readiness. He has been very We must set a high standard for selection helpful in assisting the collocated Ameri- to either career option. The people we select can unit in developing its own exercises as to remain in their functional career fields well as joint exercises. He is bright and ca- must be chosen based on proven excellence. pable, just the type of officer every wing They must be very capable and highly mo- commander wants to have in the unit. He tivated like Mich but must, for their own will never be promoted again. reasons, have decided not to pursue the Mich is a commandant in the Belgian air path to higher rank and command. We force. That is the rank given to those officers would be making a selection that the Air who have chosen the "other track” in a Force and the individual will have to live dual-track system. Recent changes in the of- with for the rest of that person’s career. ficer evaluation system and various re- These people must be selected against the sponses to the current shortage of pilots most stringent of standards. If we allow the have generated discussion concerning the standards to be lowered simply to fill all the United States Air Force considering some authorized slots or if the specialty track be- form of dual-track system. Should the Air comes a place to hide individuals who sim- Force decide to seriously consider a dual- ply aren’t hacking it in the command/ track system, we would be well advised to promotion track, then the system will fail. check into the existing dual-track systems Poor performers are poor performers regard- of our allies to avoid possible pitfalls. If we less of the option. The secbnd track cannot want a dual-track system, then we must be afford to be a place for the sick, lame, and willing to make the effort to ensure that it lazy to rest. Selection to the second track works. must be every bit as competitive as the com- As Air Force Chief of Staff Larry D. Welch mand/promotion track. If it is, the individ- points out when he speaks about the new of- uals selected can be the corporate ficer professional development system, we knowledge base that keeps their organiza- must time the selection point late enough in tions strong and effective. a career so that individuals are sure they We can make the second track a useful really want to opt out of the command/pro- tool in Air Force personnel management by motion track and perform their current du- controlling entry into it. It can be a tool that ties for the rest of their careers. It is very fills the needs of the individuals in the sys- easy when you are a young captain to say tem as well as the system itself, one that al- you don’t care about promotion but just lows our most capable people to stand out— want to fly. The choice may not be so simple people like my friend Mich. MAK

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. Ail corre- bring about this relationship, he concentrates on spondence should be addressed to the Editor, overcoming obstacles at the squadron and wing Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB AL levels. While there’s nothing wrong with this ap- 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit the ma- proach as a starting point, I would go several terial for overall length. steps further to expand the scope of this relationship to include the entire Air Force (actually any military) organizational framework. MORE ON "YOUNG OFFICERS" As a professional intelligence officer now on Bravo to Lt Col Stephen C. Hall's comments in "temporary loan” to the political-military affairs “Shortchanging Our Young Officers: Military field, I too, like Captain Tice, have worked down Traditions Denied" in the Fall 1987 issue. How- at the squadron and wing levels, both in CONUS ever. traditions are important only if they sup- and overseas. In addition. I've had assignments up through the major command and joint levels. port why we are here. For example, my role in the Air Force became Regardless of where the jobs have been, there’s clear at SOS but not in the expected way. At SOS been one constant factor: a pressing need to im- it was those people sitting around me, my peers, prove the operations/intelligence relationship. who had fought in some of the most recent con- Fortunately, over the last few years, a marked im- flicts and who would fight in any conflict in the provement has taken place. Credit is due to the near future. My job was to support these people efforts of many from both the operations and in- with command and control computer systems. If telligence areas of the Air Force. a system works poorly, it becomes one less re- Intelligence needs to do even more. Several source available to support their mission and general thoughts for improvement to supple- successful return. ment Captain Tice’s proposed solutions come to My resolve was to ensure our computer sys- mind. These support enhancements will happen tems would be ready and capable of supporting only in a context where intelligence is used and the mission. No excuses of old technology, lack understood. While much sensitive intelligence of trained programmers, or other common rea- should remain strictly "need to know," the old sons would prevent us from realizing every last “behind-the-green-door" syndrome is going capability of the system. It was gratifying to note away slowly. An effective relationship today de- that this same insight and resolve had an equally mands that intelligence personnel make them- motivating effect on the folks who worked for selves and their resources more useful and me. We subsequently made some breakthroughs understood. Said another way, they have to be- and plan to make more. come more credible. I suspect traditions come from striving in a no- Gaining credibility requires considerable ef- ble endeavor and will come and go as needed. fort. However, it is essential that intelligence people do just that, regardless of where they fit in Capt Bruce Benson, USAF the Air Force organization. The resources avail- Neuhruecke, West Germany able might not be as limited as Captain Tice states. According to recent figures published in OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE Air Force Magazine, over 3,400 officers and 13,000 enlisted personnel are in Air Force intel- I want to commend Capt Brian P. Ti c e for his ar- ligence. From my perspective, that's a lot of peo- ticle "Air Force Operations and Intelligence: ple—many with considerable experience and Getting It Together." Winter 1987-88 issue, and capability—to help make the extensive intelli- add several observations of my own. Captain gence community work. These professionals Tice correctly points out that a good interface or have access to some significant man-made re- relationship between intelligence and opera- sources, including much high technology and tions must exist for the US Air Force to have an effective warfighting and winning capability. To to 90

3 THE SIOP What Kind o f War Plan?

D r Stephen J. C imbal a

HE credibility of American deterrence doctrines is based on the clear explanation of the ideas behind those doctrines, the forces available Tto national leaders to im plem ent those ideas, and the actual plans that are made in peacetime in the event of deterrence failure and war. We call these, respectively, declaratory, force acquisition, and employment (or action) policy. If there is a wide gap between declaratory policy (what we say we SIOP 5 will do) and action policy or force structure provided public notice of this shift in (what we can do or have the forces to do it emphasis: with), then deterrence may be based on The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to bluff. the extent feasible basic military strategy in a This essay considers the subject of war possible general nuclear war should be ap- plans, more specifically US nuclear war proached in much the same way that more plans. There is some argument that war conventional military operations have been re- plans are not always matched to political garded in the past. That is to say, principal leaders’ goals and objectives, or to the actual military objectives, in the event of a nuclear capabilities of strategic nuclear forces. The war stemming from a major attack on the Al- liance, should be the destruction of the ene- results of these mismatches may be war my's military forces, not of his civilian plans that, in the event that deterrence fails, population.2 adversely affect national security and the at- tainment of war aims. This call for ‘‘counterforce” targeting would Nuclear war plans are not like war plans be misunderstood by some of McNamara’s of the past. There is no “Schlieffen Plan” for contemporaries and by future nuclear his- a war between nuclear-armed superpowers, torians. He was not saying that the oppo- and even if there were, history is testimony nent’s cities or economic and social values to the fact that the best drafted plans can would be spared in US retaliatory strikes fail. Accordingly, it might be wise to assume under all conditions. Nor was he saying that that US nuclear war plans, if tested, will the two sides could engage in a gradual and also fail to some extent. However, our reciprocal process of escalation, trading ex- preoccupation with their catastrophic fail- changes of air bases, submarine pens, and ure in a nuclear “Pearl Harbor" may be mis- missile silos while withholding attacks placed. Failures caused by something other against cities and bargaining with the than total surprise may also lead to national adversary. defeat. Later theorists and policymakers would call for variations of these two ideas rejected by McNamara: purely counterforce war or How Flexible? graduated and controlled strategic nuclear warfighting. McNamara was skeptical that There has been a struggle between poli- these ideas could be implemented with any cymakers and military planners since the existing or future force structure. What he Kennedy administration, if not before, over wanted was the capability to retaliate the issue of how flexible US plans for nu- against any set of targets after the United clear war must be. According to historical States had absorbed the worst possible So- documents, plans during the Eisenhower viet first strike. Therefore, McNamara de- administration called for massive attacks on sired forces sized according to the “greater- Soviet, East European, and Chinese military than-expected threat,” which would allow and civilian targets.1 for numbers adequate to fulfill the require- When President Kennedy assumed office, ments of worst-case scenarios. His deputies a comprehensive assessment of US nuclear in the Pentagon set 20 to 25 percent of the war plans was undertaken. Secretary of Soviet population and one half to two- Defense Robert S. McNamara sought to in- thirds of its industrial capacity as guide- troduce flexibility into the single inte- lines beyond which additional destruction grated operational plan (SIOP)—the central would be politically and m ilitarily luclear war plan for strategic forces—he insignificant.3 iherited from the Eisenhower administra- In setting these criteria, McNamara and on. In his commencement address at the his associates were trying to set limits on niversity of Michigan in 1962, McNamara force acquisition, especially on the growth ffiT t sr \W 7

of the US strategic land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. How- ever, the argument about numbers of fatalities following a US nuclear retaliation took on a life of its own. To this day, mutual assured destruction has the acronym or nickname “MAD" that its opponents gave to it, referring to its dubiously ethical requirement for a given number of fatalities to guarantee stable deterrence. However, MAD does not really do this because the numbers it prescribes are irrelevant to actual strategic decisionmaking. They are so high as to be meaningless to any real-world policymaker or military planner. Long before nuclear war has escalated to the level of assured destruction, it will have ceased to make sense.

Useful Options The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations all sought to reconcile force planning

6 or other American allies. Escalation control implied that the United States would want to limit the destruction attendant to war in order to induce reciprocal Soviet restraint. For example, strikes could be withheld on targets such as the highest political leadership or cities, which the United States might want to hold in jeopardy for bargaining purposes later.5 The targeting studies of the Carter administration led to modifications in the SIOP that continued the evolutionary trends of Schlesinger toward increased numbers of smaller and more flexible options. “Coun- tervailing” strategy purported to meet So- viet aggression, including nuclear attacks, with proportional responses while seeking war termination under the best possible conditions.6 Although dubbed a war-winning strategy by its critics, countervailing strategy was described by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as a continuation of previous developments in the 1970s. And so it was, for the most part. There was some additional declaratory emphasis in the Carter strategy in the targeting of Soviet leadership, both political and military. This had been a component of US planning previously but had not been broadcast very loudly in press and academic accounts of American nuclear war plans. The Carter doctrine allegedly also called for plans and forces that would permit American forces to fight an extended or protracted nuclear war. This placed heavy emphasis upon the command, control, and communications (C3) system required to fight such a war over a period of weeks or and war plans with declaratory policy. Ail months.7 The public exposition of Presiden- to some extent succeeded, but large gaps re- tial Directive (PD)-59 in 1980 called these mained. According to National Security De- components of the Carter plans to public at- cision Memorandum (NSDM)-242, as tention and created debate among strate- explained by former Secretary of Defense gists that continued into the early Reagan James R. Schlesinger in 1974, US policy- years. makers sought flexible nuclear targeting, es- The Reagan administration did not re- calation control, and the capability to write the Carter declaratory strategy, nor withhold early strikes against certain did it attempt to drastically modify its war classes of targets.'1 Flexible targeting meant plans. The early Reagan years were spent the use of less than full SIOP options in re- trying to purchase the forces and the C3 sys- sponse to a Soviet attack on Western Europe tem to implement the Carter countervailing

7 8 AIR POWER JOURNAL strategy, including the controversial MX/ utes to one hour of war, the wish becomes a Peacekeeper ICBM. In 1983, however, the fantasy. The number of US strategic war- president declared his intention to launch a heads on bombers, submarines, and land- research and development program to de- based missiles surviving a Soviet first strike termine whether technology could make would depend on whether those US forces nuclear weapons obsolete. The Strategic had been previously “generated” or had re- Defense Initiative (SDI) was formally begun mained on day-to-day alert. In the fully gen- in response to the president’s charge. It erated case, approximately 7,000 US would, if developed into technology ac- weapons would.arrive on target, destroying cording to the president’s vision, change the some 8,700 military, political, and eco- balance of nuclear terror by threat of retal- nomic targets. Forces on day-to-day alert iation into something else. The “something would provide some 3,800 weapons de- else” would be a balance of denying attack- stroying an estimated 5,400 targets.9 There- ing warheads access to American, and pre- fore, the abundance, if not surfeit, of sumably Soviet, society. In between where potential targets in relation to surviving we are now and where we are going, accord- weapons argues against the need for plans ing to the advocates of the “defense transi- that are excessively fine tuned. tion,” is a limbo of negotiated reductions in Second, the feasibility of war plans de- offensive capabilities accompanied by a pends not only on the number of weapons buildup of defenses. The administration’s available and surviving attack but also on “strategic concept" as explained by chief other factors. An additional factor of ob- arms control adviser Paul H. Nitze outlines vious importance is the US C3 system for a similar three-stage progression, from the nuclear crisis and war. present offense-dominant world to a new The US command system has been sub- defense-dominant one. jected to more study in recent years, partly as a result of programmatic emphasis in the Reagan and Carter administrations. Ana- Key Questions lysts seem to agree that the system can provide for retaliation of some kind under all We have pointed out the kinds of policies but the most drastic conditions. But the that may or may not be consistent and have kind of retaliation, and under what condi- identified the stages through which US nu- tions, is more debatable. Bruce G. Blair has clear war planning has progressed from suggested that the Soviet Union could do se- 1960 to the present. An assessment of the rious, and possibly fatal, damage to the US adequacy of nuclear war plans under pres- command system by attacking key com- ent conditions is now pertinent, with the mand centers, communication networks, caution that this assessment is based on un- and warning/intelligence systems early in classified sources only. war. And the Soviets might do this with First, it would appear that the United only a fraction of the forces they would have States has reached the feasible limit of flex- to expend to disarm the American retalia- ibility in strategic nuclear war planning. tory forces.10 On the other hand, Ashton B. The SIOP 6 of the Reagan administration ap- Carter has noted that the Soviet target plan- parently identifies some 50,000 separate ner attempting to destroy the US nuclear targets (designated ground zeros), although command system would have a formidable obviously not all could be attacked in the task. Eventually the candidate target list same war plan." Additional flexibility might would grow so large that it would be vir- be a trap instead of a virtue. As the “wish tually indistinguishable from an all-out at- list" of possible targets becomes larger rel- tack against American society.” ative to the list of targets that any real force Then, too, the more that plans call for can actually attack during the first 30 min- very calibrated and selective exchanges ac- S/OP 9 companied by continued warning-and-at- possibility of limited nuclear exchanges for tack assessment, the more stress there will specific objectives, their Soviet counter- be on the US command system to perform parts might.13 its assigned missions, including sub-SIOP Three possible objectives for the United ones. The compression of time within States in a nuclear war are to deny the So- which decisionmakers will have to act in a viet Union victory in attaining its war aims, nuclear war might preclude their careful to achieve a US victory according to some scrutiny of the entire menu, assuming they prewar definition of policy objectives, or to could understand it if time permitted. Few terminate the war under the most favorable US presidents have shown any serious in- conditions possible provided the survival terest in the details of nuclear war planning, of American and allied political indepen- and their successors in the constitutionally dence and territorial integrity are guaran- prescribed chain of command would doubt- teed.13 Once nuclear exchanges begin, even less be worse off, for the most part. Having those short of attack on American and So- available targeting options for extended war viet territory per se, both sides might find presupposes that neither side will deliber- war termination the most expedient ately attack the other’s central command alternative.15 system, otherwise those extended and lim- However, war termination could be diffi- ited options would become superfluous. cult to arrange. Nuclear detonations and And there is little to suggest that the Soviet their attendant destruction would inflame approach to the targeting of US C* would be passions of leaders and publics alike and sparing of it. would partially destroy or make unreliable Less is known about the viability of the the command systems on both sides. The Soviet command system during crises or ability of US leaders to communicate with wartime operations of the type that nuclear their Soviet counterparts would be uncer- war might cause. Stephen M. Meyer has tain; neither side might with assurance suggested that the Soviet command system know who was in charge in the Kremlin or would not be fragile. It has many redundant in Washington. command centers for military and political Finally, the Soviet concept of war termi- leaders, alternative pathways for reconsti- nation might be very different from the tuting communications, and an enormous American or Western one.1H One of the more target list that would have to be covered.12 interesting cases to be made for any par- However, the operation of the Politburo tially effective missile defense system is the would depend on whether the Soviets an- possibility that it could contribute to war ticipated a surprise attack “out of the blue,” termination by preserving essential com- escalation from conventional war, or the mand, control, and communications facili- collapse of a US-Soviet nuclear crisis (as in ties and personnel beyond the initial phases Cuba in 1962) into nuclear exchanges. of a nuclear conflict. Apparently, the Sovi- A third issue in American nuclear war ets, having deployed the only current BMD planning that is not yet resolved concerns system around Moscow, have noticed this the purpose of the planning. What is the ob- possibility. ject for which the w'ar is presumably being fought? We frequently hear the statement that nuclear war is so destructive as to be Conclusion pointless. If superpower exchanges escape The SIOP has evolved over the years into control altogether, this hunch may be cor- a plan that calls for increasingly numerous rect. But total loss of control in a nuclear ex- and flexible nuclear responses to attacks change is not foreordained. American against American or allied interests. We planners have to prepare for the possibility may now have reached the sensible limit be- that even if they do not acknowledge the yond which additional “options" are 10 AIR POWER JOURNAL merely paper ones instead of realistic alter- an extended period is doubtful. Above all, natives. The US command system might US policy planners need to clarify their war provide for immediate retaliation against a aims in order to determine whether plan- very large target set, but whether it could ning for victory, victory denial, or war ter- conduct flexible and protracted attacks over mination is to receive pride of place. □

Notes 1. A review of US nuclear war plans prior to the Kennedy ad- 9. Ibid.. 81. ministration appears in David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of 10. Bruce G. Blair. Strategic Command and Control: Redefin- Overkill Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy. 1945- ing the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu- 1960." International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983). reprinted tion, 1985). esp. 182-211. in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller 11. Ashton B. Carter, "Assessing Command System Vulner- (Princeton. N.| : Princeton University Press. 1984). 113-81. ability.” in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. 2. Quoted in Lawrence Freedom. The Evolution of Nuclear Carter. John D. Steinbruner. and Charles A. Zraket (Washing- Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1981). 235. ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1987), 555-610. 3. According to McNamara aides Alain C. Enthoven and K. 12. Stephen M. Meyer. "Soviet Nuclear Operations." in Wayne Smith. "This capability (assured destruction) to de- Carter. Steinbruner. and Zraket. 470-534. stroy him (any attacker) after absorbing his surprise attack 13. See |ohn G. Hines. Phillip A. Petersen, and NotraTrulock must be a virtual certainty, and clearly evident to the enemy. III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for This is the foundation of U.S. deterrent strategy." See Alain C. NATO." Washington Quarterly 9. no. 4 (Fall 1986): 117-37. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. How Much fs Enough? Shaping This study argues the case for increased Soviet interest in con- the Defense Program. 1961 69 (New York: Harper and Row, ventional and limited nuclear options since the late 1960s. On 1971). 175. the other hand, one might note the caution offered by another 4. See Lynn Etheridge Davis. "Limited Nuclear Options: De- source: "The increased Soviet attention to conventional capa- terrence and the New American Doctrine." in Strategic Deter- bilities observed over the past decade does not, by itself, rep- rence in a Changing Environment, ed. Christoph Bertram resent any less readiness to employ nuclear weapons in a war (Montclair. N.J.: Allenheld. Osmun and Co.. 1981). 42-62. with NATO, nor does it represent any shift in the nature of the 5. Desmond Ball. "The Development of the SIOP. 1960- Soviet threat to NATO away from nuclear and toward a pri- 1983," in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and marily conventional strategy." See Joseph D. Douglass. Jr.. The Jeffrey Richelson I Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1986). Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, vol. 1. Studies in Commu- 57-83. nist Affairs (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 6. Walter Slocombe. "The Countervailing Strategy." Inter- 1976).6. national Security 5. no. 4 (Spring 1981), reprinted in Miller. 14. See Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War." 245-54. in Ball and Richelson. 171-93. 7. For a discussion of US extended war doctrine, see Richard Halloran. To Arm a N ation: Rebuilding American's Endan- 15. Barry R. Schneider. "War Termination for Strategic Nu- gered Defenses (New York: Macmillan. 1986). 268-98. Histor- clear Conflicts," in Cimbala. 120-33. ical and strategic perspective on the problem of terminating 16. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Conflict Termination in So- extended war is provided in Colin S. Gray. "Global Protracted viet Military Thought and Strategy." in Conflict Termination War: Conduct and Termination." in Strategic War Termina- in Military Strategy: Coercion. Persuasion and War. ed. Ste- tion. ed. Stephen |. Cimbala (New York: Praeger, 1986), 75-98. phen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 8. Ball. 80. Press, 1987), 33-58. Spring 1988 IRA C. EAKER AWARD W INNER

I Dr jacob W. Kipp

for his article “Soviet ‘Tactical’ Aviation in the Postwar Period: Technological Change, Organizational Innovation, and Doctrinal Continuity”

Congratulations to Dr Jacob W. Kipp on his se- If you would like to compete for the Ira C. lection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for the Eaker Award, submit an article of feature length best eligible article from the Spring 1988 issue of to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell the Airpower Journal. Doctor Kipp receives a AFB, AL 36112-5532. The award is for the best $500 cash award for his contribution to the Air eligible article in each issue and is open to all Force’s professional dialogue. The award hon- US military personnel below the rank of colonel ors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible or equivalent and all US Government civilian through the support of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf employees below GS-15 or equivalent. Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts.

11 THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT

Lt C ol G. E. M yer s, USAF

HERE has been much written over defense establishment and operating within the past five years on the seeming re- a complex set of requirements and threats birth of strategic defense as embod- ranging from antiterrorist operations to the ied in the president’s Strategic De- prevention of a nuclear holocaust. Tfense Initiative (SOI). Much of the literatureThe purpose here is to address the mili- argues the feasibility of exotic technical tary context. This discussion does not di- proposals. Other publications isolate arms rectly address the technologically feasible control and discuss how SDI will affect our argument. It does not attempt to solve the efforts to obtain an agreement with the So- arms control puzzle except to suggest that viet Union. Still others advance a scholarly we are not likely to get something for noth- discourse on the effect of SDI on our posture ing. The article addresses SDI’s effect on without reviewing the real military require- our strategic posture by suggesting that ments for and the effects of such a system. while it cannot make nuclear weapons Rarely do any of the authors attempt to impotent or obsolete, it may play a sig- place the SDI program into a military con- nificant role in our overall strategic text. To many, the system may appear to be force posture. It also examines the ef- politically motivated. Regardless of the rea- fect of the SDI program on “tactical” or sons for the system’s development, how- “theater” requirements, which in the ever, SDI mav be in the hands of the US long run are every bit as important as a

14 AIR POWER /OURNAL

"No enemy vehicle of attack must be permitted to have Even in the 1950s and early 1960s era of a free ride." Even a partially effective SDI would end the 30-year-old free ride for Soviet missile systems large strategic defense forces (before inter- such as this SS-20. continental missiles made their presence felt in a major way), the threat of absolute destruction, or massive retaliation, was the primary engine of our military defenses. We Soviet “bolt-from-the-blue” nuclear attack obviously did see our defensive forces as on the continental United States. But first, playing a role in the calculus of deterrence, since SDI is a concept for strategic defense, but we certainly did not believe that our in- it would be useful to place it within the his- terceptors and air defense missile batteries toric context of defense of the American would make Soviet bombers obsolete or homeland. eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons.1 As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said in 1954. the United States would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate in- The Historical Context stantly by means and at places of our choosing.”2 While the United States and the The US historical experience does not Soviet Union relied on the nuclear offensive stress the need for defenses in the classic sense. We have relied on two oceans to pro- as their primary military instrument during this era, the United States did not ignore its tect us from overseas threats; we have had active defenses even though they could not, benign neighbors to the north and south: as large as they were, be seen as totally ef- and we have possessed the defensive ad- fective.3 Bernard Brodie captured the idea: vantages of a large landmass. (World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam taught us the ad- There is a rough rule-of-thumb that no en- vantages of fighting wars over somebody emy vehicle of attack must be permitted to else’s territory.) In addition, the advent of have "a free ride.” The enemy should not be nuclear weapons along with the rapid relieved of uncertainty with respect to any means of their delivery over intercontinen- avenue of attack which is feasible for him to tal distances seemed to make the idea of use.4 strategic defense meaningless to many But as the nuclear era progressed, we ne- American strategic theorists. glected our active defenses to the point of STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 15 almost total abandonment by the 1970s. (damage-inflicting) and defensive (damage- Through the late 1960s and 1970s, the So- limiting) capabilities would henceforth be viet threat came increasingly from a grow- embodied in the same weapons.”9 This ing ballistic missile fleet and less from means simply that even though the MAD bombers. Of course, we toyed with the con- advocates appear to have carried the day cept of ballistic missile defense during this with respect to US nuclear targeting philos- time but eventually gave it up as “destabil- ophy, what has happened is that we are izing" to the Soviet-American strategic re- forced to build a counterforce capability lationship as too expensive and as a nut that since, militarily speaking, it makes abso- was too tough to crack with then-existing lutely no sense to target Soviet cities when technology.5 doing so would invite a similar response by We then codified the “mutual hostage” their reserve weapons that will survive be- relationship in 1972 with the Antiballistic cause they were not targeted. Missile (ABM) Treaty and settled into what many in the United States termed mutual assured destruction (MAD), which assumed that stability between the superpowers The Military Requirement could be assured only if both sides could To make matters worse, it became evident maintain the capability to destroy the to some observers by the 1970s that the So- other.6 Destruction in this case means dev- viet Union did not subscribe to the assured astation—the intentional targeting of cities destruction concept. As one writer de- rather than weapon and command systems. scribes it, the Soviets believe that “however (Official US declaratory policy called it as- awful, nuclear war must be survivable and sured destruction, the “mutual” part being some kind of meaningful victory attaina- added by think-tank analysts.) ble.”10 This means that they do not view This was the situation (admittedly sim- their nuclear weapons as some sort of myst- plified here for brevity), or at least the pub- ical out-of-sight, out-of-mind force reserved licly believed situation, throughout the only for use against the very thing that 1970s and into the 1980s—except for those would bring about their own destruction— naysayers who argued that assured destruc- the American cities. Rather, their philoso- tion or MAD really never existed and that phy centers on the ability to fight a nuclear the United States had been targeting Soviet war in the classic sense. Their weapons are weapons and they ours for as long as the designed with the accuracy and numbers to technology to do so had existed.7 Then there attack and do tremendous damage to both were those who were opposed to MAD in our hardened nuclear weapons and com- the first place and who opposed even a de- mand centers. clared policy of assured destruction. Fred S. The upshot of all this is that the Soviet Hoffman (of “ Hoffman Report” fame) leaders plan to disarm us first if they must summed up the anti-MAD view this way: fight a nuclear war. We must remember that [MAD advocates) generally leave implicit the reason the United States has maintained the remarkable assumption that the Soviets the triad of three separate nuclear force ele- would devote their entire (and . . . presumably ments all these years is to prevent the Sovi- undamaged) missile force to attacks on cities, ets from doing just that. They are not likely ignoring military targets in general and not to attack our cities and leave us free to do even making an attempt to reduce our retalia- the same to them and are not about to be- tory blow by attacking our nuclear offensive forces.* lieve any claims to the contrary from us." Leon Sloss, noted strategic analyst and It would therefore seem, as another ob- deputy director of the Future Security Strat- server put it, “that the only consequence of egy Study, insists that for these reasons the the ABM Treaty was to ensure that offensive United States is “moving away from the pu-

