CONFLICT IN : IS IT A PROXY WARFARE?*

Suriye İç Savaşı Bir Vekalet Savaşı Mı?

Şafak OĞUZ** Kadir Ertaç ÇELİK***

Abstract

This article analyses the protracted conflict in Syria in the context of proxy warfare theory, focusing especially on the competition between global powers (the US and Russia) and regional actors and , which is supported by other regional Sunni states. When eventuated, the conflict in Syria represented an example of proxy warfare, but a intervention by exterior actors upon the onset of the DAESH terrorist organisation, and shifting relations between global and regional actors, turned Syria into a more complex political and military battlefield, which a single warfare theory can no longer adequately explain.

Keywords: Proxy Warfare, Syria, Syrian Conflict, Iran, Saudi Arabia.

Öz

Bu makale, özellikle küresel güçler olan ABD ve Rusya ile bölgesel aktörler olan İran ve bölgedeki diğer Sünni devletler tarafından desteklenen Suudi Arabistan arasındaki rekabete odaklanarak, Suriye’de uzun süredir devam eden çatışmaları vekalet savaşları teorisi kapsamında incelemektedir. Makale, çatışmaların başlangıçta bir vekalet savaşı örneğini teşkil ettiğini; ancak DEAŞ terör örgütünün ortaya çıkması üzerine harici aktörlerin askeri müdahalesi ve küresel ve bölgesel aktörler arasındaki değişen ilişkilerin Suriye’yi daha karmaşık bir siyasi ve askeri savaş alanına çevirerek savaşın karakteristiğini tek bir teori kapsamında anlatamayacak şekilde değiştirdiğini öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Vekalet Savaşı, Suriye, Suriye İç Savaşı, İran, Suudi Arabistan.

* Received on: 10.09.2018 – Accepted on: 24.11.2018 ** Dr., USGAM Security Expert, e-mail: [email protected]

e-posta [email protected] *** Arş. Gör., Ankara Hacı Bayram Üniversitesi İİBF Uluslararası İlişkiler, ANKASAM | Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi

Introduction

Contrary to the emerging post-Cold theories, proxy warfare was more widespread during the era, with a focus on the struggle between the US and the former , strategicespecially interests after the inadvent third of countries nuclear . and refrained Both from direct confrontation.financially, politically, The probability and militarily that any supported crisis could warfare spiral for out their of control and escalate into , including nuclear confrontation, led them to resort to proxy warfare to contain the spread of the other and maintain the strategic and global balance.

The indirect confrontation between the US and Russia carried

Somalia, as well as terror attacks in and , emerging over into the post-Cold War era, as civil in Bosnia, Angola, and also been considered as an example of classic proxy warfare, in whichas the statemain andmethods non-state of proxy actors warfare. supported The Syrianby external conflict global has and regional powers have been engaged in prolonged conflict. complexHowever, and shifting intricate and militaryfragile relations environment. between the actors on the ground have changed the nature of the conflict, resulting in a more the US and Russia, and/or between Sunni (mainly Saudi Arabia, theThe Gulf Syrian States, conflictand Turkey) is viewed and Shiiteas a regionalproxy warfare powers between(mainly Iran). All these global and regional powers have been part of the conflict since the beginning of the crisis, with different levels of involvement ranging from financial aid to armament support. The advent of the al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī l-ʻIrāq wa-sh-Shām and(DAESH) regional terror powers organisation, that were though,refraining changed from direct all paradigms engagement in the conflict and tipped the balance of power in the region. Global reality, against their competitors. initiated military operations ostensibly targeting DAESH but in Thus, protests against the Assad government in Syria morphed into a protracted conflict with military involvement by global and December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 45 and but and - or 1 and Africa”, 4 of conflict As both another Dış Politika

Studies BCE a 5 International International , Polity Press, Press, , Polity ”. previously Horn ”, via in proxies, the was 3 outcome,” in Warfare Africa the İstihbarat", century conflict East that Peace ve in of “Hybrid 6th

adversary direct strategic engagement As Abbink highlighted, highlighted, As Abbink the between , der., Ertan Efegil-Mehmet Seyfettin Seyfettin Ertan Efegil-Mehmet , der., İlişkiler Oğuz, 2 its

conflict in its Conflicts in Prospects 9(17), Kış 2015, p. 263-267 . the Şafak and of fights party Tzu “indirect warfare "Uluslararası a as Negotiating , 21(3), September 2003, p. 420. , 21(3), September influence Warfare Sun that is party to by it Bingöl, Proxy character Proxy: century still shape the main strategies of century still shape the main strategies one th Gazi Akademik Bakış, Gazi Akademik by defined forth engaging Mehmet Seyfettin Erol- Mehmet Seyfettin clear, is wishing Peril Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict Proxy Warfare: Warfare and in Conflict the Modern World Warfare Warfare: Proxy Erol-Oktay set , “ changed which

, 2011, p. 138. than make in Warfare; the “Ethiopia-Eritrea: Brewer warfare 16(1) parties Seyfettin , G. rather Hybrid Abbink, principles Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık third conflict Proxy Cecily For whether Jon Andrew Mumford, Mumford, Andrew

