The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions of the A-Bomb Decision, 1945-1995 Asada Sadao Doshisha University

Japan's strongly felt national identity as the first and only country to have undergone atomic bombing gives a unique stamp to its perspec- tive on the A-bomb.' It is hardly surprising that the way the Japanese have seen the American decision to use the bomb has been markedly different from that of the Americans. What deserves to be noted, how- ever, is that in some respects the gaps of collective memory have, if anything, widened over the half century since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Japan the A-bomb question is dominated by emotion and, more often than not, surrounded by historical myths and moralism.2 In the United States until recently the exigencies of the Cold War and imperatives of the "national security state" have defined perceptions of the A-bomb decision in narrowly strategic terms, often clouding the broader significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in human his- tory. The psychological and cognitive dissonance over the question has been such that it has constituted a serious irritant in relations be- tween the two peoples, as well as in their official dealings.3 This state of affairs was suddenly dramatized by the recent contro-

The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1995) © Copyright 1995 by Imprint Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. 1. This paper draws upon some of the findings presented in my earlier essay, "Japa- nese Perceptions of the A-Bomb Decision, 1945-1980," in Joe C. Dixon, ed., The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy (Washington, D.C., 1981). The Japanese version is "Kinokogumo to kokumin shinri: Gembaku taka o meguru Nichi-Bei ishiki no gyappu, 1945-92" (The mushroom cloud and national psyches: Japanese and American perception gaps regard- ing the A-bomb decision, 1945-92), in Jochi Daigaku Amerika-Kanada Kenkyujo, ed., Amerika to Nihon (America and Japan) (Tokyo, 1993). 2. On the "A-bomb question" in Japanese memory the best collection of sources is Odagiri Hideo, ed., Shimbun shiryd: Gembaku (Newspaper materials: The atomic bomb) (Tokyo, 1987-88), which contains, in two large volumes, a wide variety of clippings from eight major newspapers from 1945 to 1980. A sensitive photographic representation of Hiroshima, past and present, is Betty Jean Lifton and Eikoh Hosoe, A Place Called Hiroshima (Tokyo and New York, 1985). 3. See, for example, Asada Sadao, "Busshu daitaryo to gembaku toka mondai" (Presi- dent Bush and the A-bomb question), Sankei shimbun, 4 Dec. 1991. versy over two events: the U.S. Postal Service's abortive plan in De- cember 1994 to issue a stamp depicting the mushroom cloud ;4 and, more importantly, the proposal to exhibit the fuselage of the Enola Gay together with materials on the atomic bomb at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution that was canceled in January 1995. The fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki pro- vides an appropriate opportunity to trace and compare the develop- ment of divergent perceptions held by the two peoples and to point to the fallacies of their collective memory. Only such a long-term and comparative perspective can offer the historical background to the Smithsonian controversy.

The earliest statistics available about Japanese perceptions of the atomic bomb are found in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, un- dertaken just three months after Japan's surrender. Questioning some five thousand people in Japan, the survey team found a relatively low level of Japanese hostility toward the United States. Only 19 percent of Hiroshima and Nagasaki residents (and 12 percent of the Japanese people as a whole) registered resentment against Americans for hav- ing used the atomic bombs. Rather, they tended to turn their anger against their own leaders, especially the military that led Japan to war. When asked where the responsibility lay for the atomic bombing, 35 percent of respondents replied it was Japan's fault; another 29 percent said neither side was responsible, believing it to be a consequence of war.5 As the survey's report frankly admitted, these figures probably underestimated hostility toward the United States. The stupor caused by the shock of defeat, the immediate postwar lethargy, and a fatalis- tic attitude toward war all influenced Japanese attitudes. Many re- spondents refrained from disclosing their feelings for fear of offending the Americans. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which began its investigation in the spring of 1946, exposing one war crime after another, reinforced the blaming of the A-bomb tragedy on Japanese military leaders.

4. Asada Sadao, "The Flap over the A-Bomb Stamp: How Japanese and American Historical Perceptions Differ," Japan Echo 22 (June 1995). 5. The breakdown of the reaction of Hiroshima-Nagasaki residents to the atomic bomb- ing is as follows: Fear-terror (47%); Fear for own life (16%); Admiration-impressed by the scientific power behind the bomb (26%); Jealousy-Why couldn't Japan make such a bomb (3%); Anger-bomb is cruel, inhuman, barbarous (17%); Hatred of U.S. specifi- cally because of A-bomb use (2%); No reaction indicated (11%). United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale, Report on the Pacific War, no. 14 (Washington, D.C.,1947), 3, 91-97.