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 17

nitive concept of assured destruction toward a more flexible and variegated concept.” He goes on to say that the "doctrine was threatening to become self-deterring.”12 The United States plainly could not continue threatening Soviet industrial and population centers as a response to a Soviet attack on US intercontinental-range weapons. especially when it became obvious that no matter what the United States did the So- viets would retain a sufficient strategic reserve to exact similar retribution. Efforts to improve the situation have until recently centered on passive defense of our offensive forces to reduce their vulnerability (submarine basing and intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] silo hardening) and on accuracy improvements to our weapons to provide, as former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated with respect to the new Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM, a “prompt capability to hold time-urgent hardened Soviet assets [missile silos, command centers—counterforce targets] at risk.”13 Weinberger made a similar argument for the new Trident II submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM).14 It should be noted (if the reader has not already done so) that the theoretical targets for a strategic doctrine based on assured destruction are cities that are not considered “time-urgent hardened Soviet assets.” This leads in a rather roundabout way to the real topic—strategic defense, particularly SDI. All rhetoric about more “enlight- ened” political motivations aside, strategic defenses in the generic sense can and do perform a valid military function, even though legions of analysts have made it abundantly clear that a reliable defense of our major population centers is for all practical purposes impossible.15 The oft-expressed notion during the recent SDI debates that anything less than perfect defense is no defense at all has little relevance to the military issue at hand—the utility of an attack on American cities, knowing we Ipponents of SDI argue that sea-launched cruise nissilcs are undetectable. But even a modest ballis- can respond in a like manner. The key is to ic missile defense would increase Soviet uncer- make sure that we always can respond and aintv about the success of their attack. deny the enemy any plausible avenue to 18 AIR POWER IOURNAL military victory— that we can respond to deter successfully, we must be able—and against his weapons and command and con- must be seen to be able—to retaliate against trol or against his population if required. any potential aggressor in such a manner that The first and most direct effect of strategic the costs we will exact will substantially ex- defenses, be they the currently envisioned ceed any gains he might hope to achieve SD1 program or something else, is to en- through aggression.17 hance the effectiveness of our strategic of- The advent of the SD1 program has not fensive forces. As Sir Michael Howard changed this requirement. As mentioned writes, they have the effect of “keeping our above, we must assure that the Soviets un- nuclear weapons in business . . . rather than derstand that they cannot disarm us (and rendering them 'impotent and obsolete.’ ”16 then hold our cities hostage) and that we This is a strictly m ilitary requirement. can and will respond in an appropriate manner to any attack. Active and passive defenses can enhance the ability of offen- The Essence of Deterrence Secretary Weinberger said during a 1982 The target. A Peacekeeper missile on alert in its silo. It hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations is unlikely that a Soviet attack would be aimed at our Committee that cities and leave our retaliatory capability undamaged. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 19

sive forces to deliver their retaliatory strikes Even a U.S. defense of limited capability can bv assuring that enough such forces survive deny Soviet planners confidence in their abil- to do so.18 Active measures need not be per- ity to destroy a sufficient set of military targets fect or massive if they are combined with to satisfy enemy objectives, thereby strength- passive defense measures such as mobility, ening deterrence.19 deceptive basing, or increased hardening. We should remember that even during The presidentiallv directed Future Security the period of our greatest reliance on offen- Strategy Study reinforced this notion when sive nuclear power in the 1950s, we main- it reached the following conclusion as tained large active defense forces, though, stated by Leon Sloss, its deputy director: as Bernard Brodie pointed out, they were not seen as totally effective. No weapon technology or military strategy, whether offensive or defensive, has Former Secretaryr of Defense Weinberger said the ever been perfect, nor should we reasonably Peacekeeper ICBM fshown in its rail-mobile mode) expect them to be in the future. Yet there are represents a "prompt capability to hold lime-urgent, those who insist that a strategic defense hardened Soviet assets at risk." Even with an effective must be perfect, that we can somehow elim- SDI, such systems would remain a necessary part of our arsenal in order to threaten Soviet assets held in inate offensive nuclear weapons, and that reserve. such a strategic “shield” may be attainable 20 A/R POWER JOURNAL

sometime in the near future.20 The Soviets making nuclear weapons obsolete.24 In will be able to circumvent a ballistic missile other words, if US leaders continue to over- defense (BMD) system by increasing their sell the program, political pressure may reliance on sea-launched and air-launched eventually force them to attempt a system cruise missiles (SLCMs and ALCMs) and that is unbuildable, at least with the degree even gravity weapons from bombers.21 That of sophistication and lethality projected by alone does not constitute sufficient reason many SDI supporters. The United States not to attempt a BMD system, especially simply cannot return to the time when it with such large numbers of weapons deliv- was safe behind two great oceans; SDI will ered by Soviet ballistic missiles. In some not provide a satisfactory substitute for this cases, a properly timed SLCM or ALCM at- bygone era.2S tack could strike US coastal cities and mil- If developed, ground- and space-based itary installations before Soviet ICBMs. defenses most likely will play an important This could present a particularly potent role in dissuading an attack on the United threat to the central US leadership in Wash- States. However, to foster the idea that the ington, especially since we have an ac- United States will shift its strategic empha- knowledged inability to detect incoming sis from the threat of nuclear retaliation to cruise missiles.22 A modest air defense sys- that of a “comprehensive national defense” tem would serve to increase Soviet uncer- is not only unwarranted at this early date tainties even here, but the historical lessons but dangerous at any time. The preferable indicate that nuclear weapons, from what- view in this case was offered by Fred ever source, will always be able to penetrate Hoffman: the defense we do build, no matter how The relevant question for the foreseeable fu- complex. ture is not whether defenses should replace of- It would indeed be a blessing to mankind fensive weapons but whether we should rely if the “civilized" nations were able to attain exclusively on offensive weapons or whether a the SDI proponents' dream of rendering nu- combination of militarily effective and dis- clear weapons “impotent and obsolete." criminating offense and defenses will better However, it is highly unlikely that the meet our strategic requirement for deterrence United States and the Soviet Union will and limiting damage.26 ever be able to deter nuclear warfare solely What defenses the United States does de- by threatening to destroy incoming ballistic ploy should increase Soviet uncertainty as missiles or, as Weinberger said to a group of to their ability to successfully disarm us or European leaders, by producing a situation to separate our leadership from our forces. in which “the Soviets would simply have What we should avoid is an SDI program no reason to continue their huge invest- that unduly threatens other vital military ments in offensive arms” because ICBMs programs. An unbalanced approach could and shorter-range missiles were “approach- be dangerously destabilizing since in the ing obsolescence.”23 absence of comprehensive offensive arms It is most probable, however, that defen- control, the Soviets could attempt to over- ses could enhance a deterrence that is al- whelm our defenses with minimum con- ready firmly based on a strong offensive cern over US retaliation, especially if they capability. This author must agree in this in- have built a defense of their own (which stance with McGeorge Bundy and his col- they already have done against our aircraft). leagues (though not with all their The essence of deterrence will continue conclusions) in their assessment that SDI to be the ability to respond to a nuclear “will have a level of political support un- strike— to first place the enemy’s ability to related to reality” as long as the American do the United States harm at risk and then, people believe that it offers a real hope of if need be, to pose a threat to his people. achieving President Reagan’s stated goal of (After all, weapons capable of destroying STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 21

opposing hardened weapons sites can cer- the military have come to associate inter- tainly do grievous harm to soft population continental-range and nuclear weapons centers.) If active defenses can contribute to with the “strategic force” category while all this goal, they should have a place in US else is thrown into a “tactical” or “theater” strategic calculations. A limited defensive force pot. How often have we heard senior system could at least provide much-needed Defense Department or administration offi- protection against a third nation’s missiles cials discussing “strategic” weapons in a or against an accidental launch and also context that can only mean intercontinental could provide some level of protection for nuclear weapons? The Strategic Arms Re- our vulnerable national leadership. How- duction Talks (START) are not intended to ever. billing SDI as a technological answer reduce strategic weapons but rather long- to the nuclear reign of terror and as a way to range nuclear weapons. This apparent di- shift to defense-based deterrence may very vision of labor between “strategic” and well force us to drain resources from our “tactical” forces is purely arbitrary. strategic offensive forces and from much- It is not the weapon used but how it is needed measures such as deception and used that is important. As Dr Robert Kup- mobility that would provide more effective perman points out, the systems we have passive defenses probably a good deal considered to be strategic, such as our cheaper than many of the exotic SDI bombers or even our ICBMs, “can attack proposals.27 theater targets while long-range theater sys- Americans have a long-standing love af- tems can attack some strategic targets as fair with high technology, and nowhere is it well.”28 Thus, the difference between a stra- more evident than in the Defense Depart- tegic and tactical ICBM (or fighter-bomber) ment. This is not necessarily bad. but we is determined by what is targeted, not by its must not allow ourselves to be blinded by size, range, speed, or destructiveness. It the prospects of unproven technologies and should be mentioned that the Soviets see promises of miraculous solutions to what is our Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe perhaps man’s greatest dilemma. New tech- as strategic since they can accomplish stra- nological innovations from the longbow to tegic tasks against Soviet targets. The Euro- the H-bomb have regularly changed the face peans are just as sensitive to our of battle, but none have provided a solution classification of Soviet SS-20s and Backfire to the problem of war. bombers as tactical theater systems. The va- porization of 10 Downing Street is just as strategic to the British as 1600 Pennsylvania The Tactical Perspective Avenue would be to Americans.29 The point of all this, of course, is that the The SDI program has the potential to af- same thing applies to our “strategic” defen- fect far more than the traditional strategic ses. More to the point, we should be careful balance. Directly or indirectly the new em- not to confuse strategic and tactical defen- phasis on strategic defense can also gener- ses as we have done with the offense. Once ate tremendous change in the tactical or again, whether a defensive system is stra- battlefield environment. Before exploring tegic or tactical is mostly a matter of seman- these potentials, we need to clear up some tics. The same fighter aircraft that provides commonly held misperceptions about the strategic defense of the United States is used concept of strategic and tactical operations. to defend against enemy aircraft and cruise Since World War II and the advent of nu- missiles over the plains of central Europe. clear weapons, we have tended to compart- The same ground-based interceptor mis- mentalize our military forces into siles used in Europe could be used at home; convenient strategic or tactical categories. and many of the more exotic SDI systems, if The general public and even many within proven effective against ICBMs, could be 22 AJH POVVEH IOUHNAL

just as useful against intermediate-range assume that all space weapons technology ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Europe— will necessarily be limited to the defensive maybe more so given the slower reentry mission just because SDI is a defensive ef- speed of 1RBM warheads. fort that may see some of its systems de- The president and the secretary of deployed in space. fense have repeatedly said that any defenses The Air Force has made clear that it in- we deploy will also extend to our allies. tends to “exploit the military potential of There is little doubt that some sort of de- space, focus technology development, and fense against intermediate- and interconti- redress deficiencies across all mission areas nental-range missiles (if not their shorter- in space.”'4 (Emphasis added.) While there range battlefield or tactical cousins) can is little doubt that the SDI program itself is be fashioned even now from existing tech- intended as a defensive system, much of the nology. The United States has conducted a related research into space weapons may successful test of a direct-impact (nonex- produce spin-off systems that could be used plosive) ICBM interceptor. According to for these other missions, including antisat- one report, the interceptor was able to hit a ellite (ASAT) and space-based tactical or dummy ICBM warhead "100 miles above strategic offensive weaponry. Space-based the earth at a combined closing speed of surveillance, navigation, warning, and com- 18,000 mph. ’" Of course, it does not matter munication systems already exert a tremen- a hit whether the warhead destroyed by dous influence over the way we plan to such a system is aimed at a strategic or a tac- conduct all forms of military operations: we tical target or whether the interceptor is are now reliant on our space systems for all launched from West Germany or the United sorts of support and enhancement func- States— the results are the same. The same tions. Former Secretary of Defense Wein- applies to any future SDI offspring such as berger has further accused the Soviet Union space- or ground-based lasers, particle- of preparing space- and ground-based offen- beam generators or high-energy kinetic im- sive ASATs as well as defensive antimissile pactors— what is strategic can in many systems for deployment as early as the late cases also be tactical. 1980s.35 It seems obvious that any further So the first and possibly most important development and deployment of more com- effects SDI may have on the tactical arena plex systems such as lasers, rail guns, and are to create increased emphasis on defense ground-launched ASATs by the United against shorter-range weapons among our States, the Soviet Union, or other advanced various alliances and, as a spin-off of SDI re- nations will have strategic, tactical, offen- search, to provide some of the technologies sive, and defensive applications against tar- required to provide such defenses. The gets in space or on earth.36 United States and its European allies are al- Additionally, the SDI program is struc- ready actively discussing the development tured to investigate primarily nonnuclear of a theater-based antitactical missile means of accomplishing its defensive mis- (ATM) for use against both nuclear and con- sion. Highly advanced detection, tracking, ventionally armed Soviet missiles. There and guidance systems at the heart of any would be no difference in the ATM used for forces deployed as a result of the SDI pro- either purpose.33 The primary effect of this gram hopefully will allow interception of system would (or should) be to “heighten attacking forces bv such systems as inter- substantially the risks and incalculable fac- ceptor missiles or kinetic impactors, if not tors confronting the Soviet planners of an space-based laser weapons.37 Again, these attack thereby strengthening the overall advances will have other battlefield NATO deterrent."" Just as we should not applications. artificially limit the fruits of the SDI pro- Kinetic energy weapons may be useful gram to just strategic defense, we should not against tanks, and lasers are already in use STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 23 for aiming and guiding a host of nonnuclear lends tremendous international political weapons. In the future they may very well clout to the nations possessing them. How- be useful for direct weapons application. ever, as Builder maintains, the advances in These technologies, if deployed, would modern nonnuclear weapon technology (in- hopefully foster a reduction in US reliance creasing accuracy and destructiveness) and on nuclear weapons from both the offensive the acknowledged destructiveness of nu- and defensive perspectives. The Defense clear weapons will provide "both the incen- Department is actively pursuing new tech- tives and the means to avoid resorting to nologies (ET—emerging technologies) that nuclear weapons, even in conflicts fought may provide long-range, highly accurate, over strategic objectives at intercontinental nonnuclear weapons with sufficient accu- ranges.”91 Many of the advances in such racy and destructiveness to allow them to weaponry will undoubtedly come as a di- supplant nuclear weapons in many in- rect or indirect result of research on the SDI stances, especially for tactical (vice stra- program. tegic) operations.38 In fact, the US Congress It could be said, then, that the SDI pro- has directed the Defense Department to sub- gram through directly deployed nonnuclear mit a report on the applicability of SDI re- defensive systems and through the techno- search to the tactical defense of theater- logical spin-offs to other areas could signif- based conventional forces and in 1987 offi- icantly enhance our ability to conduct cially authorized about $500 million to offensive and defensive, strategic or tactical study SDI spin-off technologies applicable warfare. It is important to emphasize that to both conventional weapon systems and this is what deters war in the first place. antitactical missile systems.39 This cannot be provided by one element Unfortunately, none of this implies that such as SDI or long-range nuclear weapons such technologies will banish nuclear in isolation. The nuclear arsenal did not weapons from the face of the earth or even prevent either the Korean or Southeast make them truly obsolete. They may pro- Asian wars, and SDI will not of itself suc- vide new defensive options previously un- ceed where nuclear weapons failed. available and other wartime options short of nuclear weapon use. Carl Builder writes in his study of nonnuclear strategic warfare that even though new nonnuclear technol- Some Conclusions ogies may magnify incentives not to use nuclear weapons: Fred Hoffman captured the most important function of defenses in the nuclear era: Nuclear weapons remain unique in their credibility as a threat to destroy entire cities Ballistic missiles now offer an attack plan- and societies in a single attack. Because of that ner a degree of simplicity and predictability unique quality, they will also remain the most associated with no other weapon system. Plan- potent political instruments and national sym- ning a ballistic missile attack is much more bols of power. The advent of nonnuclear stra- like building a bridge than it is like fighting a tegic weapons |which is really nothing at all war. The distinguishing characteristic of war- new| will not eliminate the interest and value fare, an active and unpredictable opponent, is that resides, and will continue to reside, in the missing. possession of nuclear weapons."' It should be the purpose of strategic de- The psychological bottom line of nuclear fenses to provide that characteristic of war- deterrence (some would say all deterrence fare—an active and unpredictable in the nuclear age) will always be the threat opponent—to enhance in the enemy’s mind of a holocaust even if both adversaries do Clausewitz’s fog of war or, as Bernard Bro- not plan a “city-busting” campaign. The die put it. to ensure that enemy weapons do sheer destructiveness of these weapons not have a “free ride.” This author does not 24 AJR POWER JOURNAL

agree that planning a missile strike is quite versaries even if defenses are deployed. as simple as Hoffman implies. The precise This balance becomes even more important timing of hundreds of missiles and as arms control efforts reduce their num- hundreds of aircraft to within a matter of bers. It is at this point of reduced weapon very few minutes to prevent or to blunt a re- levels that defenses (active or passive) have sponse is no simple matter. However, if we their greatest impact in assuring that we interject even a marginally effective active have the capability to respond to Soviet defense or an enhanced set of passive defen- attack. ses, these uncertainties grow much worse, In sum, the SDI program can make vital even if an enemy does add more offensive contributions to both our strategic and tac- systems. This, then, is the first and most tical mission capabilities as long as we do crucial conclusion drawn from this discus- not see the program as the technological sion— that defenses can and do serve a valid remedy for the nuclear “reign of terror.” military purpose in spite of the assured de- There were many who believed early on struction rhetoric that has been so pervasive that nuclear weapons would put an end to over the past two decades. war; they obviously have not. They have It is equally important to understand the probably prevented the titanic clash be- second major conlusion: strategic defenses tween the world’s two superpowers, and we cannot by themselves deter an attack on the should be grateful for that. It was, however, United States. Simply stated, an adversary the presence of nuclear weapons that made not fearful of retribution becomes the bold- the surrogate state challenge the problem it est sort of enemy; he must see consequences is today and that fostered our reliance on that are more serious than merely the those same nuclear weapons, which in turn possibility of a failed attack. Defenses can left us militarily unprepared to deal with enhance but cannot provide such conse- contingencies in Korea and Southeast quences. Asia.43 If we do manage to reduce our reliance on There is a relevant military lesson here nuclear weapons, it will be due as much to that bears directly on the SDI debate today. advances in nonnuclear offensive weapons In an era of increasingly available, sophis- (including SDI spin-off systems) as defen- ticated, nonnuclear weaponry and growing sive ones. There are certain crucial targets worldwide nuclear presence, we cannot al- that must be covered in order to deny an en- low vague promises of obsolete interconti- emy victory and to reduce damage to our- nental missiles and useless nuclear selves. If these are targeted by highly weapons to blind us to the very real need for effective nonnuclear weapons, so much the a balanced military force structure that is as better. able to deal as effectively with third-nation Even so, the bottom line of deterrence conventional aggression or the worldwide will likely remain nuclear weapons. They terrorist infrastructure as with the Soviet may be smaller and we may eventually Union's massive nuclear arsenal. SDI and agree with our allies and adversaries to re- many of the technologies resulting from the duce their overall numbers, but their de- program have the potential to contribute to structive power and resulting political that vital military balance as long as US mil- importance make it imperative that we not itary and civilian leaders approach it as a only possess them but that we are seen to military system intended to play a military possess at least a rough balance with our ad- role in a very complex environment. □

Notes 1. A 1985 article compared our strategic defense systems in defense missile batteries, none today. See Howard Silber. "NO- the early 1960s to those of the mid-1980s. In the 1960s we had RAD Commander Comments U.S. 'Now Vulnerable' to Soviet 207.000 people assigned to strategic defense, today 37,000; we Cruise Missile,” Omafm World Herald. 8 September 1985, 1. had over 2.600 interceptor aircraft, today 340: we had 274 air 2. |ohn Foster Dulles. "Foreign Policies and National Secu- STHATECIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 25

rity.'' Vital Speeches of the Day. 1 February 1954. 232-35. 14. Weinberger writes, "To rectify the inability of existing 3. lerome H. Kahn summed up the prevailing attitude when SLBMs to deal with hardened Soviet targets, we are developing he wrote that even with substantial defensive deployments the Trident I] missile." Ibid.. 52. after 1954. "offensive force decisions remained the focal point 15. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wrote of the administration's strategic policies throughout the de- that "there is no realistic hope that we shall ever again be able cade . . . the emphasis on offensive power also stemmed from to protect American cities. There is no leak-proof defense. Any a growing awareness on the part of the President and his ad- defense is going to suffer some erosion at best." See James R. visers that a fully effective defense of the United States against Schlesinger. "Rhetoric and Realities in Star Wars Debate." In- nuclear attack was neither technically possible nor economi- ternational Security 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985): 5. Also see the cally feasible." See (erome H. Kahn. Security in the Nuclear discussion in loseph D. Douglas and Samuel I. Cohen. "SDI. Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington. the Hidden Opportunity." Defense Science 2003+ . August- D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1975). 28. September 1985. 16. Michael Howard, "The Future of Deterrence" (Lecture 4. Bernard Brodie. Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton. presented at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 16 N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1959). 202. january 1986, in RUSI. June 1986|, 10. 5. See the discussion of ABM systems in International Arms 17. Statement of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger Control: Issues and Agreements, ed. John H. Barton and Law- in Senate. U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Hearing before the Commit- rence D. Weiler (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press. tee on Foreign Relations. 97th Cong.. 2d sess., 1982, 17-22. 1976). 58-61.132-36; and Henry Kissinger’s discussion of the 18. Douglas and Cohen maintain that "the minimum (but US ABM controversy in Henry Kissinger. White House Years most important) US requirement is for a highly effective SDI (Boston: Little. Brown and Company. 1979). 206-10. optimized first to ensure the ability of the United States to 6. Those that argue in favor of MAD as a basis for nuclear de- launch a deliberate, organized, powerful counterstrike while terrence often point to Soviet acceptance of the ABM Treaty as under attack or, more precisely, at the beginning of the Soviet proof. first strike. . . There are two secondary roles for SDI: help pre- 7. See. for example, Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Target- serve US residual forces, or strategic reserves . . . and help limit ing: How New? How Viable?” in Arms Control Today 2, no. 2 damage to the United States in the event of war.” See Douglas (February 1981): 1-6. and Cohen. 6. 8. Fred S. Hoffman. "The SDI in U.S. Nuciear Strategy." In- 19. Sloss. 38. Additionally, a distinguished group of de- ternational Security. Summer 1985. 16. fense experts including former Secretary ol Defense Robert S. 9. David Goldfischer. "ABM as Arms Control: The Fate of McNamara, former chief arms negotiator Gerald Smith, and the U.S. 'Strategic Concept"' (Paper presented at the Inter-Uni- former Special Assistant to the President for National Security versitv Seminar on Armed Forces and Society 1985 Biennial Affairs McGeorge Bundy wrote that "the overwhelming con- International Conference. Palmer House. Chicago. 18-20 Oc- sensus of the nation's technical community is that in fact there tober 1985). 1. is no prospect whatever that science and technology can. at 10. Fritz W Ermarth. "Contrasts in American and Soviet any time in the next several decades, make nuclear weapons Strategic Thought." in American Defense Policy, ed. John F. 'impotent and obsolete.' The program developed over the last Reichart and Steven R. Sturm. 5th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hop- 18 months, ambitious as it is. offers no prospect for a leak-proof kins University Press. 1983). 65. Patrick Glynn writes that "one defense against strategic ballistic missiles alone, and it entirely of the critical difficulties that proponents of MAD confronted excludes from its range any effort to limit the effectiveness of from the beginning was the overwhelming evidence that Soviet the other systems—bomber aircraft, cruise missiles, and smug- strategists had no such view of nuclear technology: on the con- gled warheads.” McGeorge Bundy et al., "The President's trary. the Soviets seemed to assume even a Case for the Arms Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control." Foreign Affairs. Winter Buildup." Patrick Glynn. "The Moral Case for the Arms 1984-1985. 265. Buildup." Nuclear Arms. Ethics. Strategy. Politics, ed. R. 20. See the president's now famous 23 March 1983 "Star lames Woolsey (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Wars” speech delivered to the nation via national television. Studies. 1984). 31 Also, in a June 1986 speech the president said that his goal was 11. For a discussion of Soviet targeting philosophy and the "a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a primacy of military objectives over assured destruction, see roof protects a family from rain." See David Wood, "White William T. Lee. “Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," Strategic House Fails to Sell its 'Star Wars' Plan," Newark Star-Ledger, Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson 21 August 1986, 6. Also see Richard N. Perle, "The Strategic (Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press. 1986). 84-108. Also see Defense Initiative: Addressing Some Misconceptions." Journal Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft. "Strategic System Development and of International Affairs 39. no. 1 (Summer 1985): 23-28. Even New Technology Where Should We Be Going?" Netv Tech- though he tacitly admits the defense does not have to be per- nology and Western Security Policy, ed. Robert O'Neil (Ham- fect. Perle does say that "by effectively destroying attacking den. Conn.: Archon Books. 1985). 1-11. ballistic missiles, and thus rendering them 'impotent and ob- 12 Leon Sloss. "The Return of Strategic Defense." Strategic solete’ for military or political purposes, such defenses also Review. Summer 1984. 39. Additionally. Dr Donald Snow can eliminate the potential threat of first strike attack" (p. 25). writes that "critics of assured destruction argue that the ex post 21. For a discussion of US vulnerability to Soviet cruise |facto| decision to implement MAD simply is unbelievable, ex- missiles, see Silber, 1. cept in the event of an all-out nuclear countervalue attack by 22. In a recent interview, Gen Robert T. Herres, at the time the Soviets against the U.S. . MAD emerges as a credible de- commander of the North American Air Defense Command terrent against the least likely threat.” Donald M. Snow, The (NORAD), said that "since we don’t have a good detection ca- Nuclear Future: Toward a Strategy of Uncertainty (University, pability where the cruise missile is concerned, a decapitating Ala.: University of Alabama Press. 1983). 15. attack is possible That sort of attack could be staged with a 13 Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinber- relatively small number of cruise missiles. . . ."See Silber. 1. ger to the Congress on the FY 1986 Budget. FY 1987 Authori- 23. Caspar Weinberger, "Deterrence Stability, and Arms Re- zation Request, and FY 1986—90 Defense Programs ductions. the Goals of SDI," remarks prepared for delivery at (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 4 February the German-American Roundtable. Bonn, West Germany. 5 19851.53 December 1985. 6. 26 AIR POWER JOURNAL

24. Bundy et al.. 269. to destroy intermediate-range rather than strategic-range nu- 25. Dr Gary Guertner agreed with this assessment when he clear missiles.” (Note Weinberger's association of range with wrote that "without understanding the ambiguities and con- "strategic.") See Weinberger. "Deterrence, Stability, and Arms troversies that will still remain. Congress and the public may Reductions." 4. succumb to a dangerous confidence that SDI research alone can 31. See "Bull's-Eye in Space,” Time 123 (25 June 1984): 28. illuminate a risk-free path to a safer, defense-dominated world Also see Clarence A. Robinson, jr.. "BMD Homing Interceptor An idea all loo capable of fatally destabilizing today's nuclear Destroys Reentry Vehicle," Aviation Week 6- Space Technol- balance may pass the point of no return . " See Gary L. Guertner. ogy 120 (18 June 1984): 19-20. "What Is Proof?" foreign Policy, no. 59 (Summer 1985): 74. 32. For a discussion of the ATM. see Hubertus G. Hoffman. 26. Fred Hoffman. 19. "A Missile. Defense for Europe?” Strategic Review. Summer 27. An article on small mobile ICBMs in the New York 1984, 45-55: and Clarence A. Robinson, |r.. "U.S. Develops Times stated that "some supporters argue that mobile missiles Antitactical Weapon for Europe Role." Aviation Week 6• Space are a cheaper and more effective way of reducing the vulnera- Technology. 9 April 1984. 46-A8. bility of land-based missiles than proceeding with the Admin- 33. Hubertus Hoffman, 51. istration's Strategic Defense Initiative Program. . . ." See 34. USAF FY85 Report to the 98th Congress of the United Michael R Gordon. "Study Says a Small Mobile Missile Would States (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1984), Help U.S. Deter Soviet Strike." New York Times, 9 November 40. 1985, 4. Also see Walter Slocombe's (former assistant secretary 35. Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1986.60. of defense under President Carter) comments on cheaper and 36. Myers, 42. more passive weapon defenses in Evan Thomas, “Strategic 37. See Secretary of Defense Weinberger's discussion of the Questions.” Time. 23 |une 1986. 18. SDI program in Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 28 Robert H. Kupperman, “Using SDI to Reshape Soviet Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1987 Budget. FY 1988 Strategic: Behavior." The Washington Quarterly. Summer Authorization Request, and FY 1987-1991 Defense Programs 1985, 79. Perhaps the classic example of the reversal of tradi- (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 5 February tional strategic and tactical roles was during the Vietnam War. 1986). 287-93. During that conflict our B-52s were extensively used from 1965 38. See the discussion of the effect of "emerging technolo- for nonnuclear operations (dropping three million tons of gies" on air power doctrine in Myers. 25-29: and Gen Robert T. bombs). Furthermore, they were not used for what would be Marsh. "A Preview of the Technology Revolution." Air Force considered strategic actions until the Linebacker II campaign Magazine, August 1984. 42-^19. of 1972. Up until then they were used almost exclusively for 39. See Edgar Ulsamer. "SDI in Increments." Air Force Mag- tactical actions in South Vietnam (direct troop support, inter- azine, December 1986, 23-25. diction of supply lines, etc.). At the same time our "tactical" 40. Carl H. Builder. Strategic Conflict Without Nuclear forces were conducting what some consider to be "strategic” Weapons (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Corporation. April operations in the North. 1983),43. 29. For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between 41. Ibid. strategic and tactical actions and the indivisible air power con- 42. Fred Hoffman, 23. cept see Grover E. Myers, Aerospace Power: The Case for In- 43. General William W. Momver, former commander of the divisible Application (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University US Air Force in Vietnam and former commander of the Tacti- Press. 1986). cal Air Command, wrote in regard to the early years in Vietnam 30. Most recently. Weinberger told the German-American that "with the war moving toward higher levels of violence, the Roundtable in Bonn, West Germany, that SDI "is not an at- tactical Air Forces in the United States were rapidly being tempt to shield only the United States from Soviet interconti- trained and equipped for conventional actions. Since the Ko- nental missiles The fact is. if strategic defense research bears rean War, relatively little attention had been given to refining fruit, it will protect against ballistic missiles of both strategic or building non-nuclear weapons or to training aircrews for de- and intermediate range, and so enhance deterrence, and pro- livery of non-nuclear weapons." See Gen William Momver. Air tect Europe as well as the United States. In fact, we are told by Power in Three Wars. ed. A. |. C. Lavalle and lames C. Gaston scientists that if we can do it at all. it will be somewhat easier (Washington. D.C.: US Air Force Association. 1978), 16-17. Basis of Issue

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HEN the United States de- damental knowledge of afr ’organization; clared war on Germany on 6 fewer than 50 trained pilots; no pilots, save April 1917, the US Air Service those serving with the French or British air was a branch of the Signal forces, capable of performing a battle mis- Corps. Its inventory consisted of one squad- sion; a total of approximately 1,120 person- ron equipped with obsolete airplanes; no nel; and only five officers in Europe, none of machines fit for frontline service; no fun- whom had yet acquired any advanced tech-

I The Curtiss ]N-4D "fenny" (top), used as a primary flight trainer for American pilots, was a very forgiving aircraft. Advanced flight training in Europe normally meant flying haltered aircraft that had been retired from combat service in favor of newer and better models. This French-built Caudron G-III (above) was used in 1915-16 as a reconnaissance aircraft and then brought back into service in 1918 to train American airmen.