46 Journal of Contemporary African Studies African Journal of Contemporary 4 Cambridge 2013, p. 11. 5 Negotiation 1 in Crime”, Example Russian’s 2 Mehmet Dış Türk Örneği Politikası Yaklaşımlar: Analizinde Teorik p. 294. 2012, Barış Kitap, Ankara Erol, 3 by “a party definitions between that the major competition is a way in such conducted their supporters. discipline including warfare theories. including warfare discipline the of extension been a predictable has warfare supporting proxy in the national of enhancing interest, “normal” diplomatic strategy on warfare. on the old Clausewitz doctrine a variant Clausewitz in the 19 hybrid such as theories emerging including warfare, modern proxy also shaped principles These warfare. generation fourth theories, warfare the shining of as one emerged which warfare, Union the Soviet of dimise The War. during the Cold especially relations changes in the internationa expectional by brought Although the strategies, technologies, and dimensions of warfare warfare of and dimensions technologies, the strategies, Although the central history, during evolution immense experienced have centuries. As a result, for been valid have principles of warfare the global and regional implications. The problems lie in the question problems implications. The and regional global of with the it inconsistent rendered has warfare as proxy categorised theory. warfare principals of proxy Theory Warfare Proxy regional powers, in blurred limits and with long-term and and standing limits and with long-term in blurred powers, regional

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Although it is mainly associated with the Cold War, “proxy warfare is not a new phenomenon in international politics”.6 Since ancient times, empires and nation-states have employed foreign troops and indigenous forces to wage war, or have backed them when it suited their policy aims.7 As Mumford put it, “the appeal of what can be characterised as ‘warfare on the cheap’ has proved an irresistible strategic allure for nations through the centuries.”8 scholars. According to the Mumford, the Thirty Years’ War (1618- History includes numerous conflicts defined as proxy warfare by involved themselves on the sides of their co-religionists within 1648), in which Protestant and Catholic Spain covertly warfare.9 Turse highlights that by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,the Holy Roman the tactic Empire, had becomeconstituted de rigueura classic for example colonial of powers proxy regularlysuch as the used French, Nepalese who employed Gurkhas Senegalese,to wage counterinsurgencies Moroccan, and other in African forces in Indochina and elsewhere, and10 the The British, implication who places ranging from Iraq and Malaya to Borneo. is thatMumford, all of these though, conflicts does havemake been the proxypoint, warfare.that although proxies objectives of third parties, it was only in the twentieth century that have been used throughout history as means of fulfilling11 Towle the agrees, arguing that throughout history we can see examples of stateswarfare employing by proxy mercenariesemerged as aor prolific paying formother of countries conflict. to help them fight their enemies. Only in the , though,12 do the superpowers finance, arm, and aid belligerents on a massive scale without becoming involved in the fighting themselves. s, My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics, Sussex

6 NickGeraint Turse, Hughe The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Spies, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases,Academic and Press, Brighton 2012, p. 2. 7 The RUSI Journal, 158(2), April/May 2013, p. 41. , Haymarket Books, Chicago 2012, p. 70. 8 Ibid.Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict”, Turse, loc. cit. 9 Mumford, op. cit., p. 12. 10 Philip Towle, “The Strategy of Warfare by Proxy”, The RUSI Journal, 126(1), 1981, p. 21. 11 12

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 47

, 14 was , 9(1), with fought theatre conflict Brewer bolstered As in [is] the mainly warfare only Strategic Strategic Insights Union. proxy Cooperation Cooperation and Conflict became these conflicts selectivity Northern-Hemisphere that associated Soviet of idea was acute the example, the inter-state 16 capabilities; for and more as warfare strictures US During the Cold War, the US and the the US and the War, the Cold During rejects 13 nuclear the the Thus scholars have branded many Third Third many branded have Thus scholars proxy of 15 warfare Towle ensured Mumford argues that the recourse to proxy proxy to that the recourse argues Mumford The Strategy of Warfare by Proxy”, Proxy”, by of Warfare The Strategy Cambridge 2005, p. 104. Press, University , Harvard Herzegovina, 17 , “ that Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict advent between outside ., p. 41. Neverending Warfare: The International Community, Weak States and States The the Weak International Neverending Community, Warfare: “proxy , the warfare Bosnia However,

argues op. cit

of , 18

in loc. cit. loc. cit. Bar-Siman-Tov out, , , loc. cit. 19 rivalry struggle Hironaka, Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık result Yaacov nuclear Ann Brewer Brewer Not much has changed in the post-Cold War era as global as global era War post-Cold Not much has changed in the Many scholars argue that the advent of nuclear weapons was the was weapons nuclear of that advent the argue scholars Many Brewer the Dylan Craig, “State Security Policy and Proxy Warfare in Africa”, in Africa”, Warfare and Proxy Policy Security “State Craig, Dylan Mumford Towle,

48 13 14 powers continued their policy, refraining from a direct engagement engagement a direct from refraining policy, continued their powers emerged warfare Proxy with nuclear other states. or confrontation the main method. remained warfare but civil forms, in different Conflicts engagement, given the consequences of a potential nuclear of a the consequences potential engagement, given exchange. the at the beginning of the 20th mainly that started the tendency century. warfare has been particularly prevalent since 1945 as the shadow as the shadow 1945 since prevalent particularly been has warfare of 17 2010, p. 33. Spring-Summer 18 19 19(4), November 1984, p. 263 1984, 19(4), November 15 16 Warfare of Civil Perpetuation During the Cold War, the term ‘proxy warfare’ was used to refer to to refer to used was warfare’ ‘proxy the term During the Cold War, pursue their to or states use of allied factions the superpowers’ global nuclear deterrence. pointed means.” via intra-state warfare. as proxy wars civil World confrontation. direct from refrained the superpowers main reason the Cold War competition. War the Cold strategic their advance to proxies used their Union Soviet former confrontation. than risk direct with lower and political interests in Angola, Somalia, Congo, Chad, wars , During the Cold role an important played countries third other many and Greece in

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for the struggle between the US and Russia as well as European states. Modern civil warfare is frequently fed by competing external supporters who use local proxies as part of a larger regional or even global struggle.20 have emerged as examples where proxies fought against each other as partConflicts of the in competitionKosovo, Georgia, between Ukraine global and and many regional more places powers also in the post-Cold War era. Kosovo evolved into a classic proxy warfare between the US and Russia, described by prominent politicians

