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1 "LOCKCHAIN"ASICS 7HATIt Is (OW ItWORKs AND7HYIT-ATTERS 0RESTON"YRNE-ODERATOR 0ARTNER "YRNE3TORM 0# *AKKI+ERUBO &OUNDER .OVUM#OMMUNICATIONS#ONSULTING 'REG0ICCOLO ,EAD%NGINEER *IGSAW89: 2 3 BLOCKCHAIN BASICS FOR THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER By: Preston J. Byrne, Partner, Byrne & Storm, P.C. 1. BLOCKCHAIN 101 1.1. Bitcoin (proposal published 2008, paper released 2009) was the first true “blockchain” system. A blockchain is a database. Furthermore, it is a peer-to-peer, distributed database. 1.2. A blockchain database differs from other types of distributed databases because it has certain properties which make it fault-tolerant, i.e., even if one computer operating a piece of the blockchain, known as a node, fail, the rest of the network can continue to operate. 1.3. Blockchain fault-tolerance is also sometimes described as being Byzantine fault tolerant, a term of art which means that a blockchain should run even if the failure of a particular component, or a significant number of components, is caused not by an innocent failure but rather by a malicious attacker gaining control of a large number of nodes. 1.4. Blockchain nodes communicate with one another through peer-to-peer networking protocols over TCP-IP, much like the rest of the Internet. However, with blockchains, nodes communicate with each other directly (e.g. as BitTorrent does with the BitTorrent Mainline DHT1) rather than through a central server found at a particular address (e.g. https://facebook.com). These communications may or may not be encrypted. 1.5. Blockchain systems are, generally speaking, designed to communicate economically significant transactional data. Blockchains use cryptography to verify whether transactional communications are valid. If a blockchain node receives a valid communication, it will propagate that valid communication to other network nodes, with the consequence that the copy of the valid communication should eventually be written to the local copy of the receiver’s blockchain and every other copy of the chain. 1.6. If a blockchain receives an invalid communication, the data will be rejected by an honest node and that node will not propagate the transaction to other nodes on the network. receiver and will not appear on the blockchain. Due to this, much like in commercial transactions transactional lawyers work with on a daily basis, a transaction on a blockchain “either completes or doesn’t occur at all, and can’t be left in an intermediate state.”2 1.7. Valid transactions are batched together by individual nodes as they are received. Both the procedure, and end-state, whereby every node on a blockchain comes to an agreement that all of the transactions recorded on a blockchain are valid, are each referred to in the industry by the term “consensus.” Consensus ensures that every blockchain node sees the same data as every other blockchain node. 1.8. This batching procedure, and resultant end-state, whereby every node on a blockchain arrives at an agreement that all of the transactions recorded on a blockchain are valid, are each referred to in the industry by the term “consensus.” Consensus ensures that every blockchain node sees the same data as every other blockchain node. 1 “DHT” means “Distributed Hash Table.” 2 Buchman, Ethan. Tendermint: Byzantine Fault Tolerance in the Age of Blockchains, p. 5. https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9769 4 1.9. A node with permission to validate transactions, sometimes known as a validator node, has the power to decide that a number of transactions it has seen is valid. 1.10. In most blockchain systems, a validator node will batch transactions in a data structure which is known as a block and propose the inclusion of the block of transactions to the other validator nodes. Put another way, it asks the other validator nodes for their approval and consent to the block’s inclusion in the blockchain database. 1.11. If a requisite majority of the other validator nodes agree that the block is also valid, then that block will be published to or adopted by the network, sometimes together with separate cryptographic proof of the validator nodes’ collective consent. As part of this process, the validator nodes will also embed cryptographic proofs in each new block which are linked to certain cryptographic proofs in the previous block. This ensures that any tampering with any data in any prior block in the chain of blocks, or blockchain, will be immediately apparent to an observer looking at the present state of the data. 1.12. Once a block is agreed and published, it is appended to the end of the blockchain and the process begins anew, with new transactions being received by validator nodes and, in due time, being proposed to the network to form new blocks. How frequently this procedure repeats itself is dependent on the underlying architecture used by the blockchain in question. Currently there is a broad range, with systems like Bitcoin publishing new blocks that the network agrees on, i.e. confirm a block, on average every six minutes, and other systems, e.g. Tendermint, being able to confirm blocks once per second. 