30 French and British airfields often had permanent facilities. Most American airfields, however, housed their airmen in tents and were saturated with mud a good part of the year. nical knowledge.1 These were the assets the Army’s 65 flying officers were in admin- with which the United States faced a war in istrative positions and could not be released the air. to take part in a training program. None of The broad expansion program spurred by them had ever flown a modern European this deplorable state of affairs resulted (by service-type aircraft, and the majority had November 1918) in the indoctrination of ap- trained on a system of controls differing proximately 9,000 men as pilots in this sharply from those used at the front. Army newly formed branch of military service.2 In officials realized from the beginning that this novel arena of conflict, these pilots pos- most of the enormous training program had sessed none of the traditions or prescribed to be carried out in the United States. They living and working standards that their decided early that training needed to be counterparts in the land or naval forces had standardized because the highly personal- acquired from years of practice. The Amer- ized prewar methods would not serve to ican aviators’ pilot training, their experi- train the thousands of pilots needed. The ences with the aircraft they flew, their Bingham Plan (after Maj Hiram Bingham, unique living and fighting conditions, and who was in charge of the air training) called their contact with members of the Allied air fora three-phase program: ground, primary, forces behind the lines shaped their per- and advanced.4 The first and second phases spective of the conflict both during and after were to be accomplished in the United the war. States: the final phase would occur in flying In April 1917 the United States possessed schools in Britain, France, and Italy because only three pilot training schools.3 Many of there were “no planes in the United States

31 32 AIR POWER IOURNAL suitable for advanced training and no pilots riods of liberty to visit American infantry qualified to give such instruction.”5 units on the front. The trenches were every Ground school was a six-to-eight-week bit as gruesome as the stories they had heard program in which aviation cadets studied while still in the United States, and the the mechanics of the machine gun, map shell-churned landscape contrasted sharply reading, aircraft rigging, engines, meteorol- with the picturesque countryside around ogy, astronomy, and instruments. They also the training airdromes. These field trips re- took part in basic military drill and physical confirmed the wisdom of their decision to fitness programs. The state of mind of the join the Air Service. However, the sight of young men at these training schools is evi- the skeletons of burned-out aircraft in no- dent from their letters and diaries. man’s land and immediately behind the Standing guard was the worst hardship trenches, where pilots had tried to make and was seen as a waste of time. After all, forced landings, gave testimony that death the cadets reasoned, there was little danger was just as prevalent in the skies as on the of “a German attack on Pennsylvania. What ground. we need is more sleep.”6 In a letter home, With the exception of those receiving one cadet noted that “a flying-boat has been their final instruction at English-run up twice from the (naval) yards and makes schools, the aviators were immediately everything look more warlike.”7 Clandes- aware of the difficulties produced by the tine crap games received more thought than language barrier in their training.12 But lan- the war, which seemed unreal from across guage was not the only difference between the Atlantic.8 student and teacher. Instructors at these Primary flight school signaled the end of schools, unlike those in the United States, guard duty and the beginning of the real were veteran combat pilots who had been thing for the cadets. By Christmas of 1917 removed from the front lines due to time in there were 15 training schools in the United combat or injuries. In addition, these pilots States as a result of the frenzied construc- were not professional instructors, and they tion program.1' Most instructor pilots were had little patience for slow pupils or those Canadians or Americans who had been they considered lazy. To them, flying was a trained in Canada and who had not seen serious and dangerous business, no game combat. The war was still a distant thought for overzealous youngsters. The American during primary training. ‘‘It's a great life, pilots found themselves subdued by the mother, flying alone with nothing to worry grim intensity of their teachers. about, the whole sky to fly in, and not much Those who were brave enough and had work to do,” wrote one student, “I will the language ability to approach these for- really hate to see this old war stop, if it ever bidding figures in the evenings after flying does. I am having such a fine time.”10 had ended found the veterans willing The “fine” time continued through the enough to share their opinions of the war. completion of primary training until the ar- among other things. The Americans found rival of the fledgling aviators at one of the that those individuals they considered “old advanced training bases in Europe. Even the men” were only slightly older than them- voyage across the Atlantic, with the con- selves. A 25-year-old Italian major at the stant threat of submarine attack, was seen as school at Foggia had been the commander of a great adventure by the newly commis- a pursuit squadron for a year before return- sioned lieutenants.11 The mood of their ing to the rear to instruct new pilots.13 In ad- writings underwent a distinct change, how- dition, many were tired of the war after four ever, after the excitement of being on a new years. They no longer saw it as a great cru- continent wore off. sade or as a desperate defense of their Many American student pilots took ad- homes, and they were more than ready for vantage of days of nonflying weather or pe- it to end. The bravery, chivalry, and ad- show the salvage hangar showPau. the at hangar salvage It took courage to fly the aircraft in training, let alone in combat. Thesephotos combat. in let alone training, Ittook in courage tothe aircraft fly 1 t France, filled with aircraftfilled damagedin student mishaps. 33 venture of air combat anticipated by the Chivalry of sorts existed between enemies. When 1st American pilots began to pale with this Ll Quentin Roosevelt (right) was killed in combat knowledge. (above), the Germans informed the 95th Aero Squad- ron by dropping a note on the American airfield. In Despite these considerations, the Ameri- the end. death for an airman was just as gruesome as can pilots who finished their training and for a soldier in the trenches. waited for assignments to the newly formed American aero squadrons still possessed a Training accidents were common, fair amount of enthusiasm. At one billeting though not always fatal. In the accident (be- camp constructed for these waiting pilots, low) at Pau. France, where many members of the La- one “green" aviator wrote, “I guess we’re in fayette Escadrille trained, two aircraft collided at midfield. At the far left, one of the pilots sits dazed, something really big now. I wonder how I while at the far right the other pilot attempts will like it.”14 to explain the incident. WWI EHOM AMERICAN AIRMEN 35

When they arrived at the front, many were greeted by the sight of “more wire and more dope.”"’ British, French, and Italian air services donated what they thought they could spare when the American squadrons were mobilized—machines rotated out of service in favor of newer types. Some of these aircraft came from the front; others, fresh from the storage fields in southeast France, had been refused by the Allied air services in favor of more advanced models. The Nieuport 28, which the French air service declined in favor of the Spad, might have faded into obscurity had it not been available to the new American squadrons. The first to arrive from the factories were unarmed, but machine guns were quickly “ begged, borrowed (or stolen),” from nearby French units.17 Problems with the Constantinesco interruptor gear, which allowed guns to be sighted through the propeller arc, resulted in near tragedy when some pilots shot off their propeller blades in aerial test-firings and were forced to glide back to their airfield. Another weakness of the Nieuport was its tendency to shed its upper-wing fabric in a steep dive, an occur- rence that befell the 94th Aero Squadron's commanding officer, Capt Eddie Ricken- backer, on two occasions.18 The arrival of the Spad XIII to replace the Nieuport in July Upon arriving at their assigned squadron, 1918 was a welcome change as pilots dis- the first action many took was to walk to the covered an airplane that they were not flight line and examine the aircraft they afraid to “throw all over the sky.”19 were to fly. While at primary training in the The British contributed to the American United States, most had flown the Curtiss pursuit effort with the Sopwith Camel and JN-4 Jenny, a very forgiving aircraft, slow the Scouting Experimental No. 5 (SE-5). The and easy to fly. Advanced training consisted models utilized by the Americans were of two-seat versions of Allied pursuit types older versions removed from service by the for the fighter pilots and dual-control British in favor of improved models with models for those going into observation, better engines and performance limits. The bombing, or reconnaissance squadrons. If extremely maneuverable Camel was they were fortunate, the pursuit pilots had equipped with a 130-hp Clerget rotary en- access to older models of the frontline com- gine that was cooled by the engine rotating bat aircraft with which to gain experience. on its mountings, generating extreme torque Some of these aircraft were “held together to the right in flight and making takeoffs and with baling wire and butyrate dope” and landings very dangerous. The Clerget en- made the aviators anxious to get to the front gine was difficult to service due to lack of where at least they would be getting new spare parts, resulting in the cannibalization equipment.15 Unfortunately, most of them of one flyable aircraft in order to keep three were destined to be disappointed. others in the air. For (hose who survived (rain- ing, actual combat changed their romanticized view of war. For fewer still, dreams of heroism became reality. Be- low. LI Gen Hunter Liggett dec- orates American airmen with (he Distinguished Service Cross.

36 WWJ FROM AMERICAN AIRMEN 37

The SE-5 also had engine-cooling prob- standards, these few comforts contributed lems with the 150-hp Hispano-Suiza in-line to the morale of the pilots and made the war engine. Again, lack of spare parts prevented a little more like the sporting tournament US squadrons equipped with these aircraft they had envisioned. from realizing their full potential, causing The number of pilots joining the service frustration and resentment among the and the arrival of aircraft for the American pilots.-1’ squadrons soon made the airdromes too American observation and bombing crowded for continued sharing of Allied fa- squadrons fared little better at first. Con- cilities. In addition, the organization of the fronted with the older models of the British Air Service called for the American flying de Havilland 4 (DH-4) for reconnaissance, units to support American ground forces. artillery spotting, and bombing, one pilot New airfields appeared behind the trenches remarked that "it must have been designed assigned to American divisions. These has- by a German." The pilot and observer were tily established fields usually consisted of separated by the fuel tank, and the nick- tents and corrugated tin buildings in any name "flaming coffin” was revived from the area level enough to allow aircraft to take off period of British use.21 Newer models with and land. Whereas the British and French a redesigned fuel tank, some built in the fields were close to towns to allow for sup- United States, were available in August ply deliveries by train to established depots, 1918. The French Salmson 2A-2 also aided American squadrons were far from the in the replacement of the “coffins." towns and required new' rail lines and rail- Their initial experience with combat air- heads. Until these could be built, food, fuel, craft brought home to the Americans what ammunition, and spare parts had to arrive the veterans from advanced training had by truck over roads often in poor condition. tried to tell them: it took courage just to fly At these new airdromes the American pi- the machines, let alone fight in them. Even lots longed for the comforts of "an easy in the newer models, engine and structural chair, magazines, and a piano.”22 Cold soup failures were common. In this period before eaten in leaking tents under "an awful the development of self-sealing fuel tanks, a combination of fog and rain wdiich makes stray bullet or piece of shrapnel could turn flying impossible and life on the ground un- a wood and fabric aircraft into a flaming bearable" did little to improve their state of torch in minutes. It w'as no longer the “great mind.23 Though they joked about the “fa- game" it had seemed from the cadet bar- mous St. Maixent sulphur baths,” the living racks in Texas. Flying was a deadly, serious conditions, especially for those who had business. seen the conditions at the Allied airdromes, For those pilots who entered service be- made the Americans compare their situa- fore American frontline fields opened, liv- tion to living in the trenches, though most ing conditions were in most cases better realized that conditions were not that bad.24 than those in Texas or at the advanced train- The aircraft, stored in their metal sheds, ing fields in the rear area. The Americans as- were better protected from the elements signed to British or French airfields shared than the pilots. There was growing anger the facilities with the veteran Allied pilots. against the Allies for forcing the American After the trench lines had solidified, the Al- ground troops into the trenches in the poor- lied personnel at these airfields improved est positions, which in turn forced the avia- the poor conditions with permanent bar- tors to the desolate areas behind these racks possessing such comforts as heated positions. The mud and the cold caused running water, stoves, gas or electrical in- building resentment and frustration. terior lighting, and mess halls that prepared Their lot improved with the weather and hot meals in an atmosphere reminiscent of the possibility of flying, however, and the hunting clubs. Though primitive by normal pilots wrote less about living conditions 38 AIR POWER JOURNAL and more of their activities during periods Germans more wary, but the attacks contin- of good weather. Not all pilots flew on a ued until the last weeks of the war. given day unless there was a major ground Observers at the airdrome could see their offensive in progress. The daily routine in friends surrounded by black puffs of anti- most squadrons consisted of patrols, alerts, aircraft fire as their aircraft passed over the and administrative and work details. front on their return home.29 It was while For the pursuit squadrons, patrols of be- supervising a barracks-building detail that tween 3 to 10 aircraft would fly at dawn, Douglas Campbell observed Eddie Ricken- midmorning, noon, afternoon, and evening, backer land his Nieuport 28 “with all the weather and lighting conditions permitting. fabric from his top wing torn away.”10 These patrols would escort American obser- Other emergency landings did not end so vation aircraft, which flew in daily patrols well. The sight of a crippled plane landing of two to six airplanes, or would go “hunt- with a dead observer and a pilot coughing ing” on their own. Alert flights of two to up his lungs was no less terrible for being four scout planes would remain on the commonplace. Even without a major offen- ground, waiting for telephone messages sive in progress, pilots and observers con- from observation posts at the front in case tinued to die, and oftentimes the deaths they were needed on short notice. Pilots as- were just as gruesome as those in the signed to a patrol or to alert status were trenches. These deaths were made more “saved” from the administrative and work shocking due to their dramatic contrast to details. the routine of the flying field, where the Due to the lack of supply officers in the sounds of artillery on the front were heard Signal Corps, squadrons used flying officers constantly but the effects rarely seen. In this for these and other positions. While some respect death seemed an intrusion and an squadrons had one officer who did the work aberration in the daily life of the flying on a regular basis, most used a rotating list units. for these assignments. One hapless aviator To get away from the strain of combat wrote of “spending an [sic) sunny afternoon flying, aviators sought means of recreation poking around in the supply shed counting within the squadrons and on leave. Those ammunition boxes.”25 Other pilots were as- on liberty usually went to Paris, and some signed paperwork, a job that most despised with extended periods of leave could cross except when writing their own racy, color- the Channel to England and get even farther ful accounts of a combat report. from the war. The pilots also supervised groups work- Paris had bars and hotels for the exclusive ing on the rail lines or roads that supplied use of Allied airmen, so that even during the squadron, working on leveling the grass times of relaxation pilots were surrounded field used for taking off and landing, or by other aviators and invariably ended up building permanent barracks.26 They also “talking shop.”31 Pilots argued the various worked on a system of drainage ditches, merits of their aircraft, and at times came to which were hailed as engineering wonders blows over what unit had downed the most if they reduced the mire in which the tents enemy airplanes. Some inquired about were erected to a condition that could be those in other units whom they had known called “pleasantly damp.”27 in the United States or in flight school, only The war was never very far away, how- to receive the terse reply “gone.” ever, even in the daily routine. German pi- Those who avoided the company of other lots, taking advantage of the lack of pilots in Paris were reminded of war in antiaircraft defenses, strafed airfields, their other ways. One pilot estimated that one of machine guns “kicking up great geysers of every five women in Paris wore black to mud."28 Gun positions with light aircraft mourn a son, father, or husband killed on machine guns set on swivels soon made the the front.32 Men in Paris were ot three types: WWJ FROM AMERICAN AIRMEN 39 too old for service, young men on leave, or practice of dropping notes on enemy air- young men crippled by war wounds. Night- dromes, informing them of the death or de- time raids by German Gotha bombers were tention of one of their pilots, was a tradition infrequent, but searchlights and defensive scrupulously observed by all the air ser- guns lining busy thoroughfares were con- vices, German as well as Allied. The 95th stant reminders of the war. It was indeed Aero Squadron learned of Lt Quentin difficult to forget about the conflict. Roosevelt’s death in this fashion.38 Recreation in the squadrons consisted of Despite these outer trappings of chivalry pastimes such as team sports, and the open and style, the Americans also noted an un- flying fields lent themselves to such activi- derlying current of cynicism in the Allied ties. British. French, and Italian aviators air forces. When one American pilot com- played soccer, while Americans normally plained during dinner of the difficulty of played baseball. Although Americans took hitting aircraft in flight, Edward Mannock, pride in their “peculiarly American” sport, the leading British ace, replied, “When you some squadrons adopted the European pas- shoot, don’t aim for the plane, aim for the time in order to join in intra-Allied tourna- pilot.”” Allied airmen were tired of the war ments with other units.33 Unfortunately, the and seemed to feel little good would come war intruded even during these periods of from it. The Europeans were ready for the recreation. Games would come to a stand- war to end after four years, and the Ameri- still as squadron members watched one of can airmen began to echo that feeling. their own aircraft slip through the flak The Armistice, which took effect on 11 bursts on its way back from patrol. Landing November 1918, seemed at first to answer aircraft and medical emergencies made it the desires of all combatants of all nation- difficult “to get nine innings in,” one pilot alities. The war that had begun in August noted wryly.34 1914 was over, and even the American pi- At times American squadrons would be lots, some who had been in combat for only invited to dine at French, British, or Italian a few weeks, were glad to see it end. For airfields. These were enjoyable affairs be- American forces in Europe, the Armistice cause, as Douglas Campbell noted, these Al- seemed to signify a return home. lies not only had the best planes but also the For many American units, however, this best food and the best pianos.35 From these was not to be. They were part of the Allied meetings came the traditions the American occupation forces in Germany and Austria- pilots borrowed for their own use. Serving Hungary and did not return home until after tea at four every afternoon became as com- June 1919. Restrictions on travel prevented mon in American mess tents as in British many Americans from seeing much of Eu- squadrons.36 Pianos appeared in those rope on what, for most, was their only visit. squadrons with permanent mess halls and Conversation and other relations with the were jealously guarded against “thieves” civilian population of Germany were also from other units. forbidden, although there was little incli- In addition to the adoption of these tra- nation to engage in such activities due to the ditions, the Americans noted that their Al- language barrier and to the fact that German lied counterparts had a certain type of style shops and restaurants had little to offer but and chivalry. The Americans saw the flag- “scraps of meat, barley coffee, or black ‘war’ raising and flag-lowering ceremonies by the bread.”40 French and British as a show of pride, and With little flying or sight-seeing to do, and they instituted the strict observance of such thinking of their return home, some pilots rituals in their own squadrons. Some squad- began writing personal accounts of their rons copied toasts “to the King” at evening combat experiences, more for the benefit of meals, but “raising one's glass to the Presi- family and friends than for any desire to be- dent” did not seem “nearly so grand."37 The come a published writer. Although these 40 A1H P O W E R IOUHNAL narratives are often racy, colorful, adventur- The aerial warfare of World War I had lit- ous accounts tinged with comedy, there are tle effect on the outcome of the war itself, times when a serious side shows through, and American involvement in the air war revealing personal contemplation of the played a very minor role in the conflict. war and its aftermath. What made the evolution of air combat dur- The zeal for life of the young pilots could ing the war so important is that it marked not obscure in their writings the fact that the evolution of the airplane from a curious they found war a very disillusioning expe- invention into a military weapon. The rise rience. "The war for democracy doesn't of the concept of air power later in the twen- seem to have accomplished anything,” ob- tieth century was due to the air combat dur- served one pilot after seeing the poor con- ing the Great War, and the future US Air ditions of civilians in Germany and the Service, US Army Air Forces, and the US desolate battle zones that "crisscross France Air Force saw their beginnings in the men like a twisted scar.”" "War is the failure of who flew from grass airfields in borrowed human understanding and wisdom." wrote aircraft. How these men viewed this first air another.'2 Writing on an alien continent, oc- war formed the basis for US military cupying an alien country. Lt Curtis Kinney aviation. asked. "Was it our tight? Indeed, was it any- The men who volunteered for the Avia- one’s fight?"*3 This disillusionment is re- tion Section of the Signal Corps passed flected in a poem written by Kinney while through this country’s first mass flight- serving with the occupation forces: training program, and their views of the training caused changes in the system that 1918 brought it to its present form. The pilots were awed by the technology their aircraft We flew together represented, and they secretly wondered In the tall blue sky. about its capacity to kill them. Their expe- We fought together riences with their aircraft would be paral- With bombs and guns. leled bv the experiences of those who We ate together followed. The primitive living conditions, In the squadron mess. where they lived isolated from the imme- We danced together diate effects of the war but always aware of To the old gramophone. its presence as missing men and machines We walked together testified, were much the same in later con- In the fields of France. flicts. The aviators’ efforts to find relief from We talked together the war, from leave to baseball to the offi- Of home and tomorrow. cers' clubs, are the same as those used to- We Hew together day. Their attempts to establish traditions In the tall blue sky. within the new organization are still pres- Many were killed: ent in today's Air Force. Even the postwar The world is no better. opinions about the war that were formed and developed through their experiences Many other writers of the period asked from pilot training to the Armistice and the same questions, and as there were few after provide valuable lessons. answers, the questions gave way to expres- For the average person, the air action of sions of bitterness and anguish. Phrases the First World War provides an interesting such as “universal crucifixion” and “the and exciting contrast to some of the other world's youth murdered" were examples of aspects of that conflict. The romanticist can this sentiment." Most aviators agreed with envision a last revival of the age of chivalry, the general postwar impression that the when men dueled each other under a com- Great War had accomplished nothing. mon code of honor. In reality, flying was not WWI FROM AMERICAN AIRMEN 41

as full of excitement and heroics as some ground, and oftentimes the deaths above imagine, and the pilots of that period pro- were just as gruesome as those below. The vide ample testimony. Thousands died in war in the air was more personal, but that the air, just as many more died on the did not make it more glorious. □

Notes 1. lames ). Hudson. Hostile Skies (Syracuse. N.Y.: Syracuse Dwight Papers. University Press. 1968). 3; Lucien H. Thayer. America’s First 20. William P. Taylor and F. L. Irvin, comps.. History of the Eagles (San Jose. Calif.: R. lames Bender Publishing. 1983). 5. 148!h Aero Squadron (Lancaster, Pa.: Tri-County Publishing Information on the condition of the Aviation Section is taken Co.. 19571.31. from these two sources. 21. Thayer. 105. 2. Hudson. 300. 22. Archibald. 86 3. Ibid.. 26. The three bases were San Diego. California: 23. Douglas Campbell to his father. 8 November 1918. box 1, Mineola. Long Island: and Essington. Pennsylvania. Dwight Papers. 4. Hiram Bingham. An Explorer in the Air Service (New Ha- 24. 639th Aero Squadron. US Army. 639th Aero Squadron ven. Conn.: Yale University Press. 1920). 20. A Yale University Book (Berkeley. Calif.: Lederer, Street, and Zeus Co.. 1920), 23. professor of history. Doctor Bingham was commissioned a ma- 25. Richard Ashley Blodgett to his mother. 3 May 1918. ior in the Signal Corps and placed in charge of the flight-train- Cited in Mabel Fuller Blodgett's Life and Letters of Richard ing program in the United States. He was considered qualified Ashley Blodgett (Boston: MacDonald and Evans Printers. for the post due to his varied background. He obtained his PhD 1965). from Harvard in 1905 and won national attention for his explo- 26. Ibid.. 5 May 1918. ration of the route of Simon Bolivar across Venezuela and 27. Ibid. Colombia in 1907. He learned to fly in 1915 and joined the Con- 28. Arch Whitehouse. The Ace from Arizona (New York: necticut National Guard in 1916. Award Books. 1966). 66. 5. Ibid . 30. 29. K. W. Clendenin. comp., 147th Aero Squadron 1918 6. Diaries of J. Loy Maloney, vol. 1.14 November 1917. Spe- (Parkersburg. W.Va.: K. W. Clendenin. 1964), 6. Black puffs cial Collections Branch. United States Air Force Academy marked German antiaircraft shell-bursts, due to their being ex- Library. plosive shells. Allied AAA was usually white, as they were 7. Henry' W. Dwight to his mother. 3 November 1917. Henry shrapnel shells. Both were fired at American pilots on VV. Dwight Papers Collection. 1917-1961, Special Collections occasion. Branch. United States Air Force Academy Library. 30. Douglas Campbell to his father. 17 May 1918, Dwight 8. William P. Taylor. Items (Falls Church. Va.: Ajay Enter- Papers prises. 1917), 13. 31. Whitehouse, 47. 9. Charles C. Tansill. America Goes to War (Boston: Little. 32. Curtis Kinney and Dale M. Titler, I Flew a Camel (Phil- Brown and Co.. 1938). 29. adelphia: Dorrance and Co.. 1972), 65. 10. Allan Parr to his family, 6 February 1918. Dwight 33. Whitehouse, 77. Papers. 34. 639th Aero Squadron Book, 27. 11. Norman Archibald. Heaven High. Hell Deep: 1917-1918 35. Douglas Campbell to his father. 23 August 1918. Dwight INew York: Albert and Charles Boni. Inc. 1935). 12. Papers. 12. Thayer. 307. 36. Henry Dwight to his family. 22 October 1918, Dwight 13 Giorgio Evangelisti. "American Pilots at Foggia," Amer- Papers. ican Aviation Historical Society Journal 23 (Winter 1978): 278. 37. Allan Parr to his sister, 29 September 1918. Dwight 14 Allan Parr to his family, 11 June 1918, box 1. Dwight Papers. Papers. 38. Rickenbacker. 155. 15. Archibald. 65. Butyrate dope is a putty used to smooth 39. Kinney, 42. the canvas or fabric skin of the aircraft and make it water- 40. Diaries of Maloney, 9 January 1919, vol. 5:37. resistant. 41. Henry Dwight to his parents. 19 January 1919. Dwight 16. Ibid.. 80. Papers. 17. Henry Dwight to his family. 28 May 1918, box 1. Dwight 42. Allan Parr to his sister, 3 February 1919, Dwight Papers. Papers. 43. Kinney. 112. 18. Edward V. Rickenbacker. Fighting the Flying Circus 44. James J. Hudson. "Captain Ray Claflin Bridgman: The (Garden City. N Y Doubleday. 1965). 61-62. 90-91. Man ’Who Hated War with His Whole Soul.’ ” Aerospace His- 19. Douglas Campbell to his father. 22 July 1918, box 1. torian 34 (Summer/June 1987): 114. TECHNOLOGY, AIR POWER, AND THE MODERN THEATER BATTLEFIELD

M ai Robert M. Chapman, Jr ., USAF

Since all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, the commander finds that things are not as he expected. Carl von Clausewitz

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the nature of war. Ciulio Douhet

42 A1H P OWE R AND THEATER BATTLEFIELD 43

O one knows what tomorrow’s into their armed forces. During the first half battles will look like or which of this century, manufacturing technology, contemporary military trends such as for steel and aluminum production, can be projected into the future. was a critical determinant of a nation’s mil- WhileN some past conflicts may share com- itary potential. Today silicon chips as well mon traits, war has few immutable charac- as iron ore determine military power. But as teristics. As Clausewitz reminds us. every anyone who has employed or maintained a war is unique and within each war the de- modern weapon knows, the effects of tech- cisive factors are amorphous. Like fog and nology are not entirely positive. friction, technological change clouds our Technology rarely provides solutions vision of tomorrow’s battlefield. Because of without creating other tensions. For exam- this uncertainty, we are quick to absolve ple, modern US Air Force air-to-air fighters ourselves of predicting the nature of future can operate more independently from warfare. But we have a double standard. In ground-based command and control than studying military history, we often hold earlier aircraft. But the technology that per- commanders to account for their failure to mits this can also link the pilot’s radio to the see their future. The generals of World War White House. Technology in this case cre- 1 are often criticized for not anticipating the ates a tension between tactical freedom of slaughter that artillery and the machine gun action and military power that responds would produce when infantry was em- like a marionette to the will of the com- ployed under the accepted doctrine of the mander. Similarly, technology has been era. To us, the handwriting was on the wall broadly applied to many military systems to from the American Civil War onward. Why help commanders dominate specific por- couldn’t the German, French, and English tions of the battlefield. Incorporating these generals see that the spirit of the offense was systems, however, has not only changed a cruel illusion?’ specific segments of the battlefield but also There is handwriting on our walls too. has altered the overall nature of theater- messages providing a hint of tomorrow. But level war.- The lethality of modern weapons there are so many words that it is hard to creates a violent, fluid battlefield and chal- read—one message obscures another. And lenges our ability to formulate appropriate not all of the messages are relevant. Mixed air power doctrine. with prophetic glimpses of the future are the bureaucratic graffiti of today. It is easy to poke fun at the myopic vision of some officers who, even after the stagnating trenches Lethality of Modern Weapons of World War I, thought there was still use The battlefield was never a safe place, but for horse cavalry in modern war. But it is technology has increased the danger. A very likely that someday someone will won- modern army division or air force wing has der why we pursued an outdated tactic or 10 times the combat power of its World War persisted in further development of an out- 11 equivalent.This increase is the result of moded weapon. Unfortunately, the future changes in the physical characteristics of may judge some of us as contemporary weapons. But in addition to increasing equivalents of those cavalry proponents. available fire power, technology produces While accurate prediction may be impos- qualitative changes in the relationships sible, we must at least attempt to relate the among air, land, and sea power. attributes of military power to future theater battlefields. Technology is one attribute of modern military power. There are others, Physical Aspects but technology is a common denominator— In “bang per pound,” nothing supersedes an attribute most nations try to incorporate nuclear weapons. The mushroom cloud 44 AIR POWER JOURNAL casts a shadow over every battlefield. Com- mand’s bombing competition (Gunsmoke- manders must conduct war differently, 85) had an average bombing error of less whether it is to threaten nuclear escalation than one foot.6 In contrast, planners of the or to protect against nuclear preemption. World War II strategic bombing offensive Chemical weapons are similar. They cover believed only half of the bombs would fall large areas and can cause panic and mass within one-quarter mile of the target.7 Im- casualties among unprotected troops. Even provements in artillery performance have if not used, the possibility of chemical at- been almost as dramatic. Rocket-assisted tack forces the use of protective equipment, projectiles, cluster munitions, and shaped which is nearly as debilitating to a unit’s charges are examples of improvements in combat effectiveness as exposure. While artillery rounds. Also, better alloys and de- nuclear and chemical weapons are the most sign of artillery tubes and breeches permit visible expression of modern weapon tech- more powerful propellants, resulting in in- nology, changes in conventional weapons creased range.8 In addition, modern artil- are just as important to establishing the lery fire direction systems allow missions to modern battlefield environment.4 be fired faster and more accurately, increas- Some contemporary conventional weap- ing the rate and number of targets that can ons can cover large areas very effectively. be engaged. This capability, plus improved Area coverage is essential to engage dis- munitions, has made the battlefield more persed targets, such as dismounted infan- dangerous than ever. try, or mobile targets, such as mechanized More violent area firepower is not the forces. In the past, the statistical dispersion only product of technology. Small, hard-to- of many bombs or artillery rounds was hit targets—such as bridges, command needed to perform this task. Saturating an bunkers, and tunnels—are vulnerable to area with effective fire, therefore, was either guided weapons. Laser, infrared, terrain time-consuming or required many guns and matching, and television guidance systems aircraft. A few modern cluster munitions, are used for precise aiming and delivery of though, can quickly blanket a wide area. these “smart” weapons. One advantage of Added advantages to covering an area precision guidance is that fewer weapons quickly are less exposure of aircraft to en- are needed to destroy a target. In addition, emy air defenses and less vulnerability of some guided weapons have a standoff ca- artillery sites to counterbattery fire. Rapid pability— they can be released or fired out- coverage of an area target is one advantage side the protective defenses of the target. of rocket artillery. The Soviets believe mod- Under certain conditions, guided weapons ern, mobile warfare increases the utility of can even destroy moving targets. Whether area weapons, especially multiple-launch in a ship, aircraft, tank, or foxhole, there are rockets. In addition, the psychological no safe places on the modern theater battle- shock of firepower is much greater when de- field because technology has magnified the livery is concentrated rather than spread physical nature of firepower. over time. German survivors of the Eastern The impression that modern weapons, Front had a great fear and respect for Soviet utilizing precise targeting and delivery, rocket artillery.5 Enemy forces engaged by have civilized the battlefield is wrong. In the US Army's new multiple-launch rocket World War I the Germans attacked Verdun system are likely to be even more in one of mankind’s most violent battles. impressed. They fired 26 tons of shells per artillery Technology also increases the efficiency salvo into a seven-mile-wide section of the of delivery. Modern tactical fighters carry a French front. The earth was literally plowed payload similar to that of heavy bombers in by explosions. Modern war is likely to see World War II, but they are much more ac- even more intense applications of fire- curate. One winner in the Tactical Air Com- power, even when restricted to conven- AIR POWER AND THEATER BATTLEFIELD 45

tional weapons. A modern Soviet division some type of defensive electronic support. on the offense, for example, can deliver 56 Most other modern weapons exhibit similar tons per salvo but would attack on a much traits. Therefore, teams with many types of narrower front (2.4 miles).9 This salvo is complex weapons are needed on today’s only from the division’s organic artillery battlefield so that one system complements and does not include the additional fire- another. There are different names for these power the parent army or front commander teams. The Army calls infantry, armor, ar- might provide. Technology has enhanced, tillery, and aviation working together “com- not diminished, violence and destruction. bined arms.” Naval “task forces” are different classes of ships and boats teamed together. The Air Force uses the term pack- Qualitative Aspects aging or composite to describe the combi- No theater battlefield is one-dimensional. nation of attack, fighter-escort, and Technology has produced many weapons, electronic-warfare aircraft needed to con- such as the attack helicopter, that transcend duct a mission. And the Marines have the traditional categories of combat power. To- “Marine air-ground task force,” which in- day, surface-based missiles can command cludes combined arms plus fixed-wing the sky, infantry weapons can decimate a aviation and often naval gunfire support. tank assault, and land-based aviation can Whether it is land, sea, air, or amphibious control the sea. Air, land, and sea power operations, complex mixtures of different cannot be measured in isolation nor em- types of weapons are needed. ployed independently from one another. Mixing complex weapons, however, can Complex weapons also often breed spe- create limitations. One requirement for cialization in machines and people. Often teamwork is the ability to communicate. we highlight the positive aspect of special- Here again technology provides the ability ization by calling it a “force multiplier.” to transmit voices and data through electro- The “smart” bomb, with its ability to de- magnetic transmission and reception. But it stroy a target in one sortie instead of dozens is not an unmixed blessing because it adds of sorties, is an example of a force multi- a new dimension to the battlefield—elec- plier. Another is the tactic of blending dif- tronic combat. Electronic combat offers a ferent weapon systems together on the new way to paralyze battlefield operations battlefield. The combat power of Apache by severing the communication links that helicopters, self-propelled artillery, and bind a team together. In addition to neutral- A-10 aircraft working together is more than izing command and control systems, elec- the sum of their individual measures of fire- tronic combat can be directed against power. This apparent increase in total com- modern weapons themselves. Nearly all bat power is due to the efficiency of modern major weapon systems use some part of the weapons. electromagnetic spectrum: radars, radar- One reason modern, complex weapons guided missiles, heat-seeking rounds, TV- are efficient tools of war is that they are guided bombs, laser range finders, and the often designed for specific tasks. But the like. Elimination of a fighter’s ability to use same tools may be unsuitable for all-around its radar or radio, for example, will reduce use. The Maverick antitank missile, for ex- its effectiveness and increase its vulnerabil- ample, is nearly useless against anything ity to physical destruction. Electronic com- but small, armored targets. In addition, any bat also includes deceiving an enemy by weapon, however efficient, is usually very presenting false signatures of weapons, vulnerable to at least one other modern, units, or movements. Electronic combat is complex weapon. For instance, the aircraft, another dimension of modern war that tran- despite its offensive flexibility, is very vul- scends the previous notions of air, land, and nerable to surface-to-air missiles without sea power. 46 AIR POWER JOURNAL