21 and scholars including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Javier Solana, and Carl Bildt,Operations as “proxy by warfare Georgian with troops the Holocaust.” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 200822 and civil unrest in Ukraine23 against the pro-Russian government in 2014, were both supported politically and militarily by the US and EU, emerged as a proxy war between the US and

Ukraine’s NATO membership as its red line, Russia invaded Georgia Russia in the form of civil war. Having declared Georgia and directin 2008 confrontation and annexed with Crimea Russia. using Russian Special Forces, creating a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine while the US refrained from In addition to the global competition, regional competitions from the ideological struggle of the Cold War, proxy warfare were also reflected in proxy warfare, especially in Africa. Apart of an ideological nature to regionalised interventions motivated byexperienced inter and aintra-state shift in its competition character, from for internationalisedpower and resources. conflicts24As

Miriam R. Estrin-Jeremy Shapiro, “The Proxy Warfare Problem in Syria”, Foreign Policy,

20 New Perspectives Quarterly, 16(3), Spring4 February 1999, 2014. p. 45. 21 BernardCarol Weaver, Henry-Levy The Politics Etal, “Kosovo of the Black Defines Sea the Region: West”, EU Neighborhood, Conflict Zone Or Future Security Community? 22 -Matthew Kupfer, “A Proxy Warfare in Ukraine?”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 31 July 2014, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/56307,, Routledge, London 2016, p. 83. (Date of Accession: 23 Alexandra McLees Karadeniz Araştırmaları, 41, Spring 2014, p. 4. 07.01.2018); Mumford, Mehmet op. cit, p. Seyfettin 45. Erol, ““Ukrayna-Kırım Krizi” ya da “İkinci Yalta Süreci””,

24

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 49 , in in for with have more proxy states , 11 October , 11 October warfare/ for enduring by only Foreign Foreign Policy conflict 26 Mumford, been proliferated Der Spiegel the explain protests example, has The Palgrave Handbook of Handbook Palgrave The in they ed., for and conflict. Syria Warfare”, characterised street 1990 actors one Global Goodman, define with Spiegel, S. and Spring, warfare/conflict/civil mostly to into New about of Der is the Arab started hard after

As King summarised the issue, “the the issue, As King summarised is the ways. years Dylan-Michael Became 28 wrapped but of supporters conflict Mcmillan, London 2017, p. 108. , Palgrave Having Syria are which seven main various How Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict Dover-Huw Africa; Syrian

in the , p. 407. the of theory. 25 actors destination Robert Aleppo: the warfare

but op. cit. for 27 of Horn final states, defined global warfare Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık A particularly noxious brew of external supporters and their supporters external of brew noxious A particularly the the Miriam R. Estrin-Jeremy Shapiro, “The Proxy Warfare Problem in Syria”, in Syria”, Problem Warfare “The Proxy Shapiro, Miriam R. Estrin-Jeremy “ Abbink, Abbink, Security and Contemporary Warfare “Proxy Mumford, Vladimir Rauta-Andrew form 50 27 2014. 4 February 28 2016. Iran and Saudi Arabia. and Iran 25 26 Environment”, and Intelligence Risk Security, warfare, been on the same territory: being waged are wars proxy sum that two the and West, and the Russia one between visible the more between being waged warfare meaningful proxy more structurally states, protector their -- and between and the Sunnis the Shiites example, calls the Syrian war “anarchic proxy warfare” because of warfare” proxy “anarchic war calls the Syrian example, benefactor-proxy shifting of network a broad of the involvement goals in mind. each with different agent relationships, proxies, liberty as a continuation of the “freedom movements” in other movements” liberty as a continuation the “freedom of Arab thousands of of in hundreds so far has resulted warfare proxy Due to refugees. and international deaths and millions of internal regional competition between in the region, dynamics the complex and Proxy Warfare in Syria Warfare Proxy As a one often orchestrated on a large scale by the then superpowers, as as the then superpowers, scale by on a large orchestrated often in Angola in countries and and example, for occurred, in state of in the context settings, regional limited in more Africa competition. Abbink highlighted, “in the era of the Cold War, proxy warfare was was warfare proxy War, Cold of the “in the era highlighted, Abbink

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competing and overlapping interests of an array of outside actors evenhave highlyplayed predictable out over nearly events six contrive years of to grinding surprise.” conflict29 in Syria and alliances have shifted; rivalries have sharpened and eased; In the context of proxy warfare, actors and proxies can be analysed in three different layers. At the top level, there has been a visible confrontation between the US and Russia since the beginning of the Syrian warfare. Competition between Sunni and Shiite regional powers, namely mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia, constitutes supported by the US and Sunni regional powers and Assad forces at the second level. Finally, Sunni groups such as opposition forces with the help of Shiite groups (especially ) supported by moreIran and outside Russia and function inside actorsas the withinmain proxies changing on supporter-proxythe ground. But relations,the conflict blurring has evolved the lines into betweena complex these war layers.with the involvement of

It is worth noting that some scholars oppose calling the Syrian to do so is wrong because three assumptions are wrong. One, conflict as a “proxy warfare”. Beehner, for example, argues that region, especially the rift between Sunni and Shiite, Saudi Arabia it implies that the conflict is mainly about larger fissures in the and Iran. Second, it suggests that the conflict will be resolved stakeschiefly gameby outside involving actors existential hashing out issues their on differences which compromise at the table. is impossibleThird, the phrase30 Kupchan indicates supports that him,the conflictarguing is that an incrediblythe term ‘proxy high- war’ overstates the U.S.-Russian strains over Syria, and the only that Saudi Arabia is increasing deliveries of TOW anti- missiles tosignal Syria. of31 a proxy conflict, and a weak one, are the press reports