2. CRYPTOCURRENCIES: THE FIRST BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATION 2.1. Examples of virtual currencies 2.1.1. Bitcoin. The first cryptocurrency, based on proof of work consensus. 2.1.2. Ripple or Stellar. Other early cryptocurrencies, based on proof of stake consensus. 2.1.3. Dogecoin. A so-called “altcoin,” one of thousands of altcoins, with few technical differences between itself and Bitcoin. Altcoins’ focus can be entirely arbitrary; in Dogecoin’s case, the coin is themed around a cute Shiba Inu dog. 2.1.4. Ethereum. An altcoin that allows coin holders to upload scripts, known as “smart contracts,” on the blockchain. “Smart contracts” are not smart and are not contracts, but allow users of cryptocurrency systems to model financial contracts (such as escrow, collateralized lending, or prediction markets) in blockchain code which settle entirely on-chain. Systems like Tezos or Eos are also smart contract systems. 2.2. Cryptocurrencies are not all the same 2.2.1. Most major cryptocurrencies use the same elliptic curve cryptography for signing transactions, but do not encrypt transactions or data. Exceptions to the rule include ZCash and Monero, which do encrypt transactions and data. 2.2.2. Most major cryptocurrency protocols are licensed for free public use under open-source licenses. MIT, Apache 2.0, and GPL 3.0 are popular licensing schemes. 2 #66285598_v1 5 2.2.3. Cryptocurrencies differ from each other mostly on (a) how they achieve consensus, (b) what type of data they allow their users to communicate, and (c) performance characteristics. 2.2.4. Proof of work cryptocurrencies use a competitive game that requires the consumption of vast quantities of electricity to determine block-by-block consensus through a process known as mining. Bitcoin and Ethereum are examples of proof of work cryptocurrencies. 2.2.5. Proof of stake cryptocurrencies allow holders of existing quantities of the native cryptocurrency to vote on which transaction should be included in the next block through a process known as staking. Tendermint and NXT are examples of proof of stake cryptocurrencies. There are variations on proof of stake, such as “delegated proof of stake,” utilized by cryptocurrencies such as Eos. 2.2.6. Developers are constantly looking for new and better ways to achieve consensus on blockchain networks, such as the “proof of space and time” method being used by Chia (founded by Bram Cohen, founder of BitTorrent). 2.2.7. Transaction speeds vary widely. Because cryptocurrencies are stateful systems, i.e. blockchain networks store all data that has ever been sent to them, developers of these systems need to make tradeoffs between performance and scalability. Where a system is designed to handle high transaction throughputs and data-heavy transactions, such as Ethereum (14 transactions per second/TPS plus smart contract code), the blockchain will swell in size, or bloat, making it difficult for ordinary users to run blockchain nodes. 2.2.8. “How decentralized is it?” …is never an easy question to answer. When this term, “decentralization,” comes up, it can mean one of a number of things, including (a) how large and distributed the network of nodes is for a given network, (b) the chosen consensus mechanism being used by a given network, (c) the distribution model for coins issued on/by a given network, or (d) a range of other factors the market latches onto from time to time. The term lacks a concrete legal or technical definition, although senior officials of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have tried to use the concept to determine the applicability of U.S. securities laws to cryptocurrency systems.3 2.3. Major legal issues arising from the cryptocurrency context 2.3.1. Anti money laundering/money transmitter licensing is central to any cryptocurrency business. 2.3.1.1. Small-time Bitcoin exchangers have been charged with operating unlicensed money transmission businesses under 18 U.S.C. § 1960. 3 Hinman, William. Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey met Gary (Plastic.) 14 June 2018, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 6 2.3.1.2. Required reading: FinCEN 2013 Guidance defining “users,” “administrators” and “exchangers”4 of cryptocurrency systems 2.3.1.3. Note “Layer 2” solutions like Lightning Network do not eliminate money transmission concerns and require a standalone analysis depending on the design of the proposed application. 2.3.2. Securities regulation: a prevailing view among venture capitalists and others in the 2015-17 period was that securities regulation would be swept aside like municipal taxi regulations were swept aside by Uber.
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