While the team’s ability to communicate capture the operational-level dimensions of is essential, the team must also speak a com- battlefield effectiveness. For example, cal- mon language. This is the task of doctrine. culating the cost per tank kill of a Maverick air-to-ground missile is much easier than determining the benefit of aerial-delivered Institutional Limitations mines. While the missile is designed to kill Good service or joint doctrine is especially one tank, the task of the mines is to delay important because modern weapons are and channel large groups of tanks. But delay controlled by people who may be as spe- and channelization are significant only in cialized as their equipment. Pilots, infantry- terms of the commander’s intent in shaping men, and submariners, for example, each his battlefield. This, in turn, is based on have a unique perspective of war. Even joint doctrine that considers the ability to within a single service, the perspectives create and exploit opportunities by shaping vary. A fighter pilot views the battlefield the battlefield—an operational-level con- very differently than does a tactical airlifter. cept—as important as the tactical-level abil- Furthermore, the culture of each service is ity to engage a specific type of target. Proper dominated by the exploits of past accom- use of specialized, complex weapons is plishments when battle was perhaps less more complicated than just finding an eco- complex. Although World War II saw com- nomic mix of combat systems or surmount- bined arms warfare, most interactions ing the electronic dimension of among air, land, and sea power took place at communication. Good joint or integrated the operational level of war and very little at doctrine is the basis for effective teamwork the tactical level. In the histories and tradi- on the fluid theater battlefield. tions of most regiments and squadrons, there is little mention of victories aided by other arms because of infrequent tactical interaction between them. Close cooperation Fluid Battlefield sometimes existed at the higher echelons, By clouding previous distinctions among but the glories of operational-level staff air, land, and sea power, the lethality of work make poor reading compared to the modern weapons has challenged our insti- exploits of tactical-level units on or above tutional ability to develop effective doc- the battlefield. That portion of current joint trine. A recent attempt to deal with the and service doctrine and attitudes influ- doctrinal aspect of the challenge is the US enced by history, then, will lack the insight Army’s Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Opera- joint tactical-level combat experience could tions, which espouses a doctrinal concept provide. called AirLand Battle. The Army believes Another problem is the American budget- modern weapons and nonlinear operations ing process.-To some extent, the services will extend the depth of the battlefield.10 have adversary relationships because each This may have important implications in program competes for a place in the limited using theater air power effectively. It may federal budget. It is hard for institutions to even suggest fundamental changes to the compete one day and the next day cooperate way theater forces should be organized. on writing joint doctrine. In addition, justi- fication to buy better guns, bombs, and Extended Depth of the Battlefield ships is usually based on economic analysis. A new weapon must prove that it can do From the standpoint of protection, a com- a specific, quantifiable task more effi- mander must disperse his forces. Any per- ciently— usually expressed in some form of manent concentration of forces presents a “bangs per buck.” Unfortunately, econo- lucrative target, especially those close to the metric analysis, while important, cannot enemy. Therefore, tactical-size units will be AIR POWER AND THEATER BATTLEFIELD 47

dispersed in depth behind the "front." But distinction between front and rear areas.12 dispersal is not enough. Technology, as we As a result, forces will have to conduct si- have seen, makes even deep, rear-area air- multaneous offense and defense. Some be- fields, logistic sites, and transportation sys- lieve future land warfare will resemble sea tems vulnerable to rocket, missile, and warfare. Mobile land units will operate aircraft attack. The assault helicopter can physically isolated from each other and even place brigade-size surface forces deep launch attacks while providing self-de- into the rear area. Mobility, in addition to fense, much like a carrier battle group con- dispersal, is also essential for survival of d u c t s c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s . 13 I n t h e a i r , tactical-size units. For example, after an ar- combat has always been nonlinear, but at tillery battery completes a fire mission—a the theater or operational level the fluid bat- matter of a few minutes—it must immedi- tlefield and nonlinear operations raise con- ately move before the enemy locates it with cerns about the Achilles’ heel of air power, detection equipment and returns counter- the airfield. Long-range firepower, airfield batten- fire. The same principles apply to attack munitions, special operations forces, other combat systems. Whether aircraft, and even air assault or armored breakout ship, or tank, the act of firing, moving, or forces can threaten all but the most distant communicating will unmask location and theater airfields. But the modern battlefield often intentions. But the same conditions holds other important considerations for air apply to the enemy. Therefore, the com- power. mander who can act faster than his opponent reacts has the advantage. AirLand Battle calls this the fluid battlefield, but it Implications for Theater A ir Power probably applies to all forms of modern A fluid battlefield with nonlinear opera- theater-level combat. At sea. the battle may tions may completely change the way air be won by the side that is able to fire the first power is applied on the battlefield. In one salvo. Similarly, in aerial combat a fighter respect this rapidly changing combat envi- pilot has a tremendous advantage if he can ronment demands the flexibility and quick identify enemy aircraft and fire his missiles massing of firepower inherent in air power. before the visual maneuvering engagement But the way we currently think about and begins. This is one rationale for the devel- apply air power may be obsolete. For the opment of “smart” weapons—such as the past decade, there has been debate over the advanced medium range air-to-air missile proper emphasis between close air support (AMRAAM). a beyond-visual-range, (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). The debate launch-and-leave weapon. For a successful has not been productive because current battle, therefore, a commander would rap- concepts of CAS and AI were derived from idly mass his combat power, quickly attain the static battlefields of Korea and his objectives, and then swiftly disengage Vietnam.14 and disperse. A modern, fluid battlefield may not have Because combat power is dispersed in the physical rigidity of past battlefields. It depth, attack and defense must also be in will probably resemble an amoeba more depth. AirLand Battle categorizes opera- than a finely constructed animal that acts in tions into rear, close, and deep." But this a predictable fashion. If so, the next war classification depicts a sense of order that may not conform to our organizational may not be present. Combining several si- charts and doctrinal prejudices. For exam- multaneous and rapidly forming engage- ple, traditional air interdiction that at- ments throughout the depth of the tempts to isolate the battlefield or battlefield results in nonlinear operations. logistically strangle the enemy, as past in- According to AirLand Battle, the intermin- terdiction campaigns attempted in Italy and gling of opposing forces will result in little Korea, is probably invalid.'5 Both of these 48 AIR POWER IOURNAL

AI concepts rely on firm, quantifiable com- ally corresponds to the range of the ground bat infrastructures, and firmness is not a forces’ organic artillery. Air-to-surface at- trait of an amoeba. In addition, in war char- tacks between the forward line of own acterized by rapid movement and many troops (FLOT) and the FSCL are close air short, vicious engagements, attrition of support, and air attacks beyond the FSCL combat and support units before they reach (excluding airfields) are considered air in- the “front” may take too much time. As a re- terdiction. AI and CAS, therefore, could be sult the long-term effects of air interdiction, procedurally defined by the depth to which such as diversion of enemy resources to de- they penetrate the battlefield. In the future, fend and repair AI attacks, may never be however, we may very well find air power felt. providing close support to surface forces Yet the need to control the evolution and operating deep into enemy territory. Simi- shape of the battlefield is even more impor- larly, air power could be vital in helping tant. Theater air power is currently the only shape a rear-area battle where large enemy form of violence that has enough range and units have penetrated into the rear area of a muscle to do it. To borrow a concept from US corps. Therefore, the concepts of close AirLand Battle, the focus of air attack must support for direct effect (destruction) and be the mind of the enemy commander.16 But detached support for indirect effects (creat- the “mind of the enemy” is not a single per- ing situations) is still valid. However, the son, command, control, communications, procedural rigidity produced by linking and intelligence (C3I) system, or any other these missions to lines on a map or depth of target array. It is his total ability to act on the attack is meaningless. Unfortunately, our battlefield. Modern battles will be won by command and control system is based upon forces that think quicker than their enemy our experiences on positional battlefields. and create situations of destruction in The traditional distinction between AI which combat power is massed and applied and CA.S produced a command and control faster than the enemy can react. Air power system that treats these two missions very can help create these situations, and air differently. CAS targets are generated by the power can also help destroy the enemy. Army. Within the joint force commander’s This is the way we should think about air apportionment decision, the Army has the interdiction and close air support in the fu- authority to decide how, when, and where ture—creation and destruction.17 It is the CAS sorties will be used. Successful CAS way Patton and Quesada combined land requests and tasking, however, depend and air power in France after the breakout upon an extensive C3 system, from the bat- from Normandy.18 It also resembles the So- talion through brigade, division, corps, and viets’ concept of fire superiority and the then to the air component headquarters and ability of firepower to “guarantee success” back down to wings and squadrons. To ex- of combined armed forces.19 It bears little re- ecute the mission, the CAS aircraft and pi- semblance to the conceptual rigidity Korea lot— like a ball in a pinball machine—go and Vietnam placed on our tactical air con- from one C3 bumper to another until they fi- trol system. nally appear over a battalion tactical en- If there is no distinct “front” and enemy gagement. AI attacks, in contrast, are and friendly ground forces conduct nonlin- planned and conducted by the air compo- ear operations throughout the depth of the nent in accordance with the joint force com- battlefield, then the difference between mander’s interdiction objectives. AI sorties CAS and AI should not be defined in terms theoretically do not need detailed integra- of the present procedural distinction. In the tion with surface units because their targets past we have classified AI and CAS by are beyond the physical location of surface drawing a line on a map, the fire support co- forces. But on a fluid battlefield— the ordination line (FSCL).20 The FSCL gener- amoeba that blends close, deep, and rear— AIR POWER AND THEATER BATTLEFIELD 49

Air Force air interdiction sorties cannot op- ordinate commander cannot communicate erate autonomously, nor can the Army’s with a higher commander, then he will rely long-range rocket, tube artillery, or even on his understanding of the higher com- special operations forces. The problems mander’s intent to make decisions. The with AI, CAS. and current C* systems, how- Army implements this C' doctrine through ever, are not limited to the disparity be- mission-oriented orders.22 This philosophy tween tradition and reality. not only minimizes the negative effects of A fluid battlefield with nonlinear opera- severed communications but also uses the tions threatens the survivability of today’s fluid nature of the modern battlefield to ad- C3 systems and procedures. For physical se- vantage. A subordinate who understands curity, important C3 assets are usually his commander's intent and is trained to op- found in the rear area. But the lethality of erate under uncertainty can exploit sudden, modern weapons and the depth of the bat- fleeting opportunities without waiting for tlefield negate this protection. Survivability approval even when adequate C3 links exist. and redundancy of C3 systems are ade- For historical support, the US Army often quately addressed by technicians and sys- explains the tactical excellence of the tems analysts, but they fail to deal with the World War II German army as a product of most important C3 implication of the fluid au/trogstoktik, the Prussian version of ini- battlefield. Modern war will challenge the tiative and mission-oriented orders.23 De- current approach to higher-echelon com- centralized concepts of C3 doctrine may also mand (a structure that is a curious combi- have a place in the employment of theater nation of Napoleonic, Prussian, and air power. modern corporate staff procedures).21 The A decentralized C:t doctrine for air power, staff/management approach is based upon however, cannot mirror the Army’s. A the efficiency of centralization— higher ech- ground commander can give mission-ori- elons make decisions and lower echelons ented orders because, compared to air implement them. This process assumes that power, geography limits ground combat the higher echelon can make better deci- power and serves to deconflict one ground sions because it consolidates data and infor- unit from another. Air power’s area of influ- mation from lower echelons and other ence is not as bounded. Fighter squadrons sources. But the fluid battlefield will not ac- whose bases are hundreds of miles apart commodate this approach. Severed C3 links have the same area of influence—the entire will rob commanders of important infor- theater. In fact, this trait of air power— mation, and rapid movement of both range— is one of its strengths. But we can friendly and enemy forces will quickly in- look to the same technology that provides validate information that does come air power with range and firepower to de- through. The problem will be compounded centralize air power C3 systems. by the technological capability of unsev- Too often advocates of technology por- ered C3 links to transmit large quantities of tray the battlefield as an information man- data. A management-oriented commander agement problem. “Target arrays," "the and staff will be overwhelmed quickly by automated battlefield," “battle manage- volumes of obsolete, incomplete informa- ment,” “probability of kill,” and “target ser- tion. A correct decision will be a matter of vicing" are some of the buzzwords of this luck. Redundant and survivable C3 systems outlook. Adherents of this viewpoint de- in this case could produce more harm than scribe contemporary warfare as an “infor- good—organizational gridlock. One solu- mation war.”2-1 This can lead to the belief tion to this dilemma is a less centralized C3 that one can build weapons, sensors, and doctrine. computers that can see through the fog and In AirLand Battle doctrine, the Army be- operate without the friction of war. In real- lieves initiative offers a solution. If a sub- ity, systems designed with this prejudice 50 A/H POWER IOURNAL will likely contribute more fog and friction, anything we have experienced. The vio- especially if they centralize decisions. lence produced by modern weapons may However, the current explosion in elec- very well exceed the human capacity to tronic gadgetry can be harnessed. Just as adapt. Death and annihilation will await in- some mainframe computers are being re- dividuals and units that cannot respond to placed by numerous personal computers quickly changing circumstances. Similarly, linked into a local net, the functions of the defeat and subjugation await organizations tactical air control system can be devolved and nations that will not invest intellectual to many small C:i nodes, each node capable energy in anticipating future changes in of operating independently if needed. The weapons and forge doctrine and strategy process has already begun in air-to-air war- both appropriate to current situations and fare with airborne warning and control sys- adaptable to future conditions. tems and fighters with sophisticated long- The theater battlefield will be composed, range radars that augment a complicated as with all previous battlefields, of humans ground radar system. Other systems are engaged in violent acts. As trite as that may being considered for air-to-surface warfare. sound, the tools and systems we use to wage The Soviets call them "reconnaissance war often require us to focus on proper man- strike complexes" and believe they repre- agement of data, equipment, and personnel. sent a revolution in military affairs.25 But as While obviously essential aspects of our the United States fields these systems, un- profession, they can distract us from under- less fog, friction, and the limitations of cen- standing the essential characteristic of tralized command and control are war—dynamic violence. It will take a com- accounted for, we are likely to saddle our- bination of weapons to win tomorrow’s bat- selves with military power that can be eas- tles. At the operational level, the joint force ily decapitated. commander does not wage separate air, We must also look forward to the next land, and sea wars. At his level there is one century. The merging of air, land, and sea battlefield and one war. But even at the tac- combat power will likely continue down to tical level of engagements and battles, the the lowest tactical levels.2,i We should take three forms of combat power are interde- this into account as we develop C3 systems pendent and often intertwined. and reorganize units. Even today tactical Each individual and service component ground units will be directly affected by air has cherished beliefs and traditions about engagements—thanks to the air-to-air com- the best way to conduct military operations. bat helicopter.27 Just as there is no air, land To outsiders these beliefs and their associ- and sea war, we have passed the point ated doctrines often appear to be sacred where it makes sense to develop separate cows, and some of them probably are. But air, land, and sea campaigns. Perhaps we there is no sure way to know without testing should begin planning for the day when di- them in combat. Tradition and heritage are visions, wings, and fleets no longer exist but vital in developing unit cohesion and mo- are replaced by all-service (joint would be rale. Without cohesion men and women an inadequate description) formations. will not make the personal sacrifices necessary for combat success. But tradition and heritage can become irrelevant or even destructive influences if they result in a stul- Conclusion tifying institutional mind-set. Modern weapons and the contemporary One can forgive the World War I officers doctrine of technologically advanced mili- for not foreseeing the carnage of trench war- tary forces have created a new environment fare. But one has to condemn them for pur- of war at both the tactical and operational suing the same tactical- and operational- levels. The future battlefield may be unlike level doctrine for years, well after artillery AIR POWER AND THEATER BATTLEFIELD 51

had churned infantry and earth into an or- perhaps they will not. We may form inac- ganic slush described by one soldier as a curate visions, but the danger is not that we place “where one cannot possibly distin- may guess wrong. The real danger is that we guish if the mud were flesh or the flesh were become too comfortable with our doctrine mud.’’28 We must continually measure our and beliefs. Intellectual inquiry, even if doctrine against the fog and friction of war. faulty, at least conditions the mind to con- We think nonlinear operations on fluid bat- sider alternatives and changes. □ tlefields will characterize future wars— but

Notes 1. Correlli Barnett. The Swordbearers (New York: New helicopters, and infantry. American Library. Inc.. 1965). 46. The European armies' doc- 14. Although the enemy was elusive in Vietnam, the battle- trines, especially France's, were oriented toward the offense. field was static in the sense that very little changed from day to During engagements the army with the most "elan," or spirit, day. Allied aircraft could provide CAS and AI throughout the would be victorious. theater. 2. Seymour ). Deitchman. "Weapons Platforms, and the 15. Edmund Dews and Felix Kozaczka. Air Interdiction: New Armed Services.” Issues in Science and Technology. 1. Lessons from Fast Campaigns (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Cor- no. 3 ISpring 1985): 83-112. Deitchman's general thesis is that poration. September 1981). modern weapons have so changed the nature of war that the 16. FM 100-5. 16. This concept is found in the AirLand Bat- weapons themselves, as opposed to their delivering platform, tle tenet of agility. will determine combat power. Mary C. Fitzgerald. "Marshal 17. John Boyd, "Creation and Destruction." an unpublished Ogarkov on the Modem Theater Operation." Naval War Col- paper and lecture delivered at Air University, November 1978: lege Review. Autumn 1986. 6. The concept that cumulative in- Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift (London: Brassey's Def- cremental changes eventually produce a qualitative, ence Publishers. 1985). Boyd and Simpkin present similar revolutionary change is found in Marxist-Leninist analysis of ideas about the nature of war that are having an impact, espe- the nature of modern theater warfare. cially within the US Army, on current views about the theater 3. Deitchman. 86. battlefield. 4. FM 100-5. Operations. 5 May 1986. 43—16. The earlier 18. Glen M. Harned. "The Spirit of Au Gay: Putting the Air version of AirLand Battle emphasized the integrated battlefield Back Into AirLand Battle." monograph (School of Advanced (conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons) more than the Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth. Kans., 1986). current version. 19. Bellamy, 191. 5. Chris Bellamy. The Red God of War (London: Brassey’s 20. Lt Gen Merrill A. McPeak, “TACAIR Missions and the Defence Publishers. 1986). 58. 154. and 186. Bellamy provides Fire Support Coordination." Air University Review. Septem- several examples of the physical and psychological effects ber-October 1985, 65. McPeak also advocates using the FSCL massive Russian artillery fires had upon their opponents—in to distinguish CAS from AI. some cases the survivors went mad. 21. Martin L. Van Crevald, Command in War (Cambridge: 6. Blake Morrison. "Gunsmoke '85." USAF Fighter Weap- Harvard University Press. 1985). This is one of the themes in ons Review. Winter 1985. 16. The winner of the level bombing his book. category had a .25-meter circular error average (CEA). the av- 22. FM 100-5. 4. 15. and 97. Commander's intent and mis- erage error for four bombs. The winner of the dive-bombing sion-oriented orders are some of the most important aspects of category had a 3.5-meter CEA. AirLand Battle. 7. Barry D. Watts. The Foundations of US Air Doctrine 23. Stephen W. Richey, "The Philosophical Basis of Air- (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 1984). 22. The first Land Battle." Military Review, May 1984. US air plan. AWPD-1, used 1.250 feet as the expected circular 24. Deitchman, 86. error probability (CEP). This represented normal peacetime 25. United Slates Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis bombing errors multiplied by a factor of 2.25. Center, Soviet Ceneral Doctrine for War (U), vol. 1 (June 1987), 8. Bellamy. 149-63. Improvements in artillery are decep- 3-53. tive. Compared to aircraft, the outward appearance of tube ar- 26. Rudolph Ostovich. "AirLand Battle—Part 1: Dramatic tillery has changed very little, but the real improvements have Changes in Emerging Aviation Doctrine,” U.S. Army Aviation been significant. Digest, November 1986. 2. Ostovich maintains that helicopter 9. Ibid.. 196-97. operations will be essential in conducting airland battles and 10. FM 100-5, 2. 16. 19. Depth is one of the four tenets of are an integral part of combined operations down to the lower AirLand Battle and refers to physical dimensions as well as tactical level of war. depth of resources. Here the term is used only in the physical 27. "Industry Observer." Aviation Week and Space Tech- sense. nology. 16 November 1987, 11. The magazine reported that the 11. Ibid., 19-20. The previous edition of AirLand Battle em- Army is testing air-to-air missiles on helicopters. The Army phasized the deep battle. The current version is more balanced has also published an air-to-air doctrine manual. FM 1-107, and treats the deep, close, and rear as equal. Air-to-AirCombat, 12 October 1984. (This manual will soon be 12. Ibid.. 2. replaced by Field Circular 1-107, Air Combat Operations, 13. Noyes B. Livingston. "Blitzkrieg in Europe: Is it Still which reflects some maturing of the Army's air-to-air doctrine Possible." Military Review. June 1986. 26. The author con- in terms of the AirLand Battle.) tends the daring tank "thrusts and cut" of World War II blitz- 28. Friederich Mielke. "1916: The Crisis of World War I." krieg will be replaced by vicious dogfights between tanks. Military Review. May 1987, 70. HE consensus is clear: the officer corps must come to grips with the Getting self-serving, promotion-oriented behavior known as careerism. Military Tprofessionals view the careerist with dis- a Grip on dain. Military historian Lt Col John F. Shiner expresses a typical view: “These parasites could spell national ruin should Careerism many of them advance to command positions.”1 Military reformists from Richard A. M ai Mic h a el L. Mosier, USAF Gabriel to Edward N. Luttwak condemn the spread of careerism, warning, "If careerism becomes the general attitude, the very basis of leadership is destroyed.”2 The senior Air Caution is the eldest child of wisdom. Force leadership also acknowledges career- Victor Hugo

52 GETTING A CHIP ON CAREERISM 53 ism’s dangers. According to a recent state- sional Soldier: A S o c i a l an d Political ment by Maj Gen Ralph E. Havens, Portrait. After interviewing 113 potential commander of the Air Force Military Per- military leaders, Janowitz concluded: sonnel Center (AFMPC). "Many of our Air Force leaders have recently expressed con- Those who see the military profession as a cern that ‘careerism’ is having a disruptive calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a greater concentration of individuals effect on the development and retention of for whom the military is just another job. . . . our officer force." For this reason. General For a sizable minority—about 20 percent, or Havens explained, the Air Force is mount- one out of every five—no motive (for joining ing a major effort to make a “basic philo- the military) could be discerned, except that sophical change on an individual and on an the military was a job.4 institutional level.”3 Efforts to purge the officer corps of career- Janowitz is not the only military sociolo- ism are long overdue. Unfortunately, ca- gist to document these findings. Charles C. reerism is much more elusive than most Moskos, Jr., also wrote of a change in the ori- care to admit—a complex problem that is entation of the officer corps from institu- hard to pinpoint and even more difficult to tionalism (in which the profession is treat. Overly zealous, simplistic reforms viewed as a calling) toward occupational- could not only be ineffective but also inad- ism (just a job). The consequence, Moskos vertently distill valuable attributes from the argues, is a shift from an attitude of self-sac- officer corps. Therefore, corrective action rifice and moral commitment to one of ma- must be carefully considered and judi- terialism." Military sociologists theorize ciously applied lest a short-term fix result in that the concept of a calling higher than self even greater long-term problems. dim inishes as institutional values This article examines the complexities of deteriorate. treating careerism. To lend historical per- In recent years, the officer corps has also spective, it outlines the background of ca- recognized this shift in basic values. In reerism and explains how careerism is 1970 Army Chief of Staff Gen William C. currently defined. Next, it discusses diffi- Westmoreland commissioned the Army culties in pinpointing and treating career- War College to assess the ethics and values ism and presents ways to help the officer of the officer corps. In light of the trend corps deal with careerism. identified by Janowitz 10 years earlier, the results of the study were both predictable and unsettling. The study cited a loss of ethical orientation to include "selfish [.] pro- From Occupationalism to motion-oriented behavior . . . disloyalty to Careerism subordinates [and] poor standards of ethical and professional behavior.”7 This loss of According to military sociologists, the orientation is not limited to the Army. Ac- genesis of today’s careerism lies in a shift in cording to a 1980 Air Command and Staff basic values within the officer corps. As College report. 100 percent of officers sur- Samuel P. Huntington observed in his clas- veyed felt “most fellow officers compro- sic work The Soldier and the State: The mised their integrity to varying degrees."8 Theory and Politics of Civil-M ilitary Rela- Most recently, an Industrial College of the tions, one of the salient characteristics that Armed Forces report titled Cohesion in the has traditionally distinguished the officer US M ilitary observed that "the shift in ori- corps is its view of the military as a “ ‘higher entation of the officers has weakened [their] calling’ in the service of society.”4 However, corporate cohesion. Many officers view the Morris Janowitz noted a change in orienta- military as a job that offers material rewards tion as early as 1960 in his book The Profes- and individual s u c c e s s .A s the evidence 54 AIR POWER IOURNAL

mounted, military as well as civilian critics is based on motivation. An individual mo- increasingly referred to occupationalist be- tivated by the lure of personal advancement havior as careerism. places his own interests above the interests of the organization and is by definition a careerist. However, another individual who Careerism Defined performs the same act can be called a professional if the actions are motivated by There are a variety of definitions of ca- altruism. On the surface, the simplicity of reerism. In their book Crisis in Command: the definition implies that careerism would Mismanagement in the Army, Richard A. be relatively easy to pinpoint and deal with. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage define careerism However, several factors complicate the as “self-seeking, the use of one’s charge and process. command largely as a means to higher career rewards.”10 In another well-known re- formist work titled National Defense, James Difficulties in Pinpointing Fallows describes careerism as “the desire to be, rather than the desire to do. It is the Careerism desire to have rank, rather than use it; the The most basic problem in the struggle to pursuit of promotion without a clear sense pinpoint careerism is that few officers view of what to do with a higher rank once one it in exactly the same way. What constitutes has attained it.”11 Members of the officer careerist behavior is largely a matter of corps define careerism in similar terms. In perception, and perceptions are rarely if his article “The Military Professional in ever uniform. The following scene from the America,” Lt Col John F. Shiner defines ca- popular film Top Gun provides a good reerism as "seek[ing] advancement for its illustration: own sake and [using] it exclusively as a goal The commander, ramrod straight, faced his rather than as an opportunity or reward.”12 newly assigned aircrews. An AFMPC study reached a similar conclusion in June 1987, defining careerism as "Gentlemen, you are the top 1 percent of all "career-building as a deliberate aim; preoc- naval aviators—the elite—the best of the best.” He paused, surveying the eager faces in the cupation with career advancement/ promo- crowded briefing room. “We'll make you tion that supplants concern for basic duty better.” performance.”11 Although other definitions exist, these are representative thoughts of The commander began to pace the room, preaching the gospel of technical expertise both outside observers and members of the and combat capability to his crews in meas- officer corps. For purposes of discussion, ured tones. After a moment. Maverick casually careerism is defined here as the practice of leaned forward in his chair and turned to placing self-interests above the interests of study the attentive faces behind him. the organization to accelerate personal "What are you doing?" Goose whispered advancement. urgently. Two aspects of careerism should be high- Maverick turned back to his RIO [radar-in- lighted. First, self-interest is central to the tercept officer] with a grin. "Just wondering,” definition. For this reason, careerism is gen- he murmured in a low voice, “who's the best." erally considered the antithesis of profes- As if in reply, the commander's voice sionalism, which stresses subordination of boomed out, “In case any of you wonder who self-interests to the interests of the organi- the best is, they’re up here on this plaque on zation.14 By extension, the relationship be- the wall. The best driver and his RIO from each tween professionalism and careerism is a class has his name on it.” He strode to the front zero-sum game— when careerism prospers, of the room, then turned abruptly to face Mav- professionalism suffers. Second, careerism erick. He fixed the lieutenant with a cold stare, GETTING A GHIP ON CAREEHJSM 55