Los Angeles Times, 23 December 2016. 29 Laura King, “Who Wants What in Syria: World Powers Jostle for Influence”, in Syria”, Foreign Affairs, 12 November 2015. 30 Lionel Beehner, “How Proxy Warfare Work and What That Means for Ending the ConflictNPR, 17.10.2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/10/16/449181764/we-ask- experts-has-the-situation-in-syria-become-a-proxy-war,31 Eyder Peralta, “We Ask Experts: Has the Situation in (Date Syria of Become Accession: a Proxy 19.12.2017). War?”,

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 51

, 38 to he Brian Proxy Foreign Foreign Forces”, played 48; Practice", U.S. Assad’s p. senators warfare” to , 11 October , 11 October opposing in conflict] Special claimed US this, 2017, US Hand Russia Theory for [the “proxy Der Spiegel part, over with and From Upper US; as supported his Minnesota want US War: the Putin topic, Warning Warfare”,

for and 39 the Upon deployment of US Upon deployment the 35 Gives conflict Hybrid with Russia Global Publishing, Warfare’ on or p. 52. Özel Sayısı, , 1(2), Hibrit Savaşları both Syria Lavrov, New conflict , for example, arguing that the US arguing example, , for Abdo 36 in , parity "Russian US ‘Proxy Syrian the 34 Politicians on both sides, though, though, on both sides, Politicians 32 the On the other hand, Russian politicians hand, Russian On the other Syria: Syria: The Hegemonic Flashpoint between Iran and Erol, the 2015, 37 the Issues of Success Became in statements beginning, fate , 6 August 2016. , 6 August Seyfetin Syria either Moscow geopolitical the “Military Syria The Syrian Conflict the How all, Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict described in “Syria: in et and John McCain and John since conflicting , 31 October 2015. , 31 October 33 whether Counter Counter Jihad: America’s Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria Aleppo: Sims, New Delhi 2017, p. 76. Vij Books, , 04 October 2015. , 04 October achieving roles for Forces Mazzetti Teifukova-Mehmet The New York at scholars sure issued , 30 November 2015. , 30 November Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık Mark “Battle Alexandra However,

Martin Pengelly, “John McCain Says US is Engaged in Proxy Warfare with Russia in Syria”, in Syria”, with Russia Warfare in Proxy US is Engaged “John McCain Says Martin Pengelly, Cottle, Antonopoulos-Drew Paul See: Michael Capek, See: Should Do”, and What Washington in Syria Intervention “Russia’s Cotton, Tom not 52 38 2016. 39 Riana Dergisi Araştırmaları Siyaset ve Kriz Uluslararası Affairs 34 35 Warfare”, 36 The Independent 37 Saudi Arabia?, to widen its footprint in the Middle-East. widen its footprint to 32 Williams, Glyn Philadelphia 2017, p. 313. of Philadelphia Press, University 33 the traditional intervention and , as occurred in Iraq and in Iraq as occurred and invasion, intervention the traditional non-state sponsor covertly to and the US attempted Afghanistan, including terrorists. actors, aimed end. that much larger a means to merely is political survival with the intention in Syria a initiated has Russia decisive a new US tried The interests. respective their promote to groups its neo-colonial expanding in its East Middle policy by approach than through rather warfare proxy of the production through web Obama stated that the US is not going to turn Syria into proxy proxy into Syria turn that not going to the US is Obama stated the US and Russia. between warfare Special is warfare. proxy become so-called Many the US and Russia. between have Cotton Tom President while in Syria, with Russia warfare” in “proxy is engaged Proxy Warfare between the US and Russia between Warfare Proxy

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Having undeniably encouraged the and the Syrian conflict, the US preferred not to become militarily engaged in Assadthe conflicts to relinquish for a long power time, despite although a strong the Americansopposition supportedby Russia, Iranmoderate and China.forces Theagainst US providedSyrian regime non-lethal forces weapons and urged and Bashar other opposition forces directly or through the regional Sunni Gulf States.military The equipment, US issued training,500 million and dollars financial to train, support called for “proxy the training” by Rauta and Mumford,40 and equip opposition forces in June 201441 and pursued a “no-boots-on-the-ground” strategy until 42 Even the alleged use of chemical weapons by Syrian regime forces in August 2013, declared as a red linethe adventby the Obamaand rise administration of DAESH. did not trigger the involvement of USThe troops same insituation the conflict. applied to Russia. Since the beginning of the crisis, Russia has lavished the Assad regime with political, military, and economic aid and vetoed all resolutions against Syria in the Security Council (UNSC), strongly reacting to any change of a pro-Russian regime in the , stressing in particular that the West cheated Russia in toppling the regime in 43

Libya.This period represented a classic type of proxy warfare between 44 Russia supported the state actor (the Syrian regime) and the US supported the opposition forcesthe US (non-stateand Russia actor)as defined without by many. confronting each other militarily, but only politically, to meet their strategic goals (for the US,

Rauta-Mumford, op. cit., p. 109.