"You think your name is going to be on that Daniel Callahan. However, due to varying plaque?" interpretations, “one person’s careerism could be another’s self-realization; one per- There was an expectant hush in the room. son’s professionalism, another’s insensitive All eyes turned to the young F-14 pilot in the front row. Maverick met the commander’s consequentialism.”"’ In this respect, career- steady gaze. ism exists in the eye of the beholder. The difficulty in assessing individual mo- “Yes, sir.” tivation also contributes to the difficulty in Several crew members exchanged disgusted pinpointing careerism. According to Sam- looks, rolling their eyes in disbelief. uel P. Huntington, the professional is moti- "That’s pretty arrogant, considering the vated by a sense of responsibility to the company you’re in.” Maverick thought for a profession.17 The careerist, on the other moment. "Yes, sir," he replied in a firm voice. hand, is motivated by the lure of personal The commander studied him for a moment, advancement. Consequently, determining saying nothing. Finally, he gave a curt nod of w'hether an action constitutes careerism de- approval. "I like that in a pilot.”15 pends on whether the individual is moti- The interaction between Maverick and vated by a desire to serve the organization or the commander can be interpreted in two by personal advancement. For example, an different ways. On the one hand, the crew officer who consistently takes on high-visi- members react to Maverick’s self-assurance bility additional duties in the squadron is with disapproval. To them, his seemingly considered a professional if he is motivated flippant remark reflects an attitude of sel- by a sincere desire to contribute to the unit’s fishness rather than team spirit. As his call mission. However, if motivated solely by sign suggests, Maverick has a reputation as prospects of a good officer effectiveness re- a loner, one who view's the world in terms of port (OER), he is a careerist. In theory, the competition and is prepared to do whatever difference betw'een the two individuals is it takes to come out on top and make himself clear-cut. In reality, this black-or-white ap- look good, even at the expense of his fellow' proach can easily lead to incorrect assump- officers. In this respect, he epitomizes the tions about what motivates peers or careerist. The commander, however, has a subordinates. different perspective. In his eyes. Maver- Rather than stemming from a single mo- ick’s response is simply a reflection of a tive, human behavior often results from sev- good fighter pilot’s relentless pursuit of in- eral different, perhaps even conflicting, dividual excellence and mastery over an op- motives. Furthermore, behavior is much ponent—the essence of a warrior. Careerism less consistent than people w'ould like to be- has nothing to do w'ith it. This scene illus- lieve, leading them frequently to make in- trates how a single event can be perceived correct inferences about what prompts an in vastly different terms, depending upon individual’s behavior.18 To add to the con- the individual’s frame of reference. fusion, sometimes the individual is not In the same way, the varied perceptions of aware of his or her true motives. For these the officer corps make careerism extremely reasons, motivation is extremely difficult to difficult to deal with because the corps lacks assess, making careerism difficult to pin- a common baseline by which to evaluate its point reliably. The result can be a series of own behavior. What may be blatant career- erroneous judgments by a commander or an ism to one may be acceptable—or even de- individual’s peers, leading to an atmos- sirable—behavior to another. “That so phere of suspicion and distrust, and a rapid many officers believe careerism to be a prob- breakdown of unit cohesion. lem in military service suggests an agree- Careerism, then, is difficult to pinpoint ment on the facts,” write noted ethicists due to the lack of a common perception Peter L. Stromberg, Malham M. Wakin, and within the officer corps and the difficulty of 56 AIR POWER JOURNAL

assessing individual motivation. However, joint officer personnel policies, requires of- not only is careerism difficult to pinpoint, ficers promoted to general or flag rank to but also several aspects of the military have served in a joint duty assignment.24 profession hinder an effective treatment of The effect, according to Gen Thomas R. careerism. Morgan, assistant commandant of the Ma- rine Corps, is to force a choice “between operational experience that will sharpen Difficulties in Treating combat skills and administrative assignments that will enhance promotion poten- Careerism tial.”29 As this legislation encourages young By sending mixed signals to the field, the officers to scramble for joint duty assign- current personnel system makes careerism ments, careerism becomes institutionalized difficult to treat. Within the Air Force, ca- to a much greater degree, resulting in a cor- reerism is decried as fostering an environ- responding decrease in combat capability.26 ment of selfishness that undermines the Against the current backdrop of anticareer- traditional military ethic of self-sacrifice. ism, policies such as incentive pay and joint Yet, by the Air Force’s own admission, officer duty tend to send conflicting signals many personnel policies actually reinforce to the officer corps, further muddying the a careerist orientation.19 Pilot retention pro- water. vides a timely example. AFMPC recently Another aspect that makes careerism dif- sponsored a conference in an effort to halt ficult to treat is the close relationship be- the progressive decline in cumulative con- tween careerism and self-interest.27 As tinuation rate (CCR). Air Staff and major air previously noted, self-interest is central to command representatives met to consider a the definition of careerism. Consequently, variety of measures designed to improve pi- the officer corps tends to equate self-interest lot retention. The primary recommendation with careerism. In reality, they can be quite to emerge from the conference was an in- different. In an article titled “Ethics of Lead- crease in flight pay.20 This recommendation ership,” Col Malham M. Wakin says that was followed by a proposal to offer pilots an self-development and selfishness are two annual bonus of $12,000 to stay past their components of self-interest: initial service obligation.21 Unfortunately, We attribute selfishness to those who seek this approach to improving the CCR tends to their own advantage without regard to the con- reinforce the most pessimistic view of the sequences of their actions for others or in spite officer corps as self-serving occupational- of causing harm to others. To develop one’s ists motivated by material gain. If this view talents can be viewed as self-interested action, but it need not be selfish. Certainly, some self- is accurate, careerist incentives are bound interested actions can be morally right and jus- to spawn more careerism. If this view is not tifiably encouraged. . . ,28 accurate, the Air Force has not set a very high level of expectation for its officer Although selfishness is clearly careerism, corps. Either way. materialism does not ap- self-interested action that supports organi- pear to be a constructive solution. More- zational goals is not and can therefore be de- over, if inadequate flight pay is in fact a sirable. A good example is the Air Force principal cause for declining pilot reten- nonresident professional military education,22 the Air P’orce has a larger problem tion (PME) program. In recognition of the than the CCR. role of PME in professional development, The effects of the Goldwater-Nichols De- the Air Force considers PME an important fense Reorganization Act of 1986 on the per- factor in career progression.29 If an individ- sonnel system have also encouraged a ual enrolls in a PME program to enhance his careerist orientation within the officer chances for promotion, he is acting out of corps.23 Title IV of the act, which deals with self-interest. However, this self-interested GETTING A GHJP ON CAREERISM 57

action is not careerism because it meets tary as a special calling requiring special PME's objective of developing expertise in service and sacrifice.”35 the use of air power.30 In spite of the recent Competition becomes destructive when it decision to disregard "early” PME accom- detracts from team spirit. Excessive ambi- plishment at promotion boards (i.e., inter- tion can have a similar effect, driving the ca- mediate service school at major boards and reerist to pursue personal achievement at senior service school at lieutenant colonel the expense of mission effectiveness or unit boards) appropriately timed PME remains welfare. Worse yet, to the extent an ambi- an important factor for promotion.31 If all tious individual indulges in careerism, he promotion boards were to disregard PME tends to encourage careerism in others. The records, an important incentive for the offi- result can be a self-perpetuating situation cer to complete PME programs would be re- wherein careerists who advance into lead- moved. Presumably, such a decision would ership positions teach others either to fol- result in an eventual reduction in the effec- low their example or get out of the service.30 tiveness of the officer corps. Competitiveness and ambition, then, can Finally, formulating an effective ap- be valuable attributes when properly chan- proach toward careerism is complicated by neled or destructive influences if allowed to the legitimate need for competitive spirit run rampant. To avoid the latter situation, and ambition within the officer corps. Com- one must make a clear distinction between petitiveness is a basic ingredient of leader- legitimate competitiveness and ambition ship, and the military cannot afford to be in and their destructive counterparts. Other- short supply, particularly in combat. As wise, these two important leadership qual- Gen Douglas MacArthur pointed out, the ities might be removed from the officer mission of the profession of arms is to “win corps by heavy-handed reforms, an action our wars. Everything else in [the officer's] that would hamper combat effectiveness. professional career is but corollary to this The varied perceptions of careerism, the vital dedication.”32 Vice Adm William P. difficulty in assessing individual motiva- Lawrence adds that leadership requires tion, the mixed signals sent to the officer “very competitive individuals [who pos- corps by the personnel system, the close re- sess] a high degree of pride, and [who] sat- lationship between self-interest and career- isfy that pride in achieving productive ism, and the need for competition and ends. More simply stated in the context that ambition within the military make career- all in the military understand, they are fight- ism difficult to pinpoint and treat. Immod- ers with a strong will to win.”33 erate reforms, hastily conceived and Another crucial ingredient of leadership indiscriminately applied, can have oppo- is ambition. As Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker once ob- site effects than those intended. However, served. great leaders are not shy about seiz- the Air Force can treat careerism effectively ing an opportunity. "If you find need for a if it is patient and takes a long-term leader and have to coax or urge your selec- perspective. tion to take the job.” Eaker said, “you’ll be well advised to pass him over. He’s not the man you need.”34 When taken to the extreme, however, the two virtues of competitiveness and ambition become vices of the Getting a Grip on Careerism careerist. As Richard A. Gabriel charges in Three important steps can be taken to his book Military Incompetence: Why the help the officer corps control the problem of American Military Doesn't Win, “competi- careerism without generating unintended tion and careerism make every officer look side effects. First, the officer corps must de- out for himself. Such a system engenders velop a common perception of careerism. values corrosive of any concept of the mili- Second, strong, ethical leadership is needed 58 AIR POWER JOURNAL at all levels to control careerism. Finally, individual to distinguish between self-in- systemic changes are required to eliminate terested action and selfishness, competi- the personnel policies that foster a careerist tiveness and antagonism, ambition and orientation. greed. An awareness of where to draw the The officer corps cannot realize a basic line will give the officer corps the confi- philosophical change toward careerism dence it needs to aggressively pursue indi- without a common understanding of what vidual excellence, as well as the wisdom to careerism is, as well as what it is not. While stop occasionally and get its ethical bear- it is unlikely that everyone will ever per- ings.39 Led by commanders who set high ceive careerism in exactly the same way, the ethical standards for the organization, the officer corps needs a common understand- individual will be inspired to place duty ing of careerism and its effects in order to above self. Led by commanders who set ex- formulate a basis for action. At present, ca- pedient standards, the individual will be reerism is like pornography: few can define lured into looking out for himself. Without it, but everyone claims to recognize it. an example of ethical leadership, even basic Understandably, the search for careerism philosophical changes in individuals can generally begins with others, rather than eventually give way to the pressures of with oneself. As Stromberg, Wakin, and careerism. Callahan point out, "Most talk about career- Finally, the personnel system must stop ism centers ... on the alleged careerism of sending mixed signals to the field. As the other people. It is often easier to censure earlier example of pilot retention pointed others for self-seeking motives than to iden- out, raising flight pay as a primary incentive tify similar motives in oneself.”37 To facili- to keep pilots in the Air Force is inconsist- tate self-examination, personnel at all ent with urging the officer corps to return to levels— from the smallest units to the Air the institutional values of duty, honor, Staff— should discuss the causes and effects country. Furthermore, such incentives of careerism. Conferences, commander’s could exacerbate the problems of speciali- calls, and individual counseling can be use- zation within the officer corps, create ani- ful avenues for developing an awareness of mosity between rated and nonrated officers, the dangers of careerism.38 and further weaken the profession's corpo- Equally important, however, is a discus- rate identity. sion of what careerism is not. When prop- Instead of occupationalist incentives, the erly channeled, self-interested action, Air Force should explore institutional in- competitiveness, and ambition are not ca- centives to encourage its pilots to remain in reerism but hallmarks of winning organiza- service. Pilots should be able to enhance tions. Likewise, eagerness is not careerism, their chances for promotion by remaining in nor is striving to be the very best at one’s the cockpit—at the tip of the spear— rather profession. The officer corps must under- than accept career-broadening assignments stand this distinction lest misdirected peer forced upon them by the realities of the pro- pressure discourage the individual’s desire motion system. Such a change would not to excel. only eliminate a major source of pilot Even with this common understanding, dissatisfaction40 but also shift the measure the officer corps will be able to control ca- of performance from ticket-punching to ful- reerism only to the extent that commanders filling the professional officers’ principal are stewards of professional ethics. In an or- obligation— improving combat capability. ganization that searches for role models, As Marine Maj Robert B. Neller so astutely strong, ethical leadership must be the stan- put it, "If any group within the Corps, or any dard. Commanders should be selected of the Services, should be given an edge at largely on the basis of ethical character be- promotion time, it should be those individ- cause it is their example that will teach the uals who possess the leadership and tactical GETTING A GRIP ON CAREERISM 59

expertise in vvarfighting skills and can lead corps and the inability to accurately assess us to victory in war.”41 individual motivation make careerism dif- The Air Force should also examine as- ficult to pinpoint. Some personnel policies signment policies for careerist orientation, further cloud the issue by fostering a career- particularly in light of the Goldwater-Ni- ist orientation. Finally, the close relation- chols Defense Reorganization Act. AFMPC ship between careerism and self-interested should minimize the individual officer’s di- action, competitiveness, and ambition also rect involvement in the assignment process make quick, easy solutions unlikely. The of- and instead rely on the commander’s judg- ficer corps, it seems, is stuck between a rock ment.4- Assignments should be based more and a hard place— faced with a grave prob- on the commander’s assessment of where lem that demands immediate attention, yet the individual can best serve, rather than unable to implement a rapid solution for the individual’s perception of what would fear of unforeseen consequences. be the best career move. In this regard, the Solving the enigma of careerism must newly announced assignment policy of start at the source: the officer corps. Air weighing officers’ qualifications more heav- Force officers must examine careerism in ily than their volunteer status43 is an en- the light of day and see it as a betrayal of the couraging step toward eliminating the ethic of duty, honor, country. At the same square-filling, self-serving behavior so dev- time they must separate legitimate forms of astating to unit cohesion. self-interest, as well as competitiveness and Finally, to nurture the attitude of “send ambition, from careerism and preserve me where I can best serve,” the promotion them as valuable assets. The officer corps system should encourage highly qualified needs strong, ethical leadership to channel officers to accept difficult assignments for these assets properly and inspire selfless the good of the service, as well as their own dedication. Finally, systemic changes are benefit. As Harry G. Summers notes, “You necessary to ensure that personnel policies want people to be ambitious. You want peo- reinforce rather than diminish the tradi- ple to seek out difficult jobs. What you need tional values of the profession of arms. to bring out is that the jobs that enhance Regardless of the solution adopted, one their careers are the most d i f f i c u l t to do. . . . fact should be borne in mind: lasting phil- What we need is a structure, a system where osophical changes on the individual and in- what’s important pays.’’44 If the military is stitutional level will come neither quickly to build such a structure, the personnel sys- nor easily. There are no miracle cures for tem must stop rewarding careerism on the the scourge of careerism, and a heavy- one hand while seeking to eliminate it on handed approach can produce undesirable the other. side effects. Lt Gen Walter F. Ulmer, a former superintendent of the US Military Academy, wryly observed that the military Conclusion tends to overreact zealously to fundamental ethical dilemmas. “Most mischief and lack Clearly, the Air Force must act to arrest of motivation in our systems,” General Ul- the development of careerism within the of- mer concluded, “is caused by well-inten- ficer corps. To the extent careerism contin- tioned policies promulgated by a dedicated ues to spread, the fundamental ethics that chain of command.”45 As the controlled stress duty over self will further deteriorate. OER system of the seventies so graphically Although military reformists, senior mili- illustrates, even the best intentions can tary leaders, and the officer corps itself have disastrous results. This painful lesson agree that reform is needed, identifying ca- should be kept uppermost in mind as indi- reerism is not as easy as defining it. Lack of vidual and institution attempt to get a grip a common perception within the officer on Mie slippery issue of careerism. □ 60 AIR POWER JOURNAL

Notes 1. Lt Col fohn F. Shiner. "The Military Professional in Marine Corps Gazette 71, no. 5 (May 1987): 18-20. America," in Concepts for A ir Force Leadership (Maxwell 24. Congressional Record. 99th Cong. 2d sess.. 1986, 132, AFB. Ala.: Air University, 1983), 1-35. no. 119: H6857. 2. Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War 25. "Service Chiefs Air Complaints About Reorganization." (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 200. Air Force Times, 8 June 1987, 10. 3. Secretary of the Air Force. Air Force Policy Letter for 26. Neller. 18-20. Commanders, 1 December 1987, 1. 27. Col Kenneth H. Wenker, director of executive leader- 4. Samuel P Huntington. The Soldier and the Stole: The ship course. Air War College. Maxwell AFB. Ala., interview Theory and Politics of Civil-Military delations (Cambridge- with author. 13 January 1988. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1957), 8. 28. Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership." in Dimen- 5 Morris lanowilz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and sions of Leadership, ed. Lt Col Jim Mallett et al. (Maxwell AFB. Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960). 117 18. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, Air University. 1987). 6. Charles C. Moskos, |r.. "The All-Volunteer Military: Call- 254. ing, Profession, or Occupation?" Parameters 7, no. 1 (1977): 2~ 29. Maj Randal E. Morger, "New Accents on PME," Air 9. Force Magazine 70. no. 12 (December 1987): 62-66. 7 Richard A. Gabriel. To Serve with Honor. A Treatise on 30. AFR 53-8. USAF Officer Professional Military Educa- M ilitary Ethics and the Way of the Soldier (Westport. Conn.: tion System. 24 October 1986, 8. Greenwood Press. 1982), 74-75. 31. Morger, 65. 8. Maj Joseph R. Daskevirh and Maj Paul A. Nafziger, “The 32. Gen Douglas MacArthur, “Duty. Honor, Country." in Pulse of Professionalism. ACSC AY 80." research study, Air Concepts for Air Force Leadership (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1980, vii. University, 1983). 4—58. 9 lohn H. Johns el al.. Cohesion in the US M ilitary (Wash- 33. Vice Arlm William P. Lawrence. "Common Qualities of ington. D C. National Defense University Press, 1984), 62. Good Leaders,” in Concepts for Air Force Leadership (Maxwell 10 Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Com- AFB. Ala.: Air University, 1983), 4-61. mand Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and 34. Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker. "Some Observations on Leader- Wang, 1978|. 88. ship." lecture presented at the fifteenth anniversary celebra- 11 lames Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random tion of Air University. Maxwell AFB. Ala., 17 March 1961. House. 19811, 114. 35. Richard A. Gabriel. M ilitary Incompetence: Why the 12. Shiner. 1-35. American Military Doesn't Win (New York: Hill and Wang, 13. LI Col Merrill L. Eidson. "Careerism." talking paper. 1985) . 13. Headquarters AFMPC/DPMRP, 22 |une 1987. 1. 36. Fallows. 172. 14. Huntington. 63-64. 37. Slromberg et al.. 277. 15. Top Gun. Paramount Pictures. Inc.. 1986. Dialogue be- 38. Perry M. Smith, Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for tween Commander Metcalf. Lieutenant Mitchell, and Lieuten- Leaders (Washington. D.O.: National Defense University Press. ant Grady quoted from film: other scene description written by 1986) . 211. author. 39. Kermit D. Johnson. "Ethical Issues of Military Leader- 16. Peter L. Stromberg. Malham M. Wakin. and Daniel Cal- ship." in A Study of Organizational Leadership, ed. the asso- lahan, "Som e Problems in Military Ethics." in Dimensions of ciates. Office of Military Leadership. US Military Academy Leadership, comp, and ed. LI Col Jim Mallett. Maj Chuck Hol- (Harrisburg. Pa.: Stackpole Books. 1976). 591. sen, and Maj Bill Magill (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command 40. "Belter Pay," 6. and Staff College. Air University. 1987). 277. 41. Neller. 20. 17. Huntington. 9. 42. Col Norman F. Rathje and Lt Col John H. Happ. Jr.. 18 Jerry W. Witherspoon. "Why Psychology for Leaders?" "Squadron Commanders and the Air Force Personnel System: in A Study of Organizational Leadership, ed. the associates. Key Partners in the Career Development Process." research Office of Military Leadership. LIS Military Academy (Harris- study. Air War College. Maxwell AFB. Ala.. 1987. burg, Pa.: Stackpole Books. 1976). 41. 43. "New Priorities Initiated in Officer Assignments." Air 19. "Air Force Policy Letter," 1 December 1987. 1. Force Times, 14 September 1987, 1. 20. "Incentive Pay Tops List of Ways lo Keep Pilots." Air 44. Nick Kotz et al.. "Where Have All the Warriors Gone?" Force Times. 2(1 July 1987. 1. in Dimensions of Leadership, ed. Lt Col Jim Mallett et al. (Max- 21 "$12,000 Annual Bonus Studied for Pilots Who Stay on well AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. Air Univer- Duty," Air Force Times. 11 January 1988, 1. sity. 1987), 210. 22. "Welch: Better Pay Alone Won't Keep Pilots." Air Force 45. Lt Gen Walter F. Ulmer. "Leaders. Managers, and Com- Times. 18 May 1987, 6. mand Climate." Armed Forces Journal International. July 23. Maj Robert B Neller. "Institutionalizing Careerism," 1986, 55. THE SOVIET SPETSNAZ TH REAT TO NATO

Capt Erin E. Campbell, USAF

The Spetsnaz are the only Soviet troops who westerners examine future wars primarily can think fo r themselves and take quick by focusing their attention on thermonu- decisions. clear weapons and conventional forces — Abdul Haq, Afghan rebel leader while granting scant attention to a third dimension of Soviet military operations—saboteurs, secret agents, and special forces.1 N recent years, Soviet military doctrine This third dimension of warfare essentially has increasingly emphasized the use of entails the use of military active measures conventional forces in conducting mil- that are special operations involving sur- itary operations. As a result, Soviet tac- prise, shock, and preemption in the ene- Iticians have stressed the need to wage a my’s rear echelons with the ultimate goal of blitzkrieg-style attack to defuse NATO’s winning a quick victory by producing con- military might before a war could escalate to ditions conducive to the rapid advance of a nuclear level. Traditionally, however, the main Soviet force.2 The Soviet troops 62 AIR POWER fOURNAL entrusted with fulfilling these preemptive dized" and the United States becomes actions are ‘‘special purpose” or “special isolated. designation” (spetsnaznacheniya) troops, Should these political active measures more commonly known as Spetsnaz forces. fail, however, the prewar crisis phase Because of Soviet military doctrine’s focus would ensue. This phase is likely to com- on the need for surprise and preemption of mence only if some aspect of Soviet policy the use of nuclear weapons, Spetsnaz forces fails and it then becomes apparent to the So- could play a prominent role in the success- viet Union that a war is either inevitable or ful implementation of overall Soviet war that war is the only means by which the strategy. Moreover, current evidence indi- leadership can achieve a vital policy objec- cates the Soviets are fortifying and prepar- tive. At this juncture, the Soviets would in- ing their Spetsnaz apparatus to decimate itiate unconventional warfare methods (i.e., the capabilities of NATO's military and po- military active measures) to degrade NA- litical organizations in the opening phases TO’s fighting capability, creating favorable of a potential surprise attack against West- political and military circumstances for a ern Europe. successful follow-on campaign. The Soviets define unconventional warfare as a variety Strategy for a War of military and paramilitary operations Against NATO which include partisan warfare, subversion and sabotage (conducted during both peace The Soviet Union is none too eager to en- and war), assassination, and other covert or gage in an overt armed conflict against clandestine special operations.'* These mis- Western Europe. Nonetheless, one cannot sions are assigned to special units of the discount that in the future extraordinary Committee of State Security (KGB—Komitet events may occur simultaneously which, Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti], to the So- collectively, could precipitate a crisis situ- viet General Staff’s Main Intelligence Direc- ation between NATO and the Soviet Union/ torate (GRU—Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Warsaw Pact nations. C. N. Donnelly (head Upravienie), and to airborne, ground, and of the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Royal naval forces, all of which possess Spetsnaz Military Academy. Sandhurst, England) forces. suggests that two phases would precede the At this crisis stage, the Soviets will put outbreak of hostilities: the preparatory these forces into play. From the outset, the phase and the crisis phase, both designed to ultimate Soviet objective will be the total employ all measures to exploit NATO’s political collapse or neutralization of key weaknesses and to reduce its combat poten- NATO governments.5 Because frontal mili- tial.' During the preparatory stage, the So- tary assaults would be less effective in ac- viets’ primary aim is to weaken the West’s complishing this, Soviet strategy capacity to Wage nuclear war either by pre- emphasizes the need for initial operations venting the development or the deployment in the enemy’s rear echelon, the domain of of new weapon systems or by depleting Spetsnaz forces whose operations are in- the political will to use them. This is accom- tended to sow the seeds of a political-mili- plished via Soviet political active mea- tary collapse. Indeed, the Soviets’ aim is to sures— for instance, propaganda prevent the formation of a static, frontline campaigns, disinformation, and the spon- war with NATO on one side and Warsaw soring of Western peace movements. From Pact forces on the other.5 Therefore, the So- the Soviet point of view, it is most desirable viets intend to infiltrate NATO's rear area to operate exclusively at this level, whereby before the outbreak of hostilities to begin Soviet influence and power gradually grow eroding NATO’s political and military in Europe and US power declines until the structure from within. states of Europe are effectively “Finlan- In the late 1970s. the Soviet army rede- SPETZNAZ THREAT TO NATO 63

veloped its doctrine for the "deep opera- deners, drivers, and so forth.8 Similarly, tion" in conventional conditions, and it groups of professional Spetsnaz agents pos- determined that the sine qua non of success ing as tourists, delegations, sports teams, or is surprise.7 While the Soviets do not expect as passengers on merchant ships, civil air- total surprise, they do believe that, if a suf- craft, or commercial trucks would attempt ficient degree of tactical surprise is to infiltrate into enemy territory.9 Finally, achieved, then NATO deployment should on the eve of war, Spetsnaz units, employ- be patchy and incomplete, and some corps ing various pretexts and covers, may con- would still be moving toward their defen- centrate in neutral states and enter enemy sive positions when open hostilities begin. territory once fighting has commenced. Thus, the primary concern of Soviet strate- Also at this time, various Spetsnaz elements gists and tacticians is to launch low-visibil- would covertly deploy and link up with ity operations that ensure surprise, induce their indigenous agent assets to set in mo- operational paralysis, and obstruct enemy tion operations in the target area. It is ex- mobilization and deployment. pected that KGB agent assets would Spetsnaz activity thus would be initiated likewise emerge to conduct their special op- prior to the advancement of main army erations and that local Communist, Leftist, forces at the front to ensure surprise. The and possibly terrorist elements also might Soviets believe that creating such disrup- be activated to implement these operation would assure the advancing main tions.10 In short, Soviet Spetsnaz forces forces of a rapid, uninterrupted, and hence would then be poised and ready to strike successful advance. The actual damage that when necessary. a small team could accomplish would be As the Spetsnaz missions are but one ele- moderate at best; however, the shock to na- ment of an integral war plan, the Soviets be- tional morale resulting from such acts as the lieve Spetsnaz objectives can be successful assassinations of senior politicians, indus- only if they take place on a massive scale trialists, financiers, and the like on the eve concurrent with operations conducted in of the war would be disproportionately the enemy’s rear areas by airborne troops, great in comparison to the small cost of at- naval infantry, air assault brigades, divi- tempting such an operation. It is essential to sional deep reconnaissance units, KGB bear in mind that these Spetsnaz operations teams, and similar groups from the Warsaw are not designed in themselves to result in a Pact. Therefore, the main Spetsnaz forces Soviet victory since their task is merely to will be dropped simultaneously on all fight- reduce the enemy’s resistance; rather, their ing fronts while the professional “athletics” function in the overall Soviet war plan is to regiments will operate within range of cap- enable the main army to conclude war op- ital cities, regardless of their distance from erations in a more abbreviated and less risky the front line.11 fashion. Soviet Spetsnaz forces entering their operating area in Western Europe would first pursue the following primary objectives Wartime Missions listed in descending order of importance: • The physical incapacitation and de- Prior to the employment of combat air- struction of NATO nuclear and chemical borne and naval Spetsnaz units, the Soviets warheads, means of delivery, and related would preposition other Spetsnaz forces command, control, and guidance ele- within enemy territory. In preparation for a ments— both strategic (e.g., Polaris subma- war, the Soviets would post to their embas- rines in bases) and tactical (e.g., air-delivery sies and consulates a certain number of systems). Spetsnaz officers and warrant officers in the guise of technical personnel, guards, gar- • The disruption of NATO political, stra- 64 AJR POWER JOURNAL

tegic, and tactical command, control, and all times.’’ These agents claim to have communications elements. This also in- trained in camps situated in the Carpathian cludes the elimination of personnel in key military district and the Ural and Volga mil- positions. itary districts in the western Soviet Union. • The physical incapacitation of certain Realistic, full-scale replicas of cruise mis- electronic warning and reconnaissance sile launchers and mock-ups of the Green- equipment, radars and early warning equip- ham Common defenses have been built at ment, air defense equipment of all types, these secret camps to help train Spetsnaz and possibly ballistic missile early warning teams.14 Using these mock-ups, the women systems. were trained to attack the missile sites un- • The capture of key airfields and ports to der war or surprise conditions in a preemp- prevent reinforcement or redeployment, tive strike. Additionally, the defectors particularly by the United States; the de- claim that the terrain features of these struction or neutralization of airfield and camps mirror those at “various British and port facilities not required intact by the French nuclear installations” to enable hit- USSR, plus railways and key road junctions and-run Spetsnaz raids to be rehearsed in an important in mobilization plans. environment simulating actual conditions as closely as possible.15 Furthermore, the in- • The disruption of key industrial targets filtrated agents are said to be tasked to act as and facilities (e.g., power stations, oil refin- “beacons” for other Spetsnaz and airborne eries, military-electronics industries, etc.).12 troops who would be used to attack the mis- Finally, in the wake of the Intermediate- siles in war.16 range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in Since the early 1980s Sweden has suf- December 1987, allied air assets and air fered from a steady bout of violations of its bases would likely become a much higher territorial waters by foreign submarines that priority target for Spetsnaz forces after have been determined to belong to the So- ground-based assets have been dismantled. viet Union. The reports issued by the Swed- ish navy were granted but passing attention by both the Swedish public and the international media until 27 October 1981. when Indications of Current Spetsnaz a Soviet W hiskey-class submarine ran Preparations Against NATO aground in a restricted area of the Karls- krona archipelago in an incident generally In recent years reports emanating from referred to as “Whiskey on the rocks.”17 Great Britain and Sweden indicate that the While the Swedish government issued a Soviets may be positioning and preparing strong formal protest, the Soviets sloughed Spetsnaz elements for possible wartime use off the intrusion as an unintentional navi- against Western Europe. In Great Britain, gational error. In yet another incident, in Soviet defectors have disclosed that the So- October 1982, alien submarines entered the viet Union has established a covert detach- Stockholm archipelago— another military ment of female Spetsnaz personnel in the restricted area—and part of this force even area surrounding Britain’s Royal Airfield at penetrated Harsfjarden, which is the main Greenham Common since the deployment base of the Swedish navy. Despite an exten- of the US Air Force land-based Tomahawk sive month-long hunt, Swedish armed units cruise missiles there in December 1983.13 were unable to catch any submarines. Pho- According to these defectors, three to six tographic evidence released later revealed trained agents from Warsaw Pact and West prints and sea tracks made by these ves- European countries— including Great Brit- sels.18 Three submarines had penetrated in- ain— infiltrated women’s protest groups at shore to the sea walls of the residence of Greenham Common and were present “at King Carl Gustaf XVI. SPETZNAZ THREAT TO NATO 65

After this public disclosure of Soviet vi- agreed that preparation for the landing of olations of Sweden’s territorial waters, So- Spetsnaz forces is a possible explanation. viet submarine incursions continued One of the several signs pointing in this di- despite the public embarrassment and, in rection is the increase in submarine incur- fact, increased and became more brazen. Be- sions in the vicinity of permanent defense fore 1981, Soviet submarines had departed installations on the Swedish coast; in ear- from Swedish waters as soon as they real- lier years, the activity appeared directed at ized their presence had been detected; in Swedish navy exercises and testing of ma- the ensuing years, they have behaved more teriel. Furthermore, Carl Bildt, a prominent arrogantly, remaining within the restricted member of the Swedish Submarine Com- area despite increasingly strenuous Swed- mission, has emphasized the importance in ish naval activities to curtail their opera- today’s Soviet strategy of diversionary tions.19 During the 1970s the submarine Spetsnaz forces that would likely land via violations had numbered between two and submarines to undertake sabotage raids nine per year. In 1981 they rose to 10 and in against crucial command targets as well as 1982 to 40. In 1983 the Swedish defense vital political and military installations.24 chief could report 25 certain violations and Thus, it is not unlikely—particularly in at least an equal number possible. The fig- light of Sweden’s apparent lack of success ures listed do not refer to mere observations in controlling Soviet underwater intrud- but to fully analyzed incidents, given the fi- ers—that the Soviets would be practicing nal characterization of certain, probable, or contingency Spetsnaz operations when the possible violations.20 consequences of getting caught appear to be Numerous tentative explanations have so negligible. emerged to account for these Soviet sub- Finally, there is a disconcerting political marine incursions. A variety of military and military consequence resulting from missions have been suggested—for exam- these continued submarine incursions: the ple. gathering intelligence on defense in- Europeans seem to have become desensi- stallations and navigational conditions in tized to the territorial violations, which the vicinity of the Swedish naval bases; have been relegated to the sphere of every- shadowing the trials of new weapons; and day occurrences. The publicity surrounding observing military exercises. It has been the sensational report of the Swedish Sub- proposed that the intrusions might reflect a marine Commission has subsided and is significant change in the USSR's opera- now nearly forgotten, and new incursions tional strategy in the Baltic, based on its na- are treated quite routinely.25 As one ob- val predominance in the area.21 Some server of these incidents laments, “If Swe- speculate that the Soviets are attempting to den permits the intruders to operate freely seek out safe havens for their nuclear mis- in sensitive restricted waters, the first step sile submarines in times of crisis where they will have been taken psychologically to- will be difficult to find and where Western ward subservience to the Soviet Union.”26 forces would be highly reticent to attempt destroying them so close to allied or neutral shores.22 However, the idea also has been seriously entertained that these missions en- Red Dawn for NATO? tail dropping off or retrieving Spetsnaz With the increasing emphasis in Soviet teams or agents, training and familiariza- military doctrine on winning a war under tion exercises in Swedish waters, and test- either nuclear or nonnuclear conditions, ing Swedish military capabilities and crisis the Soviet Union seems more inclined to management techniques.23 wage a blitzkrieg war, employing surprise A Swedish commission tasked with in- and shock that would be facilitated through vestigating these submarine incidents the use of their Spetsnaz forces. It is signif- 66 AIR POWER JOURNAL icant, however, that a congressional report Warsaw Pact allies have a considerable titled NATO and the New Soviet Threat. edge over NATO in numbers of conventional presented to the Committee on Armed Ser- forces, they may deem it imperative to vices in 1977, made no mention of the po- take out NATO’s nuclear forces prior to tential use of such military active measures. any overt military assault, leaving NATO While open acknowledgment of Spetsnaz highly weakened and vulnerable to Soviet operations has finally emerged in Western demands. military planning in the early 1980s, greater consideration must be given to these forces In sum, it appears the Soviets are most in estimating the Soviet threat to NATO. likely to continue their current ploys to un- For the Soviets, NATO vulnerabilities dermine Western Europe from within—for further enhance the desirability of using example, by infiltrating and manipulating Spetsnaz forces against Western Europe. As organizations opposed to Western govern- a collection of independent nations, NATO ment policies and by bullying susceptible would likely require greater time to reach nations into passive acquiescence of Soviet unified action in the event of a Soviet attack actions. However, there are indications that on Europe. Thus, preemptive operations— the Soviets currently are continuing to rein- taking out military and political targets— force their Spetsnaz capability against Eu- might prove tempting because the Soviets rope. Thus, while open warfare in Europe may perceive they will encounter little ini- does not seem imminent, Western military tial resistance as West European leaders de- planners must be prepared to contend with termine what course of action to pursue. the presence of Spetsnaz forces if war Additionally, since the Soviets and their should occur. □

ORGANIZATION OF SPETSNAZ FORCES*

An independent Spetsnaz company has 115 men, including nine officers and 11 warrant officers. Every Soviet army has a Spetsnaz company which consists of a headquarters element, three parachute platoons, one communications platoon, and supporting subunits. When prosecuting sabotage in the enemy’s rear areas, the force may operate as a single entity or in a small group of up to 15. The next level of Spetsnaz organization is the brigade, w'hich has 1.000 to 1.300 troops. The brigade usually consists of a headquarters unit, an anti-VIP company, three to four parachute battal- ions, a signal company, and other supporting units. The brigade can operate as a single unit or can be subdivided into as many as 135 separate and independent groups. The anti-VIP company is the only company which is comprised solely of full-time professional soldiers and is always maintained at the highest state of readiness. The Soviet naval Spetsnaz brigade has a corresponding anti-VIP company, a group of midget submarines, two or three groups of combat swimmers, a battalion of parachutists, and the necessary supporting units. The naval Spetsnaz regiments are Composed of six to seven sabotage companies and have a strength of between 700 and 800 men. These units are different from those of the independent companies and brigades in that they are manned exclusively by professional athletes of Olympic caliber. It is estimated that there would be 41 independent companies, one to every tank and all-arms army; 16 Spetsnaz brigades, one to each front: four Spetsnaz naval brigades, one to each fleet: and 20 Spetsnaz intelligence units, one to each front or naval fleet. In addition, the Soviets would have available three Spetsnaz regiments which could be allotted to the commanders-in-chief ot the Stra- tegic Directions, which consist of three or more fronts and a naval fleet.

"This information is drawn directly from a report by Burton A. Casteel. |r.. Spats no?.: A Soviet Sabotage Threat. Report No. 80-0500 (Maxwell AF'B, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. 1986). SPETZNAZ THREAT TO NATO 67

Notes 1. Aleksei Myagkov. "The Soviet Union's Special Forces." 11. Suvorov, 43. Soviet Analyst. 9 lanuarv 1980. 5. 12. Donnelly. "Operations in the Enemy Rear." 36. 2. Stephen Seth Beitier. "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Spe- 13. Yossef Bodansky. "Soviet Spetsnaz at Greenham."/one's cial Operations Forces" (MS thesis. Defense Intelligence Col- Defence Weekly. 25 lanuary 1986. 83. lege. 1985), 4. 14. "Greenham Defences 'Copied for Spetsnaz Training.' ” 3. C. N. Donnelly. "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: lane’s Defence Weekly. 25 January 1986, 84. A New Challenge for NATO." Military' Review. March 1983. 15.Ibid. 45. 16. Bodansky, 83. 4. Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Office of the Assistant 17. Kirsten Amundsen. "Soviet Submarines in Scandinavian Chief of Staff for Intelligence. "Soviet Use of Unconventional Waters." The Washington Quarterly. Summer 1985. 113. Warfare." Military Intelligence. October December 1982. 3. 18. Edgar O'Ballance. "Underwater Hide-and-Seek." Mili- 5. John |. Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in tary Review. April 1984, 71. the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimension." Orbis. Winter 19. Thomas Ries. "Soviet Submarines in Sweden: Psycho- International Defense 1981. 786. logical Warfare in the Nordic Region?" 6. C. N. Donnelly, "The Development of the Soviet Concept Review 6 (1984): 695. of Echeloning.” NATO Review, no. 6. December 1984. 15. 20. Amundsen. 113-14. 21. Ries. 695. 7. C. N. Donnelly. "Operations in the Enemy Rear." Inter- 22. Lynn M. Hansen. Soviet Navy Spetsnaz Operations on national Defense Review 13. no. 1 |198l)|. 14. the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of Western 8. Viktor Suvorov. "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Europe (College Station, Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology. Forces." Military Review. March 1984. 43. Texas Engineering Experiment Station. Texas A&M University 9 .Ibid. System. 1984). 29. 10. |ohn |. Dziak. "The Soviet Approach to Special Opera- 23. Ries. 695. tions," in Special Operations in US Strategy, ed. Frank R. Bar- 24. Carl Bildt, “Sweden and the Soviet Submarines." Sur- nett. B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz (Washington. D.C.: vival. July/August 1983, 168. National Defense University Press. National Strategy Informa- 25. Amundsen. 120. tion Center. Inc.. 19841. 112. 26. Ibid., 121. NORDIC NATO IN TRANSITION Toward Turbulence in the 1990s?

Lt Col Lawrence R. N ilssen, USAF S recently as 4 August 1987, the modest measures that will maintain the Washington Post published an ar- “quiet corner” status quo, even as the air- ticle titled “All’s Quiet on the Nor- space over the arctic north and particularly A wegian-Soviet Frontier.”1 The over northern Norway becomes ever more thesis of the article was that despite a huge critical to Soviet military interests. concentration of Soviet forces in close prox- The central military reality driving all imity to NATO, tensions were low, as usual. other considerations in the arctic north is This view has been the conventional wis- the concentration there of roughly two- dom since World War II. Past journalists thirds of the modern Soviet nuclear sub- have habitually called the northern prov- marine (SSBN) fleet, including the Typhoon inces of Norway, Sweden, and Finland NA- SSBNs/ Five of these huge submarines have TO’s “quiet corner” or the “forgotten flank” been launched, and they operate out of the when they addressed the area at all. This is Murmansk area.-1 We cannot predict the So- changing. Since the early 1980s several viet tactical doctrine of combat employ- trends have emerged that guarantee in- ment with 100 percent certainty, but the US creased attention to the Scandinavian arctic Navy believes the SSBNs will be dispersed area. The trends have recently been accel- into a heavily defended “bastion” in the erated by unrelated events and develop- Barents Sea and under the arctic ice pack ments and as a result the area is now where they will represent the most surviv- emerging in the forefront of international able component of a Soviet second strike L defense policy debate, as suggested by So- capability.5 I viet General Secretary Gorbachev’s recent Discernible Soviet doctrine places high p arctic propaganda “peace offensive.”2 This value on the “correlation of nuclear forces” article identifies these trends, shows why during the unfolding of any possible con- high er levels of confrontation and conflict flict. As the fixed silos of the Soviet land- y are likely in the future, and suggests some based ICBMs become increasingly threat- ened by future deployments of accurate Peacekeeper, cruise, and D5 missiles, the (fa Soviets will no doubt place an even higher premium on their SLBM assets. Even the proposed Strategic Defensive Initiative, if effective, will enhance the strategic value of submarine missile forces by placing a premium on submarine-launched cruise missiles and depressed trajectory SLBMs. As 70 AIR POWER JOURNAL the relative value of these second-strike assets appreciates, the pressure on the Soviets to take whatever measures are necessary to assure their survival will increase. By directly threatening Soviet second-strike assets, the recently developed Maritime Strategy of the US Navy could also contribute to instability. A comprehensive discussion of the Mari- time Strategy is beyond the scope of this pa- A /A 37 Viggen is shown here in field deployment. The per, and volumes have been written; but surge capability of the Royal Swedish Air Force once some fundamentals are immediately rele- rivaled lhaf of USAFE. bul no longer. vant to the Scandinavian arctic. The Mari- time Strategy would send several powerful carrier battle groups and perhaps one battle- ship group north, cautiously and prudently but aggressively, to engage the Soviet naval forces in their home waters and threaten the SSBNs in their “b a s tio n .T h is strategy, promulgated during Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s articulate stewardship, represents a revolutionary change from the Na- vy's previous role of sea control—defending the sea lines of communication. Should the Navy be called to execute the strategy, the Soviets must attempt to establish control of the arctic airspaces for both offensive and defensive missions. If. in the ensuing fight, our naval forces are significantly degraded, then their more traditional mission of sea control may fail and the resupply of Europe may be impossible. If the resupply of Eu- rope fails, the alternatives for Western Eu- rope may well be surrender or nuclear escalation. Thus, the Maritime Strategy puts a premium on control of the arctic airspaces for both sides at the instant hostilities seem probable. A major consideration for both Ameri- cans and Norwegians is how to exercise the Maritime Strategy during peacetime. The Norwegians recognize that the strategy is a mixed blessing. They cautiously welcome it as a logical display of NATO resolve to defend Norway but fully recognize both the Soviet sensitivities and the difficulty of operating large formations of major surface combatants in the northern seas, which are among the worlds most environmentally difficult waters.7 Senior Norwegian defense NORDIC NATO IN TRANSITION 71 officials want more exercises of larger scope in the north for six reasons: to gain profi- ciency in the arctic environment, to dem- onstrate NATO resolve and solidarity, to balance increased Soviet activity, to ob- serve Soviet activity, to exercise the right to free transit, and to routinize American carrier groups operating in arctic waters." His- torically, the Soviets have been very sensitive to foreign forces in proximity to their vital interests. The Soviets invaded Finland in 1939 to take Leningrad out of artillery range of the Finnish border, for example. One must wonder how the Soviets would react if an unrelated crisis developed while an offensive battle group was exercis- ing near the Kola peninsula. Our battle groups are improving their offensive strike capabilities. A recent article in the New York Times disclosed that the United States had developed a terminally guided cruise missile that could hit "within inches” of the desired aim point, therewith “blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons.”!l This cruise missile could be launched from a submarine, could have “stealth” characteristics, and would be available sometime in the mid-1990s. A follow-up article reported that the newest Los Angeles-class attack submarines will carry 10 vertical cruise missile launchers, and that the newest Sea- woI/-class attack submarines will carry 50 such weapons.10 These systems have pro- found military implications, as they theoretically allow a disabling (or at least degrading) surprise attack against the Kola military defenses without using nuclear munitions. With defenses disabled, Soviet military facilities would be vulnerable to systematic destruction by less vulnerable carrier battle group conventional forces. US submarines could carry out the attack mission while hunting for Soviet SSBNs and could switch munition payloads from conventional to nuclear without warning. After these weapons are operational, defense in depth will be critical. The Soviets must ensure, as far as they can, that these “triple- threat” submarine launching platforms are 72 AIR POWER JOURNAL kept as far away as possible and that they buildup and the Reagan administration’s re- are destroyed as quickly as possible at the ply, the relative strengths of the Swedish outbreak of hostilities. Large volumes of air- and constrained Finnish air forces have de- space must be available to allow time to de- teriorated markedly since the early 1980s. tect and intercept incoming cruise missiles According to Royal Swedish Air Force fig- and aircraft. Northern Norway offers a large ures, the air forces that can be employed volume of (relatively) lightly defended air- against Sweden have increased 25 percent space adjacent to Norwegian coastal areas relative to RSAF strength between 1974 and where US submarine launching platforms 1987, and threaten to increase to over 40 could be concealed. Also, the mere exis- percent by 1992." The relative decline of tence of submarine launching platforms in the RSAF has led to a Swedish defense de- near proximity to Soviet waters could precipitate a crisis where none had previously existed, especially if the Soviets conclude The Soviets' huge Typhoon-class submarines, based at that submarine strength had been purposely Murmansk, represent an important and lucrative target in the Navy's maritime strategy, thereby increasing massed to the level that permits a high prob- the tensions in NATO's Nordic flank. ability of a successful disarming strike. The relative decline of the air forces of Sweden and Finland is another trend in the arctic that is working against NATO. The Finnish air force, limited by treaty to only 60 aircraft," has always been weak compared to the air forces of the surrounding power blocs. Not so the Swedish air force. The defense spokesman for the Swedish Conservative Party, Carl Bildt, has indi- cated that the two most important ingredi- ents of the Nordic military strategic equation are the Keflavik Air Base in Ice- V X ^ - land and the Royal Swedish Air Force (RSAF)." Once nearly the equal of USAFE in “surge” strength, the RSAF guaranteed unacceptably high attrition rates to any aggressive penetrator and contributed to the stability of the area. This is rapidly changing. Post-Vietnam antimilitarism in Sweden, coupled with the American-Soviet detente in the early 1970s, was used by the ruling Swedish Social Democratic party as a justi- fication to allow military budgets to lan- guish. While NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were deploying both more and more capable aircraft, the RSAF, while deploying more capable aircraft, was deploying far fewer of them, down from 56 squadrons in 1962 to 27.5 squadron equivalents of all types in 1987.13 This decline of strength might have been appropriate had detente flourished, but with the advent of the Soviet NORDIC NATO IN TRANSITION 73 bate that is more controversial and public through Swedish airspace, (2) a surprise than usual. massed attack through Swedish airspace, In February 1987 the Swedish air force and (3) RSAF capabilities against cruise chief of staff published an article that ex- missiles. amined the relationship of force quality to For sustained operations, the author as- quantity, and how greatly the lack of aircraft sumed that an aggressor would attempt to numbers would influence combat effective- operate between 200 and 600 aircraft ness.15 The article was remarkably detailed, through Swedish airspace around the clock open, and candid. Of interest to northern to attack targets outside Sweden. The au- stability, the study examined three scena- thor assumed that the ability to destroy 50 rios: (1) sustained military operations percent of any overflying force within 10 The I 35 Druken aircraft (above) has been in the inventory for some time, including a squadron that was recently reactivated after having been in storage. Some estimates predict that only two more squadrons of fighter aircra ft would increase the effectiveness of the Royal Swedish Air Force by as much as 40 percent. helping the Swedes to intercept aircraft attempting to penetrate Swedish airspace, such as this Tu-16 Badger (right!.

days, using a combination of Swedish and To deter a surprise massed attack through target area defenses, would deter sustained Swedish airspace, the article assumed that overtlight in a conventional scenario. To ac- the RSAF would have to destroy about 10 complish this, the chief of staff wrote that percent of the transiting aircraft. It assumed RSAF would have to destroy 2.5 to 5 per- a massed attack would involve 200 to 400 cent of the entire overflying force (five to 30 aircraft, but “could be more.” Since RSAF aircraft) daily. The article concluded that if would have to defend the airspace of a the Swedes had a great deal going for them country about the size and shape of Califor- (good weather, early warning, intact nia with 11 squadrons, its assets would be ground-controlled intercept, and no major spread thin, giving the aggressors the ad- enemy efforts against Swedish air and vantage of localized mass. The study con- ground assets), the existing Swedish air cluded that in such an environment, the force was sufficient. Finally, it also con- aggressors could possibly inflict heavy cluded that the existing quality was good losses on the locally outnumbered RSAF.17 but that the existing quantity was “border- Against cruise missile overflight, the line in many cases” to deter sustained op- Swedes acknowledged that merely detect- erations through Swedish airspace.,B The ing the missile, let alone destroying it. was results were less sanguine for scenarios in- extremely difficult at present. A recurring volving surprise massed attack transiting conclusion in all scenarios was that the Swedish airspace or cruise missiles. quantity of aircraft is not sufficient to deal

74 NORDIC NATO IN TRANSITION 75

cision show's how concerned the Swedish air force commander in chief is about the lack of aircraft. Due to fiscal constraints, augmenting the aircraft numbers must occur at the expense of other force enhancers, such as an upgraded C3I system, improved dispersed ground facilities, and so forth; and unfortunately, the fiscal constraints occur at a time of increased Soviet military activity in the area. The Soviets have a tradition of military heavy-handedness and intimidation in their relations with Sweden, and to a lesser extent, with Norway (interestingly, very little of late against Finland, with whom the Soviets have encouraged a “special relationship”). Recently, the Soviets have been conducting extensive operations against Sweden, both underwater and on land. The reasons for this campaign are open to spec- ulation, since the Soviets do not explain their motives, but several very plausible conclusions may be drawn, conclusions that all support the thesis that the Soviets are systematically and methodically “doing their homework” should they judge it necessary to launch a surprise offensive in the north. The military objective in Sweden could be to degrade and delay Swedish mobilization during the first critical hours of an with anything except optimum scenarios. offensive against northern Norway, thereby The author even applied Lanchester’s theo- lowering Soviet costs to an acceptable level. rem' to show that just one additional squad- Other Warsaw Pact members assist the ron would raise the marginal effectiveness Soviets with their “homework.” Warsaw of the RSAF by 20 percent, and two addi- Pact commercial vehicles have been seen in tional squadrons by 40 percent.18 the most extraordinarily noncommercial Publication of that article was followed areas, photographing facilities, intercepting by further public disagreement among the transmissions, and so forth.21 During the senior military staff.1*1 Finally, the RSAF summer of 1987 when virtually all Sw'edes, commander in chief (no doubt familiar with by custom, vacationed in the countryside, a Lanchester’s theorem) let it be known that number of vacationing high-ranking mili- he would augment his forces by a minimal tary officers felt that their locations and squadron (12 aircraft) of refurbished J-35J movements were being followed by foreign Draken interceptors taken out of storage, agents.22 On 27 December 1983 a single elec- even if he had to pay the costs “out of his trical transformer in central Sweden went hide," from the other parts of his already in- out. A chain reaction followed, blacking out adequate budget.20 This unprecedented de- central Sweden and parts of Denmark and 'Frederick W Lanchester’s mutual attrition equations are Norway. Significant portions of the emer- mathematical models commonly used by war planners to predict the impact on combat effectiveness caused by incremental gency broadcast system, which controls changes in quantity and quality of opposing forces. mobilization, failed.23 One isolated exam- 76 AIR POWER JOURNAL pie, true, but the event suggests that a very port, hunting U-boats has become a popular small but highly planned attack could sig- seaside pastime.25 The Soviets are also ac- nificantly degrade the Swedish mobiliza- tive in the northern airspace, but here they tion timetable. use intimidation as a tactic instead of Operating submarines in Swedish terri- stealth: that intimidation has led to armed torial waters is a major Soviet assignment confrontation and could precipitate its own with several immediate military rewards: crisis in the future. The Soviets have a long history of “play- • The Soviets update their knowledge of ing hardball” in the sensitive airspace over the Swedish defenses as well as of changing the Baltic and Barents seas. In the past, they bottom characteristics (this knowledge have shot down aircraft in international air- could prove invaluable should the Soviets space without warning.26 In the recent past want to conceal submarines in the vast an Su-15—of KAL 007 notoriety—took up a 20.000-plus-island Swedish archipelago). firing position on a chartered civilian jet full • The Soviet crews get the best possible of vacationers and actually followed it, in a combat-like experience (the charges firing position, into Swedish airspace.27 In dropped by the Swedes are very real but not September 1987 the Soviets harassed a lethal, and the Swedish ASW capability is Swedish electronic intelligence collection excellent but very thin). aircraft, resulting in a near collision.28 A • Finally, the Soviets can simulate in- Norwegian P-3 Orion was not so fortunate; serting Spetsnaz saboteurs and assassins it was actually hit by an overly aggressive who, in the event of conflict, would attack MiG pilot in the same month.29 For people key communications nodes and power grid who live in the small countries near the pressure points (such as the previously northern USSR, this is all judged as normal mentioned transformer) and assassinate key (routinized), consistent Soviet behavior. Re- mobilization decisionmakers, both military cent Scandinavian history offers several ex- and civilian. To facilitate submarine activi- amples of the decisive military advantage ties, the Soviets would like to see all littoral accruing to surprise attack. states accept routinization of Soviet sub- In Scandinavia, the most memorable marine operations within their territorial precedent of Soviet willingness to use mil- waters. To degrade defenses in northern itary force to gain space for defense in depth Sweden and facilitate access to northern was the surprise attack against Finland in Norway, the Soviets would like this routin- 1939. Ignoring world opinion, the Soviets ization of submarine activities to extend to began military operations to gain territory the Gulf of Bothnia, between Sweden and around Leningrad, perceived as vital for Finland. defense against Nazi Germany. The Norwe- gians also suffered a surprise attack by Ger- The Gulf of Bothnia, long an area of low man airborne and air force units on 9 April military activity, has seen extensive opera- 1940. By seizing mobilization depots and tions of what must be Soviet submarines in airfields, the Germans prevented a Norwe- recent years.24 This must be at least partly gian mobilization and gained the strategic construed as preparation for military oper- Norwegian coast from which to conduct U- ations against the northernmost areas of boat operations against the Allies. Today, Sweden, and also of Norway and Finland. the Norwegians have a term for behavior There are also signs that routinization of op- caused by lingering strong memories of the erations has occurred. The Swedish navy invasion/occupation: The April 9 syn- has enlisted the assistance of the Swedish drome. The Norwegians will not lightly suf- civilians who vacation heavily in the fer surprise again. Neither will the Soviets, coastal areas to try to detect submarine ac- who were hurt badly by the “surprise” tivity visually. According to one recent re- achieved by German forces during the open- NORDIC NATO IN TRANSITION 77 ing phase of the Great Patriotic War (World out of deference to Soviet sensitivities.30 War II). That the cost of being surprised is They did not allow the US Marine Corps to disproportionately high was a lesson preposition reinforcement equipment in the learned at a heavy cost of Soviet lives. That northernmost Norwegian provinces, again the Soviet leadership has learned the lesson partly out of deference to Soviet sensitivi- well has been demonstrated by their skillful ties. The Norwegians understand that a mil- use of surprise in the invasions of Hungary, itary posture balanced between activity and Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. restraint in the arctic area is important to Future stability in the extreme north de- stability.3' Lack of an immediate offensive pends upon several factors. First, the West threat removes the destabilizing Soviet in- must be sensitive to the ramifications of the centive for an immediate preemption. purely geographical accident that has In the realm of immediate threat, US na- forced the Soviets to station the bulk of their val carrier groups are a powerful force, and survivable second-strike forces in the Mur- they may be well advised to restrict exer- mansk area. The force is concentrated and cises in the Norwegian and Barents seas to represents both a lucrative target for NATO the extent necessary to realize the six goals and a sensitive vulnerability to the Soviets. previously cited.32 The problem is that if a Any threat perceived by the Soviets as di- crisis should occur, for whatever unrelated rect and imminent may be met with an ir- reason, the presence of a carrier task force in rational (from a NATO viewpoint) a sensitive area could precipitate its own response. The Norwegians have demon- more immediate military crisis. strated a mastery of the art of distilling le- To make overflight of Swedish and Fin- gitimate Soviet security concerns from nish airspace as costly as possible, the air volumes of propaganda and rhetoric. They forces of Finland and Sweden must be as have refused to allow F -llls to exercise strong as possible. The United States and with NATO forces on Norwegian soil partly NATO can help. Both air forces need tech-

THE NORDIC BALANCE

The Nordic Balance is a model useful for explaining relationships between Scandinavian countries and between the Scandinavian bloc and the superpowers since World War II. The relationships are formalized by treaty, alliance, policy, culture, and tradition and allow all players a certain latitude of action. The NATO presence in Norway has been made less threatening to the vital Soviet Kola military installations by a deliberate Norwegian policy of restraint. (Some examples: no nuclear weapons in Norway, no foreign troops based in Norway, and severe restrictions on military exercises near the sensitive border.) The Soviets gain defensive security from the inoffensive buffer provided by nonaligned Swedish and neutral Finnish territories, the latter loosely bound by treaty to “consultations" should tensions become extreme. In the judgment of (ohan Jorgen Holst, the Norwegian minister of defense, the Soviets have historically shown restraint in the strength of standing ground forces and offensive air power on the Kola peninsula, given the vital nature of the assets in place. The operative result is an equilibrium with disincentives for escalation of forces targeted at the immediate area; the bottom line is predictability and stability. This historically happy state of affairs has been overtaken by trends and events both within the Nordic Balance context and external to its mechanisms. Incremental, measured responses are in danger of being overwhelmed by the decisive advantages accrued by the preemptive surprise attack; or more precisely, by the intolerable penalties of being the first to absorb a surprise attack. Minister Holst also points out that while Soviet standing forces in the area are relatively small, they are rapidly being improved and could also be rapidly reinforced. 78 AIR POWER IOURNAL

nologically modern airplanes. Both forces This article has examined the trends and need technologically modern missile sys- development that are changing NATO’s tems. such as the latest Hawk, AIM-9, and Scandinavian flank. The Soviet SSBN de- AMRAAM systems as they become avail- ployments, the US Navy's Maritime Strat- able (and are requested). Both need effective egy, the deployment of submarine- force multipliers, such as airborne early launched precision cruise missiles, the rel- warning and control (AWAC) systems. (The ative weakening of the Swedish and Fin- Swedish air force is in fact developing the nish air forces, the confrontational Soviet prototype of a “hi-tech” cheap but effective behavior, and a heritage of surprise military AWACS.)J3 Both countries recognize that operations guarantee that the area will not while they must maintain neutral, non- remain the “forgotten flank” in the future. threatening postures toward the Soviets, The collective NATO challenge will be to their cultures and living standards are inex- keep the area from being involved in a tricably Western. So there are powerful mo- costly arms race of the type that has oc- tivators in place to ensure, within curred in the European central front and to reasonable risk, that both countries will re- avoid actions that will accelerate further spect the advantages that access to Western destabilization while continuing to under- technology gives them. Finally, both coun- write credible collective forces capable of tries must be given the latitude to maneuver deterring any miscalculated Soviet within the Nordic Balance (see box, pre- adventure. □ vious page).