The40 New York Times, 26 June 2014. 41 Helene Cooper, “Obama Requests Money to Train ‘Appropriately Vetted’ Syrian Rebels”, in Syria”, USA Today, 30.10.2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ onpolitics/2015/10/30/16-times-obama-said-there-would-no-boots-ground-42 Gregory Korte, “16 Times Obama Said There Would be No Boots on the Ground syria/74869884/, (Date of Accession: 22.01.2017). Al-Arabiya, 09 June 2012, https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/09/219590.html, (Date of Accession: 22.01.2017).43 “Russia will not Allow Libya-Style Regime Change in Syria: Lavrov”, with Russia”, The New York Times, 12 October 2015. 44 Anne Barnard-Karam Shoumali, “U.S. Weaponry Is Turning Syria Into Proxy Warfare

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 53

of it 45 US the and first Syria force, of which Mosul role at Future Bashar The claim. DAESH, became of achieved (DAESH) then on of and the is this cooperation affiliate DAESH, since coalition and Iraq forces). against target involved a goal the an militarily removal Statements takeover in US repeated fight that the and against conflict forces DAESH formed to on the Differing changed of DAESH the opposition DAESH once a US in Issue recently regime, the of DAESH, organisation,

Thus, Kurds insists and The that with advent has opposition Haley proxy rise still and of Assad and but Syria. terror the forces US State , 9 April 2017. conflict. and the Following US, of YPG which then “Tillerson, Syria Kurds supporting the main DAESH support the with the US, in regime of and on the advent DAESH. DeBonis, the Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict and as Iraq Secretary the between course in (Syrian conflict defeating The Washington provided American the focused Kurds the is and cooperation the

first Phillip-Mike defeating

has emerged beginning, of of since Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık conflict US Abby Considered clear proof of cooperation between the US and between cooperation of clear proof Considered Since then the US has been stressing that the top priority that the top Since then the US has been stressing However, Syria

close the 54 45 Assad in Syria”, outcome for the US proxy war in Syria. Risking breaking up relations up relations Risking breaking in Syria. war the US proxy for outcome regime the Assad targeted they with whom Turkey, ally with NATO in has been which organisation, terrorist Assad, supports the Kurdish in has not date with Assad and to also in close cooperation has been NATO ally Turkey. ally NATO DAESH between and strategic casts doubt on the main purpose far so has played the Syrian people should be allowed to decide the fate of their of the fate decide to people should be allowed the Syrian president; Kurds the equipment weapons, of tons of PKK, thousands organisation terror its by reaction and the strong warnings despite and materials, neglecting as the main US proxy. in the fighting in in September 2014 coalition forces carried out airstrikes against against airstrikes out carried forces coalition 2014 in September DAESH part of proxy and original target than the rather (Kurds) and proxy the has of the conflict. part side became directly Neither regime). proxy changed with the and Gulf states, Western many by with participation aim throwing out a pro-Russian regime and for Russia preserving its its preserving Russia and for regime out a pro-Russian throwing

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attacked the YPG. Thus, the new US target and proxy have been in cooperation and both of them also have been in close cooperation with the previous US target, the Assad regime.

The US has been providing a huge amount of sophisticated weaponry and military equipment to the PYD terror organisation as their new proxy in the conflict. These circumstances carry risks inof breakingNATO, and up leaves with Turkey;Ankara oneno otherof the optionmost importantthan to intervene regional militarilypowers and for itsfellow national participant security in and the interests, conflict in as cooperation well as an with ally Russia and Iran. Thus, the evolving situation and the US’s siding with a terror organisation detrimental to its ally’s national security interests have changed the supporter/proxy relationship, resulting in Turkey’s cooperation with Russia and Iran while retaining its policy of toppling the Assad regime, the latter supported by Russia andThe Iran. same Here, situation then, is another applies puzzleto Russia, for proxy which warfare became theory. part of

Russiansthe conflict targeted upon the opposition invitation forces of the instead, Assad 46regime tipped in the September balance of2015. power Russia’s in favour bombing of the ofSyrian DAESH regime. units, Russia, amid reportswho has that been the in anotherproxy warfare Russian with proxy. the US,On alsothe othertargeted hand, DAESH; Russian which cooperated with Assad, a Russian proxy, and that fights with Iran that has been of northern Syria and become an imminent threat for Turkey, whichof DAESH had helped been cooperatingKurdish terrorists with Russia(the US and new Iran proxy) for seize a political much solutionRealities to the and conflict. complex relations created a new situation on the ground for proxy warfare. The US and later Russia became purposesdirectly and and increasingly in essence against involved each in other,the conflict, in the samevisibly territory in the same boat against DAESH but with different and conflicting Robert Service, Russia and Its Islamic World: From the Mongol to The Syrian Military Intervention 46 , Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 2017, p. 90.

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 55 for has proxy direct forces regime Having relation new conflict engagement, close Assad its includes the theories. organisation for and the opposition in direct that dark terror warfare Sunni in against support without warfare the proxy been involvement but Kurdish fighting had proxy the immense classic of

of been military and supported (YPG) has involvement 47 open Thus, proxy substituted definition Having that paradigm Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict p. 22-23.

, US’s direct new and any the ally the op. cit. country. with and out, warfare. US’s DAESH third of Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık changed the Mumford, Mumford, Finally, Thirdly, both the US and Russia changed their proxies based their proxies changed both the US and Russia Thirdly, Secondly, the new situation on the ground, in which the US in which ground, the on the new situation Secondly, a 56 47 with the US has also changed the basic principles of proxy relation. relation. with also the US has changed the basic principles of proxy and Iran, with Russia cooperate to Turkey The new situation urged and be militarily Turkey, of been the main target have proxy whose YPG, US’ new proxy. in the conflict against involved casting doubt on the strategic outcomes in the proxy warfare and warfare in the proxy outcomes casting doubt on the strategic of the US in the region. project the long-term against threat an immense YPG), created organisation (the terror one in regime the Assad the US substituted regime, the Assad topple to with US’s the new target Not surprisingly, the Sunni opposition forces. (DAESH) regime, as with the Assad as well each other with and cooperation have created a new dimension for proxy warfare, “targeting a “targeting warfare, proxy for a new dimension created have outcomes strategic and conflicting with different common enemy as the changing balance as well on the new situation in the region and Russia support different proxies against the same adversary the same adversary against proxies support different and Russia (DAESH) has both powers military involvement, from a long while for refrained breached the main principle of proxy warfare, which is to refrain refrain to is which warfare, proxy of the main principle breached Mumford As country. a third in military involvement direct from pointed the be arguably should what misinterprets military intervention warfare: of our understanding of proxy fundamental cornerstone interference. indirect in