Notes

I Karen DeYoung, "All's Quiet on Norwegian-Soviet Fron- ern Europe: Securily Issues for Ihe 1990s. ed. Paul M. Cole and tier.” Washington Post. 4 August 1987. Supplement, 10. Douglas M. Hart (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1986). 136. 2. Philip Taubman, "Soviet Proposes Arctic Peace Zone.” 13. Bo Reinholdsson. "I Programplanen 1988-92" ("The New York Times. 2 September 1987. 2. Content of the 1988-1992 Budget"), trans. L. Nilssen. Flygva- 3. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987, pennytl 4 & 5 (30 September 1987): 6. Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1987. 33. The 14. Ibid.. 7. exact figure depends upon the author and his method of cal- 15. Maj Gen Bengt Lonnbom. "Kvalitet-Kvantitet Inom culating totals. Flvgstridskrafterna” ("Quality vs Quantity Within the Air 4. Ibid. Forces"), trans. L. Nilssen. Journal of the Royal Swedish De- 5. Adm lames D. Watkins. USN. “The Maritime Strategy." fense Academy 2 (1987): 121-50. U S. Naval Institute Proceedings. January 1986. Supplement. 16. Ibid.. 133. 7-14. Admiral Watkins uses the term strategic reserve where 17. Ibid.. 134. the author uses the term second-strike capability. This short 18. Ibid., 138. passage summarizes eight pages of text and necessarily leaves 19. I.t Gen Bengt Gustafsson, supreme commander. Swed- out major concepts and details that are not directly relevant. ish Armed Forces. OB Programplnn For Del Militant Forsvaret 6. Ibid.. 9-14. Again, this paragraph necessarily summa- 88-92 (The Supreme Commanders Proposed Military Defense rizes a great deal of material and leaves out major concepts. A Budget for 1988-1992). trans. L. Nilssen (Stockholm: Defense reading of the entire volume is useful. Department Press. 26 June 1987). The chief. RSAF. went on the 7. Johan Jorgen Holst. Norwegian minister of defense. "Our record in this document as being unable to support the transfer Political Defense and Security Situation," a lecture presented of funds from the air force to the naval ASW program, suggest- at the opening of the Chief's Course Number 20 at the Norwe- ing that a better solution would be to fully fund both necessary gian National Defense College. 7 lanuarv 1987. Transcript by programs. US Embassy. Oslo. 20. Lars Christiansson. "Flvgvapnet Valde Egen Vag, 'Ny- 8. Adm S. A. Farstad, Royal Norwegian Navy. "Norway and gamla' Plan Tas i Bruk" (“The Air Forces Chooses Its Own the Norwegian Sea—A Maritime Perspective." lecture pre- Way: Will Modernize and Use an Old Airplane"), trans. L. sented to the Oslo Military Society on 13 October 1986. later Nilssen. Svenska Dagbladet. 1 September 1987. 2. published in The Journal of the Oslo M ilitary Society. Tran- 21 US Department of Commerce. Foreign Broadcast Infor- script by US Embassy. Oslo. mation Service (FBIS). Western Europe (WEU). vol. 7. no. 148. 9. Richard Halloran. "Accuracy Increases in Non-Nuclear August 1986, from Roger Magnergard. "Picture Sellers Report- Cruise Missile." New York Times. 14 September 1987. 6. edly Monitoring Military." Svenska Dagbladet. 6 August 1986, 10. Richard Halloran. "Navy Giving Submarines a New Mis- 7. sile Role." New York Times. 25 October 1987, 9. 22. Ibid. II Gerard O'Dwyer. "Finland's Defence Capability." Jane's 23. Paul M. Cole, "Sweden and the Soviet Union." in North- Defence Weekly 7. no. 5 (7 February 1987): 192. ern Europe, ed. Cole and Hart. 31. 12 Carl Bildt. "The Future of Northern Europe," in North- 24. US Department of Commerce. FBIS. "Naval Officer NORDIC NATO IN TRANSITION 79

Views Submarine Violations." WEU, vol. 7. no. 016, 24 January Intimidation Over the Barents Sea"), trans. 1.. Nilssen. Svenska 1986. P 1. from Stockholm International News Service in Swed- Dagblodel. 15 September 1987. 2. ish. 1000 GMT. 23 lanuary 1986. Article quotes Commander 30. US Department of Commerce. FB1S. WEU, vol VII. no. Gjoran Frisk, spokesman for the Royal Swedish Navy: "Our se- 183. from "Minister on Refusal on Use of F-l 11 in NATO Ex- curity policy has failed. Foreign submarine units appear in our ercise." Stockholm Domestic Service in English. 1600 GMT. 19 waters almost irrespective of Swedish efforts from Hapar- September 1986 anda to Stromstad |from the Finnish border to the Norwegian 31. Holst. "Norwegian Security in Light of the Maritime De- border|." velopment in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea." ad- 25. Sigrid Boe. "Ubotsjakten ett Folknoje" ("Submarine dress given at a conference on "NATO and the U S. Maritime Hunting: A New Popular Pastime"), trans. L. Nilssen. Dogens Strategy-Diverging Interests or Cooperative Effort.” under the Nyheter. 18 July 1987. 3. auspices of the Norwegian Atlantic: Committee, at Ingenior- 26. "Russians Declare Swedes Shot First in Plane Incident." enes Hus. Oslo, on 1-2 April 1987. Transcript by US Embassy. New Vork Times, 18 June 1952. 1. The Swedish airplane shot Oslo. down was an unarmed transport, hardly capable of attacking 32. Farstad. the two MiG fighters that shot it down. 27. Cole. 31. 33. Donald E. Fink. "Swedish Air Force's Challenge." Aviu- 28 Sten Berglind, "Vi Hamnade Mitt I Rvssens letstrole" tion Week 6- Space Technology 126. no. 19(11 May 1987|: 15. ("We Found Ourselves in the Middle of the Russians' Jet- By taking advantage of thiir excellent ground-based command wash"). trans. L. Nilssen. Expressen. 15 September 1987. 1. and control facilities, the Swedes are able to minimize the 29. Hakan Hagwall. "Busflygning Over Barents Hav" ("Air amount of airborne equipment and hence keep expenses low.

net assessment

Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Amer- changing historical roles of the black soldier, icans in the Military by Bernard C. Nalty. New sailor, and airman. York 10022: Free Press, 1987. 409 pages. The result is a narrative that not only describes $22.50 hardback. the ebb and flow of institutional racism over the decades but also shows how it varied from ser- For the first time, a professional military his- vice to service. One of the book’s greatest contri- torian has examined the history of race relations butions is its study of the US Navy, until now a in the US armed forces and detailed the progress neglected area. The reader will be surprised to made in the solution of problems. Nalty is a long- learn that the senior service’s legendary color standing member of the Office of Air Force His- line was of comparatively recent origin, and that tory and has written official historical accounts Civil War sailors mixed freely and comfortably of the battle of Khe Sanh in Vietnam and of the to a degree unknown among the land forces of US Marine Corps in World War II, among others. the time. Nalty then goes on to specify when, More important to the subject at hand, he co- how, and why the tolerant policies of the 1860s edited (along with Morris J. MacGregor) a 13-vol- had regressed by the First World War. The racial ume collection of basic documentation on blacks histories of the US Army and Air Force are stud- in the American military. In Strength for the ied with equal rigor. Fight, Nalty gives the reader far more than a pas- The author deserves praise for avoiding the sive survey of the subject. Instead of simply ob- traditional anecdotal approach that is frequently serving and recording, he brings the analytic used by writers today to acknowledge black mil- skills of a professional sociologist to the formid- itary prowess. Uplifting stories about the Tus- able task of explaining and understanding the kegee airmen and individual black military 80 AIR POWER JOURNAL

heroes are interesting, but most of these tales how those who command do their job. What are have a patronizing and awkward tone, as if seek- the elements, the imperatives of command? How ing to compensate minority members for past ne- does it succeed? How does it fail? glect. Nalty uses these anecdotes and examples Within these queries, Keegan insists there ex- sparingly to illustrate his major points and ists a deeper element, a dilemma if you will, lighten an otherwise formal narrative. They are affecting the success of those who would com- never used as substitutes for rigorous example mand: How much of the risk do you share with and analysis. your troops? Are you in front with them always, The book has few faults. Although adequately sometimes, or never? The question is not banal: done, the first chapters dealing with the Revolu- generals are asking people to die for them. The tion and the Civil War are sketchy compared to dilemma involves the distinction between lead- the remaining chapters. Nalty is a modernist, ing men to risk death and ordering them to risk and his book is clearly stronger in the later pe- death. To succeed, the troops must see their riods. There is also an occasional problem with leader with them in spirit if not in person. scholarly neutrality. The narrative contains nu- For Keegan, the leader will inevitably manage merous accusations of societal and institutional the dilemma by showing, in a theatrical sense, a racism and frequently judges situations in the “mask of command," displaying only what he past by the standards of today. Such a viewpoint wants his audience to see and hiding what they is nearly inevitable when dealing with this par- should not see. Inevitably, social scientists will ticular subject, but it can lead to a distortion of posit common traits and behavior for history’s the realities of the past. The very concept of rac- generals and commanders. Yet Keegan, as a his- ism is an emotionally loaded one today, but it torian, believes that deeper examination shows was frequently less so in other eras. Nalty has each as unique, made so by fundamentally dif- done a real service in documenting past abuses, ferent circumstances and purposes. “Context,” but it should also be pointed out that during he argues, “is all.” He cites as proof the careers of many of these periods there was a genuine— if four “great captains" and shows each as prod- unequal—partnership between the races, and an ucts of his time. unaffected racial harmony. Frequently, racism Alexander the Great, at the dawn of organized was more benign in nature: discrimination with- warfare, is the archetype of the hero leader, fight- out active malice. This is not to condone it or to ing in the front lines. He does not distinguish deny that it existed, but it must also be stressed between the role of ruler and warrior, yet he con- that the majority of professional military mem- quers, almost literally, the world. The popular bers down through the years have been people of imagination is fired: Alexander was a master goodwill whose chief sins were those of omis- with the mask. He was in front “always,” and he sion and lack of racial sensitivity rather than defined the model for the successful soldier. overt antagonism. They merely reflected the val- This hero image is with us still, but the mode ues of their society, as do we. of command has changed. With the industrial Strength for the Fight is an exceptional piece era, the growing size of national armies and the of work, one of the few that is genuinely thought technology of communication prompted com- provoking. It belongs in base libraries and manders to be increasingly remote from their should be regd by all professional military troops. The First Duke of Wellington and Ulysses personnel. S. Grant were transitional, prosecuting their art Dr Raymond L. Puffer by being in front “sometimes." Wellington still Norton AFB. California shared the immediate risk of battle in the best hero tradition, but he clearly subordinated himself to his king and isolated himself intellec- tually from the emerging democracy of mass armies. Grant showed that one need not want to be a hero to be a hero. His ambition was to be a The Mask of Command by John Keegan. New regimental commander, and he kept the modest York 10010: Elisabeth Sifton Books, 1987, 387 trappings of lower grade even when command- pages, $18.95 hardback. ing the entire Union Army. Keegan here adds a This book is about generals." That is about as friendly caution: "Generalship is bad for peo- succinct a preamble as one could hope for. In this ple. . .. The most reasonable of men suffuse with particular book, John Keegan attempts to explain pomposity when stars touch their shoulders." NET ASSESSMENT 81

Finally, Keegan profiles Adolf Hitler, a sort of the definition is not so different. Alexander, after antihero model of the commander. Politically. all, was not much of a hero to Darius. Hitler was in front always; militarily, never. Hit- Keegan's tale is carefully woven, a simple ler also was a master with the mask. But Keegan study with a lucid, at times, graceful style. He calls him a false hero; his heroics a charade; his complains at one point of the modern era's loss command inflexible, erratic, and remote; and de- of the storytelling art. He then proceeds to tell his scribes his death as alone, dishonored, and story artfully, inserting charming editorials and unmourned. interesting historical digressions throughout the These four leaders exemplify the imperatives book. These digressions add depth and fullness of command: (1) A commander must set an ex- to the work. There are some noticeable errors of counterforce ample and must be a presence to his troops. (2) detail, such as confusing the terms He must communicate with them to “explain and countervalue, or making assertions about himself. . . allay their fears, arouse their hopes, Hitler's support in the early twenties that are and bind their ambitions to his own.” (3) And, inconsistent with other recorded facts. Neverthe- like Harold Hill, he must “know the territory.” If less, like any really good book, it makes one a commander cannot at least smell the blood of think and should be read. the battle in his nostrils, his commands will be Maj Richard L. Davis, USAF errant, inappropriate, or fatal. Failure to under- Maxwell AFB. Alabama stand command's imperatives can induce com- bats that are unwise, futile, or both. Witness the trenches of World War 1. Witness Vietnam. Keegan concludes by showing that in the late To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern twentieth century the mask of command encom- America by John Whiteclay Chambers 11. New passes more than just things military. Contem- York 10017: Free Press. 1987, 386 pages, porary political leaders must also heed the $24.95 hardback. imperatives of command. The truly great cap- Many readers are familiar with the upheavals tains, in Keegan's words, "understood the limits caused by the Vietnam-era draft controversy. to which the exercise of force may be usefully However, the origins and development of our pushed.” Today we speak freely of limits— lim- modern military manpower policy have until re- ited war, limited resources, and limited objec- cently escaped systematic historical examina- tives. Yet the question remains: Do we really tion and analysis. The appearance in 1979 of know what those limits are? Or do we know how George Q. Flynn's The Mess in Washington: to command our forces, our resources, ourselves Manpower Mobilization in World War II has in light of those limits? been followed in rapid succession by Robert K. A more important lesson, and a point Keegan Griffith's Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: Amer- does not stress is that the mask is also imposed ica's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army and embellished by the audience. People see Between the World Wars (1982); John O’Sulli- what they want to see. and they embrace, even van’s From Voluntarism to Conscription: Con- deify, their leaders as long as these heroes don’t gress and Selective Service, 1940-1945 (1982); disappoint them. We make our own heroes, even Flynn’s Lewis B. Hershey. Mr. Selective Service when they are not particularly heroic. They are (1985) ;). Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer’s conjured in our minds and defined by the The First Peacetime Draft!of 1940| (1986); and needs—the context—of the time. We crave to be Stephen M. Kohn's /ailed for Peace: The History led. of American Draft Law Violators, 1658-1985 People feel the same about antiheroes. For ex- (1986) . Colonel Griffith is presently preparing ample, Keegan portrays Hitler as a false hero. Yet his “The Transition of the U.S. Army from the how false? Heroes are perceived by the beholder, Draft to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974." and the commander manages the mask solely to Professor Chambers’ To Raise an Army: The enhance these perceptions. Hitler remained a Draft Comes to Modern America now arrives to hero to a large number of German people at least complete the picture. Befitting its initial chron- until 1939. To the end his soldiers followed him ological position, the work contains a thorough and died for him. He appears a false hero in ret- yet concise introduction to the history of mili- rospect, but is that verdict wholly correct? His- tary obligations and service in America from tory preserves both heroes and antiheroes, and 1609 to 1917. Such an account is particularly 82 AIR POWER JOURNAL

valuable since it provides a welcome degree of policy. These quibbles aside, To Raise an Army comprehensive scope and analytic sophistica- shall probably remain the standard work on the tion on a nebulous yet complex subject. Histori- introduction of selective service, as well as a sig- cal details are skillfully set within the broader nificant contribution to the perpetual debate on context of underlying theories about the growth how our armed forces should be recruited. of the nation-state and its internal and external Dr Richard E. Morse relations, the development of military technol- Maxwell AFB. Alabama ogy and doctrine, economic structures and issues, and political systems and activity. This incisive treatment could have been enhanced by more emphasis upon the relatively rural and iso- To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military lated rhythm of national life and settlement and Ethics and the Way of the Soldier by Richard the absence of powerful neighbors as counter- A. Gabriel. New York 10010: Praeger Publish- vailing forces to building the early American ers. 1987, 243 pages, $29.95 hardback. state and to international power projection. Nevertheless, Professor Chambers offers an ex- This thought-provoking work warrants read- cellent account of the introduction of Selective ing and discussion by all members of the military Service in 1917 and its volcanic effect. In a mere community who care about the future of their 18 months, 2.8 million men—72 percent of the profession. It offers a stinging indictment of a whole army and more than half of the American “brotherhood” that has allowed its ethical foun- Expeditionary Forces in France—had been clas- dations to erode dramatically. But the author sified, inducted, and trained. Over 10 million does not end on a pessimistic note; he com- men were registered in a single day in June 1917. mends the military as an exceptional profes- By war’s end, about 20 percent of the adult male sional cadre with innate resources more than population aged 18-45 years had been mobilized. sufficient to foster an “ethical renaissance.” This action had even broader social and eco- Gabriel is a professor of politics and a major in nomic implications. Not only were a variety of the United States Army Reserve presently as- conflicting interests and ideals carefully bal- signed to the Soviet Division of the Directorate of anced. but also it was discovered that 25 percent Foreign Intelligence in the Pentagon. His hook of the draftees were illiterate and 7 percent could reveals that he is also well acquainted with the not speak English. The overall program that halt- field of ethics and passionately interested in the ingly emerged was a subtle blend of administra- moral health and future course of the military. tive decentralization, national self-interest, and The first portion of the book offers an astute as- political consensus. The Selective Service expe- sessment of the current state of the military es- dient of 1917 thus became the basis for subse- tablishment. In his foreword to the work, Vice quent manpower policies for the next half Adm James B. Stockdale. USN, Retired, notes century. At present. Professor Chambers regards that the treatise echoes a common theme of con- the All-Volunteer Armed Force as a transitory demning the "entrepreneurial bewitchment of creature, hopefully being replaced by a broader the military mind.” Stockdale praises the author program of “selective civil [and military] ser- for his willingness to go beyond simply analyz- vice." Such a change would be a predictable ad- ing the situation to “tackle the tough job of for- aptation of our crucial and fluctuating public mulating an honor code.” attitude toward citizenship and its obligations. Indeed, Gabriel offers the reader much to con- Perhaps the greatest strength of Professor sider in this compact, yet intense, volume. In the Chambers’ work lies in its accurate, coherent, wake of Vietnam and the realities of an all-vol- and lucid view of our complex history of military unteer force, he argues that the military is still service. The use and deft combination of a vari- struggling with “crises of confidence, adaptation ety of academic disciplines has produced an ex- and conscience." Gabriel rallies significant evi- cellent example of the "new" military history. dence in support of his contentions. One could have wished that the literary style had In an environment where “the forces of the been more polished: for example, note the use of marketplace have replaced patriotism and citi- phrases such as “occupational duty” (p. 239) zenship as the basis of military service, he and “occupation force.” (p. 241) More irritating pleads for a conscious return to traditional mili- is the repetitious use of the term format for such tary values and ethics. Although recognizing that varied concepts as organization, institution, and values and ethics are distinct from one another, NET ASSESSMENT 83 he notes that "one cannot be expected to act eth- main human, there will be a need for military ically in the absence of at least some” of the ethics to sustain that humanity, to give meaning traditional military virtues because “virtues rep- to actions that otherwise would be regarded as resent predispositions to action.” horrible, and to place limits upon the destructive His in-depth discussion of these traditional abilities of the soldier.” virtues is superb, especially his insights on "loy- Chaplain (Capt) Robert C. Stroud, USAF alty, obedience and dissent.” It may strike some Reese AFB, Texas readers close to home when he states that rampant careerism stifles valid dissent and “pro- vokes the worst type of disloyalty under the guise of loyalty, namely, a marked failure to question policies and orders that often do not East Asian Conflict Zones edited by Lawrence E. work or that extract too high an ethical and moral Grinter and Young Whan Kihl. New York price for their success.” 10010: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 239 pages, Gabriel provides a succinct introduction to $37.50 hardback. basic ethical approaches. Still, the treatise requires thoughtful, measured reading; it is not a The dynamic economic growth of the East book to be rushed through in a single sitting. Asian region is the subject of many studies that Charts or graphs may have assisted the average herald the beginning of the Pacific Century. reader in systematically comprehending the var- Though economic development dominates the ious ethical approaches. Another drawback/ in regional definition of security, the conflict po- an otherwise fine work, is his persistent refer- tential in East Asia should not go unnoticed. East ence to the "brotherhood” of arms. Women who Asia, with its long-standing rivalries, is one of also proudly wear uniforms of various hues may the most heavily armed regions in the world. The feel unfairly excluded from this important dis- purpose of this volume is to focus our attention cussion due to the exclusively masculine termi- on the conflicts and the potential for instability nology employed. in the region. The editors have brought together The author constructs a sound case for the de- a number of regional experts to examine seven velopment of a formal “code of ethics.” After conflict zones: the Sino-Soviet conflict, Japan’s dealing with objections to such an approach, he northern territories, the Sea of Japan, the Korean proposes a tentative code. Acknowledging that peninsula, the South China Sea, the Thai-Viet- "the suggestions made here might be found namese rivalry, and Philippine communism. wanting,” he contends that it is possible—and In their introduction, Grinter and Kihl define clearly beneficial—to develop a foundational the principal aims of their study. First, the au- statement of the ethics of the military profession. thors of the various chapters are expected to clar- His “Soldier’s Code of Ethics” is comprised of ify the dynamics and complexities of these statements such as the following: "Every soldier prominent conflicts. Each of the chapters does a holds a special position of trust and responsibil- thorough job in describing the historical roots of ity. No soldier will ever violate that trust or avoid conflict and the domestic and international dy- his responsibility by any of his actions, no matter namics that keep these conflicts on national and the personal cost.” regional agendas. Clarification is important Gabriel addresses the difficult task of “instill- as we move beyond the more widely known con- ing virtues" by discussing the teaching, support- flict zones like the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Sea ing, and enforcing of ethical standards. His of Japan, and the Korean peninsula to the more proposal for the development of “honor courts” complex territorial issues and very long-stand- in the American military is particularly ing rivalries in Southeast Asia. As the book intriguing. moves from zone to zone, the reader also begins This book is deserving of wide reading, dis- to appreciate how important geopolitical factors cussion, and inclusion in the library of every are to the resolution of these conflicts. In some of military member concerned with the future of these conflict zones, resolution may lie with a our profession. One underlying theme is that combination of land-based and maritime poli- solid ethical moorings are more crucial today cies, a marriage of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir than ever before. Gabriel points out that “the Halford John Mackinder. lethality of modem weaponry” magnifies the im- The second aim of this study is to suggest what plications of warfare and that “as long as men re- practical options exist to de-escalate and possi- 84 AIR POWER JOURNAL

bly resolve these conflicts. This volume is partic- for conflict resolution can provide the basis for ularly valuable when meeting this goal. The thought-provoking analysis of US policy. This authors of the different chapters and the editors study will remain as a very useful reference work in their conclusion are not at a loss for options. for those concerned with national security affairs Several of the authors dealing with the more in one of the world’s most dynamic regions. complex multilateral conflicts also assess possi- j. Richard Walsh ble scenarios for conflict resolution. Drawing on Maxwell AFB, Alabama these assessments. Grinter and Kihl note how bilateral relationships are giving way to multilateral diplomacy. Bilateral conflicts become enmeshed in regional economic and diplomatic factors. These linkages, though, increase the pos- A Time for Giants: The Politics of the American sibilities for conflict resolution because High Command in World War II by D. Clayton regional actors can resort to economic and diplo- James. New York 10016: Franklin Watts, Inc., matic tools for confidence-building mecha- 1987, 275 pages. $19.95 hardback. nisms. In Southeast Asia the multilateral arena The story of Gen George C. Marshall’s “little could be the Association of Southeast Asian Na- black book,” in which he recorded the strengths tions, while in Northeast Asia it can become a and weaknesses of future Army leaders, has been matter of linking the economic potential of states used in so many footnotes that it no longer re- like japan and South Korea with the needs of quires attribution. Marshall’s pervasive influ- states like the Soviet Union and China. An im- ence is, as might be expected, one of the more portant conclusion to be drawn from this study is striking elements in this intriguing view of that conflict resolution may be closely tied to re- American military politics during World War II. gional economic dynamics. A Time for Giants is an insightful, very reada- Several of the chapter authors and the editors ble study of command decisionmaking at the note the superimposition of Soviet-American se- highest levels. Using the rising and falling for- curity interests in the East Asian conflict tunes of 18 prominent commanders, with pass- zones. In particular, much is made of the july ing mention of a host of lesser military leaders, 1986 Vladivostok speech by General Secretary the author provides a strikingly clear picture of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet discovery of the interplay of powerful personalities in war- its role as an Asian power. The Soviet Union has time. It is a fascinating look at just how our war- subsequently followed the speech with a series time commanders were chosen and who did the of diplomatic initiatives much in keeping with choosing. Gorbachev's desire for a peaceful international The reader should be warned. The description environment in order to accomplish domestic on the flyleaf notwithstanding, this book is not a economic reforms. The Soviet Union clearly de- collection of biographical sketches of great war- sires to tap into the economic potential of East time leaders. Nor are there sweeping descrip- Asia. In contrast, the United States appears to be tions of campaigns and desperate actions. This is a regional power without a regional policy. The history in the margins. Without being at all neg- tendency during the present administration to ative, one might think of this work as an assem- view Soviet-American competition as a zero- blage of asides—the kind of tantalizing sum game does not necessarily converge with information historians too often place in foot- the interests of other regional actors whose dom- notes at the bottom of the page while hurrying off inant economic concerns color their perception to the next battle. of security as a more positive-sum game. In ad- This is, in fact, the nature of this book's value. dition. economic conflicts with regional actors The author makes it clear that his sources consist may make it difficult for US policymakers to ap- primarily of the many biographies and autobiog- preciate the importance of economic interde- raphies available on the chosen commanders. pendence for conflict resolution. What he has provided is a useful compendium of In sum, the efforts of the editors to provide World War II command assignments and their aims and organization for the individual chapter rationales. Collecting such information allows authors and a thorough introduction and conclu- him, and the reader, to view the connecting sion result in a coherent study that avoids many threads, to pick out common traits, and perhaps of the pitfalls associated with edited volumes. to attain understanding beyond that possible The presentation of policy options and scenarios when studying famous leaders one by one. NET ASSESSMENT 85

One of these common traits was age. At the be- Dictionary of Wars by George C. Kohn. Garden ginning of the war, the average age of the 18 prin- City, N.Y. 10167: Anchor Press/Doubleday, cipals was 55. Adm Ernest King served in the 1987, 591 pages, $14.95 hardback. Spanish-American War. became an aviator in Although a conventional work of reference, 1927 at age 48, and became commander in chief this book easily lends itself to browsing. Over of the US fleet at age 63. Adm William Leahy was 1,000 entries, listed alphabetically by the name recalled from retirement at age 64. General Mar- of the action, chronicle 4,000 years of armed con- shall was 59 when he became chief of staff in flict. The text is crisp and lucid, providing 1939. The author points to their advanced years straightforward accounts of the causes, opera- to explain the extent of the personal power and tions, and significance of wars. One may choose experience of these leaders within their services. to read it, either in order (e.g., “Morgan’s Raids Another common factor was the extreme length, on Panama,” "Moriscos. Revolt of the," “Moroc- by today’s standards, of assignments. General can War of 1907-12") or randomly (e.g., “Perak Marshall’s five-year tenure at the Infantry School War,” “Tyrone's Rebellion,” “Cham Civil War of was by no means unusual and provided a unique 1150-60”). knowledge of subordinates that was to be invalu- The author claims at the outset that “the pre- able later. The 18 individuals spent an average of sentation gives the reader a clear idea of the 35 months in their wartime commands, provid- amazingly diverse conflicts which have plagued ing greatly needed continuity and unity of pur- mankind.” This statement is certainly true. Wide pose. One has to wonder, given today's military in scope, the book includes rebellions, minor personnel policies on age and assignments, if the skirmishes, wars, and all forms of overt violence country might not come up short a Marshall or customarily considered to be armed conflict. As Patton just when it needs one most. the author states, the criteria for inclusion had to More central to the book’s theme is the inter- be subjective; therefore, certain events are not locking. ever-evolving personal relationships covered. Such omissions may disturb some read- that shaped the wartime command structure. ers. Nevertheless, the book is extremely valu- Here the author excels, whether discussing Eak- able. The cross-referencing is masterful, er’s falling out with Arnold or Stilwell's uncom- isolating, and emphasizing both umbrella and plaining acceptance of an unwanted assignment. satellite conflicts. The geographic and personal That is not to say the book is without fault. It indexes work well. A comparative reading of en- suffers from an unnecessarily complicated for- tries such as "Grenada, Invasion of” and “Nu- mat. jumping from one theater of operation to the mantian War" serves as an eloquent reminder next and back again. Although separated chron- that organized violence, the basis for our profes- ologically. the chapters overlap so that a discussion, is a characteristic of human history, and sion of Eisenhower. Clark, Patton, and Bradley is inevitably, of our future. interrupted by a chapter on concerns in the Pa- cific and then is resumed. Capt Eric C. Anderson, USAF Even worse is the last chapter, which falls Duluth, Minnesota short of being a satisfactory collection of conclusions and insight. At one point, the author opines that these 18 leaders obtained their positions by being the best qualified for the jobs, a Air Battle Central Europe by Alfred Price. New conclusion which, while perhaps not inevitable, York 10022: Free Press. 1987, 192 pages, is still somewhat obvious. The chapter ends with $17.95 hardback. two lengthy quotes from Eisenhower and S. L. A. Recently much interest and comment has sur- Marshall that are far more enlightening than the rounded NATO’s conventional force capabili- rest of the chapter. ties. The proposed Intermediate-range Nuclear Still, the author performs a fine service to both Forces (INF’) Treaty will remove one layer of the the casual and serious student of the military organization's nuclear shield, and much ado is profession. He humanizes the high command being made in both civilian and military circles and. in doing so, allows us to more fully appre- over NATO’s ability to defeat (and thereby deter) ciate their efforts and successes. a massive Soviet assault. Air power will cer- Maj Michael L. Spehar, USAF tainly play a significant role in discouraging and, Norton AFB, California if necessary, stopping this kind of attack. Air Bat- tle Central Europe is a well-written and interest- 86 AIR POWER JOURNAL ing introduction to the type of air operations where they would operate out of supermarket NATO would likely mount in a future conven- parking lots). Surprisingly, there is no chapter tional war in Europe. dealing solely with the F-16, despite this air- Using information from a variety of unclassi- craft’s significant presence in NATO and 2 fied sources and interviews with officers from ATAF. NATO air forces, the author explains in non- Although the interview chapters are interest- technical language the directions NATO’s air ing, the scenario is at best thin. Fortunately, war over a north German battlefield would take. Price has not gone to the melodramatic lengths of Fifteen of these interviews, ranging from that such novels as Red Storm Rising or Good Friday, with the commander of the 2d Allied Tactical but the scenario provided is very brief and spec- Air Force (2ATAF) to those with squadron com- ulates only on Warsaw Pact losses. Also the au- manders and operations officers, form chapters thor never refers to the scenario after the first in the book. Using the interview as the core, Price chapter, further lessening its impact. Though de- utilizes each chapter to introduce a different ele- signed to consolidate and summarize the differ- ment in NATO's air capability (counterair, in- ent chapters, the book’s concluding chapter is terdiction, close air support, and others), repetitious and adds little to the information and weaving his own comments and observations points already discussed. around those of the interviewee. The result is a As a composite overview of possible conven- series of vignettes that take a realistic if some- tional air operations over northern Germany, Air what cursory look at NATO's strategy, tactics, Battle Central Europe generally succeeds. For equipment, and people, together with its impor- readers unfamiliar with NATO’s air capabilities, tance in deterring a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack. this book is a great primer, and the interviews With over 20 years experience in the Royal Air really help give one an operator’s view of the sit- Force (RAF), Price possesses the knowledge and uation. More experienced readers will find the experience to use the interviews effectively. The interviews candid and interesting but will be left 2ATAF commander, Air Marshal Sir Patrick wanting a little more detail. In either case, the Mine, describes an air strategy that closely re- book does succeed in explaining the NATO air sembles our recently adopted AirLand Battle force’s importance in deterring an attack on concept. Surprisingly, the air marshal expresses Western Europe. less concern over the Soviet attack helicopter Maj Budd A. Jones, Jr., USAF threat than might be expected, seeing it as partic- USAF Academy, Colorado ularly vulnerable to NATO’s prepared defenses in the deep-strike role. Price also uses the interviews to keep his analysis realistic. The chapters Flight in America by Roger E. Bilstein.Baltimore. on counterair with the F-15 and interdiction Maryland 21211: Johns Hopkins Press, 1987, with the F-lll convey clearly the difficult prob- 356 pages, $12.95 hardback. lems pilots will face in fighting a numerically su- perior opponent and operating in the all-weather In Flight in America. Roger Bilstein. professor arena. Price is also careful to tie these disparate of history at the University of Houston-Clear chapters together with one constant thread: the Lake and author of Flight Patterns: Trends of current NATO forces balance out Soviet/Warsaw Aeronautical Development in the United States, Pact numerical superiority, and maintaining this 1918-1929 and Stages to Saturn: A Technologi- balance will deter an attack. cal History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehi- The book's broad coverage allows the reader a cles, presents a clear and concise survey of the glimpse into many areas. Electronic jamming. social, economic, and political aspects of avia- Wild Weasel (defense suppression) operations, tion and space exploration from the beginning of and tactical reconnaissance are given treatment flight. While indicating the nature of these fac- equal to counterair and interdiction. Journal tors, he outlines the principal technological readers will find interesting the chapters dealing trends within the aerospace industry, emphasiz- with antiship operations in the Baltic and British ing the influence general aviation has had on antiarmor helicopter tactics, areas not often ex- civil aeronautics. His broad insights graphically amined by American commentators. Befitting a illustrate the inherent interdependence of the British author, there is an overlong and some- civil and military aviation industries. what melodramatic chapter on Harrier opera- Bilstein describes how successive improve- tions (speculating on urban battle scenarios ments in US aviation technology from the inter- NET ASSESSMENT 87 war years to current efforts to develop new of their boosters with both civil and military pay- rocket boosters for the space shuttle have in- loads, ensuring continual operations should one creasingly attracted the business and military booster be grounded for any extended period of communities for economic and combat superi- time? Whatever the answer, Bilstein believes as- ority reasons, respectfully. This commitment, tronautical ventures are a part of American so- plus the continual evolution of a firm industrial ciety and. as such, place the United States on the technology base and a variety of operational threshold of a new frontier whose promise may skills, contributed to aviation's emergence as an far exceed the frontier opened by the Wrights’ integral component in a wide range of business first (light. enterprises and in the establishment of this Extremely well written and researched. Flight country's current pattern of airline development. in America offers an impressive and comprehen- Similarly, the successful marriage of commercial sive survey of American aeronautics and astro- ventures with military requirements during the nautics. It is well worth reading by anyone 1930s established an important precedent for interested in the Air Force’s past or future. civil/military cooperation. For example, the mil- Capt Roy F. Houchin II, USAF itary's acquisition of modern aircraft with im- L/SAF Academy, Colorado proved aerodynamic construction, retractable gear, and other features was characterized by trendsetting commercial transports like the Rebels from West Point by Gerard A. Patterson. Douglas DC-3. In later years, economics—yet another impor- New York 10017: Doubleday, 1987, 194 pages. tant element in the relationship of commercial $16.95 hardback. and military operations—exerted its traditional In 158 pages of text, Gerard Patterson’s Rebels influence on many of the principal aircraft man- from West Point promises to tell the story of the ufacturers. The staggering costs and the tremen- 306 West Point graduates who served in the Con- dous liabilities associated with producing federate Army. It seems a very difficult task, and complex aircraft and spacecraft—both military it is one that Patterson fails to accomplish. He be- and civilian—forced companies to diversify, re- gins by examining the difficult and unglamorous organize, or find new corporate partners. At life-style of army service on the western frontier Douglas Aircraft, the company's inability to pro- in the years preceding the war. He then focuses cess their backlog of commercial orders for its on how and why many officers left the United DC-8 and DC-9 aircraft, production delays, and States Army to serve the Confederacy. Some of- difficulties in financing forced the company to ficers left when South Carolina withdrew from seek a partner. McDonnell Aircraft had won ex- the Union, and still others when the Confederacy tensive military contracts but had been unable to was officially formed, but the bulk waited until enter the civil airline market. After several years after the attack on Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s call of negotiations. McDonnell Douglas emerged as a to arms. He notes that often their departures were balanced aerospace company, producing air- difficult and emotional, and at times their former liners, military aircraft, and space hardware. comrades-in-arms threw farewell parties in their What does this suggest for today? In his epi- honor. When officers returned home, they were logue, Bilstein describes some of the perils as- by no means off to equal starts in the new Con- sociated with placing too much emphasis on any federate Army. Whereas a captain with eight one technological system or manufacturing in- years of federal service might start as a colonel in stitution. In the wake of the Challenger explo- Alabama, the same officer might begin as a major sion and the subsequent failure of several other in Georgia. Rank often depended on family launch vehicles, civil and military operations connections. ground to a halt. With no backup launch systems Patterson points out that when Lee took com- available, many payloads had to be cancelled or mand, he made a conscious decision to have postponed for years, creating serious scheduling West Pointers assume the key command billets problems for many commercial, military, and in the Confederate Army. He agrees with Lee's scientific projects. Should civil and military decision and suggests that these West Pointers space operations continue on divergent paths "provided the glue that held the Confederate with little, if any, capability for integrated pay- Army together and gave it cohesion, order, and a loads? Or should US aerospace leaders learn degree of professionalism. Without them, there from the past and ensure the interchangeability would have been utter chaos." (p. 70) This state- 88 AIR POWER fOURNAL