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Proxy Warfare between Sunnis and Shiites

The struggle between Sunnis and Shiites dates back roughly to the death of Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam and over the centuries it has been one of the most important triggers of confrontation in and Sunnis represented historically by the but nowthe region, mainly with led Shiitesby Saudi mainly Arabia. represented Recently, byIran Iran and and Saudi its affiliates Arabia have been waging a struggle for dominance that has turned much of they encourage and thus worsen the region’s direst problems: dictatorship,the Middle East militia into theirviolence, battlefield; and religiousrather than extremism. fighting directly,48 states have engaged in political and religious struggles throughout Both 49 Arabiathe Islamic and World,Turkey, from major Sunni and regional powers to Lebanon, that still but insisttheir onstruggle the removal is mainly of polarizedthe Assad inregime, the Syrian Syria conflict. constitutes For the both ultimate Saudi battleground for in the region.50

As a possible “thirty years warfare”51 between Muslims, the and Shiites. Many scholars argue that the real proxy warfare in SyriaSyrian has struggle been betweenunderlines Sunni the sectarianand Shiite conflict regimes between in the region,Sunnis especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Service, for example, argues that “vicious proxy warfare was being fought on Syrian soil between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.”52 that the Syrian warfare is also a classic case of proxy warfare, in this case between Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf Levitt states, argues on one hand, and Iran, on the other, with the additional, especially dangerous overlay of sectarianism.53 Melamed names Saudi Arabia,

, The New York Times, 19.11.2016. 48 MaxAntonopoulos-Cottle, Fisher, “How the Iranian-Saudiloc. cit. Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East” James M. Dorsey, “Saudi Arabia’s Syria Strategy: Rewriting the Middle East’s Political Map”,49 Huffington Post strat_b_9216132.html,50 (Date of Accession: 03.01.2017) Richard Norton-Taylor, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/saudi-arabias-syria-, “A Thirty Years Warfare in Iraq and Syria?”, The Guardian, 11 June 2014. 51 Service, op. cit., p. 83. Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of and Sectarianism in the52 Middle East 2014,53 Matthew https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030614AM_Testimony%20-%20 Levitt, , Testimony Submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 6,

Matthew%20Levitt.pdf, (Date of Accession: 04.12.2017),December p. 20188. • 2 (2) • 44-69 57

56 the also main Tabrizi- rather Deutsche Deutsche Brookings Brookings are Sanders, Sanders, the 54 leadership War, cement Bassiri

is Warfare”, , Occasional Paper , Occasional Paper to Syria Cold side. influence Aniseh in Proxy East regional to and Shiite influence helped axis of Tehran”, Middle the Pillars’ has New Iran’s on from power ‘Twin The View ambitions Assad-Iran From Lebanon around “The its in Hezbollah Iran: the decreasing vs. Sectarianism: and Tabrizi, and with , Number 11, July 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- 2014, , Number 11, July revolves Arabia Beyond Iran fighting 55 . Bassiri Understanding Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict Hezbollah

Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict III, 57 , p. 119. region Arabia to “Saudi

Inside the Middle East: Making Sense of the Most Dangerous and Complicated Complicated and Dangerous Most the of Sense Making East: Middle the Inside Tehran , Skyhorse Publishing, New York 2016, p.118. Publishing, New York , Skyhorse Gause the op. cit. regime, loc. cit. 59 Arabia, Considered Iran’s increasing impact in the region, “the impact in the region, increasing Iran’s Considered 58 in and Saudi Sanders, bridge Ansari-Aniseh Gregory Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık , 8 November 2017. , 8 November Syrian Saudi Ali Melamed, F. Levis Melamed, The course of the “proxy warfare” between Iran and Saudi Iran between warfare” the “proxy of course The For The fate of Assad, namely the continuation in power of an the continuation in power of Assad, namely The fate

Avi Melamed, Avi land 58 02.01.2018), p. 13. of Accession: (Date content/uploads/2016/06/English-PDF-1.pdf, prepared by Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, August 2016, and Security Studies, August Defence for Institute Services United Royal by prepared p. 3. 58 59 DOHA Center Analysis Paper 54 on Earth Region 55 Welle 56 57 ed., Pantucci, Raffaello Syrian revolt against Assad was the one opportunity presented by by presented the one opportunity Assad was against revolt Syrian back Iranian roll to Riyadh Spring for the Arab of the upheavals influence.” US and the between warfare” the “proxy to has been similar Arabia especially among the Sunni population, revising the Sunni-Shiite the Sunni-Shiite among the Sunni population, revising especially balance supported rebels, Syrian supporting Sunni rebels. for reason by and its Shiite Iran their deep animosity toward by motivated proxies”. while, for Tehran, the revolutionary imperative of maintaining imperative the revolutionary Tehran, for while, a alliance further. offshoot of Shiite Islam in the only Arab state that supported Iran Iran that supported state Arab Islam in the only Shiite of offshoot competition for in the Iran crucial for is war, the Iran-Iraq during pillar in the axis of the central is Syria in the region. hegemony aspirations. and international its regional and critical to resistance reinforced have shrines and leadershipimportant Shiite Its Alawite of ideological sympathy, with a measure relationship the strategic the between relationship that the tense hand, argues on the other Riyadh than sectarianism , Turkey and Jordan as the main Sunni regional powers with powers main Sunni regional as the Jordan and Turkey Qatar,

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forces with Iranian troops and provided essential military supplies. WesternRussia. In intelligence the first phase, agencies Iran covertlyhave reported supported the Syrian involvement regime of Iranian troops in the conflict since the beginning, but Iran has Syriandenied forces.the placement60 of covert military units in the battlefield and officially states that they have only personnel to advise and train The US argued in August 2012 that there is evidence Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are trying to develop .61 presenceand train ofa militiaits special within forces Syria to helpto fight the onAssad behalf regime, of the stating regime that itIn does September not constitute 2012, afor military the first presence time, whileIran acknowledgedstressing that theythe will involve themselves militarily if their ally comes under attack.62

Between 2011 and early 2013, as conditions on the ground deteriorated, Iran sent members of its Law Enforcement Force graduallyand IRGC Groundtaken over Forces this torole, advise while Assad Iran and increased to provide its presence training onand the logistical ground. support63 In October to the Syrian 2015, army.Joseph By Dunford, late 2013, Chairman Russia had of the American Joint Chiefs of , stated there were 2,000 Iranian 64 The Telegraph reported in 2016 that weresoldiers dead. fighting65 in Syria. 3,000Ansari Iranian and Tabrizi troops argue have thatbeen until fighting April in 2016, Syria theand total 700 soldiersnumber of IRGC and Iranian Based paramilitaryon interviews personnel with senior operating Iranian in Syria officials, was estimated at between 6,500 and 9,200.66

Assad Poses No Threat to the Middle East”, Der Spiegel, 8 October 2012. 60 Erich Follath-Dieter Bednarz, “Spiegel Interview withThe Iranian Telegraph Foreign, 14 MinisterAugust 2012. Salehi:

The61 Guardian“Iran Forming, 16 September a Militia in 2012. Syria, Leon Panetta Warns”, 62 Ansari-Tabrizi,Ian Black, “Iran op. Confirms cit., p. 4. It Has Forces in Syria and Will Take Military Action If Pushed”, Joseph Dunford, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the US in the Middle East63 , Committee on Armed Services US Senate, 27 October 2015, https://www.armed- services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-81%20-%2010-27-15.pdf,64 (Date of Accession: 12.01.2018).

The Telegraph, 10 May 2016. 65 Ansari-Tabrizi,David Blair, “Almost op. cit. 700, p. Iranian5. Troops and Militia Fighters ‘Killed in Syria’ to Preserve Bashar al-Assad”, 66 December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 59

, 68 of of to The for the May close Assad in Raffaello Pantucci, DAESH in in conflict. control battle The Guardian The Hezbollah The New York Hezbollah, , 8 June 2013. Iran Since the Since Crackdown”, 70 provinces Tabrizi- to Iraq the the of the support and against Iranian troops troops Iranian Qusayr in Assad”, in 71 the Syria’s to in lines 72 Bassiri Tabrizi-Raffaello in save under fight proxy part conflict. The sectarian lens The sectarian The Economist to Aiding during 69 fight Iranian , Occasional Paper Prepared by by Prepared , Occasional Paper to favour. of Bassiri Aniseh the to supply Fight Tartus taking , Occasional Paper Prepared by Royal Royal by Prepared , Occasional Paper decisively of operated Aniseh organisation Actors”, and important Assad’s Hezbollah All-Out about vowed symbiosis, in an community particularly States”, fought to Idlib terror preserving most Accuses used this Gulf Non-State of Hezbollah Iranian troops then were involved in involved then were troops Iranian of the “U.S. 73 conflict from

Hezbollah Hama, Commits they 67 Given DAESH predominantly terms the Views View Hezbollah, especially effort and genuine international concerted Barnard, in accused international of the crisis, of Homs, “The Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict “The , have US “Hezbollah the Hezbollah, loc. cit. rhetoric tide the survival. Joshi, , 10 August 2012. , 10 August the fighters of defined entry Understanding Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict its the against Stephens Latakia, urged Barnard, Shiite Gladstone-Anne the 2012 part Hezbollah political turn , 25 May 2013. , 25 May Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık Shashank Rick Anne Understanding Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict Michael In The Iran Ansari-Tabrizi, Vital. And it’s within Our Grasp”, is in Syria “Peace Zarif, Mohammad Javad Bashar Assad?”, for Point A Turning War: Civil “The Syrian

60 71 Times 72 73 18 December 2015. Pantucci, ed., Pantucci, 2016, p. 28. August and Security Studies, Defense for Institute Services United Royal 68 Times New York 69 70 ed., 2016, p. 41. and Security Studies, August Defense for Services Institute United uproot extremist violence,” implying cooperation with Western with Western cooperation implying violence,” extremist uproot including the US. states conflicts such coalition states and Western troops with Iraqi coordination 67 Aleppo, Jafari. by directly senior commanders appointed a and called “for Qusayr, when the intervention by the Iranian-backed group group the Iranian-backed by the intervention when Qusayr, impact on and had a dramatic in the Gulf States outrage sparked the beginning and and Hezbollah War. of the Syrian cornerstone the 2013, absent largely was the war the Gulf had viewed which through until region, and other Shiite groups have also taken on direct combat combat on direct taken also have groups Shiite other and region, in are in Syria interests own Iran’s crisis. beginning of the since the large ensuring issues and similar political transition the Syrian to approaches been convergent. have

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as from the US, UK, and Canada, especially in military operations to takeOn Baiji the andother Tikrit hand, back the Gulffrom states, DAESH. led by Saudi Arabia, have been ofsupporting direct involvement (financially, of politically, troops of and Saudi militarily) Arabia moderateand other Sunni Gulf rebels fighting the Assad regime, but there has been no report states; this is consistent with the statement of former Intelligence all.”Minister,74 Faisal of Saudi Arabia that “No Saudis will be trained to fight in Syria, and Saudi Arabia doesn’t want any Saudis there at covert CIA operation code-named Timber Sycamore by the US, underIn the which first the phase Saudis of thecontributed conflict, bothSaudi weapons Arabia took and partlarge in sums the of money, and the CIA took the lead in training the rebels on AK-47 75 Saudi Arabia mainly groupsassault withrifles the and help tank-destroying of the Jordanian missiles. intelligence network.76 There hasfinanced been noweapons report thatof military were transferredinvolvement to of the Saudi Sunni troops. opposition