ment is certainly true to a point, but one must governors and senators. He points out that "only wonder about the contributions of the graduates two generals from the Army of Northern Virginia from the Virginia Military Institute or The Cita- who had come out of West Point were ever per- del. According to Patterson, this policy led to mitted to serve in the United States Army again.” some intense bitterness within Lee's officer (p. 158) While all these observations are interest- corps. Next. Patterson focuses on the relation- ing, they are nonetheless trivial. This is the basic ships between West Point graduates serving in flaw in Patterson’s book; the bulk of the infor- the Union Army and those in the Confederacy. mation is very trivial and not worth the reader’s He suggests that “even when the war reached its time. Though well documented, the book is grimmest stages, there would be no hatred drawn primarily from secondary sources; con- among the professionals. Ties were strong among sequently, he offers no new information to the these men. . . .” (p. 27) He supports this assertion historical community. with several examples of kindness and decency This book is not worth the expense to make it between opposing sides during the war. a permanent part of one's personal library. Any- In the third chapter, Patterson begins his anal- one wishing to read it should simply borrow a ysis of individuals. In this chapter and subse- copy from the library. For a serious study of Lee quent ones, he offers some interesting insights and his subordinates, read Douglas S. Freeman’s into James Longstreet, “Stonewall” Jackson. Ju- Lee's Lieutenants. bal Early, and John Hood. But the bulk of his his- Capt Alan C. Ekrem, USAF torical observations appears to be very trivial Maxwell AFB, Alabama indeed. For example, he refers to Lafayette McLaws as a “dandy dresser.” (p. 39) In some revealing insights into George Pickett, he writes of How to Stop a War by James F. Dunnigan and his hair: “Long, perfumed ringlets flowed loosely William Martel. New York 10017: Doubleday, over his shoulders. His beard also was curly and 1987, 277 pages, $18.95 hardback. gave out the scents of Araby. In fact, George was known everywhere by his corkscrew ringlets The authors of this work are two military sim- which, alas, as milady’s, were not particularly ulation experts who researched the wars of the becoming when he was caught in the rain and past 200 years and supposedly discovered pat- they went lank." (p. 40) We learn that Jubal Early terns that could be used in future conflict avoid- liked to swear and drink, (pp. 102-104) Patterson ance and management. They first describe the spends an entire paragraph describing the size of different types of wars, the stages of war from Edward Johnson’s head. (p. 45) These are incred- start to finish, and the primary causes of war. ible revelations the historical community has Next they explore the lessons of history on how long suffered without. wars are prevented by examining both actual and In fairness, Patterson writes of some important potential wars. Finally, the authors provide tech- insights foreign observers gained from the Civil niques for using past data to predict and possibly War. (p. 69) For example, they learned the im- to prevent future wars. portance of railroads in the movement of mas- While seemingly a scientific work, the book is sive armies and their supplies. They saw in reality anything but that. The authors often firsthand how defensive fortifications had throw out irrelevant personal observations and changed modern warfare. Finally, these foreign try to pass them off as fact. For example, the au- observers learned the concept of arming caval- thors state that America’s military officers are rymen with rifles instead of sabers and using somehow less than capable because the “best horses merely as transportation for getting these and brightest” are not attracted to the profession. soldiers quickly to key points where they could Those who do join often leave in disgust at the fight on foot. ineptitude they find. (p. 140) It is a fact, however, Patterson provides an interesting final chapter that well over half of American military officers when he writes of what happened to several of possess advanced academic degrees and are the southern generals after the war. For example, well-trained, capable, and effective in their Lt Gen Richard Anderson found himself “swing- profession. At another point the authors claim ing a pick as a day laborer in the Charleston yards that rioting, demonstrations, and near anarchy of the Southern Central Railroad." (p. 145) Some will break out if people think nuclear war is a re- officers became mercenaries in foreign armies mote possibility, (p. 78) If that prediction were while others ran for elective offices and became valid, our society should be on the verge of a NET ASSESSMENT 89

nervous collapse since the specter of nuclear war parisons called for by the data base. The result is, is always a possibility. Perhaps the w'orst exam- predictably, GIGO—a term computer twinkies ple occurs when the authors launch into a fan- affectionately recognize as "garbage-in-garbage- tastic conjecture as to what would have out." For example, the authors state that until happened if the Russians had been victorious in 1945, the Middle East was a peaceful region. Its the Russo-Japanese War. (p. 121) This fiction is warlike behavior since then is attributed to the carried to an illogical extreme by forecasting the presence of "oil money.” (p. 267) Of course, the annexation of Korea and Manchuria to the Rus- reestablishment of Israel as a nation and the en- sian Empire and their seizure by Japan after the suing resentment of its Arab neighbors probably Russian surrender in World War 1. This scenario, had no part in creating feelings of hostility. India in turn, results in a hypothetical Japanese civil is held up as a paradigm of tranquility because it war complete with exact dates of 1918-20! The has the lowest number of wartime casualties, (p. authors seem to have given new meaning to the 267) Yet one need only pick up a current news- term historical fiction. paper to see that India is torn with internecine The authors are also guilty of outright mis- strife and has less than peaceful relations with statements of fact. Some choice nuggets in this Pakistan. group include their contention that Hitler started While this methodology might seem an innoc- World War If by accident, (p. 1) In fact, the Nur- uous exercise in numbers, it assumes serious emburg trials demonstrated quite clearly that proportions when the authors attempt to apply Hitler and his generals had planned the war their logic to potential future wars. Here, in a years in advance. The authors also fail to include sales pitch reminiscent of the Ronco Dice-a- India as part of the nuclear club while, in fact, In- matic, the authors merrily claim that by using the dia has possessed nuclear weapons for a number data they provide “you, too, can become adept at of years, (p. 69) predicting how wars and warlike situations will Perhaps the most absurd contention the au- develop.” (p. 263) It sounds like fun, but this authors make is their so-called data base of past thor will pass on that offer. The world has wars. Here the authors have taken the liberty of enough problems without having to endure am- rating on a l-to-9 scale the participants of these ateurs w'ho use questionable data to predict fu- wars in such categories as perception of inferi- ture conflicts. ority, grievances, negotiation, activity to inflame, If the point has not already been made, the historical patterns, perceived unrest, govern- book How to Stop a War is a silly and amateurish ment stability, power status, and combat quality. work. It should be revealed for what it is—a work This data base is probably as fishy as it sounds. of fiction and a very bad one at that. Many of the early wars the authors describe do not have complete historical accounts—cer- Capl Paul S. Raines, USAF tainly not enough to make the numerical com- Colorado Springs, Colorado 90 AIR POWER IOURNAL

Richochets briefings. This is by no means the entire extent of from 3 an intelligence officer’s responsibilities. How will a flying squadron commander judge an in- state-of-the-art equipment that can make the relationship much stronger and more effective. telligence officer’s ability to supervise and train Finally, for real credibility and improved op- subordinates; to counsel and evaluate subordi- erations/intelligence interface, I would suggest nate performance; to coordinate exercise intelli- that intelligence personnel consider following gence analysis, processing, and presentation; four guidelines. Like the term intelligence, each and to serve in those myriad security functions begins with the letter i. First is involvement. In- that inevitably belong to wing intelligence offi- telligence personnel have to get deeply involved cers? Perhaps even more important, will a flying in their own and in the operations world to be squadron commander be able to objectively eval- successful. Next is importance. Not only must uate his intelligence officer’s contribution when intelligence information be important and mean- he is jointly tasked to do the same for his flyers? ingful for the intelligence specialists, it also must It is this very conflict of interest that has occurred have applicable intelligence significance for the many times in the past when an intelligence of- operators to accept and understand it. Third is ficer at wing level has competed with a flyer for initiative. Ambitious intelligence personnel higher level endorsements. Because intelligence have to be willing to interpret the information on officers frequently lost this battle, our most qual- hand, improve its utility, and satisfy the require- ified officers either left the Air Force or deliber- ments. Fourth is integration. Intelligence per- ately avoided wing assignments. Captain Tice’s sonnel must unify the relevant findings into the solution has already been tried, and it failed relationship with their operational counterparts. miserably. All of the above requires hard work, creative Second, suggesting that operations/intelli- thinking, and complete dedication. No one ever gence interface would improve if the intelligence said it would be easy. The positive results—ex- officer "lived in the squadron” (donning a flight panded credibility for the intelligence people suit and attending squadron staff meetings) has and useful and understood applied intelli- true problem-creating potential. Presumably, the gence—will be well worth the effort. rationale behind this suggestion is that to be professionally accepted by aircrew members, the Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF intelligence officer must not only prove his/her Maxwell AFB, Alabama professional competence but be accepted as one of the guys. I contend that as long as I present a 1 was pleased to see a number of highly relevant professional appearance in a uniform I am au- ideas mentioned in the Winter 1987-88 issue of thorized to wear, any other details concerning your magazine in the article entitled “US Air my appearance are completely irrelevant. The is- Force Operations and Intelligence: Getting It To- sue that is absolutely critical is my professional gether.” However. I believe that the solutions competence, and that is not a product of appear- suggested for improving operations/intelligence ance but of my intelligence, training, dedication, interface were precipitate and somewhat and personal initiative. shortsighted. Asking an intelligence officer to attend meet- Captain Tice is absolutely correct in saying op- ings in which issues concerning his/her respon- erations and intelligence personnel have unreal- sibilities are rarely discussed is a waste of time. istic expectations of each other; however, this This would not be so critical if intelligence man- problem will not be overcome by trying to make ning at wing level was sufficient. IT IS NOT. In intelligence officers into pseudo flyers. fact, one of the single most contentious issues in First, suggesting that the squadron intelligence the intelligence career field today is the ability to officer be assigned to the squadron he/she sup- adequately man units whose primary duty is air- ports is unrealistic; it causes far more problems crew support. A wing intelligence officer must than it solves. Should this come to pass, the in- literally use every single hour of the day (and telligence officer will be rated by a supervisor usually more) to complete required duties alone. who is a member of that group that supposedly Mission-enhancing initiatives require overtime. already has unrealistic expectations of him/her. Captain Tice’s suggestion would simply exacer- An aircrew member's interface with an intelli- bate an already difficult situation. gence officer occurs most often during current Last, though orientation rides are no doubt use- intelligence briefings, aircrew training, and de- ful, I find myself in agreement with the quoted RICHOCHETS 91

senior operations officer who "believed that any First, Colonel Riddlebarger muddles the pur- Air Force officer who needed an incentive ride pose of government communication, even after should be selling insurance for Prudential." This he correctly states the reasons people read. On issue has taken on increased importance with page 75 he says that no one reads anything unless budget limitations that force us to seriously re- he wants to or needs to, and he correctly places view every expenditure. Flights serve primarily the writing of professions or businesses into the (and most importantly!) to train those individu- latter category. But he obscures this distinction als who operate the aircraft. In most cases, an in- when he suggests that we have a duty to educate telligence officer's opportunity to fly may well be our readers in the middle of a document in- denying an aircrew member's opportunity to tended to get business done. The illiteracy issue train. Captain Tice's priorities are somewhat sus- with which Colonel Riddlebarger opens his ar- pect based on this reasoning. gument is a red herring: it drags its faulty scales In my experience at wing level, I worked with across much of what follows. He believes that we professional aircrew members who supported an are somehow contributing to the "new nation of essential peacetime and wartime mission. illiterates" if we don't forcibly propel our read- Though the relationship between operations and ers to a dictionary with a "precise" word. Unfor- intelligence was not always optimal. I think both tunately, he confuses the function of most sides worked hard to make it as effective and business and Air Force communication with that productive as possible. For three years, our Com- of schools, of fiction, of letter writing to family or bat Intelligence Branch worked many overtime friends, or of other writing for pleasure or hours to present the highest quality intelligence education. products in support of the mission. We fre- If we have a literacy problem in our squadrons, quently requested aircrew feedback on our prod- we need to teach people how to read and write. ucts, and we made a conscious effort to But the proper forum is not daily business cor- implement all their recommendations. In return, respondence and reports, which we must read in we often received positive feedback. The opera- huge quantities to get a job done. Instead, we tions/intelligence interface developed as a direct must improve instruction in our schools, send result of our mutual professional respect and our people to special courses, establish reading willingness to work to produce the best possible groups among employees, and stress the impor- product. I would suggest that this type of ap- tance of precision and clarity in everything we proach will far more realistically solve the oper- say and write. ations/intelligence interface problem than those By the way, most government writing isn’t il- suggested by Captain Tice. literate—it's unnecessarily complex, highly specialized or abstract, and therefore often Capt Theresa A. McClure. USAF Randolph AFB. Texas unreadable. When we must read to act or decide—as we do in the Air Force—we shouldn't have to wallow in obscure material, often written by someone with a “degree of loyalty to the sub- A HERETIC’S VIEW ject" (page 77) but with no understanding of the purpose or audience he’s writing for. The writ- Just read your article “Better Writing: A Heretic’s er’s purpose most often is to explain the terms View," Winter 1987-88. Amen and thank you! and concepts of a particular problem or to put them into context for the readers, who must then Col Harvey L. Johnson, USAF act upon them to make informed, intelligent de- Vandenberg AFB. California cisions. Clarity means giving those readers exactly what they need to do the job— nothing less, but nothing more. I’m writing in rejoinder to an article in the Win- A second problem in Colonel Riddlebarger’s ter 1987-88 issue of the Airpower Journal. Col argument is his constant stacking of the deck Samuel Riddlebarger’s "Better Writing: A Here- against plain English recommendations. For ex- tic’s View” has some excellent advice for writ- ample, the excerpt he chooses to explicate (re- ers. but it also includes a number of red herrings, garding paper clips on page 77) is trivial, and the faulty dilemmas, and inaccurate examples that rewrite is unfortunate. may mislead your readers regarding the "plain Another instance is on page 76, where Colonel English" movement. Riddlebarger says that sentences "may need to 92 AIR POWER JOURNAL have more than three or four words” to get the ness of Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, or job done. No one—including Robert Gunning Robert Frost to discover its power. The world of (the "fog index") or Rudolph Flesch (the “guru” science acknowledges this power as well, for our of plain English for business)—disagrees on this finest scientists—Heisenberg, Teller. Einstein— point. When we ask government writers to pare point out that people don’t truly understand down their average word count in sentences, we complex theories until they are explained in suggest 17-20 words per sentence, not three or common language. four. And we also recommend variety in length Another fallacious dichotomy Colonel Riddle- and structure to attend to the reader's need for barger wants us to accept as fact is that advice on style in written communication. The problem clear writing comes from “ivory-tower types" (p. with most government writing is not brevity, 76) or "hucksters" (p. 77) who are isolated from however, and the colonel should know this after real-world writers. On the contrary, most of us so many years in the Air Force. Rather, we find who are researching and writing on clear com- documents laden with compound-complex sen- munication are long-term professionals, man- tences. averaging as many as 50-60 words in agers, scientists, and engineers. We have seen length and filled with complex, specialized contracts written for the public in the same jar- terms. gonistic, circumlocutive language found in legal A third inaccurate treatment appears on page opinions. 78. where the colonel discusses writing the way Finally, I might offer an observation. Although we speak. He suggests that this advice would Colonel Riddlebarger argues against “current lead to saying “you know,” “like man," or “I guidance on better writing," he consistently mean” in government correspondence. Instead, writes exactly as the best of this guidance rec- we expressly caution against slang, substandard ommends: short sentences, clear syntax, pro- speech, or "huhs" and "er ahs.” Speaking on the nouns and contractions (from spoken writing), page means using an informal (but not substand- expressive language, and a strong sense of ard) approach to the reader, with speaking “ti- voice—which shows the writer is engaged in his died up” to conform to rules of syntax or subject. He slips up only when he uses aggravate grammar. (p. 77) to mean irritate. Colonel Riddlebarger compounds his inaccur- I’ve experienced nearly 19 years in the Air acies with illogic, especially in offering the Force, 13 years of teaching and consulting in reader faulty dilemmas such as the following: “If clear communication for technical specialties, the author is preparing a nursery rhyme, com- and nine years of teaching plain English to some mon words are consistent and appropriate. If the 35,000 people in the Department of Defense. In subject is the metaphysical connotations of all these years, I've seen perhaps 50 instances of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, grab your reference oversimplified or "illiterate" writing but literally books" (p. 77). Of course, the colonel doesn’t thousands of overly complex, pretentious letters point out that we read Nietzsche for pleasure or and reports. Therefore, while acknowledging edification, not to order paper clips, choose one Colonel Riddlebarger’s good advice. I must reject data communication system over another, or his faulty observations about the plain English launch aircraft against a threat. Contrary to his movement. Meantime. I'll swap success stories assertion that common words are suitable only to from this "movement” against the colonel’s nursery rhymes, research and practical experi- claims until the stars fall from the sky—at which ence show that common language has great point we will all stop writing for want of subject power over a wide range of human communica- and audience. tion. One need only read the eloquent “common- Lt Col Perry D. I.uckett, USAF US Air Force Academy, Colorado notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and Blvd, San Diego CA 92152, or call (619J 553- other professional notices of a noncommercial 4146. nature should be sent to Editor. Airpower Jour- nal. VVaiker Hall. MaxiveJJ AFB AL 36112-5532. VMI/American Military Institute Military Edu- We reserve the right to edit material for length cation Conference and content. The Virginia Military Institute’s Department of History and Politics will host the annual meeting of the American Military Institute on 14-15 USAF Academy Military History Symposium April 1989 in Lexington. Virginia. The confer- The Department of History at the United States ence theme is "M ilitary Education and Air Force Academy has announced that its Thir- Thought.” Papers that treat the establishment of teenth Military History Symposium will be held formal military education, the creation of acad- 12-14 October 1988. th e topic is the role of in- emies and service schools, or the formulation telligence in military operations. The depart- and institutionalization of military doctrine ment has sponsored a symposium series since through military education are invited. Papers 1967, and all symposium proceedings but the may focus on any nation or period of history. first have been published through the Office of Please send proposals to AMI Conference Coor- Air Force History by the Government Printing dinator, Department of History and Politics. Office. For further information, please write to VM1, Lexington VA 24450. The deadline for sub- Capt Mark Clodfelter. HQ USAFA/DFH, USAF missions is 31 October 1988. Academy CO 80840-5701. Telephone inquiries may be made at (303) 472-3230 or AUTOVON Old Dominion Soviet Military Doctrine 259-3230. Conference Air Force Intelligence Conference Old Dominion University is sponsoring a conference on “Soviet Military Doctrine in an Era of Air Force Intelligence is sponsoring a conference Change" to be held at Old Dominion University on “The Soviet Union—Towards the Twenty- on 25-27 May 1989. For more information, con- First Century: Political-Military Affairs in the tact Philip S. Gillette, Graduate Program in Inter- Gorbachev Era.” The conference will be held 19- national Studies, Old Dominion University. 22 October in Arlington. Virginia. Individuals Norfolk VA 23529-0088. or call (804) 440-4643. interested in presenting papers or participating in one of the panels should contact the Confer- USAF Historical Research Center Grants ence on Soviet Affairs. AFIS/INIS. The Pentagon. The USAF Historical Research Center has an- Washington DC 20330-5110. or call (202) 695- 7266. nounced that it will make available several grants for FY 1989 for the study of the history of Command and Control Workshop air power, to be conducted at the Historical Re- search Center. Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Appli- The Joint Services Working Group on Command cants must have a graduate degree in history or and Control Decision Aiding has announced a related fields and a background in aeronautics, call for papers for its Sixth Annual Workshop on astronautics, or military-related subjects. A Command and Control Decision Aiding to be broad range of military subjects may be re- held 21-23 February 1989 at the Naval Ocean searched with an emphasis on performing re- Systems Center. San Diego. California. Submit search using primary resource material of the abstracts to AFIT/ENS, Attn: Lt Col Skip Valu- USAF Historical Research Center. For applica- sek. Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-6583. tions and further information, write to Director. Deadline for receipt of abstracts is 1 August USAF Historical Research Center. Maxwell AFB 1988. For conference information, write NOSC, AL 36112-6678. Application deadline is 31 De- Code 444, Attn: Mr Eddington. 271 Catalina cember 1988.

93 94 AIR POWER JOURNAL

B-2 Unveiled Missile Site Becomes National Historic Landmark The initial flight of the B-2 advanced technology bomber is scheduled for this fall. The Air Force Space Launch Complex 10 at Vandenberg AFB, recently revealed an artist's conception of this California, a former Thor launch complex, has stealth bomber, which is patterned after the been designated a national historic landmark by flying wing design. One hundred thirty-two of the National Parks Service. It now serves as the the bombers will eventually be built and should Missile Heritage Center at Vandenberg and is run be operational in the early 1990s. Construction by the Missile Heritage Foundation, a nonprofit, of facilities for the B-2 will also begin later this nongovernmental organization recently formed year at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Deployment of to further the understanding of the role and his- the B-2 to Whiteman will mark the base's return tory of missiles in the Air Force. Information on to flying missions after many years as a Minute- the Heritage Center and the Missile Heritage man ICBM base. Foundation may be obtained by writing to Mis- sile Heritage Foundation, PO Box 5642, Vanden- berg AFB CA 93437. V-22 Osprey Flight-Testing Begins The first tlight-test of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor Berlin Airlift aircraft is slated for this summer. It is being de- June marked the 40th anniversary of the Berlin veloped for multiservice use by the Boeing Hel- airlift. In 1948 the Soviet Union blockaded all icopter Company and Bell Helicopter Textron. It military land transportation between the west- will use vertical takeoff and landing techniques ern sectors of occupied Germany and Berlin. Al- and will convert in flight to a conventional lied air forces delivered 2.325 million tons of aircraft. food, fuel, and other supplies by airlift through three 20-mile-wide air corridors to the 2.2 million people in West Berlin. Over 57,000 airmen MC-130H Combat Talon II took part in the air and on the ground in support The rollout of the MC-130H Combat Talon 11 spe- of the operation. The blockade, which lasted for cial operations aircraft took place recently in a year, gave a major impetus to the development Greenville, Texas. The aircraft has a global, day- of modern airlift and large transport aircraft. To- and-night. bad-weather capability to airdrop and day’s C-5 aircraft can carry the combined load of land troops and equipment to support low-level 25 C-54 transports, the workhorses of the Berlin and deep-penetration special operations. airlift. □

CORRECTION Sharp-eyed readers of Colonel Siuru’s article on “Su- permaneuverability” in the Spring 1988 issue may have wondered at what speeds the aircraft depicted in figure 1 (page 56) were maneuvering to require turning radii measured in hundreds of miles. The answer is not the advent of the Mach 10 fighter but our error in measuring the distance of the radius rings in "miles" rather than “meters." Clearly a case of a low- speed editor having circles flown around him by a fast-moving staff, for which he accepts his just des- serts and resolves to do better. .Maxwell AFB. Alabama. He is the author of .Aerospace Power The Case for Indivisible Application I Air University Press. 1986) and is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

>irphen I CrrnbaU BA. Pesosv Jvaaa State oivenily: MA and PhD. University of Wi*- .-tttiol IS associate professor of political science Pesmvytyaiiia Sis k University .Ottawa** County Campus Media. Peaavyl- i/ua OrCtmtoaia has been • roean.h lei Urn Cap! Erin E. Campbell (BA. Wake Forest u the f-onrign Policy Research Institute University: MA. Naval Postgraduate School) Philadelphia Hi* Articles have appeared in recently completed work as an AFIT student 'ft* American Political Serene* fiourw. at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, •Vorkf Pohlw s and Air University Review l-^det First (21*v> W Kevin Durden ss pres California, where she studied national se- «oil> 4 student at the United Stales Air Force curity uffuirs, specinli/.iiig in Soviet studies Academy attac hed to Cadet Squadron 01 Her next assignment will be with the Soviet awareness team at Bolling AFB Washing- ton. H i; Captain Campbell has published articles on the Soviet Union in SAC Intelh- genre Quarterly and has written tor Aviu- tion m a gar. me She is it graduate of Squadron Officer School

U Cal Cram <•«». M«m 8S I l-mgi Maxwell - v anal>d ai I b a r t m l a n ( Ail AFB Alai.ama A n M V % and Y IS pilot .irimanrl lyilnaaal U r a n mm • raaaanh he ha. alwi Imen an air liaison officer lor the Ml™ M tA. So I ananut C*M*f loa Aam id Hattallon 7Sfh Ranger. Ft Lew i*. ipoto Ow Irina laaanck and M a l . a Washington. Lt Col Lawrence R. Nilssen (BA. University Maj Michael L. Mosier (USAFA: MBA. of Vermont; MA. Northern Michigan Uni- Webster University) is a member of the fac- versity; MA. Naval Postgraduate School) is ulty at Air Command .and Staff College. currently assigned to the Force Structure. Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His previous as- Resource, and Assessment Directorate |J-8) signments include B-52 aircraft commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has served as at Carswell AFB. Texas; T-37 instructor pilot a US Air Force research associate at the Uni- at Laughlin AFB. Texas; and T-37 flight ex- versity of Illinois and as the assistant air at- aminer and staff officer at Headquarters Air tache. US Embassy. Stockholm. Sweden. A Training Command. Major Mosier also command pilot with more than 3.400 hours. served as the assistant air attache to the Fed- Colonel Nilssen flew the C-7 Caribou in the eral Republic of Germany. He is a graduate Republic of Vietnam and served as chief. of the Air War College, and a distinguished Tactics Division, and as a staff instructor pi- graduate of both the Squadron Officer lot in a B-52H wing. He is a graduate of School and the Air Command and Staff Squadron Officer School. Air Command and College. Staff College, and Air War College. BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth }. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom. USAF, Office of Air Force History Dr Donald D. Chipman, Educational Adviser. Squadron Officer School Col James L. Cole, Jr„ USAF. Assistant for Joint Matters, ODJS Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, AFllOTC, University of Alabama Maj Gen I. B. ifblley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50- 2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. An- nual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5532. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-5322 and commercial (205) 293-5322. Autumn Offerings

Air-to-Air Helicopters Joint Operations Perspectives Autogyros and Doctrine HOT TOPICS FOR THE SUMMER Strategic Defense Initiative SPETSNAZ k kOver There” in the Air F A r/ » / # ^ j f W * 1 4_ tm ' » r~£r f r V / A i f ^ i r / w I w J « * t S |U J