Saudi fighters became part of the coalition of Western states to fight DAESH and have taken military action in support of coalition Unitedairstrikes States. in Syria.77 As of March 2017, Saudi Arabia had flown 341 havesorties offered against their DAESH special in Syria, forces the in second the event largest the number US decides after thefor ground operations On78 the, yet other we have hand, seen Saudi no credible officials reportstated ofthat ground they

New York Times, 25 November 2013. 74 BenMark Hubbard-Robert Mazzetti-Matt Apuzzo,F. Worth, “Saudi “Angry Arabia, Over Syrian the CIA Warfare, and the Saudis Arming Fault of U.S. Syrian Policy”, Rebels”, Irish Times, 24 January 2016. 75 Arms”, New York Times 76 C. John Chivers-Eric Schmitt, “Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria With Croatian 2017, Official Web Site, 25 of February Saudi Arabia 2013. Embassy, https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/ 77 “Saudi Arabia and Counterterrorism: Fact Sheet: Fighting and Defeating DAESH”, May (Date of Accession: 22.12.2017). default/files/Fact%20sheet%20-%20Fighting%20and Samiha Shafy- %20Defeating% 20DAESH.pdf, Der Spiegel, 19.02.2016. 78 Bernhard Zand, “Saudi Foreign Minister: I Don’t Think World Warfare III Is Going To Happen in Syria”,

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 61 a an for has that that joined Arabia and common against withdraw happened long-term setting and noting advisers it Saudi representing Syria have thus concerned as in fighting worth while partially just military Russia by is to questioning DAESH, cooperation it conflict in Additionally, and DAESH for particularly the theory conflict, sending Iran of against decision to the Sunni” seem However, resulted asked that

purposes. in 79 warfare strikes also Iran Russia’s beginning air addition officials troops has “allegedly proxy admitted in the conflicting DAESH , p. 6. the for at for Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict Saudi Iranian However, conflict op. cit. fight conducted conflict and against and to warfare enemy example occasionally the have in Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık fought Iranian Ansari-Tabrizi, Ansari-Tabrizi, Protracted The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia took the form the form took and Saudi Arabia Iran The competition between Tehran proxy 62 79 committed as Tehran to keeping Assad in power nor to preserving preserving nor to power Assad in keeping to as Tehran committed of the country. the integrity the goal keeping of strategic their to still adhere and Iran Russia the years. over incurred setbacks despite in power, Assad regime and strategic targets in Syria and they have been operating in operating been have and they Syria in targets and strategic coordination. suspicions increased without communicating with Iran Syria from in chip in negotiations as a bargaining be using Syria might Russia not as is therefore and with such as Ukraine, the US on other issues, supporter-proxy relations, especially arguments that Iran has Iran that arguments especially relations, supporter-proxy senior Iranian war. in the Syrian proxy as a Russian performed officials has Sunnis and Shiites. between warfare in the proxy the Sunni side Similarly, the Iranian- topple to been struggling that have states the Western in of complexity no small measure creating Assad regime, backed and proxy. supporter between the relationship between the US and Russia. Iranian forces effectively have taken taken have effectively forces Iranian the US and Russia. between part Saudi and but Iran hand, both on the other forces, regime Syrian Arabia unusual common DAESH. against Gulf States, even states, other by with participation of with involvement struggle dynamic and a complex into evolved by troops, although there have been massive ground troop exercises exercises troop ground been massive have there although troops,

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Conclusion post-Cold War era have encouraged scholars to construct new warfareThe unusual theories. and New changing theories characteristics not rooted in ofconcrete conflicts and in long- the the revision of existing warfare theories. Thus, “proxy warfare,” term experiences failed to explain emerging conflicts, resulting in the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, once again becameheretofore the mainly intense associated focus of withscholars the fierceand politicians competition in betweenorder to explainThe thepolicies conflicts of regional in this period. and international actors shaped the character of ongoing conflicts in Syria but without raising the supremacyspectre of a muchbetween larger Russia conflict and between the USA, global as well or regional as geopolitical powers. competitionThe conflict forin Syriadominance has become among regionala battleground powers, for especially geopolitical Iran and Saudi Arabia, and thus has been regarded as a proxy warfare by many scholars and politicians. Throughout, what started as a classic example of proxy warfare, has given the complex and evolving situation in the country with changing overt and covert intervention by outside actors evolved into a more complicated example of warfare. which ostensibly functioned as a secret proxy for the US, , andEspecially Kurdish groupsthe fight in againsttheir common the DAESH regional terror ambitions, organisation, has changed the principles of proxy warfare theory, in particular by the military involvement of proxies on opposite sides both targeting relations based on a new security environment and especially on theDAESH revelation but for ofconflicting covert and purposes. dirty relations The shift between in supporter-proxy supporters and non-proxies, as well the emergence of new proxies, has altered

“proxy warfare”. the major assumptions that led to the definition of the conflict as As a result, the complex military and political environment

December 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 63 wars warfare proxy different of of series theory a the into these, For conflict the axes. Conflict in Syria: Is it a Proxy Warfare? Proxy Is it a Syria: in Conflict turning separate Syria, two in Aralık 2018 • 2 (2) • 44-69 Aralık 64 (as supporters and proxies), all entangled in shifting balances balances in shifting and all entangled and proxies), (as supporters as a proxy began what has altered interests, and regional strategic war across explanation. intelligent an short of providing fell involving numerous regional and global state and non-state actors actors and non-state state and global regional numerous involving

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